Supplement to the 'Middle Way'

(Madhyamakavatara)

&

Explanation of the

'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'

(*Madhyamakavatarabhashyam*)

by Chandrakirti

Illumination of the Thought

by Lama Tsongkhapa

WITH TRANSCRIPTS OF ORAL COMMENTARY

BY

GESHE JAMPA GYATSO

January 2000 – May 2001

Supplement and *Explanation of the Supplement* translated by Ven. George Churinoff (1994)
Illumination Chapters 1-5 translated by Jeffrey Hopkins
extracted from *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*
Chapter 6 commentary on verse 1-7 translated by Jeffrey Hopkins
extracted from *Path to the Middle* by Anne Klein
Chapter 6 to the end translated by Joan Nicell (2001)

Oral translation by Thubten Sherab Sherpa
Oral commentary transcribed and lightly edited by Joan Nicell

FPMT MASTERS PROGRAM MATERIAL

© Geshe Jampa Gyatso & FPMT, Inc.
All rights reserved

No part of this work may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system or technologies now known or later developed, without permission in writing from Geshe Jampa Gyatso & FPMT, Inc.

Monday afternoon, January 17, 2000

Commentary to Chandrakirti's *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'*
by Geshe Jampa Gyatso

(Note: Chandrakirti's *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'* inserted in these transcripts comes from an unpublished translation by George Churinoff distributed at Sera Monastery on the occasion of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's commentary in 1994, while the translation of Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination of the Thought* has been inserted from Jeffrey Hopkins' *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*.)

Today we begin the subject of the Middle Way based on Chandrakirti's *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* (also called *Supplement to [Nagarjuna's] 'Treatise on the Middle* Way') and his commentary to that text, *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way,"'* together with the commentary to it by Lama Tsongkhapa called *Illumination of the Thought*.

Shakyamuni Buddha gave a great variety of teachings but among them the most profound and supreme are the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. These teachings contain both explicit and hidden meanings; the hidden meaning having been clarified by Maitreya, and the explicit meaning, the profound view, emptiness, by Nagarjuna.

The etymology of the term 'middle way' in general is that it means a way that is free from either of the two extremes: the extreme of permanence and the extreme of annihilation. There are three types of middle way: a basis middle way, path middle way, and resultant middle way. On the other hand, in the specific context of the text *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* the term 'Middle Way' refers to a particular text by Nagarjuna called *Treatise on the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakashastra*) or *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way Called 'Wisdom'* (*Prajnanamamulamadhyamakakarika*), which is referred to in George Churinoff's translation as *Fundamental Wisdom* and in Jeffrey Hopkins' as either the *Treatise* or *Treatise on the Middle Way*. The title of Chandrakirti's commentary on *Fundamental Wisdom*, which in Sanskrit is *Madhaymakavatara*, is variously translated into English as the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way,' Entering into the 'Middle Way,' or Engaging in the 'Middle Way.'*

I will give my commentary to Chandrakirti's *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* based on Chandrakirti's autocommentary, *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'* and Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination of the Thought*. I received the transmission of these texts and commentary on them from His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama at Sera Je Monastery in 1994.

(Note: In these transcripts
- Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* is referred to as *Fundamental Wisdom*,
- Chandrakirti's *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* as the *Supplement*,
- Chandrakirti's *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'* as the autocommentary, and
- Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination of the Thought* as *Illumination*.)

The Tibetan version of Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary begins by giving the name of the text: *Illumination of the Thought, An Extensive Explanation of Chandrakirti's 'Supplement to the Middle Way.'*

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) continues:

Homage to Manjushri

> I bow down and go for refuge with great respect to the feet of the revered guru Manjughosha and the father – the superior Nagarjuna – and his sons.

With these opening lines of his commentary, *Illumination*, Lama Tsongkhapa pays homage to Manjughosha, or Manjushri, whom he calls guru in that he received teachings directly from him. The Tibetan word *je tsun*, here translated as 'revered,' has great meaning in Tibetan but we will not go into it here. The Sanskrit word *guru* (in Tibetan lama) is composed of two syllables *gun* and *rup*, which respectively mean 'quality' and 'heavy,' therefore together signifying 'one who is heavy in qualities.' The Tibetan for Manjugosha is *jam yang* which respectively mean 'soft' and 'melodious.' His very name indicates his mind is soft in that it is free of the afflictive emotions and his speech is melodious in that it possesses the sixty-four melodious qualities of a buddha's speech. When reciting this phrase one should do so with the desire to receive the blessings of Manjushri and to attain the qualities of Manjushri signified by his name.

In regard to "the father – the superior Nagarjuna – and his sons" there are two interpretations; the first being that there are two sons and the other being that there are four sons. In the latter case the father is Nagarjuna while the four sons are Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, and Chandrakirti.

"I bow down and go for refuge with great respect to the feet" indicates that Lama Tsongkhapa bows down even to the lowest part of a holy being's body.

The Tibetan word *chag tsel*, translated here as 'bow down,' contains the following meaning. The syllable *chag* stands for the excellent qualities of the holy beings, while *tsel* means to strive, therefore together they mean "I strive for your excellent qualities." Bowing down, or prostrating, can be done by way of either body, speech, or mind. Physical prostration involves touching one's five 'limbs' (head, hands, and knees) to the ground, verbal prostration involves reciting praises of the excellent qualities of the holy beings, and mental prostration involves keeping in mind and generating faith in the excellent qualities of the holy beings.

"Go for refuge" means that on the basis of the trust that Manjushri can protect one from fear, the obstructions, and problems, one goes for refuge to him. In brief, going for refuge means to place one's trust, free from any doubt, in a particular object.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> May I always be protected by the King of Subduers,
> Sun of all teachers, treasure of all good explanations
> Of the profound and vast, unusual friend of all the world,
> Eye revealing the good path to migrators on the three levels.

The first three lines of this verse describe the excellent qualities of Shakyamuni Buddha. The word 'profound' refers to the teachings on emptiness, while 'vast' refers to the teachings on the paths and grounds. Shakyamuni Buddha is the treasure of all these explanations. "Unusual friend of all the world" is an epithet of Shakyamuni Buddha. The Tibetan word *jig ten*, in Sanskrit *loka*, which is translated into English as 'the world,' is composed of two syllables. The syllable *jig* means 'transitory' or 'momentarily disintegrating' and refers to our aggregates, and the syllable *ten* means to depend. Therefore together they mean 'that dependent on the transitory aggregates,' i.e., sentient beings. There are two types of transitory objects: the inhabitants and the environment. "Unusual friend" indicates that Shakyamuni Buddha is our dearest friend because he is completely impartial toward all beings and takes care of them equally. This quality is very strong in a buddha; it is for this reason that the second chapter of Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] 'Compendium of Valid Cognition* describes the outstanding quality of a buddha in possessing equanimity toward all sentient beings. In this text Dharmakirti says that even if Shakyamuni Buddha were to have one person massaging one side of his body with oils and perfumes and one person cutting the other side of his body he would have the

same compassion for these two beings without making any distinction at all between them. Due to this quality, Lama Tsongkhapa calls Shakyamuni Buddha the 'unusual friend of the world.'

"Eye revealing the good path to migrators on the three levels" refers to the beings abiding on the three levels: below, on, and above the ground. "Eye" is mentioned because our eyes are of great value in that they allow us to see others, to recognize them, and so forth. Shakyamuni Buddha is said to be an 'eye' in that he opens the wisdom eye of sentient beings.

The Tibetan word *thub dbang* (*munindra*) is translated here as King of Subduers, *thub* literally meaning ability and *dbang* meaning lord or supreme. The word *thub*, translated as subduer, refers to hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers who have overcome the afflictive obstructions. However, since Shakyamuni Buddha has not only overcome the afflictive emotions and is therefore superior to them he is called the King of Subduers or Mighty Subduer (see the translation of *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'*).

"Sun of all teachers" means that just as the sun illuminates darkness, Shakyamuni Buddhas teachings dispel the darkness of sentient beings' ignorance. (The order of my explanation differs from the English translation but accords with the order of the words in the Tibetan. There are two [valid] ways of translating a text: one that maintains the same order of the words and one that does not.)

This concludes the discussion of the homage to Shakyamuni Buddha.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> May I always receive the blessed empowerment
> From guru Manjughosha, source of profundity
> In the retinue of countless conquerors, unequaled
> In proclaiming the lion's roar of right discourse supreme.

Lama Tsongkhapa pays homage to Manjushri indicating Manjushri's particular quality of presenting the subject of emptiness, fearlessly proclaiming, like a lion's roar, these teachings in the midst of a throng of people.

Manjushri is said to manifest in the form of a bodhisattva in the retinue of all the supreme emanation bodies of buddhas, to receive teachings from them, and to then give teachings on emptiness. This is because if it is a supreme emanation body it is pervaded by having the eight close sons, one of whom is Manjushri. Although these eight close sons are called bodhisattvas, they are actually buddhas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Homage from my heart to the prophesied Nagarjuna,
> Who explained as it is the middle way of dependent-
> Arising, free from extremes, the mind essence of the sugatas
> In the past, present, and future. Hold me then with the hook of mercy.

Here Lama Tsongkhapa pays homage to Nagarjuna, one of the two clarifiers who opened the track of the Middle Way. This verse indicates that Nagarjuna explained the path of dependent-arising, the middle way, which is the essence of the mind of the sugatas of the three times. Nagarjuna is called an opener of the chariot way of the middle way. The Middle Way is the system that holds that all phenomena ranging from forms through the exalted knower of all aspects lack true existence, but are still possible as agents, actions, and objects. Because Nagarjuna clarified this point he is said to be a clarifier of the Middle Way or an opener of the chariot way of the Middle Way. In fact, Shakyamuni Buddha himself prophesied that Nagarjuna would open the chariot way of the Middle Way. There is a passage in the *Mahamegha Sutra* (see José Ignacio Cabezon, *A Dose of Emptiness*) concerning this prophesy in which Shakyamuni Buddha says: "This youngster will be born as a monk called Naga

when four hundred years have elapsed after my parinirvana. He will spread my teachings and eventually [he will be born] in the earthly kingdom called Radiance of Faith where he will become the conqueror known as the tathagata 'Radiance of the Gnostic Source.'" This prophecy is found in both sutra and tantra in that Nagarjuna is also said to be an innovator of tantra. In the *Descent from Lanka Sutra* (José Ignacio Cabezon, *A Dose of Emptiness*) it says: "In the south, in the land of Vaidalya, a monk renowned as the Glorious One, called by the name of Naga, will eliminate both the side of existence and that of non-existence. Having explained to the world that my vehicle is the supreme Great Vehicle, he will accomplish the stage of joy, and then proceed to Sukhavati."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Homage to the feet of the glorious Aryadeva,
> Who ascended to high rank through that protector's precepts,
> Clarifying for migrators what he had realized,
> Attaining dominion of discourse teaching the good path.

With this verse Lama Tsongkhapa pays homage to the main son of Nagarjuna, Aryadeva. Although Aryadeva is called Nagarjuna's 'son,' both the Prasangika Madhyamikas and the Svatantrika Madhyamikas consider Nagarjuna and Aryadeva to be of a similar level. This is because Aryadeva also composed a treatise on the Middle Way, called the *Four Hundred*, and likewise composed a commentary on the *Guhyasamajatantra*. It is said that the text *Four Hundred* arose from Aryadeva's teachings on the four noble truths in that he is said to have taught twenty-five stanzas on each of the sixteen attributes (perhaps this is just an oral transmission regarding its origin as this information is not found in any text).

Aryadeva lived in Veda, or Vaidalya, which is also called 'Glorious Copper Mountain,' in the same period as Nagarjuna. It is recounted that at one time the monks of Nalanda Monastery were in danger of losing to their opponent, Ashvagosha, as none of them were brave enough to face him. They decided to send for Aryadeva through Mahakala and for this purposed organized a ritual of appeasement to Mahakala (*kang-sur*). A message to Aryadeva was put in the torma inviting him to come to Nalanda to debate Ashvagosha. During the ritual, the torma was put on the roof of the monastery where it was eaten by Mahakala in the form of a crow who then took the message to Aryadeva on Glorious Copper Mountain. Aryadeva received the message and asked his guru, Nagarjuna, whether or not to accept the invitation. Nagarjuna advised him to accept it but suggested that Aryadeva train in debate against him, with Nagarjuna taking the position of the non-Buddhists. In this way they proceeded to debate but, as Nagarjuna was so good at upholding the position of the non-Buddhists, Aryadeva began to think that his guru might actually share these views. At one point, Aryadeva took off his shoes and circled them around Nagarjuna's head saying '*kor-sum*.' Due to his having made such an inauspicious gesture, Nagarjuna prophesied that although Aryadeva would win the debate he would encounter some problems. In fact, on his way to Nalanda Aryadeva encountered an old blind man who asked him for one of his eyes. As Aryadeva was a bodhisattva he complied and then continued on to Nalanda. The day after his arrival, during morning puja, Ashvagosha appeared in the door of the temple and began to count the monks while pointing at each of them with his walking stick. When he arrived at Aryadeva he asked, "From where has this bald-head which was not here before appeared?" To this Aryadeva said "This bald-head which was not here yesterday arose from the neck," whereupon Ashvagosha could not reply. Ashvagosha then asked Aryadeva, "Am I coming or going?" to which Aryadeva replied, "It depends on your mind," and once again Ashvagosha could not reply. A short time later the king and his retinue were invited to attend the debate between them. The opponents began by making an agreement that if Aryadeva lost the Nalanda monks would join the non-Buddhist school, while if Ashvagosha lost he would become a Buddhist. However, when Ashvagosha was on the point of losing the debate he instead flew up into

the air! He was followed by Aryadeva who warned Ashvagosha not to go too high saying that if he did so he would die. As Ashvagosha did not believe him, he told him to throw his long hair up into the air. When Ashvagosha did so his hair was immediately cut by the wind. Ashvagosha became frightened and descended, whereupon Aryadeva took him back to Nalanda where he was locked up in the library. There Ashvagosha began to read the Buddha's scriptures until he came across a passage in which it was prophesied that Aryadeva would debate Ashvagosha and win, whereupon Ashvagosha would be converted to Buddhism. Upon reading this Ashvagosha was in fact converted to Buddhism and went on to become a great Buddhist scholar.

Tuesday morning, January 18, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> I bow down with my head to the feet of Buddhapalita,
> Who accomplished the word of the revered Manjughosha,
> Illuminated the final thought of the Superior,
> And went to a place of knowledge bearer adepts.

Just as Manjushri taught, Buddhapalita explained his words to others. The term "the Superior" refers to Nagarjuna, while "the final thought of the Superior" refers to the Prasangika Madhyamika view. This it what was illuminated or explained by Buddhapalita. "A place of knowledge bearer adepts" means that Buddhapalita is a knowledge bearer of the tantra path.

Buddhapalita understood the meaning, or intention, of Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* and explained it in his commentary, *Buddhapalita's Commentary on the 'Middle Way,'* using consequences. Acharya Bhavaviveka countered this by writing his own commentary *Lamp for [Nagarjuna's] 'Wisdom,' Commentary on the 'Treatise on the Middle Way*,' which explains the meaning of *Fundamental Wisdom* using autonomous syllogisms and asserting inherent existence. Because Bhavaviveka was a monk of high caste, while Buddhapalita was a lay person of low caste, Buddhapalita did not write another text refuting Bhavaviveka's position.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Homage to the honorable Chandrakirti and Shantideva,
> Who completely and perfectly revealed the path
> Of the great sage [Buddha], subtle and hard to realize,
> The extraordinary essentials of Nagarjuna's system.

There are two Middle Way schools: the Prasangika Madhyamika school and the Svatantrika Madhyamika school. Chandrakirti is said to have opened the chariot track of the Prasangika Madhyamika system, while Bhavaviveka opened the chariot track of the Svatantrika Madhyamika system. On the other hand, Nagarjuna opened the chariot track of the Middle Way school (the Madhyamika) in general. The chariot track, or system, of the Prasangika Madhyamika is that nothing is established by way of its own character, yet conventionally phenomena perform a function in terms of cause and affect, agent, action, and object, and so forth. The chariot track, or system, of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas is that, although nothing exists truly, phenomena are established by way of their own character or from their own side. Thus, the chariot track of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas is that true existence and establishment by way of its own character are not contradictory. Bhavaviveka himself makes this assertion and in order to present it used many reasonings.

Lama Tsongkhapa next mentions Shantideva in his homage. Shantideva was a great yogi who was skilled in the practice of the vast, the grounds and paths. When Shantideva first came to Nalanda

Monastery he was known as an ignorant monk who only engaged in three practices: eating, sleeping, and defecating. It is recounted that in the vicinity of Nalanda there was a nunnery that invited a qualified monk to give a Dharma teaching on the 15th of each month. The monks took turns, going according to their ordination status. When Shantideva's turn arrived the nuns thought to embarrass him and built an unusually high throne without stairs. However, when Shantideva arrived he was seen to suddenly be seated on the throne without any difficulty or need for assistance. He then asked the nuns what they wanted him to teach. The nuns requested him to give a teaching that had not been taught in the past by any of the Indian pandits. Shantideva agreed and began to teach his text *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* saying that although he was not skilled in poetry he would teach something that had never been taught before. In addition to the nuns there were also various scholars present at the teachings. Shantideva went through the various chapters of his text and when he arrived at the ninth chapter on wisdom he began to levitate higher and higher and at the conclusion flew away to the south of India. Fortunately, some of the scholars at teachings were able to retain the words of the teachings by means of their ear clairvoyance. As Shantideva no longer wished to return to Nalanda, after his teachings has been written down, some of the scholars went to the place were he was living and asked him to check the accuracy of the text. Because in the teachings on *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* Shantideva at times referred to a text he had written called the *Compendium of Trainings*, they asked him where it could be found and were told that he had hidden it in the ceiling of his room. He also told them that it had been written in Sanskrit, which was the language of the scholars!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> I have seen well with the eye of stainless intelligence
> All the meanings of the uncommon essentials
> In the tenets of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva
> And commentaries of the three great charioteers.
>
> In order to remove the corruptions by the pollutions
> Of interpretations by most who sought to teach this system
> And because others have requested it I will explain at length
> In full and correctly the *Supplement to the Middle Way*.

Lama Tsongkhapa here promises to compose a text to explain Chandrakirti's *Supplement to the Middle Way*. The verse says that he will do so "in order to remove the corruptions by the pollutions of interpretations by most who sought to teach this system," thus indicating that there are commentaries composed by Tibetan scholars which contain misconceptions and errors.

The names Nagarjuna and Aryadeva are mentioned saying "the tenets of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva," while those who clarified their view are mentioned saying "commentaries of the three great charioteers." The three great charioteers are perhaps Chandrakirti, Buddhapalita, and Shantideva, since their names appear elsewhere in this homage. Another possibility is that they are the three charioteers of the Prasangika Madhyamika, Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika, and Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika schools who are respectively Chandrakirti, Shantarakshita, and Bhavaviveka.

In short, Lama Tsongkhapa promises to compose this commentary, *Illumination*, saying: "In order to remove the corruptions by the pollutions of interpretations by most who sought to teach this system and because others have requested it I will explain at length in full and correctly the *Supplement to the Middle Way*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Here I will explain, in accordance with his own commentary, Chandrakirti's *Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara)*, a great text settling without error the profound and the vast. The explanation has four parts:
>
> 1 The meaning of the title
> 2 Obeisance of the translators
> 3 The meaning of the text
> 4 The meaning of the conclusion
>
> 1 The meaning of the title
>
> In Sanskrit, one of the four language families of India, the title of this treatise is *Madhyamakavatara.* This is translated as *Supplement to the Middle Way.* The 'Middle Way' here is Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakashastra)* because Chandrakirti says, 'In order to supplement the *Treatise on the Middle Way*…'[6]

Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:

> 1 Meaning of the title
> 2 Translator's homage
> 3 Meaning of the text
> 4 Meaning of the conclusion
>
> 1 Meaning of the title
>
> In the Indian language:[1] *madhyamakavatara bhashyam nama*
> In Tibetan: *dbu ma la 'jug pa'i bshad pa zhes bya ba*
> [In English: *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'*]

'Middle Way' in the context of the title of Chandrakirti's text refers to the *Treatise on the Middle Way* (or *Fundamental Wisdom*) by Nagarjuna, the full name being *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way, called 'Wisdom.'* The Tibetan word 'supplement,' literally engaging (*'jug pa*), means to supplement or to engage in the explanation in terms of both the profound and vast. The English word 'supplement' means to fill in the gaps, which is perhaps not quite the same meaning as engaging. The Sanskrit word *avatara* is the same word that appears in the title *Bodhisattvacharyavatara* (*Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*) which is usually translated into English as 'engaging.' Because in *Fundamental Wisdom* only the profound side, emptiness, is discussed and not the vast side, the grounds and paths, Chandrakirti's *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* and his autocommentary fill in this gap by also explaining the vast side.

Nagarjuna composed many texts including the Six Collections of Reasonings, the Seven Praises, and the *Compendium of Sutra*, however only three of them extensively discuss both the profound and vast sides: *Precious Garland*, *Praise of Sphere of Qualities*, and *Compendium of Sutra.*

Of the "four language families" of India, Chandrakirti composed this text in the languages of the gods of the Brahma Realm, i.e., Sanskrit.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Furthermore, when in his own commentary Chandrakirti cites Nagarjuna's *Treatise* as a source, he frequently says, 'From the *Middle Way*....' The *Middle Way* should, therefore, be taken to mean Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*, not other texts on the middle way[7] or any of the other meanings of *madhyamaka* [such as a person holding the tenets of the middle way or the tenets themselves].

[1] Of the various Indian languages, here, Sanskrit is referred to.

> In his *Lamp for Wisdom (Prajnapradipa)* Bhavaviveka explains that based on the verbal root *[ka* meaning proclaim] of *madhyamaka*, the term *madhyamaka* indicates a treatise of tenets of the middle way. Therefore, even though only the word *madhyamaka* appears [in Chandrakirti's title], it should be understood as referring to the *Madhyamakashastra*, Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way.*

This shows that Middle Way can refer to various things including the *Treatise on the Middle Way* (*Fundamental Wisdom*), the tenets of the Middle Way, and so forth. In this context 'Middle Way' refers to the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, which is the *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way, called 'Wisdom.'* This text by Nagarjuna has twenty-seven sections or chapters. Chandrakirti begins to explain these twenty-seven sections with the sixth chapter of his text, *Supplement*.

The text *Fundamental Wisdom* begins with a praise to Shakyamuni Buddha and then there is a stanza saying: "There is no production from self, other, both, and causelessly." In this way Nagarjuna indicates that all phenomena are not produced from inherently existent causes because they are not produced from self, other, both, and causelessly.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> QUESTION: How does Chandrakirti's text supplement Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way?*
> ANSWER: One person [Jaya-ananda] says that in Nagarjuna's *Treatise* conventional and ultimate natures are not taught extensively, but that Chandrakirti teaches these two extensively here and in this way supplements Nagarjuna's *Treatise.*

The name Jayananda is composed of the words *ananda*, in Tibetan is *gyel po*, meaning 'king,' and *jaya*, in Tibetan *kun ga*, meaning 'always joyful,' therefore together they mean 'Always Joyful King.' Jayananda is the only scholar who composed an explanatory commentary on Chandrakirti's autocommentary.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> This is not a good explanation because the forms of reasoning ascertaining suchness are far more extensive in Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* than in Chandrakirti's *Supplement.*

Lama Tsongkhapa says that the objection put forth by Jayananda regarding how the *Supplement* supplements *Fundamental Wisdom* is incorrect because the reasoning regarding the profound that are set forth in the *Supplement* are not as vast as those set forth in *Fundamental Wisdom*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Our own system on this is that Chandrakirti supplements Nagarjuna's *Treatise* in two ways, from the viewpoints of the profound and of the vast.
> With respect to the first, Chandrakirti says that he composed the *Supplement* in order to indicate that the meaning of the middle way which he ascertained is not shared with other Madhyamikas [specifically, Svatantrikas].

The system set out by Chandrakirti is not shared with other Madhyamikas, such as the Svatantrikas. The assertions and non-assertions that are not shared are of eight types (*Illumination* page 215):

- The three non-assertions:

1. the non-assertion of a mind-basis-of-all that is a different entity from the six consciousnesses,
2. the non-assertion of the uncommon manner of refuting a self-cognizer,

3. the non-assertion of the generation of a view of suchness in the continuum of an adversary by means of an autonomous syllogism,

- and [the five assertions]:

4. the necessity of asserting external objects just as consciousness is asserted,
5. that hearers and solitary realizers realize functioning things as non-inherently existent,
6. that the conception of a self of phenomena is an afflictive emotion,
7. that disintegratedness is a functioning thing, and
8. an uncommon way of positing the three times due to those reasons.

These are assertions that are not shared with the Chittamatra and the Svatantrika Madhyamika tenets. The text *Note on the Eight Difficult Points* by Lama Tsongkhapa discusses these eight in detail.

The main point to understand here is that in the context of *Supplement to the 'Middle Way,'* the term 'Middle Way' refers to the text *Fundamental Wisdom*. However, in other contexts the term middle way can refer to, for example, a basis middle way, path middle way, and resultant middle way. The way in which the *Supplement* supplements *Fundamental Wisdom* is explained by Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa in his text *Great Exposition of the Middle Way* (the author was given the name 'Omniscient Laughter of Manjushri,' although his real name was Ngawang Tsondru, because he was of very sharp faculty which pleased Manjushri and caused him to laugh). It is said that when Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa wanted to recite a particular passage from a text, the text would open by itself to that page!

Tuesday afternoon, January 18, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> He also says that he composed it in order to show that it is not suitable to explain the meaning of Nagarjuna's *Treatise* in accordance with the Mind-Only system *(Chittamatra* or *Vijnaptimatra).* Chandrakirti says in his own commentary, 'The learned should determine that this system is uncommon,' and, 'This *Supplement* was written for the sake of unmistakenly indicating the suchness of the *Treatise* because, through not understanding suchness, this profound doctrine might be abandoned.' Chandrakirti's *Clear Words (Prasannapada)* says, 'The mode of dependent designation can be known from my *Supplement.*' Also, refutation of the Mind-Only system, which was not done at length in Nagarjuna's *Treatise* or in Chandrakirti's *Clear Words*, is extensive here in the *Supplement.* Therefore, one way in which this book supplements the *Treatise is* through its good determination of the meaning of the *Treatise* from the viewpoint of these two purposes [distinguishing the suchness of the *Treatise* from the interpretations by Svatantrikas and by Chittamatrins].

Chandrakirti's text *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* is a supplement in terms of both the vast and the profound. Lama Tsongkhapa says that its way of supplementing *Fundamental Wisdom* in terms of the profound is not shared with the Chittamatrins and Svatantrika Madhyamikas. It is not shared in terms of the eight ways that were explained earlier. These eight are sub-divided into two groups of three and one group of two. The first group of three are assertions not shared with Chittamatrins, the second group are assertions not shared with the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, and the third group of two are assertions that are not shared with either the Chittamatrins or the Svatantrika Madhyamikas.

(*Illumination* page 215) "With respect to the way of commenting on the Superior's text, although there does not exist even a mere atom of establishment by way of its own character, in dependence on this unshared system that is a way of commenting which is permissible due to positing all actions and agents, there are many [points] not shared with other commentaries of completely pure tenets. What are they? If some of the main ones are described they are:

- The three non-assertions:

1. the non-assertion of a mind-basis-of-all that is a different entity from the six consciousnesses,
2. the non-assertion of the uncommon manner of refuting a self-cognizer,
3. the non-assertion of the generation of a view of suchness in the continuum of an adversary by means of an autonomous syllogism,

- and [the five assertions]:

4. the necessity of asserting external objects just as consciousness is asserted,
5. that hearers and solitary realizers realize functioning things as non-inherently existent,
6. that the conception of a self of phenomena is an afflictive emotion,
7. that disintegratedness is a functioning thing, and
8. an uncommon way of positing the three times due to those reasons.

In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that there does not exist a mind-basis-of-all different from the six consciousness, nor does there exist a self-cognizer, yet there do exist external objects. These three assertions are completely contradictory to the assertions of the Chittamatrins, and, therefore, are said to not be shared with the Chittamatrins. Chandrakirti supplements *Fundamental Wisdom* by refuting these three assertions of the Chittamatrins.

The next group of three are assertions that are not shared with the Svatantrika Madhyamikas in that this school asserts: (i) the existence of autonomous signs, (ii) that all superiors do not realize the selflessness of phenomena, and (iii) that the conception of a self of phenomena is not an afflictive obstruction.

The last group of two are assertions that are not shared with either the Chittamatrins or the Svatantrikas: (i) that disintegratedness is a functioning thing and (ii) an uncommon presentation of the three times. In this context there is a discussion as to whether there is a difference between cessation (*gag pa*) and disintegratedness (*zhig pa*). If it is a product is it necessarily a cessation (*gag pa*)? If it is a compounded phenomena it has three characteristics: production, abidance, and cessation (*gag pa*) or disintegration (*jig pa*). While the Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert that disintegration and cessation are functioning things, they do not assert that disintegratedness (the state of having disintegrated) is a functioning thing.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> It also supplements the *Treatise* from the viewpoint of the vast. According to the superior Nagarjuna's system, the two vehicles [Hinayana and Mahayana] are not distinguished by the presence or absence of the wisdom realizing the very profound suchness [but by the vast methods]. Although Nagarjuna's *Treatise*, except for the topic of profundity, does not indicate the features of vastness in the Mahayana, his text was nevertheless composed in terms of the Mahayana rather than the Hinayana. This is so because extensive teaching of the selflessness of phenomena through limitless forms of reasoning is solely for Mahayana trainees and in Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* such extensive teaching is given.

The superior Nagarjuna asserts two vehicles which are not distinguished from the point of view of having or not having the wisdom realizing suchness. According to the Prasangika Madhyamika school both hinayanists and mahayanists have the realization of emptiness. Thus, these vehicles are asserted to differ from the point of view of the vast and not from the point of view of the profound. In spite of this, the text *Fundamental Wisdom* belongs to the mahayana for the reason that it establishes the selflessness of persons through limitless reasonings. Such extensive reasonings are meant only for mahayana trainees.

In short, *Fundamental Wisdom* is a mahayana treatise that establishes the selflessness of phenomena and was taught for mahayana trainees. In this context there can be debate regarding the fact that Lama Tsongkhapa says Nagarjuna gave limitless forms of reasonings in that one can assert

that there are in fact a certain number. However, it means that a mahayana trainee of sharp faculty is able to use many reasonings with respect to one base in order to establish the selflessness of phenomena. For example, such a trainee can apply the reasoning: a sprout is not produced ultimately because it is not produced from self, other, both, or causelessly. In addition, he can use many reasonings in regard to 'because it is not produced from self,' many reasonings in regard to 'because it is not produced from other,' and so forth. This will be discussed in detail later on.

> Chandrakirti says this very clearly in his own commentary to his *Supplement*, 'It is correct that the Mahayana was taught for the sake of clarifying the selflessness of phenomena because [Buddha] wished to give an extensive teaching [of the selflessness of phenomena]. In the hearer vehicle the selflessness of phenomena is illustrated only briefly.' I will explain this later.

The selflessness of phenomenon is taught extensively in the mahayana while it is explained only briefly in the hinayana. This will be explained later on. When Nagarjuna establishes the selflessness of phenomena he does so mainly by means of the diamond slivers reasoning; for example, a sprout is not ultimately produced because it is not produced from self, other, both, and causelessly. This is one of the five reasonings used to establish selflessness.

Another of the reasonings is the reasoning of freedom from one and many which is used to analyze the entity of phenomena. This was explained extensively by Shantarakshita in his text *Ornament for the Middle Way* through his giving many detailed reasons. For this reason His Holiness the Dalai Lama suggests that one should do this analysis as set out by Shantarakshita. If a stanza from the *Ornament for the Middle Way* is set out as a syllogism: phenomena asserted by our own and other schools, as the subject, do not exist truly because they are free from being a truly existent one and a truly existent many, for example, like a reflection. Or it could be said: phenomena asserted by our own and other schools, as the subject, do not exist inherently because they are free from being an inherently existent one or an inherently existent many. In short, "other schools" includes the Samkyas, Vaishashikas, and so forth, while "our own schools" includes the Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, and Chittamatrins.

The third reasoning, the four alternatives, mainly negates production with regard to both causes and results. This is explained in *Discrimination of the Two Truths* by Acharya Jnanashribhadra. The four alternatives are: a single cause does not produce a single result; a single cause does not produce many results; many causes do not produce many results, and many causes do not produce a single result.

The fourth reasoning is that refuting inherently existent production with respect to results. It says that there is no production of an existent and that production of a non-existent is like a sky-lotus,. For example, a sprout, as the subject, does not exist ultimately because it is not produced as an existent at the time of its cause and because it is not produced ultimately as a non-existent at the time of the cause. In short, a result is not produced as an existent at the time of its cause and a result is not produced ultimately as a non-existent at the time of its cause.

The fifth reasoning is called the King of Reasonings because it is the best among all reasonings. It is also called the reasoning of dependent-arising, or dependent relation. Through such reasoning one is able to eliminate both the extremes of permanence and the extreme of annihilation. The word 'dependent' of dependent relation indicates that phenomena are dependent whereby they cannot be permanent, while the word 'relation' indicates that they exist in relation, whereby they do exist. Thus, the word 'dependent' eliminates the extreme of permanence and the word 'relation' eliminates the extreme of annihilation. The Sanskrit word for dependent relation is *samutpada* which can be interpreted in many ways in that it can mean 'meeting,' 'relying,' 'depending,' or 'arising.' There are specific reasons for these various interpretations.

> Thus, [Chandrakirti thought that] it would be very good to fill in the gaps in the paths explained in the *Treatise on the Middle Way* – supplying the other Mahayana paths of vastness by way of the quintessential instructions of the superior Nagarjuna [as found in his *Precious Garland (Ratnavali)* and *Compendium of Sutra (Sutrasamuchchaya)*]. In order to fill these gaps Chandrakirti set forth (1) the three practices done on the level of a common being, (2) the ten grounds of a learner superior, (3) the effect ground, and (4) the cultivation of special insight through the steps of the fifth and sixth grounds. The latter is an investigation by analytical wisdom of suchness – the two selflessnesses – in dependence on calm abiding, the entity of concentration.
>
> When the meaning of Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way is* considered, you should be mindful of these topics as set forth in Chandrakirti's *Supplement* and should keep in mind the stages of the path which are a composite of both the profound and the vast. If a person does not do this, he forsakes the two purposes of Chandrakirti's composing the *Supplement*.
>
> Thus, the second way that this text supplements Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* is in supplementing the paths of the *Treatise* from the viewpoint of the vast.

(1) "The three practices done on the level of a common being" are great compassion, the awareness realizing non-duality, and the mind of enlightenment.
(2) "The ten grounds of a learner superior" are the ten grounds of bodhisattvas: the Very Joyful, Stainless, Luminous, Radiant, Difficult to Overcome, Manifesting, Gone Afar, Immovable, Good Intelligence, and Cloud of Dharma.
(3) "The effect ground" is the resultant ground which is omniscience, the result of the previous ten grounds.
(4) "The cultivation of special insight through the steps of the fifth and sixth grounds" shows that Chandrakirti sets out the cultivation of calm abiding and special insight.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that if one is not mindful of the vast and profound while contemplating the meaning of *Fundamental Wisdom*, then the two purposes to Chandrakirti's having composed the *Supplement* are lost. The two purposes are to supplement *Fundamental Wisdom* from the viewpoint of the vast and the profound.

This concludes the discussion of the section on the title of the text: *Supplement to the 'Middle Way,'* which includes a translation of the title and an explanation of the title. Next comes the obeisance, or homage, of the translator.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Homage to youthful Arya Manjushri.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) likewise says:

> 2 Obeisance of the translators
>
> Homage to the youthful Manjushri.

"Arya" indicates that Manjushri is a superior, a being who is superior to ordinary beings in that he has gone beyond the level of ordinary beings. The Sanskrit name Manjushri in Tibetan is *jam pel*. *Jam* means soft and indicates that Manjushri has a soft mind free from the coarseness of the afflictive emotions, while *pel* means glorious and indicates that his body is adorned with the major and minor signs.

The translator prostrates, or pays homage, to Manjushri in order to apply a rule established by past Dharma kings who said:

- when translating a text belonging to the higher knowledge (abhidharma) basket the translator should pay homage to Manjushri in order to show that it mainly presents the higher training of wisdom;
- when translating a text belonging to the sets of discourses (sutra) basket the translator should pay homage to the buddhas and bodhisattvas in order to show that it mainly presents the higher training of concentration, and
- when translating a text belonging to the discipline (vinaya) basket the translator should pay homage to the Omniscient One to show that it mainly presents the higher training of ethics.

Here the translator prostrates to Manjushri because this text belongs to the abhidharma basket in that it mainly presents the higher training of wisdom and Manjushri is the deity of wisdom.

Wednesday morning, January 19, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The meaning of the words is easy to understand.
>
> Since this book presents ultimate knowledge *(paramartha-abhidharma)*, the training in wisdom is central. Therefore, the translators paid homage to Manjushri in accordance with the former partitioning of Buddha's word [into three scriptural collections: knowledge *(abhidharma)*, sets of discourses *(sutranta)*, and discipline *(vinaya)*].

Among the following divisions the first two have been concluded, and next comes the discussion of the third:

1. Meaning of the title
2. Translator's homage
3. Meaning of the text
4. Meaning of the conclusion

3 Meaning of the text

This section has four parts:

A Expression of worship – a means of beginning to compose the text
B Body of the text
C Way that it was composed
D Dedication of the virtue of composing it

3A Expression of worship – a means of beginning to compose the text

This section has two parts:

1 Praise of great compassion without differentiating its types
2 Homage to that compassion within differentiating its types

3A1 Praise of great compassion without differentiating its types

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to supplement the *Treatise on the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakashastra*), since I wished to compose the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way*,' rather than [praising] the perfect complete buddhas and the bodhisattvas in the beginning, in order to indicate as worthy of praise the first excellent cause of buddhahood: the blessed (bhagavan) great compassion which bears the characteristic of thoroughly protecting, without exception, immeasurable vulnerable sentient beings bound in the prison of *samsara*, I mentioned two stanzas:

> *Hearers and middling realizers of suchness are born from the mighty subduers,*
> *Buddhas are born from the bodhisattvas;*
> *Compassionate mind, non-dual awareness and*
> *Bodhichitta are the causes of the Conqueror's children.* [1.1]
>
> – and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The honorable Chandrakirti, having assumed the task of making a supplement to Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*, does not state as his object of worship the hearers and solitary realizers who are taken as objects of worship in other books. Furthermore, he indicates that, rather than praising buddhas and bodhisattvas, it is suitable to praise great compassion – the most excellent cause of buddhahood, bearing the nature of thoroughly protecting all vulnerable sentient beings bound in the prison of cyclic existence; it is also the main cause called by the name of its effect, the blessed one (*bhagavati*).

Who supplemented the *Treatise on the Middle Way* (*Fundamental Wisdom*)? Chandrakirti did so in his *Supplement to the 'Middle Way.'* In this text he takes great compassion, the cause of buddhahood, as his object of worship rather than paying homage to the hearers, solitary realizers, bodhisattvas, and buddhas as is done in other texts. The purpose of his praising great compassion is to indicate it as the root of both the great and lesser vehicles. Great compassion has particular characteristics in that (i) it has the nature of thoroughly protecting all vulnerable sentient beings bound in the prison of cyclic existence and (ii) it has the aspect of the aspiration to free sentient beings from sufferings and the aspect of the aspiration to protect them. Here what is most important is the aspiration to protect them from suffering. This is because the first aspect of compassion, the aspiration to free sentient beings from sufferings, also exists in the continua of hearers and solitary realizers, whereas they do not have the aspect of compassion that is the aspiration to protect sentient beings. Great compassion is called 'the blessed one' (*bhagavati*); this is a case of giving the name of the result, bhagavati, to the cause, great compassion.

The Tibetan word for bhagavati, *bcom ldan 'das ma*, or for bhagavan, *bcom ldan 'das*, can be translated literally as 'transcendent endowed destroyer.' However, it would have been more literal to translate bhagavan into Tibetan as only 'endowed destroyer.' A buddha is called an endowed destroyer in that he is endowed with the six fortunes and has destroyed the four types of maras. However, the word transcendent (*'das*) is added to the Tibetan translation of the Sanskrit word 'bhagavan' because bhagavan alone covers many beings including Brahma, Ishvara, Indra, and so forth, whereas by adding the word 'transcendent' a buddha is distinguished from these worldly beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Hearers and middling realizers of suchness*
> *Are born from the Kings of Subduers.*
> *Buddhas are born from bodhisattvas.*
> *The mind of compassion, non-dual understanding,*
> *And the altruistic mind of enlightenment*
> *Are the causes of children of conquerors.* [1.1]
>
> *Mercy alone is seen as the seed*
> *Of a conqueror's rich harvest,*

As water for development, and as
Ripening in a state of long enjoyment,
Therefore at the start I praise compassion. [1.2]

The discussion of this has two parts:

A Compassion as the main cause of a bodhisattva
B Compassion as the root of the other two causes of a bodhisattva

3A1A Compassion as the main cause of a bodhisattva

This section has three parts:

1 The way hearers and solitary realizers are born from Kings of Subduers
2 The way buddhas are born from bodhisattvas
3 The three main causes of bodhisattvas

3A1A-1 The way hearers and solitary realizers are born from Kings of Subduers

Hearers are so called because they listen to correct precepts from others and after attaining the fruit of their meditation – the enlightenment of a hearer – they cause others to hear about that fact. They say, 'I have done what was to be done; I will not know another birth,' and so forth. Many such instances appear in the scriptures.

Although there are some hearers – such as those in the formless realm – to whom this etymology does not apply, there is no fault because the features of an etymology do not have to apply to all instances for a term to be used as an actual name. For instance, the term 'lake-born' is used for a lotus grown from dry soil.

Hearers and solitary realizers are said to be born from the King of Subduers (*thub dbang*). This is in the sense that Shakyamuni Buddha, the King of Subduers, taught dependent-arising whereby the hearers and solitary realizers who listened to these teachings went on to attain their respective enlightenments.

The Tibetan word for hearer (*nyen thos*) is actually more literally translated as 'listener-hearer' in that the etymology indicates that having listened one causes others to hear.

"Correct precepts" here refer to instructions on the means of attaining the hearer and solitary realizer enlightenments. In the context of mahayana precepts the definition of a precept is: speech that teaches the means of attaining the object of striving of mahayanists, buddhahood.

Hearers say: "'I have done what was to be done; I will not know another birth,' and so forth." This indicates that hearer foe destroyers have destroyed the foes, or enemies, which are actions and afflictive emotions and, therefore, will not take another birth in cyclic existence due to actions and afflictive emotions. In short, what has been done is to have abandoned actions and afflictive emotions; due to this they will not be reborn in cyclic existence.

The etymology of the other word for hearer (*thos grogs*), literally hearer-proclaimer, implies that hearers abide in the midst of others in that they first hear the mahayana teachings and then proclaim them to others. However, there is no pervasion that this is actually the case because there are hearers in the formless realm who do not hear teachings, as there is no sound in the formless realm, and who do not proclaim what they have heard to others. This is similar to the case of the name 'lake-born' for a lotus although a lotus is not necessarily born from a lake since it can grow in dry soil. There are two kinds of names which appear in the text *Awarenesses and Knowers*: an actual name and an imputed name. Lama Tsongkhapa says "there is no fault because the features of an etymology do not have to apply to all instances for a term to be used as an actual name." If a term engages an actual name it does not have to be that actual name. If it is that which engages the actual name it is not necessarily the actual name, for example, 'definition.' Definition engages the name 'definition' but is not a definition. The definition of definition is: that which fulfills the three qualities of substantial existence.

If a name engages a basis as an actual name it is not necessarily the actual name of that basis. For example, 'functioning thing' engages pot as an actual name but it is not the actual name for pot because by means of the name 'functioning thing' one is not able to understand pot. Another example is the name 'human being' which can be applied to all human beings. But, does 'human being' engage the basis Thubten Sherab? 'Human being' does engage the basis Thubten Sherab as an actual name but it is not his actual name because Thubten Sherab is not understood by it. The definition of an actual name is (see *Awarenesses and Knowers*): that which is observed to be the common locus of (i) being a term initially applied arbitrarily to that object and (ii) being the main name of that object.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The Sanskrit word for hearer, *shravaka*, can also mean 'hearing and proclaiming' in the sense that they hear from buddhas about the superior fruit or the path proceeding to buddhahood and proclaim it to those of the Mahayana lineage seeking that path. The *White Lotus of Excellent Doctrine Sutra (Saddharmapundarika)* says [in reference to bodhisattvas who merely proclaim the path without practicing it]:
>
> > O Protector, today we have become hearers.
> > We proclaim the excellent enlightenment
> > And set forth the terms of enlightenment.
> > Thus we are like intractable hearers.
>
> For those two reasons these bodhisattvas are similar to hearers, but the actual meaning of hearing and proclaiming applies [only] to hearers.

The Sanskrit word *shravaka*, in addition to meaning 'listening and hearing,' can also mean 'hearing and proclaiming.' Bodhisattvas are like hearers in that they listen to mahayana teachings from buddhas and then cause others who are proceeding in the mahayana to hear them. The term 'listener-hearer' can be applied in general to those who listen to Buddha's teaching and therefore can also be applied to the bodhisattvas in Buddha's retinue. Thus, in this context the name 'hearer' also applies to bodhisattvas who are the disciples of Buddha. Bodhisattvas 'have become hearers' in the sense that they are disciples of Buddha who listen to his teachings and then proclaim excellent enlightenment. "Excellent enlightenment" is great enlightenment which is defined in the fifth chapter of the *Ornament* saying: "The exalted wisdom of the extinction and non-production of stains is called 'enlightenment.'" The word 'enlightenment' in Tibetan is *byang chub*; *byang* meaning purified, which indicates the purification of negativities and so forth, and *chub* meaning realization, which indicates the realization of all that is to be realized. In Sanskrit the word for enlightenment is *bodhi* which has various meanings, this being the reason for the various translations in English.

In sutra it says: "Thus we are like intractable hearers."

Q: What is the meaning of the Tibetan word *mi bzad* translated here as 'intractable'?
A: There are different ways of spelling this word in Tibetan and here perhaps it should be spelled without the *ba* prefix, but in either case the meaning is inextinguishable or inexhaustible.
Q: If it means inexhaustible in what sense is one inexhaustible?
A: A buddha has inexhaustible disciples or inexhaustible qualities.

"For those two reasons these bodhisattvas are similar to hearers, but the actual meaning of hearing and proclaiming applies [only] to hearers." What are the two reasons? (i) Because they listen to the teachings of Buddha and proclaim them, i.e., make others to hear them, and (ii) because they are disciples. In this sense, bodhisattvas are similar to hearers. However, the actual meaning of the terms

'listener-hearer' and 'hearer-proclaimer' applies only to hearers because they are actual names of hearers.

> [Jaya-ananda] says that because the word 'excellent' is absent in the third line [of the quote from the *White Lotus]* the former enlightenment is the Mahayana and the latter the hearer enlightenment. However, the thought of Chandrakirti's commentary is that the first is the Mahayana enlightenment and the second is the path proceeding to it.

That the former enlightenment is mahayana enlightenment and the second is the path proceeding to it is also mentioned in Chandrakirti's commentary.

> OBJECTION: Bodhisattvas would [absurdly] have to be [Hinayana] hearers because they hear the path of buddhahood from buddhas and proclaim it to trainees.
>
> ANSWER: There is no such fault because the thought is that hearers *merely* proclaim the Mahayana path; they themselves do not achieve even a similitude of it.

The point under discussion is that the term 'hearer-proclaimer' also refers to bodhisattvas. However, there is a difference between hearers and bodhisattvas in that hearers only hear and proclaim the mahayana while not practicing it and not achieving even a similitude of it, whereas bodhisattvas hear, proclaim, practice, and achieve it.

Next comes a discussion of the word 'middling buddhas' in the Tibetan translation of verse 1.1 which has been translated into English as 'middling realizers of suchness' in accordance with the original Sanskrit. In fact, someone argues that instead of saying 'middling buddhas' the text should say 'middling realizers of suchness.'

> [In Chandrakirti's root text 'middling realizers of suchness' was translated into Tibetan as 'middling buddhas'.] In the commentary Chandrakirti says that *tattva-buddha* applies to all three persons [hearer, solitary realizer, and buddha superiors]. With regard to the meaning of this, some identify *tattva-buddha* as realization of suchness and apply it to all three. As will be explained, this is a good interpretation because it is said, '*Tattva* means suchness *(tathata)*, and *buddha* means realization.'
>
> When the term *buddha* is taken to mean 'realization of suchness', this applies to all three persons.

The word 'tattva-buddha' refers to all three persons, hearer, solitary realizer, and buddha superiors, because it means 'one who has realized suchness.' In other words, if the term 'buddha' is understood to mean 'one who has realized suchness' then it also applies to hearers and solitary realizers. There are three levels of enlightenment: small, middling, and great enlightenment. Small enlightenment is the enlightenment of hearers, middling enlightenment that of solitary realizers, and great enlightenment that of buddhas.

Wednesday afternoon, January 19, 2000

Q: It was said that *Fundamental Wisdom* sets forth limitless reasons to establish the selflessness of phenomena. Can Geshe-la please say something more about what this means?
A: In general the mahayana treatises, as does *Fundamental Wisdom*, set forth many reasonings that establish the selflessness of phenomena. On the other hand, in general the hinayana scriptures do not set forth many reasons that establish the selflessness of phenomena, and in particular the unshared hinayana sutras do not give any reasons at all. This is because even if many reasons were to be set forth establishing the selflessness of phenomena hinayanists would not be able to understand them.

There are two ways of positing a hinayanist: one from the point of view of tenets and one from the point of view of path. According to those who are hinayanist from the point of view of tenets there are no sutras in which Buddha sets forth reasons that establish the selflessness of phenomena. In other words, the sutras accepted by those who are hinayanists from the point of view of tenets do not set out reasonings establishing the selflessness of phenomena. Those who are hinayanist from the point of view of path are the hearers and solitary realizers. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas the subject of the selflessness of phenomena is suitable to be taught to those who are hinayanists from the point of view of path, but according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas this is not suitable. What is an example of a hinayana sutra in which there is a presentation of the selflessness of phenomena? As it says in *Illumination*, quoting Chandrakirti's *Supplement*, there are very few: "In the hearer vehicle the selflessness of phenomena is illustrated only briefly." One example is the hinayana sutra, *Sutra Taught to Hearers*, it which it says: "Forms are like balls of foam. Feelings are like bubbles. Discriminations are like mirages. Compositional factors are like banana trees. Consciousnesses are like magical illusions. Thus, [the Buddha], the Sun-Friend said."

If someone were to say that only reasonings that establish the selflessness of phenomena are set forth in *Fundamental Wisdom* while reasonings that establish the selflessness of persons are not set forth, the answer is that this is not correct in that it also sets forth reasonings that establish the selflessness of persons. This is because in the twenty-second chapter it says: "When the Buddha was asked is there a beginning point he did not reply." This question was based on the conception of a self of persons and therefore it indirectly indicates the selflessness of persons. This question arose in the context of the fourteen unanswered questions called unspecified views, from among the sixty-two views. They are unspecified because the Subduer did not give an answer to them.

In short, many reasonings are set forth in *Fundamental Wisdom* that establish the selflessness of persons. There are twenty-five types of view of the transitory collection set forth in *Fundamental Wisdom*, among which there is a presentation of the conception of a self of persons together with a presentation of the selflessness of persons. However, the *Fundamental Wisdom* is included in the mahayana basket because it explains the selflessness of phenomena using limitless reasonings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Though the term 'realizers of suchness' also indicates 'solitary realizers', it was translated [into Tibetan] as *buddha.* In general the term *buddha* should be rendered as 'buddha' but here this is not appropriate. For it is also explained that *buddha is* used to indicate an *opening* of lotus petals and an *awakening* from sleep; therefore 'buddha' is not the only translation.

The word 'buddha' in Tibetan is *sang gye*; *sang* meaning purified in the sense that a buddha has purified all obstructions, and *gye* meaning extended in the sense that a buddha's knowledge extends to all objects of knowledge.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> With respect to the meaning of 'middling', solitary realizers surpass hearers through their superior feature of practicing merit and wisdom for a hundred eons. However, since they do not have the two collections of merit and wisdom, nor the compassion viewing all sentient beings at all times, nor omniscience and so forth, they are inferior to perfect buddhas. Thus, they are middling.

Although solitary realizers are superior to hearers, they are inferior to perfect buddhas, whereby they are middling. Solitary realizers are middling in that they complete the two collections in a hundred eons; this being more time than a hearer who does so only for three lifetimes and so forth [and less time than that of bodhisattvas who do so for three countless great eons]. Sharp faculty hearers

accumulate the collections for three lifetimes and attain the state of a hearer foe destroyer. On the other hand, solitary realizers who accumulate the collections for only three lifetimes do not attain the state of a solitary realizer foe destroyer. According to the sutra vehicle mahayanists accumulate the collections for three countless great eons in order to achieve buddhahood, it being said that the first countless great eon is spent on the path of accumulation and the path of preparation, the second on the seven impure grounds, and the third on the three pure grounds. However, there is debate about this such as: "Is it necessary to remain on each of these three parts of the path accumulating merit for one countless great eon?" The conclusion is that it is enough to accumulate an amount of merit equal to that accumulated in this period but it is not necessary to do so for that entire period.
Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> One [Jaya-ananda] says that the meaning of solitary realizers' surpassing hearers in terms of wisdom should be understood in accordance with Maitreya's statement in his *Ornament for the Realizations (Abhisamayalamkara)*, 'They abandon the conception of objects [by realizing that object and subject are not different entities].' This is not correct because here in the Prasangika system it is said that both hearers and solitary realizers realize that all phenomena do not inherently exist. [Jaya-ananda] himself asserts this [when later he says that hearers and solitary realizers cognize the emptiness of all phenomena].
>
> In his commentary Chandrakirti says that a solitary realizer's wisdom surpasses in its increase that of a hearer. This 'increase' should be taken to mean proceeding higher and higher on the path. Solitary realizers are intent on cultivating merit and wisdom over a hundred eons; thus, unlike the hearers, they are able to continue cultivating the path for a long time.

If someone says that solitary realizers are superior to hearers in possessing the wisdom realizing suchness this is incorrect because hearers also possess the wisdom realizing suchness. Solitary realizers are superior to hearers because they cultivate their path accumulating merit and wisdom for one hundred eons, whereas hearers are not able to do so. In short, from the point of view of the collections of merit and wisdom solitary realizers are superior to hearers because they proceed in these for a hundred eons, whereas hearers do not do so.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> [Chandrakirti says that solitary realizers do not collect merit and wisdom; however, they do have secondary or imputed collections.] The mere term 'collection' is indeed used for merit and wisdom in general, but it applies mainly to fully qualified merit and wisdom. As Haribhadra's *Clear Meaning Commentary (Abhisamayalamkara-nama-prajnaparamitopade-shashastravrtti)* says, 'By being entities that thoroughly achieve it, they *hold* the great enlightenment; therefore, great compassion and so forth are collections.' Collections are said to hold their fruit through being the means of unmistakenly achieving highest enlightenment. Those that are not fully qualified are secondary. This is a contextual etymology of the original Sanskrit word for collection, *sambhara*. [With letters added, *sam* comes to mean 'thorough achievement', *bha* 'entity', and *ra* 'bearing'.]
>
> Because solitary realizers' progress in merit and wisdom greatly exceeds that of hearers, they are able to generate the wisdom of a foe destroyer *(arhan)* during their final lifetime in the desire realm without depending on another master's teaching. Because they become enlightened – that is to say, attain or are in the process of attaining the state of a foe destroyer – for their own sakes alone, they are called 'self-enlightened' and also 'self-arisen.'

Q: The attainments of hearers and solitary realizers are the same, i.e., a hinayana nirvana, therefore if a sharp faculty hearer can achieve this state in three lifetimes whereas it takes a solitary realizer a hundred eons, why are solitary realizers considered superior to hearers?
A: The nirvana attained, in terms of being a liberation from the afflictive obstructions, is the same. However, the attainment of solitary realizers is superior because their realization continues to increase in time whereas that of hearers does not. The nirvana is the same because both sharp and dull faculty

hearers and solitary realizers attain the same state. Thus, in terms of nirvana the attainment is the same. However, the divisions into small and middling enlightenments are in terms of enlightenment being a realization whereby the realization of hearers is smaller than that of solitary realizers since they only spend three lifetimes accumulating the collections while solitary realizers do so for a hundred eons. For example, a sharp faculty person compared to a middling faculty person learns a subject very quickly while the other takes a longer time. However, in the end there is a difference because one of middling faculty who takes a long time to learn has developed much familiarity with the subject and does not forget it since his understanding is very stable, whereas one who learns quickly also quickly forgets whereby his understanding is very temporary. Although they studied the text over different amounts of time, at the end the person who did so for a longer period of time will have learned more and his knowledge will be more stable. We can see this based on our own experience. For example, I know someone who studied all four main texts and the supplementary subjects for nine years at Varanasi, took the exams, and became an acharya yet his knowledge cannot be compared to that of a monk who has studied these texts for twenty-five years. This is because the Varanasi student only studied for a short time while a geshe has familiarized with these subjects over a long time.

Q: If the nirvana that hearers and solitary realizers attain is the same, when they enter the mahayana path is there a difference in their way of progressing?
A: Solitary realizers take less time to attain the great enlightenment because they have a greater collection of merit than do hearers.

"This is a contextual etymology of the original Sanskrit word for collection, *sambhara*. [With letters added, *sam* comes to mean 'thorough achievement', *bha* 'entity', and *ra* 'bearing'.]" The particle *sam*, for example, comes in the context of *samyaksambuddha* which means perfectly complete buddha. It also comes in various mantras, for example, OM SAMBHARA SAMBHARA HUM, the mantra of the torma offering to the landlord spirits.

In the mahayana scriptures it is said that the collection of merit deposits the latencies to realize the form body, while the collection of wisdom deposits the latencies to achieve the truth body. Perhaps according to the hinayana scriptures the collection of merit enables hearers to achieve the body of a foe destroyer and the collection of wisdom to achieve the mind of a foe destroyer. However, there is debate about this: "It is said that the body of a hearer is a true suffering, but how can this be? Also a human body is a true suffering yet it is the result of the collection of merit, how can this be?" This discussion is based on the fact that it is taught that meritorious actions bring rebirth as a human being or god while demeritorious actions bring rebirth in the lower realms.

Thursday morning, January 20, 2000

Solitary realizers can also be called self-enlightened or self-arisen. As Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says: "Because they become enlightened – that is to say, attain or are in the process of attaining the state of a foe destroyer – for their own sakes alone, they are called 'self-enlightened' and also 'self arisen.'" In their last life solitary realizers attain enlightenment without depending on a master because of the prayers they made when they were on the learner's path. This is explained in the second chapter of the *Ornament* which says that solitary realizers prayed to attain enlightenment without depending on a master, to be reborn when there are no buddhas or hearers, and to give teachings by means of physical gestures without speech. In *Ornament* (v. 2.7) it says:

To whomever, whatever meanings, just as they are –
To so-and-so desiring to hear
This and that meaning –
They appear thus even without sounds.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> [With respect to the phrase 'Kings of Subduers] the term 'subduer' is indeed used for hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers, but since they are not *kings* of subduers, only buddhas are so called. This is because buddhas have attained an excellent lordship of doctrine superior to hearers, solitary realizers, or even bodhisattvas and also because the word of buddha rules these three in the sphere of doctrine. That hearers and solitary realizers are born from Kings of Subduers means that they are issued forth by them.

The word 'subduer,' in Sanskrit *muni* and in Tibetan *thub pa*, also applies to hearers and solitary realizers, while the term 'King of Subduers' or Mighty Subduer (*munindra, thub dbang*) applies only to buddhas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> QUESTION: How do Subduer Kings give birth to hearers and solitary realizers?
> ANSWER: When buddhas come to the world, they teach dependent arising without error. Those bearing the lineage of hearers and solitary realizers listen to the modes of dependent arising, think about what they have heard, and meditate on the meaning of what they have thought. Through these stages, the aims of hearers and solitary realizers are fulfilled in accordance with the effect to which they aspire, and in this way Subduer Kings give birth to hearers and solitary realizers.

Hearers and solitary realizers are born from buddhas in the sense that they hear teachings from the buddhas on dependent-arising, think about the meaning, and meditate on it, whereby they became hearers and solitary realizers. Buddha taught the *Rice Seedling Sutra* on the subject of dependent-arising in which it says that due to such-and-such there arises such-and-such and so forth; for example, due to ignorance there arises the second link of karmic formations. This sutra also says: "Having seen the Buddha, they see the Dharma. Having seen the Dharma, they see the Sangha." Thus, the term 'dependent-arising' includes both general dependent-arising and the instance of dependent-arising that is the twelve links.

Upon hearing teachings on dependent-arising hearers and solitary realizers understand how one remains in cyclic existence and how one leaves cyclic existence. They contemplate and come to understand the twelve links in both forward and reverse orders in terms of both the thoroughly afflicted and the completely pure. More specifically, through meditating on the twelve links in terms of the thoroughly afflicted they come to understand that true sufferings and true origins are to be abandoned, and through meditating on them in terms of the completely pure they come to understand that true cessations and true paths are to be achieved. In this way they achieve nirvana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> OBJECTION: Although many of the hearer lineage actualize enlightenment in the very life in which they hear the doctrine from a buddha, those of the solitary realizer lineage do not do so. Therefore, it is incorrect that their aims are fulfilled through hearing, thinking, and meditating on meanings set forth by Subduer Kings.
> ANSWER: There is no fault. Some bearing the lineage of solitary realizers become skilled in cognizing the ultimate just by listening to the Teacher's setting forth dependent arising. However, they do not attain the nirvana of a solitary realizer in just that life during which they hear the

> doctrine. Still, a solitary realizer practitioner to whom a buddha teaches dependent arising will definitely achieve nirvana in another life. An example of this is a person's accumulating an action the effect of which must be experienced but not in the same life as when accumulated; however, the effect will definitely be experienced in another birth. Also, since solitary realizers hear, think, and meditate on just the doctrine formerly taught by a buddha, the explanation that their aims are fulfilled is not intended to refer to this life only.

Although solitary realizers do not attain nirvana in the very same life in which they received teachings from the Buddha, they definitely do so in another life. Buddha did not teach them in order for them to attain enlightenment in that lifetime and the solitary realizers did not listen to these teachings in order to attain their enlightenment in that lifetime. However, through the Buddha's teachings their wishes are definitely fulfilled.

There are three kinds of actions (karma):

1. that which will definitely be experienced in that very same life,
2. that which will definitely be experienced in the very next life, and
3. that which will definitely be experienced in a future life other than the next.

In short, the fact of solitary realizers listening to the teachings of Buddha in one life and achieving their wishes in a future life is similar to a karma created in this life that will definitely be experienced in a future life other than the next life.

Q: Why is it similar to a karma that will definitely be experienced in a future life that is other than the next life and not that which will definitely be experienced in the very next life?
A: Because they have to accumulate merit for a hundred eons it is definite that they attain nirvana in a life that is not the very next life.

Q: But can they not receive teachings during those hundred eons?
A: This example of karma is given by Lama Tsongkhapa. However, solitary realizers are not like us in that we receive many teachings from many different lamas, in that for solitary realizers it is enough to hear teachings once and then they put them into practice for a long time [and achieve their result].

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Aryadeva's *Four Hundred (Chatuhshataka*, VIII.22) says:
>
> Though one who knows suchness does not achieve
> Nirvana here, in another birth
> He will definitely attain it
> Without effort, as in the case of actions.
>
> Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* (XVIII.12) says:
>
> Though the perfect buddhas do not appear
> And hearers have disappeared,
> A solitary realizer's wisdom
> Arises without support.

The wishes of solitary realizers are definitely fulfilled in a future life in that they make the prayer while on the learner's path to arise when hearers have disappeared and buddhas do not appear. At that time they also make prayers to be able to teach the Dharma by means of physical gestures without speech.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> One [Jaya-ananda] asserts that this section in Chandrakirti's commentary answers the doubt, 'It is seen that though dependent arising is taught, some do not achieve the state of hearers and so forth; thus, hearers and so forth do not fulfill their aims through the teaching of dependent arising.' Other [Tibetans] say that this answers the doubt that although it would be suitable for the effect to arise immediately after practicing the meaning of dependent arising and non-production, it does not, and, therefore, the effect might not arise later either.
>
> These explanations are instances of not understanding the meaning of this section. Because there are greater doubts about the Subduer Kings' giving birth to solitary realizers, [doubts about this] should be singled out and eliminated [but according to these explanations Chandrakirti] did not do so.

There is a qualm concerning the fact that in dependence on the teachings of dependent-arising some hearers do not achieve the result of hearer foe destroyer and therefore do not achieve their aims. Some others say that if hearers do not attain the result in this life perhaps they do not attain it even in another life.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As they possess unsurpassed lordship of the doctrine, because of excellent noble lordship even over hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas; and because their word rules the hearers and so forth, the buddha bhagavans are called mighty subduers (*munindra*). That the hearers and so forth are born from them means they are produced by them.
>
> If asked: How?
>
> When the buddhas arise, because of engaging in teaching dependent-arising without error, because hearers and so forth will become fully complete in accord with their special aspirations also from the stages of hearing that, contemplation, and meditation.
>
> Even if there are some who indeed do not attain nirvana in just that very life (the life which sees), though they became skilled in realizing the ultimate from just hearing dependent-arising taught; nevertheless, practitioners of the teachings will without doubt attain full maturation of the desired result in another lifetime, like the results of definitely maturing actions (karma).
>
> As explained by Aryadeva [in the *Four Hundred Verses*, 8.22]:
>
> Even if nirvana is not attained here through knowing suchness,
> in another rebirth, effortlessly it will definitely be attained, as with actions.
>
> Because of that, it is also taught in the [*Treatise on the*] *Middle Way* [18.12]:
>
> When perfect buddhas do not emerge and even the hearers have disappeared,
> the exalted wisdom of the solitary realizers arises completely without support.
>
> There, hearers are so-called since they cause [others to hear] about attaining the results of the perfect oral instructions [they listened to from others]. Thus, "I did the tasks like this. I shall not know another existence beyond this," and so forth, are set forth.
>
> Alternatively, [they are called] hearer-proclaimers since, having heard the supreme result or the path of the perfect complete buddhas from the tathagatas, they proclaim it to seekers.
>
> It is taught in the *Sutra of the White Lotus of the Noble Dharma* [4.53]:[2]
>
> O Protector, today we have become hearers.
> We shall perfectly proclaim noble enlightenment

[2] See Poisson. p.253, note 6, for location. See Hopkins for more about differing translations of this verse.

> And also finely express the terms of enlightenment.
> Hence we are like intractable hearers.
>
> Although bodhisattvas are indeed like that, nevertheless, since those who just proclaim, not practicing even a similitude are hearers, it does not follow for bodhisattvas.
>
> The term 'buddha' of "*tattva-buddha*" (realizer of suchness) applies also to the three: hearers, solitary realizers and unsurpassed perfect complete buddhas, hence the term 'buddha' (realizer) indicates solitary realizers. Because they are specially distinguished from the hearers through the distinction of higher increase of merit and wisdom, and because they are inferior to the perfect complete buddhas through lacking omniscience and so forth, [they are] middling.
>
> Therefore, since exalted wisdom arises untaught and since they become awakened (buddha) for solely themselves, [they are called] solitary realizers (solitary buddhas).
>
> In the manner which was explained, because those hearers and solitary realizers definitely emerge through being taught the Dharma by the tathagatas, they are born from the mighty subduers.

This was already discussed in relation to Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination*. However in short, hearers and solitary realizers are born from mighty subduers, or Kings of Subduers, in the sense that buddhas teach profound dependent-arising, they listen to these teachings, think about them, meditate on them, and thereby fulfill their wishes. In this context there is the objection that the wishes of solitary realizers are not fulfilled because, although hearers attain nirvana in the same life in which they hear the teachings, solitary realizers do not and therefore their wishes are not fulfilled. The conclusion is that although their wishes are not fulfilled in that same life they will definitely be fulfilled in another life. The wishes of solitary realizers who listen to teachings on dependent-arising will be fulfilled in a future life other than the next immediate life and therefore the result of listening to the teachings will definitely be attained. For this reason the case of solitary realizers is said to be like that of a karma that will definitely be experienced in a future life that is other than the next. Solitary realizers do not attain the state of foe destroyer in the same life in which they hear the teachings because they made prayers on the learner's path to be able to give teachings to sentient beings when buddhas and hearers do not appear. If they attained foe destroyer in the same life in which they hear the teachings this prayer would not be fulfilled as in that life there is the presence of buddhas and hearers. For this reason they attain foe destroyer in a future life.

There is also a discussion in this context regarding the term 'hearer-proclaimer' concerning that fact that bodhisattvas could also be called hearer-proclaimers in that they also listen to the teachings and proclaim them to others. The answer to this is that hearers and bodhisattvas are not the same and that this term only refers to hearers because they merely listen to the mahayana teachings and then proclaim them to others, while bodhisattvas listen to them, put them into practice, and then proclaim them to others.

There is also a discussion of the term 'subduer.' The conclusion is that the term 'subduer' can also be applied to hearers and solitary realizers, while the term 'mighty subduer,' or 'king of subduers,' can only be applied to buddhas in that only buddhas have perfect mercy-compassion, wisdom, and ability. Hearers and solitary realizers do not have such perfect mercy-compassion, wisdom, and ability and therefore can be called subduers but not mighty subduers.

Before it was said that hearers and solitary realizers are born from the mighty subduers, next there is a discussion as to buddhas being born from bodhisattvas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3A1A-2 The way buddhas are born from bodhisattvas

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Further, if asked: from whom are the mighty subduers born?
>
> It was mentioned *buddhas are born from the bodhisattvas* [1.1b].
>
> If asked: are the bodhisattvas not called Conquerors' children since they are born from teachings by the tathagatas? If so, because of that, how are the buddha bhagavans born from the bodhisattvas?
>
> Though that is indeed true, none-the-less, bodhisattvas are causes of the buddha bhagavans for two reasons:
> 1. from the viewpoint of state, and
> 2. through instilling [them] to perfectly uphold.
>
> There,
> 1. from the viewpoint of state, because the state of the tathagatas has the state of the bodhisattva as a cause,
> 2. through instilling to perfectly uphold,
>
> just as it is set forth that Arya Manjushri through merely being a bodhisattva, instilled the Bhagavan Shakyamuni and the tathagatas other than him to perfectly uphold the bodhichitta in the very beginning. Therefore, the tathagatas are shown to be born from the bodhisattvas having thus relied upon being the principal cause of the final result.

It would appear to be contradictory that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas, yet bodhisattvas are known as 'the conquerors' children.' However, there is no contradiction because there are two reasons for saying that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas:
1. from the point of view of the attribute of state because a buddha is of the same continuum as the previous bodhisattva who practiced the path and
2. through instilling bodhisattvas to perfectly uphold which means that, for example, bodhisattvas instill other bodhisattvas to uphold the teachings whereby they become buddhas. For example, the bodhisattva Manjushri exhorted other bodhisattvas to uphold the mind of enlightenment and proceed to enlightenment, whereby they became buddhas.

Thursday afternoon, January 20, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3A1A-2 The way buddhas are born from bodhisattvas
>
> QUESTION: If hearers and solitary realizers are born from Subduer Kings, from what are Subduer Kings born?
>
> ANSWER: The perfect buddhas are born from bodhisattvas.
>
> OBJECTION: Are bodhisattvas not called 'conqueror children' because they are born from buddhas' teaching? Since bodhisattvas are conqueror children, how can buddhas be born from bodhisattvas? For example, the father of a child cannot be that child's child.
>
> ANSWER: It is true that bodhisattvas are the children of certain conquerors; however, there are two reasons why bodhisattvas cause buddhas. Bodhisattvas are causes of buddhas from the viewpoint of state because the state of a tathagata buddha is the fruit of that of a bodhisattva. This indicates that bodhisattvas cause buddhas through being the substantial cause which is of the same continuum as that buddha. The state of buddhahood is only attained through one's formerly having developed the state of a bodhisattva on the path of learning.

A buddha superior is pervaded by his having been in the past a bodhisattva of the same continuum. That bodhisattva practiced the path and became a buddha. "Bodhisattvas cause buddhas through being the substantial cause which is of the same continuum as that buddha."

Someone makes the objection that a buddha cannot be born from buddhas because they are called 'conqueror children.' The answer is that there is no fault because a single man can be both father and son, in that he is father with respect to his son and son with respect to his father. Likewise, buddhas are born from bodhisattvas. There are two ways in which buddhas are born from bodhisattvas: (i) from the point of view of substantial cause and (ii) from the point of view of cooperative condition. That buddhas are born from bodhisattvas in terms of substantial cause means that the buddha is the same continuum as the bodhisattva, and that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas in terms of cooperative condition means that, for example, Manjushri exhorts bodhisattvas to uphold the mind of enlightenment and thereby acts as a cooperative condition for the buddha they become.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Bodhisattvas also cause buddhas through causing them to bear the truth in the sense that, as it says in sutra, the venerable Manjushri as a bodhisattva caused our own Teacher and other buddhas to bear the altruistic mind of enlightenment at the very beginning. This establishes that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas from the viewpoint that a bodhisattva, who is of a different continuum from the buddhahood which another bodhisattva will attain, acts as a cooperative cause of that buddha.

In short, a bodhisattva [of a separate continuum] can be a cooperative condition for another bodhisattva to become a buddha.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> OBJECTION: [Chandrakirti states the position of] an objector who says that since bodhisattvas are conqueror children, it is correct for them to be born from conquerors, but the opposite is not feasible. [In answer] he says it is true that bodhisattvas are conqueror children, thereby indicating that he accepts this. Though it is necessary to give the reason why, despite this assertion, there is no contradiction in saying that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas, Chandrakirti – without giving any such reason – [goes on to] establish that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas. Thus [his procedure] is wrong because a doubt has already arisen with respect to the topic and has not been eliminated.
>
> ANSWER: There is no such fault. With respect to the first reason why the root text says that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas, Chandrakirti explains the attainment of the fruit of buddhahood through a bodhisattva's practice on the path of learning. It is thereby known that a bodhisattva is not the child of the buddha that he himself becomes. Hence, when Chandrakirti says that it is true – meaning, 'bodhisattvas are indeed born from buddhas' – how could he be referring to a bodhisattva's birth from the buddha he becomes? Furthermore, one newly born as a bodhisattva from the speech of our Teacher is a child of this buddha, but this buddha is not born from the bodhisattva. Indeed, if one has intelligence, why would one not realize from the answer given in the commentary that the objector has not distinguished these two modes? Still, many senseless explanations have appeared with respect to this.

The bodhisattva who is newly born from Shakyamuni Buddha's teachings is said to be born from the conqueror Shakyamuni Buddha, but Shakyamuni Buddha himself is not born from that bodhisattva. In other words, in the case of a bodhisattva born from the teachings of Shakyamuni Buddha, it cannot be said that Shakyamuni Buddha is born from that bodhisattva yet one can say that Shakyamuni

Buddha is born from a bodhisattva. This is because there are the two modes in which a buddha can be said to be born from a bodhisattva:
(i) that of a buddha being the same continuum of a previous bodhisattva and
(ii) that of a bodhisattva having been exhorted by another bodhisattva to uphold the mind of enlightenment whereby he became a buddha.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Buddhas praise bodhisattvas because bodhisattvas are the principal causes of buddhas. There are four reasons for the praise.

Chandrakirti autocommentary says:

> 1. For that very reason, because the perfect cause is highly esteemed, and

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The first is that this excellent cause of buddhahood is very profound and precious.

These are the four reasons why buddhas praise bodhisattvas. The first reason is that it is very important to take care of novice bodhisattvas, those who have recently generated the mind of enlightenment, just as it is very important to take good care of a newborn baby. Afterward when the bodhisattvas have practiced for some time there is no need to take so much care of them as their mind of enlightenment has become stable.

Regarding the second reason Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> 2. since it is intended that through expressing homage to the cause, homage to the result will also be implied,

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The second is that through expressing worship to the cause – bodhisattvas – praise of the fruit – buddhas – is intended implicitly.

The second reason is that by expressing worship to the cause, the result is also indirectly praised. For example, if one takes care of a seed one indirectly takes care of the plant it will become. Chandrakirti takes great compassion as the object of worship in the *Supplement* because it is the initial cause of a bodhisattva. When someone pays homage to great compassion one indirectly pays homage to the bodhisattvas and buddhas. There are three causes of a bodhisattva. The first cause, great compassion, is the main cause because it is the initial cause of a bodhisattva and also because it is the cause of the other two causes, the awareness realizing non-duality and the mind of enlightenment.

However, there is debate concerning how the bodhisattva is also an object of worship. If bodhisattvas are also the object of worship it would contradict what it says in *Illumination*: "Rather than praising buddhas and bodhisattvas it is suitable to praise great compassion." Does Chandrakirti pay homage to the bodhisattvas? If the opponent replies that he does not, one then says: "Yet Lama Tsongkhapa says: 'The second is that through expressing worship to the cause – bodhisattvas – praise of the fruit – buddhas – is intended implicitly.'" On the other hand, if the opponent replies saying that Chandrakirti does pay homage to the bodhisattvas then one quotes: "Rather than praising buddhas and bodhisattvas it is suitable to praise great compassion."

Regarding the third reason Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> 3. because the buddha bhagavans teach that [the bodhisattvas] are to be cautiously cared for as is in the case when the stem and so forth of a great medicinal tree, which will definitely bestow incredible results, are seen and its leaves are tender, and

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The third reason is that one should value and sustain the state of a novice bodhisattva, for it is the shoot of the tree of buddhahood that nourishes all beings. Just as one who has seen the shoot, trunk, and so forth of a medicinal tree bearing countless wished-for fruits would cherish and sustain the leaves of the tree when they are young and soft, so one should value and sustain the state of a novice bodhisattva with great effort.

Just as one would take care of the shoot of a medicinal tree because in the future it will produce a great quantity of medicine, likewise the buddhas take great care of novice bodhisattvas since in the future they will become buddhas and benefit many beings.

Regarding the fourth reason Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> 4. because the throng of sentient beings who are near at that time and who are set in the three vehicles will definitely be conjoined with the mahayana itself, bodhisattvas are to be praised.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The fourth reason is that when bodhisattvas are praised in the presence of those who are established in the three vehicles, such persons thereby definitely enter into the Mahayana.

When bodhisattvas are praised in the presence of those who are established in the three vehicles, the hearers and solitary realizers turn toward the mahayana. In addition, those who are not yet established in a vehicle also turn toward the mahayana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The *Pile of Jewels Sutra (Ratnakuta)* says, 'Kashyapa, it is like this: For example, people bow down to a new moon and not to the full moon. In the same way, Kashyapa, those who have great faith in me should bow down not to tathagatas but to bodhisattvas. Why? Tathagatas arise from bodhisattvas. All hearers and solitary realizers arise from tathagatas.' This establishes through scripture that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas.

Just as one would bow to the new moon and not to the full moon, one should bow to those bodhisattvas who have newly generated the mind of enlightenment and not to the tathagatas. This is because these novice bodhisattvas are more precious than tathagatas. In general, people tend to pay homage to the tathagatas and neglect the bodhisattvas but this is not correct. In the Hindu and Moslem cultures the full moon is worshipped, but not the new moon. However, it would be more appropriate to worship the new moon as it the new moon which develops more and more. Novice bodhisattvas are likened to the new moon and the buddhas to the full moon. This is because a buddha's knowledge is fully developed in that it encompasses all objects of knowledge. It is said that when one practices on the 8th, 15th, and 30th of the lunar calendar one creates a greater amount of

merit. In the *Kalachakra Tantra* it is also mentioned that there is a connection between the red and white constituents, the outer elements, and the phases of the moon.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The two former reasons establish it through reasoning.
>
> Thus, here Chandrakirti does not directly honor hearers, solitary realizers, buddhas, or bodhisattvas – who are renowned as objects of worship in other books. This is because he honors the causes that are their roots.
>
> The first two lines of the root text indicate that these four – hearers and solitary realizers, buddhas, and bodhisattvas – are in an effect and cause relationship respectively. This is for the sake of identifying the cause that is their ultimate root [compassion].

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was taught in the exalted *Pile of Jewels Sutra*:[3]
>
> > Kashyapa, it is like this: for example, like bowing to the new moon and not to the full moon. Kashyapa, similarly, those who have strong faith in me should bow to the bodhisattvas; not like that to the tathagatas. If asked: why? The tathagatas arise from the bodhisattvas; all the hearers and solitary realizers arise from the tathagatas.
>
> Therefore, it is thus established through reasoning and scripture that "the tathagatas are born from the bodhisattvas."

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In the statement "the two former reasons establish it through reasoning," what are the two former reasons in that there are four reasons for praising bodhisattvas?
Student: The two are: (i) from the viewpoint of the attribute of state and (ii) through instilling to perfectly uphold in that Chandrakirti's autocommentary says: "Though that is indeed true, none-the-less, bodhisattvas are causes of the buddha bhagavans for two reasons..."
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is correct.

With respect to the statement "This establishes through scripture that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas," does this mean that the *Pile of Jewels Sutra* is the only sutra that establishes this? Another scripture that establishes that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas is the *Great Wish-fulfilling Medicinal Tree*.

This entire discussion regards the statement that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Though bodhisattvas are born from the teaching of buddhas, Chandrakirti does not need to explain this as he did for hearers and solitary realizers when he said that they are born from Subduer Kings. He taught that hearers and solitary realizers are born from Subduer Kings in order to show that their root ultimately derives from compassion. [In the following stanzas] he indicates separately that the root of bodhisattvas derives from compassion.

If buddhas are born from bodhisattvas from what are bodhisattvas born? They are born from the three practices.

[3] Poisson, p. 255, note 3, cites another note in *Shikshasammuchchaya*, p. 52, note.

To conclude this discussion one can ask: "In what are the three vehicles rooted?" They are rooted in great compassion. Hearers and solitary realizers are born from the kings of subduers. From what are the buddhas born? They are born from bodhisattvas. From what are bodhisattvas born? They are born from the three practices of this context. The three causes of bodhisattvas are: (1) great compassion, (2) the wisdom of non-duality, and (3) the mind of enlightenment. From what are the wisdom of non-duality, and the mind of enlightenment born? They are born from great compassion. In this way the three vehicles come down to great compassion.

In short, the definite goodness of the three vehicles derives from great compassion. To indicate this Chandrakirti takes great compassion as the object of his expression of worship in his *Supplement*. Great compassion is considered very important, therefore our main practice should be its development and in all our various activities we should never be separated from it. Great compassion is so important that in Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* it says: "The wisdom appreciating the supreme vehicle is the mother for those practicing the Buddha-Dharma. Those living in the comfortable womb of concentration and possessing the surrogate mother-like compassion are the children born from the subduers."

Friday morning, January 21, 2000

SUMMARY OF THIS WEEK'S TEACHINGS

The Buddha has given many mahayana teachings which can be condensed into the vast and profound. The stages of the vast come down to us from Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* which sets out the hidden meaning of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. In this context the word 'vast' encompasses the paths from mind generation through enlightenment which are given the name 'seventy topics.'

Maitreya is said to have opened the chariot track of the vast. There are two openers of the chariot track of the profound: Nagarjuna who opened the chariot track of the Madhyamika and Asanga who opened the chariot track of the Chittamatra. Nagarjuna opened the chariot track of the Madhyamika by composing his Six Collections of Reasonings which settled the meaning of the profound. This was covered in the context of the teachings on the *Ornament*.

The Six Collections of Reasonings (*Ocean of Sport*, vol. I, page 29) are:

1. *Fundamental Wisdom*,
2. *Treatise Called 'The Finely Woven,'*
3. *Refutation of Objections*, ,
4. *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness*,
5. *Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning*, and
6. *Precious Garland of Advice for the King*.

In addition, Nagarjuna composed *Compendium of Sutras* and the Collection of Praises, which includes the *Praise of the Sphere of Qualities* and so forth. Among these treatises only three of them present the entire path, whereas the others present only part of the path. These three are: *Precious Garland*, *Compendium of Sutras*, and *Praise of the Sphere of Qualities*. *Fundamental Wisdom* presents only the profound teachings and not the vast.

When Chandrakirti composed the *Supplement*, on the basis of presenting the profound, he also included a discussion of the vast, whereby this text presents both the profound and the vast. Chandrakirti's text is called *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* because 'Middle Way' refers to the text *Fundamental Wisdom* and his text supplements *Fundamental Wisdom* by discussing both the profound and the vast.

Because both conventional and ultimate truths are explained extensively in the *Supplement* some say that this is why it is called 'supplement.' However, this is not correct because when the explanation of the profound in the *Fundamental Wisdom* and that in the *Supplement* are compared there is found to be more explanation of the profound in *Fundamental Wisdom*. Although *Fundamental Wisdom* does not present the vast, because it presents limitless forms of reasonings regarding the ultimate truth it is included in the mahayana basket. The main reasoning explained in *Fundamental Wisdom* is the diamond slivers reasoning which negates the assertions of lower schools regarding inherent production. For example, certain schools assert that phenomena are produced from self, produced from other, produced from both, and produced causelessly, all of which are refuted in Nagarjuna's text.

After the discussion of the meaning of the title comes the homage of the translators. Homage is paid by the translator to Manjushri because the *Supplement* belongs to the basket of higher knowledge (the abhidharma basket).

Then comes a discussion of the first verse of the *Supplement*. Hearers and solitary realizers are born from buddhas because they listen to teachings by buddhas on the profound, i.e., dependent-arising, then reflect on their meaning, and then meditate on it, whereby they fulfill their wishes.

The term 'hearer' has two etymologies: 'listening and hearing' and 'hearing and proclaiming.' Hearers are called listener-hearers because they listen to teachings on the mahayana and then cause other to hear them. They are called hearer-proclaimers because they do not practice the mahayana that they hear but merely proclaim it to others. Bodhisattvas are not called 'hearer-proclaimers' because they also put the mahayana teachings into practice by listening, reflecting, and meditating on them whereby they fulfill their wishes.

However, there is debate regarding the fact that, while hearers' wishes are fulfilled because having listened to the buddhas' teachings they attain their enlightenment in that very life, this does not apply to solitary realizers. The answer is that the wishes of solitary realizers are also fulfilled because although they do not attain foe destroyer in that very life they do attain it in a future life other than that life, like karma which will definitely be experienced in a future life other than the next life.

One difference between hearers and solitary realizers is that hearers accumulate the collection of merit and wisdom for only three lifetimes, whereas solitary realizers do so for a hundred eons. For this reason solitary realizers are said to be superior to hearers. They are also different in terms of their way of giving teachings. Solitary realizers give teachings only when buddhas have not appeared and the hearers have disappeared and do so by way of physical gestures without speech. According to Svatantrika Madhyamika school hearers and solitary realizers are also asserted to be different in terms of their mode of abandoning their objects of abandonment, but according to the Prasangika Madhyamika school this is not so. In the second chapter of the *Ornament* (2.8) it says: "Because it abandons the conception regarding apprehended-objects, because it does not abandon apprehending, and by the support, the path of the rhinoceros-like is to be known as perfectly summarized." It is in this way that according to Svatantrika Madhyamika school solitary realizers are superior in terms of their realization.

Then comes the question: "If hearers and solitary realizers are born from buddhas, from whom are the buddhas born?" The answer is that they are born from bodhisattvas. Having said this there arises the question: "How is it possible for buddhas to be born from bodhisattvas in that the bodhisattvas are said to be the children of the conquerors, i.e., buddhas? How can a father be born from his own son?" There is no fault in saying that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas for two reasons:

1. from the point of view of the attribute of state and
2. from the point of view of instilling to perfectly uphold.

The first means that the same continuum of a bodhisattva becomes a buddha through practice; the second that bodhisattvas exhort other bodhisattvas to uphold their mind generation whereby they become buddhas.

It is proven by scriptural authority that buddhas are born from bodhisattvas. In the *Pile of Jewels Sutra* there is a verse that mentions that it is like bowing to the new moon and not to the full moon.

Thus, buddhas are born from bodhisattvas in terms of buddhas being produced from the very same continuum of the bodhisattva and being produced from others' continuum in the sense of being exhorted by another bodhisattva to uphold the mind generation whereby they do so and become a buddha. Thus, in terms of both substantial cause and cooperative condition buddhas are born from bodhisattvas.

Q: It was said that solitary realizers make prayers to teach when there are no hearers and buddhas and to teach by means of physical gestures without speech. It would seem that they have an altruistic motivation to do so. If they do not then what is the motivation that impels them to make such prayers?
A: It is usually said that solitary realizers do have altruism, however, their altruism is not as strong as that of a bodhisattva. This is why in one text it says: "Although hearers and solitary realizers do have great compassion they lack the attribute of taking the responsibility of others upon themselves." Therefore, they are in fact kind-hearted and much less selfish than us.

Q: It was said that a solitary realizer does not speak in order to teach, so does he teach by manifesting as a bridge for example?
A: When it is said that they teach Dharma by physical gestures without speech it means that through magical emanations that cause faith to arise in the mind of others. Through their physical gestures others can understand the meaning. In the *Treasury of Knowledge* it says that by means of physical gestures one can understand the meaning in that this is a type of revelatory form which can be perceived and a meaning understood. For example, we can understand others are unhappy merely by their facial expressions and gestures.

Solitary realizers can fly, for example, and can also emanate fire blazing from the upper part of their body and water flowing from the lower part. They can also do the opposite. These appearances cause others to generate faith and to contemplate impermanence and so forth, whereby those who see them receive a teaching on impermanence and come to realize it. This way of teaching impermanence is very potent. Buddha gave his first teaching on the four noble truths beginning with impermanence and at the end of his life taught impermanence by showing the aspect of passing away. Thus, solitary realizers teach by physical gestures which cause those who see them to understand.

Q: Did Chandrakirti call his autocommentary a *bhashya*, an explanation, (*Madhyamakavatarabhashya, Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'*) and not a *vritti*, a commentary, because it does not cover all the subjects included in Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom*? Also Geshe-la once said that for a text to be a *vritti*, a commentary, the author should have the three conditions: have received a vision of the deity, have received permission from him to write the text, and to have realized the subject it contains. Since this text is a *bhashya* and not a *vritti* do these three conditions also apply to Chandrakirti?
A: A *bhashya* is a commentary in that it is an extensive explanation. In Sanskrit the words *vritti*, *bhashya*, *tikka*, and so forth are synonyms. Did you suggest that Chandrakirti's text cannot be called a commentary, *vritti*, because it does not cover all the subjects of *Fundamental Wisdom*? That is not the case. This *bhashya* comments on the entire text of the *Supplement* and is therefore complete. Chandrakirti merely chose to call his commentary on the *Supplement* '*bhashya*.' It also can be said that

this *bhashya* was a public discourse by Chandrakirti on the *Supplement* which was then written down. In short, both a *vritti* and a *bhashya* are commentaries.

In short, although a *bhashya* is not called a *vritti* it is a commentary or an extensive explanation. It is up to the author what he prefers to call his text! There is no doubt as to Chandrakirti having all three conditions. He definitely had the first condition which is to have the unbroken lineage from the Buddha through the previous holy beings. He also had the second condition which to have had a vision of one's meditational deity and to have received permission from him to write the commentary. He also has the third condition which is to have the wisdom realizing the entire meaning of the text he has written (there are cases of people who write things and the next day do not even remember the meaning of what they themselves wrote!).

Q: Why do Middle Wayers not accept the scriptural authority of the *Ornament*? For example, Lama Tsongkhapa says that according to the Prasangika Madhyamika school it is not correct that solitary realizers abandon the conception of objects which is an assertion made by Maitreya?
A: The Prasangika Madhyamikas do accept the *Ornament*, but not literally. For example, Maitreya in the *Ornament* (v. 2.8) says:

> *Because it abandons the conception regarding apprehended-objects,*
> *Because it does not abandon apprehending, and*
> *By the support, the path of the rhinoceros-like*
> *Is to be known as perfectly summarized.*

The Prasangika Madhyamika school asserts that solitary realizers do not abandon the conception of external objects. The Chittamatrins and Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert that external objects do not exist but that forms and so forth depend on the activation of latencies in the mental continuum. They assert that solitary realizers abandon the conception of apprehendeds. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is incorrect because solitary realizers cannot abandon the conception of external objects because external objects do exist.

Q: When Geshe-la gave the example of the difference between hearers and solitary realizers he gave the example of the person who had studied at Varanasi and become an acharya but whose knowledge could not be compared to that of a geshe. This example is easy to understand but since hearers and solitary realizers achieve the same goal what is the actual difference? Is it in terms of altruism or pride or a wish to practice alone?
A: Hearers and solitary realizers are different only from the point of view of their motivation to accumulate the collections of merit and wisdom. In the example of one who has studied at the Tibetan Institute of Higher Studies in Varanasi and one who has become a geshe at one of the monastic universities there is a difference in their familiarity with the subjects studied. Likewise, when solitary realizers attain foe destroyer their familiarity with the collections of merit and wisdom is greater than that of hearers.

END

Monday afternoon, January 24, 2000

Q: Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says: "In general the term buddha should be rendered as 'buddha' but here this is not appropriate." Why is this so?
A: It means that in this particular context of middling buddhas it is better to translate the word 'buddha' as 'realizer of suchness.' There are two different translations of the *Supplement*, one of which is by Lotsawa Patsab Nyima Drag. He translated it into Tibetan according to the Kashmiri text and said "Hearers and middling buddhas are born from the kings of subduers." Later, the *Supplement* was retranslated and this same phrase reads: "Hearers and middling realizers of suchness are born from the kings of subduers." In this translation, 'middling buddhas' was translated as 'middling realizers of suchness.' Lama Tsongkhapa indicates that it is better to follow the latter translation which says 'middling realizers of suchness.'

We have concluded the discussion of the way in which buddhas are born from bodhisattvas; next comes a discussion of the three main causes of bodhisattvas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3A1A-3 The three main causes of bodhisattvas
>
> QUESTION: If hearers and solitary realizers are born from Subduer Kings and if Subduer Kings are born from bodhisattvas, what causes bodhisattvas?
> ANSWER: Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *The mind of compassion, non-dual understanding,*
> *And the altruistic mind of enlightenment*
> *Are the causes of Children of Conquerors.* [1.1cd]
>
> The main causes of bodhisattvas are three, a compassionate mind which will be explained [in the following stanzas], a wisdom realizing the meaning of freedom from the two extremes with regard to things, non-things, and so forth, and an altruistic mind of enlightenment.

Here, the root text lists the three main causes of bodhisattvas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti says in his commentary that the altruistic mind of enlightenment is as shown in the quoted sutra. The *Omnipresent Doctrine Sutra* says, 'One realizes the suchness of phenomena and generates the thought, "I will cause sentient beings to understand this nature of phenomena." This mind which is generated is called an altruistic mind of enlightenment.' This does not indicate all the characteristics of an altruistic mind generation because it takes cognizance of only one part – its objects of intent. The definition in Chandrakirti's commentary is also partial. He says, 'One definitely generates an altruistic mind thinking, "I will relieve all these worldly beings from suffering and will definitely join them to buddhahood."' The commentary does not mention taking cognizance of the object of attainment, one's own enlightenment.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that the quotation above in *Omnipresent Doctrine Sutra* "does not indicate all the characteristics of an altruistic mind generation because it takes cognizance of only one part – its objects of intent" – and that the definition in Chandrakirti's commentary is also partial in that it "does not mention taking cognizance of the object of attainment, one's own enlightenment."

There are two observed objects of mahayana mind generation, therefore, for the definition of the mahayana mind generation to be complete, it must observe both (1) enlightenment, one's object of

attainment, and (2) others' welfare. To establish this, one can cite the first chapter of Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization* (v. 1.18ab):

> *Mind generation is the desire for*
> *perfect complete enlightenment*
> *For the welfare of others.*

Mind generation is the definiendum and 'desire for perfect complete enlightenment' is its short definition.

Then the *Ornament* (v. 1.18cd) says:

> *That and that are, as in the sutras,*
> *Expressed in a brief and extensive manner.*

'That and that' are respectively enlightenment and others' welfare, which are explained in the middling length Perfection of Wisdom Sutra and likewise in the brief and extensive Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. In brief, this stanza in the *Ornament* establishes that the mahayana mind generation observes both enlightenment and others' welfare.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Further, if asked: bodhisattvas are the bearers of what causes?
>
> It was mentioned [in verse 1.1] that compassionate mind, non-dual awareness and bodhichitta [are] causes of the Conqueror's children.
>
> There, compassion is mercy, having an aspect and self entity which will be explained just here. Non-dual awareness is wisdom, separated from the two extremes, such as things and non-things.
>
> Bodhichitta is, as indicated in the *Exalted Omnipresent Doctrine Sutra:*
>
> > The bodhisattva, out of bodhichitta, is to understand all phenomena. All phenomena are equal in the sphere of dharma. All phenomena are to be merely known to arise adventitiously without abiding and, because they are empty of subjective-knowers, are merely to be fully known. Hence, this mind that is generated in a bodhisattva having thought: "I shall thus cause sentient beings to understand this nature of phenomena (dharmata)" is called the bodhisattva's bodhichitta. The mind of benefit and happiness for all sentient beings; the unsurpassed mind; the friendly mind due to love; the irreversible mind due to compassion; the mind without regret due to joy; the stainless mind due to equanimity; the unchanging mind due to emptiness; the unobscured mind due to the lack of signs and the non-abiding mind due to the lack of wishes.

A bodhisattva is born from the three practices of this context:
1. great compassion,
2. non-dual awareness, and
3. the mind of enlightenment.

In the passage above from the *Illumination,* when it says "The *Omnipresent Doctrine Sutra* says...", this does not actually quote the sutra but paraphrases its meaning, while the actual quotation appears in Chandrakirti's autocommentary.

Thinking merely to cause sentient beings to realize reality is not sufficient as a definition of the mahayana mind generation. Also if one merely thinks to liberate sentient beings from suffering and place them in buddhahood, this is not sufficient as it does not observe one's own object of attainment.

In the *Omnipresent Doctrine Sutra,* Buddha presents the four immeasurables – love, compassion, joy, and equanimity – respectively saying: "mind due to love, the irreversible mind due to compassion, the mind without regret due to joy, the stainless mind due to equanimity." Buddha then sets forth the three doors of liberation, saying: "the unchanging mind due to emptiness, the unobscured mind due to the lack of signs, and the non-abiding mind due to the lack of wishes." One needs to cultivate meditative stabilization on these three doors. When the three doors of liberation are discussed, the first door, emptiness, is that all phenomena have the entity of being empty of true existence; the second door, signlessness, is the pacification of signs of truly existent causes; and the third door, wishlessness, is that there are no truly existent results that are to be wished for. In the *Questions of Dritarashtra Sutra* it says: "Sentient beings, because of not knowing emptiness, pacification, and non-production, wander in cyclic existence."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> However, Chandrakirti later shows in his commentary that an altruistic mind of enlightenment is generated in dependence on compassion; he says, 'One wishes to attain buddhahood, which is the cause giving rise to the marvelous taste of ambrosia of the excellent doctrine, which is characterized by the disappearance of all wrong thoughts, and which has the nature of being the friend of all beings.' Thus, he clearly mentions taking cognizance of the object of attainment, one's own enlightenment. Therefore, the complete definition of an altruistic mind generation is asserted to be the wish to attain highest enlightenment – the object of attainment – for the sake of all sentient beings – the objects of intent.
>
> That such appears in [Jaya-ananda's] commentary is good. There is also no difference between what is said in Maitreya's *Ornament for the Realizations* and this system.

"That such appears in [Jaya-ananda's] commentary is good" refers to Jaya-ananda's explanatory commentary on Chandrakirti's autocommentary.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, the complete definition of an altruistic mind generation is asserted to be the wish to attain highest enlightenment – the object of attainment – for the sake of all sentient beings – the objects of intent." This is similar to what it says in verse 1.18 in the *Ornament,* which was cited above.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Assigning these three practices as the causes of bodhisattvas is the system of Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (174c-175):
>
> If you and the world wish to gain
> The highest enlightenment,
> Its roots are an altruistic aspiration
> To enlightenment firm like Meru, the king of mountains,
> Compassion reaching in all directions,
> And wisdom which relies not on duality.
>
> This passage indicates that these three are the roots of enlightenment but does not explicitly show that these are the roots of a bodhisattva; however, since root means 'beginning', Nagarjuna is indicating the three main causes of the beginning, and thus it can be known from the context that these are the main causes of bodhisattvas.

The main causes of a bodhisattva are:

(1) compassion,
(2) non-dual awareness, and
(3) the mind of enlightenment.

In this context there is a discussion of great compassion which is a cause of the second two causes: non-dual awareness and the mind of enlightenment. Initially there is great compassion which is the thought thinking, "How wonderful it would be if all sentient beings were free from suffering." Having generated this thought, one then examines whether one is actually able to free them from the suffering of cyclic existence. One finds that the root of cyclic existence is the ignorance conceiving a self and the view of the transitory collection. One then has to understand how this ignorance conceives a self, and examine whether this conception of a self is a correct or incorrect cognizer and whether its referent object exists or not. From this analysis, one comes to understand that the conception of a self is incorrect and can be harmed by a valid cognizer. Thereby, one generates the understanding that the referent object of the conception of a self, or the referent object of the view of the transitory collection, does not exist, whereby one generates the awareness of non-duality. The realization of non-duality is to realize that things and non-things do not exist truly, or to realize things and non-things. When one generates such an awareness, one understands that the conception of true existence can be abandoned. Understanding this, one also realizes that one can attain liberation. One also realizes that one is able to abandon all types of obstructions and achieve omniscience, buddhahood. Understanding that one can attain enlightenment, one thinks, "I must attain enlightenment for the welfare of others."

In this way, first there arises compassion, then non-dual awareness, and then the mind of enlightenment.

Someone objects: "I understand that great compassion and non-dual awareness are causes of bodhisattvas, but how can the mind of enlightenment be a cause of bodhisattvas?" A contrived mind of enlightenment thinking to attain enlightenment for the welfare of sentient beings is similar to an actual mind of enlightenment. This contrived mind of enlightenment is said to be similar to the taste of the bark of sugar cane. Although one has not yet entered the path, one has a special mind of enlightenment wishing to attain enlightenment for others' welfare. Such a contrived special mind of enlightenment is the cause of entering the mahayana path of accumulation.

It can be said that the mind of enlightenment is the cause of most bodhisattvas. This is because the earth-like mind generation accompanied by aspiration (the first of the twenty-two types of mind generation) is a cause for all the bodhisattvas on the middling path of accumulation upward. When someone generates the mind generation for the first time, among the twenty-two types of mind generation which does he generate? He generates the earth-like mind generation accompanied by aspiration.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's teaching these three practices as the causes of bodhisattvas occurs at the time of analyzing the doubt, 'If hearers and solitary realizers are born from buddhas, and buddhas from bodhisattvas, then from what are bodhisattvas born?' Therefore, these three are not suitable to be causes for positing someone as a bodhisattva; they are the causes producing a bodhisattva.

"Therefore, these three are not suitable to be causes for positing someone as a bodhisattva; they are the causes producing a bodhisattva." Here "causes for positing" refers to a definition. In other words, a definition can also be said to be "a cause for positing" or "a reason for positing." For example, it is a pillar because it is that which is able to perform the function of holding up a beam. Or it is a pot

because it is a bulbous-bellied, flat-bottomed water-holder. In this way a definition is 'a cause for positing.'

In this context, the three practices are the causes of producing a bodhisattva and not the causes of positing a bodhisattva, i.e., they are not the definition of a bodhisattva.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> OBJECTION: Is the lowest type of bodhisattva, in relation to whom these three practices are assigned as causes, a novice bodhisattva who has just entered the path or not? If he is, then it is incorrect to assign the altruistic mind generation of the Mahayana as a *cause* because as soon as he attains such a mind generation he is a bodhisattva.

The objection is that the mind of enlightenment cannot be the cause of a novice bodhisattva who has just entered the path because entering the path and generating the mind of enlightenment occur simultaneously. According to Prasangika Madhyamikas, there must be a gap of time between a cause and its result; however, according to the Vaibhashikas, a cause and its result can arise simultaneously.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Moreover, it is not feasible to assign the wisdom that does not rely on the two extremes as a cause of a bodhisattva. This is because he initially generates a conventional mind of enlightenment and *then* trains in the bodhisattva deeds – the six perfections and thus only when training in the perfection of wisdom does he train in the wisdom not relying on the two extremes. On the other hand, if the lowest type of bodhisattva in relation to whom these three are posited as causes is not taken as a novice bodhisattva who has entered the path, then it would contradict the explanations of this lowest type of bodhisattva as like a new moon and as like the shoot of a medicinal tree.
>
> ANSWER: The second position is not asserted because it would incur the fault as explained. Therefore, the first position is asserted, but it does not entail the faults stated above.

Tuesday morning, January 25, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The 'mind generation that precedes a bodhisattva' refers to the time of cultivating mind generation and not to an actual mind generation that has been produced through having cultivated it. The difference between these two mind generations is like that between tasting the bark and the inside of sugar cane. Because the mere thought, 'I will attain buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings' is just verbal understanding, it is like tasting the bark of sugar cane, and although it is *called* an altruistic mind generation, it is not. Through having trained in this mind of enlightenment in accordance with quintessential instructions, special experience is generated that can redirect the mind well. This is like tasting sugar cane itself; therefore, it is fully qualified as a mind generation. Thinking of this, Buddha said in the *Questions of Adhyashaya Sutra (Adhyashayasamchodana):*
>
> > Verbalization is like the bark,
> > Contemplating the meaning is like the taste.

There is no fault regarding the first position because when it is said that mind generation is the cause of a novice bodhisattva, it is the mind generation that is in the process of being cultivated and not the actual experience. It is said to be like tasting the bark of sugar cane compared to tasting the actual sugar cane in that the tastes are similar in that they have a factor of sweetness. Likewise, a contrived mind generation – which is that which is being cultivated – and an actual mind generation both have the aspect of wishing to attain enlightenment for others' welfare. Therefore, there is no fault in the first

position as it refers to a contrived mind generation that is in the process of being cultivated and not the mind generation that has been produced through cultivation.

"Through having trained in this mind of enlightenment in accordance with quintessential instructions, special experience is generated" means that one should develop mind generation through the two quintessential instructions: (1) the seven, the six causes and one effect, and (2) equalizing and exchanging self with others. By means of the seven instructions for mind generation, one first generates a contrived mind generation through the six causes:
(i) recognizing all sentient beings as having been one's mother,
(ii) remembering their kindness,
(iii) thinking to repay their kindness,
(iv) developing attractive love,
(v) developing compassion, and
(vi) the extraordinary thought.
These are followed by (vii) the result, mind generation. This mind generation is of two types: (1) a contrived mind generation and (2) an uncontrived mind generation. First, one develops a contrived mind generation, only later does one develop an uncontrived mind generation. An uncontrived mind generation is a wish to attain enlightenment for the welfare of all sentient beings that arises spontaneously and effortlessly.

The other technique for developing mind generation is that of equalizing and exchanging self and others. One first recognizes sentient beings as having been one's mother, then remembers their kindness, and then thinks to repay their kindness. On this basis one contemplates in many ways the faults of self-cherishing and the advantages of cherishing others, whereby one decides to give up self-cherishing and to cherish others. One then trains in the compassion that takes the suffering of sentient beings upon oneself and the love that gives away one's happiness to sentient beings, whereby one generates the extraordinary thought. In this context the extraordinary thought is the thought to take upon oneself the responsibility of freeing sentient beings from suffering and placing them in happiness. However, when one checks whether one can actually do so, one will discover that only a buddha can do so, whereby one generates the wish to achieve enlightenment. This is the meaning of Lama Tsongkhapa's saying that thereby "special experience is generated that can redirect the mind well."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> A bearer of the bodhisattva lineage with sharp faculties first seeks the view of suchness and then generates the altruistic mind. Therefore, as will be explained later, the second fault is also not incurred.

If it is a sharp-facultied bodhisattva, he is pervaded by having generated the view of suchness before the mind of enlightenment whereas for a dull-facultied bodhisattva there is no such certainty. This is because among dull-facultied bodhisattvas there are those who first generate the mind of enlightenment and then the view of suchness, and there are those who first generate the view of suchness and then the mind of enlightenment.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 'Non-dual understanding' does not refer to the absence of the dualistic appearance of object and subject [which occurs later on the path of seeing]. Chandrakirti's commentary explains it as wisdom free from the two extremes; thus, it is not contradictory for it to occur prior to becoming a bodhisattva.

If "the absence of the dualistic appearance of object and subject" is taken to mean that objects, forms and so forth, and the consciousnesses apprehending them are not different substances, this accords with the Svatantrika Madhyamika school. On the other hand, if it is said to mean that to the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise there is no appearance of duality of subject and object, this would be acceptable to the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

With respect to "wisdom free from the two extremes," the two extremes are the extremes of existence and non-existence, or the extremes of permanence and annihilation. However, Chandrakirti says that the two extremes are things and non-things, which however are respectively permanence and annihilation. Although non-dual understanding means the wisdom free from the two extremes, there is no fault that such a wisdom occurs before the mind generation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> [Jaya-ananda's] explanation that 'non-dual understanding' refers to an ultimate mind generation [which involves the non-appearance of subject and object and begins with the path of seeing] is quite senseless because 'non-dual understanding' must also indicate the wisdom that is a cause of a bodhisattva newly entering the path.

The explanation that non-dual understanding is an ultimate mind generation is not correct because ultimate mind generation is not present before the first ground and therefore cannot be a cause of a novice bodhisattva who has newly entered the path of accumulation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The three principal causes of bodhisattvas are the three practices (dharmas) called:
> 1. compassion,
> 2. wisdom of non-duality, and
> 3. bodhichitta.
>
> As taught in the *Precious Garland* [175]:
>
> > The root of that is bodhichitta, stable like the king of mountains, compassion reaching all classes and exalted wisdom not depending on duality.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3A1B Compassion as the root of the other two causes of a bodhisattva
>
> Compassion is the root of the altruistic mind of enlightenment and non-dualistic wisdom; therefore, it is the chief of the three causes. Indicating this in his root text, Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *Mercy alone is seen as the seed*
> > *Of a conqueror's rich harvest,*
> > *As water for development, and as*
> > *Ripening in a state of long enjoyment,*
> > *Therefore at the start I praise compassion.* [1.2]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Because compassion is also the root of the [other] two, bodhichitta and the exalted wisdom of non-duality, wishing to indicate compassion as the principal itself, [the root text] mentions:

Since mercy itself is accepted as the seed of this excellent harvest
Of the conquerors, as water for development and
Like the ripening in a state of long enjoyment,
I therefore praise compassion at the beginning. [1.2]

Just as for excellent outer grains and so forth, seeds, water and ripeness are the essentials in the beginning, middle and end due to being the very principals, similarly, also during the three times, compassion itself is indicated to be essential for the excellent harvest of the conquerors.

In order to reap a harvest, one first needs a seed planted in a field. This is likened to compassion, which is the seed of the mind of enlightenment. Then, in order for the seed to grow, water is needed. Initially, due to compassion, one generates the mind of enlightenment but later without compassion the mind of enlightenment will be in danger of degenerating. Therefore, compassion is important at the beginning and also in the middle, as without it there is the risk of losing the mind of enlightenment. By means of the mind of enlightenment one attains enlightenment. Compassion is still important at that time because without it one will not be motivated to make a rain of Dharma fall. Because compassion is the root at the beginning, middle, and end it is taken as the object of worship by Chandrakirti in his *Supplement*.

It was said before that Chandrakirti takes compassion as the object of worship unlike other texts, which praise the buddhas and bodhisattvas. The question then arises: "What is the mother that is the object of worship in the context of the *Supplement*?" When this question is asked in the context of the *Ornament for Clear Realization,* the answer is that the mother, which is the object of worship of that text, is the three exalted knowers: the knower of bases, knower of paths, and exalted knower of all aspects. They are the mother that is taken as the object of worship because these three exalted knowers are able to fulfill the wishes of the four superior sons: hearer superiors, solitary realizer superiors, bodhisattva superiors, and buddha superiors. In the context of the *Supplement,* the answer is that compassion is the mother that is the object of worship because compassion is the root of all three vehicles: the hearer vehicle, solitary realizer vehicle, and the great vehicle (mahayana). This will be gone into in more detail in the coming discussions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Mercy is important, like a seed, for the initial development of the marvelous harvest of a conqueror. In the middle mercy is like water for increase higher and higher. At the end mercy is like the ripening of a fruit in a state of long enjoyment for trainees. Because mercy is asserted in this way, I, Chandrakirti, rather than praising hearers, solitary realizers, buddhas, bodhisattvas, or the two other causes of bodhisattvas, praise great compassion at the start of this treatise.

It is not that Chandrakirti *will* praise compassion; the immediately preceding indication of its importance in the beginning, middle, and end with respect to growing the harvest of a conqueror is the praise. 'Mercy *alone'* indicates that unlike the three different examples of importance [seed, water, and ripeness] at the beginning, middle, and end for an external harvest, only compassion is important in the beginning, middle, and end for the harvest of a conqueror.

In short, compassion is important like a seed in the beginning, like water in the middle, and like ripening in the end.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Like this: since those having compassion are pained by the suffering of others, in order to provide refuge fully to the suffering sentient beings without exception, by considering "without

> doubt, I shall take all these worldly ones out of suffering and conjoin them definitely with buddhahood," they definitely generate the mind.

Compassion has two aspects:
(1) the aspect of wishing sentient beings to be free from enlightenment and
(2) the aspect of wishing to protect them or give them refuge.
Here, the second aspect is discussed. The way in which sentient beings suffer will be explained in detail later on.

In this context, praise is made to compassion without differentiating its types, while the praise to compassion within differentiating its types comes later. The three types of compassion are:
1. compassion observing mere sentient beings,
2. compassion observing phenomena, and
3. compassion observing the unobservable (or the unapprehendable or non-referential).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The way that compassion's importance in the beginning is like a seed is this: Those who have great compassion generate a mind that observes their object of intent [the welfare of others] with the thought, 'In order to protect all suffering sentient beings pained by misery, I will relieve them from the suffering of cyclic existence and definitely establish them in buddhahood.' Seeing that [the ability to do] this depends upon their own attainment of buddhahood, they definitely generate a mind observing enlightenment with the thought, 'For their sake I will definitely attain highest enlightenment.'

Mind of enlightenment has two observed objects, as was explained before:
(1) the object of intent, others' welfare, and
(2) the object of attainment, enlightenment.
What is the thought to attain enlightenment for? It is for the welfare of sentient beings. What is the meaning of others' welfare and what is the meaning of enlightenment? Lama Tsongkhapa's *Golden Rosary*, [a commentary on the *Ornament*,] says that others' welfare is the nirvana existing in the continua of others and that enlightenment is one's own enlightenment. In some texts, others' welfare is said to be high status and definite goodness. Since high status and definite goodness are others' welfare, one has to achieve the perfect welfare. What is the perfect welfare? It is the two form bodies of a buddha, the enjoyment body and emanation body. Why is it called 'perfect' welfare? Because the enjoyment body and emanation body teach the Dharma whereby others attain high status and definite goodness. Thus, others' welfare can be understand as either the nirvana in the continua of others or as high status and definite goodness. Since definite goodness is nirvana there is not much difference between these two statements.

Q: Are the two form bodies of a buddha the *cause* of others' welfare or are they others' welfare?
A: They are the cause of high status and definite goodness. In general it is said that the two form bodies are the perfect welfare of others. There is a discussion of this in the context of the object of worship in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] 'Compendium of Valid Cognition'* which says: "To you who have dispelled the net of conceptualizations and possess the profound and extensive bodies, Samantabhadra, you who have light rays radiating everywhere, I prostrate." Here Dharmakirti presents the three perfections (or excellences):
(1) perfect self welfare,
(2) perfect others' welfare, and
(3) perfect enlightened activities.

"You who have dispelled the net of conceptualizations" presents the perfect self welfare in that it refers to the elimination of the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena. "[You who] possess the profound and extensive bodies" [refers to the perfect others' welfare]. "Profound and extensive bodies" is interpreted in different ways by different scholars, but one interpretation is that it refers to the two bodies of a buddha. The one possessing these two bodies is Samantabhadra. The word Samantabhadra in Tibetan is Kuntu Sangpo (*kun tu bzang po*), which means "Always Good," meaning that he is good in the three times. "You who have light rays radiating everywhere" presents the perfect enlightened activities because one possessing the two bodies radiates rays of light that enact the welfare of sentient beings.

"[You who] possess the profound and extensive bodies" is also explained to mean perfect realization. This is because perfect realization includes the realizations of both modes and varieties. One who has these realizations possesses the two bodies of a buddha in that the profound body is the realization of modes, i.e., emptiness, and the extensive body is the realization of varieties, conventionalities. Thus, in the first two lines the excellent qualities of a buddha are expressed in that "You who have dispelled the net of conceptualizations" presents the excellent quality of abandonment of a buddha, whereas "[you who] possess the profound and extensive bodies" presents the excellent quality of realization of a buddha. Saying "Samantabhadra, you who have light rays radiating everywhere" indicates the two form bodies of a buddha, the enjoyment body and emanation body. In this way, the remaining part of the third line and the fourth line present the perfect enlightened activities. Although there are many types of enlightened activities, there are twenty-seven main ones, for example, placing sentient beings in the four means of gathering disciples. These enlightened activities are performed by light rays radiating from the body of a buddha, whereby the mental continua of sentient beings are ripened. In this context, the two form bodies are the causes of perfect others' welfare, high status and definite goodness, which also include nirvana and the two bodies. (The object of worship in Dharmakirti's text is recited in the Tibetan monasteries at the beginning of *Lama Tsongkhapa's Guru Yoga (Ganden Lha Gyema)*.)

In short, although the observed object of the mind of enlightenment is others' welfare, there are various ways of positing others' welfare. In the phrase "the net of conceptualization," just as a net is used to trap animals, likewise the net of the conception of a self of persons and the conception of the self of phenomena traps sentient beings in cyclic existence. In order to become free from cyclic existence, one has to cut this net. To do so one has to develop the wisdom realizing the selflessness of persons and the wisdom realizing the selflessness of phenomena.

Tuesday afternoon, January 25, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Because they understand that such a promise cannot be fulfilled if the practices of giving and so forth – illustrated [in Chandrakirti's commentary] by non-dualistic wisdom – are forsaken, they definitely engage in these practices, the chief of which is wisdom. Therefore, the seed of all buddha qualities is great compassion. Referring to this Nagarjuna says in his *Precious Garland* (378):
>
> > Who with intelligence would deride
> > Deeds motivated by compassion
> > And the stainless wisdom as is
> > Taught in the Mahayana?
>
> Nagarjuna says that all the meanings of the Mahayana are contained within the three: general practices induced by (1) the altruistic mind of enlightenment preceded by (2) compassion, and the particular practice of (3) wisdom free from the stains of conceiving the two extremes.

If one gives up the practices of generosity and so forth, which are illustrated by the exalted wisdom of non-duality, then one's promise to attain enlightenment cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, one must engage in these practices, the chief of which is wisdom. "Definitely engage in these practices" means to definitely engage in the practices of generosity and so forth.

Compassion is the seed of all the excellent qualities of the buddhas. In Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* it says: "Who with intelligence would deride deeds motivated by compassion and the stainless wisdom as is taught in the Mahayana?" Compassion and stainless wisdom should precede all activities; this is not to be derided by anyone.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, since this promise cannot be fulfilled by forsaking the exalted wisdom of non-duality, they just definitely engage also in the exalted wisdom of non-duality. Hence, because of that, the seed of all buddha's qualities is compassion itself.
>
> As taught in the *Precious Garland* [378]:
>
> > Who with intelligence would deride all the deeds preceded by compassion and the stainless exalted wisdom that is explained in the mahayana?
>
> Although bodhichitta is already generated, if later it is not moistened repeatedly by the water of compassion, the extensive collections of the result are not accumulated. In this case, [one] will pass beyond sorrow through the thorough passing beyond sorrow (nirvana) of the hearers and solitary realizers.
>
> Although the state of infinite results already generated, if separated from full maturation of compassion, in this case, one will not be enjoyed (used) over a long time. Also, the stages of the great resultant community of aryas, the uninterrupted transmission from one to another will not strongly increase for a long time.

This concludes the discussion in the autocommentary of compassion without differentiating its types.

Compassion is generated at the beginning. After that, one generates the exalted wisdom of non-duality and then the mind of enlightenment. This order of generation is specifically for the sharp-facultied, in general it is also true for the dull-facultied, although it is not certain.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says: "Nagarjuna says that all the meanings of the mahayana are included in three: general practices induced by (1) the mind of enlightenment preceded by (2) compassion and the particular practice of (3) wisdom free from the stains of conceiving the two extremes." These three include all the practices of the mahayana. Therefore, when one completes these practices one completes the meaning of the mahayana.

Chandrakirti then says: "Although bodhichitta is already generated, if later it is not moistened repeatedly by the water of compassion, the extensive collections of the result are not accumulated." Lama Tsongkhapa explains this in the following passage (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*):

> The importance of compassion in the middle is similar to water. For, although the seed of compassion initially grows into the shoot of an altruistic mind of enlightenment, if later it is not moistened again and again with the water of compassion, one will not amass the two extensive collections that serve as the causes of the fruit, buddhahood. In that case one would actualize the nirvana of either a hearer or solitary realizer. However, if the shoot of an altruistic mind of enlightenment is moistened again and again with the water of compassion, that will not happen; [one will actualize the enlightenment of a buddha].
>
> The importance of compassion at the end is similar to a state of ripeness. For, if one attains the state of a conqueror but lacks the ripened state of compassion, one will not be a source of

> enjoyment and use by sentient beings as long as cyclic existence lasts. Also, the collection of hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattva superiors [arising from] the transmission [of Buddha's word] from one to the other would not increase uninterruptedly. However, when great compassion operates continually at buddhahood, the opposite occurs.

If one attains buddhahood but does not have compassion one will not make the rain of Dharma fall, whereby the hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas will not be born and the continuity of the transmission of the Dharma will be interrupted. Therefore, compassion is necessary at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end. For example, if it is lacking at the end, although one has become a buddha with all the realizations of an enlightened being, sentient beings will not enjoy the ambrosia of the Buddha's speech. On the other hand, because of compassion there is the continuity of the Dharma teachings from Buddha down to us.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Through Chandrakirti's commentary on the meaning of these four lines you should gain firm conviction with respect to the teaching that it is necessary to train in these practices. You should think, 'If I wish to become a Mahayanist, my mind must first come under the influence of great compassion, and then in dependence on this I must generate from the depths of my heart a fully qualified altruistic mind of enlightenment. Once I have done this, I must engage in the general practices of bodhisattvas and in particular must penetrate the profound view.'

Thus, this section discusses the importance of compassion for becoming a bodhisattva. In *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment* (*lam rim chen mo*), it says that for someone to be a mahayanist it is not sufficient for the subject matter to be the mahayana – one must develop the mind of enlightenment in order to be a mahayanist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3A2 Homage to great compassion within differentiating its types

This section has two parts:

A Homage to compassion observing sentient beings
B Homage to compassion observing phenomena and the unapprehendable

3A2A Homage to compassion observing sentient beings

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, especially clarifying the specific entities of compassion by way of their operation in particular instances of observation, desiring to compose a homage, it is mentioned:
>
> *Initially, there is adherence to a self, 'I', and then*
> *Clinging to things is produced, "This is mine."*
> *I bow to that compassion for migrators*
> *Who are powerless like a rambling water mill.* [1.3]
>
> The worldly ones, prior to strongly adhering to 'mine', thoroughly grasping to an 'I' consider that a self exists which [in fact] does not exist. Having finely imputed it, they strongly adhere to just this as true. Then, the consideration that "This is mine" is the strong adherence to every aspect of things other than the object of 'I' grasping.
>
> Because these worldly ones
> 1. strongly adhere to an 'I' and 'mine', very tightly bound by the rope of actions and delusions,

2. engage, relying upon the movement of the operator of the mechanism, the consciousness,
3. wander about the great well of samsara, from the peak of existence to the depths of the Most Torturous Hell (*Avichi*) ceaselessly,
4. by their own nature, engaging to migrate downward, [but] are to be drawn up with how much effort,
5. although having three [sets of] the fully afflicted – affliction such as unknowing, actions and rebirth – the order of the former, latter and middle are not definitely beheld, and
6. battered by the suffering of suffering and changeable suffering every day,
   they abide without passing beyond the state of a water-mill machine.

Since bodhisattvas are pained by those sufferings, having observed them through extreme compassion, they delight in protecting. Therefore, just at the very beginning, homage is made to the bhagavan great compassion. This is the compassion of the bodhisattvas observing sentient beings.

In order to generate compassion for sentient beings, one must first understand how they are suffering. First, they strongly adhere to an 'I.' As a result of this, they strongly adhere to 'mine.' This strong adherence to I and mine is present in all sentient beings. Due to it, sentient beings are said to be bound by the rope of actions and afflictive emotions, like a bucket in a well bound by a rope. The consciousness is likened to the one who turns the wheel. Cyclic existence is analogous to the well. Sentient beings go up and down in cyclic existence from the Peak of Existence to the Most Torturous Hell like a bucket going up and down in a well. This is because just as a bucket goes down into a well effortlessly, likewise sentient beings go to the lower realms without effort. On the other hand, when the bucket is full of water and is to be brought up, there must be strong effort on the part of the operator. Likewise, for sentient beings to go up to the upper realms there is the need of great effort.

There are three types of thoroughly afflicteds: (1) thoroughly afflicted *afflictions*, (2) thoroughly afflicted *actions*, and (3) thoroughly afflicted *rebirth*. These three form a circle, making it difficult to distinguish which comes first, as Chandrakirti says: "the order of the former, latter and middle are not definitely beheld." These three types of thoroughly afflicteds encompass all twelve links because:
(1) thoroughly afflicted afflictions includes the links of ignorance, craving, and grasping,
(2) thoroughly afflicted actions includes the links of karmic formations and existence, and
(3) thoroughly afflicted rebirth includes the remaining seven links.
This is indicated in Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland,* saying that as long as one conceives of the aggregates, one conceives of an I; due to this one creates karma, whereby one takes rebirth. These three paths continuously circle like the circling of a firebrand without beginning, middle, or end. In this way sentient beings wander in cyclic existence.

Sentient beings are "battered by the suffering of suffering and changeable suffering every day." As long as one takes rebirth in cyclic existence due to the power of actions and afflictive emotions, one will experience various types of sufferings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Chandrakirti says:

Homage to that compassion for migrators who are
Powerless like a bucket traveling in a well
Through initially adhering to a self, an 'I',
And then generating attachment for things, 'This is mine.' [1.3]

The view of the transitory collection as a real 'I' generates the view of that collection as real 'mine'. Therefore, these sentient beings initially – prior to the view of the transitory adhering to real 'mine' – adhere to an 'I' as a truth. The view of the transitory apprehending a real 'I' thinks that the self – which does not inherently exist – does so. Subsequently, the view of the transitory apprehending

> real 'mine' generates attachment for the truth of the 'mine', thinking, 'This is mine,' with respect to phenomena other than the 'I' such as forms and eyes.
>
> Chandrakirti's homage to compassion observing sentient beings is: Homage to compassion for migrators wandering powerlessly like a bucket traveling in a well.

Sentient beings first strongly adhere to an 'I' and then to 'mine.' One should identify the nature of this view of the transitory collection. The definition of a view of the transitory collection is: an afflicted wisdom that observing either the I or mine in the continuum of the person possessing it in his continuum conceives it to exist inherently. What is the difference between the view of the transitory collection conceiving 'I' and the view of the transitory collection conceiving 'mine'? They are the same in observing the I; the difference is in the manner of conception in that the first conceives 'I' and the latter 'mine.' Is the view of the transitory collection a conception of a self of persons? Some interpretations say that it is. Then what are the conceptions adhering to the true existence of 'the eye which is mine,' 'the nose which is mine,' and so forth? Are they a view of the transitory collection? They are not, because they are not conceptions of a self of persons but are conceptions of a self of phenomena. This is because they are conceptions of true existence that, from among the two observed objects of the conception of true existence, persons and phenomena, take phenomena as their object. The view of the transitory collection conceiving 'mine' does not have a specific mine as its object, such as 'the eye which is mine, 'the ear which is mine,' 'the car which is mine,' and so forth. In other words, the view of the transitory collection conceiving 'mine' does not conceive of any particular mine. This subject is greatly debated – for example, some people assert four possibilities between the view of the transitory collection and the conception of a self of persons:

1. that which is a view of the transitory collection but not a conception of a self of persons,
2. that which is a conception of a self of persons but not a view of the transitory collection,
3. that which is both a view of the transitory collection and a conception of a self of persons, and
4. that which is neither a view of the transitory collection nor a conception of a self of persons.

An illustration of the first is the view of the transitory collection conceiving 'mine.' An illustration of the second is a mental consciousness conceiving a self of persons; this is a conception of a self of persons, but is not a view of the transitory collection because it is not a wisdom. An illustration of the third is the view of the transitory collection conceiving 'I.' An illustration of the fourth is the conception of true existence of a pot; it is not a view of the transitory collection because it does not observe the mere I and it is not a conception of a self of persons because it does not observe a self of persons. These four possibilities are mentioned in one text, perhaps Gyeltshap Je's commentary on the *Supplement* called the *Condensed Meaning of the Supplement*. There are, however, many scholars who say that there are no such four possibilities, but only three because there is nothing that is a view of the transitory collection but not a conception of a self of persons. They also say that the view of the transitory collection conceiving 'mine' is a conception of a self of persons. This is asserted by, for example, Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa. These scholars say that the view of the transitory collection conceiving 'mine' does not have a specific mine as its object but conceives only the I itself. According to them, it would appear that the view of the transitory collection conceiving 'I' and the view of the transitory collection conceiving 'mine' are not different. According to the Prasangika Madhyamika school, the root of cyclic existence is the view of the transitory collection. This is mentioned by Chandrakirti in the sixth chapter of his *Supplement,* after the discussion of production by four alternatives, in the context of negating a self.

One should meditate on how the conception of 'I' and 'mine' arise. To do so, one first needs to recognize the 'I' and 'mine,' and the 'self' and 'of the self.' One can see the I more easily when one is strongly attached to an object, when one is very angry, when one is so happy that tears come to the eyes, and so forth. One then has to distinguish between the I that is to be negated and the I that exists conventionally. This is a complicated subject. In fact, when some lamas teach mahamudra (Tib. *phyag rgya chen po*), they send people away to a place where there is danger in order to look for the I.

Wednesday morning, January 26, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> QUESTION: In what way are migrators similar to a bucket in a well?
> ANSWER: Sentient beings are the bearers of similarity, and a bucket in a well is the object of similarity, both having six features such as being tied.
> The first feature is that these worldly beings are bound very tightly by the rope of contaminated actions and afflictions. In Chandrakirti's commentary, the word 'these' should be applied to the other five features also.

"Worldly beings" are sentient beings who are bound very tightly in cyclic existence by the rope of contaminated actions and afflictive emotions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The second is that the process [of cyclic existence] depends on being impelled by the mind, like the operator of the pulley mechanism.
> The third is that these sentient beings ceaselessly wander in the great well of cyclic existence from the Peak of Cyclic Existence down to the Most Torturous Hell.
> The fourth feature is that these sentient beings naturally and effortlessly go downward to bad migrations and must be drawn with great exertion upward to happy migrations.
> The fifth is that they have the three sets of thorough afflictions, the order of which cannot be determined one-pointedly. The three sets are (1) the afflictions of ignorance, attachment, and grasping, (2) the actions of compositional action and 'existence', and (3) the productions of consciousness, name and form, six sources, contact, feeling, birth, and aging and death.
> The sixth feature is that every day these sentient beings are battered by the sufferings of pain and change, and the pervasive suffering of being so conditioned as to be always ready to undergo pain. Therefore, these sentient beings do not pass beyond the state of a bucket in a well.
> Here the application of similarity by way of six features is not made merely for the sake of understanding the way that sentient beings wander in cyclic existence.

These six features of similarity between a bucket in a well and the way sentient beings wander in cyclic existence were already explained.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> QUESTION: Then what is the purpose?
> ANSWER: Previously Chandrakirti indicated that one who wishes to enter the Mahayana must initially generate great compassion, but he did not show how to generate compassion in meditation. Here, by showing the way that sentient beings wander powerlessly in cyclic existence he indicates how to generate great compassion through meditation.

The way to generate compassion is to meditate on the way in which sentient beings circle in cyclic existence and the way in which they are battered by suffering. Having done this meditation well, one will develop compassion. While meditating, one should think that sentient beings are battered by the three types of suffering: the suffering of suffering, suffering of change, and pervasive compounded suffering. There is no moment in which sentient beings do not experience one of these three. In the *Sutra on the Four Close Placements of Mindfulness* it says: "Hell beings experience the fire of the hells, hungry ghosts experience hunger and thirst, animals experience eating one another, human beings experience [the need for] nourishment and drink, gods experience a lack of conscientiousness. On the tip of needle-like cyclic existence there is never any happiness."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> By what agency do sentient beings enter into cyclic existence? By just this extremely unpeaceful, untamed mind.

In brief, only our own minds cause us to circle in cyclic existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Where and how do they wander? From the Peak of Cyclic Existence to the Most Torturous Hell without the slightest interruption in their circling.
>
> By what causes and conditions do they wander? By the power of contaminated actions and afflictions. They wander in bad migrations by the power of non-meritorious actions and afflictions, and in happy migrations by the power of meritorious and unmoving actions and afflictions. To be born in bad migrations the process operates automatically and without effort, but it is difficult to be born in happy migrations because great effort must be made to achieve their causes. The *Topics of Discipline (Vinayavastu)* says that instances of leaving either a happy or a bad migration and going to a bad one are as numerous as the particles of this great earth and that instances of leaving a happy or a bad migration and going to a happy one are as few as the particles held on the tip of a fingernail.

The difficulty and rarity of beings in bad or happy migrations dying and taking rebirth in a happy migration is likened to the number of dust particles on the tip of a fingernail. On the other hand, the number of beings who take rebirth in a bad migration are likened to the particles of dust the entire earth. What makes sentient beings circle in cyclic existence from the Peak of Existence down to the Most Torturous Hell is an unpeaceful and untamed mind. .

Cyclic existence is 'the continuous joining by the force of actions and afflictive emotions.' The cause of rebirth in the bad migrations is non-meritorious actions, which are easily and effortlessly created in that non-meritorious actions are created even by doing meaningless actions. In this way, we create a great amount of non-meritorious actions, whereby we take a great many rebirths in the bad migrations. On the other hand, the causes of rebirth in the happy migrations are meritorious actions and immovable actions. Meritorious actions are said to be easy to create compared to immovable actions, yet still they require great effort. Due to creating meritorious actions one will be reborn as a human being, antigod, or god of the desire realm. Due to immovable actions, one takes rebirth in the form realm and formless realm. The preparations that include calm abiding and special insight, which require effort and are not easy to attain, are immovable actions. In addition, the actualizing action for rebirth in the form realm is the attainment of an actual concentration, while that for rebirth in the formless realm is an actual formless absorption.

In this way, the number of beings taking rebirth in the bad migrations are likened to the dust particles of the entire earth, while the number of beings taking rebirth in the happy migrations are likened to the amount of dust particles that can be taken up on the tip of the fingernail of a tathagata.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Whenever any of the three groups of thorough afflictions in a round of dependent arising is present, the two remaining groups are also operating in other rounds of dependent arising. Therefore, the process is uninterrupted, and every day – like ripples in water – beings are tormented more than once by the three sufferings.
>
> If your mind has not been affected by thinking about the way that you yourself wander in cyclic existence, then when you think about these modes of suffering in other sentient beings, there is no way that you as a beginner can find their suffering unbearable. Therefore, as Chandrakirti says in

> his commentary on Aryadeva's *Four Hundred*, first you should think about these in yourself and afterwards meditate on them in other sentient beings.

For example, while one set of afflictions (ignorance, craving, and grasping) of one round of dependent-arising occurs, there is another set of rebirth (consciousness, name and form, six sources, contact, feeling, birth, and aging and death) of another round of dependent-arising occurring and another set of karma (karmic formations and existence) of another round of dependent-arising occurring. For example, our present rebirth as a human being belongs to one round of dependent-arising. To which link does it belong? We are presently experiencing the twelfth link of aging and death. From the point of view of the four existences, we are experiencing the fourth, the first being the death existence, the second being the intermediate state existence, the third being the birth existence, and the fourth being the previous time existence. Previous time existence is the existence subsequent to birth and prior to death. Although we are experiencing the twelfth link of a human life we are creating other rounds of dependent-arising due to ignorance and karmic formations, which accumulate karma for another rebirth. Therefore, even in one day a human being, who is in the round of dependent-arising of a human rebirth, accumulates karma that will bring future rebirths.

One should begin by thinking of one's own suffering before going on to think of others' suffering, as in this way the meditation will be more effective.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> QUESTION: Can great compassion be induced merely by meditating on the way that other sentient beings are tortured in cyclic existence by suffering and by the sources of suffering or is another aid needed?
>
> ANSWER: In the world when suffering is seen in an enemy, not only is it not unbearable, but one delights in it. When a person who has neither helped nor harmed one is seen to suffer, one will in most cases pay no attention to that person. These [reactions] are due to not having a sense of pleasantness with respect to these persons.
>
> When one sees a friend suffer, it is unbearable [in the sense that one must do something about it], and the degree of unbearability is just as great as one's sense of pleasantness toward him. Therefore, it is an important essential that one must generate a sense of strong cherishing and affection for sentient beings.

It is not enough to meditate on true sufferings and true origins with regard to sentient beings in order to generate great compassion; one must also meditate on the pleasantness or attractiveness of sentient beings. By doing so, love and compassion for them will arise simultaneously because when one explicitly wishes sentient beings to have happiness, one implicitly wishes them to be free from suffering and vice versa.

When a friend is experiencing intense suffering, one strongly wishes him or her to be free from this suffering. On the other hand, if that person is seen in an unattractive aspect one will not develop such a wish.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Among the kings of scholars, there are two systems concerning the means for generating a sense of pleasantness. Of the first, Chandrakirti says in his commentary to Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* that if sentient beings are considered to have been friends – such as parents – from beginningless time, then one can bear to plunge into cyclic existence for their sake. The great being Chandragomin and the king of scholars, Kamalashila, also presented it this way. The second is the system of the glorious Shantideva. These can be known from my explanations elsewhere [in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*].

Chandrakirti sets out the system for developing the mind of enlightenment of (1) recognizing sentient beings as having been one's mother, (2) remembering their kindness, (3) thinking to repay their kindness, (4) developing pleasant love, (5) compassion, and (6) the extraordinary thought. Here Chandrakirti says to consider sentient beings as having been one's parents, i.e., one's fathers and mothers. One can also think of them as having been one's sons or daughters, brothers and sisters, and so forth.

The second system for developing the mind of enlightenment is that of equalizing and exchanging self and others, which is usually said to come from Shantideva. However, the actual source of this system goes back to the *Precious Garland* by Nagarjuna.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Those who strive to train in great compassion through strongly cherishing sentient beings and reflecting on the ways in which those beings are tortured in cyclic existence make meaningful Chandrakirti's uncommon expression of worship. Those who otherwise claim to be skilled in this are like prattling parrots. This analogy applies to other situations as well.
>
> Later I will explain how this comes to be called compassion observing sentient beings.

If one meditates on the way in which sentient beings suffer in cyclic existence and thereby develops pleasant love for them, then Chandrakirti's expression of worship becomes meaningful – otherwise it is like being a prattling parrot merely repeating a phrase without understanding its meaning.

In this regard there is a story about a family who had a parrot that they kept in a cage by the door. One day a bald man entered the house. The parrot asked him, "Did someone turn a hot frying pan upside down on your head?" Although it appeared to be a meaningless question, in fact it had happened that one day a hot frying pan had been put upside down on the parrot's head whereupon his head had been burned! Sometimes people say things that appear ridiculous; for example, there is a story of a man who had a bump on his head who, when asked where it had come from, answered that his bottom had been butted by a sheep! However, this was the case in that when the sheep butted him he was bending down, whereupon his head hit against a wall.

The next outline in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) is:

> 3A2B Homage to compassion observing phenomena and the unapprehendable

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to also clarify the compassion observing phenomena and the non-referential by way of their observations, [the root text] mentions:
>
> *That sees migrators like a moon in moving water,*
> *As fleeting and empty of self-nature.* [1.4ab]
>
> "Homage to that compassion" should be joined to that.
>
> Thus, when the reflection of the moon within a portion of very clear water covered by ripples from a mild breeze appear like observing in direct perception the actual previously observed object of support (the water) together with the disintegrating [moon] – the noble ones see it as a situation which clarifies these two specific essential-natures. That is, impermanence in each instant and emptiness of specific nature.

> Similarly, also when bodhisattvas who have come under the influence of compassion see sentient beings as abiding within an ocean of the view of the transitory collection – the characteristic of all erroneous conceptions – the extensive blue water of the ignorance of the entirety of migrators strongly agitated by the wind of improper conceptualization, the situations in front of them like reflections of their own actions, the suffering of the impermanence in each instant descending upon them, and empty by self-nature; they desire to perfectly attain buddhahood, the cause of the eminent taste of the nectar of the holy Dharma that destroys the suffering of their impermanence, the characteristic that overcomes all erroneous conceptions, the nature of the kinship of the entirety of migrators.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's homage to compassion observing phenomena is: Homage to compassion viewing migrators as evanescent or momentarily disintegrating, like a moon in water stirred by a breeze. His homage to compassion observing the unapprehendable is: Homage to compassion viewing migrators as empty of inherent existence though they appear to exist inherently, like the reflection of the moon in water.

Through changing the words of Chandrakirti homage slightly, homage is paid to the two types of compassion, compassion observing phenomena and compassion observing the unobservable (non-referential or unapprehendable).

Wednesday afternoon, January 26, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In order to illuminate the compassions observing phenomena and the unapprehendable from the viewpoints of the objects observed, Chandrakirti says in his root text:
>
> *[Homage to that compassion for] migrators*
> *Seen as evanescent and empty of inherent*
> *Existence like a moon in rippling water.* [1.4ab]
>
> Chandrakirti's homage to compassion observing phenomena is: Homage to compassion viewing migrators as evanescent or momentarily disintegrating, like a moon in water stirred by a breeze. His homage to compassion observing the unapprehendable is: Homage to compassion viewing migrators as empty of inherent existence though they appear to exist inherently, like the reflection of the moon in water.
>
> In commenting on this, Chandrakirti says, 'Homage to that compassion' omitting 'for migrators', but his thought is that the 'migrators' [of the previous stanza] are included as the objects observed by the latter two compassions.
>
> An image of the moon appears in a portion of very clear water that is covered by ripples from a mild breeze. The water that serves as the basic object is [actually] apprehended prior to the reflection, but the reflection is manifestly apprehended as a real moon that disappears each day. The excellent ones, namely, beings who are skilled in these ways, see momentary impermanence and the emptiness of the nature of the moon as it appears to be.

The last line [of the Tibetan] of the third verse in the *Supplement* (1.3d) says "Homage to that compassion for migrators." The word "migrators" also comes in the first line of the fourth verse (1.4a) which says "for migrators." "In commenting on this, Chandrakirti says, 'Homage to that compassion' omitting 'for migrators', but his thought is that the 'migrators' [of the previous stanza] are included as the objects observed by the latter two compassions." In the third verse homage is paid to the compassion observing mere sentient beings, while in the fourth homage is paid to the compassion

observing the unobservable and the compassion observing phenomena, however in all three cases migrators are observed.

The compassion observing mere sentient beings is compassion which observes sentient beings not qualified by impermanence, emptiness, and so forth and wishes them to be free from suffering.

The compassion observing phenomena is the compassion that observes sentient beings qualified by impermanence and wishes them to be free from suffering.

The compassion observing the unobservable is the compassion that observes sentient beings qualified by not existing inherently and wishes them to be free from suffering.

The fourth verse of Chandrakirti's *Supplement* (1.4) pays homage to both the compassion observing phenomena and the compassion observing the unobservable by changing the words slightly. In order to pay homage to the compassion observing phenomena the words need to be changed to: "Homage to compassion viewing migrators as evanescent or momentarily disintegrating, like a moon in water stirred by a breeze." And in order to pay homage to the compassion observing the unobservable the words need to be changed to: "Homage to compassion viewing migrators as empty of inherent existence though they appear to exist inherently, like the reflection of the moon in water." This is clarified by Lama Tsongkhapa.

In regard to this Chandrakirti's autocommentary said before:

> Thus, when the reflection of the moon within a portion of very clear water covered by ripples from a mild breeze appear like observing in direct perception the actual previously observed object of support (the water) together with the disintegrating [moon] – the noble ones see it as a situation which clarifies these two specific essential-natures. That is, impermanence in each instant and emptiness of specific nature.

The moon's reflection in water changes daily in that it is not seen during the day but only at night. During the day the moon disappears, or disintegrates, in the sky whereby there is no longer a reflection in the water. Then when the moon reappears so does the reflection in the water. The noble ones realize that sentient beings disintegrate momentarily just as the moon disintegrates both in the sky and in the water each day. In addition, the reflection of the moon in water appears to be a real moon although it is not, [and, likewise, sentient beings appear to be inherently existent but are not].

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> As in the example, bodhisattvas who have come under the influence of compassion also see sentient beings in an ocean – the view of the transitory – which is filled by a vast blue river of ignorance. They see that this ocean in which sentient beings abide is stirred by the winds of improper thought and that the reflections of the beings' own wholesome and unwholesome actions which are like the moon in the sky are reflected in front of them. Bodhisattvas see sentient beings with the suffering of composition – momentary disintegration – descending on them, and they see beings as empty of inherent existence. Observing them, bodhisattvas generate great compassion, and, as explained earlier, their great compassion arises from reflecting on the pleasantness of sentient beings and on the ways in which they wander in cyclic existence.

Here Lama Tsongkhapa set out an analogy likening the view of the transitory collection to an ocean and ignorance to a blue river that fills it. On the other hand, when Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen describes

the formation of the universe in his *Ocean of Sport* he takes the ocean as an illustration of cyclic existence, the surrounding twenty mountains as the view of the transitory collection, and the darkness above this universe as ignorance. These twenty mountains are huge and vast and covered with dense forests whereby it is difficult to exit from them, just as it is difficult to leave cyclic existence. These mountains are covered by darkness which is analogous to ignorance.

However, in *Illumination* Lama Tsongkhapa takes the ocean as analogous to the view of the transitory collection and takes the blue river flowing into it as analogous to ignorance. Sentient beings are drowning in this ocean, over which blows a strong wind analogous to improper conceptualization. In front of these sentient beings there is the reflection of the moon which is likened to their different kinds of actions.

Ignorance in this context is the conception of a self of phenomena while the view of the transitory collection is the conception of a self of persons. This is because the conception of a self of persons is based upon, or fed by, the conception of a self of phenomena. Although here the view of the transitory collection is said to be the cause of cyclic existence, the cause actually comes down to the conception of a self of phenomena.

The higher schools say that the view of the transitory collection is ignorance and an afflicted wisdom, whereas the lower schools say that it is not ignorance but is a wisdom. Thus, the view of the transitory collection can either be included among the six object-determining mental factors as wisdom, or among the six root afflictive emotions as ignorance. The lower schools assert that ignorance and afflicted wisdom are two different mental factors in that ignorance is one of the six root afflictive emotions while the view of the transitory collection is an afflicted view. In *Abhidharmakosha*, [which sets out the Vaibhashika tenets,] the view of the transitory collection is asserted to be included in wisdom and therefore to be one of the object-determining mental factors.

On the other hand, according to the Prasangika Madhyamika school the view of the transitory collection is both ignorance and an afflicted wisdom. However if it is asked whether ignorance is a view of the transitory collection, the answer is that it is not because ignorance is not a conception of a self of persons. For this reason ignorance cannot be a view of the transitory collection. In short, if it is a view of the transitory collection it must be a conception of a self of persons.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Even though the view of the transitory is ignorance, Chandrakirti explains ignorance separately [as a river flowing into the ocean of the view of the transitory] because he is referring to the ignorance that induces the view of the transitory – the conception of a self of phenomena.

If someone we do not know walks into this room, his form aggregate appears to us whereupon the conception of a self of phenomena arises (phenomena being the form aggregate of that person). At this point we have only seen his form aggregate and do not yet know who he is. When this person introduces himself as so-and-so whereby we come to know his name, we generate the conception of a self of persons. In this way the conception of a self of persons is based upon the conception of a self of phenomena.

Another example is what happens when someone sees an arm coming from an open window. If someone outside sees only the hand he generates a conception of a self of phenomena in relation to that hand. This person does not know whose hand it is and only after finding out whose it is does he generate a conception of a self of persons observing a person. In this way, the conception of a self of phenomena induces the conception of a self of persons.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> At this point in his commentary Chandrakirti says that the three compassions are distinguished by the objects that they observe, not by their subjective aspects. Therefore, all three types of compassion have as their subjective aspect the wish to free sentient beings from suffering; they are thereby similar in that they observe sentient beings. In discussing the first type of compassion Chandrakirti says (stanza 1.3a), 'Compassion for migrators', and in discussing the latter two types of compassion he says (1.4ab), 'Evanescent migrators.' In this way he shows that sentient beings are the objects observed.

In short, all three types of compassion have the same aspect.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Still, compassion observing phenomena does not observe just sentient beings, but those who momentarily disintegrate. Therefore, the objects of observation are sentient beings qualified by momentary impermanence. When one determines that beings disintegrate momentarily, the existence of a permanent, partless, and independent person is eliminated in one's mind. Thereby, one can ascertain the non-existence of sentient beings who are different entities from their mental and physical aggregates. At that time one understands that they are *designated* to the mere collection of the mental and physical aggregates. Sentient beings who are designated to the mere phenomena of the aggregates and so forth serve as the objects of observation, and thus this is called 'compassion observing phenomena'.

Because sentient beings are merely designated on the collection of aggregates, the compassion observing them is called 'compassion observing phenomena.' The compassion viewing sentient beings qualified by momentary impermanence is compassion observing phenomena, as is the compassion observing sentient beings qualified by being empty of being permanent, partless, and independent. The compassion observing sentient beings as empty of being self sufficient substantially existent is also compassion observing phenomena. In short, the compassions observing sentient beings as qualified by impermanence, as qualified by being empty of being permanent, partless, and independent, and as qualified by being empty of self sufficient substantial existence are compassions observing phenomena. Only when a compassion views sentient beings qualified by being empty of inherent existence is it compassion observing the unobservable.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Impermanent sentient beings are just an illustration. Observing those who do not substantially exist in that they are not self-sufficient is also called 'observing phenomena'. Therefore, giving the name, 'observation of phenomena', to observation of sentient beings who are designated to mere phenomena is a contraction.

The term 'observing phenomena' is a contraction in that specific words are missing which complete the meaning. In short, 'compassion observing phenomena' and 'compassion observing the unobservable' are contractions of respectively compassion observing sentient beings designated on phenomena and compassion observing sentient beings qualified by non-true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Compassion observing the unapprehendable also does not observe mere sentient beings. It observes a special object, sentient beings who are empty of inherent existence. 'Unapprehendable' means 'not truly existent' and refers to the referent object's not existing in the way that it is conceived to exist by a consciousness grasping at signs [of inherent existence]. Giving the name, 'observing the unapprehendable' or 'unapprehendable compassion' to the observation of sentient beings qualified by non-true existence is a contraction.

> Many Tibetan commentators say that the second compassion observes momentary disintegration and the third non-inherent existence. These are explanations of those who have not understood well the subjective aspects and objects of observation of these two compassions. For, it is necessary to assert that both have the aspect of wishing to free sentient beings from suffering, and if momentariness and non-inherent existence were asserted as the objects of these aspects, then one compassion would have two discordant aspects as its mode of apprehension [because it would also have the aspect of realizing momentariness or non-inherent existence].

A single awareness cannot have two objects of the mode of apprehension. In short, a single awareness cannot have dissimilar modes of apprehension, one wishing sentient beings to be free from suffering and one apprehending sentient beings as momentary, or one wishing sentient beings to be free from suffering and one apprehending sentient beings as empty of inherent existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Sentient beings qualified by momentariness and non-inherent existence are put as the objects of observation of these two compassions. Thus, before a person can have these two in his mental continuum, he must ascertain that sentient beings are momentary and do not inherently exist. Then, in dependence on his previous ascertainment, the aspects of these two qualities must appear to his mind. However, it is not necessary that these compassions themselves apprehend sentient beings as impermanent or not inherently existent. [The appearance of these qualities to a compassionate mind due to previous ascertainment is sufficient.]

The compassion observing phenomena observes sentient beings qualified by impermanence, for example, and wishes them to be free from suffering, while the compassion observing the unobservable observes sentient beings qualified by being empty of inherent existence and wishes them to be free from suffering. The person who has these two compassions has necessarily previously realized that sentient beings are momentarily impermanent and empty of inherent existence. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "However, it is not necessary that these compassions themselves apprehend sentient beings as impermanent or not inherently existent." This means that while these compassions do not themselves apprehend impermanence and the emptiness of inherent existence, the person who has generated these two compassions does realize that sentient beings are impermanent and empty of inherent existent.

Q: Does he do so simultaneously?
A: The compassion observing sentient beings and the wisdom realizing sentient beings as impermanent arise simultaneously and manifestly, likewise the compassion observing sentient beings and the wisdom realizing sentient beings are empty of inherent existence arise simultaneously and manifestly. (Note: In Guy Newland's *Compassion: A Tibetan Analysis* says that they do not arise simultaneously.) This assertion is based on their being explicitly conjoined. Because they are explicitly conjoined both compassion and wisdom occur manifestly and simultaneously, otherwise they would not be said to be explicitly conjoined. There is a difference between 'conjoined' and 'explicitly conjoined.' If it is conjoined, that which is conjoined and that which conjoins do not have to be manifest simultaneously. 'Conjoined' means to benefit and assist each other. We say, for example, "He is conjoined with misleading companions" in that sense that when one is conjoined with misleading friends one is helped to lose one's qualities and increase one's negativities. However, one can argue that this person is harmed and not helped and ask what benefit is there from misleading companions.

Is there a compassion accompanied by a conception apprehending a permanent, partless, and independent person? There is in that we think "How pitiful" with respect to sentient beings whom we

perceive as permanent, partless, and independent. Even if we do not have this compassion, we do have a compassion accompanied by a conception of a self sufficient substantially existent person.

Thursday morning, January 27, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In both the basic text and the commentary Chandrakirti explains that the latter two compassions observe sentient beings qualified by the qualities explained above and says that mere sentient beings – who are not so qualified – are the objects of observation of the first compassion. Therefore, his giving the name, 'compassion observing sentient beings', to the first compassion is a convenient contraction.
>
> It is wrong to assert that the first compassion must observe permanent, partless, and independent sentient beings. As for compassion in the continuums of those who have not found the view of selflessness, there are many instances of their generating compassion observing only sentient beings. There are also many instances of it observing sentient beings, not qualified by either of the two qualities explained above, in the continuums of those who have found the view of common personal selflessness or the view of suchness. For instance, even though someone has completely refuted the referent object of a consciousness apprehending a pot to be permanent and has understood that the pot is impermanent, not every instance of his observing it is posited as an observation of a pot that is qualified by impermanence. Also, even though someone might not have understood that a pot is impermanent, not every instance of his observing it is put as an observation of a pot that is qualified by permanence.

Someone makes the objection that the first type of compassion, the compassion observing sentient beings, observes sentient beings qualified by being permanent, partless, and independent. However, this is incorrect. This is because there are instances of observing mere sentient beings by both those who do not have the realization of the selflessness of persons and those who do have the realization of the selflessness of persons. In other words, there are instances of compassion observing mere sentient beings without their being qualified by being permanent, partless, and independent. An example of this is the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of the path of seeing. In the continua of this person there is compassion observing mere sentient beings but not compassion observing sentient beings qualified by impermanence or qualified by non-true existence. The compassion in the continuum of one on the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing is the first type of compassion. It is not the second type of compassion because it does not observe sentient beings qualified by impermanence. It is also not the third type of compassion because it does not observe sentient beings qualified by non-true existence. However, in subsequent attainment there can be the second and third types of compassion, that observing phenomena and that observing the unobservable, in the continuum of this person.

Q: Does conventional truth appear to a person on the mahayana uninterrupted path of the path of seeing?
A: It appears to the person but not to the mahayana uninterrupted path of the path of seeing. However, this can be debated. This above assertion accords with Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen who says that someone on the uninterrupted path of the mahayana path of seeing has a conventional mind generation which necessarily observes both observed objects, complete enlightenment and others' welfare. Therefore, it is said that to this person there is the appearance of conventional truth while to his meditative equipoise it does not appear. This is mentioned in Gyeltshap Je's *Essential Explanation* and in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Golden Rosary*. However, according to Panchen Sonam Drakpa a person on the mahayana uninterrupted path of path of seeing does not have the mind of enlightenment, compassion, love, and so forth. However, this means that he does not have them manifestly because

Panchen Sonam Drakpa asserts that if an awareness exists in the continuum of a person it is pervaded by being manifest. If he is asked whether this person degenerated the conventional mind generation or compassion, Panchen Sonam Drakpa answers that he has not because it is exists in a manner of non-degeneration. Then if asked does it exist, Panchen Sonam Drakpa answers that it does not.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* then says that when a pot is observed there is no pervasion that it is observed qualified by permanence or qualified by impermanence. This means that one can observe the mere pot not qualified by any features.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it is great compassion is it pervaded by being one of the three compassions indicated in this context?
Student: There is no pervasion; for example, the compassion observing sentient beings qualified by permanence.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Would you accept that there is a great compassion observing sentient beings qualified by permanence?
Student: Yes.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Then it is not any of these compassions because it is not the first compassion because the object, sentient beings, in this case is not qualified by permanence; it is not the second because the compassion observing sentient beings as permanent does not observe sentient beings qualified by impermanence or qualified by being empty of self sufficient substantial existence; and it is not the third compassion because it does not observe sentient beings qualified by non-true existence. Who is a person who observes sentient beings qualified by permanence thinking "How pitiful"?
Student: Myself!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> No matter which of the three objects of observation these three compassions observe, each has the aspect of wishing to protect all sentient beings from all suffering. Therefore, they differ greatly from the compassion generated by hearers and solitary realizers. When [practitioners] generate such compassions, they generate an altruistic mind of enlightenment, thinking, 'For the sake of sentient beings I will definitely attain the state of a buddha.'

Compassion in this context is pervaded by the aspect of wishing to protect all sentient beings. Hearers and solitary realizers also have compassion but there are different assertions concerning this in that some scholars say that they have compassion but not great compassion while some say that they have great compassion but do not have the aspect of wishing to protect all sentient beings. If hearers and solitary realizers have great compassion what follows? It would contradict the verse in the *Ornament for Clear Realization* (v. 1.10) which says "Through knowledge, not abiding in existence, through compassion, not abiding in peace," because if they have great compassion hearers and solitary realizers would not remain in solitary peace but would arise from it. There is a text by Khedrub Dentar of Sera Me that says that although hearers and solitary realizers do have great compassion they do not have the extraordinary thought that takes upon oneself the responsibility for all sentient beings. It is said that this scholar is a manifestation of Venerable Maitreya and in previous lives was Purbuchog, the tutor of Gyelwa Jampa Gyatso, the VIII Dalai Lama, the author of *Collected Topics*, and a tutor of the XII and XIII Dalai Lamas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

The compassion to which Chandrakirti offers worship is mainly initial compassion, but it is also the other compassions of bodhisattvas. Thus, there is no contradiction in Chandrakirti's saying in his commentary at this point that bodhisattvas generate compassion.

QUESTION: Can all three types of compassion be a cause of bodhisattvas when they first enter the path?

ANSWER: Those bearing the Mahayana lineage who are followers of fact [and not just words] initially seek knowledge of the true suchness [emptiness]. Once they have ascertained the ultimate well, they generate an altruistic mind of enlightenment, which is founded on generating great compassion for sentient beings, and then train in the discipline of a Subduer – the bodhisattva deeds. Those bearing the Mahayana lineage who are followers of faith cannot realize suchness first. They generate an altruistic mind of enlightenment after which they train in the bodhisattva deeds such as searching for knowledge of the meaning of reality. Shantirakshita's *Ornament of the Middle Way (Madhyamakalamkara)* says:

> First searching to know reality
> They ascertain well the ultimate
> And then generate compassion
> For the world obscured by bad views.
> Heroes effecting migrators' welfare,
> Skilled in the vast mind of enlightenment,
> They practice the Subduer's discipline
> Adorned with wisdom and compassion.
> Followers of pure faith generate
> The mind of perfect enlightenment,
> Assume the discipline of the Subduer,
> And strive for knowledge of reality.

Thus, there are two types of practitioners, and among them there are cases of generating all three compassions prior to becoming a bodhisattva. [The followers of fact realize emptiness before becoming a bodhisattva and thus can generate compassion observing sentient beings qualified by non-inherent existence.]

Chandrakirti's expresses worship mainly to initial compassion, the first of the three practices, yet the compassion of bodhisattvas can also be posited as the object of worship of this context. However, there are different interpretations regarding this. The three practices of this context are the causes of a bodhisattva. It can be asked: "If it is a bodhisattva is he pervaded by being born from the three practices of this context?" There is no pervasion because, although sharp-facultied bodhisattvas are pervaded by being born from the three practices, there is no pervasion that dull-facultied bodhisattvas are born from the three practices. This is explained by Shantarakshita in his *Ornament of the Middle Way* which say: "First searching to know reality they ascertain well the ultimate and then generate compassion for the world obscured by bad views." In other words, sharp-facultied bodhisattvas first investigate reality and then generate compassion for sentient beings who are obscured by the cloud of bad views.

Shantarakshita then says: "Heroes effecting migrators' welfare, skilled in the vast mind of enlightenment, they practice the Subduer's discipline adorned with wisdom and compassion." "The Subduer's discipline" refers to the fact that bodhisattvas have the bodhisattva vows and abide in the conduct of a bodhisattva. Then in regard to dull-facultied bodhisattvas Shantarakshita says: "Followers of pure faith generate the mind of perfect enlightenment, assume the discipline of the Subduer, and strive for knowledge of reality." This means that dull-facultied bodhisattvas first generate compassion, then the mind of enlightenment, then take the vows of a bodhisattva and engage in the conduct of a bodhisattva, and only then strive in the knowledge of reality. In this case the wisdom realizing emptiness cannot produce this bodhisattva because it is generated after he has already become a bodhisattva.

Q: For sharp-facultied bodhisattvas it seems that Shantarakshita asserts the order in which the three practices are generated is different from how they are set out by Chandrakirti?
A: That is correct. Chandrakirti says that sharp-facultied bodhisattvas are pervaded by first searching for the knowledge of reality and then generating the mind of enlightenment, whereas dull-facultied bodhisattvas also generate the mind of enlightenment and search for the knowledge of reality and thereby realize emptiness but the order in which they do so is not definite. It can be asked: "Are the three practices of this context only posited from the point of view of sharp-facultied bodhisattvas or are they posited from the point of view of both sharp and dull-facultied bodhisattvas?" The answer is that the three practices of this context are posited from the point of view of both sharp and dull-facultied bodhisattvas. However, for those of dull-facultied there is no certainty as to the order in which they are generated.

Q: Shantarakshita seems to be saying that the main cause of the other two causes is not compassion but wisdom in that first comes wisdom and then compassion and the mind of enlightenment which would contradict what Chandrakirti says regarding compassion being the cause of the other two causes. Is that right?
A: It would seem so.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says: "Thus, there are two types of practitioners, and among them there are cases of generating all three compassions prior to becoming a bodhisattva." "There are cases of generating all three compassions prior to becoming a bodhisattva" is an answer to the previous question: "Can all three types of compassion be a cause of bodhisattvas when they first enter the path?"

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Even though one has previously found the view of suchness, it is not contradictory that when training in the bodhisattva deeds [which include training in wisdom] one ascertains and trains in the meaning of suchness. Not only is that not contradictory, it is the way it must be done.

Although one has previously realized emptiness and then goes on to practice the bodhisattva deeds, one still needs to ascertain and train in the meaning of suchness. In other words, a bodhisattva practices the bodhisattva deeds accompanied by an understanding of emptiness.

> Even though Chandrakirti, having offered worship, does not explicitly promise to compose his text [as is customary], there is no fault as Nagarjuna did the same in his *Treatise on the Middle Way* and *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktishashtika).* Similarly, there are many instances of [an author's] making a promise to write a book and not making an explicit expression of worship as, for example, in Nagarjuna's *Friendly Letter (Suhrllekha).* Still, Chandrakirti implicitly promises to write the book when, wishing to begin it, he makes an expression of worship.

In general when someone is about to compose a treatise, the author first expresses an offering of worship followed by a promise to compose the text. In his *Supplement* Chandrakirti makes an offering of worship but does not explicitly promise to compose the text. However, he makes an implicit promise to compose the text when he makes the expression of worship. This is like the case of Nagarjuna in his *Fundamental Wisdom* and *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*. There are also cases of an author making a promise to compose the text but not making an expression of worship, for example, Nagarjuna's *Friendly Letter* in which he did not make an offering of worship as his text was written in the form of a letter. In short, Lama Tsongkhapa says that Chandrakirti makes an explicit offering of worship in his *Supplement* and an implicit promise to compose the text.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> With respect to the factors causing others to become involved in the book, the *subject matter is* the profound and the vast. The *uncommon purpose* has been explained. The *temporary essential purpose* begins with practicing the meanings of the text that one has come to know [through hearing and thinking] and extends through progressing on the four paths [of a bodhisattva – accumulation, preparation, seeing, and meditation]. The *final essential purpose* is [the attainment of] the effect ground – buddhahood. The *relationship* of these is that the essential purposes depend on the purpose and that in turn depends on the text [the *Supplement*].

It can be asked: "Is the *Supplement* speech related to a purpose?" This can be asked because is not explicitly indicated as it is in the *Ornament*. However, it is speech related to a purpose because speech concordant with a meaning is pervaded by having the four factors:

1. subject matter,
2. purpose
3. essential purpose, and
4. relationship.

The text to be composed must have a subject matter; unlike the treatise composed to prove that crows have teeth Chandrakirti's text does possess a subject matter. The treatise composed to prove that crows have teeth was composed by a non-Buddhist scholar to defeat his daughter in a debate about this subject. The scholar maintained that when a crow bites someone a wound is left, proving that a crow has teeth. The daughter said that the crow does not have teeth and that the wound was made by the beak itself. Chandrakirti's *Supplement* has the subject matter of the profound and vast.

Chandrakirti's *Supplement* also has a purpose, in fact it has an uncommon purpose, which as Lama Tsongkhapa was explained previously. This refers to when it was said previously that the purpose is to realize the meaning of the profound and vast in dependence on the *Supplement*.

Chandrakirti's *Supplement* also has both a temporary and an ultimate essential purpose, or purpose of purpose. The temporary essential purpose is the realization of the four paths, the path of accumulation and so forth, and the ultimate essential purpose is the final attainment, buddhahood.

Chandrakirti's *Supplement* also has the fourth, relationship, which is that the essential purpose is related to the purpose and the purpose is related to the text. By hearing and studying the *Supplement* one realizes the meaning of the profound and vast. In dependence on the subject matter of the text one realizes the purpose, the meaning of the profound and vast, and as a result one attains the temporary essential purpose, the four paths, and the ultimate essential purpose, buddhahood.

Therefore, Chandrakirti's *Supplement* is speech related to a purpose possessing the four features. Therefore, this treatise is not at all like the treatise composed to prove that crows have teeth; the treatise on taking one's own mother as a bride; the treatise on taking the crown of a naga king, and the treatise on making sacrifices [which are respectively examples of texts lacking the four features.]

Thursday afternoon, January 27, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B Actual body of the text
>
> This section has two parts:
> 1 Causal grounds
> 2 Effect ground
>
> 3B1 Causal grounds

This section has three parts:

A Ways of practicing the paths of this system in general
B Ways of practicing on the level of common beings in particular
C Presentation of the grounds of bodhisattva superiors

3B1A Ways of practicing the paths of this system in general

QUESTION: If here in Chandrakirti's text the profound and vast paths of bodhisattvas are arranged following the protector Nagarjuna, how are the stages of paths proceeding to buddhahood asserted in the latter's system?

ANSWER: The purpose of settling the systems of the second buddha – the honorable Nagarjuna – and so forth through hearing and thinking is to find great conviction in the ways to practice the pure path. You thereby will not be led astray by similitudes of paths. No matter how much you train in the texts of the Mahayana systems, hearing and thinking that do not develop any conviction in the ways to practice the path are cases of not properly accomplishing hearing and thinking. Though you would have made effort in the Mahayana, you would have not extracted its essence well. You should strive to know the stages of progress on the path.

In order to establish the profound and vast paths in one's continuum as set out by Nagarjuna, one has to hear about them and then think about them. Then one has to gain certainty with regard to the way to practice the path. If one has understood this well, no one will be able to cause one to stray from the right path. On the other hand, if one studies Nagarjuna's system for a long time yet does not gain conviction as to how to practice the path, it shows that one has not been able to integrate one's hearing in one's practice whereby it becomes a waste of time. The main purpose of listening to teachings and studying is to learn how to practice, if this is not understood one's study has been meaningless. In daily life it is important to gain conviction regarding the subject of one's practice. In other words, in order to meditate on, for example, the subject of compassion, one has to first recognize what compassion is and then learn the ways to develop it in one's mind. In this way one will slowly become able to generate one's own mind in the aspect of compassion.

There is a difference in the way of meditating on emptiness and the way of meditating on compassion. Meditation on compassion means to transform the entity of one's mind into compassion, the wish that sentient beings be free from sufferings. This is not the case for meditation on impermanence and emptiness. Meditation on emptiness, for example, means to take emptiness as one's object of the mode of apprehension and to analyze it; in this case one's own mind is the subject, or object-possessor, analyzing the object.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The honorable Nagarjuna made many explanations of portions of the path but wrote three books teaching the body of the path based on both the profound and the vast. As was quoted before, Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (174c-175) says:
>
> If you and the world wish to gain
> The highest enlightenment,
> Its roots are an altruistic aspiration
> To enlightenment firm like Meru, the king of mountains,
> Compassion reaching in all directions,
> And wisdom which relies not on duality.
>
> And (378):

Who with intelligence would deride
Deeds motivated by compassion
And the stainless wisdom as is
Taught in the Mahayana?

Nagarjuna sets forth an identification of the six perfections, their benefit, and the training in them as well as in accompanying compassion (435-9):

Briefly the virtues observed
By bodhisattvas are
Giving, ethics, patience, effort,
Concentration, wisdom, compassion, and so forth.

Giving is to give away completely
All one's wealth, ethics is to help others,
Patience is to forsake anger,
Effort, to delight in virtues;

Concentration is unafflicted one-pointedness,
Wisdom is to ascertain the meaning of the truths,
Compassion is a mind that savors only
Mercy and love for all sentient beings.

From giving there arises wealth, from ethics happiness,
From patience a good appearance, from [effort in] virtue
Brilliance, from concentration peace, from wisdom
Liberation, from compassion all aims are achieved.

From the simultaneous perfection
Of all those seven is attained
The sphere of inconceivable wisdom,
The protectorship of the world.

Nagarjuna sets forth the basis of the deeds – a preliminary generation of the mind of enlightenment – and the progress on the ten bodhisattva grounds through those deeds.

Lama Tsongkhapa indicates that, although Nagarjuna composed many texts, only three of them present the path in terms of both the profound and the vast. The first of these three texts is *Precious Garland*, which is quoted here. Nagarjuna says that in order to attain enlightenment, one must first generate the mind of enlightenment and, in order to develop that, one must generate its main causes, compassion and so forth, the three practices which are indicated saying: "Who with intelligence would deride deeds motivated by compassion and the stainless wisdom as is taught in the Mahayana?" This show that all mahayana practices are preceded by compassion.

In the following stanzas the entity of the bodhisattva practices, the six perfections, generosity, and so forth, are set out. Here the bodhisattva deeds are said to be seven: "Giving, ethics, patience, effort, concentration, wisdom, compassion, and so forth." Nagarjuna then defines these seven beginning with generosity which he says is "to give away completely all one's wealth." In the *Stages of the Path* generosity is explained to be of three types: (1) the generosity of material things, (2) the generosity of protection from fear, and (3) the generosity of Dharma. In tantra there are said to be four types of generosity by adding the generosity of love to these three.

"Ethics is to help others" and to abandon harming them. The definition of ethics is: the intention to abandon harm. There are three types of ethics: (1) the ethics of refraining from bad conduct, (2) the ethics of collecting virtuous qualities, and (3) the ethics of enacting the welfare of sentient beings.

"Patience is to forsake anger," which means to have an undisturbed mind. To have an undisturbed mind is, for example, when harmed by someone to maintain a calm mind undisturbed by anger. Patience is of three types: (1) the patience of bearing sufferings, (2) the patience of definitely thinking about Dharma, and (3) the patience of non-retaliation.

"Effort is to delight in virtue," virtue being white or positive qualities. There are many types of effort, but what is important is to develop constant effort within ourselves. We should not have strong effort at the beginning of an activity and then completely give up all effort, like a strong storm that brings much water and then suddenly and completely disappears.

"Concentration is an unafflicted one-pointedness." When cultivating concentration; one should place the mind one-pointedly without distraction on the object. Concentration is also of different types.

"Wisdom to ascertain the meaning of the truths," 'the truths' being either the two truths or the four truths. The two truths are the conventional truth and ultimate truth. Buddha said that the basis is the two truths, the path is method and wisdom, and the result is the form body and truth body. The two truths can be ascertained by way of either a valid inferential cognizer or a direct perceiver. Presently we can understand the two truths by means of a valid inferential cognizer in dependence on correct reasonings.

"Compassion is a mind that savors only mercy and love for all sentient beings."

"From giving there arises wealth, from ethics happiness," here happiness refers to rebirth in the happy migrations.

"From patience a good appearance" means that one will be born beautiful through the practice of patience. Nagarjuna then says: "From [effort in] virtue brilliance, from concentration peace, from wisdom liberation." "From compassion all aims are achieved" means that one achieves all one's aims in this life and also of future lives.

In order to understand that "from giving arises wealth" one has to rely on a correct sign of conviction. One cannot do so based on a correct sign by way of the power of the fact or a correct sign by way of renown. An appropriate syllogism is: The passage that says "from giving arises wealth," as the subject, is non-deceptive with respect to the subject it presents because it is a passage which is pure by way of the threefold analysis. A correct sign of conviction can be divided into:
(1) a correct sign of result,
(2) a correct sign of nature, and
(3) a correct sign of non-observation.

(1) An example of a correct sign of result is the syllogism: The passage that says "from giving arises wealth," as the subject, is preceded by a valid cognizer realizing that it is non-deceptive with respect to the subject it presents because it is a passage that is pure by way of the threefold analysis. Among correct signs of result this is a correct sign of result proving that a cause existed before.
(2) An example of a correct sign of nature is the syllogism: The passage that says "from giving arises wealth," as the subject, is <u>non-deceptive</u> with respect to the subject it presents because it is a passage which is pure by way of the threefold analysis. It is a correct sign of nature because the reason and the predicate are the same nature.
(3) An example of a correct sign of non-observation is the syllogism: The passage that says "from giving arises wealth," as the subject, is <u>not deceptive</u> with respect to the subject it presents because it is a passage which is pure by way of the threefold analysis. This is a correct sign of non-observation because the predicate of this syllogism is in the negative. Another example with the same subject and sign but a different predicate is: The passage that says "from giving arises wealth," as the subject, it is not that there is no valid cognizer realizing the subject it presents because it is a passage which is pure by way of the threefold analysis.

The threefold analysis is:
1. not being harmed by a valid direct perceiver and being established by it,
2. not being harmed by a valid inferential cognizer by the power of fact and being established by it, and
3. not being harmed by a valid inferential cognizer by the power of conviction and being established by it.

A pure text by Buddha presents any of the three subjects: manifest phenomena, slightly hidden phenomena, or extremely hidden phenomena. If Buddha's sutra presents manifest phenomena it is not harmed by a valid direct perceiver and is established by it; if it presents slightly hidden phenomena it is not harmed by a valid inferential cognizer by the power of fact and is established by it; if it is presents extremely hidden phenomena it is not harmed by a valid inferential cognizer by the power of conviction and is established by it.

There is debate concerning the above: "In the case of 'from giving arises wealth' is the object taught an extremely hidden phenomenon?" Some say that it is not an extremely hidden phenomenon since it is easily verified. They say that what is an extremely hidden phenomenon is when and where wealth will arise from giving. In order to understand the specific results of giving one must rely on conviction gained through scriptural authority. This is also true of the statement "from ethics happiness" and the statement "from patience a good appearance." However, in daily life one can see the immediate results of the practice of patience. For example, we can observe the expression of a person who is angry and see that due to his anger there is a change in his face and it becomes ugly. On the other hand, if that person has a relaxed mind his face changes and becomes attractive. Therefore, due to anger there is ugliness and due to patience beauty.

Then Nagarjuna says "From the simultaneous perfection of all those seven is attained the sphere of inconceivable wisdom, the protectorship of the world." In other words, one will attain the state of being able to protect other sentient beings through the practice of these seven.

"Nagarjuna sets forth the basis of the deeds – a preliminary generation of the mind of enlightenment – and the progress on the ten bodhisattva grounds through those deeds."

In regard to the second of Nagarjuna's text, *Praise of the Element of Qualities*, which sets out both the profound and vast, Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) then says:

> Nagarjuna's *Praise of the Element of Qualities (Dharmadhatustotra)* explains the generation of the altruistic mind of enlightenment – which is done after taking refuge – the enhancement of one's lineage through the ten perfections, and the ten bodhisattva grounds.

Here the *Praise of the Element of Qualities* is not actually quoted and its subject matter is only presented briefly. First one goes for refuge and then, on the basis of guarding the precepts of refuge, one generates the mind of enlightenment. Then one enhances or develops "one's lineage through the ten perfections." The lineage referred to here is the developmental lineage in that the naturally abiding lineage cannot be enhanced or diminished. One enhances the developmental lineage through the practice of the ten perfections. On the first ground, Very Joyful, a bodhisattva practices the surpassing practice of generosity, on the second ground the surpassing practice of ethics, on the third ground the surpassing practice of patience, on the fourth ground the surpassing practice of effort, on the fifth ground the surpassing practice of concentration, on the sixth ground the surpassing practice of wisdom, on the seventh ground the surpassing practice of skill in means, on the eight ground the surpassing practice of prayer, on the ninth ground the surpassing practice of power, and on the tenth ground the surpassing practice of exalted wisdom.

Friday morning, January 28, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> These rough condensations of the stages of the path are explained in detail in his *Compendium of Sutra*. There he sets forth the difficulties of attaining leisure, fortune, and faith in the teaching and the even greater difficulty of generating an altruistic mind of enlightenment. He presents the difficulty of attaining great compassion for sentient beings and the still greater one of gaining the means of abandoning the karmic obstructions [arising] from criticizing bodhisattvas, the thought to despise bodhisattvas, demonic activities, forsaking the excellent doctrine, and so forth. Many such explanations are contained in his *Compendium of Sutra*.
>
> Compared to the *Precious Garland* or the *Praise of the Element of Qualities*, the *Compendium of Sutra* is indeed clear. However, Shantideva – a great bearer of the master Nagarjuna's system presents very clearly and extensively those stages of the path still more difficult to realize in general in both his *Compendium of Instructions (Shikshasamuachchaya)* and *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyavatara)*. He does this in particular in his *Compendium of Instructions* which is a commentary on the meaning of Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra*.

In the *Compendium of Sutras* Nagarjuna says that it is difficult to find the leisures and fortunes (endowments) of a precious human rebirth and to have faith in the Buddha's doctrine. To make life meaningful, one must meditate on how difficult it is to find this precious human rebirth again. A precious human rebirth is characterized by eight non-leisures: four states of non-leisure of non-human beings and four states of non-leisure of human beings. The four states of non-leisure of non-human beings are: (1) rebirth as a hell being, (2) hungry ghost, (3) animal, or (4) long-life god of Without Discrimination. These are said to be states of non-leisure because they are states in which there is no leisure to practice the Dharma, on the other hand being free of these states one does have the leisure to practice the Dharma. In addition, those with a precious human rebirth are free from the four states of non-leisure of human beings: (1) to be born in an eon of darkness, (2) to be born stupid and dumb, (3) to born as a barbarian in a border region, and (4) to hold wrong views. Since we are free of these non-leisures we have all eight leisures.

The ten fortunes, or ten endowments, are also composed of two groups: five personal fortunes and five circumstantial fortunes. The five personal fortunes are: (1) to be born as a human being, (2) to be born in a central land, (3) to have complete sense faculties, (4) to not have committed the five actions of immediate retribution, and (5) to have faith in the four noble truths, i.e., that the first two are to be abandoned and the latter two to be practiced, or faith in the three higher trainings, or most importantly faith in the three Dharma baskets. The five circumstantial fortunes are: (1) a buddha has arisen in the world, (2) he has taught the Dharma, (3) the Dharma still exists, (4) there are people following the Dharma, and (5) there are people who support Dharma practitioners. We have all these eighteen qualities of a precious human rebirth, therefore we should rejoice in our good fortune. However, they are not easy to find again so we should make this life meaningful.

We have a precious human rebirth which is difficult to find and faith in the Dharma which is difficult to generate, and in addition we are seeking the mind of enlightenment which is even more difficult to generate. However, we should continue to strive in it even if we are only able to generate a contrived mind of enlightenment. Nagarjuna also says that it is difficult to develop compassion for sentient beings and, even if one has generated it, it is very easy to lose it when sentient beings treat one badly. The Tibetan nomads say: "If compassion is generated quickly, hatred still remains." For example, when we see the poor we think "How pitiful" but then if they treat us badly we immediately become angry.

Nagarjuna says that it is difficult to abandon such negativities as "criticizing bodhisattvas, the thought to despise bodhisattvas, demonic activities, forsaking the excellent doctrine, and so forth."

The action of forsaking the excellent doctrine is a very heavy negativity. In fact in the *Guhyasamajatantra* it says that while the five immediate actions can be purified by practicing this tantra the action of abandoning the Dharma is very difficult to purify. We should examine whether we have the action of abandoning the Dharma in our continuum. Although we do not explicitly think "I will give up the Dharma," we do things like stepping over Dharma texts, putting saliva on them, and so forth. These are not actually actions of abandoning the Dharma but are of a similar type.

"Demonic activities" were discussed in the *Ornament for Clear Realization* saying that there are four groups of ten plus six, for a total of forty-six. To overcome these is difficult.

Then Lama Tsongkhapa says: "However, Shantideva – a great bearer of the master Nagarjuna's system presents very clearly and extensively those stages of the path still more difficult to realize in general in both his *Compendium of Instructions (Shikshasamuachchaya)* and *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyavatara)*. He does this in particular in his *Compendium of Instructions* which is a commentary on the meaning of Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra*." Shantideva in his *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* refers readers to his text *Compendium of Instructions* for further clarification of certain points.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In explaining the *Compendium of Sutra* this book describes the initial thought on the importance of leisure and fortune and the extreme difficulty of finding both. It then sets forth helpful thought for extracting the essence of this life, generation of faith in general and of firm faith in particular through recalling the qualities of the Mahayana. It then explains generation of the aspirational mind of enlightenment, assuming vows of practice, giving away one's body, enjoyments, and roots of virtue, and the modes of maintenance, purification, and increase of these.

Shantideva says that one should first contemplate the difficulty of finding a precious human rebirth which is greatly meaningful, then extract its essence, generate faith in the doctrine in general and the mahayana in particular, then generate the aspirational mind of enlightenment, take the bodhisattva vows and practice giving away one's body, enjoyments, and roots of virtue. To indicate the aspirational mind of enlightenment and the practical mind of enlightenment Shantideva says that they are respectively like "wishing to go" and "going." These two minds of enlightenment are differentiated in terms of being conjoined or not with the bodhisattva practices. The aspirational mind of enlightenment is a mind generation that is not explicitly conjoined with the practice of any of the six perfections, generosity and so forth. On the other hand, practical mind of enlightenment is a mind generation that is explicitly conjoined with the practice of any of the six perfections, generosity and so forth.

To attain enlightenment one must practice the bodhisattva deeds, the six perfections, in order to ripen one's own continuum and engage in the four means of gathering disciples in order to ripen others' continua.

"Assuming vows of practice" refers to the bodhisattva vows. Having taken them one should safeguard them without degeneration and practice the bodhisattva deeds.

"Giving away one's body, enjoyments, and roots of virtue, and the modes of maintenance, purification, and increase of these" means that giving away one's body is to be understood in terms of maintaining, purifying, and increasing as are giving away one's enjoyments and roots of virtue. This is explained elaborately by Shantideva in his *Compendium of Instructions*. One should also refer to the *Compendium of Sutra* to which it is a commentary.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In his *Four Hundred* Aryadeva also presents the body of the profound and vast paths. Moreover, the body of the path is similar in Bhavaviveka's *Essence of the Middle Way (Madhyamakahrdaya)*, Shantirakshita's *Ornament of the Middle Way*, and Kamalashila's three *Stages of Meditation on the Middle Way (Bhavanakrama)*. Therefore, all the great bearers of the superior Nagarjuna's system agree on the structure of the path.
>
> The means for readily bestowing conviction in these paths and facilitating a beginner's entry to them can be known from the precepts found in the *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradipa)* by Atisha, who was skilled in the two systems of the Mahayana [of Nagarjuna and Asanga].

One should refer to the *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment* by Atisha in that it is short and easy to understand yet includes the vast and profound teachings that come down from Nagarjuna and Asanga. For example, the textural tradition of the great masters can be likened to a refrigerator filled with food in the house of a rich family. Atisha's *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment* can be likened to a skilled chef who takes the food from the refrigerator and prepares it well. Just as if a cook has prepared food for us it is ready to be taken and eaten, likewise the *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment* can easily be taken up and all the teachings of the great masters put into practice. This text is said to be easy in that it is a short text yet it contains the entire meaning of the teachings of Nagarjuna and Asanga, the openers of the chariot tracks of the vast and profound.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: If a pot is qualified by impermanence does the pot appear as impermanent?
A: Here one has to distinguish whether it appears to a person or to a mind. When a pot qualified by impermanence appears to a person, impermanence appears to the person. On the other hand, to a conception which is an awareness apprehending a pot qualified by impermanence there is the appearance of pot but no appearance of impermanence. Why? Because a conception is an eliminative engager. However, to an eye consciousness apprehending pot, when pot appears impermanent pot appears. There is a stanza in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] 'Compendium of Valid Cognition'* which says that when a functioning thing is seen all its qualities are also seen. Therefore, when pot appears to an eye consciousness apprehending pot everything that is the same substantial establishment in terms of place, time, and nature also appears, meaning that when the pot appears impermanent pot appears, the functioning thing pot appears, the product pot appears, and so forth. This is because an eye consciousness apprehending pot is a direct perceiver and a direct perceiver is a complete engager.

There is a discussion of eliminative engager and complete engager in a text by Gyelwa Gedun Drup in which it says that an eliminative engager (or partial engager) engages its object by eliminating its parts (or engages it partially) . On the other hand, a complete engager (or collective engager) engages its object without eliminating its parts.

Q: To the compassion observing phenomena is the reason that sentient beings appear qualified by impermanence that the compassion is explicitly conjoined with a realization of impermanence?
A: Yes.
Q: If a pot appears to a sentient beings as truly existent is it because it is explicitly conjoined with an awareness conceiving true existence? Since to sentient beings phenomena appear as qualified by true existence is the compassion observing sentient beings explicitly conjoined with the conception of true existence?
A: In general, one could say that our compassion is explicitly conjoined with a conception of true existence but if this is said there follows a consequence. It is true that sentient beings appear to us as truly existent but one does not think that sentient beings are truly existent and therefore generate

compassion. Although to us pot appears as truly existent, there is no pervasion that we apprehend it to be truly existent. Although sentient beings appear to us as truly existent, there is no pervasion that we apprehend them to be truly existent.
Q: Sentient beings appear to us as truly existent but it is not necessary that we apprehend them to be truly existent?
A: Right.
Q: Then when a sentient being appears to us qualified by impermanence there is no pervasion that we apprehend that sentient being as impermanent?
A: If a sentient being appears as qualified by impermanence there is no pervasion that impermanence appears.
Q: If a sentient being qualified by impermanence appears it is not necessarily apprehended as impermanent?
A: Right. If a sentient being appears qualified by impermanence there is no pervasion that an impermanent sentient is apprehended.
Q: It seems that if it is compassion it is a compassion observing phenomena because when a sentient being appears it appears as a sentient being qualified by impermanence.
A: No pervasion.

Q: What is the difference between object of the mode of apprehension, object-aspect, appearing object, and object of engagement?
A: An object of the mode of apprehension seems to be the same as the object-aspect because the object-aspect is the object that is taken as the object of the mode of apprehension. An object of engagement and an object of the mode of apprehension with respect to a consciousness are the same. An object of engagement and an object of the mode of apprehension are different with respect to a person. With respect to a person there is an object of engagement but not an object of the mode of apprehension. An object of engagement can also be posited with respect to an expressive sound. This is because an expressive sound is an object-possessor. Because it possesses its object, that object can only be an object of engagement, I think. That with respect to a person there is an object of engagement means that a person engages in objects which are to be adopted and discarded.

Q: I think Geshe-la said yesterday that the compassion in the continuum of someone on the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing is the first of the three compassions. Is that correct?
A: It is.
Q: Then why is it not the third type because this person realizes emptiness directly? If he realizes emptiness directly why does he not have a compassion observing sentient beings as empty of true existence?
A: That person is realizing emptiness directly because his uninterrupted path of the path of seeing realizes emptiness directly. However, the compassion in his continuum is not manifest at that time. The direct realization of emptiness in the continuum of someone on the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing is not explicitly conjoined with compassion since compassion is not manifest. This compassion is not explicitly conjoined with emptiness because only the realization of emptiness is manifest. In order for something to be explicitly conjoined with something else both must be manifest. Is that compassion not conjoined with that wisdom? It is conjoined, but it is not *explicitly conjoined*. In one text it says that having attained a ground it is not possible for mind generation to be separated from practice. A bodhisattva on the mahayana uninterrupted path of the path of seeing has attained the first ground, he has compassion which cannot be apart from practice, practice meaning wisdom. In other words it is conjoined with wisdom. Yet is it explicitly conjoined? It is not.

Q: Of the three types of compassion that were presented is it enough to have one of them to enter a path or are all three necessarily present?
A: Regarding one specific person who enters the bodhisattva path there is no pervasion that this person has developed all three types of compassion in order to become a bodhisattva. He can become a bodhisattva by developing any one of the three. A person who has not entered any path can have a realization of impermanence or a realization of emptiness, yet these are not paths. For example, it is said that if one has an uncontrived experience of compassion, that compassion is not pervaded by being a path. According to Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa there can be an uncontrived experience of compassion in someone who has not entered a path. When someone has an uncontrived experience of the mahayana conventional mind generation he enters the bodhisattva path for the first time. Before the uncontrived experience of the mahayana conventional mind generation he has had an uncontrived experience of compassion.

Q: Is the direct realization of subtle impermanence a specific characteristic of buddha?
A: All superiors have this realization.
Q: Is it not true that production, abidance, and disintegration for Prasangika Madhyamikas are mutually inclusive?
A: This is true for all Buddhist schools.
Q: If they are mutually inclusive and a characteristic of subtle impermanence yet a superior still has the appearance of true existence, how does a superior realize subtle impermanence?
A: These three characteristics are equally pervasive but there is no need for them to be realized simultaneously. For example, when a form appears to eye consciousness all the qualities of form appear simultaneously. It is the same. A superior has a yogic direct perceiver realizing subtle impermanence directly, yet he has the appearance of production, abidance, and disintegration. For example, a yogic direct perceiver realizing table as impermanent in the continuum of a superior, to that yogic direct perceiver impermanence is the object of the mode of apprehension. At the same time all that which is the same substantial establishment with it also appears, product and so forth. In the first chapter of *Compendium of Valid Cognition* it says that when a functioning thing is seen all its qualities are seen. This is said in regard to a direct perceiver.

Q: It was said that for the lower schools the view of the transitory collection is a wisdom which is an object-determining mental factor. On the other hand, it was said that for the Prasangika Madhyamikas it is ignorance, yet the definition given was that it is an afflicted wisdom. This appears to be contradictory.
A: The Vaibhashikas assert that the view of the transitory collection is a wisdom. The view of the transitory collection which is wisdom cannot be ignorance because if it is wisdom it is a factor that analyzes, whereas ignorance engages in an obscured manner. If the view of the transitory collection is a wisdom it can be debated: "Is the view of the transitory collection able to discriminate phenomena properly?" According to some if it is an intelligence (*lo dro*) it must be that which is able to discriminate phenomena properly whereas it if it a wisdom (*she rab*) this is not necessary.

If it is a view of the transitory collection it is necessarily an afflicted wisdom. The lower schools posit the definition of a view of the transitory collection as: an afflicted wisdom that observing the I or mine in the continuum of the person possessing it in his continuum conceives it to be self sufficient substantially existent. The definition of the view of the transitory collection according to the Prasangika Madhyamika school is: an afflicted wisdom that observing either the I or mine in the continuum of the person possessing it in his continuum conceives it to be inherently existent. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that such a view of the transitory collection is an ignorance because it is of a discordant class with a knower that is an exalted wisdom.

Q: Therefore for the Prasangika Madhyamika school the view of the transitory collection is both wisdom and ignorance?
A: Right. The view of the transitory collection is wisdom and it is also an ignorance.

END

Monday afternoon, January 31, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1B Ways of practicing on the level of common beings in particular
>
> QUESTION: This text presents both the vast and profound paths of bodhisattvas as well as the fruit attained through them. Therefore, the stages of paths on the level of a common being which are extremely important for a bodhisattva – should have been taught here after the expression of worship but they were not. How could it be right for Chandrakirti to begin his explanation with the grounds of a superior?
>
> ANSWER: Since Chandrakirti explained those paths on the occasion of the expression of worship, he did not explain them after it. His purpose was to indicate that one who wishes to enter the Mahayana must first practice these paths by teaching the three main causes which, when cultivated in meditation, cause one to become a bodhisattva.
>
> Not only must you practice these first but you must also do so once you have become a bodhisattva. Since the wisdom not relying on duality is the chief practice, you should understand, through its illustration, that you should train in the other deeds such as giving.

Someone says that prior to explaining the stages of the paths of bodhisattva superiors, it would have been appropriate to explain the stages of the paths of ordinary bodhisattvas and asks why Chandrakirti did not do this. The answer to this question is that Chandrakirti already explained the stages of the paths of ordinary bodhisattvas in the context of his expression of worship.

Although the three practices of this context are said to be preliminary practices that are to be done before becoming a bodhisattva, they are also to be practiced after having become a bodhisattva. Among the practices of bodhisattvas, the main practice is the six bodhisattva deeds, i.e., the six perfections, and among them the main practice is the perfection of wisdom. While Lama Tsongkhapa says that wisdom is the main practice, the remaining five perfections are also to be practiced.

In short, the paths of ordinary bodhisattvas were already explained in the context of the expression of worship and therefore there is no need to explain them again prior to the explanation of the stages of the paths of bodhisattva superiors.

> Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* says, 'A bodhisattva should not apply himself to the profound nature of phenomena bereft of skill in means. A union of method and wisdom is the right application of a bodhisattva.' You must train in a union of the two collections and not place confidence in being satisfied with a portion of method or wisdom or in a mere one-pointedness of mind that lacks special method and wisdom.

One should not teach the subject of emptiness to someone who lacks the mind generation. "A portion of method or wisdom" means that, when one practices, one should neither cultivate a path that is separated from method nor a path that is separated from wisdom, but should train in a path that is a union of both method and wisdom. In other words, one should cultivate a path that unifies the collections of method and wisdom.

"In a mere one-pointedness of mind that lacks special method and wisdom" means that one should not develop one-pointedness of mind alone but should also develop method and wisdom. This is because calm abiding alone cannot destroy the root of cyclic existence. For example, the beings who have achieved the concentrations and are separated from attachment have not cut the root of cyclic existence.

> Some do not properly identify the measure of the object of negation that is refuted by the reasoning analyzing suchness and consider that everything is refuted. They mistake all thought as conceptions of true existence and consequently assert that all presentations of conventionalities are based only on [the ignorance of] others. They say that at the time of the fruit [buddhahood] there is

> nothing else except a truth body which is mere suchness devoid of wisdom. They also assert that form bodies are included within the mental continuums of trainees. According to such people it would not be the system of Chandrakirti's *Supplement* that hearers and solitary realizers are born from Kings of Subduers and buddhas from bodhisattvas even though Chandrakirti proves these with scripture and reasoning. They would say that cultivation of the three practices is posited only for others and is not the system of the bodhisattva Madhyamikas; thereby, they deprecate all paths that must be practiced from one's own point of view. For them, the explanations that wandering sentient beings who are empty of inherent existence are like a bucket in a well in six ways would only be self-contradictory. Thus, you should know that, beginning with the expression of worship, they have explained the meaning of the text incorrectly.
>
> The ways of training in giving and so forth are also explained in connection with the grounds of superiors, but you should understand and strive now to practice the many deeds that are essential even from the level of a common being.

Those who do not properly identify the measure of the object of negation that is refuted by the reasoning analyzing suchness say that all conceptions are conceptions of true existence. Because all conceptions are conceptions of true existence, they assert that all conceptions are to be abandoned. This is the assertion of Hashang. Why does he assert that all conceptions are to be abandoned? He says that, for example, if a white dog bites somebody, that person is bitten and, similarly, if a black dog bites somebody, that person is bitten. Likewise, a white, or positive, conception is a conception and a black, or negative, conception is a conception. To prove how conceptions, both positive and negative, bind one to cyclic existence Hashang says that when someone is bound to a pole by a chain it does not matter whether the chain is made of iron or gold. In the same way, whether one has a positive thought, such as love or compassion, or a negative thought, it is a thought that binds one to cyclic existence. Therefore, he asserts that all conceptions are to be stopped. He says that it is best to not have any conceptions, that is, to not manifest any mind. He asserts that all conceptions that arise in the mind are conceptions of true existence because anything that appears to conception appears to exist truly and just as it appears the conception apprehends it to exist in that way. Thus, the meaning of saying "Some do not..." refers to Hashang.

There is a story about a debate that took place between Acharya Kamalashila and Hashang in Samye, Tibet. Samye is the place where Kamalashila founded a monastery to which he invited Padmasambhava. During the debate Hashang maintained his position that all conceptions are objects of abandonment. Kamalashila asked, "Do you yourself actually stop conceptions?" Hashang answered that he did. Then Kamalashila asked, "When you stop all conceptions do you stop thinking? Do you not have a mind thinking 'I am stopping all conceptions?'" Hashang could not answer, as he did indeed have such a thought. As he could not answer, he began to beat around the bush saying, "If you are bitten by a white dog, you are bitten" and so forth. In the end, Hashang lost the debate and Kamalashila went on to compose his text *Stages of Meditation*. Although prior to the debate they had agreed that the loser would adopt the winner's position, instead Hashang escaped from Samye so quickly that he left behind his shoes. Even now, people still say that the fact that Hashang left behind his shoes is a sign that his view will remain existent in Tibet.

Initially it is important to identify the object of negation. For this reason, in the ninth chapter of his *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*, Shantideva says that without properly identifying the imagined object its non-existence cannot be apprehended. For example, in an archery competition, in order to hit the target one must first identify it properly as otherwise there will be no possibility of hitting it. Likewise, if one does not identify the object of negation well, one will not negate the proper object. In fact, there is the risk that if one does not identify the object of negation, one will become like Hashang who says that all conceptions are to be abandoned.

Some also say that the presentations of conventionalities are posited solely for others. They also say that at the time of the result "there is nothing else except a truth body which is mere suchness devoid of wisdom." They also say that the form body is included in the mental continua of trainees.

These people do not understand what was said previously in the context of the expression of worship regarding hearers and solitary realizers being born from Kings of Subduers and buddhas being born from bodhisattvas. In short, the assertions they make do not correspond with the system of the Middle Way as set out in the *Supplement*. They also say that the cultivation of the three practices is posited only to the sight of others and is not a system of the Middle Way. From this they are forced to make many other [absurd] assertions. Because they do not understand the meaning of the *Supplement,* "they deprecate all paths that must be practiced from one's own point of view. For them, the explanations that wandering sentient beings who are empty of inherent existence are like a bucket in a well in six ways would only be self-contradictory. Thus, you should know that, beginning with the expression of worship, they have explained the meaning of the text incorrectly."

Lama Tsongkhapa says that "The ways of training in giving and so forth are also explained in connection with the grounds of superiors, but you should understand and strive now to practice the many deeds that are essential even from the level of a common being." In other words, although the six bodhisattva deeds are explained in the context of superiors, one should begin to practice them from the level of an ordinary bodhisattva and even from the level of a common being.

In short, there are people who make incorrect assertions such as that form bodies are included in the mental continua of trainees. Who says this? Although we do not know exactly who these people are, there must have existed people in Tibet who held this view and others. For example, there have been Tibetan scholars who were well versed in the side of conduct but not in the side of view, who, due to lacking the correct view, said that Chandrakirti and others had fallen into the extreme of annihilation. There have also been others who have asserted that the ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge.

In brief, what is important to understand is that the three practices of this context – great compassion, the understanding of non-duality, and the mind of enlightenment – are practices of both ordinary bodhisattvas and those who have not yet entered the mahayana path. In short, we too need to develop compassion, the understanding of non-duality, and the mind of enlightenment.

3B1C Presentation of the grounds of bodhisattva superiors

This section has three parts:

1 Presentation of the ten grounds in common
2 Presentation of the individual grounds
3 Presentation of the features of the ten grounds

3B1C-1 Presentation of the ten grounds in common

Chandrakirti's explanation here of eleven grounds – the Very Joyful and so forth – is based on Nagarjuna's rough presentation of the ten grounds and the eleventh [buddhahood]. Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (440) says:

> Just as the eight levels of hearers
> Are explained in their vehicle,
> So are the ten bodhisattva
> Grounds in the Mahayana.

Chandrakirti also bases his explanation on the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhumika)*.
When Chandrakirti describes the ten grounds – the Very joyful and so forth – as ten mind generations, he is referring to ultimate mind generations [and not conventional ones].

Nagarjuna says that just as there are eight levels, or eight grounds, of hearers, there are ten bodhisattva grounds. The eight levels of hearers are the eight inferior levels, which are:

1. the level of lineage,
2. the level of the eighth,

3. the level of seeing,
4. the level of the diminished,
5. the level of separation from attachment,
6. the level of realizing that to be done,
7. the level of hearers, and
8. the level of solitary realizers.

The path that exists in the continuum of a hearer on the path of accumulation or that which exists in the continuum of a hearer on the path of preparation is the *level of lineage*. The *level of the eighth* is an exalted wisdom existing in the continuum of an approacher to stream enterer. In Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realization,* this exalted wisdom is said to be called "the eighth" because when one counts the eight sangha beginning with (1) the abider in the result of foe destroyer down through (2) approacher to foe destroyer, (3) abider in the result of non-returner, (4) approacher to non-returner, (5) abider in the result of once returner, (6) approacher to once returner, (7) abider in the result of stream enterer, and (8) approacher to stream enterer, the eighth is the approacher to stream enterer.

The *level of seeing* refers to the path of seeing, which is the level of an abider in the result of stream enterer. An illustration of the *level of the diminished* is the ground, or realization, or exalted knower, of an abider in the result of once returner. An illustration of the *level of separation from attachment* is the level of an abider in the result of non-returner. An illustration of the level of *realizing that to be done* is the level of an abider in the result of foe destroyer.

The *level of hearers* includes the exalted knowers existing in the continuum of an approacher to once returner, an approacher to non-returner, and an approacher to foe destroyer. The *level of solitary realizers* includes the realizations of both the congregating and rhinoceros-like solitary realizers.

Just as there are eight levels, or grounds (the Tibetan word *sa* is the same in both cases), of hearers, there are ten grounds of bodhisattvas. The ten grounds of bodhisattvas are:

(1) Very Joyful,
(2) Stainless,
(3) Luminous,
(4) Radiant,
(5) Difficult to Overcome,
(6) Manifesting,
(7) Gone Afar,
(8) Immovable,
(9) Good Intelligence, and
(10) Cloud of Doctrine.

When eleven grounds are mentioned, the eleventh is buddhahood, which is called Universal Light. There are thirteen grounds from the point of view of tantra.

The presentation of the ten grounds in the *Supplement* is based on the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*. Here the ten grounds are posited with respect to the ten perfections. In the *Supplement,* the ten perfections are expressed by the term 'mind generation.' The term 'mind generation' in this context refers to ultimate mind generation and not to conventional mind generation. The <u>definition of an ultimate mind generation</u> is: a distinguished mental cognizer to which the dualistic appearance with respect to complete enlightenment has vanished. In other words, ultimate mind generation is an awareness absorbed in meditative equipoise on the reality of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> With respect to the nature of the ten grounds which are assigned to ultimate mind generations, Chandrakirti's commentary says, 'When a bodhisattva's uncontaminated wisdom, conjoined with compassion and so forth, is divided into parts, each part is called a "ground" because it is a base of qualities.' The four topics by which the grounds are explained are (1) their nature, (2) the qualities

> with which they are thoroughly conjoined, (3) the way they are called 'grounds', and (4) by etymology.

This is an explanation of the individual grounds. Lama Tsongkhapa quotes the *Supplement,* saying: "When a bodhisattva's uncontaminated wisdom, conjoined with compassion and so forth, is divided into parts, each part is called a 'ground' because it is a base of qualities." (George Churinoff's translation of the *Supplement* says: "When a bodhisattva's uncontaminated exalted wisdom, fully held by compassion and so forth, is divided into parts, it attains the name 'ground' (Skt. *bhumi*) because of being the support of good qualities."

The definition of a ground within the distinction of the two, paths and grounds (*Ocean of Sport* page 468) is: a clear realizer of one who has entered a path that acts as the basis for the various excellent qualities which are its result. This definition is also found in the text *Grounds and Paths* (Tib. *sa lam*). However, Chandrakirti gives the definition of a ground within the distinction of the two, paths and grounds as: a bodhisattva superior's uncontaminated exalted wisdom conjoined with compassion. Just as the ground, the earth, acts as a basis for plants and so forth, a ground in this context acts as a basis for the excellent qualities which are its result.

In short, Lama Tsongkhapa defines a ground as an uncontaminated wisdom conjoined with compassion, this being called a ground because it is the base of qualities.

Tuesday morning, February 1, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In accordance with Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharmakosha)*, some persons [Jaya-ananda and some Tibetans] explain the nature of 'uncontaminated wisdom' as uncontaminated in the sense of not being amenable to the increase of contaminations. They have not understood the uncommon meaning of 'uncontaminated' in this system. In our own system the contaminated is anything polluted by either ignorance – the conception of true existence – or its predisposing latencies. The uncontaminated is wisdom free from those pollutions; as Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* says, '...not from the viewpoint of the nature of the objects of uncontaminated wisdom in those who are *free from the obscurations of ignorance*.'
>
> Before achieving buddhahood, a mind that is not polluted by predisposing latencies of ignorance is none other than the non-conceptual wisdom of the meditative equipoise of superiors. It is 'alternating' in the sense that when superiors rise from meditative equipoise, they become polluted by pre-disposing latencies.
>
> Up to and on the seventh ground pollution can occur through ignorance. However, for bodhisattvas on the eighth ground as well as for hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers, polluting ignorance has been extinguished; therefore, pollution occurs for them not by way of ignorance but through predisposing latencies of ignorance.

'Uncontaminated' is not to be understood in this context as it is explained in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* (*Abhidharmakosha*). In that text, Vasubandhu defines the contaminated as: that which is suitable to increase contaminations either by way of observation or concomitance. He defines the uncontaminated as: that which is not suitable to increase contaminations either by way of observation or concomitance. These definitions of contaminated and uncontaminated are not acceptable to the Prasangika Madhyamika school. In the *Ornament for Clear Realization,* the Svatantrika Madhyamikas' definitions of contaminated and uncontaminated are discussed in the context of the observed objects of the mahayana achievings. The Prasangika Madhyamikas define the contaminated as: that which is polluted either by the ignorance that is the conception of true existence or by its latencies. On the other hand, the uncontaminated is the exalted wisdom free from this pollution.

Lama Tsongkhapa quotes Chandrakirti's *Clear Words,* which says: "...not from the viewpoint of the nature of the objects of uncontaminated wisdom in those who are *free from the obscurations of*

ignorance. Before achieving buddhahood, a mind that is not polluted by predisposing latencies of ignorance is none other than the non-conceptual wisdom of the meditative equipoise of superiors." In other words, the only unpolluted mind of sentient beings is the meditative equipoise of a superior. This implies that the exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment is contaminated. In fact, all consciousnesses existing in the continuum of someone in subsequent attainment are contaminated because, having arisen from meditative equipoise, the latencies of ignorance once again become manifest.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "It is 'alternating' in the sense that when superiors rise from meditative equipoise, they become polluted by pre-disposing latencies." This means that a superior in meditative equipoise has an uncontaminated consciousness, whereas in subsequent attainment he has a contaminated consciousness. In short, a contaminated and uncontaminated consciousness cannot arise simultaneously, but arise in a manner of alternating.

Bodhisattvas on the eighth ground and above, as well as hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers, do not have the pollution of ignorance but only have the pollution of the *latencies* of ignorance. This is because they have abandoned ignorance. This assertion is similar to the Chittamatrins' assertion that bodhisattvas on the eighth ground have abandoned all afflictive emotions. This is discussed by Lama Tsongkhapa in one of his texts, in the context of the mind-basis-of-all, in which he says: "Those who have attained power (i.e., the bodhisattvas on the eighth ground) and hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers do not have a mind-basis-of-all. Therefore, there are no reasons for positing a mind-basis-of-all." At that point, there is no mind-basis-of-all because there is no afflicted mentality, one of the eight collections of consciousness posited by the Chittamatrins.

On the other hand, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, those bodhisattvas who are definite in lineage simultaneously abandon the afflictive obstructions and knowledge obstructions. In the *Compendium of Knowledge* it says: "A foe destroyer who has abandoned the afflictive obstructions and a tathagata who has abandoned the knowledge obstructions arise simultaneously."

> In his commentary Chandrakirti says that the first ground 'is called non-dualistic wisdom'. This refers to the lack of dualistic appearance of object and subject as if distant and cut off from each other. It does not refer to a wisdom that has merely abandoned the two extremes [as does the non-dual understanding among the three practices of common beings].
>
> The books of the master Chandrakirti contain many references to 'knowledge' and 'wisdom' free from the darkness of ignorance. Therefore, it would be an extremely deprecating denial to link ignorance and the predisposing latencies of ignorance with all knowledge and propound that according to this master's system wisdom disappears when ignorance and its predispositions are extinguished. These explanations are on a par with the Forder (*Tirthika*) Mimamsakas' assertion that if the pollutions were extinguished, so would be the mind. Saying that there is no wisdom in a superior's meditative equipoise is also similar.

Someone says that Chandrakirti calls the first ground 'non-dualistic wisdom' in terms of it being a wisdom that has merely abandoned the two extremes of permanence and annihilation. However, this is not correct according to our own system.

Chandrakirti makes many references in his texts to wisdom (Tib. *shes rab*, here translated as "knowledge") and exalted wisdom (Tib. *ye shes*, here translated as "wisdom") free from the darkness of ignorance, which implies that there exists an exalted wisdom that is not pervaded by ignorance. On the other hand, others assert that ignorance and its latencies pervade wisdom and exalted wisdom. This is not correct because it would imply that ignorance and its latencies are a generality, and that wisdom and exalted wisdom are its particularities. If this were the case, it would follow that when the pervader (ignorance) is abandoned, that which is pervaded (wisdom) is also eliminated. In other words, when ignorance is removed wisdom is removed, which is similar to the assertion that when the stains are removed the mind is eliminated. This is not valid according to our system but is only asserted by the Mimamsakas. If this assertion is upheld it is a deprecation; it is like asserting the end

of the mind and the end of the Dharma. 'The end of the mind' and 'the end of the Dharma' mean that when the stains are extinguished, the mind is also extinguished.

Some assert that there is no exalted wisdom in the meditative equipoise of a superior. This, too, is a deprecation because superiors *do* have uncontaminated exalted wisdom in meditative equipoise. The former opinion is asserted by many people who think that in meditative equipoise there is nothing present and that therefore there is also no exalted wisdom.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (363d-364ab) says:
>
> > Those who see thus are liberated.
> > What sees [suchness]? By convention
> > It is said to be the mind.
>
> By what functioning of a subject is suchness directly seen? In answer to this question, Nagarjuna says that conventionally the mind sees suchness directly. Also, his *Praise of the Element of Qualities* says:
>
> > When a metal garment which has become stained with
> > Contaminations and is to be cleansed by fire
> > Is put in fire, its stains
> > Are burned but it is not.
> >
> > So, with regard to the mind of clear light
> > Which has the stains of desire and so forth
> > Its stains are burned by wisdom's fire
> > But not clear light, its suchness.
>
> When a dirty garment, woven from threads of stone, is put in a fire, its stains are burned away but not the garment. Similarly, when the stains of the mind are burned by the fire of wisdom, the stains are burned, but the mind of clear light does not become non-existent.

What sees suchness? It is the mind that sees suchness. However, there are many assertions regarding this mind. For example, some say that because the mind is mixed with the stains, when the stains are cleansed the mind is extinguished. Our system does not accord with this as, later in the *Supplement,* it says: "Due to the mind ceasing, a body is achieved." If one takes this literally it would appear that the mind is stopped and a buddha body achieved, but what it means is that when the mind *together with stains* is ceased a buddha body is achieved.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that when the stains of the mind are burned by the fire of wisdom, only the stains are consumed and not the mind. This is likened to a garment made of asbestos ("threads of stone") which, when stained, is put into a fire, whereby the stains are removed but the garment remains intact.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> A bodhisattva superior's wisdom of meditative equipoise and that belonging to hearer and solitary realizer superiors are similar since they directly cognize the nature of phenomena and are devoid of pollution by the predisposing latencies of ignorance. However, the differences that cause one, and not the other, to be described as a bodhisattva superior ground are that the one is influenced by great compassion and possesses the powers of the twelve hundred features and so forth whereas the other does not.

The exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers and that of bodhisattva superiors are the same in terms of their realization of reality. However, the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers is not considered to be a ground because it is not influenced by great compassion, whereas the exalted wisdom of a bodhisattva superior *is* influenced by great compassion. In addition, the bodhisattvas on each ground have particular qualities in that a first ground bodhisattva has twelve sets of 100 qualities, a second ground bodhisattva has twelve sets of 1,000 qualities, and so forth. For example, one of the twelve sets of 100 is that a first ground bodhisattva can manifest 100 bodies. In addition, this bodhisattva can also surround each of the 100 bodies with 100 bodhisattvas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Also, as explained earlier, there is a great difference as to whether or not direct cognition of suchness occurs from extending one's mind to the profound meaning [of emptiness] during the paths of accumulation and preparation through the use of limitless forms of reasoning pertaining to the meaning of suchness – the two selflessnesses.
>
> Chandrakirti's statement, 'When divided into parts,' refers to the individual grounds that are the earlier and later parts of the one uncontaminated wisdom – the whole – divided into individual stages. A 'ground' (*bhumi*, literally 'earth') is like the earth because it acts as a source or base of auspicious qualities.
>
> These points indicate that all ten ultimate grounds are assigned as only non-conceptual wisdoms.

Bodhisattvas on the paths of accumulation and preparation realize the meaning of suchness through the use of limitless forms of reasoning. However, this does not imply that they realize the profound meaning *directly*. Although there is an understanding of the profound meaning on these paths, it is not as fully extended as is that on the first ground.

Q: The bodhisattva's direct realization of emptiness in the meditative equipoise of the grounds is an extension of his realization of emptiness on the path of accumulation and path of preparation by means of limitless forms of reasoning. It appears that Lama Tsongkhapa says that the factor of wisdom of a bodhisattva is different from that of hearers and solitary realizers due to this and not just due to the fact that it is influenced by compassion. Is that right?
A: The exalted wisdom of hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers and that of bodhisattva superiors are similar in not being polluted by ignorance and in directly realizing suchness. However, they are different due to the bodhisattva's exalted wisdom being influenced by compassion. In addition, what Hopkins' translation appears to be saying is also correct, i.e., that the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of a bodhisattva is more extended regarding the profound meaning due to having used infinite reasonings on the path of accumulation and path of preparation. On the other hand, the hearers and solitary realizers do not use such infinite reasonings. This was discussed in the context of "engaging by means of the profound and vast." Earlier on, it was said that the text *Fundamental Wisdom* cannot be a hinayana treatise, but is a mahayana treatise, since it presents infinite reasonings regarding emptiness. Bodhisattvas learn these infinite reasonings and apply them, whereby they realize emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Chandrakirti's statement, 'When divided into parts,' refers to the individual grounds that are the earlier and later parts of the one uncontaminated wisdom – the whole – divided into individual stages." This means that the uncontaminated exalted wisdom of a bodhisattva is divided into ten parts, i.e., the ten grounds.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Though they are similar, individual grounds such as the Very Joyful are posited, and this is done from four points of view. The first feature is that the first ground has twelve sets of a hundred qualities, the second ground has twelve sets of a thousand qualities, and so forth, and – as will be explained later – the number of qualities increases progressively.

(*Note*: The following has been added by Hopkins and does not occur here in the Tibetan.) Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> [The twelve sets of a hundred qualities during one instant on the first ground after a bodhisattva has risen from meditative equipoise are:
> 1. seeing a hundred buddhas in one instant
> 2. receiving the blessings of a hundred buddhas
> 3. going to a hundred Buddha Lands
> 4. illuminating a hundred lands
> 5. vibrating a hundred worldly realms
> 6. living for a hundred eons
> 7. seeing with true wisdom the past and future of a hundred eons
> 8. entering into and rising from a hundred meditative stabilizations
> 9. opening a hundred different doors of doctrine
> 10. ripening a hundred sentient beings
> 11. emanating a hundred versions of one's own body
> 12. surrounding each of the hundred bodies with a hundred bodhisattvas
>
> The number increases with each ground:
> first: one hundred
> second: one thousand
> third: one hundred thousand
> fourth: one hundred ten million
> fifth: one thousand ten million
> sixth: one hundred thousand ten million
> seventh: one hundred thousand ten trillion
> eighth: a number equal to the particles of a billion worlds
> ninth: a number equal to the particles of ten million billion worlds
> tenth: a number equal to the particles of an inexpressible number of an inexpressible number of buddha lands.]

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The second feature is the attainment of greater and greater majesty of power. Though this is explained [by Jaya-ananda], as vibrating a hundred lands, a thousand lands, and so forth, such is included in the increase of the number of qualities [which is the first feature]. Therefore, this feature should be taken as the increase higher and higher of the power for purifying the stains of the individual grounds and the power for advancing on the paths of these grounds.
>
> The third feature is a surpassing perfection – of giving on the first ground, ethics on the second ground, and so on [patience on the third, effort on the fourth, concentration on the fifth, wisdom on the sixth, skill in means on the seventh, aspirational prayer on the eighth, power on the ninth, and supreme wisdom on the tenth].
>
> The fourth feature is the higher and higher increase of births of fruition – on the first ground birth as a king ruling Jambudvipa [this world], on the second as a king ruling the four continents, and so forth [as a king ruling the Land of the Thirty-Three on the third ground, the Land Without Combat on the fourth, the Joyous Land on the fifth, the Land of Liking Emanation on the sixth, of Controlling Others' Emanations on the seventh, as a great Brahma lord of a thousand worlds on the eighth, as

a great Brahma lord of a million worlds on the ninth, and as the Devaputra Maheshvara of the Highest Land on the tenth].

Since the non-conceptual wisdoms of the individual grounds vary greatly in terms of inferior and superior abilities – such as the number of qualities that are present – individual grounds are posited. The grounds should not be understood as just meditative equipoise because the features subsequent to meditative equipoise that exist on each ground are included in that particular ground. The mode of division into individual grounds should be understood as explained; it is impossible to divide these ultimate grounds by making a differentiation in terms of their object of observation or aspect.

The individual grounds are explained in terms of four features:

1. The first feature is that the number of qualities progressively increases higher and higher on each of the grounds.
2. The second feature is the attainment of greater and greater majesty of power.
3. The third feature is a surpassing perfection on each ground, such as the surpassing perfection of generosity on the first ground and so forth.
4. The fourth feature is the higher and higher increase of fruitional births of the bodhisattva.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The mode of division into individual grounds should be understood as explained; it is impossible to divide these ultimate grounds by making a differentiation in terms of their object of observation or aspect." What is the observed object of the exalted wisdom of the first ground? What is its aspect? The exalted wisdoms of the ten grounds are not differentiated from the point of view of their observed objects and aspects, that is, their observed objects and aspects are the same. If this is so, why are they posited as different? The aspects of these exalted wisdoms are non-inherent existence. In the *Ornament for Clear Realization,* it says that the exalted wisdom of the first ground observes the sphere of reality progressing everywhere, that the second observes the supreme meaning, and so forth. Therefore, in this text, which is based on the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, it would seem that they have different observed objects. However, when it is said that the first ground observes "the sphere of reality progressing everywhere" it is means that the bodhisattva on the first ground realizes the emptiness of the great, the ten directions. On the second ground the bodhisattva is said to observe "the supreme meaning," which is ultimate truth, nirvana, because he realizes the emptiness of the ultimate. According to the *Supplement* the exalted wisdoms of the ten grounds have the same observed object, the suchness of all phenomena.

Tuesday afternoon, February 1, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says:

Just as the wise cannot express or see
The trail of any bird across the sky,
So none of the grounds of conqueror children
Can be expressed. Then how can one listen?

Though a bird crosses the sky, the wise of the world cannot describe its trail in words, or see it in their minds. In the same way, though the ultimate grounds – like birds – progress through the sky of the nature of phenomena, even interpreters who are superiors cannot describe the mode of progress in the way that superiors themselves experience it. Thus, listeners cannot hear about the grounds the way they are perceived.

Just as when a bird flies in the sky its trail cannot be seen or explained, likewise the realization of emptiness cannot be described to others nor can it be perceived by them. In other words, bodhisattva superior's realization of emptiness can only be seen by himself and cannot be expressed to others. It is said that the exalted wisdoms of the ten grounds are not different in seeing reality (*chos nyid*), but that there is a difference in terms of their seeing the truth body (*chos sku*). For example, the ways of seeing the truth body by a bodhisattva on the first ground and by a bodhisattva on the second ground are different. After a bodhisattva attains the uninterrupted path of the mahayana path of seeing, he attains the path of release of the first ground, whereby he sees the truth body of the first ground. This is the true cessation that is the abandonment of the respective object of abandonment of the previous uninterrupted path. This bodhisattva, who has attained the path of release of the path of seeing, sees the factor that is the separation from the respective object of abandonment of the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing but does not see the factor that is the separation from the object of abandonment of the uninterrupted path of the path of meditation. However, as soon as he attains the path of release of the second ground he also sees the factor that is the separation from the respective object of abandonment of the uninterrupted path of the path of meditation. When he cultivates the uninterrupted path of the path of meditation of the second ground, he attains the path of release of the third ground and sees the factor that is the separation from the respective object of abandonment of the uninterrupted path of the path of meditation of the second ground and so forth. When he attains buddhahood, he is free from all the objects of abandonment of the uninterrupted paths. The bodhisattva's true cessations are likened to a waxing moon in that they increase until he attains the state of buddhahood, which is likened to the full moon. The Prasangika Madhyamikas therefore say that the bodhisattvas on the different grounds see true cessations differently and therefore see the truth body differently, whereas there is no difference in how these bodhisattvas see reality. However, there is a lot of debate about this subject.

Q: At the beginning, it was said that the exalted wisdoms of meditative equipoise of the bodhisattvas on the ten grounds are the same in seeing reality but different in terms of seeing the truth body. Then, at the end, it was said that the *bodhisattvas* are the same in seeing reality but different in terms of seeing the truth body. Are both correct?
A: It is correct to say both.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary makes a connection with the previous topic of paying homage to compassion, saying:

> Having finely bowed to the compassion which refers to sentient beings, refers to phenomena, and is non-referential, wishing to express the ten types of divisions of the bodhichitta of the bodhisattvas, first from the point of view of the initial bodhichitta it was mentioned:
>
> *The mind of the Conqueror's child that is under the power*
> *Of compassion in order to completely liberate migrators,* [1.4cd]
>
> *Fully dedicated through Samantabhadra's aspirations and*
> *Thoroughly abiding in joy is called 'the first.'* [1.5ab]
>
> When a bodhisattva's uncontaminated exalted wisdom, fully held by compassion and so forth, is divided into parts, it attains the name 'ground' (*bhumi*) because of being the support of good qualities.
>
> Furthermore, through particulars of
> - higher and higher numbers of qualities,
> - attainment of eminent powers,
> - surpassing generosity gone beyond and so forth, and

- increased maturation –

by dividing into the Extremely Joyous and so forth – ten types of divisions are posited. Among these, there do not exist divisions made through the differences [of the referents and aspects] of their own entities.

As taught [in the *Sutra of the Ten Grounds*, 18.5.3]:[4]

Just as the wise cannot express and do not see the trail of a bird through the sky,
So if all grounds of Conqueror's children also cannot be expressed, how can one listen?

There, the Extremely Joyous Ground of the bodhisattva is the first mind generation of the bodhisattvas – at the end the Cloud of Dharma is the tenth mind generation.

There is a difference in the order of presentation in the autocommentary and *Illumination,* but the meaning is the same.

Chandrakirti says "there do not exist divisions made through the differences of their own entities" to which is added "[of the referents and aspects]," in accordance with Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination*.

Among the ten grounds, the first is the Very Joyful (or Extremely Joyous) and the last is the Cloud of Doctrine (or the Cloud of Dharma).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2 Presentation of the individual grounds

This section has three parts:

A The five grounds, the Very Joyful and so forth
B The sixth ground, the Manifest
C The four grounds, the Gone Afar and so forth

3B1C-2A The five grounds, the Very Joyful and so forth

This section has five parts:

1 First ground, the Very Joyful
2 Second ground, the Stainless
3 Third ground, the Luminous
4 Fourth ground, the Radiant
5 Fifth ground, the Difficult to Overcome

3B1C-2A1 First ground, the Very Joyful

This section has three parts:

A Entity of the ground being qualified described in brief
B Features qualifying the first ground in detail
C Conclusion by way of expressing the features of the first ground

3B1C-2A1A Entity of the ground being qualified described in brief

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

A bodhisattva on that [first ground], in the manner explained, sees migrators as without self-nature. That mind which finely apprehended [the absence of self-nature] as the distinction of

[4] Numeration from Poisson, p.261. note 2.

> compassion is under the influence of compassion, and through the aspirational prayers of Samantabhadra, [virtues] are fully dedicated. The exalted wisdom of non-duality possessing the name 'Extremely Joyous' – finely illustrated [by] the results which bear its cause – that is called the first.
>
> On that, those ten innumerable sets of one hundred thousand prayers, such as the ten great prayers and so forth, planted by the bodhisattva [who] generated the first mind, are included within the prayers of the bodhisattva Samantabhadra. In order to include all prayers without exception, the prayers of Samantabhadra are mentioned in particular.

With respect to this, Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *The mind of a child of a conqueror overpowered*
> *With compassion to liberate migrators,* [1.4cd]
>
> *Dedicated with Samantabhadra's aspirations,*
> *And abiding in joy is called the first.* [1.5ab]
>
> When a conqueror child abides on the first ground, his mind apprehends non-inherent existence, in the manner explained above, as a special feature of migrators who are the objects observed by his compassion. His mind has been influenced by great compassion for the purpose of liberating migrators, and his virtues are thoroughly dedicated with the aspirational prayers of the bodhisattva Samantabhadra. This ultimate mind of a bodhisattva – abiding in the non-dualistic wisdom called the 'Very Joyful' and illustrated by the number of qualities and so forth that are its effects – is called the first supramundane mind.

Here, Lama Tsongkhapa posits the entity of the first ground as the exalted wisdom to which there is no longer the appearance of non-duality and which is influenced by the compassion observing sentient beings qualified by non-inherent existence. The qualities of the first ground were mentioned earlier.

The ultimate mind generation of this context is called the first supramundane mind because those abiding on the first two paths, the path of accumulation and path of preparation, are mundane while those on the higher paths are supramundane. If it is a mahayana mundane being, however, it is not pervaded by being a mundane being. If someone says "posit [an example]," we can give the example of a person on the mahayana path of preparation who previously completed the hinayana path and attained the state of a hearer foe destroyer. He is a mahayana mundane being because he is on a mahayana path and is on one of the two mundane paths, the path of accumulation or path of preparation, but he is also a supramundane being because he is a foe destroyer and a superior. Ordinary beings are called mundane beings, while superiors are called supramundane beings.

With respect to one on the mahayana path of seeing who previously attained hearer foe destroyer, is there a difference between the uninterrupted path and the path of release in his continuum? Since this person has already abandoned the afflictive emotions, he does not have any objects of abandonment until he attains the eighth ground but he needs to accumulate merit by exerting effort in the six bodhisattva deeds. If he has overcome all afflictive obstructions, why does he enter the path of accumulation and not the eighth ground? He enters the path of accumulation because he must still accumulate the collection of merit needed for the attainment of enlightenment, i.e., the merit accumulated over three great countless eons. The first of these three eons is spent on the paths of accumulation and preparation, the second on the seven impure grounds, and the third on the last three pure grounds. Although the bodhisattva does not necessarily remain on these grounds for this amount of time, he must accumulate the merit equivalent to that accumulated over three countless great eons.

Who is faster in attaining buddhahood, one who previously became a hearer foe destroyer and is about to enter the bodhisattva vehicle or one who is definite in the mahayana lineage and is about to enter the bodhisattva vehicle? Although it might appear that one who previously became a hearer foe destroyer would be faster, as he has already abandoned the afflictive obstructions, in fact the one who is definite in the bodhisattva lineage is faster. Why? This is because he is of sharp faculty, whereas the other is of dull faculty. Generally, those who are sharp-facultied progress faster than those who are dull-facultied. In addition, one who previously became a hearer foe destroyer is habituated to the hinayana path and still has the tendency to work for his own welfare, even when he becomes a bodhisattva.

> The ten innumerable hundred thousands of prayer petitions planted by a first grounder – such as the ten great petitions in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* – are included in Samantabhadra's aspirational prayers, to which Chandrakirti refers in his root text in order to include all such prayers. These are the *Aspirational Prayers for Auspicious Deeds (Bhadracharyapranidhana)*, and among them two stanzas are said by Shantideva in his *Compendium of Instructions* to be unsurpassed dedications:
>
> I dedicate all these virtues
> To my training in accordance
> With the knowledge of the hero Manjushri
> And likewise of Samantabhadra as well.
>
> With the dedications so highly praised
> By all the Conquerors of the three times
> To auspicious deeds I dedicate
> In all ways these roots of virtue.

These two stanzas are excerpted from the *King of Prayers*, which is also called Samantabhadra's Prayer. Lama Tsongkhapa quotes them here from the *Compendium of Instructions* in which Shantideva says that they are unsurpassed dedications. In the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* it mentions ten great prayers, whereas other texts mention ten innumerable hundreds of thousands of prayers. There is also a discussion of five sets of prayers. These prayers are discussed in the eighth chapter of the *Supplement*.

What is a prayer? What is the difference between a prayer and a dedication? If it is a dedication, it is pervaded by being a prayer but if it is a prayer, it is not pervaded by being a dedication. The difference is that a prayer is not necessarily dependent on a substance, whereas a dedication is dependent on a substance, the substance being one's roots of virtue. What is something that is a prayer but not a dedication? It is, for example, "May I be reborn in Sukhavati." On the other hand, if one says, "*Due to this virtue* may I be reborn in Sukhavati," then it is both a dedication and a prayer. This is explained in the second chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realization* in the context of the path of meditation of dedication.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's commentary says that just as hearers on the path of preparation are not said to be approaching the first fruit [of a stream enterer], so the great of the great bodhisattvas practicing with belief who are just about to become first grounders are on a level where the mind of enlightenment has not yet been generated. Chandrakirti is referring to the non-generation of an ultimate mind of enlightenment. It has already been explained that in general the aspiration to highest enlightenment has been generated even before this time and that such persons are also accepted by this system as bodhisattvas.

Here, Lama Tsongkhapa explains that according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system hearers on the path of preparation are not approachers to the first result because they are not superiors. However, for the Svatantrika Madhyamika system there is no pervasion. They assert that because hearers on the path of preparation will, on the same seat, become approachers to stream enterer, they are approachers to the first result, yet they are not superiors. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not agree with this and assert that approachers to stream enterer must be superiors. Later in the *Supplement,* it says that persons on the eighth level are presented to be superiors.

"The great of the great bodhisattvas practicing with belief" refers to bodhisattvas on the mahayana paths of accumulation and preparation which together are called "the ground of practicing through belief." "The ground of special thought" refers to the first seven grounds, "the ground of fruition" refers to the last three pure grounds, and "the ground of the abandonment of obstructions" refers to the buddha ground. These four grounds are mentioned in the context of "bodhisattvas practicing with belief." The ground of practicing through belief is the ground on which the bodhisattva realizes emptiness by way of belief, that is, not directly.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, just as in the hearers' vehicle, eight types of hearers' grounds are posited through the division of entering and abiding on the resultant paths; similarly, also in the mahayana, there are ten bodhisattva grounds of the bodhisattvas.
>
> Further, just as generating the state of the hearers' similitude of definite separation (path of preparation) is not accepted as being the state which enters into the first result, similarly the bodhisattva who will become [a first grounder] is also.
>
> As taught in the *Cloud of Jewels Sutra*:[5]
>
> > With a nature of practice by the great of the great appreciation, situated to immediately attain the first ground – this is a level which has not generated the bodhisattva's [ultimate] bodhichitta.

"This is a level which has not generated the bodhisattva's bodhichitta" means that a bodhisattva on the supreme mundane quality level of the path of preparation has not yet generated ultimate bodhichitta, the ultimate mind of enlightenment. This bodhisattva, however, has generated the mind of enlightenment, as have those on the heat, peak, and tolerance levels of the path of preparation and those on the path of accumulation. Here, if a "bodhisattva's bodhichitta" is interpreted to mean the *conventional* mind of enlightenment, it is incorrect.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In his *Compendium of Instructions* Shantideva also establishes through many sutras that ordinary beings can generate a mind of enlightenment. Therefore, the assertion that [those on the paths of accumulation and preparation] are 'imputed bodhisattvas' is wrong.

In short, saying that bodhisattvas on the path of accumulation and path of preparation are merely designated is not correct, because they do have the conventional mind of enlightenment although they do not the ultimate mind of enlightenment.

[5] Poisson, p. 262, note 2, cites *Shiksasammuchchaya*, 7.13, where it is also quoted.

What do we need to do? We should try to cultivate the paths of bodhisattvas, beginning with the heat, peak, tolerance, and supreme mundane quality levels of the path of preparation, and then the ten grounds. If we cannot do so presently we should at least aspire to do so in the future. In short, we should train in the three practices of this context: (1) great compassion, (2) the understanding of non-duality, and (3) the mind of enlightenment. If one cannot cultivate an uncontrived mind of enlightenment, one should at least cultivate a contrived mind of enlightenment. One should be happy to have this opportunity to study the *Supplement*. In the *Jataka Tales,* it says that hearing the Dharma is the best lamp among all types of lamps dispelling darkness and the best wealth among all types of wealth, as it cannot be stolen by anyone. The only thief that can steal our knowledge is forgetfulness! Therefore, we should be careful not to generate this afflictive emotion by developing mindfulness.

Wednesday morning, February 2, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> OBJECTION: In his *Compendium of Knowledge (Abhidharmasamuchchaya)* Asanga explains that when one becomes a hearer on the path of preparation [who will attain the fruit of stream enterer] in a single session and until one attains the first fruit, one is an approacher to the fruit of stream enterer. Therefore, Chandrakirti's example is not established.
>
> ANSWER: Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* explains that those approaching the fruit of stream enterer have attained a superior path; however, Asanga's *Compendium of Knowledge* does agree with the objector. These two discordant systems arose, and the master Chandrakirti is in agreement with the *Treasury of Knowledge*. This accords with Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* where it is said that giving one meal for one day to a follower of doctrine [a person on the path of preparation] generates immeasurably greater merit than giving a hundred divine tastes of food and divine clothing each day for as many eons as there are sands in the banks of the Ganges to as many followers of faith [persons on the path of accumulation] as there are particles in all the realms of the world. Further, giving one meal for one day to a person on the eighth level [an approacher to the fruit of stream enterer] generates immeasurably greater merit than giving as before to as many followers of doctrine as described above.
>
> A follower of faith is clearly on the path of accumulation, and a follower of doctrine is clearly on that of preparation [therefore, a person on the eighth level is on the path of seeing, a superior path].

There are two different presentations of approachers to stream enterer. In Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* (*Abhidharmakosha*), it says that approachers to stream enterer are necessarily superiors whereas according to Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra,* this is not so. Chandrakirti's assertion accords with the presentation in *Treasury of Knowledge*.

An approacher to stream enterer is a person who is in the process of exerting effort for the attainment of the result of the virtuous endeavor which is the abandonment of the three thorough entanglements, objects of abandonment of the path of seeing. In the *Ornament for Clear Realization,* an approacher to stream enterer is said to be one of the four approachers who is in the process of exerting effort for the attainment of the result of the virtuous endeavor which is the abandonment of the three thorough entanglements, which are objects of abandonment of the path of seeing. The three thorough entanglements are:

1. the acquired view of the transitory collection,
2. the acquired view holding bad ethics and bad conduct as supreme, and
3. afflicted doubt.

Vasubandhu says:

> Not wishing to go, mistaking
> The path, and doubting the path
> Obstruct progress to liberation.
> Therefore the three are indicated.

The three thorough entanglements are respectively likened to not wanting to go, mistaking the path, and doubting the path. These three thorough entanglements are posited as obstacles to liberation. "Not wanting to go" illustrates the acquired view of the transitory collection, "mistaking the path" illustrates the acquired view holding bad ethics and bad conduct as supreme, and "doubting the path" illustrates afflicted doubt. As an illustration of the three thorough entanglements, we could say they are like someone who has to go to a particular city but does not want to go, someone who although wanting to go mistakes the way, and someone who although wanting to go doubts the way.

The result of stream enterer is the result of virtuous endeavor attained through abandoning the three thorough entanglements.

In short, there are these two systems. Lama Tsongkhapa quotes Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutras* [, which mentions followers of faith and followers of doctrine]. Followers of faith and followers of doctrine are respectively posited as those on the path of accumulation and those on path of preparation. Persons on the eighth level are approachers to stream enterer. As each of these is respectively superior to the previous one, one gains respectively more merit by making offerings to them. For example, the merit created by making offerings to a follow of doctrine is greater than the merit of making offerings to the followers of faith. Likewise, there is more merit from making offerings to one on the eighth level than to followers of doctrine. In the *Ornament for Clear Realization,* it is said that if it is a trainee intent upon the *Ornament,* it is pervaded by being either a follower of faith or a follower of doctrine and, therefore, being either a bodhisattva abiding on the path of accumulation or one abiding on the path of preparation. In other words, this trainee is not a superior. In the *Ornament for Clear Realization,* [Maitreya] says that he composed this text in order for the wise to see.

The path of accumulation is a clear realization of the doctrine. 'Doctrine' refers to the words of the scriptures. In the context of the path of accumulation, the word 'accumulation' refers to accumulating much hearing of doctrine. The path of preparation is a clear realization of the meaning. 'Meaning' refers to the fact that those on the path of preparation realize the truth by means of a meaning generality.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thoroughly explained in that [Sutra] itself:
>
> > Even situated on the instant which practices appreciation, son of good lineage, it is like this: for example: a *chakravartin* king has passed beyond the complexion of a human, yet he has not attained the complexion of a *deva*. Similarly, the bodhisattva too has completely passed all the levels of levels of the worlds, the hearers and the solitary realizers, yet he has not attained the ground of the ultimate bodhisattva.

(*Note:* In the Tibetan, it says "he <u>has</u> attained the ground of the ultimate bodhisattva," which is incorrect).

"The bodhisattva too" refers to bodhisattvas on the paths of accumulation and preparation. These bodhisattvas are superior to ordinary beings, hearers, and solitary realizers, but have not yet attained the ground of the ultimate bodhisattva. They have passed "all the levels of levels of the worlds, the hearers and the solitary realizers" because of being superior to them in terms of their lineage. In other

words, since these bodhisattvas have the conventional mind generation, they are superior to hearers and solitary realizers. However, t this level, they are not superior to them in terms of their intelligence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1B Features qualifying the first ground in detail

This section has three parts:
1 Features beautifying one's own continuum
2 Features outshining others' continuums
3 Surpassing feature on the first ground

3B1C-2A1B-1 Features beautifying one's own continuum

This section has two parts:
A Individual features beautifying one's own continuum on the first ground
B Features beautifying one's own continuum in brief

3B1C-2A1B-1A Individual features beautifying one's own continuum on the first ground

This section has three parts:
1 Feature of attaining a meaningful name
2 Four features of birth in the lineage and so forth on the first ground
3 Three features of advancing to higher grounds and so forth

3B1C-2A1B-1A1 Feature of attaining a meaningful name on the first ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Further, when he has entered into the first ground called the Extremely Joyous:
>
> *From then onwards, having attained that, he*
> *Is addressed by the very term 'bodhisattva.'* [1.5cd]

(*Note:* In the Tibetan text of the autocommentary, there is an extra particle *te* in the root text which should not be there.)

Having attained that, he becomes an ultimate bodhisattva.

> The attainment of that mind, in a state passed beyond the level of ordinary beings in all ways, is to be expressed by only the term 'bodhisattva' and not other types, because at that time he is an exalted one (*arya*).

When the bodhisattva attains the first ground, he becomes an 'ultimate bodhisattva.' However, he became a bodhisattva.

> As was taught in the *Blessed Mother of Two Thousand Five Hundred Verses*:[6]
>
> > 'Bodhisattva' is an epithet of the brave-minded beings (*sattva*) who have realized, by whom all phenomena have been realized and known. How are they known? [As] not arisen, unreal, false and not as they are imagined by childish, ordinary beings and not as found by childish, ordinary beings. Therefore, they are called bodhisattvas.

[6] 2,500 Verse Bhagavati Prajñaparamita, also called *Questions of Suvikrantavikramin Wisdom Gone Beyond Sutra.*

> Why is that? Enlightenment is not imagined. Enlightenment is not achieved. Enlightenment is without referent. Suvikrantavikramin, the Tathagata did not acquire enlightenment because he has not acquired all phenomena. Because of not referring to all phenomena, one says enlightenment. Like that, one says the enlightenment of buddha [yet] what was expressed is not so.
>
> Suvikrantavikramin, those generating the mind toward enlightenment and producing a mind adhering to enlightenment, saying "we will generate this mind toward enlightenment. The enlightenment to which we will generate the mind, exists" – are not called bodhisattvas. They are called growing brave-minded beings.[7]
>
> Why is that? Like this: strongly settling upon generation; strongly settling upon mind; strongly settling upon enlightenment.[8]

– and so forth.

It is taught:

> Further, enlightenment (*bodhi*) is without characteristics, since it is separated from the nature of characteristics. That, realized by someone like this, is called 'enlightenment,' but what was expressed is not so.
>
> Suvikrantavikramin, because of completely realizing those phenomena, one speaks of bodhisattvas. Suvikrantavikramin, someone, while not knowing and not completely realizing these phenomena, perceiving in his thought 'bodhisattva' to himself – that bodhisattva is far from the bodhisattva grounds and he is far from the bodhisattva's dharmas. Similarly, by the name of 'bodhisattva,' he is deceiving the worlds of the devas, humans and *asuras*.
>
> Suvikrantavikramin, if by the mere word he became a bodhisattva, then all sentient beings would become bodhisattvas also.
>
> Suvikrantavikramin, this is not a mere action of speech. Like this: [it is] the ground of the bodhisattva.[9]

– and so forth.

(*Note:* The Tibetan text does not say "this is not a mere action of *speech*," but says "this is not a mere action of *anyone*." Perhaps this needs to be checked against other printings of the Tibetan.)

In the *Supplement,* when it says "From then onwards, having attained that, he is addressed by the very term 'bodhisattva,'" (v. 1.5cd) this refers to the fact that a bodhisattva who attains the first ground has an ultimate mind of enlightenment and is called an ultimate bodhisattva. He attains the first of the eight qualities, that of a meaningful name. The remaining seven qualities are the four:

- birth in the tathagata lineage,
- abandoning the three thorough entanglements,
- maintaining supreme joy, and
- vibrating a hundred world systems,

and the three:

- advancing to higher grounds,

[7] Tibetan: sKye.bar sems.dPa'.

[8] See Conze, *The Questions of Suvikrantavikramin*, p. 15, lines 16-42. Also Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*, p. 140, for the portion of the quotation mentioned by Lama Tsongkhapa.

[9] Ibid, p. 13, lines 23-34.

- ceasing the paths of the bad migrations, and
- extinguishing the levels of ordinary beings.

Chandrakirti says: "'Bodhisattva' is an epithet of the brave-minded beings (*sattva*) who have realized, by whom all phenomena have been realized and known. How are they known? [As] not arisen, unreal, false and not as they are imagined by childish ordinary beings and not as found by childish ordinary beings. Therefore, they are called bodhisattvas." To childish, ordinary beings, phenomena appear as truly existent; however, they are not established as they appear. A bodhisattva who realizes this is an ultimate bodhisattva.

Chandrakirti continues: "Why is that? Enlightenment is not imagined. Enlightenment is not achieved. Enlightenment is without referent." "Enlightenment is not imagined" means that enlightenment is thoroughly analyzed. Enlightenment exists as it is found by superiors, i.e., to not exist ultimately or truly.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> > *Then, having thus attained that mind*
> > *He is called a 'bodhisattva'.* [1.5cd]
>
> From the time of entering the first ground, the bodhisattva, because of having attained that ultimate mind, is called an 'ultimate bodhisattva'. Once having passed beyond the level of an ordinary being he is not called by any other name discordant with this term because he has become a bodhisattva superior. The *Cloud of Jewels Sutra (Ratnamegha)*, which Chandrakirti quotes in his commentary, says, 'One having the great supreme qualities, [the fourth and last level] of the path of preparation, has not attained the ground of an ultimate bodhisattva.' Thereby, it is known that [on the first ground] one is called a 'bodhisattva' with the qualification 'ultimate'.
>
> The *Two Thousand Five Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (Sardhadvisahasrikaprajnaparamita)* says, 'In what way does he know [all phenomena]? As non-arisen, non-produced, and false, not in accordance with the imputations by or findings of childish common beings. Therefore, he is called a bodhisattva.' This implicitly indicates that one who understands the suchness of phenomena in the way that a superior does is called a bodhisattva. This also refers to an ultimate bodhisattva and does not indicate that among common beings there are no qualified bodhisattvas.

One should realize things not as they are found by childish, ordinary beings, but as they are realized by superiors. When childish, ordinary beings realize the final mode of subsistence of phenomena, they realize it by means of a meaning generality and not directly. They realize it within the appearance of true existence, whereas to a superior in meditative equipoise, there is no appearance of true existence and the appearance of duality has vanished.

When does a bodhisattva receive the meaningful name 'ultimate bodhisattva'? Only upon attaining the first ground. From this, one should indirectly understand that ordinary bodhisattvas do not receive this meaningful name, yet they are bodhisattvas. In other words, a bodhisattva receives the meaningful name from the path of seeing onward. The text says that at this time one is born in the tathagata lineage. One can ask, are those bodhisattvas on the path of accumulation and path of preparation not born in the tathagata lineage? Are they not children of the conquerors? Are bodhisattvas on the path of accumulation and path of preparation not sons and daughters of good lineage? If someone says that they are not born in the tathagata lineage but are born in the buddha lineage, one can ask is there a difference between tathagata and buddha?

This subject of the *Questions of Suvikrantavikramin Sutra* will be discussed later on in more detail. In the *Ornament for Clear Realization,* in the context of the seventeen texts (the six mothers and eleven sons), the *Questions of Suvikrantavikramin Sutra* was said to be included in the eleven sons, as is the *Two Thousand Five Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*. This topic is discussed in Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport,* in which it says that the mothers are sutras that present all eight categories whereas the sons are sutras that present only part of the eight categories.

Wednesday afternoon, February 2, 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1B-1A2 Four features of birth in the lineage and so forth on the first ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The attainment of bodhichitta which has been explained is not only expressed by just the term bodhisattva on that occasion – moreover:
>
> *He is also born in the lineage of the tathagatas,*
> *All his three fetters are abandoned,*
> *The bodhisattva retains a supreme joy and*
> *Is able to vibrate one hundred world systems.* [1.6]
>
> Because he has passed beyond all levels of ordinary beings, hearers, and solitary realizers, and because he has generated a path which pursues the tathagata ground called Universal Light (*Samantaprabha*), the bodhisattva is born in the tathagata lineage.
>
> Then, through directly seeing the selflessness of persons, he is separated also from the three fetters called viewing the transitory collection, doubt, and holding morality and codes of behavior as supreme, because they will not grow again.
>
> Not seeing suchness, through superimposing a self the view of the transitory collection arises and, similarly, due to doubt there is a possibility to proceed also on other paths – otherwise not.
>
> Since he has entered into certainty [of mahayana lineage], he attains the qualities caused by that and separates from the faults of the ground's discordant class. Thereby, because of a multitude of extreme joys due to special growth of extraordinary joy, the bodhisattva also maintains a supreme joy. Because of having especially distinguished extreme joy, this ground obtains the name 'Extremely Joyous.'
>
> He is also able to move one hundred world systems.

(1) The first of the four qualities mentioned here is to be born in the tathagata lineage because, due to having attained the path of seeing, the bodhisattva is definite to attaining the tathagata ground, Universal Light.

(2)The second quality is to have abandoned the three thorough entanglements – the view of the transitory collection, the view holding bad ethics and conduct as supreme, and afflicted view – by attaining the path of seeing. Through generating the uninterrupted path of the mahayana path of seeing, one generates the antidotes to the entanglements, whereby one abandons the objects of abandonment and attains a path of release. In this way one abandons the three thorough entanglements such that they will not return. On the other hand, in the case of cultivating a mundane path, although one abandons the objects of abandonment it is not in a manner of their not returning

again, meaning that they can return again. Shantideva, in his text *Bodhisattvacharyavatara,* says that although a mundane path can abandon attachment, attachment will return. This is the case with the absorption without discrimination. When the absorption without discrimination is present in one's continuum, gross feelings and gross discriminations are ceased; however, they will return. In short, the bodhisattva on the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing abandons the objects of abandonment in a manner of their not returning again.

(3)The third quality is holding supreme joy. The bodhisattva possesses supreme joy because he attains the qualities of that ground and separates from the faults of the its discordant class.

The fourth quality, mentioned in both the autocommentary and *Illumination,* is the ability to move 100 world systems. This means to make the earth quake or make the world shake.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *Born in the tathagata lineage*
> *He completely forsakes the three links.*
> *The bodhisattva attains an excellent joy*
> *And can vibrate a hundred world-systems.* [1.6]
>
> He is born into the lineage of the tathagatas because, abiding on the first ground, he has passed beyond all levels of ordinary beings, hearers, and solitary realizers and has generated in his continuum the paths certain to proceed to buddhahood. He will not go to other paths and is of definite lineage with respect to his own path. This 'first ground bodhisattva directly sees personal selflessness – that a person does not exist of his own nature. Thereby, he abandons all three links – the [artificial] view of the transitory, the [afflicted] doubt which is a subtle increaser [of contamination], and holding [bad] ethics and codes of behavior as superior. He abandons them in the sense that they will not arise again – meaning that the seeds of these three are abandoned.
>
> The path of seeing abandons the artificial but not the innate form of the view of the transitory collection as a real 'I' and 'mine'.
>
> QUESTION: Why does Chandrakirti mention only these three? Other afflictions to be abandoned by the path of seeing are also abandoned.
>
> ANSWER: There are two ways of interpreting the thought of sutras setting forth this topic, but the superior one accords with the explanation given in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*:
>
> Not wishing to go, mistaking
> The path, and doubting the path
> Obstruct progress to liberation.
> Therefore the three are indicated.
>
> For example, three main obstacles confront one who intends to go to another area – not wishing to go, mistaking the path, and having doubts about it. Similarly, there are three main obstacles to progressing toward liberation. The first [the view of the transitory collection as real 'I' and 'mine'] causes fear with respect to liberation as a result of which one does not wish to proceed there. The second [holding bad ethics and codes of behavior as superior] is a case of mistaking the path through relying on another one. The third [doubt] causes hesitation with respect to the path. Therefore, Chandrakirti mentions these three.
>
> A first ground bodhisattva has, as was explained before, entered a definite lineage. He has attained the qualities of its fruits and is free from the faults abandoned by this ground. Therefore, extraordinary joys are generated. On account of his many great joys, the conqueror child maintains an excellent joy, and because of his superior joys this ground is called the Very Joyful.
>
> He also becomes able to vibrate a hundred different world systems.

This is how Lama Tsongkhapa sets out the four qualities mentioned in the *Supplement*.

Lama Tsongkhapa says, "He also becomes able to vibrate a hundred different world systems." When someone first generates the mind generation it causes the ground to shake. This is a sign that occurs when the bodhisattva first generates mind generation; as he increases his mind generation he becomes able to shake 100 different world systems. This is not a negative thing, but a positive sign of the bodhisattva's qualities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1B-1A3 Three features of advancing to higher grounds and so forth

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

He advances from ground to ground and fully progresses upwards –
Then, all his paths of bad migration are ceased –
Then, all his levels of an ordinary being are exhausted –
His is indicated to be like the eighth arya. [1.7]

Regarding the aforesaid, because of familiarizing with the doctrine just as it was borne in mind and because of great delight in advancing to the second ground and so forth, when advancing from ground to ground he will fully progress upwards.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Chandrakirti's root text says:

Advancing from ground to ground he ascends,
Now all his paths to bad migrations have ceased,
All the levels of ordinary beings are ended. [1.7abc]

He is very enthusiastic to advance from the first to the second ground, and he will ascend to higher grounds. As soon as he attains the first ground, all paths going to a bad migration cease for the bodhisattva.

OBJECTION: Once one attains forbearance [which is the third of four levels] on the path of preparation, is it not impossible to go to a bad migration by the power of former actions (*karma*)? What need is there to say that paths to bad migrations cease for one who has attained the first ground?

ANSWER: The impossibility of going to a bad migration once one attains forbearance on the path of preparation is not a case of having overcome the seeds leading to a bad migration through their antidotes but through an incompleteness of their causes. Here on the first ground, the seeds are overcome by means of their antidotes. Furthermore, Asanga's *Compendium of Knowledge* explains that the mental and physical aggregates (*skandha*), constituents (*dhatu*), and so forth of bad migrations are abandoned by the path of seeing.

When a bodhisattva attains the first ground, all levels of a common being end for him.

In short, the three qualities here are:
1. one advances to higher grounds,
2. ceases the paths to bad migrations, and
3. ends the levels of ordinary beings.

The bodhisattva progresses or transfers from one ground to another. He does so as presented in *Grounds and Paths* (Tib. *sa lam*), which says that when a bodhisattva goes from ground to ground he does so by going from meditative equipoise to meditative equipoise, not from subsequent attainment to subsequent attainment or from subsequent attainment to meditative equipoise. When one attains a

path of release one attains a ground. On the other hand, at the end of a ground one attains an uninterrupted path. For example, at the end of the first ground the bodhisattva generates an uninterrupted path; then when he generates the path of release that is its result, he attains the second ground. Both grounds are paths of meditation. In the same way, at the end of the second ground the bodhisattva generates an uninterrupted path of the path of meditation of the second ground and when he generates a path of release he attains the third ground.

Lama Tsongkhapa says, "Furthermore, Asanga's *Compendium of Knowledge* explains that the mental and physical aggregates (*skandha*), constituents (*dhatu*), and so forth of bad migrations are abandoned by the path of seeing." Based on this statement, the question can arise: "Are the aggregates and constituents of the bad migrations acquired objects of abandonment of the path of seeing?" It follows that they are, because they are objects of abandonment of the path of seeing. If someone replies that they are not acquired objects of abandonment of the path of seeing, one can refer to the definition of an object of abandonment of the path of seeing as: that which is observed to be an acquired object of abandonment of the path of seeing and an object to be eradicated by the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing. However, the response is that the aggregates and constituents of the bad migrations are not conceptions and therefore cannot be acquired objects of abandonment of the path of seeing. The aggregates and constituents of the bad migrations are matter, whereas an acquired object of abandonment of the path of seeing is necessarily a consciousness.

When the text says that "the mental and physical aggregates (*skandha*), constituents (*dhatu*), and so forth of bad migrations are abandoned by the path of seeing," perhaps it means that because they derive from the afflictive emotions they are abandoned. There is debate concerning this: "Are the afflictive emotions that are the cause of rebirth in the bad migrations innate or acquired objects of abandonment of the path of seeing?" If someone says that they are acquired objects of abandonment of the path of seeing, then one says: "Is the ignorance that is a cause of bad migrations that is the first link of the twelve links of dependent-arising not the root of cyclic existence? It is not the root of cyclic existence because it is an acquired object of abandonment." If someone says that there is no pervasion, one says: "In Lama Tsongkhapa's *Definitive and Interpretive Meanings* (Tib. *Drang nges legs bshad snying po)* it says that the acquired view of the transitory collection cannot be the root of cyclic existence because it does not exist in the continua of beings, such as birds, antelopes, and so forth, whose minds have not been influenced by tenets." Birds and so forth have the root of cyclic existence, afflictive emotions which cause rebirth in the bad migrations, but their ignorance cannot be an *acquired* afflictive emotion.

When the text says that the aggregates and constituents are objects of abandonment of the path of seeing, this is a case of merely giving the aggregates and constituents the *name* 'object of abandonment of the path of seeing' because at this point a bodhisattva no longer has the non-virtuous karma to be reborn in the bad migrations. If it is abandoned by the path of seeing it is not pervaded by being an object of abandonment of the path of seeing.

The third quality mentioned in the text is that of reaching the end of the level of an ordinary being, which occurs when one attains the level of a superior. In other words, when one attains the first ground the state of a common being is extinguished.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1B-1B Features beautifying one's own continuum in brief

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In brief, just as for the arya stream enterer, faults are separated from and qualities arise through realizing the arya's doctrine concordant with him, similarly for this bodhisattva too, qualities arise and faults are exhausted appropriate to him through realizing a ground. That is made completely clear by means of the example of the stream enterer.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *He is shown to be like the eighth superior.* [7d]
>
> When the four abiders in and four approachers to the fruit are counted downwards from foe destroyer, the eighth superior is an approacher to the fruit of stream enterer. The features of abandonment and realization concordant with this approacher's level arise by virtue of his having attained the superior doctrine [or path]. A bodhisattva's extinguishing of faults and arising of auspicious qualities – which are due to his having attained the first ground – are shown in a similar manner to those of an eighth superior.

The four abiders and four approachers were explained in the context of the twenty sangha in the *Ornament for Clear Realization*.

The main objects of abandonment of an approacher to stream enterer are the three thorough entanglements. An abider in the result of stream enterer is one who has abandoned these three thorough entanglements. The main objects of abandonment of an approacher to once returner are most of the five partial concordances with the lower. An abider in the result of once returner is one who has abandoned most of the five partial concordances with the lower.

Why is it said "*most* of the five partial concordances with the lower"? The <u>five partial concordances with the lower</u> are:
(1-3) the three thorough entanglements,
(4) aspiration for the desire realm, and
(5) harmful intent.

Aspiration for the desire realm can be divided into nine: the three great, three middling, and three small, which are each further divided into great, middling, and small. One abiding in the result of once returner has definitely separated from the first six degrees of attachment to the desire realm. However, it is not definite that they have abandoned the seventh and eighth degrees, in that there are some who have abandoned them and others who have not. For this reason it says "most." On the other hand, it is definite that the ninth degree has not been abandoned.

The objects of abandonment of an approacher to non-returner are all five partial concordances with the lower. An abider in the result of non-returner is one who has abandoned all five partial concordances with the lower. He is called a non-returner because he will never again be born in the desire realm due to having abandoned all nine degrees of attachment to the desire realm.

The objects of abandonment of an approacher to foe destroyer are the five partial concordances with the upper. An abider in the result of foe destroyer is one who has abandoned the five partial concordances with the upper. What are the five partial concordances with the upper? There are two ways of counting them: one in the commentary on the *Ornament for Clear Realization* and one in the *Treasury of Knowledge*.
One way of counting the <u>five partial concordances with the upper</u> is:
1. aspiration for the upper realms (i.e., the form and formless realms),
2. sleep,

3. excitement,
4. ignorance, and
5. pride.

This is a brief presentation of the eight persons: the four approachers and four abiders. Just as these eight progress higher and higher, also the bodhisattvas of the ten grounds progress higher and higher. The eighth person, the approacher to stream enterer, it taken as an illustration of this fact.

Thursday morning, February 3, 2000

3B1C-2A1B-2 Features outshining others' continuums

This section has three parts:

A On the first ground outshining hearers and solitary realizers by way of lineage
B On the seventh ground outshining hearers and solitary realizers by way of intelligence
C The meaning established by these teachings

3B1C-2A1B-2A On the first ground outshining hearers and solitary realizers by way of lineage

This bodhisattva:

Even abiding in the mind of complete enlightenment's initial view,
The solitary realizers, along with those born from the Mighty Subduer's speech,
Are outshone and exceeded by the power of merits. [1.8abc]

That which was just said is another distinction, since it was taught in the *Liberation of Maitreya Sutra*:

> Son of good lineage, it is like this: for example, a prince, not long after birth, possesses a royal name outshining even all the principal elder assembly of ministers by the power of the great natural essence of lineage. Similarly, a novice bodhisattva, not long after having generated the mind toward enlightenment, also due to birth in the lineage of the Tathagata, the King of Doctrine, by the power of bodhichitta and great compassion outshines the hearers and solitary realizers who have practiced purity for a long time.
>
> Son of good lineage, it is like this: for example, whatever force there is of thrust of wing and whatever immaculate quality of eye there is not long after birth of the offspring of the great lord of garudas, they do not exist with any of the elders of all the assemblies of birds other than that. Similarly, the bodhisattva generating the initial mind of enlightenment, the offspring of the great lord of garudas, has perfectly arisen in the continuum of the lineage of the tathagatas, the great lord of garudas – whatever advancing beyond there is due to the strength of the wing of generating the mind toward omniscience and whatever quality there is of the immaculate eye, the special thought – none of the hearers and solitary realizers who have definitely emerged (practiced renunciation) over one hundred thousand eons have them.

– and so forth.

A bodhisattva who has just generated the ultimate mind of enlightenment for the first time outshines those of the hearer and solitary realizer lineages. The *Liberation of Maitreya Sutra* gives the analogy of a prince, saying that as soon as the son of a king is born he is given the title "prince" whereby he is paid respect by the king's ministers and so forth. Although the newborn prince outshines the assembly of ministers in terms of his lineage, the ministers outshine him in terms of their intelligence. Likewise, a bodhisattva who has just generated the ultimate mind of enlightenment outshines hearers and solitary

realizers by way of his lineage and not by way of his intelligence. In terms of intelligence, the hearers and solitary realizers outshine him.

In this sutra there is also the analogy of the garuda: a newborn garuda possesses a strength of wing greater than that of other birds and thereby outshines them due to possessing the garuda lineage . In short, bodhisattvas, from the time of first generating the ultimate mind of enlightenment through the seventh ground, outshine hearers and solitary realizers by the power of their great compassion and by their mind generation of special pure thought. Maitreya, in his *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras,* sets out four types of mind generation: the mind generation of using belief, the mind generation of special thought, the mind generation of fruition, and the mind generation of the abandonment of obstructions.

Q: Can hearers and solitary realizers see when a bodhisattva generates the mind of enlightenment or attains the path of seeing?
A: In general, those with an inferior realization do not see the higher realizations of others. In the *Treasury of Knowledge* Vasubandhu says that the realizations of someone who is superior, or has gone beyond, in terms of ground, faculty, person, and time cannot be seen by another person of inferior realizations. In short, one of dull faculties cannot see the realizations of the sharp-facultied. Therefore, because the hearers and solitary realizers are considered to be of duller faculties than bodhisattvas, they do not see the realizations of bodhisattvas. "Gone beyond" in this context means something that is hidden, something that cannot be accessed.

Q: It would seem then that the ministers would not see when the prince is born?
A: This is usually announced to all! Such an event is accessible to all. All aspects of an analogy do not have to fit the case.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> > *Even those abiding in the first mind of complete enlightenment*
> > *Overcome those born from the speech of the Subduer Kings*
> > *And solitary realizers through their own merit's increase.* [1.8abc]
>
> Not only those abiding in the second mind of complete enlightenment and so forth but even those in the first mind of enlightenment, the Very Joyful, overcome or outshine hearers – who are born from the speech of Subduer Kings – and solitary realizers through the force of the merit of their conventional mind of enlightenment and compassion. Their merit exceeds that of the hearers and solitary realizers. This feature is different from those explained earlier.
>
> The *Liberation of Maitreya Sutra (Maitreyavimoksha)* says, 'O child of good lineage, it is like this: For instance, because of the great nature of his lineage a prince with the royal name outshines all the principal elder ministers soon after his birth. In the same way, a novice bodhisattva generates an [ultimate] mind of enlightenment and is born in the lineage of a tathagata King of Doctrine. Soon thereafter, through the force of his altruistic mind of enlightenment and compassion he outshines hearers and solitary realizers, who have maintained pure behavior for a long time. Child of good lineage, it is like this: For example, soon after its birth, the offspring of a great king of eagles has power in his wing and clarity of eye that none of the older birds have. Similarly, a bodhisattva who has generated the first [ultimate] mind of enlightenment has taken birth in the lineage of a great tathagata king of eagles. As an offspring of the king of eagles he overpowers others through the strength of his wings to generate an aspiration to omniscience, and he has the pure eye of a special thought. These features do not occur in any of the hearers and solitary realizers who have practiced renunciation for a hundred thousand eons.'

(*Note*: In the example here, the word translated as 'eagle' is actually 'garuda.')

Here the first mind of enlightenment, i.e., the first mind generation, refers to the generation of the ultimate mind of enlightenment for the first time. The conventional mind generation at this time is called the 'mind generation of special pure thought.' One born in the tathagata lineage outshines the hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers due to his great compassion, mind of enlightenment, and collection of merit. The bodhisattva outshines the hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers just as a newborn with the royal title of prince outshines even the elder ministers.

> In his commentary [Jaya-ananda] explains these two passages [in the *Liberation of Maitreya Sutra*] as referring to conceptual mind generation. However, the references to a 'novice bodhisattva' and 'soon after generating a mind of enlightenment' are made in terms of an ultimate mind generation. Previously (verse 6a) Chandrakirti explained that birth in the tathagata lineage takes place on the first ground [using the example of an eighth superior (7d)], but aside from the use of different examples [those of a prince and an eagle's offspring and of an eighth superior], both passages [the explanations of birth in the tathagata lineage in the root text and in the *Liberation of Maitreya Sutra*] mean the same. Furthermore, the meaning of these three lines in the root text appears to be an abridgment of that in the sutra. Many texts such as Maitreya's *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras (Mahayanasutralamkara)* explain that mind generation of special pure thought [mentioned above in the *Liberation of Maitreya Sutra* as 'special thought'] refers to generating a mind of the first ground.

There are two types of mind generation: (1) a mind generation arisen from appellation and (2) a mind generation arisen from the attainment of subtle reality (*dharmata*). Jayananda says that the two passages refer to a mind generation arisen from appellation. A mind generation arisen from appellation is a conventional mind generation produced either through verbal instructions received from a master, such as "Now, generate the mind of enlightenment," or from conception, such as thinking, "I will attain enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings." Thus, a mind generation produced from appellation can arise either from terms, expressive sounds, or conception. In the context of appellation Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition*' gives the example of a moving object having a dewlap which is given the name 'cow.'

In this case, the mind generation of the first ground is not a mind generation arisen from appellation but is an ultimate mind generation.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Furthermore, the meaning of these three lines in the root text appears to be an abridgment of that in the sutra." The mind generation of special pure thought is the mind generation of the first ground. This is mentioned in many texts, including the *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras*. When the *Illumination* mentions the *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras,* it refers to the context in which this text says: "Mind generation is of four types: using belief, special thought, fruition, and of the abandonment of obstructions."

> OBJECTION: Then, you do not assert that hearers and solitary realizers are outshone when a bodhisattva who is a common being generates the conventional mind of enlightenment?
>
> ANSWER: It is not so; we do assert such. The *Liberation of Maitreya Sutra* says, 'O child of good lineage, it is like this: Even though a diamond has been broken, it outshines all excellent golden ornaments; it does not lose the name "diamond", and it banishes all poverty. In the same way, O child of good lineage, even though the diamond-like generation of an aspiration to omniscience lacks urgency, it overpowers all golden adornments of the qualities of hearers and solitary realizers. [With this aspiration] one will not lose the name 'bodhisattva', and all poverty of cyclic existence is overcome.' Shantideva quotes this sutra in his *Compendium of Instructions* as a source for the unsuitability of looking down on a bodhisattva who lacks the bodhisattva deeds, and it never happens that one who has attained a ground has a mind of enlightenment bereft of the bodhisattva deeds. [Therefore, this Sutra refers not to an ultimate but to a conventional mind generation.]

Once a bodhisattva has attained a ground, his mind generation cannot be separated from the bodhisattva deeds. The meaning of this is in relation to his conventional mind generation, which is illustrated by a diamond. Just as even a fragment of a diamond outshines all gold ornaments, likewise even the conventional mind generation outshines the qualities of hearers and solitary realizers. Just as a diamond is so valuable that it dispels poverty; likewise, the conventional mind generation dispels the poverty of cyclic existence. In his text *Bodhisattvacharyavatara,* Shantideva says that in the second moment of mind generation, one's impure body is transformed and becomes priceless. This text also says (in the context of the benefits of the mind of enlightenment): "The very instant that a miserable being bound in the prison of cyclic existence generates the mind of enlightenment, he becomes 'a child of those gone to bliss' and an object of the veneration of worldly gods and human beings." One should therefore uphold mind generation.

In short, one with even the conventional mind generation outshines hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1B-2B On the seventh ground outshining hearers and solitary realizers by way of intelligence

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *On the Gone Afar, he will also surpass intelligence.* [1.8d]
>
> As was taught in the *Exalted Sutra on the Ten Grounds*:
>
> > O children of the Conqueror, it is like this: for example, a prince born in a royal lineage bearing a royal name, outshines all the assembly of ministers by the magnificence of royalty through mere birth, not by analysis through the strength of his own intelligence. When he has matured, then he will greatly surpass all the activities of the ministers through generating the strength of his intelligence.
> >
> > O children of the Conqueror, similarly, as soon as a bodhisattva generates the mind, he too outshines all hearers and solitary realizers through greatness of the special thought, not by analysis through the strength of his own intelligence. The bodhisattva who abides on this seventh bodhisattva ground will greatly surpass all activities of the hearers and solitary realizers through abiding in the greatness of knowing his own sphere.
>
> One should know "therefore, indeed only from the Gone Afar (the seventh ground) onwards does a bodhisattva also outshine the hearers and solitary realizers due to the generation of the strength of his own intelligence, not on the lower grounds."

A bodhisattva on the seventh ground outshines hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers not just by the strength of his lineage, but also by the strength of his intelligence. This is because a bodhisattva on the seventh ground is able to enter into and rise from meditative equipoise on cessation – the perfect end – even within the short instant of a complete action. The bodhisattva gains this ability beginning on the seventh ground, while hearers and solitary realizers do not have it. This is discussed in the sixth chapter of the *Supplement,* (v. 6.1) where Chandrakirti says: "Abiding in the mind equipoised on the approach, he approaches the features of complete buddhahood and sees the thusness of this arising in dependence – he will attain cessation through abiding in wisdom. In short, the bodhisattva on the seventh ground is able to enter into and rise from meditative equipoise on cessation in the short instant of a complete action. Also in Gyelwa Gendun Drub's commentary, *Mirror of the Clarification of*

the Thought (translated by Martin Willson)it says: "Abiding with concentrated mind on 'Become Manifest,' he comes in sight of the perfect buddhas' dharmas, and seeing the reality of dependent-arising, by dwelling in wisdom, he achieves cessation." 'Cessation' here refers to the uncommon absorption of cessation which is attained by a bodhisattva on the seventh ground.

The Prasangika Madhyamika school presents the absorption of cessation differently from the lower schools. For the Prasangika Madhyamika school, a true cessation is an emptiness and an ultimate truth. A true cessation is the reality of the mind free from stains. This is called the cessation that is the perfect end (translated by Hopkins as "limit of reality"). According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, a bodhisattva is able to absorb into meditative equipoise on the reality of an object from the first ground (common absorption of cessation), but not until the seventh ground does he attain an *uncommon* absorption of cessation in which he is able to enter into and rise from meditative equipoise on cessation – the perfect end – even within the short instant of a complete action. A common absorption of cessation exists from the first through the tenth ground; an uncommon absorption of cessation exists from the seventh ground through the tenth ground.

The absorption of cessation can also be posited as common and uncommon as follows: that explained by the lower schools is the common and that explained by the Prasangika Madhyamikas is the uncommon. For the lower schools an absorption of cessation is a non-associated compositional factor that is the mere stopping of coarse feelings and discriminations, whereas it is not so for the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Thursday afternoon, February 3, 2000

When a bodhisattva reaches the seventh ground, he outshines hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers not only by the strength of his lineage but also by the strength of his mind, or intelligence. An illustration of this is the analogy of a prince who, at the time of his birth, outshines the ministers by the strength of his lineage and then later on also outshines them by the strength of his mind.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> > *On the Gone Afar he surpasses them with his intelligence.* [1.8d]
>
> When a bodhisattva arrives at the seventh ground, the Gone Afar, he outshines hearers and solitary realizers not only by way of his conventional mind of enlightenment but also through the power of his intelligence – his ultimate mind generation.
>
> The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says, 'O conqueror children, it is like this: For example, merely through being born in a royal lineage, a prince having the royal name outshines all the groups of ministers because of the king's magnificence but not by the force of his own mind. When he matures, his power of intelligence is generated, and he greatly surpasses all the ministers' activities. In the same way, O conqueror children, as soon as they generate an [ultimate] mind of enlightenment, bodhisattvas outshine all hearers and solitary realizers by the greatness of their special thought but not by the power of their intelligence. However, a bodhisattva on the seventh ground greatly surpasses all the activities of hearers and solitary realizers through abiding in the greatness that is knowledge of his own sphere.'
>
> 'As soon as they generate an [ultimate] mind of enlightenment' refers to the time of [attaining] the first ground. This is the mind generation of special pure thought.
>
> A bodhisattva outshines hearers and solitary realizers through the generation of his power of intelligence only on the seventh ground, the Gone Afar, and above. On the sixth ground and below he does not outshine them through his power of intelligence.

In the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds,* it says: "As soon as they generate an [ultimate] mind of enlightenment' refers to the time of [attaining] the first ground. This is the mind generation of special

pure thought." The mind generation of special pure thought is a conventional mind generation. When a bodhisattva attains the mind generation of special pure thought, he outshines the hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers by the strength of his lineage. Then, when he attains the seventh ground he outshines them by the strength of his intelligence. The Tibetan word (*blo*) translated as "intelligence" actually means "awareness" or "mind." Therefore, the seventh ground bodhisattva outshines the hearer and solitary realizers foe destroyers by the power of his mind.

In the sixth chapter of the *Supplement* (v. 6.1), it says: "Abiding in the mind equipoised on the approach, he approaches the features of complete buddhahood and sees the thusness of this arising in dependence – he will attain cessation through abiding in wisdom." The power of mind arises through abiding in the wisdom which is the surpassing perfection of wisdom achieved on the sixth ground.

Among the three higher trainings, the first is the higher training of ethics. The bodhisattva achieves the surpassing perfection of ethics on the second ground. The second higher training is the higher training of the mind. The bodhisattva attains this through the surpassing perfection of tolerance, which is achieved on the third ground. On the fourth, fifth, and sixth grounds the bodhisattva develops the perfection of wisdom.

Wisdom is divided into three:

(1) wisdom skilled in the coarse and subtle thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment,
(2) wisdom skilled in the coarse and subtle four noble truths, and
(3) wisdom skilled in coarse and subtle dependent-arising in the forward and reverse orders.

These wisdoms are fully developed respectively on the fourth, fifth, and sixth grounds.

"Sees the thusness of this arising in dependence" (v.6.1) means that the bodhisattva attains the wisdom skilled in coarse and subtle dependent-arising in the forward and reverse orders on the sixth ground. Thus, on the sixth ground there is the surpassing perfection of wisdom.

On the seventh ground, one cultivates the surpassing perfection of method; on the eighth, the surpassing perfection of prayer; on the ninth, the surpassing perfection of power; and on the tenth, the surpassing perfection of exalted wisdom. This is an ancillary explanation of the three higher trainings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's condensed commentary on this shows that 'surpassing all the activities of hearers and solitary realizers' means surpassing them through intelligence. [The sutra] explains 'the power of intelligence' as 'abiding in the greatness that is knowledge of his own sphere'. This is the greatness of knowing cessation, the limit of reality, the sphere of a bodhisattva.

This corresponds with Chandrakirti's commentary:

> One should know "therefore, indeed only from the Gone Afar (the seventh ground) onwards does a bodhisattva also outshine the hearers and solitary realizers due to the generation of the strength of his own intelligence, not on the lower grounds."

In the phrase in *Illumination* "This is the greatness of knowing cessation, the limit of reality, the sphere of a bodhisattva," "limit of reality" refers to the perfect end.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> With regard to the meaning of this:
> 1. Some say that although there is no difference between the wisdom entities of the seventh and the sixth grounds and below, the wisdoms of the earlier grounds are incapable of abandoning obstructions to omniscience, whereas the wisdom of the seventh ground has this capacity.

> Thus, the latter can outshine hearers and solitary realizers from the viewpoint of intelligence and the former cannot.
> 2. Others explain that on the seventh ground and above a bodhisattva is capable of leaping over [certain levels of] meditative stabilization.
> 3. Others say that a seventh ground bodhisattva outshines hearers and solitary realizers through intelligence because the wisdom of the seventh ground approaches the irreversible eighth ground.
>
> The first of these three interpretations is not correct. The [Prasangika] system asserts that all conceptions that persons truly exist are instances of afflicted ignorance, and to abandon these conceptions in such a way that they will not be produced again, it is necessary to extinguish their seeds. Since this abandonment is common to hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers, abandoning the seeds of the conception of true existence is not the same as abandoning obstructions to omniscience.
>
> Obstructions in the form of predisposing latencies – to be distinguished from seeds of the conception of true existence – are posited by the Prasangika system as the obstructions to omniscience. These are not abandoned until one attains the eighth ground.

1. The first person says that a bodhisattva on the seventh ground has the ability to overcome the knowledge obstructions, whereas those on the lower grounds do not. For this reason, the seventh ground bodhisattva outshines hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers through the power of mind (intelligence).
2. The second person says that the seventh ground bodhisattva outshines hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers through the power of mind (p intelligence) because he is able to leap over meditative stabilizations, whereas lower bodhisattvas are not able to do this.
3. The third person says that the seventh ground bodhisattva outshines hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers through the power of mind (intelligence) because he is approaching the attainment of the irreversible eighth ground.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, the seventh ground bodhisattva does not have the ability to overcome the knowledge obstructions because, until he has finished abandoning the afflictive obstructions, he does not begin to abandon the knowledge obstructions. The conception of true existence is not a knowledge obstruction but an afflictive obstruction.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Therefore, the [Svatantrika] presentation which posits conceptions of true existence as obstructions to omniscience is not asserted by the Prasangika system. The Svatantrikas also divide obstructions to omniscience into nine segments – small, middling, and great [with small, middling, and great of each of these three]. These are in turn abandoned by nine paths of meditation, the second ground and so forth [according to Svatantrika but not Prasangika]. I will elaborate on this later.

The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that conceptions of true existence are knowledge obstructions, which are divided into nine. This is not accepted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. If the seeds of the conceptions of true existence are not knowledge obstructions, what is posited as a knowledge obstruction? The Prasangika Madhyamikas posit the factor of mistaken dualistic appearance as a knowledge obstruction. Some of them say that the appearance of true existence is a knowledge obstruction. Lama Tsongkhapa will elaborate on this topic later.

According to the Svatantrika Madhyamika school, the conception of true existence is posited as a knowledge obstruction. This is divided into nine, the first of which is divided into two, whereby there are ten types of conceptions of true existence corresponding to the ten grounds.

Q: Is the appearance of true existence abandoned on the tenth ground?
A: The tenth ground is composed of a path of release, an exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment, and an uninterrupted path. During subsequent attainment, the bodhisattva has the appearance of true existence. At the last moment of the tenth ground, the uninterrupted path that is the end of the continuum of the sentient being, there is no appearance of true existence. One can say that on this uninterrupted path the appearance of true existence has ceased, but only on the buddha ground is it actually *abandoned*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The second position, that a bodhisattva gains the ability to leap over certain levels of meditative stabilization on the seventh ground, is also incorrect. 'Leaping over' signifies a disordering of stages, and there is no source showing that such a leap-over does not occur in meditative stabilization on the sixth ground and below but does on the seventh.

According to the *Ornament for Clear Realization,* the ability to leap over certain levels of meditative stabilization is present from the first ground. This is also accepted by the Prasangika Madhyamika school and, therefore, saying that this ability does not exist on the lower grounds is incorrect.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The third position, that a bodhisattva outshines hearers and solitary realizers through intelligence because the wisdom of the seventh ground approaches the irreversible eighth ground, is also incorrect. This still does not eliminate the doubt as to the reason for saying that although bodhisattvas cannot outshine hearers and solitary realizers on the sixth ground and below through their realization, they can outshine them on the seventh ground. Therefore, this is like making the disputed subject itself into the reason.

This person says that the exalted wisdom of the seventh ground, as the subject, outshines hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers because the exalted wisdom of the seventh ground approaches the irreversible eighth ground. This syllogism does not clarify, but is a case of the subject being used as a reason, or sign. It is like the following syllogism: sound as the subject, is impermanent because it is sound. Here, too, the subject is used as a reason. Likewise, in the previous syllogism the sign is "because the exalted wisdom of the seventh ground approaches the irreversible eighth ground."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In his commentary [Jaya-ananda] explains that on the seventh ground a bodhisattva thinks, 'I will engage in the paths,' and therefore exerts himself, but because the signs of doctrine, such as sutras, are not manifest [in the sense of his not needing to use words of doctrine], he has attained a path of signlessness. [Jaya-ananda] explains that since sixth grounders and below and hearers and solitary realizers do not have this signlessness, bodhisattvas outshine them in intelligence. However, the feature of outshining them here appears to be posited in terms of cognition of suchness.

Jayananda says that the bodhisattva on the seventh ground outshines hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers because of having attained signlessness. However, the reason should be that he outshines them because of his realization of suchness or emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> My excellent lamas have said that this feature should be posited from the viewpoint of entering into and arising from suchness – the limit of reality. It will be explained in connection with the seventh ground that from there a bodhisattva is able to enter into and rise from cessation – the limit of reality – in each mental instant whereas those on the lower grounds are unable to do so. This explanation is good because while practicing with belief [on the paths of accumulation and preparation] it is not difficult in quick succession to enter into and rise from the meditative stabilization on emptiness in which the mind and suchness have not become of one taste. However, when one is a superior – when the mind and suchness have become like water placed in water – this type of entering and rising is extremely difficult to accomplish.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that in accordance with what is said by his excellent lamas, seventh ground bodhisattvas outshine hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers because they are able to enter into and rise from cessation, the perfect end, in the shortest moment of a complete action, whereas bodhisattvas on the lower grounds are not able to do so. Why are bodhisattvas on the sixth ground and below not able to do so? Bodhisattvas on the sixth ground and below do not have the ability to enter into the absorption of cessation in the shortest moment of a complete action because their minds have become one taste with emptiness, like water poured into water, whereby it is not easy enter into and rise from meditative stabilization on emptiness quickly. On the other hand, on the paths of accumulation and preparation, the mind has not become of one taste with the object, emptiness, like water poured into water, and Therefore, [on those paths] it is easy enter into and rise from meditative stabilization on emptiness quickly. "The ground of practicing belief" refers to the paths of accumulation and preparation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> OBJECTION: When the features of the *first* ground are being explained, it is inappropriate to say that on the *seventh* ground bodhisattvas outshine hearers and solitary realizers through their intelligence.
>
> ANSWER: The fault of confusing subject matter is not incurred because Chandrakirti's explanation of the first ground and so forth is based on the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*, which clearly discriminates between a first grounder's outshining hearers and solitary realizers through his conventional mind generation but not through an ultimate mind generation. In order to clear away doubts on what ground a bodhisattva outshines them through his realization, the sutra says that it is on the seventh ground. Since Chandrakirti states this explanation here in his *Supplement*, it should be known that [his procedure] is very appropriate.

Here, someone objects that in the context of discussing the first ground it is inappropriate to discuss the seventh ground. The response is that this discussion is appropriate because when it is said that on the first ground a bodhisattva outshines hearers and solitary realizers due to attaining the tathagata lineage, this discussion eliminates qualms regarding when this bodhisattva outshines them by way of their mind or intelligence.

This concludes a discussion of the features outshining others' continua. In short, bodhisattvas outshine hearers and solitary realizers in two ways:
(1) by the power of their lineage and
(2) by the power of their mind.

END

(Masters Program Correspondence Course students note that there were no teachings Friday, February 4, 2000)

Wednesday morning, 23 February 2000

(MP correspondence course participants please note that there were no teachings from Friday, February 4 through Tuesday, February 22, 2000 due to the Tibetan new year study break and an Amitayus retreat)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1B-2C The meaning established by these teachings

This section has three parts:

1 The teaching in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* that hearers and solitary realizers cognize the non-inherent existence of phenomena
2 Sources proving hearers' and solitary realizers' cognition of the non-inherent existence of phenomena
3 Dispelling objections to the teaching that hearers and solitary realizers cognize the non-inherent existence of phenomena

3B1C-2A1B-2C1 The teaching in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* that hearers and solitary realizers cognize the non-inherent existence of phenomena

This section has two parts:

A Clarification of the thought of the commentator, Chandrakirti
B This is also the system of Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*

Hearer and solitary realizer superiors and foe destroyers do have the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena. Therefore, because they have the same realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena as do bodhisattvas on the sixth ground and below, these bodhisattvas do not outshine hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers by way of the power of their intelligence.

Chandrakirti then sets out three lines of reasonings as to why hearers and solitary realizers also have the realization of the non-inherent existence, or selflessness, of phenomena.

3B1C-2A1B-2C1A Clarification of the thought of the commentator, Chandrakirti

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> From this citation one can clearly ascertain that "hearers and solitary realizers also have the knowledge that all phenomena do not inherently exist." If it were not like that, because [they would be] separated from the thorough knowledge that things do not inherently exist, (1) like those separated from mundane attachment, they too would be outshone even by bodhisattvas who had generated the initial mind even through analysis by their own intelligence, (2) like the outsiders (non-Buddhists), they too would not abandon all subtle increasers which are activated in the three realms, and (3) because of erring as a result of referring to a self-entity of forms and so forth, they would not even realize the selflessness of persons because of referring to [a self entity of] the aggregates, the cause of imputing the self.

"From this citation" refers to the passages in the *Exalted Sutra on the Ten Grounds* which were cited above:

> O children of the Conqueror, it is like this: for example, a prince born in a royal lineage, bearing a royal name, outshines all the assembly of ministers by the magnificence of royalty through mere birth, not by analysis through the strength of his own intelligence. When he has

> matured, then he will greatly surpass all the activities of the ministers through generating the strength of his intelligence.
>
> O children of the Conqueror, similarly, as soon as a bodhisattva generates the mind, he too outshines all hearers and solitary realizers through the greatness of the special thought, not by analysis through the strength of his own intelligence. The bodhisattva who abides on the seventh bodhisattva ground greatly surpasses all activities of the hearers and solitary realizers through abiding in the greatness of knowing his own sphere.

These passages show that hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers also have the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena. For this reason, bodhisattvas abiding on the sixth ground and below outshine hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers merely by way of their lineage and not by way of their intelligence.

Chandrakirti sets out the first line of reasoning proving that hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers also have the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena, saying: "If it were not like that, because [they would be] separated from the thorough knowledge that things do not inherently exist, (1) like those separated from mundane attachment, they too would be outshone even by bodhisattvas who had generated the initial mind even through analysis by their own intelligence." On the other hand, if hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers did not have the wisdom realizing the non-inherent existence of phenomena, one could set out the following consequence: bodhisattvas abiding on the first ground, as the subject, it follows that they outshine hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers by way of their intelligence because hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers lack the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* explains that on the sixth ground and below bodhisattvas are unable to outshine hearers and solitary realizers by way of their realization. Through this passage one can clearly ascertain that there are also [some] hearers and solitary realizers who know that phenomena do not inherently exist.
>
> If hearers and solitary realizers did not have this wisdom, then even those bodhisattvas who generate the first ultimate mind [the first ground] would outshine them from the viewpoint of their realization. Hearers and solitary realizers would be like sages who depend on worldly paths, which have the aspect of [considering lower levels to be] gross and [higher levels to be] peaceful, and thereby become free from desire, with the exception of that for the level called 'Peak of Cyclic Existence'. This absurd similarity would follow from holding that hearers and solitary realizers lack the knowledge that phenomena do not inherently exist.

(1) The first of the three lines of reasonings proving that hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers also realize the selflessness of phenomena is:
If hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers did not possess the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena then first ground bodhisattvas would also outshine them by way of their intelligence, but they do not. If hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers did not have the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena, they would be like those who are separated from attachment by means of a mundane path. A mundane path that separates from attachment is a path that views a lower level as coarse due to seeing its faults and a higher level as peaceful due to seeing its qualities. On the contrary, if a lower level were seen as having excellent qualities one would not be able to overcome attachment to it. Such a mundane path acts to separate one from attachment to a lower level, but only abandons this attachment temporarily and not forever. The realizations of hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers are not like this path.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) then sets out the second line of reasoning saying:

> In that case, Chandrakirti says, hearers and solitary realizers – like the non-Buddhist Forders – would not have abandoned all afflictions related to the three realms as well as their seeds. This indicates that if one has not understood emptiness well and become familiar with it, one cannot remove the seeds of the afflictions. This is like the situation of those cultivating worldly paths, which have the aspect of grossness and peacefulness, [but are unable to remove the seeds of afflictions].

(2) The second of the three lines of reasonings proving that hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers also realize the selflessness of phenomena is:
If hearer and solitary realizers did not familiarize well with the realization of emptiness they would be like the non-Buddhist Forders who cultivate a path that views a lower level as coarse and a higher level as peaceful. This line of reasoning set out in the form of a consequence is: hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers, as the subject; it follows that they have not abandoned the afflictions of the three realms together with their seeds because they lack the wisdom realizing emptiness; therefore, they are like the non-Buddhist Forders who are temporally separated from attachment. Non-Buddhist Forders are posited as an example because although they are temporally separated from mundane attachment through to the level of Nothingness, they are unable to separate from the attachment of the Peak of Existence.

The second line of reasoning is set out by Chandrakirti as follows: "Like the outsiders (non-Buddhists), they too would not abandon all subtle increasers which are activated in the three realms." Subtle increasers are of ten types which are divided into two groups of five:

- five views and
- five non-views.

The <u>five non-views</u> are:
(1) attachment, (2) anger, (3) ignorance, (4) pride, and (5) doubt.
The <u>five views</u> are:
(1) the view of the transitory collection, (2) the view holding to an extreme, (3) the view holding a bad view as supreme, (4) the view holding bad ethics and modes of conduct as supreme, and (5) perverse view.

These were explained before in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. The objects of abandonment are mainly these ten subtle increasers. The word 'subtle increaser' has different etymologies, one of which is: the increase of contaminations due to observing a subtle observed object.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> If you lack cognition of suchness, you will conceive the aggregates, such as forms, to exist truly. Your mind will thereby err, and you will consequently not cognize a fully qualified selflessness of persons. This is because you will not have overcome belief in the referent object of a mind misapprehending true existence in the aggregates that are themselves the bases of designating a self, or person.
>
> Chandrakirti's statement of this indicates that if the referent object of the conception of true existence with regard to the aggregates – the bases of designation of a person – is not disbelieved, then the referent object of the conception of the true existence of the person – the phenomenon designated – will not be disbelieved. Because the person will not be cognized as lacking true existence, a fully qualified selflessness of the person will not be realized.

(3) The third of the three lines of reasonings proving that hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers also realize the selflessness of phenomena is:

Hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers, as the subject, it follows that they do not have a fully qualified realization of the selflessness of persons because they lack the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena (*or* because they superimpose a self on the aggregates, which are the basis of imputation). This implies that if one has not realized the selflessness of phenomena, one cannot have a fully qualified realization of the selflessness of persons. This is said here in relation to hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers. One can ask: "If someone has not realized the selflessness of phenomena is he pervaded by not realizing the selflessness of persons?" If someone says that there is no pervasion, one says: "Is there not a person who first realizes the selflessness of persons and then later the selflessness of phenomena?" If someone answers that there is no such person, one says: "This contradicts Lama Tsongkhapa's *Middling Stages of the Path,* which says that due to the basis of attributes one first realizes the selflessness of persons and then later the selflessness of phenomena." This is set out by Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen in *General Meaning* (*dBu ma'i spyi don;* page 113), which quotes the special insight section of the *Small Stages of the Path*: "Although there is no difference in degrees of subtlety regarding the selflessness that is ascertained with respect to persons and that which is ascertained with respect to phenomena, due to the fact of the basis of attributes, it is easier to ascertain it with respect to persons and more difficult to ascertain it with respect to phenomena." In addition, this text says: "Regarding the order of the production of the two conceptions of a self, the conception of a self of phenomena produces the conception of a self of persons. However, when engaging in the realization of selflessness, one first generates the view of the selflessness of persons and then later necessarily generates the view realizing the selflessness of phenomena." One should think about why the selflessness of persons is realized before the selflessness of phenomena and so forth.

In regard to the third line of reasoning, Chandrakirti says: "Because of erring as a result of referring to a self-entity of forms and so forth, they would not even realize the selflessness of persons because of referring to [a self entity of] the aggregates, the cause of imputing the self."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> It is very difficult to understand the meaning of these statements, and it appears that those relying on this system and on Shantideva's texts have not explained them well. Therefore, in order to come to a final interpretation, let us examine a doubt raised about this and discover how it is dispelled.
>
> DOUBT: Valid cognition establishes the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths, such as impermanence, emptiness, and selflessness – with the latter two referring to a substantially existent or self-sufficient person's lack of being either the same as or a different entity from the mental and physical aggregates. One definitely can ascertain these with valid cognition, and when that happens, the main trainees of these paths will familiarize with them intensely. The reasoning proving yogic direct perception establishes that when this happens, the selflessness of the person will be directly cognized. Thus, it is established that a path of seeing, a consciousness cognizing the selflessness of the person, abandons the artificial afflictions. When this is established, a path of meditation that is a familiarization with the selflessness of the person, which has already been directly seen, is established. Since the innate afflictions are also abandoned through the path of meditation, an extinction of all the contaminations of the afflictions is established. Therefore, even though emptiness is not cognized, all the subtle increasers of contaminations with respect to the three realms, as well as their seeds, can be abandoned. This is because the abandonment by the paths of seeing and meditation as just explained is the manner by which a supramundane path achieves abandonment. Therefore, paths that are meditations on the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths – impermanence and so forth – are capable of removing all afflictions.

This doubt is an assertion made by the lower schools, which hold that the realization of the emptiness of persons as being self-sufficient substantially existent is the realization of the selflessness of persons. More precisely, they say that the realization of the selflessness of persons is a yogic direct perceiver

realizing the emptiness of the person as self-sufficient substantially existent. Since such a yogic direct perceiver is first a path of seeing and then a path of meditation, it abandons all afflictions. Therefore, according to them one abandons all afflictions by means of the realization of the selflessness of persons. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not concord with this assertion. They say that the realization of the person as empty of self-sufficient substantial existence is not a fully qualified realization of the selflessness of persons. They say that due to the realization of the emptiness of the person being self-sufficient and substantially existent, there is a temporary stopping of afflictions. The Prasangika Madhyamikas hold that such a true cessation is the true cessation explained in the two *Knowledges* (Abhidharma texts), the *Treasury of Knowledge* (*Abhidharmakosha*) and *Compendium of Knowledge* (*Abhidharmasamucchaya*). They also hold that the foe destroyers who have such a true cessation are the foe destroyers explained by these texts.

Q: Are these true cessations or merely cessations?
A: The true cessations explained in the two Abhidharma texts are not fully qualified true cessations. Likewise, the foe destroyers explained in these two texts are not fully qualified foe destroyers. In other words, the lower Abhidharma text, the *Abhidharmakosha*, and the upper Abhidharma text, the *Abhidharmasamucchaya*, both set out true cessations and foe destroyers but the true cessations existing in the continua of hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers as explained in these two texts are not fully qualified true cessations and, likewise, the foe destroyers explained in these texts are not fully qualified foe destroyers. This is because these two texts posit a foe destroyer who has become a foe destroyer through realizing and familiarizing with the emptiness of persons of self-sufficient substantial existence.

In short, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas and the other lower schools assert that one can become a foe destroyer by realizing the emptiness of persons of self-sufficient substantial existence and without realizing the selflessness of phenomena. The lower schools, including the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, say that if it is a person definite in the solitary realizer lineage it is pervaded by not realizing the selflessness of phenomena. Thus, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamika school and below, a person can become a foe destroyer by merely realizing the selflessness of persons.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> ANSWER: I will explain. We do not deny that even though one has not found the view of suchness, one can ascertain the sixteen attributes, impermanence and so forth, with valid cognition. We also do not deny that the trainees of this path meditate on the meaning of the sixteen with great effort, or that through having done so they directly see the coarse selflessness of the person, or that familiarization with what has been seen is impossible.
>
> QUESTION: Then what do you say?
>
> ANSWER: Such a path is not a fully qualified cognition of the personal selflessness. Therefore, we do not assert that such paths are paths of seeing or supramundane paths of meditation. These paths cannot abandon the seeds to be abandoned either through the path of seeing or through the path of meditation.
>
> Explanations that these are paths of seeing and of meditation, that these abandon the artificial and innate afflictions as well as their seeds, and that at their end one attains the state of a foe destroyer are systems that require interpretation. For instance, the Chittamatrins establish through valid cognition a refutation of partless particles, an external world composed of them, and a subject that is a different entity from such an external world. When the trainees who are to be tamed by this teaching familiarize with it over a long time, they see it directly and then engage in further familiarization with what they have seen. However, the Madhyamikas explain that when progress on the ten grounds and on the latter three paths [seeing, meditation, and no more learning] is presented in terms of such teaching, the presentation must be interpreted.

The answer to the above doubt is that although [such a path is not a] realization of suchness, it is a realization of the sixteen attributes by means of a valid cognizer. "We do not deny that even though one has not found the view of suchness, one can ascertain the sixteen attributes" indicates that through establishing the sixteen attributes one attains a realization of the coarse selflessness of persons and then familiarizes with it. However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the realization of the coarse selflessness of persons is not a fully qualified realization of the selflessness of persons. The realization of the coarse selflessness of persons – the realization of the emptiness of persons of self-sufficient substantial existence – is not a fully qualified realization of the selflessness of persons. In order for it to be a fully qualified realization of the selflessness of persons, it must realize the non-inherent existence of a self of persons.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas differentiate the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena in terms of the basis of emptiness and not the object of negation. The selflessness of persons has the person as the basis of emptiness, whereas the selflessness of phenomena has as its basis of emptiness that which is other than the person, i.e., the aggregates. For the Prasangika Madhyamika school there is a subtle self of persons and a subtle self of phenomena. When inherent existence is negated on the basis of the person the subtle selflessness of persons is established, whereas when it is negated on the basis of phenomena the subtle selflessness of phenomena is established.

For the Svatantrika Madhyamika school, the two selflessnesses are instead differentiated not from the point of view of the basis of emptiness but from the point of view of the object of negation. Thus, they say that the object of negation that is a self of persons is a self-sufficient substantially existent self of persons, and that when this is negated the selflessness of persons is established. On the other hand, in the case of a self of phenomena the object of negation is the true existence of phenomena, from forms through the exalted knower of all aspects. [When this is negated the selflessness of phenomena is established.] Therefore, for the Svatantrika Madhyamikas the two selflessnesses are established in terms of two different objects of negation: self-sufficient substantial existence and true existence.

Wednesday afternoon, 23 February 2000

There is a phrase in one text that says that with the realization of the coarse selflessness of persons one can cultivate the path of seeing and path of meditation, whereby one will attain the state of a foe destroyer. However, this statement is not literally acceptable but is to be interpreted. Buddha said this to guide those sentient beings who are inclined toward the teachings on the emptiness of persons of self-sufficient substantial existence and thereby lead them through the path of seeing and the path of meditation to the path of no more learning, the state of foe destroyer. In other words, Buddha said this in order to guide these particular sentient beings to the path of no more learning. In fact, Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) said before: "For instance, the Chittamatrins establish through valid cognition a refutation of partless particles, an external world composed of them, and a subject that is a different entity from such an external world. When the trainees who are to be tamed by this teaching familiarize with it over a long time, they see it directly and then engage in further familiarization with what they have seen." The statement that by meditating on the emptiness of apprehendeds and apprehenders as different substances one cultivates the path of seeing, path of meditation, and path of no more learning is to be interpreted. The Chittamatrins assert that there are no external objects, but that if they did exist there would be agglomerations of partless particles, but this is not the case. The Chittamatrins therefore say that all existents arise due to the activation of latencies on the consciousness.

The Prasangika Madhyamika school, on the other hand, says that there do exist coarse external objects composed of particles. Because external objects do exist, there are valid cognizers

apprehending them. Are the external object and the valid cognizer apprehending it one substance? The Prasangika Madhyamikas reply that external objects are different substances from the consciousness apprehending them. Are the object and subject empty of being different substances? The Prasangika Madhyamika school replies that since they exist as different substances, they are not empty of being different substances. Therefore, the statement that by cultivating the realization of forms and the valid cognizer apprehending them as different substances on the path of seeing and path of meditation one achieves the path of no more learning is interpretable.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamika school, although there are no partless particles there are *directionally* partless particles. This is because the most subtle particle is asserted to be without directions. This is one way in which the Prasangika Madhyamika school's assertion regarding partless particles is interpreted by some scholars.

The Chittamatrins refute the lower schools assertions regarding the existence of partless particles, saying that particles do have parts because they have directions. For example, a partless particle is posited as existing on the table in front of oneself and around it are posited other particles. In this case there is one part of an outer particle that touches the eastern part of the central particle but does not touch the western part. Likewise, there is one part of an outer particle that touches the western part of the central particle but does not touch the eastern part. It is the same for particles touching the northern and southern parts of the central particle. From this example, one can understand that the central particle has these four parts in the four directions, as well as upper and lower parts. This is how the Chittamatrins refute the existence of partless particles. This is set out in the text *Twenty Stanzas on Refuting Partless Particles* by Dignaga.

In short, for the Chittamatra school, the Svatantrika Madhyamika school, and the Prasangika Madhyamika school there do not exist partless particles. In fact, they assert that if it is an established base it is pervaded by having parts.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Even if one meditates on the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, such as impermanence, only cognition of the [subtle] personal selflessness as explained above is asserted as a path freeing one from the afflictions.
>
> Asanga's *Compendium of Knowledge* explains that afflictions are abandoned through mental application of selflessness and that the remaining attributes are means of training the mind. Dharmakirti's *Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium on Valid Cognition' (Pramanavarttika)* explains it similarly:
>
> > One is liberated through the view of emptiness
> > The other meditations are for the sake of that.
>
> Some Indians [Shantirakshita, Kamalashila, Jetari, Prajnakaragupta, and so forth] mistook the term 'the view of emptiness' and asserted it to be a viewing consciousness cognizing suchness, but this is not so. It refers to the [coarse] view of emptiness of a substantially existent, or self-sufficient, person. Although such a path cannot abandon the seeds of the afflictions, it can temporarily stop manifest afflictions.
>
> Our assertion must accord with the statement in the *Knowledges* [the Hinayana and Mahayana *Abhidharmas*] that meditation having the aspect of grossness and peacefulness, which is common to Buddhists and non-Buddhists, abandons the manifest afflictions of Nothingness [the next to highest level within cyclic existence] and below. Therefore, it goes without saying that a path consciousness realizing the non-substantial existence of the person can temporarily abandon manifest afflictions.
>
> The afflictions referred to in the phrase 'abandon manifest afflictions' are those whose objects of observation and subjective aspects are explained in the Hinayana and Mahayana *Knowledges* [and not those involving the conception of inherent existence]. These paths cannot [even temporarily] abandon the manifest conception of true existence which the Prasangikas explain as an afflicted

> ignorance. These paths also cannot abandon view and non-view afflictions that accord with the conception of true existence and differ from the mode of explanation in the Hinayana and Mahayana *Knowledges*.
>
> Furthermore, although meditation having the aspect of grossness and peacefulness cannot abandon the manifest afflictions included within the level of the Peak of Cyclic Existence as explained in the *Knowledges*, these can be abandoned through familiarization with the paths cognizing the coarse selflessness of the person explained above.
>
> These points clarify Chandrakirti's statements in his commentary that paths which are said to be antidotes abandoning the afflictions but which lack a cognition of suchness are like paths having the aspect of grossness and peacefulness and incapable of abandoning all afflictions, as in the case of the non-Buddhists.

The selflessness set forth in the two Abhidharma texts is the emptiness of persons of self-sufficient substantial existence. When these texts say that one is liberated through the view of emptiness, it refers to the emptiness of persons of self-sufficient substantial existence, by means of meditating on which one attains liberation. In other words, emptiness in this context is not a fully qualified emptiness, this being the emptiness of inherent existence.

The path, or consciousness, realizing the emptiness of persons of self-sufficient substantial existence is able to abandon manifest afflictions because even the mundane path can abandon the manifest afflictions through Nothingness. Although it can abandon manifest afflictions, it cannot abandon the afflictions that are conceptions of true existence. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The afflictions referred to in the phrase 'abandon manifest afflictions' are those whose objects of observation and subjective aspects are explained in the Hinayana and Mahayana *Knowledges*." A path realizing the emptiness of persons of self-sufficient substantial existence is not able to abandon the five manifest views and five manifest non-views that accord with the conception of true existence.

In short, for the Prasangika Madhyamika school the conception of true existence is an afflictive obstruction, whereas for the lower schools it is not an afflictive obstruction but a knowledge obstruction. This is one difference between the assertions of the Svatantrika Madhyamika school and those of the Prasangika Madhyamika school.

Q: What is a correct consequence for each of the three lines of reasonings proving that hearers and solitary realizers also realize the selflessness of phenomena?
A: These are set forth in *General Meaning* by Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen (page 112):
(1) Just as first ground bodhisattvas outshine those free of mundane attachment by way of intelligence, likewise it follows that they are able to outshine hearers and solitary realizer foe destroyers by way of intelligence because first ground bodhisattvas directly realize the selflessness of phenomena [while] hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers do not directly realize the selflessness of phenomena. Isn't this your reason? If you accept this, it would contradict what is stated in the *Exalted Sutra on the Ten Grounds*: "Similarly, as soon as the bodhisattvas generate the [ultimate] mind, they outshine all hearers and solitary realizers by the greatness of their special thought, but not by the power of their intelligence."
(2) Hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers as the subject, they do not abandon the subtle increasers of the three realms because they lack the wisdom that directly realizes the selflessness of phenomena like, for example, the non-Buddhist sages.
(3) Hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers as the subject, it follows that they are not people who realize the selflessness of persons by way of a valid cognizer because they superimpose true existence on the aggregates – which are the basis of imputation of the person – due to not realizing the selflessness of the aggregates, which are the basis of imputation of the person. This follows because they have not realized the selflessness of phenomena. Aren't these in turn your reasons? If you assert the root [reason that hearers and solitary realizers do not realize the selflessness of the aggregates:

hearers and solitary realizer foe destroyers] as the subject, they do not have a fully qualified realization of the selfless of persons because of your assertions.

Q: But to each of these consequences cannot the opponent say 'no pervasion'?
A: If he says no pervasion then he has to explain why there is no pervasion, which is rather complicated. The third of these consequences is the most complex. To attain certainty with regard to this consequence see *General Meaning* (page 112-3): "The meaning of the third line of reasoning needs to be explained. It is said in [Je Tsongkhapa's] *Treatise Discriminating What is to be Interpreted and the Definitive* that, 'if one holds to the tenet of a self of phenomena the realization of the selflessness of persons is not possible.' Also, it says in his commentary to the *Supplement* that, 'if one does not give up conceiving a self of phenomena, one will not realize the selflessness of persons. Therefore, it is necessary that even hearers and solitary realizers realize both selflessnesses.' This peerless insight was rarely seen by others earlier. Also, the meaning of the [passage] from [Chandrakirti's] *Autocommentary*, 'because of erring in observing a self-entity of form and so forth,' is just this."

In short, the *Treatise Discriminating What is to be Interpreted and the Definitive* says that if one conceives of a self of phenomena, one cannot realize the selflessness of persons because as long as one conceives phenomena to exist truly or to have a self, then one will also conceive of persons to be truly existent and to have a self. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, in order to realize the selflessness of persons one must realize that the person does not exist truly or does not exist inherently. If, due to tenets, one conceives a self of phenomena then one will also conceive the person based on the aggregates to exist truly, whereby one cannot realize the selflessness of persons.

The four noble truths can be explained in terms of both coarse and subtle attributes. However, when they are explained in the two *Knowledges,* they are explained in terms of sixteen coarse attributes. The four truths are themselves divided into the coarse and subtle, whereby there are coarse and subtle true sufferings, coarse and subtle true origins, and so forth. Similarly, their sixteen attributes are divided into coarse and subtle. However, some people say that among the sixteen attributes the first, impermanence, does not have coarse and subtle aspects whereas the remaining fifteen do. This is because impermanence is explained in the same way by the higher and lower schools. Just as the lower schools define impermanence as 'momentariness,' so do the higher schools; for this reason impermanence is not divided into coarse and subtle. One such scholar who asserts this is Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen.

However, another scholar, Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa, does not agree with this assertion and instead says that impermanence can also be divided into coarse and subtle just as can the remaining fifteen attributes. He says that the four truths themselves are divided into coarse and subtle, meaning that true sufferings and so forth are both coarse and subtle. Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen and Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa posit the coarse and subtle four noble truths in the same way. For example, Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa posits coarse true sufferings as the contaminated aggregates produced by the cause that is the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person. He posits subtle true sufferings as the contaminated appropriated aggregates caused by the conception of a naturally existent person. Due to coarse and subtle causes, there are coarse and subtle results. These two divisions of true sufferings are posited in terms of it being easier to realize the contaminated aggregates produced by the cause that is the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person than it is to realize the contaminated appropriated aggregates caused by the conception of a naturally existent person. In this way, Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa sets out the definitions of each of the subtle four noble truths.

Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa also sets out reasons for there being both coarse and subtle impermanences saying that the impermanence existing upon the aggregates that is produced by the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person is coarse, whereas the impermanence

existing upon the aggregates which is produced by the conception of a naturally existent person is subtle.

Jedzunpa does not agree with this assertion but says that when one realizes the impermanence of the aggregates that is produced by the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person, one realizes that the aggregates are momentary and, likewise, when one realizes the impermanence of the aggregates that is produced by the conception of a naturally existent person, one realizes that the aggregates are momentary. Therefore, impermanence in both cases is momentariness and there is no difference in subtle and coarse. However, the remaining fifteen attributes can be divided into coarse and subtle. (See the translation of *General Meaning,* page 131, in review class handout, Feb. 24, 2000.)

When Lama Tsongkhapa gave a commentary on the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way,'* among his listeners there were Kunrig Gyeltshen Sangpo and Khedrub Je. Kunrig Gyeltshen Sangpo heard the commentary in accordance with the Chittamatra school and later on composed a commentary on it, explaining the views of the Chittamatrins. Later, Khedrub Je scolded him, saying that Lama Tsongkhapa had explained it in accordance with the view of the Middle Way school. Kunrig Gyeltshen Sangpo then wrote some pages saying that Lama Tsongkhapa had gone to a pure land leaving him alone, belittled by others. In short, listeners hear the teachings in accordance with the latencies on their mental continua.

Thursday morning, 24 February 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A1B-2C1B This is also the system of Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*
>
> The great conqueror child Shantideva also asserts this. His *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (IX. 41ab) says [citing an objector's opinion]:
>
> > One is liberated through seeing the truths,
> > What then is the use of seeing emptiness?
>
> Someone asks, 'Since one is liberated from the afflictions through the paths perceiving the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths, impermanence and so forth, one does not need to perceive the emptiness of inherent existence in order to extinguish the afflictions.' In answer to this, Shantideva says (IX. 41cd):
>
> > Scripture says that without this path
> > There can be no enlightenment.
>
> It is said in scripture that without the path perceiving the emptiness of inherent existence one cannot attain any of the three enlightenments [of a hearer, solitary realizer, or buddha]. With respect to how this is taught in scripture, Prajnakaramati's great commentary on *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* quotes a mother sutra (*Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*) which explains that one who discriminates true existence is not liberated and that all [levels of the path] from stream enterer to solitary realizer – in the past, present, and future – are attained in dependence on just this perfection of wisdom.
>
> Thus, Shantideva is not just referring to the highest enlightenment.

The lower schools hold that by means of seeing the truths, i.e., the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths, one can achieve liberation and that it is therefore not necessary to realize the emptiness of inherent existence. In response to this, Shantideva says that without the realization of the emptiness of inherent existence one cannot attain enlightenment. To prove this, Prajnakaramati's commentary on *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* quotes the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that one must realize the emptiness of inherent existence in order to attain enlightenment because without this one cannot abandon the conception of true existence through negating its referent object. In short, without abandoning the conception of true existence one cannot abandon afflictions, whereby one cannot achieve liberation. The word enlightenment is *byang chub* in Tibetan, *byang* meaning the purification of the obstructions and *chub* meaning the full realization of the meaning of reality. In the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras it says that "one who discriminates true existence is not liberated." This means that one who holds phenomena to exist truly cannot attain liberation. Only in dependence on the wisdom realizing non-inherent existence can one attain the path of stream enterer through the path of solitary realizer 'Enlightenment' in this context refers to the enlightenment of all three vehicles.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Shantideva, says (IX.45):
>
> > The root of the teaching is monkhood, but even
> > It is difficult, for those whose minds apprehend

> [Inherent existence] find it hard
> To pass away from suffering.
>
> [The roots of the teaching are monks who have abandoned the afflictions, that is, foe destroyers. Not to mention buddhahood, even such monkhood is difficult, that is, impossible, if the wisdom realizing emptiness is not cultivated, because the conception of inherent existence prevents nirvana. The teaching is both the verbal and the realized doctrine. Foe destroyers such as Kashyapa, Upali, Ananda, the sixteen elders (*sthavira*), and the foe destroyers present during the collections of the word are called the roots of the teaching because they undertook, sustained, and increased the doctrine.] These four lines teach that nirvana cannot be attained by means of a path having the observed object of a mind conceiving true existence.

The annotation by Jeffrey Hopkins already explains Shantideva's root text! When Shantideva says that "the root of the teaching is monkhood," the word 'monkhood' refers not to just any monks but to those particular foe destroyer monks who collected the Buddha's teachings together. Without the wisdom realizing non-true existence, the attainment of the state of foe destroyer is impossible because in order to attain this state one has to overcome the foes, which are the afflictions, by means of the wisdom realizing non-true existence. Here the foe is specifically the conception of true existence or the conception of a self of phenomena. In order to abandon the conception of a self of phenomena, one must realize the non-existence of the object conceived by the conception of true existence. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (page 49) says: "nirvana cannot be attained by means of a path having the observed object of a mind conceiving true existence."

One on the learner path strives to abandon the observed object of the conception of true existence, without which liberation cannot be attained. In one text it says: "When the analysis is concluded, one attains enlightenment." This means that when the observed object of the conception of true existence is eliminated one attains enlightenment.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Then, Shantideva says (IX.46ab):
>
> > 'Through abandoning the afflictions there is liberation.'
> > Then, immediately thereafter [extinguishment] would occur.
>
> The first line states the opponent's position which is that through cultivating the paths of the sixteen attributes of the four truths, impermanence and so forth, the afflictions are abandoned and liberation is attained. At this point the debate concerns whether liberation from the afflictions can be attained by means of only the paths of the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths, impermanence and so forth. That this is the meaning here is also very clear from the earlier debate (IX.41):
>
> > One is liberated through seeing the truths,
> > What then is the use of seeing emptiness?
> > Scripture says that without this path
> > There can be no enlightenment.
>
> Therefore, the former passage should in no way be interpreted to mean, 'We assert that the paths of merely the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths, impermanence and so forth, can extinguish the afflictions, but they do not liberate one from all suffering.'
>
> The thought of Shantideva's refutation is: The opponent maintains that a liberation extinguishing the afflictions has been attained when the afflictions that are also posited by the two hearer schools are not manifestly active due to generating in the mental continuum the paths of the four truths. If so, then immediately after having temporarily abandoned only the manifest afflictions, a liberation extinguishing all contamination would be attained.

The debate here is that if the afflictions posited by the two lower schools are eliminated, whereby liberation is attained, it follows that a liberation that is the extinguishment of all contaminations is attained immediately after having temporarily abandoned the manifest afflictions. "The two hearer schools" are the two lower schools, the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas. If we ask: "Is it possible to attain enlightenment by means of the understanding of the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths alone?," our position is that liberation cannot be attained by meditating on the sixteen attributes as they are asserted by the lower schools. On the other hand, liberation can be attained by meditating on the sixteen attributes as they are asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. This is because instead of meditating on the person as empty of self-sufficient substantial existence, one meditates on the person as empty of inherent existence, whereby one can indeed attain liberation. In short, one can attain liberation, or nirvana, and enlightenment by means of a path that meditates on the sixteen subtle attributes of the four noble truths.

Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa, in his *Great Middle Way* (page 337) in a section entitled "Our Own System," says: "The definition of a subtle true suffering is: suffering/misery or a contaminated appropriated aggregate produced by its cause, a subtle true origin such as the conception of true existence. In that it is such, the impermanence that is the disintegration in the shortest instant of a complete action and therefore misery, empty of true existence, and the lack of an independent self are posited as subtle attributes of true sufferings.

The definition of a subtle true origin is: the cause of its result, true sufferings, which is included in either a karma or an affliction that is uncommonly induced by the conception of true existence. Such karma and afflictions which act as cause, origin, condition, and strong production are the subtle attributes of true origins.

The definition of a subtle true cessation is: a reality (dharmata) that is the abandonment of either of the two obstructions by the force of a true path. In that it is such, the four features are the cessation of its respective object of abandonment, the pacification of that, auspicious highness, and a definite emergence that will not return from that. These are the subtle attributes of true cessation.

The definition of a subtle true path is: a superior's path possessing the four attributes, such as path. In order to illustrate such a true path, the four – path, suitability, achievement, and deliverance, which are related to the occasion of directly realizing non-true existence – are the subtle attributes of true paths."

On the other hand, the coarse attributes of the four noble truths are those that are usually posited. The definitions of the four noble truths according to the Svatantrika Madhyamika school are set out by Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen in *Ocean of Sport* as follows. The definition of a true suffering is: a truth of the thoroughly afflicted class distinguished by being qualified by the four attributes of impermanence, misery, empty, and selfless. The definition of a true origin is: a truth of the thoroughly afflicted class distinguished by being qualified by the four attributes of cause, origin, strong production, and condition. The definition of a true cessation is: a truth of the completely pure class distinguished by being qualified by the four attributes of cessation, pacification, auspicious highness, and definite emergence. The definition of a true path is: a truth of the completely pure class distinguished by being qualified by the four attributes of path, suitability, achievement, and deliverance. The Chittamatra school would give a similar definition of the four noble truths, whereas they are defined slightly differently by the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas.

Thus, the four noble truths are the essence of the Buddha's teachings and must be understood well. The four noble truths are likened to an onion in that one can peel away more and more layers.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Shantideva indicates that this cannot be asserted (IX.46cd):

> Though [manifest] afflictions are [temporarily] absent
> They are seen to have [rebirth by] the power of actions.
>
> Though the manifest afflictions are temporarily absent, [such persons] are seen to have the power impelling a future rebirth through the force of contaminated actions (*karma*).
>
> These passages should be explained in this way and not as other commentators and some Tibetans have done, saying, 'Though they had no afflictions Maudgalyayana, Angulimala, and so forth were seen to have suffered from the effects of contaminated actions accumulated earlier when they were common beings; therefore, they were not immediately liberated.' Shantideva is not referring to [karmic] power that generates suffering in this lifetime. His passage must be understood as indicating that since the power of impelling a future rebirth through the force of contaminated actions has not been overcome, there is no liberation.

In his *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds,* Shantideva says: "Though [manifest] afflictions are [temporarily] absent they are seen to have [rebirth by] the power of actions." There are people who lack afflictions and yet experience the power of actions. Who are they? Think about it.

Through cultivating the path asserted by the two *Knowledges* afflictions are abandoned, yet such a person still has the karma that has the power to impel rebirth. This is because such a path is only able to overcome manifest afflictions temporarily, and therefore one still has the projecting karma to be reborn in cyclic existence and does not attain liberation. In one text it says: "One who sees the truth has no more projecting karma, one who is free from craving is not reborn." This means that one who sees the truth does not accumulate any more projecting karma.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "These passages should be explained in this way and not as other commentators and some Tibetans have done, saying, 'Though they had no afflictions Maudgalyayana, Angulimala, and so forth were seen to have suffered from the effects of contaminated actions accumulated earlier when they were common beings; therefore, they were not immediately liberated.'" These commentators did not understand the meaning of these passages correctly.

Maudgalyayana and Angulimala are mentioned here as examples of people who, although they no longer had afflictions, were seen to suffer the effects of actions accumulated in the past. It is recounted that when Shariputra's mother died she took rebirth in a hell located below the northern land of Light Rays. Shariputra and Maudgalyayana went to visit her there by the force of magical emanation. There they also met some teachers of the non-Buddhist Forder school who had been reborn there. The non-Buddhist teachers asked Shariputra and Maudgalyayana to relay a message to their previous followers in the human realm to stop sacrificing animals, as every time an animal sacrifice took place they experienced intense suffering. Shariputra did not pass on this message upon returning to the human realm for fear of angering their followers, but Maudgalyayana did so. As a result he was severely beaten by their followers. Although Maudgalyayana possessed magical powers he did not escape from this beating. When he was asked by others as to why he had not used his magical powers at that time he explained that while he was being beaten he had not even been able to think to use these powers. When Buddha was asked why this was so, Buddha explained that when Maudgalyayana was a child he had hit his own mother with a stick and had not confessed this negative action. Due to this, Maudgalyayana had experienced the suffering of being beaten by the followers of the non-Buddhist teachers. This is why Maudgalyayana is mentioned by Lama Tsongkhapa in this context.

When Angulimala was a young child he had very sharp faculties and was sent by his family to a non-Buddhist teacher in order to learn the various sciences. This teacher was a layman with a family. When Angulimala grew up he became very handsome, whereupon his teacher's wife fell in love with him and urged him to have sexual intercourse with her. Angulimala refused saying that he could not do so as she was the wife of his teacher. The woman became so upset that she pulled out her hair, scratched her face, and so forth. When later the teacher asked her what had happened she said that Angulimala had done this to her when he tried to rape her. The teacher believed his wife and

called Angulimala to him. He told Angulimala that he had created a serious negativity, but Angulimala responded that he had not done what the wife accused him of. The teacher did not believe him and said that he had created a heavy negativity which needed to be purified by killing a thousand human beings. Angulimala was to return to him with a rosary made of a thousand thumbs to prove that this had been carried out. Angulimala set out to do as he had been instructed and succeeded in killing 999 people. Upon looking for the thousandth person, he saw his mother approaching him with food in her hands and thought to kill her but upon seeing a saffron-robed monk nearby he changed his mind and decided to kill the monk instead. Angulimala began to run toward the monk, who was the Buddha, but was unable to catch up to him. He called to the monk to stop whereupon the Buddha said to him, "I have been waiting for you all the time." Angulimala wondered what this response meant and thought deeply upon its meaning. As a consequence his intention to kill the monk diminished, whereupon he clearly saw Shakyamuni Buddha. The Buddha ordered him to accompany him to his monastery and to take ordination. Angulimala did so and began to meditate on the four noble truths whereby he eventually became a foe destroyer. However, even then when begging for alms people would escape from him, as he was known to have killed many people, and he would go hungry. He tried to explain to people that he had changed and become one who had entered the path to liberation but they found it difficult to believe him. In this way Angulimala experienced the result of killing those 999 people in that very life. It is also said that when Angulimala was alone in his room he experienced the sufferings of the hot hells, although he was a human being. Through experiencing these sufferings he was able to purify the heavy negative karma that he had created. This story shows the way in which karma functions. Therefore, it is very important for us to purify our negative karma. Shantideva, in his *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds,* says that even those with strong attachment like Nanda and those with strong hatred like Angulimala can purify their karma and attain liberation.

Thursday afternoon, 24 February 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> For, Shantideva says (IX. 49abc):
>
> > Though an [afflicted] mind lacking [meditation on]
> > Emptiness is halted, it is again produced as in
> > The case of the absorption of non-discrimination.
>
> If one lacks cognition of emptiness, then even though afflicted minds are temporarily halted through cultivating other paths, they cannot be totally overcome. Manifest afflictions are again produced, and thereby wandering in cyclic existence under the power of contaminated actions is not eliminated. That afflicted minds can be halted temporarily means, as was explained before, that manifest afflictions can be temporarily abandoned.

The afflictions can be temporarily abandoned by cultivating a path lacking the wisdom realizing emptiness, but they will return. This fact is likened to the absorption without discrimination. The definition of an absorption without discrimination is: a non-associated compositional factor that is the stopping of coarse feelings and coarse discriminations on the basis of the form aggregate. The absorption without discrimination is cultivated in order to take rebirth in a division of the fourth form realm called Without Discrimination. One does so on the basis of understanding that due to feelings and discrimination, many problems arise such as attachment, hatred, and so forth.

When it is said that through the cultivation of a path lacking the wisdom realizing emptiness the afflictions are abandoned temporarily it refers to a consciousness realizing the emptiness of persons of self-sufficient substantial existence. Since the manifest afflictions will return, one will again

be reborn in cyclic existence. Therefore, because the afflictions have not been completely eradicated, wandering in cyclic existence under the power of contaminated actions is not eliminated.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In answer to the statement, 'They are seen to have [rebirth by] the power of actions,' the opponent says (IX.47ab):
>
> > The absence of attachment
> > To rebirth is definite.
>
> 'Since these paths extinguish attachment that causes rebirth, it is certain that they will not be reborn again through the power of actions.' In answer to this, Shantideva says (IX.47cd):
>
> > This attachment is not afflicted but
> > Why is it not like obscuration?
>
> The opponent asserts two types of ignorant obscuration – an afflicted and an unafflicted, one as explained in the *Knowledges*. Why not also assert afflicted and unafflicted attachment to accord with the explanation in the *Knowledges* [of those obscurations]? This indicates the existence of an 'unafflicted attachment' as it is commonly known in the two hearer schools and in the Mahayana, but in our own [uncommon] system this attachment is said to be afflicted [because it is induced by the conception of inherent existence which is asserted as the chief affliction].

Shantideva was quoted previously as saying: "Though [manifest] afflictions are [temporarily] absent they are seen to have [rebirth by] the power of actions." To this the opponent says: "The absence of attachment to rebirth is definite." This means that when craving (here translated as 'attachment'), the eighth link, is abandoned then the subsequent links including birth are also abandoned. The objection here is made by the lower schools. To them the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that since you lower schools assert two types of ignorance, an afflicted and an unafflicted, why do you not assert two types of craving (attachment), an afflicted and unafflicted?

Q: Do the Prasangika Madhyamikas not also assert afflicted and unafflicted ignorances?
A: The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not accept an unafflicted ignorance. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas ignorance is pervaded by being afflicted because the two types of conceptions of a self, the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena, are both ignorances. On the other hand, according to the lower schools only the conception of a self of persons is an affliction, whereas the conception of a self of phenomena is not. This discussion can be found in the commentary on *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The opponent asserts two types of ignorant obscuration – an afflicted and an unafflicted, one as explained in the *Knowledges*." In this context, 'the opponent' is the lower schools in that they assert two types of ignorance, an afflicted and an unafflicted, as is explained in the *Knowledges*. Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say to them why do you not also accept an afflicted craving and an unafflicted craving?

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "This indicates the existence of an 'unafflicted attachment' as it is commonly known in the two hearer schools and in the Mahayana, but in our own [uncommon] system this attachment is said to be afflicted." This statement means that for the Prasangika Madhyamika school craving (or attachment) is necessarily afflicted, whereas according to the other schools, including the Chittamatra and Svatantrika Madhyamika schools, there is also an unafflicted craving. In other words, according to the Prasangika Madhyamika school the craving that is a

conception of true existence is afflicted, whereas for the lowers schools this craving is not known to be afflicted because they do not assert a craving that is a conception of true existence.

It is said that just as when the body is destroyed the body sense power is destroyed, likewise when the ignorance of true existence is destroyed all other afflictions are destroyed. This will be discussed again in the context of the two truths.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Therefore, the meaning of this passage is: Although the manifest [coarse] attachment induced by the conception of the person as substantially existent or self-sufficient has been temporarily abandoned, why is there no [subtle] attachment induced by the [subtle] view of the transitory collection – the conception that the person inherently exists?
>
> One who has abandoned such [coarse] manifest afflictions has not even overcome the manifest [subtle] view of the transitory and manifest [subtle] attachment. If one has abandoned [only] the manifest afflictions of both these systems [Prasangika and non-Prasangika], the seeds of both [the coarse and subtle afflictions] have similarly not been abandoned, and if the manifest and non-manifest do not differ [as to whether or not their seeds have been abandoned], then it is senseless to differentiate attachments [by calling one afflicted and the other not because the afflictions have to be abandoned, both in manifest and seed form, for a person to become a foe destroyer].

In brief, there are two types of craving: one induced by the conception of persons as self-sufficient substantially existent and one induced by the conception of the view of the transitory collection, or the conception of a naturally existent person.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Shantideva gives the reason why one who has abandoned other manifest [coarse] afflictions through other paths has not overcome [subtle] attachment (IX.48ab):
>
> > Attachment occurs through the cause
> > Of feeling, and they have feeling.
>
> If one lacks the view cognizing suchness, then ignorance – the conception that feelings truly exist – is not in the least abandoned. Thus, when a feeling of pleasure is produced, why would attachment to not being separated from it not be generated? Also, when a feeling of suffering is produced, why would attachment wishing to separate from it not be generated? An effect is necessarily produced from causes with respect to which the favorable circumstances are complete and the unfavorable ones are absent.

Feelings give rise to afflictions, which then nourish the conception of true existence. Through cultivating other paths, one can temporarily abandon manifest afflictions, as is explained in the *Knowledges*. However, these other paths do not even slightly harm the conception of true existence of feelings. When the conception of true existence of feelings is present it acts to produce afflictions such as attachment. When there is a pleasant feeling, due to the condition of the conception of true existence of this feeling one develops attachment to not being separated from the pleasant object. Likewise, when there is an unpleasant feeling, due to the condition of the conception of true existence of this feeling one develops attachment to being separated from the unpleasant object. In this way, all favorable conditions are present for the arisal of attachment. In *Compendium of Valid Cognition* it says: "When a cause contains all of the conducive conditions and lacks all of the opposing conditions (for ripening], it is certain to give rise to its effect."

In his *Treasury of Knowledge,* Vasubandhu gives the reasons for classifying feelings and discriminations as separate aggregates as the fact that they are a basis for disputes and the cause of cyclic existence. He says that lay people dispute with others due to feelings, whereas the ordained

dispute with others due to discriminating different views. In short, because of feelings, afflictions arise, and due to afflictions, one circles in cyclic existence. When Vasubandhu says that both these mental factors are the cause of cyclic existence it means that due to liking pleasant feelings lay people produce attachment and due to disliking unpleasant feelings they produce anger, whereby they create actions and circle in cyclic existence. On the other hand, due to liking particular views and disliking others the ordained create actions whereby they circle in cyclic existence.

Shantideva says: " Attachment occurs through the cause of feeling, and they have feeling."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> According to our own system, the way to overcome attachment to feeling is expressed by Shantideva in his *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (IX.99):
>
> > When [it is seen] that there is no
> > Feeler and feeling, why would
> > Attachment not be overcome
> > Through seeing this situation?
>
> If one cultivates the perception that feeler and feeling do not at all inherently exist, one will overcome attachment. Shantideva is also indicating, 'If one does not have such a path, how could all attachment be overcome? This is what Nagarjuna means when he says in his *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*:
>
> > How could the great poison of the afflictions
> > Not arise for one whose mind has a base?

If one sees that feeler and feelings do not exist inherently then is craving (attachment) not overcome? And, if one does not see this, how can craving (attachment) be overcome?

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Cha-ba (Rigs-pa'i-dbang-phyug Cha-pa-chos-kyi-seng-ge) and Tsek-wang-chuk-seng-gay (rTsegs-dbang-phyug-seng-ge) refute Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*: 'Shantideva's explanation that attachment exists because feeling does is not good because the presence of a cause cannot prove that of an effect.'

It is true that in general the existence of the cause does not establish the existence of the effect. However, Shantideva does not say this but rather says that when the causes are complete the effect will definitely arise

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> [ANSWER:] Of the two positions, that hearers cognize the selflessness of phenomena and that they do not, the latter is well known in Tibet [even though it is wrong]. Being more accustomed to that system and not having trained decisively in the scriptures and reasonings of the former position, these commentators have not discerned the detailed meaning of the complete reasoning. They err greatly in rushing to impute fault to the great wise Shantideva.
>
> Similarly, some Tibetans [Bu-ton, Pan-chen Jom-rel, and so forth] find fault with the honorable Chandrakirti; they express spurious faults without having any detailed understanding of their opponent's position [that is, Chandrakirti's position that hearers cognize the selflessness of phenomena]. Thus, when the wise see them illustrating their own nature, it is only a source of extreme embarrassment.

Here Lama Tsongkhapa mentions that there are commentators who find fault with Shantideva and Chandrakirti. In this context there are two positions: (1) that hearers and solitary realizers realize the selflessness of phenomena and (2) that hearers and solitary realizers do not realize the selflessness of phenomena. The latter position is more well known in Tibet. However, Lama Tsongkhapa says that those who refute the first position have not studied the texts well whereby they assert that Chandrakirti has fallen into the nihilistic view. In this way they demonstrate their own nature.

In Tibet there were eight great scholars who were called the eight great lions, one of whom was Chapa Chokyi Sengge. In general, Chapa Chokyi Sengge is renowned as a great scholar, but he had some mistaken conceptions about the view. He was the author of many texts, one of which was a commentary on the *Compendium of Valid Cognition* and another on *Collected Topics*. In *Collected Topics* there is a section on isolate and substantial phenomena. Chapa Chokyi Sengge composed a commentary on this section called the *Forty-eight Isolates and Substantials,* which he taught to his students. At that time in the province of Sangpo there was a monastery and a nunnery, which often debated against each other. However, the nuns would always win the debates. In order for the monks to win the debate Chapa Chokyi Sengge gave them his text, which the nuns had never even seen before. In this way the monks won the next debate. This shows that in the past nuns also used to study and debate. Only later on was this tradition lost and nuns came to only engage in meditation practice and the performance of rituals. Presently study and debate is being brought back into the Tibetan nunneries in India.

Chapa Chokyi Sengge asserts that ultimate truth is not an object of knowlege because it bears reasoned analysis. If it bears reasoned analysis it is truly existent, whereby it does not exist. To prove that ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge he quotes the ninth chapter of *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds,* which says that the ultimate is not an object of awareness because awareness is a conventionality. Chapa Chokyi Sengge takes this to mean that ultimate truth cannot be an object of a mind which is a conventionality. However, Shantideva means that ultimate truth is not a direct object of a conceptual mind because conception is a concealer.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In his commentary [Jaya-ananda] says that the artificial afflictions can be abandoned through the sixteen paths of the four noble truths, impermanence and so forth, but not the innate afflictions. This difference is not correct. With respect to temporarily abandoning only the manifest [coarse] afflictions commonly spoken of in the vehicles, both the artificial and the innate [coarse] afflictions are similar [in that the manifest forms of both can be temporarily abandoned through the paths of the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths]. These afflictions are also similar in that their seeds cannot be abandoned [by the paths of the four noble truths]. Here [Jaya-ananda] does not know how to explain that Chandrakirti and Shantideva are in agreement.
>
> If one does not cognize the mental and physical aggregates as not truly existing, then one will not cognize the person as not truly existing and, thereby, will not cognize the selflessness of the person. Just as the emptiness of true existence with respect to phenomena such as the mental and physical aggregates is posited as the selflessness of phenomena, so the non-true existence of the person should be put as the selflessness of the person because the reasons [for doing so] are completely similar [since non-true existence is the mode of being of both].
>
> Because a conception that the person truly exists must be posited as a conception of a self of persons, it is impossible to extinguish all afflictions until that has been extinguished. Thus, conceptions of the true existence of persons and phenomena must be posited as afflictions. This very position must also be presented in connection with Shantideva's system.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that Shantideva and Chandrakirti are in agreement. The afflictions explained in the *Knowledges*, whether acquired or innate, are both abandoned by the path of the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths. On the other hand, the seeds are not abandoned by the path of the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that just as the non-true existence of persons is posited as the selflessness of persons and the non-true existence of phenomena is posited as the selflessness of phenomena, likewise, the conception of true existence of persons is the conception of a self of persons and the conception of true existence of phenomena is the conception of a self of phenomena. Thus, the conception of true existence of persons, which is the conception of a self of persons, is an afflictive obstruction. As long as it is not abandoned, the afflictions will not be abandoned. This uncommon assertion of the Prasangika Madhyamikas contradicts the lower schools, which say that although the conception of true existence of persons is not abandoned the afflictions can be abandoned. This is because they assert that the conception of true existence is not an affliction.

In short, the main point here is to prove that hearers and solitary realizers do have the realization of the selflessness of phenomena. In order to prove this there are three lines of reasonings. In addition, this will be proved by scriptural authority, which is yet to be presented. There are three reasonings and seven scriptures that establish that the realization of the selflessness of phenomena exists in the continua of hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers. Scriptures include the mahayana sutras, hinayana sutras, and treatises. The seven scriptures are difficult to identify but, in short, there are: two mahayana sutras, one hinayana sutra, and four treatises.

Friday morning, 25 February 2000

3B1C-2A1B-2C2 Sources proving hearers' and solitary realizers' cognition of the non-inherent existence of phenomena

This section has two parts:

A Sources in Mahayana sutras proving hearers' and solitary realizers' cognition of the non-inherent existence of phenomena
B Sources in treatises and in Hinayana sutras

3B1C-2A1B-2C2A Sources in Mahayana sutras proving hearers' and solitary realizers' cognition of the non-inherent existence of phenomena

Chandrakirti quotes the *Questions of Adhyashaya Sutra* in his *Clear Words* [commenting on Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*, XXIII.14]:

> 'For example, during a magical display, a man sees a woman created by a magician and desire arises in him. His mind becomes ensnared with desire, and he is frightened and ashamed in front of his companions. Rising from his seat he leaves and later considers the woman to be ugly, impermanent, miserable, empty, and selfless. O child of good lineage, what do you think? Is that man behaving correctly or wrongly?'
>
> 'Blessed One, he who strives to consider a non-existent woman to be ugly, impermanent, miserable, empty, and selfless is wrong.'
>
> The Blessed One said, 'O child of good lineage, you should view similarly those monks, nuns, laymen, and laywomen who consider unproduced and unarisen phenomena to be ugly, impermanent, miserable, empty, and selfless. I do not say that these stupid persons are cultivating the path, they are practicing wrongly.'

The Buddha questions one of his disciples as to whether, in the case that a magician creates a woman during a magical show, it would be right for one of the spectators who, having generated desire for her, to then contemplate that woman as ugly, impermanent, misery, empty, and selfless. The disciple responds that this would be wrong and the Buddha reiterates that this is not the correct way to practice. Likewise, when someone holds the aggregates to be truly existent and then meditates on them as impermanent, misery, empty, and selfless this too is incorrect because there is no such truly

existent object. Hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers do not meditate in this way because they have realized emptiness. This is the condensed meaning of this sutra passage.

When Buddha taught the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras there were four types of listeners: fully ordained monks, fully ordained nuns, laymen, and laywomen. These four groups of people are mentioned here in the sutra.

It has happened in that past that a man becomes attached to woman created by a magician. This is discussed in detail in the text *Refutation of Objections Regarding the Middle Way*. In this text there is story about a brahma and his son who went to see a magic show during which the magician created a woman with whom the son fell in love. He asked his father to arrange a marriage with her, although she was a mere illusion.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Thus, it was said very clearly [that those who conceive true existence are not liberated]. The example is the taking of a woman created by a magician as real and the subsequent consideration of her as impermanent and so forth. This should be understood as referring to conceiving that the aggregates truly exist and subsequently considering them to have the five qualities of impermanence and so forth.
>
> This is a case of observing truly existent aggregates and considering them to be impermanent and so forth, and such consideration is only a wrong consciousness, mistaken with respect to its referent object [truly existent impermanent aggregates which actually do not exist]. Therefore, such is not validly established.
>
> However, in the mental continuum of one who has not found the view overcoming belief in the object of the conception of true existence, there are many cases of observing aggregates that are not qualified by either truth or falsity and of establishing by conventional valid cognition that the aggregates have an impermanence and so forth which are not qualified by either truth or falsity. Also, paths, as explained before [in connection with the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths], are generated in the mental continuum during meditation through having meditated on the meaning [of impermanence and so forth without understanding non-true existence or positing true existence].

If one holds a beautiful woman to truly exist, one will not be able to abandon attachment to her. Also if one takes truly existent aggregates as one's object of meditation and then meditates on them as impermanent, misery, empty, and selfless, the afflictions cannot be abandoned. On the other hand, if one takes aggregates which are not qualified by either true existence or non-true existence as one's object of meditation and meditates on them as impermanent, misery, empty, and selfless, this is a correct way to meditate. By means of this meditation the impermanence of the aggregates can be established by means of a valid cognizer. In this way the person will generate a path cultivating impermanence in his continuum.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Also, in the *Sutra on the Miserliness of One in Trance (Dhyayitamushti)*, which is quoted in [the twenty-fourth chapter of] Chandrakirti's *Clear Words*, Buddha says, 'Manjushri, sentient beings, whose minds are mistaken due to four errors through not seeing the noble truths correctly as they are in reality, do not pass beyond this unreal cyclic existence.' Manjushri responds, 'Blessed One, please indicate what is apprehended by sentient beings that causes them not to pass beyond cyclic existence.'
>
> The Teacher said that sentient beings are not liberated because they do not know the four truths as they are in reality, and Manjushri requested Buddha to explain what is misconceived by sentient beings that causes them not to be liberated from cyclic existence. In answer to this, Buddha says that they think, 'I will pass beyond cyclic existence, and I will attain nirvana,' with a sense of adhering to the true existence of these. Therefore, when they have meditated on impermanence and so forth, they think, 'I know suffering, I have abandoned its sources, I have actualized its

> cessation, I have cultivated the path.' They then think, 'I have become a foe destroyer.' When they have temporarily abandoned the manifest afflictions explained above, they think, 'I have extinguished all contaminations.'

It is incorrect to consider true sufferings and so forth to truly exist and then think, "I know suffering, I have abandoned its sources, I have actualized its cessation, I have cultivated the path." It is also incorrect to think in relation to the temporary abandonment of manifest afflictions, "I have extinguished all contaminations." In short, due to conceiving each of the four noble truths to be truly existent sentient beings do not pass beyond sorrow.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> It is said that at the time of death they perceive that they will be reborn; thereby, they doubt Buddha, and this fault causes them to fall into a great hell. This applies to some who abide on such a path but not to all.

There are some people who having attained an actual a concentration think that they have attained liberation. However, when they are about to die, by means of their clairvoyance they see that they will be reborn again and thereby come to doubt Buddha. For example, there are some Hindu followers of Vishnu who have faith in the Buddha because they think that Shakyamuni Buddha is a manifestation of Vishnu. Vishnu is said to have had twenty emanations, ten pure and ten impure, of which Shakyamuni Buddha is said to be the eighth pure emanation. In this way for them Buddhism is a branch of Hinduism.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: I have a question about the meaning of 'explicitly conjoined.' For example, the compassion observing phenomena seems to have in its retinue a mental factor of compassion and a mental factor of wisdom that, however, have different aspects. Yet a main mind cannot have two accompanying mental factors with different aspects.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The compassion observing phenomena takes sentient beings qualified by impermanence as its object and wishes them to be free from suffering. You are saying that it would appear that both wisdom and compassion are therefore manifest, while a main mind and its mental factors cannot have two different aspects. There would appear to be one mental factor having the aspect of impermanence and another mental factor having the aspect wishing sentient beings to be free from suffering. What is the aspect of compassion observing phenomena?
Student: Its aspect is the wish that sentient beings qualified by impermanence be free from suffering.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does compassion have an object of the mode of apprehension? Some say that it does have an object of the mode of apprehension, whereas others say that it does not. If it does not have an object of the mode of apprehension what aspect does it have? In this case one has to be clear about the difference between object-aspect and subject-aspect. Some say that compassion does not apprehend the aspect of the observed object.

In relation to this discussion the question about the meaning of 'explicitly conjoined' arises. It sometimes seems that there are two mental factors having different substances in the retinue of one main mind. However, is it possible to have two manifest mental factors having different substances in the retinue of a single main mind? To negate such a possibility it says in sutra that a continuity of consciousness of a sentient being is only one. Dharmakirti also says that two conceptions cannot arise simultaneously. This contradicts the possibility of a mind realizing impermanence and a mind of compassion being manifest simultaneously. The mind realizing impermanence is a conception as is the mind of compassion, that they can exist simultaneously is negated by Dharmakirti. When sutra

says that the continuity of consciousness is only one this means that there cannot exist simultaneously two minds of the same type but different substances.

Q: If I see someone suffering although I do not know him I can generate compassion wishing him to be free from suffering. Later, when I come to know that he is a thief I can still think, "May this thief be free from suffering." Lama Tsongkhapa says that when there is a compassion observing phenomena one is not meditating on the attributes of the observed object, but that this compassion arises due to perceiving the observed object qualified by the attribute of impermanence due to having realized impermanence previously.
A: Bravo! What you say is how things actually happen. For example, we can meditate on compassion for someone we do not know. Later on when we come to know that he is a thief we can still generate compassion for him. In this way we have both the thought "He is a thief" and the thought of compassion. This is how things happen in reality.

Q: In the case of the compassion observing the unobservable what actually appears to the meditator?
A: What appears to that person, or to that compassion, is sentient beings qualified by suffering.
Q: Do the sentient beings appear to this compassion clearly or like an illusion?
A: To that compassion there is no appearance of emptiness. In other words, there is no appearance of sentient beings as empty of true existence. In fact, sentient beings appear as truly existent since this compassion is conception. If it is conception it is pervaded by having the appearance of true existence. Is this compassion mistaken with respect to its appearing object? It is not mistaken because, although it has the appearance of true existence, it is not mistaken with respect to its appearing object. However, according to the lower schools this compassion *is* mistaken with respect to its appearing object. On the other hand, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas it is not mistaken with respect to its appearing object. In other words, it is not mistaken with respect to its appearance. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if it is a consciousness it is pervaded by being a valid cognizer with respect to its appearance. Is it pervaded by being a valid cognizer? It is not. In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if it is a knower it must know an object. Therefore, if it is a consciousness it is pervaded by being a valid cognizer with respect to its appearance.

In short, is there the appearance of illusory-like sentient beings to the compassion observing the unobservable? Illusory-like sentient beings do not appear to this compassion.

Q: What does this compassion lead to? Is it to be overcome because the appearance of illusory-like sentient beings is to be overcome?
A: It is very good to have the appearance of illusory-like sentient beings, but to us sentient beings appear as truly existent .

Q: Can sentient beings appear as illusory-like to compassion?
A: It depends on what kind of compassion it is in that to buddhas sentient beings appear as illusory.
Q: If we exclude buddhas?
A: At the level of sentient beings there is no appearance of illusory-like sentient beings to compassion.

Q: Can a scholar of sharp faculties who has not entered a path and does not have any kind of compassion realize emptiness by means of an inferential cognizer through hearing teachings on, for example, dependent-arising?
A: For those of dull faculties it is possible, whereas in the case of those of sharp faculties it has to be examined. Although those of sharp faculties can realize emptiness without generating compassion, in general due to being sharp-facultied one does have some compassion. This person can generate a realization of emptiness by means of an inferential cognizer through first generating correct

assumption followed later by a valid inferential cognizer. It is possible to have a realization of emptiness without having any of the three types of compassion, as in the case of hearers and solitary realizers. However, in general if it is a human being he is pervaded by having some slight degree of compassion.

Q: Taking compassion as an example, it can be either manifest or non-manifest. How does non-manifest compassion exist in the continuum?
A: It exists in the continuum in a manner of being dormant. For example, when we sleep we continue to maintain our general knowledge of the world but it is dormant. For example, if someone has a container full of jewelry which is closed and locked, does that person possess jewelry? Yes, he does although it is hidden away. He does not have to be wearing jewelry in order to possess it.

Another example is the anger in our continua that is presently not manifest, but as soon as the conditions arise becomes manifest.

Q: How is the unmanifest, or dormant, anger different from the seed of anger?
A: There are different interpretations. My own understanding is that dormant anger is also a consciousness, or a mentality, which due to improper mental attention superimposes unpleasantness or ugliness on a contaminated object. On the other hand, a seed is a potential that is a non-associated compositional factor able to give rise to its result, anger. In this context there can also be a discussion of latencies. If it is a latency it is not pervaded by being a seed, whereas if it is a seed it is pervaded by being a latency.

One of the MP students asked me a question a few days ago about ignorance, the first link of the twelve links of dependent-arising, and consciousness, the third link. In general it is said that due to ignorance one creates karmic formations that are deposited on a consciousness. However, if the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not assert that the latencies are deposited on a consciousness, how do they assert the third link of consciousness? The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that karmic formations are not stored on the consciousness which is the third link but are stored on the mere I. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, the third link is the consciousness that is the continuity of the consciousness existing at the time of the creation of the karmic formations.

This same student also asked me whether latencies are non-associated compositional factors. She posited that the latencies are non-associated compositional factors and asked whether, when a latency which is a non-associated compositional factor is nourished by the eighth and ninth links, does it return to being a consciousness at the time of the tenth link?

Student: Those latencies do not become consciousness.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The tenth link, existence, is said to be karma. But then there arises a question as to whether existence is the mental factor intention, which is generally the definition of karma. The lower schools say that the definition of karma is the mental factor intention. However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that karma is of three types: physical, verbal, and mental. Among these three, they say that only mental action is the mental factor intention. What are physical and verbal actions? They are form. What type of form are they? They are non-revelatory form. In fact, in Lama Tsongkhapa's great commentary on *Fundamental Wisdom* it says that the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert physical and verbal karma to be form. Later on in the *Supplement* there is a discussion of form in terms of five divisions, such as form which is a vow, form which is a non-vow, form having a strong occasion, form which is a phenomena source, and so forth.

How do the Prasangika Madhyamikas define the link of existence? Think about it.

Q: If mental factors are dormant during sleep, how can sleep yoga make sleep virtuous?

A: By means of a virtuous motivation. Is the mental factor sleep manifest or dormant during sleep? Sleep is a changeable mental factor. Thus, it can be changed into virtue by means of generating a virtuous motivation prior to going to sleep, such as by practicing deity yoga and so forth. In this way the period of sleep becomes virtuous. Sleep can also be changed into non-virtue by generating a motivation thinking to harm others and so forth prior to going to sleep. Is the mental factor sleep manifest or unmanifest? Perhaps it can be said that because sleep is manifest all other mental factors are withdrawn, meaning that they do not function. Sleep is defined as a mental factor having the function of involuntarily withdrawing activities of body and mind.

END

Monday afternoon, 28 February 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Then Manjushri asks how the four noble truths should be cognized since Buddha said that in order to liberate oneself from cyclic existence these truths must be known as they are in reality. In answer to this, Buddha says, 'Manjushri, he who sees all products as not produced knows suffering thoroughly. He who sees all phenomena as sourceless has abandoned the sources of suffering. He who sees them as utterly passed beyond sorrow has actualized cessation. He who sees all phenomena as totally unproduced has cultivated the path.' Then Buddha says that through this path one passes beyond sorrow without taking [rebirth].
>
> This shows very clearly that one who sees the non-inherent existence of the four truths is liberated from cyclic existence and that one cannot be freed through a path unless it is devoid of the conception of true existence. This thereby indicates that the seeds of the afflictions cannot be abandoned through a path of only the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths, impermanence and so forth. It also shows that in order to abandon the seeds of the afflictions one must cognize the mode of being [of persons and other phenomena] and meditate on it.

When one generates the wisdom seeing the reality of the four noble truths, one will be liberated from cyclic existence. This means one needs to realize that the four noble truths and their sixteen attributes do not exist inherently. On the other hand, if one only realizes the four noble truths as they are set out in the *Knowledges,* one will not be liberated from cyclic existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "In answer to this, Buddha says, 'Manjushri, he who sees all products as not produced knows suffering thoroughly. He who sees all phenomena as sourceless has abandoned the sources of suffering. He who sees them as utterly passed beyond sorrow has actualized cessation. He who sees all phenomena as totally unproduced has cultivated the path.'" 'Product' can be understood either as phenomena produced from causes and conditions, or as pervasive compounded suffering. Buddha says that seeing such phenomena as unproduced, one knows suffering thoroughly. "Sees all phenomena as sourceless" means that by understanding that there are no results – happiness and pain – which arise inherently from their causes – karma and afflictions – one abandons true origins. "Sees them as utterly passed beyond sorrow" means that by understanding that all phenomena have passed beyond sorrow, one actualizes, or achieves, true cessations. It can also be said that utterly passed beyond sorrow means that all phenomena are naturally passed beyond sorrow. Utterly passed beyond sorrow means to have passed beyond sorrow from the root, i.e., completely. "Sees all phenomena as totally unproduced" means that by seeing that phenomena are not produced inherently, one cultivates a path.

Lama Tsongkhapa says : "This thereby indicates that the seeds of the afflictions cannot be abandoned through a path of only the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths, impermanence and so forth. It also shows that in order to abandon the seeds of the afflictions one must cognize the mode of being [of persons and other phenomena] and meditate on it." In short, through realizing the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths alone, one cannot eliminate the seeds of the afflictions. To do so one must realize the meaning of reality (the mode of being) and meditate on it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> If you do not distinguish these points well, you will hold that hearers' paths for abandoning afflictions consist merely of meditation on the sixteen attributes of impermanence and so forth and that, therefore, hearer superiors and foe destroyers could not actually function as superiors and foe destroyers. You would accumulate the great taint of deprecating superiors, and if you have taken the bodhisattva vow, this will produce a basic infraction. Shantideva's *Compendium of Instructions* sets forth this basic infraction:

> Holding that the vehicle of learners
> Does not abandon desire and so forth
> And causing others to believe the same....

If one holds that hearers and solitary realizers meditate on a path that merely realizes the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths as explained in the two *Knowledges*, one will deprecate them, thinking that they are not actual superiors. If one does so, one commits a basic infraction of the bodhisattva vows. However, hearer and solitary realizer superiors realize the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths as non-inherently existent and are therefore actual superiors.

Among the bodhisattva vows there are sixteen that must have four binding factors complete in order to be broken, and two that do not need these to be complete. The latter two are (1) giving up the mind of enlightenment and (2) holding wrong views.

The *Diamond Cutter Sutra* is the second of the seven scriptural authorities proving that hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers realize the non-inherent existence of phenomena. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) quotes this sutra, saying:

> This meaning is also clearly set forth in the *Diamond Cutter Sutra (Vajrachchhedika)*, '"Subhuti, does a stream enterer think, 'I have attained the fruit of a stream enterer?'" Subhuti answers, "Blessed One, it is not so. Why? Blessed One, he is called a stream enterer because he has not entered anything."' Also, "Blessed One, if a stream enterer thought, 'I have attained the fruit of a stream enterer,' he would be conceiving a self of [himself and the fruit attained]. He would be conceiving a sentient being, a living being, and a person." Subhuti speaks likewise with respect to the latter three abiders in the fruits [of a once returner, never returner, and foe destroyer].
>
> If through conceiving the attainer of the level of stream enterer and the fruit attained to exist truly, he thought, 'I have attained stream enterer,' he would be conceiving a self of those. Thus, it is said that conceptions of the true existence of the person and of the fruit are both conceptions of self – the first being a conception of a self of persons and the second of a self of phenomena.

If a stream enterer were to think, "I have attained the fruit of stream enterer," because this would be a conception of a [truly existent] self, he would not attain anything. However, if a stream enterer thinks "I have attained the fruit of stream enterer" but does not have a conception of a truly existent self, then this is correct. Therefore, the *Diamond Cutter Sutra* says that hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers have the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena.

In short, as long as a stream enterer thinks "I have attained the fruit of stream enterer" free from the conception of true existence, this is correct. If it is asked whether this stream enterer has a conception of true existence, the answer is that he does. However, although he has a conception of true existence, he does not necessarily conceive the fruit of stream enterer to exist truly because he [only] has an innate conception of true existence. A stream enterer who has an innate conception of true existence does not necessarily conceive the fruit of stream enterer to be truly existent. The person does not have to assert that the fruit of stream enterer exists truly in order to have an innate conception of true existence. On the other hand, when it is said that the person conceives phenomena to exist truly, it means that the person *accepts* that phenomena exist truly. However, if Sherab, for example, has an innate conception of true existence he does not necessarily accept that phenomena truly exist. Thus, although a stream enterer has a conception of true existence in his continuum, he does not conceive the fruit of stream enterer to exist truly. In short, hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers have the realization of the selflessness of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa sets out two selves: a self of persons and a self of phenomena. A conception of a self of persons is present when, for example, a stream enterer conceives himself to exist truly,

whereas if he conceives the fruit of stream enterer to exist truly, this is a conception of a self of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> That an [actual] stream enterer does not conceive the true existence of these and thereby think, 'I have attained the fruit,' refers to his having come to disbelieve the object of the conception of true existence. Thus, this statement does not indicate that [at this early point in the path] he has no innate conception of true existence. On the basis of this it can be understood with respect to the later levels [that once returners, never returners, and foe destroyers do not conceive the true existence of themselves as attainers or the fruits attained].

(In Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning,* there is an extra negative particle that should not be there.)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) continues:

> Some Svatantrika Madhyamikas explain this passage differently, but Prajnakaramati quotes it as a source showing that it is necessary to cognize emptiness to progress to the hearer and solitary realizer enlightenment. His interpretation is good.
>
> These scriptures only teach that if you lack the view of suchness, you cannot be freed from cyclic existence and that to be free this view is needed. No scholar asserts that hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers are not liberated from the fetters of cyclic existence; and furthermore, such an assertion is not feasible. Thus, these scriptures clearly teach that hearers and solitary realizers cognize the non-inherent existence of phenomena.
>
> There are many other sources such as the great mother *Perfection of Wisdom Sutras* and so forth, but fearing too many words, I will not cite them.

In short, the meaning of this passage is that hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers realize the non-inherent existence of phenomena. Although some Svatantrika Madhyamikas explain this passage differently, Prajnakaramati's interpretation is correct. In *General Meaning* there is a discussion as to whether this Prajnakaramati is the person who composed a commentary on the *Ornament* and is a Svatantrika Madhyamika, or whether he is the person who composed a commentary on *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* and is a Prasangika Madhyamika.

According to the *Great Middle Way* by Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa, one can cite five, seven, or nine scriptural authorities in order to prove that hearers and solitary realizers have the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena. However, others, in accordance with Chandrakirti's autocommentary, say that in order to prove that hearers and solitary realizers have this realization there are three lines of reasoning and seven scriptural authorities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A1B-2C2B Sources in treatises and in Hinayana sutras

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was taught in the *Precious Garland* [35-37]:
>
> > As long as grasping to the aggregates exists, so long grasping to the I exists, due to it. When grasping to I exists, [there is] also action; from that, also, there is rebirth.

> Having three paths in mutual causation, without a beginning, middle or end – this wheel of samsara will revolve like the wheel of a firebrand.[10]
>
> Because that is not [born from] self, other or both, nor seen in the three times, grasping to I will be exhausted; then action and rebirth and...

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) also quotes the *Precious Garland*:

> Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (35-37) says:
>
> As long as the aggregates are [mis]conceived,
> So long is there [mis]conception of an 'I'.
> When this conception of an 'I' exists,
> There is action which results in birth.
>
> With these three pathways in mutual causation
> Without a beginning, middle, or an end
> This wheel of cyclic existence
> Turns like the 'wheel' of a firebrand.
>
> Because this wheel is not obtained from self, other,
> Or from both in the past, the present, or the future,
> The conception of an 'I' ceases
> And thereby action and rebirth.

Nagarjuna says that as long as one conceives of the aggregates, one conceives of an 'I' and that due to this conception one creates actions. In other words, the way in which the conception of a self arises is that from the conception of the true existence of the aggregates arises the conception of a truly existent 'I.' Then, from this conception of a truly existent 'I,' one conceives a truly existent 'mine.' 'Mine' refers to 'my friends,' 'my enemies,' 'my strangers,' and so forth. Due to this conception of mine, one creates actions that project one's future rebirths. In this way there are said to be three paths that circle with no beginning, no middle, and no end. The "three paths" are:

(1) the thoroughly afflicted path of afflictions,
(2) the thoroughly afflicted path of actions, and
(3) the thoroughly afflicted path of rebirth, or path of suffering.

These three paths can be explained in connection with the twelve links of dependent-arising. The path of afflictions is the three links of ignorance, craving, and grasping. The path of actions is the links of karmic formations and existence. The path of suffering is the remaining seven links: consciousness, name and form, the sense spheres, contact, feeling, birth, aging and death. The subject of the twelve links is quite complex in that, while a set of causes is being created, the results of other sets of causes are being experienced.

The twelve links that comprise the three paths are likened to a circling firebrand. Due to this continuous circling it is called "cyclic existence."

Nagarjuna says: "Because this wheel is not obtained from self, other, or from both in the past, the present, or the future, the conception of an 'I' ceases and thereby action and rebirth." When one realizes that the 'I' does not exist truly, the conception of an 'I' ceases, whereby action and rebirth also cease. As long as one accepts that the aggregates, which are the basis of imputation, exist truly, one will also accept that the 'I,' which is imputed on those aggregates, exists truly. This is the conception of a self. Due to asserting the aggregates to truly exist, one does not abandon the referent object of the conception of true existence and as a result continues to create actions.

[10] The Tibetan text here has dKyil.'kor – mandala, whereas the Tibetan of the next verses have 'khor.lo – wheel.

In short, hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers have abandoned the conception of a self through realizing that past, present, and future [phenomena] do not exist inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The first two lines teach that as long as there is a conception of the true existence of mental and physical aggregates, a view arises of the transitory collection which conceives a truly existent 'I'. This indicates that in order to extinguish the view of the transitory completely, it is necessary to extinguish the conception that the mental and physical aggregates truly exist. On this basis it can be known that hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers also totally abandon the conception that the aggregates truly exist.
>
> Since the referent object of the view of the transitory is not disbelieved until the referent object of the conception of true existence is disbelieved, the personal selflessness known in both Hinayana and Mahayana schools of tenets is a refutation of only a coarse self of persons. It should be understood that this is not the subtle selflessness of persons.

The two hinayana schools – the Vaibhashika and Sautrantika – and the two [lower] mahayana schools – the Chittamatra and Svatantrika Madhyamika – posit a subtle selflessness of persons that is the absence of a self-sufficient substantially existent person. However, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas this is a coarse selflessness of persons. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas and the lower schools negate a self-sufficient substantially existent person, whereby they establish the subtle selflessness of persons. They posit the coarse selflessness of persons to be the emptiness of a permanent, unitary, and independent person because such a self is posited as a coarse object of negation. On the other hand, non-Buddhist schools, such as the Samkyas, posit the existence of a permanent, unitary, and independent person. Our own school does not posit a person who is separate from the aggregates.

In conclusion, when hearers and solitary realizers abandon the conception of a self of phenomena, they become fully qualified foe destroyers.

Tuesday morning, 29 February 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Some hold that in the master Chandrakirti's system hearers and solitary realizers cognize a selflessness of persons which is similar to that of the other schools. They thereupon propound a difference between hearers and solitary realizers in that hearers do not cognize the [coarse] selflessness of phenomena whereas solitary realizers do. They have not understood Chandrakirti's system well because his commentary says that those who lack the view of suchness could not even realize the selflessness of persons.
>
> The next two lines of Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* teach that due to the presence of the view of the transitory as real 'I' and 'mine', actions binding one to cyclic existence are accumulated and through the force of these actions one is born in cyclic existence. This is said in terms of someone who has not come to disbelieve the referent object of the conception that the mental and physical aggregates truly exist. This is not applicable in general to one who merely possesses the view of the transitory as real 'I' and 'mine' because this view is present through the seventh ground, but from the first ground a bodhisattva does not take rebirth by the power of contaminated actions.

The lower schools assert the selflessness of persons to be the emptiness of the person of self-sufficient substantial existence, but this is not how it is asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamika school. Therefore, if one thinks that the selflessness of persons of the Prasangika Madhyamikas is that which

is asserted by the lower schools one has not understood Chandrakirti's view, which is that the selflessness of persons is the emptiness of the person of inherent existence. Chandrakirti's view is that in one who lacks the view of suchness there is no realization of the selflessness of persons. Here "the selflessness of persons" refers to the *subtle* selflessness of persons in that a person can have a realization of the emptiness of the person of self-sufficient substantial existence (i.e., the coarse selflessness of persons) without having the view of suchness.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that "The next two lines of Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* teach that due to the presence of the view of the transitory as real 'I' and 'mine', actions binding one to cyclic existence are accumulated and through the force of these actions one is born in cyclic existence." Nagarjuna says this regarding one who has not repudiated the referent object of the conception of true existence and not regarding one in whom the view of the transitory collection is present. Lama Tsongkhapa says that this is because the view of the transitory collection is present through the seventh ground, whereas from the first ground a bodhisattva does not take rebirth by the power of contaminated actions. Because bodhisattvas have the view of the transitory collection through the seventh ground, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas the afflictions exist through this ground. Only when bodhisattvas attain the eighth ground have they abandoned all afflictions. Are eighth ground bodhisattvas foe destroyers? They are not. Therefore, if one has abandoned the afflictive obstructions there is no pervasion that one is a foe destroyer. However, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, bodhisattvas who are definite in lineage simultaneously attain the abandonment of the afflictive obstructions, the state of a foe destroyer, and the abandonment of the knowledge obstructions, the state of a tathagata. Therefore, their assertion differs from that of the Prasangika Madhyamikas, who assert that only when the afflictive obstructions have been abandoned do bodhisattvas begin to abandon the knowledge obstructions.

Q: What is the reason that a bodhisattva on the eighth ground is not a foe destroyer, since he has abandoned all the afflictive obstructions?

A: This is a point of debate. If someone asserts that a bodhisattva on the eighth ground is a foe destroyer, one asks: "Is he an actual foe destroyer?" If someone accepts this, then one asks: "Has he fulfilled the object of training of his path? Does he abide on the path of no more learning? Has he culminated all the learning on his path?" If someone accepts this, then one asks: "Does he not still have to cultivate the eighth ground and so forth? Are the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds not paths of meditation?" If someone accepts that they are paths of meditation, one says: "It follows that they are *not* paths of meditation because you have just asserted that they are paths of no more learning since this bodhisattva has culminated the learning of his respective path." One can continue the debate, saying: "The realization existing in the continuum of a bodhisattva on the eighth ground is not a path of no more learning because it is not an exalted knower of a foe destroyer."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> These passages indicate that if you lack cultivation of the view of suchness, you cannot extinguish the view of the transitory as real 'I' and 'mine'. If you have no [practices] other than the paths of the sixteen attributes of the four truths, impermanence and so forth, the afflictions cannot be completely abandoned. Thus, once an uncommon selflessness of persons [their non-inherent existence] is posited, it would be a great mistake to leave as it is the presentation of the afflictions – identifying the view of the transitory as real 'I' and 'mine' and so forth in accordance with only the common selflessness of persons [their non-substantial existence]. One would not have delineated this uncommon system of tenets. How could this king of wise men [Chandrakirti] be mistaken about this?
>
> Some of Chandrakirti's followers do not understand that he established this [Prasangika] system explaining that hearers and solitary realizers cognize the selflessness of phenomena. Such followers do not even generate a thought wondering whether or not he has an uncommon way of

> positing the afflictions; they merely have faith in his 'system'. Using this as an example, you should examine well many other such occurrences.

If one lacks the cultivation of the view of suchness, one cannot extinguish the view of the transitory collection. If one only has the realization of the sixteen attributes of the four noble truths as they are explained in the *Knowledges*, one cannot abandon all the afflictions. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas there are two ways of positing the selflessness of persons: one that is common to the lower schools and one that is not shared by them. If one does not understand these two presentations of the selflessness of persons, one will not be able to identify the self of persons. In addition, one will not understand the Prasangika Madhyamikas' presentation of the afflictions.

In conclusion, the Prasangika Madhyamika school has its own unshared way of positing the afflictions and the selflessness of persons. If one is ignorant of this presentation yet thinks that one is a follower of Chandrakirti, this would be like those who have mere faith without real understanding. Lama Tsongkhapa says that there are many such cases.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The three pathways [mentioned in the quote from the *Precious Garland*] are the three sets of thorough afflictions – affliction [ignorance, attachment, and grasping], action [compositional action and 'existence'] and production [the other seven of the twelve links of dependent-arising: consciousness, name and form, six sources, contact, feeling, birth, and aging and death]. These three pathways have no beginning, middle, or end. Actions arise from afflictions, and sufferings from actions; from sufferings arise sufferings similar in type as well as afflictions and so forth. Because these mutually produce each other, their order is indefinite. This is the meaning of their mutually causing each other.
>
> This dependent arising [of cyclic existence] is not produced from itself, from other, or from both self and other. Furthermore, inherently existent production is not obtained – that is to say, is not seen – in the past, present, or future. For this reason, wandering in cyclic existence is overcome through extinguishing the view of the transitory which conceives a real 'I'.

Here Lama Tsongkhapa explains the meaning of the stanza from the *Precious Garland*: "With these three pathways in mutual causation without a beginning, middle, or an end, this wheel of cyclic existence turns like the 'wheel' of a firebrand."

Q: What is the cause of the ignorance that is the first of the twelve links?
A: Are you saying that although ignorance is the first of the twelve links it too must have a cause?
Q: Yes.
A: A previous set of twelve links acts as the condition for the ignorance that is the first link of a second set of twelve links.
Q: Does this mean that a suffering from the first set causes the ignorance of the second set? Or is the cause the afflictions of the first set?
A: The cause can be posited as the feeling which belongs to the previous set of twelve links. Due to feeling, ignorance arises. Although it may appear that only two sets of links occur at one time, in reality each day hundreds of sets begin. This is because in one day we create hundreds of projecting karmas, by the power of each of which there is an entire set of twelve links.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "This dependent arising [of cyclic existence] is not produced from itself, from other, or from both self and other." This shows that dependent-arising is not produced inherently; by understanding this, the view of the transitory collection is extinguished. When the view of the transitory collection is extinguished, the cause of rebirth in cyclic existence is extinguished.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It was taught further [in the *Precious Garland*, 357-365]:
>
> > Just as the eye, by mistake, apprehends the wheel of a firebrand, similarly, the sense faculties perceive present objects.
> >
> > Sense faculties and sense objects are asserted as the nature of the five elements – since an individual element is meaningless, they are meaningless as objects.
> >
> > If individual elements are different, fire without fuel would follow. If assembled they would be without character, and that is also certain of the rest.
> >
> > Thus, since elements are meaningless also in two ways, the assembled is meaningless. Because the assembled is meaningless, also form is meaningless as an object.
> >
> > Also consciousness, feeling, discrimination, and compositional factors individually, because lacking a meaningful essence in any way, are meaningless as ultimate objects.
> >
> > Just as the relieving of suffering is fancied happiness in the object, likewise the suppression of happiness is also fancied as suffering.
> >
> > Thus, because lacking entitiness, abandon craving of meeting with pleasure and the craving of separation from pain. Therefore, liberate, seeing like that.
> >
> > If asked: "what sees?" Conventionally, one says the mind. Without mental factors, mind does not exist because meaningless, so it is not accepted to exist.
> >
> > Thus, perfectly and properly, having known migrators as meaningless, like a fire without causes, without abiding, without grasping, pass beyond sorrow.

These verses in *Precious Garland* establish the selflessness of phenomena. Likewise, Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*), by quoting merely the last of these verses, says that Nagarjuna establishes the selflessness of the aggregates, constituents, and so forth:

> After that passage, Nagarjuna settles the selflessness of the aggregates, constituents, and so forth, at the end of which he says (365):
>
> > Knowing thus truly and correctly
> > That animate beings are unreal,
> > Not being subject [to rebirth] and without grasping,
> > One passes [from pain] like a fire without its cause.
>
> Having seen suchness, one passes beyond suffering.

The *Precious Garland* sets out the non-inherent existence of the aggregates, constituents, and so forth. Due to a error in the eyes one apprehends the 'wheel' of a firebrand. What is the cause of this error? Is the cause of the error inside or outside?
Student: Inside. Perhaps seeing a moving point of fire as a wheel of fire is due to a mistake in the meaning generality that appears to the consciousness.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does that mean that the cause of the error exists in the eye consciousness?
Student: I did not say exactly that, but that is probably correct.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Another example is when we are in a moving vehicle and other objects appear to us to be moving although they are not. What is the cause of this error? Also, if one puts pressure on one's eyes and then looks at the moon, one sees two moons. What is the cause of this error? One can say that the mistake can be on the subject's side: the immediate condition which is, for example, a

mental consciousness or the empowering condition which is, for example, the eye sense power. In addition, there is the external condition, the object condition, which is the whirling firebrand. In this way the cause of the error can be said to be all three conditions.

Q: Is it actually correct to say that all three conditions are the cause of the error?
A: All three conditions can act as the cause of error. This is discussed in *Awarenesses and Knowers* (*blo rik*). In this text the definition of a facsimile of a direct perceiver is given as: a cognizer that is mistaken with respect to its object. It and a mistaken consciousness are mutually inclusive. There are seven types of facsimiles of a direct perceiver, six of which are conceptual and one of which is non-conceptual [According to Lati Rinpoche in *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*, the seven are: wrong consciousnesses mistaken with respect to (1) shape, (2) color, (3) activity, (4) entity, (5) number, (6) time and (7) size]. A conceptual facsimile of a direct perceiver has six types of causes: those that are based on the object, those that are based on the subject, and so forth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is said: only bodhisattvas see the lack of self-nature like that.
> That too is not so because that was taught from the viewpoint of hearers and solitary realizers.
> If said: how is this known?
> Response: Because just afterwards, from the viewpoint of the bodhisattvas, it is said [in the *Precious Garland*, 366]:
>
> > Also bodhisattvas, having seen thus, definitely desire enlightenment. Yet, due to compassion, they maintain a becoming until enlightenment.
>
> – and so forth.

This citation also appears in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> OBJECTION: Nagarjuna is speaking of seeing suchness only in terms of bodhisattvas.
> ANSWER: Nagarjuna is speaking in terms of hearers and solitary realizers because right after that he says (366):
>
> > Bodhisattvas also who have seen it thus,
> > Seek perfect enlightenment with certainty,
> > They maintain a continuity of existence
> > Until enlightenment only through their compassion.

Bodhisattvas definitely attain enlightenment through seeing non-inherent existence. However, they remain in cyclic existence due to their compassion.

Great Exposition of the Middle Way, a Gomang College textbook by Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa, sets forth the scriptural references that prove that hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers have indeed realized the non-inherent existence of phenomena. In this text it says that Chandrakirti's autocommentary posits only five scriptural authorities, whereas his *Clear Words* posits four additional ones for a total of nine. Two of these four are the *Hundred Thousand Stanzas on the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* and the *Compendium of Sutras* which, when added to the first five, are the seven scriptural authorities mentioned earlier. When the *Stable Special Thought Sutra* (*Questions of Adhyashaya Sutra*) and the *Miserliness Concentration Sutra* (*Sutra on the Miserliness of One in a Trance*) are also added, there is a total of nine.

In short, although bodhisattvas realize the non-inherent existence of phenomena they remain in cyclic existence out of compassion. On the other hand, hearer and solitary realizer superiors leave cyclic existence as soon as they realize the selflessness of phenomena.

In short, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas the selflessness of persons is the emptiness of the person of inherent existence and the selflessness of phenomena is the emptiness of the aggregates, constituents, and so forth of inherent existence.

Tuesday afternoon, 29 February 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The passages from Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* quoted by Chandrakirti in his commentary were not rendered well in the old translations.

Some of the old translations of these passages in *Precious Garland* were not very accurate.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary then sets out the third scriptural authority, which is a hinayana sutra, saying:

> In order to abandon the hearers' deluded obscurations, it is even stated in *Sutras* revealed to the hearers that:
>
> > Form is like a mass of foam, feeling like a water bubble, discrimination like a mirage, compositional factors like the plantain tree, and consciousness like an illusion, the Solar-kinsman declared.
>
> – and so forth. Hence, through the example of a mass of foam, a water bubble, mirage water, the parts of a plantain tree, illusions and so forth, compounded phenomena are definitely analyzed.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) likewise says:

> In a sutra for hearers, products are analyzed as not existing inherently by means of five examples in order that hearers might abandon the obstructions to liberation:
>
> Forms are like balls of foam,
> Feelings are like bubbles,
> Discriminations are like mirages,
> Compositional factors are like banana trees,
> Consciousnesses are like magical illusions.
> Thus [the Buddha] the Sun-Friend said.

In sutra, the five aggregates are established as non-inherently existent by means of five examples, which are clearly set out in the quotation above. Since this is specifically a sutra for hearers, it is clear that the Buddha did in fact teach them the non-inherent existence of phenomena. In this verse the Buddha is called by the name Solar-Kinsman, or Sun-Friend, which together with the "Sugar Cane One" are epithets reserved for the Buddha (the Buddha's various names can be found in the *Small Collected Topics*).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In his *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (Bodhichittavivarana)* Nagarjuna distinguishes between hearers and bodhisattvas: 'The Teacher taught the five aggregates for hearers and the five similarities – that forms are like balls of foam and so forth – for bodhisattvas.' His distinction is based on hearers who are temporarily unable to cognize suchness and does not refer to all hearers. The same text says:
>
> > Those who know not emptiness
> > Are not bases for liberation.
> > The obscured wander in the six migrations
> > In the prison of cyclic existence.
>
> Just this meaning of the non-inherent existence of phenomena is taught in the Hinayana scriptural divisions.

According to the *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment,* not all hearers are suitable vessels for the teachings on emptiness. On the other hand, bodhisattvas are taught the emptiness of inherent existence, without the realization of which they cannot attain liberation. The above passage indicates that hearers also have the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena. If I remember well, this text, *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment*, can be found in the *Guhyasamajatantra*. It clearly says that in order to attain enlightenment one must realize emptiness and that without this, one will continue to wander in cyclic existence.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> To indicate this very meaning, in the holy words of the Acharya [Nagarjuna], it is said [in the *Precious Garland*, 386]:
>
> > Non-generation taught in the mahayana and the exhaustion by the other [are] emptiness. Exhaustion and non-generation mean the same. Accept just that.
>
> Similarly, it was taught [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 15.7]:
>
> > In the *Precepts of Katyayana*, the Bhagavan, through exalted knowledge of things and non-things, refuted both existence and non-existence.

The hinayana teaches exhaustion, or extinguishment, in terms of the exhaustion of compounded phenomena, whereas the mahayana teaches non-generation in terms of non-inherently existent production. In the end, the meaning is the same.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (386) says:
>
> > The teaching in the Mahayana of non-production
> > And of extinction in the Hinayana are the same
> > Emptiness [since they show that inherent existence] is extinguished
> > And that nothing [inherently existent] is produced;
> > Thus let the Mahayana be accepted [as Buddha's word].
>
> Mahayana sutras teach an emptiness that is the non-existence of inherently existent production whereas when Hinayana sutras speak of emptiness, they teach an extinguishment of products. Both mean the same thing. Thus, do not be impatient with the teaching of emptiness in the Mahayana.

Some scholars use this verse from *Precious Garland* as evidence that the mahayana teachings are in fact the Buddha's words. This is in response to the followers of the lower schools who assert that the

mahayana teachings are not the Buddha's words but were invented later on by Nagarjuna and others. Thus, they assert that only the hinayana teachings are the Buddha's words. To refute this, the mahayanists quote this verse from *Precious Garland,* which says that although the mahayana teaches non-production and the hinayana teaches the exhaustion, or extinguishment, of compounded phenomena, in the end they mean the same.

If the hinayanists are asked, "How can it be proved that the hinayana teachings are the Buddha's words?," they answer that the fact that the Buddha taught the three baskets is proven by his having engaged in the *Sutras*, having given permission in the *Discipline*, and not having contradicted reality in the *Abhidharma*. The mahayanists respond: "Since Buddha did the same in the mahayana teachings, why do you not accept these as Buddha's words?" They then quote this passage from *Precious Garland* to prove that the mahayana teachings are in fact the Buddha's words.

Regarding the proof that the mahayana teachings are indeed the Buddha's words in Maitreya's *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras,* it says: "Because of engaging in his own and appearing in his discipline, and because of the profound and the extensive not contradicting reality (dharmata)." In Pelmen Konchog Gyeltshen's commentary on the *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras,* a discussion takes place between the two lower schools, the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas, and our own tradition. This text (page 16) says:

> At that time, the two realists of the Arya Land (India) said that the mahayana sutra basket was not the Buddha's words because it was composed by the Tirthikas after the Buddha had passed away in order to harm the Buddha's doctrine; because it arose after the Buddha had taught the hearer vehicle and had passed away; and because, due to not teaching the antidotes to the afflictions and having such faults as teaching everything as non-existent it does not engage the sutra basket, does not appear in the discipline, and contradicts reality, whereby it does not possess the characteristics of Buddha's words.

In short, the hinayanists say that the mahayana is not the Buddha's words because by engaging in it the Buddha's doctrine is harmed. In fact, they think that the non-Buddhist Tirthikas invented the mahayana in order to harm the Buddha's teachings. Pelmen Konchog Gyeltshen's commentary on the *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras* then says (page 21):

> In answer to [the accusation] "The other sutra basket (the mahayana) does not engage, does not appear in the discipline, and contradicts reality," [our own tradition says] "The mahayana, as the subject, does not have such faults because (1) it engages the Buddha's sutra basket since it is concordant with the sutra basket in teaching the extensive points of the bodhisattva trainings, (2) it appears in the Buddha's discipline since it tames the afflictions and either the conceptions which are their roots or the knowledge obstructions, and (3) it does not contradict reality since it depends upon the profound view and extensive conduct, its subject matter."

The extinguishment of products that is explained by the hinayana is asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas to refer to extinguishment from the start, meaning that products are free from the object of negation, which is true existence, from the start. However, the lower schools assert the extinguishment of products to mean the extinguishment of the suffering aggregates, that is, a nirvana without remainder in which the basis is extinguished. The Vaibhashikas assert the extinguishment of products to be the extinguishment of both the person and the aggregates. True Aspectarian Chittamatrins likewise assert that when someone with a nirvana with remainder attains a nirvana without remainder both the person and the aggregates are extinguished. On the other hand, the

Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert a nirvana without remainder that is the extinguishment of the suffering aggregates, but not the extinguishment of the being.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In what way do these two teachings have the same meaning? Some say, 'hearers assert an extinguishment of products, but if products inherently existed, then that would not be feasible. Therefore, when an extinguishment of products is asserted, it is necessary to assert non-inherent existence from the beginning. Thus, these two teachings have the same meaning.'
>
> This is very wrong. If that were so, then a sprout or any other phenomenon which the Madhyamikas assert to exist would have that reason; and, therefore, it would absurdly follow that sprouts, as well as all other products, and emptiness would be synonymous.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Some say, 'hearers assert an extinguishment of products, but if products inherently existed, then that would not be feasible.'" This assertion of hearers is made by the followers of the two realist schools, the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas. These two lower schools say that things are in fact extinguished but they also exist inherently. Thus, the teaching on the extinguishment of products is addressed to hearers. 'Hearer' can be understood from the point of view of path and from the point of view of tenets. From the point of view of tenets, hearers are Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas. From the point of view of path, hearers are those who have entered the hearer path.

Are products extinguished? How is the extinguishment of products related to emptiness? For example, if I drink the tea in this cup, when the cup is empty the tea is extinguished, but is this the meaning of emptiness? In this context, the extinguishment of products refers to an extinguishment by the power of antidotes. Here 'product' is taken to mean the aggregates that are true sufferings, which are extinguished by the power of antidotes.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Also [Ajitamitra's] *Commentary on the Precious Garland (Ratnavalitika)* says that there is no difference in meaning at all between non-production and momentariness. However, this is the explanation of one who has not understood the meaning of the text.

It is not correct to understand non-production as momentariness, as does Ajitamitri. In the *Perfection of Wisdom Sutras,* the Buddha taught: 1) non-existence, 2) non-production, 3) isolated, and 4) not oppressed. Can non-existence be posited as the meaning of momentariness? Is non-existence not used to indicate the first attribute of true sufferings?

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> A Hinayana sutra [set forth by Shariputra after actualizing nirvana] quoted in Chandrakirti's *Commentary* on *(Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning' (Yuktishashtikavrtti)* says, 'Complete abandonment of these sufferings, definite abandonment, purification, extinguishment free from desire, cessation, thorough pacification, disappearance, non-connection to other suffering, non-arising, and non-production – this is peace, this is auspiciousness. It is like this: the definite abandonment of all the aggregates, the extinction of cyclic existence, freedom from desire, cessation, nirvana.' Commenting on this, Chandrakirti says that because the phrase 'these sufferings' uses the term of proximity 'these', the passage, 'Complete abandonment of all these sufferings... disappearance' refers only to the sufferings of aggregates that exist presently in one's own continuum. The passage 'non-connection to other suffering... nirvana' refers to future suffering. [Since this sutra clearly refers to the extinguishment of present suffering, or the present mental and physical aggregates, it does not refer to an extinguishment brought about by the path but to the

natural extinguishment which these phenomena have always had and which is seen in meditative equipoise.]

OBJECTION: 'Sufferings' and 'aggregates' are general terms used here for their instances, the afflictions. [Therefore, this sutra does not refer to an extinguishment of the aggregates in general.]

ANSWER: This also is not feasible. If general terms are not amenable to explanation with a general meaning, they must be explained as referring to their instances; here, however, this can be explained in the context of a generality. Otherwise, according to the proponents of true existence, a passage such as, 'The afflictions are primordially extinguished,' in Maitreya's *Sublime Science (Uttaratantra)* cannot be explained as primordial extinguishment in the sense that the aggregates have been primordially without inherently existent production. They must [incorrectly] explain this as a total abandonment by means of the path. Then, when the nirvana that is to be actualized exists, the actualizer would not [and thus could not report on the extinguishment that was realized, as was done in the sutra]. Also, when the actualizer exists, the nirvana to be actualized would not because the aggregates have not been extinguished. Thereby, they are unable to explain this sutra.

According to us, it is permissible to explain extinguishment here in accordance with the statement:

> Extinguishment [in this case] is not [caused] by means of an antidote;
> It is so called because of primordial extinguishment.

We are able to explain well the meaning of the sutra [as referring to a natural or primordial absence of inherent existence in phenomena].

A nirvana that is a cessation of suffering in the sense of a [primordial] extinguishment is taught in sutra, as well as a cessation in the sense of an absence of inherently existent production. The superior Nagarjuna indicates that these are the same, and because his statement appears not to have been understood, I have explained it in detail.

Also, Nagarjuna's *Treatise* on *the Middle Way* (XV.7) says:

> In the *Advice to Katyayana*
> 'Exists', 'not exists', and 'both'
> Are rejected by the Blessed One
> Knowing [the nature of] things and non-things.

Thus, Nagarjuna teaches that a refutation of the two extremes is set forth in a Hinayana sutra, which appears in the *Brief Scriptures on Discipline (Vinayakshudravastu).*

These are just illustrations. There are many [sources] in Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* not quoted here, and many are also set forth in his *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* and *Collection of Praises.*

The first part of the phrase in sutra, "Complete abandonment of these sufferings, definite abandonment, purification, extinguishment free from desire, cessation, thorough pacification, disappearance," is taught with respect to the *present aggregates*, using the seven terms: (1) complete abandonment of these sufferings, (2) definite abandonment, (3) purification, (4) extinguishment free from desire, (5) cessation, (6) thorough pacification, and (7) disappearance. The second part of the phrase, "non-connection to other suffering, non-arising, and non-production – this is peace, this is auspiciousness. It is like this: the definite abandonment of all the aggregates, the extinction of cyclic existence, freedom from desire, cessation, nirvana," is taught with respect to *future sufferings*.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "OBJECTION: 'Sufferings' and 'aggregates' are general terms used here for their instances, the afflictions." Then the answer is set out: "ANSWER: This also is not feasible. If general terms are not amenable to explanation with a general meaning, they must be explained as referring to their instances; here, however, this can be explained in the context of a generality."

The Vaibhashikas say that when a nirvana without remainder is attained, all products cease. The Prasangika Madhyamikas refute the Vaibhashikas, saying that it follows that when a nirvana without remainder is actualized, there is no actualizer and that when there is the actualizer, there is nothing actualized. According to the Vaibhashikas, when a nirvana with remainder is attained and later a

nirvana without remainder is attained, does the extinguishment of the aggregates take place naturally or by the power of antidotes? According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, since the extinguishment of the actualizer is not natural or primordial, the Vaibhashikas would have to say that it takes place by the power of antidotes. The Vaibhashikas define a nirvana without remainder as: a hinayana nirvana that is the extinguishment of the continuation of products. On the other hand, they define a nirvana with remainder as: a hinayana nirvana that is together with suffering aggregates. The presentation of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas is similar, in that they assert that a nirvana without remainder is a nirvana that is without the remainder of suffering aggregates, whereas a nirvana with remainder is a nirvana that is together with the remainder of suffering aggregates. On the other hand, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas, 'with remainder' and 'without remainder' do not refer to the presence and absence of suffering aggregates.

According to Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning*, (page 147):

> Therefore, the definition of a hinayana nirvana without remainder is: a hinayana nirvana qualified by the vanishing of the manifest appearance of true existence; for example, a true cessation in the continuum of a hinayana foe destroyer who is single-pointedly absorbed on emptiness. The definition of a hinayana nirvana with remainder is: a hinayana nirvana that is together with the manifest appearance of true existence; for example, a true cessation in the continuum of a hinayana foe destroyer abiding in subsequent attainment. The meaning of this is clearly explained in the root text, which says: 'It is not like that existing in those foe destroyers who enter peace after abandoning the aggregates.' This is because it is taught that when abiding in a nirvana without remainder, there is no appearance of conventionalities to the face of the meditative equipoise of that foe destroyer.

(1) Complete abandonment of these sufferings, (2) definite abandonment, (3) purification, (4) extinguishment free from desire, (5) cessation, (6) thorough pacification, and (7) disappearance do not appear to one absorbed in meditative equipoise because there is no appearance of true existence and, therefore, there is no appearance of conventionalities. According to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, the extinguishment of products is a natural, or primordial, extinguishment. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, it can be understood both in terms of natural extinguishment and extinguishment by the power of antidotes.

Wednesday morning, 1 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) previously said:

> Extinguishment [in this case] is not [caused] by means of an antidote;
> It is so called because of primordial extinguishment.

This extinguishment is as explained in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence:* "Also, the Supramundane Victor said [in the middle wheel of the teaching], 'All phenomena are natureless; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.'" "Quiescent from the start" means that the object of negation, which is true existence, has been pacified, or extinguished, from the very beginning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) previously said:

> We are able to explain well the meaning of the sutra [as referring to a natural or primordial absence of inherent existence in phenomena].
>
> A nirvana that is a cessation of suffering in the sense of a [primordial] extinguishment is taught in sutra, as well as a cessation in the sense of an absence of inherently existent production. The superior Nagarjuna indicates that these are the same, and because his statement appears not to have been understood, I have explained it in detail.
>
> Also, Nagarjuna's *Treatise* on *the Middle Way* (XV.7) says:
>
> > In the *Advice to Katyayana*
> > 'Exists', 'not exists', and 'both'
> > Are rejected by the Blessed One
> > Knowing [the nature of] things and non-things.
>
> Thus, Nagarjuna teaches that a refutation of the two extremes is set forth in a Hinayana sutra, which appears in the *Brief Scriptures on Discipline (Vinayakshudravastu).*
>
> These are just illustrations. There are many [sources] in Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* not quoted here, and many are also set forth in his *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* and *Collection of Praises.*

There are many texts in which it is explained that hearers and solitary realizers *do* realize the non-inherent existence of phenomena. One such text is *Advice to Katyayana,* in which, by negating the two extremes, the Buddha presents the middle way to Katyayana in particular, and to hearers and solitary realizers in general.

In regard to the extinguishment of products that occurs either naturally or by the power of antidotes, the Vaibhashikas say that when a hearer superior attains a nirvana without remainder, his aggregates are extinguished naturally and not by the power of antidotes. The Chittamatrins say that when a foe destroyer who has a nirvana with remainder attains a nirvana without remainder, the two obstructions are extinguished, not by the power of antidotes but by the extinguishment of his basis (i.e., his mental and physical aggregates). Similarly, the Vaibhashikas say that when a foe destroyer with a nirvana with remainder attains a nirvana without remainder (i.e., dies), since all products are extinguished, his aggregates and obstructions (specifically, the non-afflicted obstructions) are also naturally extinguished.

The *Great Exposition of the Middle Way* (page 202) by Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa sets out scriptural quotations proving that hearers and solitary realizers do realize the selflessness of phenomena:

> In *Advice to Katyayana,* it says: "Katyayana, why do worldly beings for the most part strongly adhere to existence and non-existence? In this way they are not thoroughly free from birth, aging, sickness, death, sorrow, lamentation, suffering, mental unhappiness, and conflict. Migrators are not free from cyclic existence. They are not free from the suffering of death." There are many such hinayana sutras that establish that [hearers and solitary realizers realize the non-inherent existence of phenomena].

The text continues (page 213) regarding the nine scriptural authorities that establish that hearers and solitary realizers have the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena, saying:

> Glorious Chandrakirti establishes that hearers and solitary realizers have the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena by means of seven and nine scriptures. The first scripture, *Precious Garland*, says: "As long as grasping to the aggregates exists...," meaning that if one does not realize the non-true existence of the aggregates one will not realize a

> fully qualified selflessness of persons. In addition, the second scriptural reference says: "Just as the eye, by mistake..." by which it is explained that all three – the hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas – realize non-inherent existence. The third scriptural reference says: "Non-generation taught in the mahayana..." by which the two teachings, the non-production explained in the mahayana sutras and the extinguishment of all sufferings and the aggregates in the hinayana sutras, are ultimately similar. The fourth scriptural reference, *Advice to Hearers*, in which the five aggregates are explained to be like foes and so forth, explains the [Buddha's] intention regarding non-true existence. The fifth scriptural reference, the *Sutra of Katyayana*, explains the abandonment of the two extremes. This sets out the five scriptural references [mentioned] here [in the autocommentary]. In *Clear Words* [it says that those five, along with] the *Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*, which says that those of all three vehicles train in the perfection of wisdom, and the *Compendium of Sutras* are the seven. Furthermore, *Clear Words* [mentions] the two, the *Stable Special Thought Sutra* (*Questions of Adhyashaya Sutra*) and the *Miserliness Concentration Sutra* (*Sutra on the Miserliness of One in a Trance*) [, making nine]. By way of these nine, it is established that [hearers and solitary realizers do realize the non-inherent existence of phenomena].

Here, in the *Great Exposition of the Middle Way,* the quotations from the nine scriptures are only indicated briefly. However, some of them appear in their entirety in Chandrakirti's autocommentary and Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) then has the following outlines:

3B1C-2A1B-2C3 Dispelling objections to the teaching that hearers and solitary realizers cognize the non-inherent existence of phenomena

This section has two parts:

A Dispelling objections set forth in Chandrakirti's commentary
B Dispelling others not set forth in Chandrakirti's commentary

3B1C-2A1B-2C3A Dispelling objections set forth in Chandrakirti's commentary

In this context Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There is one, [namely Bhavaviveka], who considered in mind: "if the selflessness of phenomena was also indicated in the hearers' vehicle, then it would become meaningless to teach the mahayana." His system also is realized like this: as contradictory with reasoning and scripture.
>
> Teaching the mahayana is not done solely to indicate the mere selflessness in phenomena. If asked: "what then?" It is also [done to indicate] the bodhisattvas' grounds, [practices] gone beyond, prayers, compassion and so forth, thorough dedications, the two collections, and the unimaginable nature.
>
> As was taught in the *Precious Garland* [390 and 393]:
>
> > In the hearers' vehicle the bodhisattvas' prayers, activities and thorough dedications are not explained. How could one become a bodhisattva through that?
> >
> > The meaning of abiding in the bodhisattva deeds was not declared in the Sutras – it was declared in the mahayana, therefore [it is to be] upheld by the wise.

> The mahayana teachings are appropriate in order to clarify the selflessness of phenomena, because [they are] asserted to express the teaching extensively. In the hearers' vehicle, the selflessness of phenomena is exhausted through a brief indication. As was taught by the holy speech of the Acharya [Nagarjuna in the *Praise of the Supramundane*]:
>
> > You taught that not realizing the signless is without liberation. Therefore you finely revealed it completely in the mahayana.
>
> Enough by treating the ancillary topics!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's commentary sets forth [and then refutes] the position of the opponent, the [Svatantrika Madhyamika] master Bhavaviveka, 'There is one who thinks, "If the selflessness of phenomena were taught in the hearers' vehicle, then the teaching of Mahayana would be senseless." His system is to be understood as contradictory to reasoning and scripture.'
>
> Buddhapalita, in his commentary on the seventh chapter of Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*, explains that Nagarjuna's statement that the selflessness of all phenomena is taught in Hinayana sutras refers to the non-inherent existence of phenomena. Bhavaviveka refutes this in his *Lamp for Wisdom*, 'If that were so, the Mahayana teaching would be senseless.'
>
> Does Bhavaviveka mean that in general the Mahayana teaching would be senseless or that the Mahayana teaching on the selflessness of phenomena would be senseless? In the first case, if his consequence that the Mahayana teaching would be senseless follows from the reason that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hinayana, then the Mahayana teaching would be limited to teaching only the selflessness of phenomena. However, this is not so because the Mahayana also teaches the bodhisattva grounds, the practice of the perfections – giving and so forth – the great waves of aspirational prayers and dedications, great compassion as well as its accompanying topics, the great waves of the two collections, the marvelous power of the altruistic mind of enlightenment, and a reality inconceivable to common beings, hearers, and solitary realizers (a buddha's truth body). Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (390, 393) says:
>
> > Since all the aspirations, practices,
> > And dedications of bodhisattvas
> > Were not explained in the hearers' vehicle, how then
> > Could one become a bodhisattva through its path?
> >
> > The subjects based on the deeds of bodhisattvas
> > Were not mentioned in the [Hinayana] sutras
> > But were explained in the Mahayana, thus
> > The clear-sighted should accept it [as Buddha's word].
>
> These stanzas were set forth to clear away the wrong idea: 'One can progress to buddhahood through just the paths explained in the scriptural divisions of the hearers; therefore, the Mahayana is not needed.'

The main point here is that Bhavaviveka says that the mahayana teachings are senseless because the selflessness of phenomena was already explained in the hinayana.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Does Bhavaviveka mean that in general the Mahayana teachings would be senseless or that the Mahayana teaching on the selflessness of phenomena would be senseless? In the first case, if his consequence that the Mahayana teaching would be senseless follows from the reason that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hinayana, then the Mahayana teaching would be limited to teaching only the selflessness of phenomena." However, this is not the case because in the mahayana many other subjects are explained aside from the selflessness of phenomena; for example, the bodhisattva grounds, the practices of the perfections, the great waves of aspirational prayers and dedications, and so forth. In short, because the mahayana presents these

subjects, it is not senseless in that there is no presentation of the grounds and the perfections in the hinayana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti is saying that, according to Bhavaviveka, Nagarjuna should have said, 'Because the selflessness of phenomena is set forth in the Mahayana, the explanations in the Hinayana scriptures are not sufficient [for the attainment of buddhahood].' However, Nagarjuna did not say this but referred to other factors of the vast [methods of the Mahayana]. Bhavaviveka may mean that it would be senseless for the Mahayana to teach the selflessness of phenomena because it is taught in the Hinayana. This does not follow, however, because the selflessness of phenomena is taught no more than briefly in the scriptural collections of the hearers whereas it is taught very extensively from many viewpoints in the Mahayana.

On the other hand, if Bhavaviveka meant that the mahayana presentation of the selflessness of phenomena in particular is senseless, this too is not correct because the hinayana only presents the selflessness of phenomena briefly while the mahayana presents it extensively, with many reasonings. While Bhavaviveka accepts that there is a presentation of the selflessness of phenomena in the uncommon hinayana sutras, he is poking fun at Buddhapalita. Bhavaviveka, in his *Lamp of Wisdom,* finds many faults with Buddhapalita's assertions. Bhavaviveka is a Svatantrika Madhyamika, while Buddhapalita is a Prasangika Madhyamika. Although the hinayana sutra basket in general presents the selflessness of phenomena, an uncommon hinayana sutra basket does not present the selflessness of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> This also is the thought of the superior Nagarjuna, whose *Praise of the Supramundane (Lokatitastava)* says:
>
> > You have said that without cognizing
> > Signlessness, liberation does not occur.
> > Thus you taught it fully
> > In the Mahayana.
>
> The first two lines indicate that without cognizing suchness – signlessness – the afflictions cannot be extinguished and, therefore, liberation cannot be attained. The next two lines indicate that Buddha taught the selflessness of phenomena – signlessness – fully or completely in the Mahayana. Therefore, you should understand that the selflessness of phenomena was not fully taught in the Hinayana.
>
> QUESTION: How does the reason given in [the first two lines of] that stanza explain why the selflessness of phenomena was taught fully in the Mahayana?
>
> ANSWER: The liberation that is an extinguishment of the afflictions cannot be attained without cognizing signlessness; therefore, the selflessness of phenomena must also be taught in the hearers' vehicle. For this reason, a difference between Hinayana and Mahayana [is that the selflessness of phenomena is set forth fully in the Mahayana]. This is how the reason should be interpreted.

The first two lines of the stanza in Nagarjuna's *Praise of the Supramundane* indicate that the hinayana sutra basket does present the selflessness of phenomena because if hearers and solitary realizers did not realize the selflessness of phenomena they would not attain liberation, whereas they do. The next two lines say that the mahayana presents the selflessness of phenomena fully, whereas the hinayana does not. Thus, there is this difference between the mahayana and hinayana. It can be asked: "If the mahayana fully presents the selflessness of phenomena whereas the hinayana does not, what is it that

is not fully presented in the hinayana? In other words, what is it that is presented fully in the mahayana and is not fully presented in the hinayana?" Think about it.

Wednesday afternoon, 1 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Bhavaviveka's consequence [that the Mahayana teaching would be senseless], stated for the sake of refutation, and the opposite implied by that consequence [that the Hinayana does not teach the selflessness of phenomena] are thus shown to be facsimiles of refutation in which the pervasion is indefinite. In this way Bhavaviveka's refutation contradicts reasoning. The contradiction with scripture has been explained in detail above.
>
> QUESTION: What is the meaning of the master Nagarjuna's explanation that the selflessness of phenomena is taught fully in the Mahayana but not in the Hinayana scriptures? Also, what is the meaning of his explanation that the selflessness of phenomena is fully cultivated on the Mahayana but not on the Hinayana path?
>
> ANSWER: In no way does Nagarjuna teach that hearers and solitary realizers do not, like the Mahayanists, cognize that all objects of knowledge are without inherent existence, but rather cognize that just a portion of objects of knowledge are without inherent existence. If a selflessness of phenomena is established by valid cognition in terms of one phenomenon, then when you analyze whether or not another phenomenon inherently exists, you can realize its non-inherent existence on the basis of your previous reasoning.

Bhavaviveka previously stated the consequence: the Buddha, as the subject, it follows that it is meaningless for him to have taught the mahayana because he presented the selflessness of phenomena in the hinayana. This consequence is a facsimile of a refutation. The opposite consequence is: the Buddha, as the subject, it follows that the hinayana basket does not teach the selflessness of phenomena because the mahayana teachings are meaningful. Such an implied consequence contradicts reason and has already been shown to contradict the scriptures in that there are many hinayana scriptures that are sources for the teachings on the selflessness of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa then poses the questions: "What is the meaning of the master Nagarjuna's explanation that the selflessness of phenomena is taught fully in the mahayana but not in the hinayana scriptures? Also, what is the meaning of his explanation that the selflessness of phenomena is fully cultivated on the mahayana but not on the hinayana path?" The answer is: "In no way does Nagarjuna teach that hearers and solitary realizers do not, like the Mahayanists, cognize that all objects of knowledge are without inherent existence, but rather cognize that just a portion of objects of knowledge are without inherent existence."

The hinayana teaches the selflessness of phenomena, as mentioned in the following quote from Lama Tsongkhapa's *Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence* (see Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism*):

> [In the "Questions of Paramarthasamudgata Chapter" of] the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought,* [Paramarthasamudgata] says:
>
> > The Supramundane Victor, [initially] spoke, in many ways, of the own-character of the aggregates [of forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses, these being that in which one travels in cyclic existence]. He also spoke of their character of production [through the force of contaminated actions and afflictive emotions, their] character of disintegration, abandonment, [of the contaminated actions and afflictive emotions that are the causes of the contaminated aggregates], and thorough knowledge [that the

> entities of the aggregates are like a disease or are not established as a substantially existent self]. Just as he did with respect to the aggregates, so he also spoke with respect to [the mode of suffering of] the sense-spheres [the six objects — visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and other phenomena — and the six senses — eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense powers], dependent-arising, and the [four] foods [that is, morsels of food, contact, intention, and consciousness]. In a similar fashion, he also spoke of the own-character of the [four] truths, thorough knowledge [of true sufferings as impermanent and miserable], abandonment [of the sources of suffering, contaminated actions and afflictive emotions], actualization [of true cessations], and meditation [cultivating true paths, which are the means for attaining true cessation of suffering] as well as the own-character of the constituents, the various [eighteen] constituents, and manifold [six] constituents, their abandonment, and thorough knowledge as well as the own-character of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment [which are the antidotes to those objects of abandonment, their] discordances [that is, what is to be abandoned], the antidotes [to those objects of abandonment], production of [virtues or antidotes] that have not been produced, the abiding of those that have been produced, non-loss [of antidotes that have been produced, their] arising again [when one has familiarized with them again and again], and increasing [those antidotes through the power of familiarity] and extending [them limitlessly].

It is incorrect to assert that the non-inherent existence of all 108 phenomena, ranging from forms through the exalted knower of all aspects, is not fully presented in the hinayana while it is fully presented in the mahayana. One might think, for example, that in the hinayana only a limited number of phenomena, those ranging from forms through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, are taught as lacking inherent existence. To prove that this is not so, Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "If a selflessness of phenomena is established by valid cognition in terms of one phenomenon, then when you analyze whether or not another phenomenon inherently exists, you can realize its non-inherent existence on the basis of your previous reasoning."

Therefore, in what way is the presentation of the selflessness of phenomena not complete in the hinayana teachings, whereas it is complete in the mahayana? Also, what is the meaning of saying that the selflessness of phenomena is fully cultivated in the mahayana but not in the hinayana? The Buddha did not teach the selflessness of phenomena in a complete way in the hinayana teachings in the sense that he did not set out limitless reasons establishing it, whereas he did this in the mahayana. For this reason, when hinayanists meditate on the selflessness of phenomena they do so using a limited number of reasonings to establish the selflessness of phenomena, whereas mahayanists use limitless reasonings to establish it. In short, due to the different aptitudes of these people Buddha taught extensive reasonings in the mahayana for establishing the selflessness of phenomena, whereas he only taught some reasons in the hinayana.

With respect to the cultivation of the realization of the selflessness of phenomena, it can be said that hinayanists do not fully cultivate the realization of the selflessness of phenomena in the sense that they do not meditate on it for the sake of abandoning both the afflictive and knowledge obstructions, whereas mahayanists do. Therefore, the full cultivation of the realization of the selflessness of phenomena means that it becomes an antidote to both obstructions.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that it is not correct to say that a bodhisattva realizes all objects of knowledge as non-inherently existent, whereas hearers and solitary realizers only realize some phenomena as non-inherently existent. This is because when hinayanists establish non-inherent existence on one phenomenon, they can then extend this realization to other phenomena. This is

because the reasoning used for establishing the non-inherent existence of one phenomenon can be applied in a similar fashion to establish the non-inherent existence of other phenomena. Aryadeva, in his *Four Hundred Stanzas,* says: " He who sees the suchness of one phenomenon sees the suchness of all phenomena." This means that when, in dependence on reasoning, someone sees that a single phenomenon is non-inherently existent, using the same reasoning he can also see that other phenomena do not inherently exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Some who wish to be Madhyamikas assert a system refuting the true existence of phenomena but maintain that the emptiness of true existence truly exists, while others assert that a positive independent nature of phenomena truly exists. The former appears to have the fault of not delimiting well the measure of true existence and thereby of refuting only a coarse form of it. The latter claims to refute the true existence of phenomena but appears not to have done so through valid cognition and instead abides in a view that is a denial of phenomena. Therefore, these [two wrong interpretations] cannot challenge [our position that if the emptiness of one phenomenon is realized, the emptiness of any phenomenon can be realized based on the previous reasoning].
>
> To establish that even a single phenomenon does not truly exist, Mahayanists use limitless different reasonings as set forth in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*. Hence their minds become greatly broadened with respect to suchness. Hinayanists use only brief reasoning to establish suchness by valid cognition, and since they do not establish emptiness the way Mahayanists do, do not have a mind broadened with respect to suchness. Therefore, Nagarjuna sets forth a difference of vastness or abbreviation and of fully or not fully meditating on selflessness. This difference arises because hearers and solitary realizers strive to abandon only the afflictions (the obstructions to liberation), and cognizing a mere abbreviation of the meaning of suchness is sufficient for that. Mahayanists are intent on abandoning the obstructions to omniscience, and for that it is necessary to have a very broadened mind of wisdom opened to suchness.

Someone asserts that while phenomena are empty of true existence, true existence itself exists truly. This person's reasoning is that because emptiness bears reasoned analysis, the emptiness of true existence is truly existent. Someone else, Jonangpa, says that a positive, independent nature of phenomena (i.e., an affirmative, independent reality) truly exists. The first person does not understand well the nature of true existence in that he is able to refute true existence with respect to things but does not delimit well the measure of true existence. The second person thinks that phenomena do not truly exist but has not realized this with a valid cognizer and therefore deprecates them. A similar objection is found in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Essence of Eloquence* in the context of thoroughly established phenomena. In this text, someone says that thoroughly established phenomena are affirmative, independent phenomena. This is incorrect, as reality is a negative phenomenon, specifically a non-affirming negative that is the negation of the object of negation.

In order to prove that even a single basis lacks true existence, Nagarjuna sets forth infinite reasonings in *Fundamental Wisdom*. Those who apply these reasonings have a mind that is greatly broadened with respect to suchness. At the beginning of *Fundamental Wisdom*, in the context of the expression of worship, it says that there is no production ultimately from self, other, both, or causelessly. For example, a sprout, as the subject, is not ultimately produced because it is not produced from self, other, both, or causelessly. The sign is composed of four parts – (1) not produced from self, (2) other, (3) both, or (4) causelessly – which are further elaborated by setting out many proofs for each of them. Therefore, in order to establish even one single phenomenon as non-truly existent, the mahayana scriptures set forth many reasonings. However, this is not the case in the hinayana scriptures.

Q: Lama Tsongkhapa says that if the emptiness of one phenomenon is realized, the emptiness of all phenomena can be realized. Does this refer to a realization by an inferential cognizer or by a direct perceiver?
A: It refers to a realization by way of a valid inferential cognizer because there is no direct perceiver that depends upon reasoning [while this realization relies upon reasoning]. The Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that even ordinary beings can have a yogic direct perceiver. The directly perceivable and manifest phenomena are mutually inclusive.

Q: According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, when one achieves a direct realization of emptiness do the realizations of the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena arise simultaneously or serially?
A: If the realization of emptiness is direct, then the realizations arise simultaneously. A direct realization of the selflessness of persons and a direct realization of the selflessness of phenomena arise only on the path of seeing. However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that a direct perception of impermanence can exist in the continuum of an ordinary being, whereby a yogic direct perceiver can exist in the continuum of an ordinary being. One should examine whether a direct perceiver is pervaded by being free from conceptuality. The lower schools posit the definition of a direct perceiver as: an unmistaken knower free from conceptuality. But in the Prasangika Madhyamika school this definition does not apply. Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa presents the Prasangika Madhyamikas' assertions regarding valid cognizers. Although usually there is a presentation of three types of valid inferential cognizers, Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa presents a fourth, an inferential cognizer of comprehension through an example (*dpe nyer 'jal gyi rjes dpag*).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1B-2C3B Dispelling objections not set forth in Chandrakirti's commentary

OBJECTION: Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* says:

Know that the paths of the rhinoceros-like
Are included completely within
Abandonment of the thought of an object,
Non-abandonment of a subject, and the base.

Thus, Maitreya says that through the paths of a solitary realizer one is able to abandon thought adhering to the truth of an object but not adherence to the truth of a subject. Maitreya also says:

Due to diminishment of the afflictions,
Objects of knowledge, and the three paths
There are purities of the students,
The rhinoceros-like, and conqueror children.

(Note: These verses were previously translated in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* as respectively:

2.8 *Because it abandons conceptions of apprehendeds as objects,*
Because it does not abandon apprehending, and
By the support, the path of the rhinoceros-like
Is to be known as perfectly summarized.

2.29 *Because of the afflictive, the knowledge, and having diminished*
Those to the three paths, there are the purities of learners,
Rhinoceroses, and children of the victors.
The buddhas' is utterly in all ways.)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) continues:

> How do you interpret Maitreya's saying that adherence to the truth of objects is an obstruction to omniscience?
>
> ANSWER: The meaning of solitary realizers' abandoning adherence to external objects must be interpreted in one of two ways:
>
> 1. Though external objects are established by valid cognition, solitary realizers meditate on the meaning of a reasoned refutation of the true existence of external objects, as laid down by the Madhyamikas. They thereby abandon adherence to the truth of external objects.
> 2. On the basis of having meditated on the meaning of a reasoned refutation of external objects in accordance with Chittamatra, solitary realizers abandon the conception that external objects exist.
>
> The first interpretation is wrong. If one who can posit the general existence of external objects refutes their true existence through a reasoning analyzing suchness, then, when he analyzes whether subjects truly exist, he can – based on the force of the former reasoning – realize that subjects do not truly exist. Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* says:
>
> > He who sees the suchness of one phenomenon
> > Sees the suchness of all phenomena.
>
> [Therefore, it would be impossible to abandon the conception that objects truly exist without forsaking the conception that subjects so exist.]
>
> Commentaries by [Svatantrika Madhyamika] masters such as Haribhadra assert the meaning of this passage from Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* in accordance with the second interpretation. For them valid cognition establishes that external objects do not exist. Once this has been established, then anyone – even with dull faculties – would understand that a consciousness apprehending an object is not a different entity from its object. Therefore, Maitreya's statement that solitary realizers do not abandon adherence to the truth of subjects should be understood as the [solitary realizers'] general assertion that minds truly exist. In no way could they refute [the true existence of] one half of subject and object which are different entities and conceive of the truth of the other half. Therefore, the statement that it would be amazing to have a similarity of tenet between the solitary realizers who compound the truth of subjects and the Chittamatrins who teach the ultimate existence of a consciousness without the duality of subject and object is laughable even for the non-Buddhist Dipakas.

The main point here is that in the second chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* it is said that solitary realizers abandon the conceptions of true existence of objects but not the conceptions of true existence of subjects. How do solitary realizers abandon adherence to the true existence of objects without abandoning adherence to the true existence of subjects? According to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, solitary realizers do not abandon the conceptions of true existence of subjects because they realize the emptiness of objects in terms of the emptiness of objects existing as external phenomena. When solitary realizers realize that apprehendeds do not exist as external objects, they abandon the conception of them as truly existent. They do not abandon the conceptions of true existence of subjects, or apprehenders, because apprehenders do in fact exist and therefore the conceptions of true existence of apprehenders cannot be abandoned.

On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas interpret these verses to mean that solitary realizers' abandonment of the conceptions of true existence of objects is itself the realization of the selflessness of phenomena, whereby they prove that solitary realizers do realize the selflessness of phenomena.

Debate in this regard arises: "It is incorrect to say that only a conception of true existence of one object is abandoned and not a conception of true existence of all objects, because if the conception of true existence is abandoned with respect to one basis it can be abandoned with respect to all bases." The Prasangika Madhyamikas assert the existence of external objects. They say that the inner

consciousness and external objects are different substances. Their manner of asserting external objects is an uncommon assertion of this school. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, there is no need for an object to exist in dependence on the activation of latencies on the mind. This means that objects can exist externally as an agglomeration of particles.

Thursday morning, 2 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> [In the Yogachara Svatantrika system] the path of a solitary realizer is said to be middling from the viewpoint of his abandoning adherence to the truth of objects [which are different entities from their subjects] and his not abandoning adherence to the true existence of subjects. Through abandoning adherence to the truth of objects he is superior to a hearer, and through not abandoning adherence to the truth of subjects he is inferior to a Mahayanist [who realizes the non-true existence of all phenomena]; therefore, he is middling.
>
> [For the Yogachara Svatantrikas] the three persons of the three vehicles – great, middling, and small – have sharp, middling, and dull faculties, and thus they posit stages of faculties in relation to selflessness. They posit the best, the Madhyamika view, for the great vehicle. They posit the middling view of Chittamatra for the middling vehicle, and the lowest view, the common one of the selflessness of the person, for the small vehicle. However, it is not definite [that this is the only way of positing a difference in faculty according to Haribhadra and so forth]. Even according to [a system propounding that] all three have the view of suchness, it is not contradictory that there be three stages of faculties from the viewpoint of [trainees'] quickly or not so quickly penetrating suchness, and so forth.

The Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika system posits the three vehicles as explained above. Followers of the hearer vehicle cultivate the realization of the selflessness of persons, whereby they abandon the conception of a self of persons. Followers of the solitary realizer vehicle cultivate the realization of the emptiness of objects and their subjects being different substances, whereby they abandon the conception of external objects and thereby abandon the coarse knowledge obstructions. Followers of the mahayana cultivate the realization of the subtle selflessness of phenomena, whereby they abandon the conception of a self of phenomena. The Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert that *some* hearers and solitary realizers realize the selflessness of phenomena. There are two sets of fathers and sons of the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas who uphold this assertion: one set consists of Arya Vimuktisena as the father and Haribhadra as the son and another set consists of Shantarakshita as the father and Kamalashila as the son. According to other scholars, Shantarakshita has two sons: Haribhadra, as the main son, and Kamalashila. The father and son of the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamikas are respectively Bhavaviveka and Jnanagarbha.

The Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert that although some hearers and solitary realizers realize the selflessness of phenomena, those hearers and solitary realizers who are definite in lineage are pervaded by not realizing the selflessness of phenomena. Likewise, although the hinayana sutra basket does present the selflessness of phenomena, the uncommon hinayana sutra basket is pervaded by not presenting the selflessness of phenomena. Who are the hinayanists who realize the selflessness of phenomena? The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that they are those who enter the mahayana and realize the selflessness of phenomena but then give up the mind of enlightenment and fall to the lower vehicle. Because such persons have realized the selflessness of phenomena, there do exist hearers who have the realization of the selflessness of phenomena. Kensur Pema Gyeltshen of Drepung Loseling Monastery, who follows Panchen Sonam Dragpa, wrote a commentary on the Middle Way which discusses this. On the advice of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Kensur Pema Gyeltshen also wrote commentaries on the Perfection of Wisdom and the *Compendium of Valid Cognition* in order to clarify doubts within the context of Panchen Sonam Dragpa's texts. There is an

expression that Drepung Loseling Monastery has two *gyeltshens* (victory banners): Kensur Pema Gyeltshen and Kensur Nyima Gyeltshen.

Bhavaviveka (of the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamikas) debated Buddhapalita (of the Prasangika Madhyamikas) regarding Buddhapalita's commentary on the seventh chapter of *Fundamental Wisdom,* saying: "It follows that the mahayana teachings are meaningless because the hinayana teachings present the selflessness of phenomena." In response, Lama Tsongkhapa asked Bhavaviveka: "Do you mean that in general the presentation of the mahayana is meaningless or that in particular the presentation of the selflessness of phenomena in the mahayana is meaningless? If you say that in general the presentation of the mahayana is meaningless, it follows that it is meaningful because the mahayana does not present only the selflessness of phenomena but also presents the grounds, perfections, prayers, dedications, and so forth. On the other hand, if you say that in particular the presentation of the selflessness of phenomena in the mahayana is meaningless, it follows that it *is* meaningful because there is a difference in the way selflessness is taught in these two vehicles. This is because the mahayana basket presents the selflessness of phenomena using limitless reasonings, whereas the hinayana basket presents it using only a limited variety of reasonings. Furthermore, mahayanists establish the selflessness of phenomena using many reasonings and cultivate the realization of the selflessness of phenomena as an antidote to both the afflictive obstructions and the knowledge obstructions, whereas hinayanists establish the selflessness of phenomena using limited reasonings and cultivate the realization of the selflessness of phenomena only as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Maitreya teaches that the inability to abandon adherence to the truth of the subject – consciousness – is a distinguishing feature of the low vehicle. Therefore, it is not suitable to interpret the view of selflessness explained in his *Ornament for Clear Realizations* as Chittamatra, as is the case with his *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras*, *Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes (Madhyantavibhanga)*, and *Discrimination of Phenomena and the Nature of Phenomena (Dharmadharmatavibhanga)*. Even Indian [scholars] interpreted Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* [variously] as Madhyamika and as Chittamatra, and their many reasons regarding this should be explained; however, fearing too many words I will not write about it now.

Maitreya's *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras*, *Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes*, and *Discrimination of Phenomena and the Nature of Phenomena* mainly present the Chittamatra view. Even Indian scholars interpreted the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* according to the Madhayamika and the Chittamatra. There are a total of twenty-one commentaries on the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. Among them is the *Pure Possessor of the Twenty Thousand* by Shantipa, who wrote this commentary – which connects the *Ornament* to the *Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* – in accordance with the views of the Mind-Only (Chittamatra) school. On the other hand, Haribhadra and Arya Vimuktisena wrote their commentaries on the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* – respectively *Eight Chapters on the Twenty-Five Thousand* and *Illumination of the Twenty-Five* – in accordance with the views of the Middle Way (Madhyamika) school.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Furthermore, Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* says:

> The element of qualities has no divisions
> Therefore the lineages cannot be different.
> Divisions of lineage are thoroughly imputed
> Through differences in the dependent phenomena.

(Note: This verse was previously translated in the context of *Ornament for Clear Realizations* as:

1.39 *Because indivisible in the sphere of reality,*
The lineages are not suitable to be different.
By way of instances of qualities supported,
The division of that is thoroughly described.)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) continues:

> This indicates that hearers and solitary realizers also cognize the nature of phenomena. With respect to the term 'element of qualities' (*dharmadhatu*) Aryavimuktisena's *Illumination of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom (Pañchavimshatisahasrika-prajñaparamitopadeshashastrabhisamayalamkaravrtti)* says, '"Thought" and "conception" are an adherence to phenomena and their signs. Because these do not exist, desire is to be known as just non-existent. This non-existence is the suchness of all phenomena. This indicates that the element of qualities itself is the cause of the qualities of superiors, and it is thus the basis of achieving the natural lineage.' The element of qualities is explained as the emptiness of true existence that is the non-existence of phenomena and their signs as they are apprehended by desire, which here refers to a consciousness adhering to the true existence of phenomena and their signs.
>
> An objection is stated: 'If the element of qualities were the lineage, then all sentient beings would abide in the lineage because the element of qualities in general would abide in all.' The objector thinks that abiding in the lineage refers to the lineage on the occasion of the path.

Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* (v. 1.39ab) says: "The element of qualities has no divisions therefore the lineages cannot be different." This means that the naturally abiding lineage existing in the continua of the followers of the three vehicles cannot be divided because it is of a single nature.

Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* (v. 1.39cd) then says: "Divisions of lineage are thoroughly imputed through differences in the dependent phenomena." Although the basis, which is the sphere of reality, cannot be divided, that which is based on it can be divided; in this sense lineage can be divided. This too is taken as proof that hearers and solitary realizers do realize the selflessness of phenomena. Just as mahayanists purify negativities by meditating on the sphere of reality, likewise hearers and solitary realizers purify negativities by meditating on the sphere of reality.

Arya Vimuktisena's *Illumination of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom* comments on the sphere of reality, saying: "This indicates that the element of qualities itself is the cause of the qualities of superiors, and it is thus the basis of achieving the natural lineage." (This can also be translated as: "This work, the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*, teaches that the sphere of reality, being the cause of superiors, is the 'naturally abiding lineage,' the basis of mahayana achievings.") Arya Vimuktisena thus says that the sphere of reality is the cause of a superior's realization and is therefore the basis that is the naturally abiding lineage.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "The element of qualities is explained as the emptiness of true existence that is the non-existence of phenomena and their signs as they are apprehended by desire, which here refers to a consciousness adhering to the true existence of phenomena and their signs." An objection is made to this: "If the element of qualities were the lineage, then all sentient beings would abide in the lineage because the element of qualities in general would abide in all." This objection arises because all sentient beings have a mind that is empty of true existence. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The objector thinks that abiding in the lineage refers to the lineage on the occasion of the path." In

other words, it follows that all sentient beings abide in lineage because they abide in the sphere of reality (and the sphere of reality is lineage).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In answer to this it is said, 'The lineage is that which serves as the cause of superiors' qualities when observed; thus, here the absurd consequence [that all sentient beings would have the qualities of superiors] is not entailed.' The mere presence of the nature of phenomena does not mean that one abides in the lineage in terms of the path. When one observes and meditates on the nature of phenomena through the path, it comes to serve as the special cause of superiors' qualities. At that time one's lineage is regarded as special.
>
> An objection is raised, 'Still, since the element of qualities has no divisions, the lineages of the three vehicles could not be different.' In answer, it is said that because there are divisions in the paths, which are dependent phenomena observing [the element of qualities], the lineages are asserted to be different.

In short, just by *having* the sphere of reality (the element of qualities) one does not *abide* in the lineage of the occasion of the path. Only by observing the sphere of reality does that sphere of reality act as a cause of the realizations of a superior. Observing and meditating on the sphere of reality acts to purify obstructions and achieve realizations. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "At that time one's lineage is regarded as special." This special lineage is 'a naturally abiding lineage which is the basis of the mahayana achievings.' A 'naturally abiding lineage' exists in all sentient beings because all sentient beings *have* a mind that is empty of true existence, this being the naturally abiding lineage. All sentient beings are said to abide in the tathagata essence. In order to prove that all sentient beings have the tathagata essence, Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* sets out three reasons saying (Gyatso, *The Doctrine of Buddhism-I*): "Because the [activities] of the buddha body radiate forth, because suchness is undifferentiated, because all sentient beings have lineage, they always possess the buddha essence." In other words, all sentient beings have the tathagata essence because: (1) the enlightened activities of the buddhas radiate to all sentient beings, (2) the minds of buddhas and the minds of sentient beings are the same in being empty of true existence, and (3) sentient beings possess lineage. In short, sentient beings have the tathagata essence because they possess that which is suitable to transform into a buddha body. The <u>definition of lineage</u> is: that which is suitable to transform into a buddha body. This is in turn posited as: (1) a naturally abiding lineage and (2) a developmental lineage.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The basis (the element of qualities) is what is observed, and the dependent are the consciousnesses observing it. With respect to the observers, there are also the two vehicles of hearers and solitary realizers. In order for the element of qualities to be observed, it must be established for that mind, and unless true existence is eliminated for that mind, an emptiness of true existence is not established for it. If emptiness is not established for it, then neither is the nature of phenomena.
>
> The fact that the nature of phenomena must be initially ascertained in relation to one [particular] base qualified by emptiness shows that hearers and solitary realizers take cognizance of either an external or internal phenomenon qualified by emptiness and observe its nature – its non-true existence.

The *basis* is the naturally abiding lineage; *that which is based on it* is the mind that observes and meditates on that basis. Hearers and solitary realizers observe that basis, the naturally abiding lineage. In order for a mind to observe that basis, the sphere of reality, true existence must be eliminated for that mind. This is because if true existence is not eliminated for that mind, an emptiness of true existence cannot be established for it. If the emptiness of true existence is established for a mind, that

mind will not conceive of true existence. When true existence is eliminated for the minds of hearers and solitary realizers, the selflessness of phenomena is established. Thus, hearers and solitary realizers also have the realization of the selflessness of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Thus, there are solitary realizers who cognize the meaning of suchness, and it does not follow that no solitary realizer can abandon adherence to the truth of consciousnesses.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas pose the question: "If solitary realizers abandon the conception of true existence, why do they not abandon the conception of true existence of consciousnesses?" The conclusion is that solitary realizers can abandon adherence to the true existence of consciousnesses. The stanza from the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* (v. 2.8) regarding the third topic of the second chapter (a knower of paths knowing solitary realizers' paths), which says: "Know that the paths of the rhinoceros-like are included completely within abandonment of the thought of an object, non-abandonment of a subject, and the base" (*or* "Because it abandons conceptions of apprehendeds as objects, because it does not abandon apprehending, and by the support, the path of the rhinoceros-like is to be known as perfectly summarized") is, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, interpretive and not definitive because it is incorrect to assert that solitary realizers abandon the conceptions of true existence of apprehendeds but not the conceptions of true existence of apprehenders. Thus, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that when the adherence to true existence of objects is abandoned the adherence to the true existence of subjects is also abandoned.

In short, Lama Tsongkhapa quotes three verses from the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*: one in relation to the third topic of the second chapter (a knower of paths knowing solitary realizers' paths, v. 2.8), one in relation to the eleventh topic of the second chapter (the completely, pure path of meditation, v. 2.29), and one in relation to the fourth topic of the first chapter (naturally abiding lineage, the basis of mahayana achievings, v. 1.39), in order to show that hearers and solitary realizers do have the realization of the selflessness of phenomena.

Thursday afternoon, 2 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Also, hearers must be divided into those who do and do not realize suchness, and for this reason two Hinayana modes were set forth in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. You must ascertain that [in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* which contains two systems] conceptions of a true difference in entity of subject and object are both assigned and denied as obstructions to omniscience.
>
> OBJECTION: The objection here is not that the lineages of the three vehicles could not be different but that a division into thirteen lineages is not feasible.
>
> ANSWER: This is not correct. On this subject Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* is similar to the statement of a hypothetical objection in Aryavimuktisena's *Illumination of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*: 'As it is said in sutra, "Manjushri, if the element of qualities is one, if suchness is one, and if the limit of reality is one, then how could receptacles and non-receptacles be designated?"' The question is that since it is said in other sutras that the element of qualities has no divisions, how could persons be designated as receptacles and non-receptacles of Mahayana? Since the objection in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* is similar to this, it is that the lineages of the greater and lesser vehicles could not be different. It does not refer to ascribing receptacles and non-receptacles in terms of thirteen lineages.

In the *Ornament,* it is said that there are two types of hinayanists: (1) those who realize the selflessness of phenomena and (2) those who do not realize it. Because of this, there are two interpretations regarding knowledge obstructions: one according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas and one according

to the Prasangika Madhyamikas. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that conceptions apprehending apprehendeds and apprehenders as truly existent different substances are knowledge obstructions, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they are not. For the [Yogachara] Svatantrika Madhyamikas such conceptions are coarse knowledge obstructions, whereas for the Prasangika Madhyamikas they are not knowledge obstructions but afflictive obstructions. For the Prasangika Madhyamika school conceptions of true existence are afflictive obstructions, while apprehendeds and apprehenders do exist as different substances. Since apprehendeds and apprehenders are in fact different substances, conceptions of them as truly existent different substances are conceptions of true existence, which are afflictive obstructions. On the other hand, according to the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas, apprehendeds and apprehenders are *not* different substances and, therefore, the conceptions apprehending them to be truly existent different substances are not subtle knowledge obstructions [because they are coarse knowledge obstructions].

An objection is then made: "The objection here is not that the lineages of the three vehicles could not be different but that a division into thirteen lineages is not feasible." The answer is that this is not correct. The thirteen naturally abiding lineages that are the basis of the mahayana achievings are feasible in that they are related to the thirteen bases, the thirteen achievings.

In Arya Vimuktisena's *Illumination of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* it says: "As it is said in sutra, 'Manjushri, if the element of qualities is one, if suchness is one, and if the limit of reality is one, then how could receptacles and non-receptacles be designated?'" Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The question is that since it is said in other sutras that the element of qualities has no divisions, how could persons be designated as receptacles and non-receptacles of mahayana? Since the objection in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* is similar to this, it is that the lineages of the greater and lesser vehicles could not be different. It does not refer to ascribing receptacles and non-receptacles in terms of thirteen lineages." Regarding the thirteen divisions of lineage, there is no debate as to whether those persons who possess them are receptacles or not for the mahayana teachings, because all thirteen divisions are the bases of the *mahayana* achievings. There are thirteen naturally abiding lineages that are the bases of the mahayana achievings. The basis, or support, is the lineage; the supported is the mahayana achievings. What is under discussion here is the naturally abiding lineage that is the basis of the mahayana achievings. With respect to these thirteen naturally abiding lineages there is no debate regarding receptacles or non-receptacles.

Q: Does being a receptacle or non-receptacle refer to having or not having the thirteen naturally abiding lineages?
A: Persons who possess the thirteen naturally abiding lineages in their continua are pervaded by being receptacles of the mahayana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The assertions of the master Haribhadra also are similar to those of Aryavimuktisena. Likewise, Maitreya's *Sublime Science* and Asanga's commentary on it explain that among hearers and solitary realizers there are some who have cognized the nature of phenomena and others who have not. Fearing it would be too much, I will not cite them.
>
> How do we know there are these two types [Hinayanists who have and have not cognized emptiness]? Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* teaches [a bodhisattva's] knower of paths which involves understanding the paths of hearers and solitary realizers so that a bodhisattva can accommodate [trainees] with those lineages. There are two types, those who are and are not vessels of the profound (emptiness), and since hearers and solitary realizers are predominantly not vessels of the profound, their paths were most frequently presented. Just as with respect to Mahayana it sometimes happens that unless one is taught Chittamatra first, one cannot find the Madhyamika view, this is also the case with solitary realizers and even hearers. [Therefore, they

> are often not taught the profound emptiness initially even though realization of it is the only path of liberation.]

In the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* Maitreya says that there are two types of knowers of paths: (1) knowers of paths knowing hearers' paths and (2) knowers of paths knowing solitary realizers' paths. These were taught in order to care for trainees who are hearers and trainees who are solitary realizers. Hearers and solitary realizers are of two types: (1) those who are correct vessels for the profound and (2) those who are not. Among these two, those who are not suitable for profound emptiness are more numerous. Because of this, their paths are taught more often, meaning that the paths that are the realization of the selflessness of persons and those that are the realization of non-duality, the emptiness of objects and subjects being different substances, are taught more often. The *Ornament for Clear Realizations* presents three paths: hearers' paths, solitary realizers' paths, and buddhas' paths, which are respectively the realization of the selflessness of persons, the realization of non-duality, and the realization of the non-true existence of phenomena. Even among mahayanists there are many who first need to be led in the Chittamatra view and only later on in the Madhyamika. Similarly, those following the hearers' vehicle are first taught the selflessness of persons and then the non-inherent existence of phenomena, while those following the solitary realizers' vehicle are first taught non-duality and then the non-inherent existence of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In both Aryavimuktisena's *Illumination of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* and Haribhadra's *Great Commentary on the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* (*Ashtasahasrikaprajñaparamitivyakhyanabhisamaya-lamkaraloka*) the element of qualities is assigned as the lineage of all three vehicles. As a source for this they quote the teaching that all superior persons are distinguished by the non-product (the element of qualities, emptiness). As a proof for the statement, 'The qualities of an enlightened one and all the doctrines taught by him do not exist,' the *Diamond Cutter* says, 'Superior persons are distinguished by the non-produced.' This means that all superiors of the greater and lesser vehicles are posited by way of their having actualized the non-produced ultimate which is the non-establishment of phenomena in reality.
>
> Therefore, this [Prasangika] system and Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* are not contradictory. You should understand that the systems of the commentators on Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* also contain two modes.
>
> Enough elaboration.

The sphere of reality (element of qualities) can be posited as the lineage of all three vehicles. This requires interpretation: the sphere of reality of the mind of a hearer is the hearer lineage, the sphere of reality of the mind of a solitary realizer is the solitary realizer lineage, and the sphere of reality of the mind of a bodhisattva is the mahayana lineage. Lineage is that which is suitable to transform into enlightenment. Enlightenment is of three types: (1) hearer enlightenment, (2) solitary realizer enlightenment, and (3) mahayana enlightenment. These are referred to in *Tenets (grub mtha')* as respectively the small, middling, and great enlightenments. On the basis of understanding these three enlightenments, one can define the three lineages as follows:

(1) the hearer lineage is that which is suitable to transform into a hearer's enlightenment,
(2) the solitary realizer lineage is that which is suitable to transform into a solitary realizer's enlightenment, and
(3) the mahayana lineage is that which is suitable to transform into great enlightenment.

Enlightenment can be divided into (1) enlightenment in terms of abandonments and (2) enlightenment in terms of realizations. The enlightenment that is abandonment and the enlightenment that is realization can be applied to all three vehicles. For example, a hearer enlightenment that is realization is a hearers' path of no more learning, while a hearer enlightenment

that is abandonment is nirvana. Or the hearer enlightenment can be said to be the state of a hearer foe destroyer.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "This means that all superiors of the greater and lesser vehicles are posited by way of their having actualized the non-produced ultimate which is the non-establishment of phenomena in reality." In short, all superiors realize emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "Therefore, this [Prasangika] system and Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* are not contradictory. You should understand that the systems of the commentators on Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* also contain two modes." In brief, hearers and solitary realizers are of two types: those who realize emptiness and those who do not.

This concludes the difficult part of the first chapter in terms of understanding. Instead, the remaining part is hard to practice!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1B-3 Surpassing feature on the first ground

This section has four parts:

A The giving of abiders on the first ground
B The giving of those with a lower basis
C Bodhisattvas' giving
D Divisions of the perfection of giving

3B1C-2A1B-3A The giving of abiders on the first ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Therefore, since those with undistracted intelligence will be able to understand the thusness of the meaning by themselves, I shall explain the principal part.

Because the intelligent are able to understand thusness by themselves Chandrakirti continues with his explanation as follows:

Then for him, the first cause of a completed buddha's
Enlightenment – just giving – becomes surpassing. [1.9ab]

For the bodhisattva who attained the Extremely Joyous Ground, from among the ten called

1. giving,
2. morality,
3. patience,
4. joyous effort,
5. concentration,
6. wisdom,
7. method,
8. prayer,
9. strength, and
10. exalted wisdom,

only giving gone beyond will become greatly surpassing. It is not that he does not have the others.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Chandrakirti says in his root text:

> *Then for him the first cause of perfect*
> *Enlightenment – giving – becomes surpassing.* [1.9ab]

When a bodhisattva attains the Very Joyful Ground, the perfection of giving among the ten perfections becomes greatly surpassing for him. However, this does not mean that he does not have the other perfections.

The only difference between the autocommentary and the *Illumination* is that Chandrakirti lists all ten perfections.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, that giving is the first cause of the omniscient state.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The supramundane perfection of giving is the first supramundane cause of complete enlightenment.

When the Prasangika Madhyamikas set out the ten perfections they assert two different types of perfections: the mundane and the supramundane. The perfections on the level of the first ground are supramundane, whereas those on the paths of accumulation and preparation are mundane.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In general the latter perfections exceed the former ones, but on the first ground it is said that giving is surpassing. This means that here a bodhisattva has not developed the measure of force with respect to the practice of ethics and so forth that he has with respect to the practice of giving. As it is said, on the first ground he is able to practice it by giving away his own body and external belongings such that even the slightest attachment – which would be contrary to the perfection of giving – does not arise. On the second ground a bodhisattva is able to refrain totally from faulty ethics – the contraries of proper ethics – even in dreams, but on the first ground he is not able to do so.

Bodhisattvas on the first ground are able to give away all their belongings and their body without the slightest miserliness. However, first ground bodhisattvas do not have the ability to keep ethics as well as bodhisattvas on the second ground, who are able to keep proper ethics even in a dream.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Since even giving away his flesh is done with devotion,*
> *It also is the cause of inferring the unsuitable to appear.* [1.9cd]

At that time, the qualities of the bodhisattva are not suitable to appear, yet whatever they are – such as realizing a ground and so forth – they are clearly inferred through the inference of the distinction of giving away material of outer and inner essence, like smoke and so forth [are inferred] from fire and so forth.

As the bodhisattva's giving is the first cause of buddhahood and the sign of definite qualities which are unmanifest.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Through his giving, one can infer the presence of unimaginable realizations on the first ground;

Chandrakirti's root text says:

His devotion to giving even his own flesh
Is reason for inferring the unimaginable. [1.9cd]

Not only does the bodhisattva give external articles with enthusiasm, but he even has great enthusiasm for giving his own flesh to one who asks for it. This quality serves as the cause for inferring internal realizations – such as attaining a ground – which most other persons cannot imagine. The inference is similar to fire being inferred due to the presence of smoke, etc.

This indicates that the bodhisattva has no taints of attachment with respect to giving away his body, life, and resources. Even though he gives these away, his continuum remains firm without changing its aspect.

When a bodhisattva attains the first ground, he has the ability to give away his belongings and body without difficulty and without any sense of loss, even if he has to cut his flesh in order to do so. Although the special inner realizations of bodhisattvas on the first ground are not suitable to appear, they can be inferred on the basis of their generosity. 'Suitable to appear' is discussed in *Signs and Reasons* in the context of two types of signs: (1) a correct sign of non-observation of that which is suitable to appear and (2) a correct sign of non-observation of that which is not suitable to appear. An example of a correct sign of non-observation of that which is not suitable to appear are flesh-eating spirits *(pishasa*) who, although present in front of oneself, cannot be seen. A syllogism regarding this is: a person for whom the flesh-eating spirits in the place in front of him are extrasensory, as the subject; it is not feasible for him to assert the existence of flesh-eating spirits because he does not observe flesh-eating spirits by way of a valid cognizer. Likewise, the realizations of bodhisattvas are not suitable to appear to others because they are extrasensory and therefore cannot be asserted to exist since there is no valid cognizer observing them. One can only know that bodhisattvas have these realization in dependence on the sign "because they practice generosity perfectly and thoroughly."

Friday morning, 3 March 2000

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: In the *Illumination* (Tib. page 58) it says:

The next two lines of Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* teach that due to the presence of the view of the transitory as real 'I' and 'mine', actions binding one to cyclic existence are accumulated and through the force of these actions one is born in cyclic existence. This is said in terms of someone who has not come to disbelieve the referent object of the conception that the mental and physical aggregates truly exist. This is not applicable in general to one who merely possesses the view of the transitory as real 'I' and 'mine' because this view is present through the seventh ground, but from the first ground a bodhisattva does not take rebirth by the power of contaminated actions.

This seems to be saying that first ground bodhisattvas no longer take rebirth in cyclic existence because they disbelieve the referent object of the view of the transitory collection. Hinayana stream enterers also disbelieve the referent object of the view of the transitory collection yet still take rebirth by the force of karma and afflictions; for example, stream enterers who will be liberated in seven lives. Yet they have the same realization of emptiness as do first ground bodhisattvas and, according to Jedzunpa, also have no projecting karma. This fact seems to contradict what it says in *Ocean of Sport* and *Illumination*.

A: In the *Illumination* it does not say that someone does not take rebirth by the force of karma and afflictions due to merely disbelieving the referent object of the view of the transitory collection. It is important to understand that there is a difference between the tenets of the Prasangika Madhyamikas

and those of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas regarding this point. What is said in the *Ocean of Sport* regarding the stream enterers who take rebirth for twenty-eight more lives is based on the *Treasury of Knowledge* and is also found in sutra. It is important to note that stream enterers, for example, those who take rebirth for twenty-eight more lives, are also to be applied to the meaning sangha (the bodhisattvas). Thus, there are also bodhisattvas who take rebirth in cyclic existence twenty-eight times out of their compassion and prayers and not by the force of karma and afflictions.

I think that your point is that stream enterers who take rebirth for twenty-eight more lives disbelieve the referent object of the view of the transitory collection as do first ground bodhisattvas. Therefore, it seem contradictory that such bodhisattvas do not take rebirth yet stream enterers do. So why is this so? First ground bodhisattvas do not take rebirth merely due to disbelieving the referent object of the view of the transitory collection. In addition, they have completed the equivalent of the collection of merit of the first countless great eon. These bodhisattvas now begin the collection of merit of the second countless great eon, due to which they do not take rebirth by the force of karma and afflictions. However, others give the reason that when a bodhisattva attains the first ground he attains a body that is the nature of mind. In other words, his body composed of flesh and bones transforms into a body that is the nature of mind. Such a body is not a true suffering. How does a body that is the nature of the mind arise? The usual answer is that it is created by uncontaminated karma and a subtle cause, a motivation which is caused by a knowledge obstruction. In other words, that body arises from uncontaminated karma and the level of the latency of ignorance. What is the level of the latency of ignorance? It is a subtle effort motivated by a knowledge obstruction.

Stream enterers who take rebirth for twenty-eight lives take rebirth by the force of karma, in spite of the fact that they no longer create new projecting karma. When it is said that such a stream enterer takes rebirth, it necessarily refers to rebirth as a human or god. On the basis of this good rebirth, they then benefit others.

Q: In the *Illumination* (Tib. page 60) it says:

> In what way do these two teachings have the same meaning? Some say, 'hearers assert an extinguishment of products, but if products inherently existed, then that would not be feasible. Therefore, when an extinguishment of products is asserted, it is necessary to assert non-inherent existence from the beginning. Thus, these two teachings have the same meaning.'
>
> This is very wrong.

Could Geshe-la please explain this paragraph?

A: 'Hearers' in this context refers to the lower schools, the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas, who assert that compounded phenomena, translated here as products, which are the aggregates and so forth, are extinguished, yet they also exist inherently. The proponent makes the objection that if it is accepted that the aggregates are extinguished, it should also be accepted that they are non-inherently existent from the beginning. From this, he goes on to assert that the hinayana extinguishment of products and the mahayana non-production are equivalent in terms of indicating emptiness. However, Lama Tsongkhapa says that this way of explaining the equivalence of 'extinguishment' and 'non-production' is incorrect.

Lama Tsongkhapa continues:

> If that were so, then a sprout or any other phenomenon which the Madhyamikas assert to exist would have that reason; and, therefore, it would absurdly follow that sprouts, as well as all other products, and emptiness would be synonymous.

The presentation of extinguishment in the hinayana does not depend on other schools, as does the objection made by the opponent who relies on the Prasangika Madhyamika tenets.

In general the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas are not correct vessels for the teachings on emptiness because they do not accept the selflessness of phenomena. When it is said that the selflessness of phenomena is presented in the hinayana it means that it is presented to those hinayanists who are hinayanists in the sense of having entered the hinayana path, i.e., hearers and solitary realizers, and not those who are hinayanists in the sense of hinayana tenet holders, the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas. Lama Tsongkhapa says that Buddha's teachings on the extinguishment of the five aggregates are based on the intention that the aggregates do not exist inherently from the beginning. Therefore, the extinguishment of the aggregates is extinguishment in the sense of pacification of inherent existence from the beginning, and not extinguishment by the power of the antidotes.

Q: Are these aggregates the contaminated appropriated aggregates or aggregates in general?
A: These aggregates are specifically the contaminated appropriated aggregates, this being mentioned explicitly in sutra.

Q: Geshe-la just explained the point of view of the objector, but then Lama Tsongkhapa says that what he asserts is very wrong although it appears to be right.
A: The objection here is made in terms of those who are hearers by way of tenets (i.e., those who do not accept emptiness). Lama Tsongkhapa says that the objector's assertion is incorrect because it follows that for hearers products and emptiness (or any other phenomena whatsoever) are mutually inclusive. The word translated here as 'synonymous' is not to be understood in terms of two different names for one thing, but as mutually inclusive or having the same meaning.

The presentation of the extinguishment of products implies emptiness. The presentation of non-production also implies emptiness. Therefore, according to our own system, both presentations are the same in terms of presenting emptiness.

In *General Meaning* (page 146) Jedzunpa says:

> Someone says: "The way these two are mutually inclusive is that in the mahayana basket 'compounded phenomena are not produced inherently' and 'compounded phenomena are extinguished' are mutually inclusive. If compounded phenomena exist inherently, they are necessarily not extinguished." This is very wrong. If that were the case, it follows that all resultant things, such as sprouts and so forth, would be mutually inclusive with emptiness because if they exist inherently this is incompatible with them being results in that if they exist inherently this is incompatible with them depending on causes.
>
> Then, [Ajitamitra's] commentary on the *Precious Garland* says: 'There is no difference in meaning between non-production and momentariness.' This too is the explanation of someone who has not understood the meaning of the text because it has the fault that it follows that all the sutras and treatises that teach compounded phenomena as momentary teach emptiness.

The objector says: "Hearers assert an extinguishment of products, as well as the inherent existence of products. However, if products inherently existed, then their extinguishment would not be feasible. Therefore, when an extinguishment of products is asserted, it is necessary to assert non-inherent existence from the beginning." Thus, the objector is saying that the presentation of emptiness and the presentation of the extinguishment of products mean the same because if things exist inherently they could not be extinguished. Our own tradition says that this reasoning is not correct because it follows that things, such as sprouts, would be mutually inclusive with emptiness because if sprouts exist

inherently they are not feasible as results in that if they exist inherently they contradict depending on causes.

Q: How does a consciousness progress from a nirvana with remainder to a nirvana without remainder?
A: According to which school?
Q: The Svatantrika Madhyamika school.
A: According to the Svatantrika Madhyamika school a superior first attains a nirvana with remainder. Then, in order to pacify the contaminated aggregates, he continues to meditate on the selflessness of persons and then one day dies and attains a nirvana without remainder. According to the two lower schools, when that nirvana without remainder is attained the actualizer no longer exists because the continuum of the aggregates ceases.

This reminds me of Thich Nhat Hanh and Master Muhen who do not assert rebirth because they say that when one dies everything ceases to exist. Perhaps they say this in relation to the assertions of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas regarding the extinguishment of the aggregates at the time of a nirvana without remainder.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamika school, one can attain a nirvana without remainder and then a nirvana with remainder. For example, they posit a foe destroyer absorbed in meditative equipoise on emptiness as having a nirvana without remainder. When that foe destroyer arises from meditative equipoise, he has a nirvana with remainder in subsequent attainment. They assert this in relation to the fact that in subsequent attainment this foe destroyer once again has the appearance of true existence. Then, when he later returns to meditative equipoise on emptiness, he once again has a nirvana without remainder.

Q: The Buddha said that a man who falls in love with a woman created by a magician and then returns home to meditate on her impermanence and so forth is foolish in that he should meditate on her lack of true existence. On the other hand, if someone prostrates to Buddha while conceiving him to be truly existent is he foolish or is he wise in that he is creating merit? There are two positions: (1) someone prostrating to Buddha without adhering to true existence but without realizing his emptiness of true existence is creating merit and (2) someone prostrating to Buddha adhering to true existence is a fool.
A: The example of a woman created by the magician and someone doing prostrations are two different things. Someone who falls in love with a woman created by a magician is foolish because there is no such woman. Even if he returns home to meditate on that woman as impermanent, misery, empty, and selfless, this is of little value. However, such meditation is in general positive. To think that the woman is impermanent is ineffective in that this woman is not impermanent. It is like meditating on the impermanence of the horns of a rabbit, in that the horns of a rabbit are not impermanent.

When someone makes prostrations to the Buddha, conceiving him to be truly existent, is he foolish? He is not. If someone asserts that he is foolish, then also all the scholars of the Vaibhashika school, such as Vasubandhu, Dignaga, etc., are foolish in that they assert Buddha to be truly existent. In the third chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* Maitreya says that attachment to the conquerors and so forth is subtle. In this context, there is a discussion of whether prostrating and so forth to a conqueror while conceiving him to be truly existent is virtuous or not. The answer is that it *is* virtuous. On the other hand, if someone prostrates to Buddha without adhering to true existence this is definitely virtuous.

Q: Please explain the relation between the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena, the root of cyclic existence, the view of the transitory collection, the first link of

dependent-arising, and the view of the transitory collection which is innate and that which is acquired.

A: The first link of dependent-arising is, in general, said to be the ignorance which is an innate conception of a self of persons. The conception of a self of persons and conception of a self of phenomena differ only in terms of their observed objects or their bases. For example, the basis of the conception of true existence or inherent existence of the person is the person, while the basis of the conception of the true existence of phenomena is any phenomena other than the person. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, the view of the transitory collection is a view that, observing one's own 'I' or 'mine,' conceives it to exist inherently. Such a view of the transitory collection is the root of cyclic existence. The root of cyclic existence is also a conception of a self of persons. Therefore, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, if it is a view of the transitory collection it is pervaded by being a conception of the true existence of the person. Therefore, the first of the twelve links, ignorance, is pervaded by being a conception of a self of persons.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, an acquired view of the transitory collection is terminologically a view of the transitory collection but is not an *actual* view of the transitory collection. There are twenty types of views of the transitory collection, four being posited in relation to each of the five aggregates. When the four divisions are posited in relation to form, they are (see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 687):

(1) form is not the self,
(2) self does not possess from,
(3) a self is not in form, and
(4) form is not in the self.

Likewise, these four can be posited in relation to the remaining four aggregates. The twenty views of the transitory collection are listed in the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* (v. 6.144):

> *Form is not the self, the self does not possess form,*
> *The self is non-existent on form, nor does form exist on the self.*
> *Thus in four aspects should all the aggregates be known –*
> *These are asserted as the twenty viewing the self.* [6.144]

Commentary to this verse can be found in the *Illumination* (Tib. page 371).

Q: If the first link of dependent-arising is the *innate* conception of a self of persons, why is there no contaminated karma created on the first ground after only the *acquired* conception of a self of persons has been abandoned?

A: A first ground bodhisattva does not create any more karma, [but this is] not merely due to having abandoned the acquired conception of a self of persons.

END

Monday afternoon, 6 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1B-3B The giving of those with a lower basis

This section has two parts:

1 Attaining the happiness of cyclic existence through giving
2 Attaining the happiness of nirvana through giving

3B1C-2A1B-3B1 Attaining the happiness of cyclic existence through giving

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Likewise, desiring to show that "it is the cause of both relieving the suffering and of attaining the continual happiness of ordinary beings, hearers, and solitary realizers" [the root text] mentions:
>
> *All beings strongly desire happiness and*
> *Yet there is no human happiness without resources.*
> *Having known that resources also arise from giving,*
> *The Subduer at first gave discourse on giving.* [1.10]
>
> The antidotes of hunger and thirst, sickness, cold, and so forth are mere remedies of suffering and causes for the pleasure of existence to occur. Through judging the continuity of essence with mere mistaken bondage, the world very strongly adheres to pleasure whose essence is not free of harm. Such pleasure, the pleasure of that strong desire, is of the nature of the mere remedy of suffering. It is not observed to be produced without an enjoyment of resources: [the enjoyment] having a mistaken essence [and the resources], the objects of strong desire, being the antidotes of suffering.
>
> Having known that "also the objects which are the cause of relieving suffering do not arise with those who did not accumulate the material which produces the merit arisen from giving", the Bhagavan, through knowing the nature of the thoughts of each and every migrator, from among the discourses on morality and so forth, gave just the discourse on giving at the very beginning.

Ordinary beings engage in generosity for the sake of this life, whereas hearers and solitary realizers do so in order to eliminate the sufferings of cyclic existence and attain everlasting peace. Yet, in reality, all beings are the same in desiring everlasting happiness; for example, human beings desire happiness and in order to obtain it they need resources, the cause of which is generosity. Understanding this, Buddha taught generosity first among the six perfections.

Chandrakirti mentions "hunger and thirst, sickness, cold, and so forth," all of which are relieved by having sufficient resources. For example, hunger is relieved by food, thirst by drink, sickness by medicines and the necessities of life, and cold by clothes, shoes, shelter, and so forth. In order to obtain such resources as food, drink, medicines, shelter, and so forth one needs to have created their cause – generosity. Therefore, one should practice generosity, specifically the generosity of giving material things.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Chandrakirti's root text says:

> *All these beings want happiness, but human*
> *Happiness does not occur without resources.*
> *Knowing that resources arise from giving,*
> *The Subduer first discoursed on that.* [1.10]

> All these beings want to attain the happiness that is a diminishment of sufferings such as hunger, thirst, sickness, heat, and cold. However, the happiness of humans and so forth is not produced without their enjoying desired objects or resources, such as food, drink, means of curing sickness, clothing, and shelter. The Subduer, understanding the thought of all migrators and knowing that these resources arise from merit accumulated by previous giving, discoursed on giving from the very first for it is easy to engage in this method.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The Subduer... discoursed on giving from the very first for it is easy to engage in this method." Among the six perfections, generosity is the easiest to practice. Generosity is defined as the intention to give. This intention needs to be developed.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, even though donor sentient beings are not in accord with proper ways, in order to express the great essence of giving harmonious with their actions, [the root text] mentions:
>
> *Who have inferior compassion, very crude minds*
> *And are only intent on their own aims,*
> *Even their desired resources,*
> *The causes that pacify suffering, arise from giving.* [1.11]
>
> Some, like merchants, desiring the result of a very vast mass of wealth from giving away very little wealth, strive even more than those who strive (i.e., beggars) and are devoted in the wish to give. Unlike the Tathagata's children who are under the influence of compassion, they do not act to strongly increase the fervor which desires to give solely without seeking the results of giving. They turn away from the fault of giving, grasping [to resources, but] are anxious to hold on to the mere qualities. Even for them, that [giving] acts to destroy the unappealing sufferings of body such as hunger and thirst, by means of issuing the excellent and eminent resources, becoming the cause of pacifying suffering.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> QUESTION: Must a giver accord with proper ways in order to attain marvelous resources from giving gifts?
> ANSWER: That is not necessary; Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *Even for beings with little compassion,*
> *Brutal and intent on their own aim,*
> *Desired resources arise from giving,*
> *Causing extinguishment of suffering.* [1.11]
>
> There are those who, like merchants, seek to gain an enormous mass of wealth by giving away very little. Wanting far vaster resources than do even beggars, they are enthusiastic in giving.
>
> As givers their compassion is low, and, unlike bodhisattvas under the influence of compassion, they do not seek to increase the joy of wanting to give without seeking the fruits of giving. Moreover, intent on only their own welfare – the happiness of high status – their minds are extremely brutal toward sentient beings. They have turned away from the fault of holding on to resources and of not giving them away but anxiously hold on to their sole hope which is for reward. Even for them, giving serves as a cause of extinguishing the sufferings of hunger, thirst, and so forth by bringing marvelous resources.

Does one who gives need to behave properly in order to experience the result of generosity, perfect resources? Even someone who does not behave properly, in the sense that he lacks ethics, will still experience the result of giving. The example given here is that of merchants who give away only a little with the hope of receiving much in return.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Wanting far vaster resources than do even beggars, they are enthusiastic in giving." The wording of the Tibetan is not very clear here but this probably means that someone wanting great resources gives something small, such as some rice, to beggars with the hope of gaining much more. One wanting a vast amount of resources should engage in generosity.

When bodhisattvas practice generosity they do so out of compassion and not out of the hope of reward. In other words, they give sincerely without any ulterior motive. Ordinary beings have inferior compassion, crude minds, and seek reward, yet the result of their giving is still resources. In short, although they give in order to attain happiness in this life, they will still reap the result, wealth, in a future life.

In general it is said that to be born as a human being is a fortunate rebirth, yet there are many human beings who are poor and who experience much suffering as a result of their poverty. This is the result of not having practiced generosity, i.e., miserliness.

It may appear easy to practice generosity, but in reality it only happens in dependence on valid scriptural authority such as: "From generosity, wealth; from morality, high rebirth." This statement is correct with respect to its main subject because it is a scripture that is established as pure by means of the three-fold analysis.

Q: Is it not that the time and manner in which the result of generosity will be experienced is an extremely hidden phenomenon, while the fact that wealth comes from generosity is only a slightly hidden phenomenon?
A: That is correct. The conclusion of debate regarding this is that the fact that wealth comes from generosity is a slightly hidden phenomenon, but when, where, and in what way the result will be experienced is a hidden phenomenon.

In brief, even if one gives with the thought of reward in this life, one will still experience the result, wealth. In general, the cause of higher rebirth as a human or god is to protect ethics. If, in addition, one practices generosity one will definitely experience resources in a future life in the upper realms. The practice of patience results in beauty. The practice of effort brings the result of magnificence, in the sense that one will be respected and looked up to by others. The practice of concentration brings a stable mind. The practice of wisdom leads to intelligence. Buddha said that the six perfections should be practiced in conjunction with each other as in this way one will develop more and more qualities. On the other hand, if one practices only some of the perfections one will not be able to progress as one will always lack some of the necessary conditions.

The next outline in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) is:

3B1C-2A1B-3B2 Attaining the happiness of nirvana through giving

In this regard Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also he, who is devoted to the desire to give merely in relation to relieving his own suffering since devoid of compassion:
>
> *He too, through the context of giving,*
> *Will sometime soon encounter an arya being;*
> *Then, correctly severing the continuity of existence,*
> *As a result of that, will progress to peace.* [1.12]
>
> – is mentioned,

Because it was set forth that "the holy ones will come in the presence of donor-patrons", one with great appreciation for giving will meet an arya being through the context of giving. Hence, from his thorough teachings, he will understand the lack of qualities in samsara and actualize the stainless arya path. Thereby, having abandoned ignorance of pacifying suffering, casting off the continuity of samsara, engaged from beginningless time in succession of birth and death one after another, he will completely pass beyond sorrow through the vehicles of the hearers and solitary realizers.

Hence, to some extent, the giving of those who are not bodhisattvas is the cause of attaining the happiness of samsara and nirvana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Chandrakirti's root text says:

Through giving even they will quickly attain
A meeting with a superior being.
Then they will cut the continuum of cyclic existence,
Going to the peace caused by meeting a superior. [1.12]

Even those bereft of compassion but intent on giving – looking after only their own happiness in the sense of diminishing suffering – quickly attain a meeting with a superior being while they give. This is because the excellent are said to associate with patrons, to whom they then teach doctrine. Through this, the patrons come to understand cyclic existence as being without any good features. Through actualizing uncontaminated superior paths, they abandon ignorance and completely sever the continuum of cyclic existence – the passage from birth to death again and again since beginningless time. They pass to the peace of a hearer's or solitary realizer's nirvana which is caused by meeting with the excellent.

Those who lack compassion engage in generosity in order to attain their own happiness and be free from suffering. Even so, as a result they will meet with a superior who will ask them for something, whereby this superior will engage his patron in conversation. In this way, while thanking the patron the superior will go on to indirectly teach him Dharma by explaining that cyclic existence is without any qualities. In this way patrons are led to develop the wish to leave cyclic existence and to attain the superiors' paths. Thereby, they progress to the attainment of a hearer's nirvana or a solitary realizer's nirvana.

In short, the practice of generosity acts as a basis for developing all excellent qualities. Due to generosity one meets with a superior, receives teachings, comes to understand the faults of cyclic existence and the advantages of liberation, and goes on to achieve nirvana. Therefore, due to generosity one can sever the continuity of cyclic existence.

In this way there are two results of giving: the happiness of cyclic existence and the pacification of suffering, nirvana. In addition, one can even achieve a bodhisattva's enlightenment as will be explained next.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1B-3C Bodhisattvas' giving

This section has four parts:

1 Extraordinary benefits of bodhisattvas' giving
2 Importance of discourse on giving for both the compassionate and the non-compassionate
3 The joy attained by bodhisattvas when giving
4 Whether or not suffering occurs when a bodhisattva gives away his body

3B1C-2A1B-3C1 Extraordinary benefits of bodhisattvas' giving

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Those with the mind which promised to benefit migrators*
> *Through giving, attain joy not long delayed.* [1.13ab]
>
> Those who are not bodhisattvas will not definitely enjoy the result explained at the same time as giving and hence, because the result of giving is unmanifest, it is even possible they will not engage in giving. Yet, the bodhisattvas, at the very same time as giving, through completely satisfying the mind of the seeker, attain the strongly desired excellent result of giving [and] thus retain a supreme joy and thoroughly enjoy the result of giving at that time. Because of that, they take joy in giving at all times.

Bodhisattvas engage in generosity knowing they will experience the result in the future and, in addition, when the recipient experiences satisfaction they themselves experience the immediate result of joy.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *Those bearing in mind a promise to help beings*
> *Attain happiness from giving before too long.* [1.13ab]
>
> When non-bodhisattvas satisfy a beggar through giving, it is not definite that they at the time or immediately afterwards enjoy the happiness that is the fruit of their giving. Because non-bodhisattvas do not at once see the fruit of their giving, it even happens that [for this reason] they do not engage in giving. However, bodhisattvas, who bear in mind their promise to help all migrators in the long run and to achieve happiness for them temporarily, attain the fruit of their giving – a supreme joy – as soon as they see a beggar's satisfaction. Enjoying the fruits of giving, bodhisattvas take joy in giving at all times.

Bodhisattvas, when they give, experience joy due to the satisfaction of the beggar who received. The result of their giving occurs at the time of giving or immediately after. On the other hand, non-bodhisattvas do not experience the result of giving immediately, whereupon they may even stop engaging in generosity. Bodhisattva donors understand that there is happiness both immediately and in the long term and therefore they continually practice generosity.

Tuesday morning, 7 March 2000

The next outline in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) is:

3B1C-2A1B-3C2 Importance of discourse on giving for both the compassionate and the non-compassionate

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, in the manner which was explained:
>
> *Because…*
> giving is the cause of the high status and definite goodness of all...
>
> *the merciful and non-merciful,*
> *Therefore, only the discourse on giving is foremost.* [1.13cd]

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *For those merciful and those not so*
> *Only discourse on giving is therefore chief.* [13cd]
>
> Giving induces the happiness of high status and definite goodness in the way explained above for all whose nature is mercy – bodhisattvas – and for all who do not have a nature of mercy. Therefore, just discourse on giving is chief, that is to say, very important.
> Nagarjuna's *Friendly Letter* says:
>
> There is no better friend for the future
> Than giving – bestowing gifts properly
> On monks, brahmins, the poor, and friends – knowing
> Resources as evanescent and pithless.

Generosity is important for bodhisattvas and non-bodhisattvas in that it brings about the attainment of both high status and definite goodness. For this reason, Buddha taught generosity first among the perfections.

Nagarjuna mentions in his *Letter to a Friend* that resources are evanescent (literally, movable or fluctuating) and pithless (essenceless). This is because they can be destroyed by the animate, i.e., various kinds of beings, and the inanimate, the four elements and so forth. Knowing this, one should practice giving to monks, brahmins, the poor, and so forth. If one practices generosity properly one will have the necessary conditions to study and practice the Dharma in the future.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A1B-3C3 The joy attained by bodhisattvas when giving

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: when they satisfy the minds of those who seek by means of distributing resources, what kind of special joy is itself generated in bodhisattvas as a result of which they are devoted to giving at all times?
>
> That is expressed:
>
> *If happiness arises in a Conqueror's child from hearing*
> *And contemplating the term 'give,' whereas such happiness*
> *Is not produced in subduers due to abiding in peace,*
> *What need is there to mention by giving all away?* [1.14]
>
> When they first take to mind the very term 'give,' heard from those who seek [resources], having understood "they are begging from me", bliss arises in the bodhisattvas again and again. If that itself has greater eminence than even the bliss of nirvana, why mention [the bliss] of those who satisfy the beings who seek by giving away external and internal things.

Bodhisattvas on the first ground experience great joy from the practice of generosity; in fact just by hearing someone say the word "Give" they experience pleasure.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> QUESTION: When bodhisattvas satisfy beggars with enjoyments, what kind of joy is generated in them that causes their enthusiasm for giving?

ANSWER: Chandrakirti's root text says:

Whereas when a conqueror child hears and thinks
Of the word 'give', happiness arises,
The subduers abiding in peace have no [such] happiness.
What need is there to mention [the joy of] giving all? [1.14]

When a bodhisattva thinks of the meaning of the words heard from beggars saying, 'Give,' he thinks, 'They are begging from me,' and from this a happiness arises again and again in his mind. Such happiness is not generated in the subduer foe destroyers by abiding in the element of peace – nirvana. What need is there to mention that happiness surpassing this peace is generated by satisfying beggars through giving away all external and internal phenomena?

If the mind is captivated by the peace of nirvana, one forgets others' welfare. However, the captivation of a bodhisattva's mind by the happiness explained earlier causes him to strive even harder for the welfare of others; therefore, this is a different type of happiness.

First ground bodhisattvas experience joy merely from someone asking them to give. This joy is even greater than that of foe destroyers who abide in peace. Foe destroyers are captivated by peace and abide in it, whereby this acts as a hindrance to accomplishing the welfare of others in that they have no thought to practice generosity. On the contrary, although bodhisattvas are captivated by the joy of giving, it only enhances their practice of generosity.

The next outline in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) is:

3B1C-2A1B-3C4 Whether or not suffering occurs when a bodhisattva gives away his body

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If asked: does physical suffering not arise in bodhisattvas who give away external and internal things as a result of which, how could it be said [that they are devoted to giving at all times]?

Explanation: It is just impossible for physical suffering to arise in great beings (mahasattvas), like the cutting of mindless things.

As was taught in the *Exalted Meditative Stabilization of Gaganaganja* [*Sutra*]:[11]

> Like this: for example, there exists a grove of great *shala* trees. When someone comes there and cuts down one *shala*, the remaining *shala* trees do not think "It was cut down, we were not cut down", and they have no subsequent attachment or anger. They have no thought or conceptualization. The patience of the bodhisattva which is like that is supreme, fully purified patience, equal to space.

It is also taught in the *Precious Garland* [226]:

> He has no physical suffering, how could he have mental suffering? Through compassion he laments the world and he himself remains a long time.

Physical suffering undoubtedly arises in someone who has not attained a state without attachment, since objects contrary to sustaining the body duly befall it. However, at that time, it abides as the very cause of far more involvement in actions for the welfare of sentient beings.

This is explained, saying:

By giving away the severed body and by his suffering,
Having seen in his very cognition the suffering
Of the hells and so forth of others,
He quickly strives with diligence to eliminate it. [1.15]

[11] Poisson, p. 276, note 3, cites *Shikshasammucchaya*, p. 272, 5-8.

> With regard to those who are subjected to the unbearable migrations of hell, the animal rebirth states, the world of the Lord of Death and so forth, physically overcome by very fierce sufferings without pause, those who have unendurable suffering very much greater than a thousand times the suffering from cutting his own body, when a bodhisattva views as his very own suffering experience, he discounts the suffering of cutting his own body and very quickly strives with diligence in order to eliminate the sufferings of sentient beings, such as hell and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> QUESTION: Is physical suffering experienced by bodhisattvas who give away external and internal phenomena and who are said to generate wonderful happiness from any giving?
> ANSWER: If this question is asked in terms of great beings who have attained a ground, no physical suffering occurs, as is the case when mindless things are cut. T*he Questions of Gaganaganja Sutra (Gaganaganjapariprchchha)* says, 'It is this way: There is, for instance, a grove of great *shala* trees, and when someone enters it and cuts down a tree, the remaining trees do not become desirous or angry thinking, "It was cut down, not us." They have no thought or imagination. Such patience in a bodhisattva is the supreme thoroughly purified patience, equal to space.'
> Also Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (226) says:
>
> If his body does not suffer,
> How can he suffer in mind?
> Through great compassion he feels pain
> For the world and so stays in it long.
>
> Nagarjuna says this about those who have attained a ground.

Bodhisattvas who have not attained a ground experience physical suffering when giving away their body. However, since those who have attained a ground do not experience physical suffering, what need is there to mention that they do not experience mental suffering? Is it possible for a bodhisattva to actually cut off a part of his body? It is. Then why does he not experience suffering? Is it because he does not have suffering feeling? As an analogy, if one tree among a grove of trees is cut, the remaining trees do not think, "I was not cut." This is analogous to the lack of attachment and anger in a bodhisattva who has attained a ground; it occurs as a result of a lack of conceptuality. This example is easy to understand in that obviously trees do not have either feelings or conceptions. Are first ground bodhisattvas similar? Think about it.

Bodhisattvas who have not attained a ground do experience physical suffering when their bodies are cut. This is because their bodies are a contaminated suffering aggregate. Does this mean that the bodies of bodhisattvas who have attained a ground are not contaminated suffering aggregates? Previously it was said that when a bodhisattva attains the first ground he attains a body that is the nature of mind. Perhaps this is one possible explanation as to why they do not experience suffering.

Nagarjuna says: "Through great compassion he feels pain for the world and so stays in it long." Bodhisattvas abide in cyclic existence for a long time with great tolerance in order to benefit sentient beings. In the *Guru Puja,* with regard to the perfection of joyous effort it says: "Even if it is necessary to remain for an ocean of eons in the fire of Unceasing Torment for the sake of each sentient being, please bless me to complete the perfection of effort which, out of compassion, strives for supreme enlightenment without despondency."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> If the question is asked in terms of those who have not attained the Very Joyful Ground in which there is no attachment to body and resources, then physical suffering definitely does arise since

conditions contrary to sustaining the body befall it. However, suffering at that time only causes one to become more involved in the welfare of sentient beings. Chandrakirti's root text says:

> *Through his own suffering in cutting and giving*
> *Away his body, he sees with knowledge others' pain*
> *In hells and so forth, and strives quickly*
> *To eliminate their suffering.* [1.15]

A bodhisattva understands the frightful state of migrators such as hell-beings, animals, and hungry ghosts. He sees that physically they are overwhelmed with great suffering which is without a break and thousands of times more unbearable than that of mutilating his own body. Through his own suffering – not considering what he suffered when he cut his body and gave it to a beggar, but because of that painful experience – he very quickly begins striving to eliminate the sufferings of other sentient beings in the hells and so forth.

Bodhisattvas who have not achieved a ground experience suffering as a result of giving away their bodies, but this is not due to miserliness. The pain comes about due to the risk of dying. If the body of a bodhisattva who has not attained a ground is cut this acts a condition placing his life at risk. There is a right moment and a wrong moment for the practice of the generosity of giving away one's body and belongings. In the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment* by Lama Tsongkhapa it says that in terms of the practice of generosity one needs to know when to give, what to give and what not to give, and so forth. In general it is said that, for example, one should not give away rotten or poisonous food as this will not bring about benefit but only harm. One should also not give away weapons, such as guns, as this too will harm others. If, for example, one gives a gun to someone who then uses it to kill others there is harm to oneself, the killer, and those killed.

When the body of a bodhisattva who has not attained a ground is cut, although he experiences pain, he thinks that his pain is nothing compared to the sufferings of many other sentient beings whereby his practice is enhanced even more. Bodhisattvas, knowing that others suffer, exert themselves to practice generosity even more.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Nak-tso's translation of this stanza is:

> Through the suffering of cutting and giving away his body
> He views the pain of others in the hells and so forth,
> And from his own experience
> He strives to eliminate it.

My explanation depends on both translations.

If such power of thought is possessed, one can give away one's body. Since it is not contradictory for that thought to be present in bodhisattvas who have not attained a ground, it is said that they also give away their bodies.

Bodhisattvas who have not attained a ground can give away parts of their bodies as long as there is no risk to their lives. Even one who is not a bodhisattva can do this. However, to be able to do so one has to overcome miserliness, which is the cause of poverty in future lives. For this reason, both Chandrakirti and Lama Tsongkhapa advise us to practice generosity.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1B-3D Divisions of the perfection of giving

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

With regard to the giving which was explained, in order to indicate the classifications of the [giving] gone beyond, it is mentioned:

Giving, emptied by gift, recipient, and donor
Is called the supramundane gone beyond. [1.16ab]

There, what is 'beyond'? The far shore or bank of the ocean of samsara – buddhahood – which has the nature of having abandoned without exception the obscurations of delusions and objects of knowledge.

To reach beyond is called "gone beyond", [by] the rule which says "omission [of a syllable] is not made when a latter word exists." Since omission of the case of the object is not made, it is formed; or, because of being *prishodara* and so forth, it is left with the later ending itself.

It is explained in particular, having specified the wisdom, and since giving and so forth are similar to the [practices] gone beyond, they are [practices] gone beyond.

There are <u>two divisions of the perfection of generosity</u>: (1) supramundane generosity and (2) mundane generosity. Supramundane generosity is a generosity conjoined with the wisdom realizing the non-true existence of the three spheres: the object given, the donor, and the recipient.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Chandrakirti's root text says:

Giving void of gift, giver, and receiver
Is called a supramundane perfection. [1.16ab]

The giving of one whose thought to give away is conjoined with the uncontaminated wisdom empty of observing gift, giver, and receiver as truly existent is called a supramundane perfection. This is said in *The Great Perfection of Wisdom*.

The unapprehendable meditative equipoise of a superior is supramundane; therefore, giving conjoined with it is assigned as such a perfection. Giving that is not conjoined with this unapprehendability is mundane. The difference between them cannot be directly ascertained by those who have not attained an ultimate mind of enlightenment.

The two divisions of the perfection of generosity – the supramundane and mundane – cannot be directly ascertained by bodhisattvas who have not attained a ground. On the other hand, those who have attained a ground can ascertain the difference. These two divisions of the perfection of generosity are only asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas; the Svatantrika Madhyamikas and the Chittamatrins do not make this distinction in that they do not assert a mundane perfection of generosity. However, they do assert mere generosity.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the word 'perfection,' literally 'gone beyond' (*phar phyin*), can be applied to (1) the means of attaining a non-abiding nirvana and (2) the state of having gone beyond, omniscience or non-abiding nirvana. Because these are both 'perfections' or 'gone beyonds,' the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert both a supramundane and a mundane perfection of generosity. In this way, a mundane perfection of generosity is posited as the means to attain omniscience or non-abiding nirvana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

With respect to the term 'perfection' [or 'transcendence'], the beyond is the far shore or port of the ocean of cyclic existence – buddhahood, the state of having abandoned the two obstructions without remainder. 'Transcend' means go beyond.

> In his commentary Chandrakirti says, 'By the rule, "The elision does not take place before the second member of the compound," the case of the object is not elided and therefore is manifest. Or, because [the compound is classed with] *prishodara* and so forth, [which are exceptional compounds, the word *parama*] is left with just an *m* ending.' The pandit Jaya-ananda explains the meaning of this as follows: In the language of India [Sanskrit] *para* means 'the farther side', and *ita* means 'gone'. When these two words are compounded, the accusative singular *am* is added to *para*, and the nominative ending *su* is added after *ita*; then, *param-ita* is compounded as *paramita*. Even though *am* and *su* are to be elided, *su* is elided but *am* is not because of the rule in the root grammar, 'The elision does not take place before the second compound [in some situations].'
>
> Chandrakirti's reference to the 'case of the object' is to the accusative singular *am*. Since it is not elided, it is included in the final form of the term *paramita*. In [this case of] '*prishodara* and so forth' the word *parama* [is left] with an *m* ending. Because *parama* is said, [the rule of] non-elision is cited. The *a* of *ma* is erased, leaving *m* to which *i* is added, making *mita*. *Su* seems wrong as the nominative ending; thus, analysis is needed as to whether it should be *si*.

For example, we can look at the Sanskrit words *rup* (form) and *dhatu* [which when combined become *rupadhatu*]. There are eight cases of *rup* in relation to each of three, the singular, dual, and plural. Singular is, for example, one cup, dual a pair of cups, and the plural three or more cups, each of these being indicated by the addition of particular syllables. The word *dhatu* is in turn related to three levels of beings: inferior beings, middling beings, and superior beings. In short, when a compounded word is constructed, syllables may either be omitted or added to the original words.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "*Su* seems wrong as the nominative ending; thus, analysis is needed as to whether it should be *si*." The reason for mentioning *si* is that in Sanskrit this syllable indicates the first of the eight cases, the singular.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> There appear to be many explanations by Tibetans which are fabrications of darkness such as 'In the language of India "perfection" is *paramita* (*param ita*); the *anusvara* is placed in file, and it becomes *param-ita*. When it is compounded, the vowel sign of *i* [over *a* as it is written in Tibetan] is added to *m*, and *a* is erased leaving *mita*.' However, the pandit's explanation is that stated above.

"The pandit" here is Jayananda.

Tuesday afternoon, 7 March 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Through the distinction of thorough dedication, having posited as definite to go beyond, it will attain the name, giving gone beyond. Also, morality and so forth, to be explained, should be understood similarly.
>
> It was taught in the *Blessed Mother of the Wisdom Gone Beyond*:[12]
>
> > If this giving called "gone beyond" is separated from referring to the object to be given, the recipient, and the giver, it is a supramundane gone beyond because the non-referential [meditative equipoise] is supramundane [and] because the referential is just mundane since included in conventional truth. That cannot be understood by those who have not attained the bodhisattva state.

[12] Bhagavati Prajñaparamita.

A supramundane perfection of generosity is a generosity conjoined with the wisdom realizing the non-inherent existence of the three spheres, for example in the case of the perfection of generosity, the object to be given, the recipient, and the giver.

The remaining perfections are also of two types, supramundane and mundane. For example, a mundane perfection of ethics is ethics not conjoined with the wisdom realizing the non-inherent existence of the three spheres related to ethics. On the other hand, a supramundane perfection of ethics is ethics conjoined with the wisdom realizing the non-inherent existence of the three spheres related to ethics. This was taught by Buddha in the *Blessed Mother of the Wisdom Gone Beyond* (*Bhagavati Perfection of Wisdom)*. In this text it says: "because the non-referential [meditative equipoise] is supramundane [and] because the referential is just mundane since included in conventional truth." If, when ethics is practiced, the object is observed to be truly existent, it is a mundane perfection of ethics whereas if practiced without observing the object to truly exist, it is a supramundane perfection of ethics.

Supramundane and mundane perfections could be interpreted in terms of whether the object is a conventional truth or an ultimate truth, but this interpretation is incorrect. The correct interpretation is that whether it is supramundane or mundane depends on whether or not it is conjoined with the wisdom realizing the non-inherent existence of the three spheres.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) then says:

> These two lines in Chandrakirti's root text specify the wisdom cognizing the three spheres [of giver, gift, and receiver] to be unapprehendable [as inherently existent entities] and explain the specific perfection of giving which is conjoined with that wisdom. Giving and so forth that are not conjoined with this wisdom are similar to a perfection conjoined with wisdom and, therefore, are called 'perfections'. Although they are not conjoined with wisdom, they are conjoined with dedication to great enlightenment and, therefore, are posited as definite to go beyond. Thus, they gain the name of a perfection of giving.

When generosity is practiced without being conjoined with the wisdom realizing the non-inherent existence of the three spheres it is still called a perfection, or gone beyond, because it is dedicated to enlightenment and will thereby definitely bring about the actual perfection, omniscience. This is a case of giving the name of the result to the cause in that the generosity that is the means for attaining a non-abiding nirvana is also given the name "perfection." Chandrakirti said previously: "Through the distinction of thorough dedication, having posited as definite to go beyond, it will attain the name, giving gone beyond."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> When the meaning of 'perfection' is applied to the object – the beyond to which one goes – it refers to the buddhahood to which one progresses. When it is taken as the means by which one goes beyond, perfections occur even on paths of learning. Through this explanation of giving, it should be understood that ethics and so forth can be conjoined with an altruistic mind of enlightenment, dedication, and wisdom – individually and collectively.

If generosity and so forth are conjoined with all three, the mind of enlightenment, dedication, and wisdom, these would be the best forms of generosity and so forth. However, if they are only conjoined with one or two of the three, this is still good. Either way they can still be called perfections.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Furthermore:

> *That, through generating clinging to the three*
> *Is taught as the "mundane gone beyond."* [1.16cd]

If that very giving has reference to the three, it is mentioned as a mundane gone beyond.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> > *When attachment to these three is produced,*
> > *It is called a mundane perfection.* [1.16cd]
>
> Sutra teaches that giving is called a mundane perfection when one is bound through having generated attachment, which is an adherence to the true existence of the three spheres of giving.
>
> With respect to putting into practice now the features explained above, you should, through imagination, train in giving your own body to others and in the special ways of generating joy. You should continuously amass other forms of giving articles by giving away anything – from water on up – to lower and higher fields of giving. At that time your giving should be conjoined with the wisdom realizing the unapprehendability of the three spheres [as inherently existent]. Furthermore, you should again and again give away in thought your own body, resources, and roots of virtue for the sake of sentient beings. You should consider that even if you do not give these away, they will disintegrate; thereby, you will have to lose them, and thus it would be better to give them first through your own thought as if you were actually giving them. Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (III.10) says:
>
> > To accomplish all sentient beings'
> > Welfare, give away without regret
> > Body as well as resources and all
> > Virtues of past, present, and future.
>
> Also (III.11):
>
> > Through giving away all one passes beyond sorrow,
> > And one's intention is to achieve nirvana.
> > Similar to losing all [at death], the best
> > Is to give to sentient beings [now].

If the practice of generosity is done while conceiving the three spheres to be truly existent, it is a mundane perfection of generosity.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "You should, through imagination, train in giving your own body to others and in the special ways of generating joy." One should emulate the bodhisattvas and train in giving away one's body, resources, and roots of virtues. In addition, just as first ground bodhisattvas experience joy just by hearing the word "Give," we too should practice developing such joy in order to increase our practice of generosity.

There are different types of objects of our generosity, here referred to as "lower and higher fields of giving." The higher fields are the Three Jewels and so forth, while the lower fields are the poor and needy. We should practice giving both of them various kinds of objects, beginning even with water. Lama Tsongkhapa mentions offering water as one possibility because by merely offering water to the Three Jewels or to the thirsty, one can create merit. Atisha rejoiced in the practice of offering water, which was common in Tibet, as it is a practice of generosity that can be done free of miserliness. However, perhaps this is more difficult in the West, where one has to pay for water and where procuring good water may involve difficulties!

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "You should again and again give away in thought your own body, resources, and roots of virtue for the sake of sentient beings." Even though one does not actually give away all these things to sentient beings, one should practice doing so in thought. Even if one cannot give away one's body, since one day it will disintegrate, we should make use of it now by thinking to give it away. Otherwise, we will die regretting that we did not use this opportunity to practice generosity.

In short, generosity is very important and we should practice it right now. This is because presently we have favorable circumstances to do so, these being the results of our previous practice of generosity. In order to experience such favorable conditions again in the future we should engage in the practice of generosity now. We all know that without resources we become unable to do many things. For example, in order to study and practice we need resources. Due to having practiced generosity in the past we now have the material things we need to study and so forth. If we had not practiced generosity we would not have enough money for our rent, food, books, and so forth. If we want to avoid having such difficulties in the future we should create the causes for resources by practicing generosity in this life.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "You should consider that even if you do not give these away, they will disintegrate; therefore, you will have to lose them, and thus it would be better to give them first through your own thought as if you were actually giving them." Before one dies one should practice giving away one's body, resources, and roots of virtue. Shantideva likewise says: "To accomplish all sentient beings' welfare, give away without regret body as well as resources and all virtues of the past, present, and future." One can practice giving conjoined with the practice of "taking-and-giving" (*tong len*). When practicing giving we imagine giving away our body, resources, roots of virtue, and so forth to all sentient beings out of love, and when we practice taking, we imagine taking their sufferings upon ourselves out of compassion.

Shantideva also says: "Through giving away all, one passes beyond sorrow, and one's intention is to achieve nirvana. Similar to losing all [at death], the best is to give to sentient beings [now]." Since we will lose everything at death it is best to practice generosity toward other sentient beings right now.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A1C Conclusion by way of expressing the features of the first ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, in order to indicate the so-called 'ground' which was explained, by means of subsequently explaining the eminent qualities of the distinction of knowledge (wisdom), [the root text] mentions:
>
> *Firmly abiding thus in the mind of the Conqueror's child and*
> *Acquiring brilliant beauty in the holy support,*
> *The joyous one is like the water-crystal jewel:*
> *Victorious, having dispelled all darkness.* [1.17]
>
> The term *thus* is in order to indicate the aspects which were explained. Saying *the joyous one*, perfectly proclaims the name of the ground. Saying *victorious* means "having defeated discordancies, to abide."
>
> That [first ground] which is the nature of consciousness is abiding on high because of abiding in the mind of a Conqueror's child. The Extremely Joyous Ground, in the manner which was explained, dispels also all heavy darkness, becoming victorious. In order to clarify through an example, the very meaning which was explained, it is mentioned saying *like the water-crystal jewe*l.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti now sets forth the Very Joyful Ground, which was explained above, by summarizing the features of that ground as qualities of uncontaminated wisdom. His root text says:
>
> *Abiding thus in the mind of a child of a conqueror*
> *Beautifying with light this excellent base,*
> *The Joyful [Ground] like a water crystal jewel*
> *Destroys and overcomes all heavy darkness.* [1.17]
>
> The Very Joyful Ground abides like the orb of the moon – the water crystal jewel.
>
> The first ground is similar to the moon in three ways. One is its abiding in a high place. Because the first ground abides in the mind of a first grounder – a conqueror child who has attained the features of that ground as explained earlier – it abides on a high path and thereby is similar to the moon high up in the sky. Since the first ground is part of a bodhisattva's mind, it is said to abide in his mind, like an eye in the head.
>
> His mind – the excellent or superior base in which the ultimate mind of the first ground abides – is made beautiful by the light of wisdom; therefore, the first ground is similar to the moon beautifying the sky – its base – with white light. Also, because the first ground abides overcoming what is unfavorable to it – that which is to be abandoned through the path of seeing – it is like the moon destroying all heavy darkness.

The Very Joyful Ground is likened to the moon in three ways. The first way in which they are similar is that just as the moon abides high in the sky, likewise the Joyful abides in the continuum of a first ground bodhisattva who is on a high path. The second way in which they are similar is that just as the moon beautifies the sky, likewise the exalted wisdom of a first ground bodhisattva beautifies his continuum. The third way in which they are similar is that just as the moon dispels darkness, likewise the first ground dispels the objects of abandonment of the path of seeing.

Q: What is a water crystal jewel?
A: In the past there was a king in India called Nyecho Sangpo who owned a wish-fulfilling gem. One of his ministers once suggested to him that it was a waste to keep the wish-fulfilling gem unseen in his room whereas if he were to put it on an open shore it would shine in all directions, reminding the people of their king. The king thought this was a good idea and gave the minister the gem. However, instead of doing what he had suggested the minister hid the gem and placed large pieces of ice on the sand whereby the sun reflected off it sending out light. The minister pointed this out to the king who was delighted. However, with time the ice melted and the shine diminished. The king sent his minister to see what had happened and to bring back the gem. He returned with the news that the wish-fulfilling gem had urinated and disappeared! This story is well known and used in the monastery to give advice to others to not be like this king who was cheated by his minister.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> From the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way,"'* the First Mind Generation called 'Extremely Joyous.'

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Such is the explanation of the first ultimate mind generation in the *Illumination of the Thought, an Extensive Explanation of Chandrakirti's 'Supplement to the Middle Way.'*

This chapter on the first mind generation explains the three practices of ordinary beings and the Very Joyful Ground of bodhisattvas. In addition, the chapter sets out the qualities of the first ground, such as beautifying one's own continuum, outshining others, and so forth.

We too need to develop compassion, the awareness of non-duality, and the mind of enlightenment. The cultivation of these three is extremely important. This is because the root of cyclic existence is the conception of a self. Knowing this, one should examine whether this conception can be eliminated, and then, having understood that it can, one should develop the wisdom realizing selflessness. In this way one should generate the mind of enlightenment and enter the path of accumulation and so forth.

Wednesday morning, 8 March 2000

THE SECOND MIND GENERATION

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A2 Second ground, the Stainless

This section has five parts:

A Thorough purification of ethics on the second ground
B Praise of ethics
C Example of non-mixture with what is not conducive to ethics
D Divisions of the perfection of ethics
E Conclusion by way of expressing the features of the second ground

3B1C-2A2A Thorough purification of ethics on the second ground

This section has four parts,

1 Sublimity of ethics on the second ground
2 Thorough purification of features in dependence on ethics
3 Superiority of ethics on the second ground over the first ground
4 Another cause of the thorough purification of ethics

3B1C-2A2A-1 Sublimity of ethics on the second ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

The explanation of the bodhisattva's first mind generation is finished. Now, in terms of the second:

Because he has sublime morality and pure qualities,
Even in dreams, the stains of broken morality are forsaken. [2.1ab]

was mentioned.

Because all the distinctive knowledges (wisdoms) of the so-called grounds are the very same nature, the qualities which do not arise without that – such as morality gone beyond and so forth – by their mere excellences act to indicate the distinctions of the second mind generation and so forth.

'Morality' (Sanskrit: *shila*) [is so-called] because of coolness due to extinguishing the fire of mental discouragement, because not willingly assuming deluded [motivations], and because of not

> giving rise to negativities on that [ground], or due to merely being the cause of happiness, because of [being] the very object to be relied upon by the holy.
>
> In addition, it has the character of the seven abandonments. The three practices – non-attachment, non-hatred and right view – are the motivators. Therefore, in terms of morality together with motivators, it is thoroughly explained as ten paths of actions.

On the second ground the bodhisattva has sublime, or perfect, ethics in the sense that his ethics are pure. Because of this he does not have faulty ethics even in a dream. In other words, a bodhisattva does not engage in the seven negative actions of body and speech even in his dreams.

The definition of ground within the distinction of the two, paths and grounds is: a clear realizer engaged in a path that serves as the basis for the various excellent qualities that are its result. Ground, path, clear realizer, and exalted knower are mutually inclusive.

The exalted wisdom of the second ground is distinguished by the perfection of ethics.

In the autocommentary, it says that ethics is so-called due to one's not voluntarily accepting the afflictions, not giving rise to negativities, and extinguishing the fire of mental discouragement. The latter is in terms of the Sanskrit word for ethics being *shila,* which literally means coolness. In addition, ethics is the cause of happiness and is relied on by the holy.

Ethics has the character of the seven abandonments – the three abandonments of negative actions of body and the four abandonments of negative actions of speech. The vows of fully ordained monks are characterized by the seven abandonments, whereas the vows of novice monks and nuns and the lay vows are characterized by four abandonments. A fully ordained monk willingly accepts to abandon the seven negative actions of body and speech. The four root abandonments of novice monks and nuns and lay people are: the three of body – not killing, not stealing, and not engaging in sexual conduct or sexual misconduct – and one of speech, not lying. When the three non-virtuous paths of action of mind are added to these seven, there are a total of ten. The ten virtuous paths of action are the acts of refraining from these. The three virtuous paths of action of mind are non-attachment, non-hatred, and right view.

In Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge,* it says that the first seven actions of body and speech are both paths of actions and actions, whereas the last three of mind are paths of actions but not actions. The other schools would make a similar assertion. The Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that the abandonments of the first seven are form, whereas the remaining three of mind are their motivators.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> > *Because his ethics are sublime and have pure qualities,*
> > *He forsakes the stains of faulty ethics even while he dreams.* [2.1ab]
>
> Because one who abides on the second ground possesses very sublime ethics and pure qualities, he forsakes, or is not polluted by, the stains of faulty ethics not only when awake but also when dreaming.
>
> This does not refer merely to faulty ethics in the sense of root infractions and transgressions of natural codes but signifies that he has abandoned the stains of all faulty ethics, even those which are transgressions of formulated codes.
>
> [Having] 'proper ethics' (*shila*) means that one does not assume afflictions which motivate faulty ethics and that sinful actions discordant with formulated codes do not arise. Thereby, one has extinguished the fire of contrition for the arising of infractions discordant with formulated codes and has thus attained a coolness. The Sanskrit original of 'proper ethics' is *shila*. *Shila* means 'cool'; *lati* means 'attained'. Another explanation is that proper ethics (*shila*) is so called because, due to its

> being a cause of happiness, it is taught by the excellent. These are contextual etymologies [with letters added].
>
> From the viewpoint of its entity, proper ethics has the character of seven abandonments – abandoning the seven faulty modes of body and speech [killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, divisive talk, harsh speech, and senseless chatter]. The motivators of the seven abandonments are non-covetousness which is non-desire, non-harmfulness which is non-hatred, and right view which is freedom from wrong views. Therefore, in terms of its entities as well as its motivators, proper ethics is comprised of the ten abandonments – the paths of wholesome actions abandoning the ten paths of unwholesome actions.

The abandonment of the stains of faulty ethics includes not only the abandonment of root infractions (root downfalls) and transgressions of natural codes (natural infractions) but also the abandonment of the transgressions of formulated codes (formulated infractions). Natural infractions are faults incurred whether or not one has taken a vow and formulated infractions are faults incurred by breaking a vow or promise. Therefore, someone who commits an action but who has not taken a vow to abandon that particular action does not incur the fault of breaking a vow.

Killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, and lying are both root infractions and natural infractions. In the context of the individual liberation vows, divisive talk, harsh words, and idle talk are both simple lapses (the breaking or degenerating of a lesser type of vow) and natural infractions. Therefore, all seven negative actions of body and speech are natural infractions.

If one who has the individual liberation vows commits the actions of killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, or lying these are both root downfalls and natural infractions. If he commits one of the remaining three negative actions, he does not commit a root infraction but only creates a natural infraction. For example, if a fully ordained monk or a novice monk engages in divisive speech, he creates a natural infraction but not a root downfall. The same is true of speaking harsh words and engaging in idle talk. On the other hand, if a monk kills a human being, steals something owned by someone else, or engages in sexual conduct – the joining of the two organs resulting in pleasure – he also creates both a root downfall and a natural infraction.

Q: Why is the last a natural infraction?
A: He also engages in sexual misconduct.
Q: But if the woman is not married, etc. why is this sexual misconduct?
A: We will leave that aside for the moment.

Q: Are all root downfalls also natural infractions?
A: They are.

The ordained are permitted to transgress a formulated code by asking Buddha for permission to do so through a particular ritual ("remembering the time"). However, they must ask for permission for the sake of others' welfare or for a Dharma purpose and not merely for their own sake. For example, fully ordained monks are not permitted to make fire, sing, or play music but they can ask permission to do so for others' welfare or for a Dharma purpose. [In this way they will not transgress their vows by engaging in such actions.]

This explanation so far has been in terms of the vows of individual liberation, but in the context of the bodhisattva grounds the explanation must also be from the point of view of the bodhisattva vows. The

bodhisattva vows consist of eighteen root vows and forty-six secondary vows, as well as the seven abandonments of body and speech, which are also common to the individual liberation vows. The individual liberation vows are posited from the point of view of abstaining from the seven non-virtuous actions of body and speech. They do not include vows of mind in that many thoughts arise in the mind without one's control. On the other hand, one can restrain one's actions of body and speech. Bodhisattvas vows do, however, include restraints of mind. For example, among the eighteen root infractions there are those related to the mind, such as giving up the mind of enlightenment and giving up love for sentient beings. By breaking these, one commits a root infraction. These vows can be transgressed by the mind since they involve mental promises to avoid such actions; for example, the taking of the aspirational mind of enlightenment by means of ritual. The promise to abandon the four unwholesome, or black, deeds implies engagement in the four wholesome, or white, deeds. Giving up love for even one sentient being is included among the four black actions; if one does so one loses the aspirational mind of enlightenment taken by means of ritual.

Unlike the individual liberation vows and tantra vows, one is permitted to study the bodhisattva vows before receiving them.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: The Sanskrit original of "proper ethics" is *shila*. *Shila* means "cool;" *lati* means "attained." One of the Sanskrit vowels is *li,* which is divided into eight. The word *lati* is related to this. The short vowel *li* and the long vowel *li* are not used very often in Buddhist scriptures. On the other hand, the short vowel *ri* is often used, whereas the long vowel *ri* is not, although it is used often in Hindu philosophical texts; for example, the word *rishi* (sage).

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "From the viewpoint of its entity, proper ethics has the character of seven abandonments – abandoning the seven faulty modes of body and speech." The three faulty paths of actions of mind are covetousness, harmful intent, and wrong view. Covetousness is, for example, to see something in someone else's home and wish to have it. Harmful intent, or malice, is the thought to harm someone. Wrong view is to hold the law of actions and results to not exist and so forth. Freedom from covetousness, harmful intent, and wrong view are respectively non-attachment, non-hatred, and right view.

Q: In deep sleep one is without attachment but this is not said to be non-attachment. Is it enough to be free of covetousness and so forth to have non-attachment and so forth?
A: When one is in deep sleep both attachment and non-attachment are present but they are unmanifest. If Lama Tsongkhapa is discussing non-attachment, non-hatred, and right view in terms of the three roots of virtue, non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance, freedom from covetousness alone is not non-attachment and so forth. Attachment, hatred, and ignorance give rise to non-virtue. On the contrary, non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance give rise to virtue. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "non-covetousness which is non-desire, non-harmfulness which is non-hatred, and right view which is freedom from wrong views." [This would be better translated as: "non-desire which is non-covetousness, non-hatred which is non-harmfulness, and right view which is freedom from wrong views."] Since hatred is not pervaded by being harmful intent, the text says "non-hatred which is non-harmfulness."

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The paths of wholesome actions abandoning the ten paths of unwholesome actions." Literally this says "the paths of white actions" and "the ten paths of black actions." In general someone is said to be positive, or white, in terms of his acting in accordance with the rules whereas someone is said to be negative, or black, in terms of his not acting in accordance with the rules.

Wednesday afternoon, 8 March 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Sublime morality is fully developed morality. Very purified qualities are pure qualities, hence joining the words by saying "fully purified sublime morality." Because its qualities are fully purified, morality is highly distinguished. Because of possessing that, the bodhisattva is not polluted by the stains of broken morality even at the time of dreams.

The ethics in the continuum of a second ground bodhisattva are sublime. In addition, the qualities of this ground are fully purified. Faulty ethics is *duhshila* in Sanskrit, which translated literally is "suffering ethics" in that *duh* derives from *duhkha* (suffering). The reason that it is so-called is that faulty ethics lead to suffering.

Are natural infractions and formulated infractions pervaded by being faulty ethics? In other words, when a bodhisattva commits a natural or formulated infraction is the ethics in his continuum faulty ethics? If someone says that it is, one asks: "Is there not someone who is stained by fault, such as striking someone with a stick, yet has perfect ethics?" The answer is complex, but the conclusion is that the delineation of a fully ordained monk with pure ethics is that he is one who is unstained by any of the four defeats and is abstaining from natural infractions. This conclusion is reached because ordinary beings constantly commit faults. For example, one who has the bodhisattva vows is most likely stained by faults. Atisha said: "Faults regarding the bodhisattva vows and tantra vows shower down like rain, whereas the individual liberation vows can for the most part can be observed well. It would be good to train well in the bodhisattva vows."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A2A-2 Thorough purification of features in dependence on ethics

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: further, how do the qualities of the [bodhisattva] become completely purified [through] sublime morality like that?
>
> *Since movements of body, speech and mind are pure,*
> *He accumulates the ten paths of holy actions.* [2.1cd]

When one's actions of body, speech, and mind are pure one's ethics become pure.

> As was taught in the *Second Bodhisattva Ground* [of the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:
>
> > O children of the Conqueror, the bodhisattva who abides on the Stainless Ground of the bodhisattva has naturally abandoned killing. Having abandoned clubs, abandoned weapons, abandoned resentment – since possessing abstention and having engaged in compassion he has a beneficial, happy, merciful and loving mind toward all animate beings and spirits. If he does not produce harmfulness to animate beings even through mere imagination, leave alone mentioning recognizing sentient beings as sentient beings and purposely enacting evil deeds physically.

The second ground bodhisattva naturally refrains from killing. Buddha says that this is because this bodhisattva has "abandoned clubs, abandoned weapons, abandoned resentment." Saying that he has

"abandoned clubs" means that he does not touch clubs. In addition, he has abandoned other weapons and resentment. On the other hand, if one has resentment one waits for an opportunity to harm others.

The quotation from the *Second Bodhisattva Ground* in Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues:

> He has abandoned taking without being given. Since satisfied with his own resources and having mercy, as he cares for others' resources, if he recognizes those things fully owned by others as owned by others and having given up the mind to steal, does not take what is not given even so much as mere grass and leaves, leave alone mentioning other articles of livelihood.

The second ground bodhisattva has naturally abandoned stealing "since satisfied with his own resources and having mercy." Since this bodhisattva is satisfied with his own resources, he does not think to take others' belongings. In addition, the second ground bodhisattva has mercy and care for others, therefore he refrains from harming them by taking their belongings. Such a bodhisattva gives up "the mind to steal, does not take what is not given, even so much as mere grass and leaves, leave alone mentioning other articles of livelihood." "Other articles of livelihood" include bedding, food, and so forth.

The quotation from the *Second Bodhisattva Ground* in Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues:

> He has abandoned sexual misconduct with regard to desire. Since he is satisfied with his own wife and is without desire for others' wives, he does not generate even a thought longing for women owned by others, others' wives and those protected by family, sex, and Dharma, leave alone mentioning revealing which is not a limb or the meeting of the two organs of a couple.

Buddha taught this in relation to male bodhisattvas, but it can be adapted also to female bodhisattvas, saying "since she is satisfied with her own husband" and so forth. Most people tend not to be satisfied with their husbands or wives and seek to change them; second ground bodhisattvas do not do this. These bodhisattvas clearly recognize the wives of others as the wives of others and so forth. "Those protected by family" could refer to those who are cared for by their parents (however, it could perhaps more correctly be translated as "protected by a blood relationship"). Protected by sex (perhaps 'gender' in that it is literally 'mark') could mean to be protected by those of the same gender. Protected by Dharma refers to those who have vows. Second ground bodhisattvas have no mind of attachment toward such men or women.

The quotation from the *Second Bodhisattva Ground* in Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues:

> He has abandoned speaking falsely (lying). In speaking truly and speaking justly, he speaks at the [proper] time, acting in accordance with what was said. If even so much as in dreams he does not speak false words with the thought of deceiving through changing [others'] views, patience, desires, and thorough understanding, leave alone mentioning speaking [falsehoods] purposely.

Lying is expressing words motivated by the desire to deceive others. Second ground bodhisattvas abandon lying and instead speak truly and justly. In short, these bodhisattvas speak the truth, speak

justly, and speak at the proper time. They also act in accordance with what they say. These bodhisattvas do not speak false words even in a dream, therefore what need is there to mention that they do not do so when awake? For example, since such bodhisattvas do not try to change others' views through speaking false words even in a dream, what need is there to mention that they do not do so when awake?

The quotation from the *Second Bodhisattva Ground* in Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues:

> He has abandoned divisive words. Since not creating disunity among sentient beings and engaged in non-harmfulness, having heard from this side, it is not told to the other side in order to divide them; and having heard from the other side, it is not told to this side in order to divide them. If not disuniting those reconciled and not further separating those divided, he does not speak words which are to make discord, either truly or falsely, being glad about discord and appreciative about discord.

"Divisive words" involves dividing two or more people by, for example, further dividing those who are already divided or dividing those who are not divided through talking to one person and then repeating his words to the other else and then vice versa with the intention to create disharmony.

Q: Sometimes, as skillful means, bodhisattvas do not tell the truth. For example, when asked whether or not they are bodhisattvas they might reply that they are not. Could Geshe-la please explain this?
A: From the point of view of vinaya, saying that one has high qualities that one does not have is "lying about supreme attainments," which is one of the four defeats. However, if one does have such qualities as having realized the right view, having achieved clairvoyance, and so forth then, from the point of view of vinaya, a monk is not permitted to say that he has such qualities. If a monk says that he has these qualities, even though he speaks truly he commits one of the ninety simple offenses.

If a fully ordained monk speaks divisive words, this too is a simple offense, whereas if a novice monk does so it is a ?fault of concordant class/fault to be abstained from. In sutra there is a story about a lioness and a tigress who lived together harmoniously until they became pregnant. Having given birth to their cubs, they continued to live together harmoniously. One day, one of the mothers died and the other found herself having to take care of the others' cub but, soon afterward, she too died. However, there continued to be harmony between the two cubs until one day a hyena said to the lion cub that the tiger cub was planning to kill him, and then said to the tiger cub that the lion cub was planning to kill him. Due to this, they began to suspect each other and their relationship began to change until they actually came to believe that it was true. One day while fighting in the cave where they were living, they rolled off a cliff together and were killed. Based on this event, the Buddha formulated the vow to refrain from divisive speech.

Thursday morning, 9 March 2000

The quotation from the *Second Bodhisattva Ground* in Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues:

> He has abandoned harsh words. Types of words that threaten, abuse, harm others, expose others' faults, are words of country people, express directly and endeavor to express directly vulgarities, are falsities, unpleasant to the ear, arisen from anger and abuse, and offensive, since disagreeable they produce grief in the heart, produce torment, and make the continuum of ones' own consciousness and the continua of others' consciousnesses unworkable – like that are abandoned.

Harsh words are, for example, those that threaten and abuse. To threaten is to intimidate others with one's words. Abuse is similar. Since threats and abuse also harm others perhaps the subsequent term "harm others" refers to other types of bad words that cause harm to others. To "expose others' faults" is to indicate others' faults. "Words of country people" refers to [the uneducated] way of speaking of country people. Harsh words also involves speaking "vulgarities." Speaking words that "are falsities, unpleasant to the ear" also makes other people unhappy. "Arisen from anger and abuse" means, for example, to shout at others out of anger. "Since disagreeable they produce grief in the heart" means that disagreeable words cause suffering in others' minds. "Produce torment, and make the continuum of ones' own consciousness and the continua of others' consciousnesses unworkable" means that harsh words make one's own and others' minds unserviceable or unruly. Having explained the kind of speech that harms others, the Buddha then explains the kind of speech that bodhisattvas use to please others:

> The types of words which [are]: tender, soft, agreeable, not false, pleasant to the ear, dear to the heart, dear to the hearts of city dwellers and crowds, agreeable to the minds of crowds, producing joyous mind, producing satisfied mind, and producing clarity in ones' own conscious continuum and the conscious continua of others – like that are expressed.

We too should speak like this, as this will make others happy and will not make them unhappy.

The quotation from the *Second Bodhisattva Ground* in Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues:

> He has abandoned senseless words. He speaks words which give proper answers and at the [proper] time, speaks justly, speaks meaningfully, speaks the Dharma, speaks suitably, speaks to subdue, speaks patiently, and speaks timely along with inquiring. If he completely abandons even as much as the objects of complete abandonment of making jokes, leave alone mentioning distracting through words.

Buddha says that when bodhisattvas are asked a question they answer it properly. Bodhisattvas also speak at the proper time and speak justly or correctly; they speak meaningfully and only with a purpose; they speak about the holy Dharma; they speak suitably. They also speak to tame others' minds by speaking slowly and softly. Bodhisattvas speak patiently to others without agitation. They speak in a timely way and ask questions. Bodhisattvas do not make jokes (that which causes laughter), so what need is there to mention that they do not distract others through their speech?

Vasubandhu says that senseless words, or idle talk, is speech motivated by afflictions.

This concludes the four non-virtuous actions of speech. The Buddha then sets forth the three of mind.

The quotation from the *Second Bodhisattva Ground* in Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues:

> He is also without covetous mind. With regard to the wealth of others, the desires of others, the substances of others, and articles fully owned by others, he does not generate a covetous mind, does not cling, does not wish for – he does not generate the mind of attachment.

Covetousness is a mind attached to that which is possessed by others.

The quotation from the *Second Bodhisattva Ground* in Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues:

> He is without harmful mind (malice). Since having toward all sentient beings the mind of love, mind of benefit, mind of compassion, happy mind, soft mind, and the mind which benefits all beings; having abandoned anger, resentment, hatred, defilement, harmful mind, and those which precede anger – those which have love are realized.

Bodhisattvas have a mind of love toward others and are free of harmful mind, or malice. They have abandoned all types of harmful minds toward sentient beings, such as anger, resentment, and so forth, and think only to benefit others. We too should abandon the mind of harm and develop the mind of love.

The quotation from the *Second Bodhisattva Ground* in Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues:

> He has also abandoned wrong view. He abides on the right path, with right view, and is separated from having the views of virtuous signs, various kinds of auspiciousness, and of bad morality. Since his view is honest and without dissimulation – without deceit, he is definite to think about Buddha, Dharma and Sangha.

Wrong views are, for example, to hold that the law of actions and results does not exist. Right view is, for example, to hold the opposite, i.e., that from non-virtue arises suffering and from virtue arises happiness. Mundane right view is this correct understanding. Supramundane right view is the realization that phenomena are empty of true existence.

The quotation from the *Second Bodhisattva Ground* in Chandrakirti's autocommentary concludes:

> There, the first three paths of virtuous actions are completed by body, the middle four by speech, and the last three by mind. Hence [he] accumulates also all ten paths of virtuous actions.

Like these bodhisattvas, we too should abandon the ten non-virtuous paths of actions and practice the ten virtuous paths of actions that are relied on by the holy.

In this regard Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> QUESTION: How do a bodhisattva's qualities become pure through the sublimity of his ethics?
> ANSWER: Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *Because his movements of body, speech, and mind are pure,*
> *He accumulates all ten paths of excellent deeds.* [2.1cd]
>
> On all occasions of waking and dreaming his movements or activities of body, speech, and mind are pure of even subtle infractions; therefore, he accumulates all ten paths of excellent or supreme deeds. His accumulation of these means that he fulfills the first three paths of virtuous actions – abandoning killing, stealing, and sexual misconduct – with his body; the middle four – abandoning lying, divisive talk, harsh speech, and senseless chatter – with his speech; and the last three – abandoning covetousness, harmful intent, and wrong views – with his mind. Not only does he refrain from what is prohibited but also he fulfills all the positive achievements related to proper ethics.

Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary here is quite brief in that it merely explains Chandrakirti's root text. In relation to these paragraphs in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds,* one text, in connection with the confession of downfalls, says: "Actions of body are three, speech three, and mind three. I individually confess the ten non-virtues."

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Not only does he refrain from what is prohibited but also he fulfills all the positive achievements related to proper ethics." This more literally refers to what is prohibited (*dgag bces*) and what is prescribed (*drub bces*). That which is prohibited for the ordained is, for example, killing, stealing, digging in earth in which there are many creatures, and so forth. That which is prescribed for the ordained is, for example, to perform the restoring and purifying ritual (*so jong*) twice a month. Within the bodhisattvas vows there are also prohibitions and prescriptions. For example, one prohibition among the bodhisattva vows it to praise oneself and belittle others. On the other hand, when someone with the bodhisattva vows uses clothes, food, and so forth there is the prescription to do so with the thought to benefit other sentient beings. Also in regard to the tantra vows there are prohibitions and prescriptions, an example of the latter being to make mandala offerings three times a day.

However, there is debate as to whether these also exist in the context of sutra. There is a story about Geshe Khenrab Tobgye from Ganden Jangtse Monastery, who used to live in Canada. When taking the geshe lharam exam, he found himself in the position of the defendant with Geshe Tsultrim Gyatso in the position of the challenger. Geshe Tsultrim Gyatso began the debate by saying to him: "I will make a mandala offering to you," this being mentioned in *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*. He then said: "When offering a mandala does one not offer one's body, resources, and roots of virtue, the four continents, sun, and moon on the base?" Geshe Khenrab Tobgye accepted this. Geshe Tsultrim Gyatso said: "Then they have already been offered?" Geshe Khenrab Tobgye replied: "They are." Geshe Tsultrim Gyatso said: "Are they already dedicated to the Three Jewels?" Geshe Khenrab Tobgye replied: "They are." Geshe Tsultrim Gyatso said: "In that case the four continents and so forth, one's body, resources, and roots of virtues already belong to others?" Geshe Khenrab Tobgye replied: "They do." Geshe Tsultrim Gyatso said: "Having made offerings of all your belongings if you use them are you not using that which belongs to others? If you have the intention to take them you are stealing. If you do not intend to take them then you create the downfall which is related to an object that has been dedicated to others." Geshe Khenrab Tobgye found it difficult to answer. One should reflect on this. We can think that since we work for the Three Jewels we are permitted to use their belongings. However, we should do so only with the thought to benefit other sentient beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A2A-3 Superiority of ethics on the second ground over the first ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If asked: are these ten paths of action not accumulated by the bodhisattva who generated the initial mind?

Indeed he also accumulated them, however:

These paths of virtue, also the ten together,
Having become surpassing on that, they become extremely pure. [2.2ab]

For the bodhisattva [who] generated the initial mind, it is not like that.

Like the autumn moon, always completely pure,
Peace and brilliance – he is beautified by them. [2.2cd]

Peace is to restrain the sense faculties. Brilliance is having a glittering clear body.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> QUESTION: Does a first ground bodhisattva not accumulate all ten of these paths of actions?
> ANSWER: Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *For him these ten paths of virtue,*
> *Perfected, are extremely pure.* [2.2ab]
>
> A first grounder does accumulate all these, but for a second grounder these ten paths of virtuous actions are perfected and become extremely pure. This does not occur for a first grounder.
>
> The teaching that giving is surpassing on the first ground indicates that bodhisattvas remain in possession of it on the higher ground. It is said that ethics is surpassing on the second ground because from among the nine remaining perfections a bodhisattva does not have the measure of perfect practice – which he has with respect to ethics – in relation to patience and so forth. Thus, this does not mean that he does not have the remaining perfections.
>
> The ten virtues are mentioned to illustrate the formulations of ethics based on them, and the bodhisattva maintains all those of proper ethics.
>
> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *Like an autumn moon he is always pure,*
> *Beautified by them, serene and radiant.* [2.2cd]
>
> One whose ethics are so pure is like an autumn moon that extinguishes the pain of heat and abides glittering with white light. Just so, one always abiding in pure ethics has the serenity of having restrained the doors of the senses and has the radiance of a glitteringly clear body, and thus he is beautified by his ethics.

Although first ground bodhisattvas do accumulate the ten virtues and safeguard ethics, the ethics of second ground bodhisattvas are superior. Second ground bodhisattvas are said to have a surpassing practice of ethics whereby they are free from faulty ethics. They also have a surpassing practice of generosity, which was attained on the first ground. Therefore, when bodhisattvas attain the third ground, in addition to the previous two surpassing practices, they also have the surpassing perfection of tolerance.

Although the safeguarding of ethics by second ground bodhisattvas is surpassing, the remaining perfections, that of tolerance and so forth, are not surpassing perfections.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that all ten perfections exist on the learner paths, whereas the Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that they do not. Instead, they assert that the *surpassing* practices of the ten – the means to attain the actual perfections – exist on the learner paths, whereas the actual perfections do not.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The ten virtues are mentioned to illustrate the formulations of ethics based on them, and the bodhisattva maintains all those of proper ethics." The ten virtues mentioned in Chandrakirti's root text in the passage "For him these ten paths of virtue, perfected, are extremely pure" illustrate the formulated ethics that are based on them. In other words, the ten virtues are the bases of the prohibitions and prescriptions.

Due to restraining their sense powers, the bodhisattvas are peaceful or serene (previously the Sanskrit word *shila* for ethics was said to mean coolness). Likewise, if we restrain the doors of our senses we too experience peace; otherwise we will not. In the Vinaya, it says that a fully ordained monk with ethics has a glowing complexion. The Tibetan nomads say: "Around the dwelling of a fully ordained monk there is the sweet smell of ethics."

We ourselves should refrain from committing the ten non-virtues and should engage in the ten virtues. Although no one orders us to do so, we should order ourselves to do so as in this way we will not feel uncomfortable, which tends to happen with orders coming from outside. We should control

our own minds. If one is not able to tame one's own mind, it will not be possible to tame others' continua. Atisha said that since it is difficult to tame others' continua without taming one's own continuum, one should begin by taming one's own mind.

Thursday afternoon, 9 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A2A-4 Another cause of the thorough purification of ethics

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Although morality is fully purified like that:

If he views a nature [in] pure morality,
Thereby, it will not become pure morality. [2.3ab]

As taught in the *Exalted Pile of Jewels Sutra*:[13]

> Kashyapa, regarding this, some *bhikshus* possess morality. Bound and abiding by the vows of individual liberation (*pratimoksha*), [with] excellent rites and spheres of activity, they view apprehensively even very subtle transgressions. Having correctly assumed [them], they train in the bases of training and since they possess fully purified actions of body, speech, and mind, their livelihood is fully purified. However, they propound a self. Kashyapa, they are the first of the artificial ones, breaking morality [yet] seeming to have morality.

From [there] until:

> Kashyapa, furthermore, regarding this, although some bhikshus correctly assume the twelve qualities of ascetic training, they view a referent. Abiding in grasping to I and grasping to mine, they, Kashyapa, are the fourth of the artificial ones, breaking morality [yet] seeming to possess morality.

Therefore, he always will be perfectly separated from
The dualistic intellect's wandering toward the three. [2.3cd]

Toward the three: the sentient beings with respect to whom one produces abandonment, that [antidote] producing [abandonment], and [the agent] who produces [abandonment], they will be separated from dualistic intellects such as things and non-things and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Chandrakirti's root text says:

If he views his ethics as inherently pure,
Then their purity will not be complete. [2.3ab]

Some monks engage in very pure ethics based on [vows of] individual emancipation. However, if they do not abandon the view that phenomena inherently exist, then their ethics will not be pure but will be faulty though apparently proper. The *Pile of Jewels Sutra* says:

> Kashyapa, some monks have proper ethics; they abide restrained by vows of individual emancipation. Their rites and spheres of activity are perfect, and they view even coarse and subtle transgressions with concern. They thoroughly assume and train in

[13] Poisson, p. 286, note 1, cites *Shikshasammucchaya*, 52.12 etc.

> the precepts and possess pure activities of body, speech, and mind. Hence their livelihood is thoroughly pure, but they propound a self. Kashyapa, they are the first of those seeming to have proper ethics which in fact are faulty....
>
> Furthermore, Kashyapa, even though some monks thoroughly assume the twelve qualities of training, they view them with apprehension [of inherent existence]. Abiding in the conceptions of 'I' and 'mine', Kashyapa, they are the fourth of those whose ethics appear to be proper but are faulty.

There are fully ordained monks (bhikshus) who abide in the tenets of the Vaibhashika and Sautrantika schools. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, if these monks view phenomena to exist inherently they do not have pure ethics. This is from the point of view of philosophy but in general a monk who keeps his 254 vows purely has pure ethics. There is debate regarding this involving the examples of Shilarakshita/Dharmarakshita (a Vaibhashika), Suvarnadvipa (a Chittamatrin), and Ratnakarashanti (a Chittamatrin) who, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, would not be pure monks in that they view phenomena to exist inherently. The Prasangika Madhyamikas would have to respond to this saying that only Prasangika Madhyamikas have pure vows.

One can ask: "Is the conception of true existence faulty ethics?" This question can be asked in that here it says that a fully ordained monk's ethics are faulty because he views phenomena to exist inherently. The Prasangika Madhyamikas would have to answer this question by saying that the conception of true existence is faulty ethics in relation to the bodhisattva vows but not in relation to the individual liberation vows. Then one could ask: "Is there no Chittamatrin with pure bodhisattva vows?" To this the answer would have to be: "If it is a Chittamatra it follows that he is pervaded by having a root infraction of the bodhisattva vows."

"They propound a self" means that they propound a truly existent self. Because of this, the ethics of such fully ordained monks are said to be faulty. Although such monks appear to have pure ethics, in fact they have faulty ethics. Here Chandrakirti only quotes the sutra regarding the first and fourth of the types of monks who appear to have pure ethics but do not. In relation to the fourth type, the Buddha says to Kashyapa that although there are monks who train well in the twelve qualities of training, if they view 'I' and 'mine' to be truly existent, although they appear to have pure ethics, in fact they have faulty ethics. The twelve excellent qualities of training are: (1) three in relation to food, (2) three in relation to clothing, and (3) three in relation to the dwelling, and (4) and three in relation to the seat. The three in relation to food are:
(i) to eat food obtained by begging,
(ii) to eat one's meal on one seat without taking a second helping (this would be a simple lapse in relation to the vows of fully ordained monks), and
(iii) to not take food again, which means to not go for alms a second time.
The three in relation to clothing are:
(i) to possess the three Dharma robes,
(ii) to wear clothes made of wool, and
(iii) to wear clothes found in cemeteries or those that have been discarded by others.
The three in relation to the dwelling are:
(i) to dwell in isolated places,
(ii) to dwell near, i.e., under, a tree,
(iii) to dwell between walls without a roof,
The three in relation to the seat are:
(i) to abide in cemeteries,
(ii) to abide sitting upright (this being further divided into superior – not leaning in any direction; middling – leaning either to the left or right; and inferior – leaning to either side and to the back, and
(iii) to be content with a cushion made of leaves or grass.

The point of these trainings is to live having few desires and more satisfaction. These can be condensed into the four types of arya lineages, which are set out by Vasubandhu in *Treasury of Knowledge* as: (1) aryas who are satisfied with mediocre Dharma robes, (2) aryas who are satisfied with mediocre food attained from begging, (3) aryas who are satisfied with mediocre housing and bedding, and (4) aryas who enjoy the abandonments and meditation. We too should practice being satisfied with our food, housing, bedding and so forth by training ourselves in this.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "they view them with the apprehension [of inherent existence]. Abiding in the conceptions of 'I' and 'mine.'" Viewing 'I' and 'mine' as inherently existent is the view of the transitory collection. Do such monks have pure or faulty ethics? According to this sutra they have faulty ethics. It would follow that second ground bodhisattvas also have faulty ethics due to having the view of the transitory collection that conceives the 'I' and 'mine' to exist inherently. The view of the transitory collection is present through the seventh ground. Perhaps it can be said that they have a conception of 'I' and 'mine,' but do not abide in this conception.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 'Propound a self' means viewing with apprehension [of inherent existence]. This is indicated by the fact that they abide in the conceptions of 'I' and 'mine', the meaning of which should not be understood as referring to the common false view of the transitory collection but as not having abandoned the [subtle] conception that 'I' and 'mine' exist by way of their own nature.

"Propound a self" does not refer to the common view of the transitory collection, which is to view the person as self-sufficient substantially existent. There are two types of views of the transitory collection: (1) that common to the lower schools and (2) that uncommon to the Prasangika Madhyamikas. The common view of the transitory collection is the view of a self-sufficient substantially existent person, whereas the uncommon view is to view the 'I' and 'mine' as existing inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The word 'he' in the first line of stanza twenty cannot refer to the bodhisattva mentioned in stanza nineteen; therefore, Nak-tso translated these two lines this way:
>
> If he viewed his ethics as inherently pure
> Then his ethics would be faulty.
>
> His translation as 'then' [the hypothetical] is good [since a bodhisattva superior would never make this error].
>
> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *Thus he always forsakes completely the wandering*
> *Of the dualistic intellect toward the three.* [2.3cd]
>
> If the view apprehending [inherent existence] is not abandoned, ethics are not pure. Thus, a second grounder always completely forsakes, or frees himself from, the wanderings of the dualistic intellect that views as inherently existent dualistic phenomena such as things and non-things. Here the view of inherent existence is forsaken with respect to the three – the sentient being with respect to whom faulty ethics are abandoned, the antidote used to abandon them, and the agent of abandonment.

This is an assertion of the Prasangika Madhyamikas alone. It is sufficient for a fully ordained monk to be in the process of becoming free from the dualistic intellect that views phenomena as inherently existent; it is not necessary that he has actually *become* free from it in order to have pure ethics, as

otherwise almost all monks would have faulty ethics since most of them view phenomena as inherently existent.

Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen, in *General Meaning* (page 163) says:

> Our own tradition: The meaning of the scriptural reference is that if it is a person viewing the three spheres of ethics as inherently existent, he is pervaded by not possessing the supramundane perfection of ethics. Therefore, second ground bodhisattvas, as the subject, are not persons viewing the three spheres of ethics as inherently existent because they are bodhisattvas abiding in the attainment of the supramundane perfection of ethics.

Someone who views the three spheres of ethics as inherently existent does not have a supramundane perfection of ethics but can still have a perfection of ethics. Therefore, he can have pure vows of ethics.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A2B Praise of ethics
>
> This section has five parts:
> 1 Enjoying the fruits of giving in a happy migration depends on ethics
> 2 Enjoying the fruits of giving in continuous lives depends on ethics
> 3 Liberation from bad migrations is extremely difficult for one bereft of ethics
> 4 Reason for discoursing on ethics after discoursing on giving
> 5 Praising ethics as a cause of both high status and definite goodness
>
> 3B1C-2A2B-1 Enjoying the fruits of giving in a happy migration depends on ethics

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (page 27) says:

> Thus, for a short while having expressed bodhisattvas as having excellent morality, after that, in order to indicate [it] as far greater than the excellent morality of the others in general, besides generosity and so forth, and being the support of all excellent qualities:
>
> *Resources from giving arise also in bad migrations*
> *Through defective legs of a being's morality.* [2.4ab]
>
> was mentioned.
>
> For the patron having morality, from just that giving excellent resources arise which are highly distinguished among gods and men. Through separating from the legs of morality, they themselves fall into the migrations of the bad migrations, born as an occasional sentient being of hell, an ox, horse, elephant, monkey, *naga*, and so forth, or preta (hungry ghost) possessing great magical emanations and so forth. For them, there will arise only the various excellent resources.

For someone who practices generosity but does not safeguard ethics, the result of generosity will ripen in a bad migration instead of being experienced in a higher realm. This occurs due to having broken the legs of ethics. Therefore, one should avoid breaking the legs of ethics whereupon one will enjoy the result of previous generosity in the happy migrations. For this reason it is important to practice generosity while safeguarding ethics.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Having said that the bodhisattva's ethics are perfect, Chandrakirti shows that although in general those of others [such as hearers] can be perfect, the features of a bodhisattva's ethics are far

greater than those of giving and so forth and serve as the base of all marvelous qualities. His root text says:

> *The arising in bad migrations of resources from giving*
> *Is due to a being's losing his legs of ethics.* [2.4ab]

From gifts given by donors with good ethics, special marvelous resources will arise during their lives as gods and humans. The arising of various marvelous resources in a birth in a bad migration, such as a being in a trifling hell or an ox, horse, elephant, monkey, naga, or a hungry ghost with great magical powers, is due to that being's having lost or been separated from his legs of ethics [that would have taken him to a good migration].

This indicates that if you lack proper ethics, the resources that are the fruit of giving will mature not in a happy migration but in a bad one. Since maturation of the effects of giving on the base of a happy migration is needed, a donor of gifts as explained above should – if he wants a happy migration – keep proper ethics.

Likewise, Lama Tsongkhapa says that if one practices generosity but does not safeguard one's ethics, one will be reborn in the bad migrations as a hell being, an animal, or a hungry ghost. There is no debate in relation to the fact that there exist animals, for example, some domestic animals, who receive plentiful food and drink, adequate shelter, (perhaps even clothing!) and so forth from their owners. This is the result of generosity in a previous life. However, there is debate regarding the maturation of the result of generosity in the hell realms in relation to how hell beings can experience the result of generosity. The conclusion is that there are occasional hells (trifling hells) in which during the day the beings experience the happiness of humans and gods but during the night experience the sufferings of hell, being forced to drink molten metals and so forth.

There are many stories about these occasional hells in sutra. For example, there is a story of merchants who traveled across the seas in search of jewels. In one house that they came across they asked the inhabitants to be permitted to stay and rest. Their request was accepted but they were warned not to stay there overnight as the situation would change. Being curious, they left as they had been advised but remained to watch from a certain distance to see what would happen. As night fell, the people in the house began to fight each other with many types of weapons. The merchants were astonished and, returning home, asked the Buddha why this had happened. The Buddha told them that this was the result of those peoples' actions when they were born at the time of Buddha Kashyapa, in that they had been monks who had played with their food, throwing it at each other and so forth.

Friday morning, 10 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A2B-2 Enjoying the fruits of giving in continuous lives depends on ethics

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore:
>
> *If interest along with principal are fully exhausted,*
> *Hereafter, resources will not arise for him.* [2.4cd]
>
> There are some, who having sown very little seed, obtain the arisal of very great results and in order for another result, sow much more seed than that. It is possible to have a great collection of results without diminishing the sequence since increasing in accordance with the time (season).

> There are some, with methods which waste what was done, who thoroughly utilize even the former seeds through foolishness. Because of exhausting even the interest together with the principal, how could they view the generation of the excellent results which will arise?
>
> Similarly, because separated from morality, the extremely foolish thoroughly utilize resources incorrectly. Hence, because separated from a projection which did not formerly exist and because of thoroughly utilizing each and every former projection, thereafter, resources will not possibly arise.

Upon taking a new rebirth, one experiences the results of virtue created in a previous life. If one merely enjoys this result one will exhaust both the principal, the virtue, and the result, the interest. For example, if a large amount of seed is sown, the result will be many crops whereas if one sows few seeds, there will be little result. On the other hand, if one does not plant any seeds there will, of course, be no result. If one practices generosity in this life and then is reborn in a bad migration, one will merely exhaust the result of generosity without the opportunity to create more generosity. It is therefore important to not be separated from the practice of ethics.

Q: Is Chandrakirti not saying that by planting a few seeds one experiences a large result? It seems that Geshe-la said that from a small amount of seeds comes a small result and from a large amount of seeds comes a large result.
A: Chandrakirti says that by planting a small amount of seeds one will reap a large result. In order to continue having more crops the intelligent again plant more seeds; in this way they continue to reap a good harvest. On the other hand, if one plants seeds one season and then reaps the result but does not plant any more seeds the next season, the result will be exhausted. This is because the person merely enjoys the result of planting the previous seeds without preparing for the future. In general, if one plants few seeds one will have a little result, if one plants many seeds one will experience a great result, and if one does not plant any seeds one will not experience any result. Likewise, if one does a little bit of study one will not gain much knowledge, but if one studies continuously, one will gain many excellent qualities. Perhaps those with sharp faculties may study very little and learn quickly but the knowledge they gain is not very stable, easily diminishes, and does not improve very much. If one plants a small amount of seeds and reaps the result, it is important to plant some more as otherwise the result will merely be exhausted.

"Seed" here is an analogy for our virtues of generosity and so forth. What is this seed? It is a potentiality and can also be called a latency. If the Prasangika Madhyamikas are asked where these latencies are stored, they answer that they are deposited on the mere 'I' in one's own continuum or that they are deposited on the continuity of the consciousness. They say that there is no need to posit a separate consciousness on which they are stored such as a mind-basis-of-all, as do the Chittamatrins, or to posit that they are stored on the sixth mental consciousness, as do the Svatantrika Madhyamikas.

Here "seed" refers to virtues and in particular to the virtue of generosity. In order to ensure that one's generosity continues to increase, one must also practice ethics.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> If one lacks ethics, the fruits of giving ripen on the base of a bad migration. Merely enjoying the fruits of former giving on that base, one gives nothing newly due to extreme stupidity. Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *Having spent completely both principal and interest*
> *He will be without resources in the future.* [2.4cd]
>
> Since the principal as well as the interest is used, it is completely consumed. Once the fruits of former giving have been spent, that person will be without resources.

> For instance, someone who has gained much produce from planting a few seeds plants even more for the sake of increase, due to which his great stores are not exhausted. However, a fool merely enjoys his harvest instead of planting more seeds and thus does not continuously increase it.

Lama Tsongkhapa also says that from a small amount of seeds comes a large result and that in order to continue to reap a similar result in the future one must plant more seeds. A similar example is someone who puts some money in the bank and then over a period of time gradually withdraws it without adding any more money to the capital. In this way, one day his money will be exhausted and he may even end up owing money to the bank! This is similar to one who practices a small amount of generosity and then stops.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A2B-3 Liberation from bad migrations is extremely difficult for one bereft of ethics

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Not only is it very difficult to obtain complete arisal of resources with one separated from the legs of morality, but having gone to bad migrations rising again from bad migrations is extremely difficult to obtain. In order to indicate that:
>
> *When engaging independently and abiding agreeably,*
> *If one does not act to uphold oneself,*
> *By falling into the abyss one will engage controlled by others –*
> *Who will raise [him] from that later?* [2.5]
>
> was mentioned.
>
> At the time he is like a hero abiding in an agreeable place, liberated from bondage – engaging as desired without relying on others and abiding in the migrations of gods, humans and so forth – if one does not act to uphold himself, like having bound a hero and thrown him into a very great ravine – after having gone to bad migrations, who will take him out? Hence, because they act to harm, one is definitely in only bad migrations.
>
> Therefore, it is taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:
>
> > Then, even if born among humans, two maturations will be manifestly achieved.

One who has broken the legs of ethics but has practiced generosity, having been reborn in the bad migrations, will consume the result of generosity, resources. But, since this person is unable to practice generosity in the bad migration, the results will merely be exhausted and he will have difficulty rising to a higher realm again. The meaning of this is that if one does not use one's rebirth in a higher realm well it will be difficult to obtain such a rebirth again. It is like someone who, having been bound and thrown into a ravine, is completely under the control of others without any independence. This is likened to someone who has been thrown from a good rebirth to a bad rebirth. This is because when one is reborn in the bad migrations no one will be able to help one. Therefore, one should use this opportunity as a human being who has control to better oneself. In this way, one will continue to take good rebirths. On the other hand, if one creates the causes for rebirth in the bad migrations, one's virtuous practices of generosity and so forth will only diminish.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> It is extremely difficult for one whose legs of ethics are broken to attain continual increase of resources. Moreover this leads to bad migrations from which it is very hard to escape. Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *If when acting freely and living agreeably,*
> *He does not act to hold [himself back from falling down],*
> *He will fall into an abyss and lose control;*
> *How will he raise himself from there in the future?* [2.5]
>
> A person who abides in a divine or human migration acts freely according to his own wish. He does not depend on others, but like a hero free from bondage abides in an agreeable land. If he does not act to hold himself from falling into a bad migration, he will be like a hero bound and cast into a great ravine. Having fallen into the chasm of a bad migration, he will have no independence and will lose control. By what means will he raise himself from that state in the future? He cannot.
>
> It is extremely rare to achieve virtue during a bad migration, in which the accumulation of sins is extremely powerful; thus, one must continue in only bad migrations. A sutra says, 'Even if one is born among humans, this is an achievement of two maturations.' Thus, it is said that birth as a human is difficult [to attain].
>
> Therefore, from now on you must keep yourself from falling into a bad migration. You should know that this means striving in proper ethics.

The principal cause of not falling into the bad migrations is striving in proper ethics. Ethics mainly means the mind of abandonment of physical and verbal misconduct. It is also a mind that does not permit one to engage in bad physical and verbal conduct. Bad conduct includes the three non-virtues of the body – killing, stealing, and sexual misconduct and the four non-virtues of speech – lying, divisive speech, harsh words, and idle talk. Ethics is the mind that abandons engaging in such actions. We are presently able to act as we wish, therefore we should definitely engage in virtuous actions as otherwise we will only create the causes to be reborn in the bad migrations.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the accumulation of sins is extremely powerful." We can see from our own experience that in general non-virtue is stronger than virtue. It is possible to create virtue mainly in the upper migrations, while in the bad migrations it is extremely rare to be able to create virtue. Only some beings are able to do so. For example, some nagas, who are classified as animals, can create virtue in that they practice generosity and other virtues. However, such nagas are an exception. Among the hungry ghosts there is also the possibility of creating virtue, which is illustrated by a story of some hungry ghosts who received teachings from the Buddha. In short, only a limited number of beings in the lower realms can create virtue. There are also bodhisattvas who take rebirth in the lower realms and create virtue there but this is a different case.

In the human realm there are many people who have complete sense powers but among them, the number of people who actually engage in pure virtue is very limited. Therefore, there is no need to mention how few of the beings born in the lower realms actually engage in pure virtue. We should not be like those mentioned in the root, which says: "If when acting freely and living agreeably, he does not act to hold [himself back from falling down]."

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: In the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* it mentions "two maturations." What are these?
A: Among the four types of results there are (1) fully ripened results (maturation results), (2) the result similar to the cause as an activity, (3) the result similar to the cause as an experience, and (4) the empowering result. Perhaps the two maturations here are the result similar to the cause as an activity and the result similar to the cause as an experience. When one is reborn in the human realm, one experiences both these results. For example, the result similar to the cause as an activity would be one's engaging in similar types of activity, such as the ten non-virtues. If the sutra says two maturations, why not three? We can also interpret these two maturations to be the fully ripened result

and the empowering result. Or perhaps the two maturations are that one will experience the result of non-virtue in the lower realm and then will experience it again when reborn in the upper realms.

Q: How many possibilities are there between action and dedication?
A: There are three possibilities in that there is nothing that is dedication but not action. The three possibilities are: (1) that which is an action but not a dedication, for example, killing insects, (2) that which is both action and dedication, and (3) that which is neither action nor dedication.

Q: The relation between form, or the aggregates, and self is set out in chapter six of Chandrakirti's autocommentary in a very condensed way, saying:

> *Form is not the self, the self does not possess form,*
> *The self is non-existent on form, nor does form exist on the self.*
> *Thus in four aspects should all the aggregates be known –*
> *These are asserted as the twenty viewing the self.* [6.144]

Could Geshe-la please explain this briefly?
A: The root verse literally says 'form is not the self,' which means the view of the transitory collection that views the form as a self, although it is not. The second part, that 'the self does not possess form,' means the view of the transitory collection that views the self as a possessor of things [which are a different entity from itself], like the way in which Devadatta possesses cows. However, the self does not possess form in the way that Devadatta possesses cows. The third, self is not on form, is the view of the transitory collection that views the self as supported on the aggregates. The fourth, form is not on the self, is the view of the transitory collection that views the aggregates as supported on the self. Such a view of the transitory collection is not qualified by inherent existence because it conceives a self-sufficient substantially existent self. Therefore, this view of the transitory collection is only an acquired view of the transitory collection and not an actual view of the transitory collection. This type of view of the transitory collection is common to the lower schools.

Q: A bodhisattva on the path of seeing attains disbelief of the referent object of the conception of true existence (see *Illumination*,; "Since the referent object of the view..."). When does this first occur? Can he already have this disbelief by means of an inferential valid cognizer?
A: It occurs whenever emptiness is realized, therefore it also includes the realization of emptiness by an inferential valid cognizer. At this time the referent object of the conception of true existence is refuted, whereby it is disbelieved. What does the realization of emptiness mean? Is the mind realizing emptiness pervaded by being a valid cognizer? [If one says "no," then] posit!
Student: A subsequent cognizer realizing emptiness.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas and the lower schools that is right, but for the Prasangika Madhyamikas a subsequent cognizer *is* a valid cognizer in that for them a valid cognizer is one that is unmistaken with respect to its main object. In the Sera Me text books by Khedrub Gendun Tenpa Dhargye, it says that a mind realizing emptiness is not pervaded by being a valid cognizer because if emptiness is realized by a correct assumption it is also a realization. What do you think?
Student: That is not right.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: One time in the past when His Holiness the Dalai Lama was offered honorary citizenship by the city of Bologna some students requested him to give the Kalachakra initiation in that city. His Holiness said that he would check but meanwhile advised them to study the two types of minds of enlightenment, the conventional and ultimate. He said that generating the conventional mind of enlightenment may seem to be easy but in reality is quite difficult. On the other hand, the

ultimate mind of enlightenment seems to be more difficult to realize, but in reality is easier, in that if one has a clear understanding of emptiness that is a realization of emptiness. Perhaps His Holiness was saying that as a realization it is enough to have correct assumption.

Q: It was said that a bodhisattva who achieves the first ground no longer has suffering because he attains a body that is the nature of the mind. What is this body that is the nature of the mind?
A: That is a bit difficult! As long as one has a physical body one is obstructed to pass through walls and so forth and is obligated to pass through open doors. On the other hand, when one has a body that is the nature of the mind one can go through mountains, walls, closed doors, and so forth. There is a story about Geshe Lekden from Tseshe Monastery who, one day when teaching his students, had a tea cup on the table in front of him. He was talking with his eye closed and clapping his hands in debate. The students saw that although he appeared to hit the cup with his hands, the cup did not move. How is that? It is said that although he appeared to have a physical body this geshe had obtained a body that is the nature of the mind. It is also said that beings in the intermediate state have a similar type of body that is the nature of the mind which is luminous and unobstructed. This is mentioned in the *Door to the Three Bodies,* which is translated by Lati Rinpoche and Jeffrey Hopkins in *Death, Intermediate State and Rebirth in Tibetan Buddhism*.

Q: With regard to the surpassing perfection of generosity, at what point on the first ground is it attained – the beginning or the end, in meditative equipoise or in subsequent attainment? And what is its direct cause?
A: The direct cause of the surpassing perfection of generosity is the exalted wisdom of the great supreme mundane qualities level of the path of preparation. The direct cause is also the strong practice of generosity done while the bodhisattva is on the path of accumulation and the path of preparation. The bodhisattva, while an ordinary bodhisattva, meditates on the three spheres of the practice of generosity as empty of true existence and engages in the practice of generosity.

It is attained on the path of seeing. When does it become manifest? It becomes manifest in subsequent attainment.

Q: What is the pervasion between giving and the intention to give?
A: They are the same.
Q: Are they mutually inclusive?
A: They can be said to be mutually inclusive.
Q: Then it follows that a great yogi does not have to give because it is enough to have the intention to give?
A: It is difficult to culminate the perfection of generosity by only cultivating the intention to give.
Q: Yet there cannot be one without the other?
A: There is such a possibility, for example, being forced to give without having the intention to give. There is a question as to whether this is generosity or not.

END

Monday afternoon, 13 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A2B-4 Reason for discoursing on ethics after discoursing on giving

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Because such broken morality is the abode of very many collections of faults:

Therefore, the Conqueror, having given the discourse on giving,
Gave the very discourse on morality: that which follows. [2.6ab]

Therefore, the Conqueror who defeated every negative quality, in order that the qualities of giving and so forth not be wasted, immediately after the time of the discourse on giving, gave only the discourse on morality. Because:

If the qualities are increased in the field of morality,
The enjoyment of results will be unceasing. [2.6cd]

Because of being the support of all qualities, morality itself is a field. There, if the qualities of giving and so forth are increased by means of not ceasing higher and higher stages of the continuation of causes and results, the collection of results increases and is able to be utilized for a long time. Otherwise, they are not.

Faulty ethics are the source of many collections of faults in that, having been led to the bad migrations, one will continue to create many faults. For this reason the Conqueror discoursed on ethics immediately after having discoursed on generosity.

In order to ensure that the result of generosity is not wasted, one should safeguard ethics. If one does this, all excellent qualities will arise, whereby the result of generosity – resources – will be enjoyed continuously. For this reason ethics is said to be a field of all qualities. Just as the ground is the basis for the animate and inanimate, such as trees, mountains, and so forth, likewise proper ethics is the basis for many qualities. In this sense ethics is said to be a field. In short, by safeguarding ethics, one's qualities as well as one's resources will increase more and more. On the other hand, if one does not safeguard ethics, one's qualities will not increase and one will not enjoy the resources that are the result of generosity.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Chandrakirti's root text says:

Thus the Conqueror, having discoursed on giving,
Spoke upon its accompaniment by ethics.
When virtues are nurtured on the field of ethics,
The enjoyment of effects is unceasing. [2.6]

Faulty ethics is a source of many faults, such as being led to a bad migration; therefore, immediately after discoursing on giving, the Conqueror who had overcome all sins spoke on the achievement of accompanying giving with ethics so that the benefits thereof would not be wasted. The reason for this is that ethics is the base of all auspicious qualities and therefore is alone the field. If the virtues of giving and so forth are nurtured on the field of ethics, the continuation of engaging in causes, such as giving, and of using effects, such as a good body and good resources, will increase more and more. The collections of effects grow, and one is able to enjoy them for a long time. Otherwise, this is not possible.

This indicates that givers of gifts should not just consider the marvelous resources that are effects of giving but should think about the physical support with which they will enjoy them. They

should consider the continuation of resources in many lives. Thus, you should know that keeping proper ethics – the means of achieving these – is very important.

Novice bodhisattvas should, as was explained before, make effort at giving gifts, and they should do this in order to attain buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings, who are their field of intent. Temporarily, however, they need a ripening of fruits of giving on the base of a happy migration over many lifetimes. This too depends on ethics because without them the favorable circumstances for training in the bodhisattva deeds are not complete.

In the vinaya it says that ethics is the base of all that moves and all that does not move. If one practices generosity alone without ethics, one will not enjoy the result of generosity with the body of a good migration. Therefore, in order to ensure that one will continue to take a body of a good migration, one should safeguard ethics. Presently we have a precious human rebirth complete with the eight freedoms and ten endowments. Therefore, we now have a special opportunity which is the result of keeping good ethics in the past. In order to continue to experience good rebirths in the future we also need to continue to keep good ethics. It is important not to degenerate our practice of ethics but to continually improve it. In addition, we should cultivate the path to enlightenment by practicing the remaining perfections. In particular, we need to cultivate the perfection of tolerance in our daily life.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) sets out the next outline as:

3B1C-2A2B-5 Praising ethics as a cause of both high status and definite goodness

The outline itself clearly indicates that ethics is the cause of both high status – rebirth as a human being or god, and definite goodness – liberation or omniscience. Since ethics is so important we should strive to combine the teachings given in the *Supplement* with those given in relation to the *Stages of the Path* and then integrate them into our daily life. In other words, we should not study such subjects merely as philosophy without putting them into practice.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tib. page 29) says:

Because of that, by this method:

For ordinary beings, those born from speech,
Those with definite character toward solitary enlightenment, and
The Conquerors' children – the cause of definite goodness and
High status is not other than morality. [2.7]

As extensively taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*, 2]:

Relying upon and abundantly enacting these paths of action of the ten non-virtues to a great degree becomes a cause of hell sentient beings. Middling becomes a cause of an animal state of rebirth. Small becomes the cause of the world of the Lord of Death.

There, through killing, sentient beings are led to the hells. Led to an animal state of rebirth. Led to the world of the Lord of Death. Then, even if born among humans, two maturations will be manifestly achieved: short life and many diseases.

Through taking what is not given, sentient beings are led to the hells. [Led to an animal state of rebirth. Led to the world of the Lord of Death. Then, even if born among humans, two maturations will be manifestly achieved:] small resources and shared (common) resources.

Through sexual misconduct, sentient beings are led to the hells. [Led to an animal state of rebirth. Led to the world of the Lord of Death. Then, even if born among humans, two maturations will be manifestly achieved:] unreliable servants and a wife with [ones'] rivals.

Through speaking falsely, sentient beings are led to the hells. [Led to an animal state of rebirth. Led to the world of the Lord of Death. Then, even if born among humans, two maturations will be manifestly achieved:] abundant slander and deception by others.

Through divisiveness, sentient beings are led to the hells. [Led to an animal state of rebirth. Led to the world of the Lord of Death. Then, even if born among humans, two maturations will be manifestly achieved:] servants in discord and bad servants.

Through harsh words, sentient beings are led to the hells. [Led to an animal state of rebirth. Led to the world of the Lord of Death. Then, even if born among humans, two maturations will be manifestly achieved:] to hear the unattractive and words of dispute.

Through senseless words, sentient beings are led to the hells. [Led to an animal state of rebirth. Led to the world of the Lord of Death. Then, even if born among humans, two maturations will be manifestly achieved:] not being words worthy to be beheld and uncertain self-confidence.

Through covetous mind, sentient beings are led to the hells. [Led to an animal state of rebirth. Led to the world of the Lord of Death. Then, even if born among humans, two maturations will be manifestly achieved:] not knowing satisfaction and great desires.

Through harmful mind, sentient beings are led to the hells. [Led to an animal state of rebirth. Led to the world of the Lord of Death. Then, even if born among humans, two maturations will be manifestly achieved:] not seeking benefit and harms done by others.

Through wrong view, sentient beings are led to the hells. Led to an animal state of rebirth. Led to the world of the Lord of Death. Then, even if born among humans, two maturations will be manifestly received: to fall into bad views and possess deceit.

Thus, these paths of action of the ten non-virtues will collect an immeasurable mass of suffering. Yet, through the cause of perfectly undertaking the paths of action of the ten virtues, rebirths will exist, such as rebirth as gods and men, up to the Peak of Existence.

Above that, if these paths of action of the ten virtues are fully meditated upon through the aspects of the trifling attitude, mind terrified by the three realms, without compassion and wisdom following that heard from others – induced from sounds: one will fully accomplish the hearers' vehicle.

Above that, if fully practiced through placing no regard in others, [aiming for] ones' own manifest complete buddhahood, without great compassion and skill in means and bearing in mind the very condition here – the profound – one will fully accomplish the solitary realizers' vehicle.

Above that, if fully trained through very extensive and immeasurable merciful heart, possessing compassion, [that] included in skill in means, firmly making great prayers, not forsaking any sentient being and referring to the very extensive exalted wisdom of buddhahood, one will fully purify the bodhisattva grounds and establish the great extensive, fully purified practices gone beyond.

Because of that, except for these paths of action of the ten virtues by these methods, there does not exist another means of attainment for ordinary beings, hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas, of any kind of high status, samsaric happiness, or definite goodness possessing the characteristic of liberation – the nature which is neither happiness nor suffering. The aforesaid will be clearly indicated.

In short, the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says that ethics is extremely important in that it brings about rebirths of high status as human beings or gods, as well as a hearer's enlightenment, a solitary realizer's enlightenment, and great enlightenment. A lack of ethics, such as engaging in the ten non-virtues, is faulty ethics. This sutra indicates that the result of non-virtue is more or less heavy in dependence on the strength of the action. If, for example, the action of killing is very heavy, one will be born in the hell realm; if it is middling, one will be born in the animal realm; and if it is light, one will be born in the realm of the lords of death, the hungry ghost realm. Because the suffering of the hell realm is the greatest, one is reborn there due to creating heavy non-virtue. On the other hand, middling non-virtue leads to rebirth as an animal in that, due to being stupid and foolish, one experiences middling suffering and has little opportunity to create virtue. Relatively light non-virtue is said to lead to rebirth as a hungry ghost because the suffering of hungry ghosts is said to be less than that of animals, due to the hungry ghosts being more clever than the animals. However, in the teachings on the *Stages of the Path,* it says that the greatest suffering is experienced in the hell realms, middling suffering in the hungry ghost realm, and the least suffering in the animal realm. Why is there this difference? Some people say that they are posited like this because hell beings have an extremely long life, due to which they experience the most suffering. The hungry ghosts have a shorter life than do hell beings and therefore suffer less. Because animals do not have a fixed lifespan, they have less suffering than hungry ghosts. The explanation in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*, on the other hand, is related to the fact that animals are very stupid whereby they cannot create happiness for themselves, whereas hungry ghosts are more intelligent and therefore experience more happiness.

The hungry ghost realm is called "the world of the Lord of Death" because that is where the lords of death live. In a ritual related to Dharmaraja (Kalarupa), there is a passage that says "the opponents of the lords of death are invoked from beneath the earth," indicating that the opponents of the lords of death live in the same place as the lords of death.

The hell guardians in the hell realms are said to be the henchmen of the lords of death. What are these hell guardians? Are they sentient beings or not?

Student: This question is asked in *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* and Shantideva says that the hell guardians are the creations of our own afflictions.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In other words, the hell guardians, who have the heads of horses, oxen, and so forth, are just appearances due to karma and not actual sentient beings. However, such karmic appearances strike the hell beings on the head with hammers and so forth, whereby they experience suffering. Think about this. If we say that everything is just an appearance of our karma we may fall into an extreme. Also, what about the lord of death, who is depicted as holding the wheel of existence between his fangs? Is he a karmic appearance or an actual being?

The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* mentions heavy killing, middling killing, and light killing. What are the respective measures of heavy, middling, and light? As an example, that which leads to rebirth in the hell realm is said to be a heavy action of killing. The measure of the heaviness of non-virtue is posited in terms of the four: (1) the field, (2) the application/execution, (3) the thought, and (4) the thing. Heavy killing in terms of the *thing* is, for example, killing an elephant as opposed to killing a fly. The heaviness of the non-virtue of killing is therefore related to the size of the thing that is killed. A heavy non-virtue of killing in terms of the application, or *execution*, is, for example, killing a being slowly while causing great pain. A heavy non-virtue of killing in terms of *thought* is, for example, killing with intense anger. A heavy non-virtue of killing in terms of the *field* is to kill a holy object, such as one's root lama, another lama, a bodhisattva, a foe destroyer, a superior, or one's parents, as opposed to killing an animal and so forth. This is why the five actions of immediate retribution include killing

one's parents. Likewise, the strength of one's virtue is related to these four, the most important being the thought and the application.

In the sutra it mentions "two maturations" which, in the context of killing, are said to be short life and many diseases. In relation to stealing, the two maturations are said to be few resources and shared resources, the latter meaning that one's resources are common property and not one's own individual property. The two maturations of sexual misconduct are unreliable servants and having a wife who is together with one's enemy. In each case, both maturations are results similar to the cause as an experience. The two maturations of lying are being slandered and being deceived by others. Those of divisive talk are having servants who are in discord and having bad servants. Due to harsh words, one will hear unpleasant words and words of dispute. Due to senseless talk, one's words will not be worthy of note, i.e., they will be ignored, and one will have uncertain self-confidence. Due to covetousness, one will have little satisfaction and much desire. Due to harmful mind, or malice, one will not receive benefit from those one has benefited and one will receive harm from others. Due to wrong views, one will again fall into bad views and possess dissimulation and deceit. To fall into bad views is, for example, due to strongly thinking in the past that the law of actions and results does not exist, one holds this bad view again in this life. To possess deceit means to naturally deceive others.

In short, this passage in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* means that due to committing the ten non-virtues, after having been born in the lower realms one will later be reborn in the upper realms, where one will experience the two maturations. Likewise, depending on what type of virtue one creates, one will take various types of rebirth ranging from rebirth as a human being through rebirth as a god of the Peak of Existence. This range includes the six levels of the gods of the desire realm, the seventeen levels of the gods of the form realm, and the four levels of the gods of the formless realm. In addition, there are various types of human rebirths: those in the four continents and those in the eight sub-continents. In this way there are many types of rebirths, which are related to the kind of non-virtue and virtue one creates.

In addition to such rebirth in the upper realms, due to specific types of virtue one will also experience the results of hearer foe destroyer, solitary realizer foe destroyer, and so forth. The results of one's actions can be experienced as results included in rebirths as ordinary beings or superiors. Thus, Chandrakirti said before:

> *For ordinary beings, those born from speech,*
> *Those with definite character toward solitary enlightenment, and*
> *The Conquerors' children – the cause of definite goodness and*
> *High status is not other than morality.*

The two maturations in relation to covetousness are not knowing satisfaction and having great desire. We too experience these and therefore we should think about this and strive to decrease our attachment to material things. Although in regard to material things we should know satisfaction and have few desires, in regard to study and meditational practice we should never be satisfied and should have strong desire.

Tuesday morning, 14 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Both the body of a happy migrator and the enjoyment on that base of the fruits of giving for a long time depend on ethics, which are also necessary for the achievement of definite goodness [liberation from cyclic existence and omniscience]. Chandrakirti's root text says:

For common beings, those born from the word,
Those set toward solitary enlightenment, and
Conqueror children, a cause of definite goodness
And high status is none other than proper ethics. [2.7]

None other than ethics is a cause of high status for common beings who have not entered the path, and a cause of definite goodness – enlightenment – for hearers born from the Subduer's word and those set on the path of a solitary realizer's enlightenment as well as for conqueror children – bodhisattvas.

There are, however, many other causes which are not ethics. Thus, this means that in order to achieve special high status and definite goodness, a definite relation with ethics is necessary. If ethics are forsaken, there is no way that these can be accomplished.

The attainment of high status as a human being or god and the attainment of definite goodness – the enlightenments of hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas – are related to safeguarding ethics. Without ethics, these results cannot be attained. The main cause for ordinary beings who have not entered the path to attain a rebirth of high status is ethics.

In the teachings on the *Stages of the Path,* three types of beings are set out: those of inferior scope, those of middling scope, and those of great scope. Practitioners of inferior scope are those who have turned their backs on the lower realms and engage in practices to attain their own scope, a good rebirth within cyclic existence. In order to achieve this, they practice ethics. Practitioners of middling scope are those who have turned their backs on the pleasures of cyclic existence and mainly strive to achieve the definite goodness of liberation for their own welfare. In order to achieve this, they practice the three higher trainings. Practitioners of great scope are those who have turned their backs on solitary peace and strive to attain great enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings. The main cause of this too is the safeguarding of ethics.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

This has been a summary of meanings set forth in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*. There it is explained:

Each of the ten non-virtues – killing and so forth – are divided into great, middling, and small which lead respectively to [migrations as] a hell being, animal, and hungry ghost. Finally, if one is born among humans, killing causes a short life and many diseases. Each of the remaining nine non-virtues also produces two undesirables [a birth in a bad migration and later birth as an unfortunate human]. The ten virtues cause birth as a desire god, a human, [and a being in any of the higher realms] up through the Peak of Cyclic Existence.

Higher than that is the practice of the ten virtues in conjunction with a trifling attitude aimed at one's own welfare alone together with renunciation and fear of cyclic existence. When the ten virtues are practiced with this aspect lacking great compassion yet having the wisdom cognizing selflessness that is induced by others' words, then one comes to be liberated through the hearer vehicle.

Still higher is the practice of one who in his final cyclic existence does not depend on others and aims at the enlightenment of a solitary realizer. If one practices thus without great compassion and skill in means but penetrates the suchness of profound dependent arising, one is definitely freed through the solitary realizer vehicle.

Above that is the practice of one with extremely vast and immeasurable mercy, compassion, and skill in means. If one practices thus, establishing great waves of prayer petitions, not casting aside any sentient being, but aiming at the extremely vast buddha wisdom, one is thoroughly purified through the mind of enlightenment and accomplishes the vast deeds of the pure perfections.

Each of the ten non-virtues has four results, the main result being the fruitional result (fully ripened or maturation result), which is rebirth in the lower realms. Having finished that rebirth in the lower realms, one then takes rebirth in the human realm, where one experiences the other three results. These three are:

1. the result similar to the cause as an activity,
2. the result similar to the cause as an experience, and
3. the empowering result.

For example, due to having killed, one is reborn in the lower realms and then later on when born as a human being, one has the tendency to kill; this is the result similar to the cause as an activity. The result of killing that is similar to the cause as an experience is a short life and many illnesses. The empowering result of killing is living in an unpleasant place where there is fighting and so forth. The four opponent powers related to confession purify these four results. The power of the base, which is to take refuge and generate the mind of enlightenment, purifies the empowering result. The power of regret purifies the result similar to the cause as an experience. The power of determination purifies the result similar to the cause as an activity. The power of applying all antidotes purifies the fruitional result. Therefore, it is important to do confession conjoined with *all* four opponent powers in order to purify *all* four results.

A hearer's enlightenment is attained by those who – seeking their own welfare – fear cyclic existence, lack great compassion, and yet train in the wisdom realizing selflessness in dependence on others' words. The sutra says "the wisdom cognizing selflessness that is induced by others' words." The uncommon assertion of the Prasangika Madhyamikas is that this wisdom is the realization of the non-inherent existence of persons, whereas the common view of the lower schools is that it is the realization of the emptiness of the person of self-sufficient substantial existence. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the realization of the emptiness of a self-sufficient substantially existent person alone is not sufficient to eradicate the conception of a self of persons and become liberated from cyclic existence. In the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* it says clearly that hearers, as well as solitary realizers, do not have great compassion. Solitary realizers are said to be "without great compassion and skill in means." However, they do penetrate "the suchness of profound dependent-arising," whereby they attain the liberation of solitary realizers. The main object of meditation of solitary realizers is dependent-arising. Dependent-arising can mean that phenomena arise in dependence on one another, but here it specifically means that solitary realizers completely realize the forward and reverse processes of the twelve links of dependent-arising, whereby they achieve their respective enlightenment. They meditate on the twelve links, beginning with the fact that from ignorance comes karmic formations, whereby they realize that this ignorance is the root of cyclic existence and they then go on to achieve liberation.

The sutra then says: "Above that is the practice of one with extremely vast and immeasurable mercy, compassion, and skill in means." This implies that a bodhisattva also meditates on dependent-arising and so forth and, in addition, has immeasurable mercy, compassion, skill in means in subduing trainees, and great waves of prayers, and does not cast aside sentient beings, and so forth. "Immeasurable mercy" refers to the immeasurable compassion which is included in the four immeasurables, whereas "compassion" refers to great compassion. The difference between immeasurable compassion and great compassion is a subject of debate. From the point of view of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* immeasurable compassion has a particular empowering condition, which is an actual meditative absorption of a concentration or a final concentration. However, it is questionable as to whether this empowering condition is actually necessary for the development of great compassion, whereas it is necessary for immeasurable compassion. This was discussed in the context of the eighth topic of the first chapter of the *Ornament*, achieving through engagement, in the context of the concentrations and formless absorptions.

In the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* it says: "not casting aside any sentient being." This is a heavy negativity. When someone who has taken the tantra vows gives up love for even one sentient being, he commits a root downfall of the tantra vows. On the other hand, if someone with the bodhisattva vows gives up the mind of enlightenment, he commits a root downfall of the bodhisattva vows. In Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way* (page 283) it says:

> If that is asserted, then a bodhisattva who has committed the root downfall of mentally giving up the mind of enlightenment and the root downfall of mentally abandoning sentient beings, as the subject; it follows that he does not have a bodhisattva's root downfall and the faulty ethics of that because he did not commit a root downfall of body and speech. This is because there is pervasion of the sign. You are unable to accept that, because the difference is in terms of whether or not they have vows of the three doors, in that bodhisattvas commit a root downfall even *by way of mind alone*, whereas hearers (those with individual liberation vows) do not [commit a root downfall] by way of mind alone (in that they do so only by body and speech).

The bodhisattva vows constitute a promise to engage in the bodhisattva deeds for the sake of all sentient beings. If it is asked: "Is a bodhisattva pervaded by having the bodhisattva vows?," there is no pervasion. Therefore, there are bodhisattvas who do not have the bodhisattva vows. An example is a bodhisattva who has generated the aspirational mind of enlightenment but not the practical mind of enlightenment.

Ethics is not pervaded by being a vow, whereas a vow is pervaded by being ethics. For example, a person who naturally stops killing has a type of ethics but this is not a vow. This is because in order for ethics to be a vow one must rely on an abbot or acharya from whom one takes the vows. However, in some cases it is also possible to take vows without the presence of a master.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Nagarjuna says in his *Friendly Letter* that training in proper ethics is very important:
>
> > You should observe ethics that are not low,
> > Not degenerate, not mixed, and not polluted.
> > Ethics are said to be the base of all attainments
> > As is the earth for all that does and does not move.

One should strive in ethics that are not degenerated by root downfalls. Just as the earth acts as a basis for that which does and does not move, similarly ethics acts as a basis for all attainments.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Therefore, although ethics is set forth in connection with the second ground, novice bodhisattvas should also practice them. They should think about the great importance of ethics, restraining their minds without being moved by tendencies toward the ten non-virtues.

Although ethics is [here] taught in connection with the second ground, lower bodhisattvas should also practice them. "Novice bodhisattvas" are bodhisattvas on the paths of accumulation and preparation. They should strive to be free even from non-virtuous motivations. This is said in relation to the specific ethics of restraining oneself from bad conduct.

In short, root downfalls of the bodhisattva vows can occur by way of actions of mind alone, whereas root downfalls of the individual liberation vows can only occur by way of actions of body and speech.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> As Chandrakirti says (2.7):
>
> > *For common beings, those born from the word,*
> > *Those set toward solitary enlightenment, and*
> > *Conqueror children, a cause of definite goodness*
> > *And high status is none other than proper ethics.*
>
> Then, they should train in conjoining the practice of proper ethics with the wisdom that cognizes the unapprehendability [of inherent existence]. Since merely understanding or familiarizing with these only a few times brings nothing, these meanings should be contemplated continuously. If they familiarize with them continuously, they will spontaneously engage in the modes of training of the bodhisattva deeds – even those that generate mental discomfort when first heard and those that our Teacher [Buddha] could not practice for a long time. Ratnadasa's *Praise of Endless Qualities (Gunaparyantastotra)* says:
>
> > Those deeds, which when heard of harm the worldly
> > And which you could not practice for a long time,
> > Will in time become spontaneous for all familiar with them.
> > Those not so familiar find it hard to increase attainments.

The practice of ethics and other virtues should be conjoined with the wisdom realizing non-inherent existence. If one only does this now and then, one will not achieve anything; therefore one needs to cultivate this wisdom continuously. Mere comprehension without putting it into practice will not bring benefit. Therefore, one should train in this awareness continuously throughout the day. It would be a mistake to meditate on this intensely only for one day or one month and then to stop.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that upon hearing about the bodhisattva deeds for the first time, some people experience discomfort. He says: "If they familiarize with them continuously, they will spontaneously engage in the modes of training of the bodhisattva deeds – even those that generate mental discomfort when first heard and those that our Teacher [Buddha] could not practice for a long time." Even Buddha could not engage in certain practices at first but, through striving in them, he became able to do so. Likewise, Shantideva says that through familiarity everything becomes easy. Therefore, by means of training continuously one will become able to engage in all types of practices. To illustrate this, Shantideva says that through familiarity even our present body, which is matter formed from the two substances of the father and mother, comes to be thought of as "mine." Likewise, if we train in such practices [as the bodhisattva deeds], one day they will become easy and spontaneous. On the other hand, if we do not do so they will remain difficult. To use an analogy, athletes who train their bodies over a long period of time gain great physical flexibility and so forth, whereas we who have not trained in the same way do not have such flexibility. However, if we were to train in a similar way we too would gain great flexibility. Likewise, through training in playing music or singing, one will eventually acquire ability in these. All such talents are attained by familiarizing with them over a long period of time.

Q: In the past, Geshe-la said that if one abandons love for a sentient being one commits a root downfall of the tantra vows, whereas if one gives up the mind of enlightenment one commits a root downfall of the bodhisattva vows. It was also said that a bodhisattva commits a root downfall through mentally abandoning the mind of enlightenment and mentally abandoning the mind of benefit

toward sentient beings. Is the mind of benefit not a mind of love? What is the difference between the abandonment of love for sentient beings in relation to the tantra vows and the abandonment of the mind of benefit toward sentient beings in relation to the bodhisattva vows?
A: Giving up sentient beings means to give up love for sentient beings; this also appears to be a root downfall of the bodhisattva vows. This is clarified in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way*. On the other hand, in the *Six-Session Guru Yoga*, giving up love for sentient beings is classified as a root downfall of the tantra vows, whereas giving up the mind of enlightenment is classified as a root downfall of the bodhisattva vows.

Student: I understood that there are two kinds of downfalls of bodhisattva vows that can be created by mind – the abandonment of the aspirational mind of enlightenment and the giving up the benefit of sentient beings. Is that right?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is different. If, having adopted the aspirational mind of enlightenment by means of ritual, one creates any of the four black actions, one commits a transgression but does not break an actual vow. Adopting the aspirational mind of enlightenment by means of ritual is not the actual taking of the bodhisattva vows, as this implies taking the vows of practical mind of enlightenment. Therefore, adopting the aspirational mind by means of ritual of enlightenment is not actually taking the bodhisattva vows. On the other hand, if one takes the bodhisattva vows, one necessarily adopts the aspirational mind of enlightenment by means of ritual.

It can be asked: "If giving up the mind of enlightenment is a root downfall of the bodhisattva vows, is giving up the promise of the aspirational mind of enlightenment taken by means of ritual also a root downfall?" Giving up the mind of enlightenment is mentally thinking that one is unable to engage in the bodhisattva deeds and unable to continue on the path to enlightenment. This is a root downfall of the bodhisattva vows if one has taken these vows. If one has not taken these vows one merely loses the aspirational mind of enlightenment taken by means of ritual. This is discussed in Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary on the section on ethics in *Bodhisattva Grounds*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) sets out the next outline:

3B1C-2A2C Example of non-mixture with what is not conducive to ethics

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The bodhisattva of the second mind generation:
>
> *Just like the ocean together with a corpse and*
> *The auspicious together with the black-eared –*
> *Thus does the great being the power of morality*
> *Not wish to abide together with that broken.* [2.8]
>
> "The black-eared" is a synonym of "inauspicious."

The Tibetan version we are following says the "black-nosed" rather than the "black-eared," as is translated here (the difference between the Tibetan words for nose and ear being just a superscribed letter). This [Tibetan] version is correct according to other sources, for example, in Chandra Das's Tibetan-English dictionary it says that "black-nosed female" is a synonym of that which is inauspicious and is a human who never accomplishes anything wherever he goes.

There is a story about this regarding one of the past mayors in Tibet. One time when he was in power, a thief was arrested and put in prison. The mayor wrote out a recommendation to the prison officials advising them to cut off a piece of his ear and free him, but by mistake he actually wrote that they should cut off a piece of the prisoner's nose. The nose of the thief was duly cut off. Upon hearing

this, the mayor became angry and asked why this had been done, whereupon he was shown the letter that he himself had written!

Tuesday afternoon, 14 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *Just as an ocean is incompatible with a corpse*
> *And just as prosperity is incompatible with calamity,*
> *So a great being subdued by ethics*
> *Does not wish to live with faulty ethics.* [2.8]
>
> For instance, a great ocean – due to the power of the cleanly nagas abiding there – does not dwell compatibly with a corpse but with its waves pushes it to the shore. Also, the marvels of prosperity and the bad fortunes of calamity are incompatible. Similarly, a second grounder, a great being subdued by pure ethics, does not wish to live with faulty ethics.
>
> Chandrakirti's commentary on Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* says, 'Calamity definitely exists in a household where Lucky resides.' However, this does not contradict his explanation here because in his commentary to the *Four Hundred* he was thinking of two persons having those names whereas here in the *Supplement* 'calamity' means misfortune.

Just as when a corpse is thrown into the ocean it is washed back to shore by the power of the nagas living in the ocean, in a similar way, a second ground bodhisattva naturally does not live with faulty ethics.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the marvels of prosperity and the bad fortunes of calamity are incompatible." More literally translated, this would be: "the two, the perfections of auspiciousness and the black-nosed female, i.e., inauspiciousness, do not associate with each other." This would be like Buddha and Devadatta not abiding together in the same place. Is this interpretation correct? On the other hand, in Chandrakirti's commentary on the *Four Hundred* this is explained in terms of there being two persons with these names abiding in the same place saying: "Black-nosed Female definitely exists in a household where Auspicious Female resides."

Here there seems to be some contradiction in that at first the text seems to be saying that these two cannot abide together and then it says that they can abide together. If this is debated, the conclusion is that it is possible for someone called 'Black-nosed Female' to abide together with someone called 'Auspicious Female' in that Black-nosed Female is not necessarily inauspicious and vice versa. For example, someone who is not a demon can be called 'Demon' and someone who is not a buddha can be called 'Buddha.'

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A2D Divisions of the perfection of ethics

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The explanation of the divisions of the previously explained morality gone beyond is:
>
> *Abandoning by whom, what, and regarding whom;*
> *If reference to the three exists, that morality*
> *Is explained as a so-called mundane gone beyond.* [2.9abc]
>
> That morality, if reference to the three exists, is indicated as mundane gone beyond.
>
> *That emptied of clinging to the three – the supramundane.* [2.9d]

> That very morality, if without reference to the three which were explained, is explained as the so-called supramundane gone beyond.

There are two types of ethics: (1) mundane ethics and (2) supramundane ethics. Mundane ethics is an ethics that is not conjoined with the wisdom realizing that the three spheres of ethics do not exist inherently. Supramundane ethics is an ethics that is conjoined with the wisdom realizing that the three spheres of ethics do not exist inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *If there be any apprehension of the three –*
> *Forsaken by whom, what, and with regard to whom –*
> *Such ethics are described as being a mundane perfection.*
> *That empty of attachment to the three is supramundane.* [2.9]
>
> If one is unable to put an end to the seeds of apprehending the true existence of the three spheres – the object of abandonment which is being forsaken, the person by whom it is forsaken, and the sentient being with regard to whom it is being forsaken – then such ethics are described as a mundane perfection. If ethics are conjoined with the uncontaminated wisdom realizing unapprehendability – that is to say, are empty of attachment apprehending true existence in the three spheres as explained above – then they are supramundane. Thus, ethics have two divisions [mundane and supramundane].

The three spheres of ethics are expressed by Lama Tsongkhapa as: "the object of abandonment which is being forsaken, the person by whom it is forsaken, and the sentient being with regard to whom it is being forsaken." Thus, they are: (1) the *person who abandons* an action, such as killing; (2) the *object that is abandoned*, e.g. the action of killing; and (3) the *field with regard to whom killing is abandoned*, e.g. the being who one does not kill.

With respect to negative actions there are four branches:

(1) the base,
(2) execution,
(3) thought, and
(4) completion.

The base is of two types: the animate and the inanimate. For example, if I were to go to Venerable Chogyal's room and take his eyeglasses, there would be two bases of my action of stealing: Chogyal, the owner, and the eyeglasses. In addition, the thief himself is also a base. Although the base of the action of killing is necessarily a sentient being, this is not the case in regard to the action of stealing.

Thus, the three spheres of the perfection of ethics are the person who abandons, that which is abandoned, and the sentient being regarding whom it is abandoned. These three spheres were already mentioned in regard to the perfection of generosity; they can be posited similarly in regard to the remaining perfections.

In regard to the mundane and supramundane perfection of ethics, it can be asked, "Who has a mundane perfection of ethics?" According to the *Illumination,* a mundane perfection of ethics is posited as existing in the continua of bodhisattvas who have not abandoned the seeds of the conception of true existence of the three spheres, i.e., the bodhisattvas abiding on the paths of accumulation and preparation. On the other hand, the supramundane perfection of ethics exists in the continua of bodhisattvas abiding on the path of seeing and above.

As with the perfection of generosity, there is:

(1) a perfection of ethics (or an ethics gone beyond) that is the means to go beyond and

(2) a perfection of ethics (or an ethics gone beyond) that is the state of having gone beyond.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A2E Conclusion by way of expressing the features of the second ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

By means of subsequently expressing the qualities of the ground which were explained, to fully complete explaining the section of the morality gone beyond:

Arisen from the moon of the Conqueror's child – also this Stainless,
Not becoming [yet] being the glory of existence, free of stain,
Like the moonlight of autumn time,
Eliminates the mental torment of migrators. [2.10]

So-called *Stainless* because of lacking stains through the paths of action of the ten virtues, is the name concordant with the meaning of the second bodhisattva ground. Just as the autumn moonlight, free from stain, eliminates the torment of sentient beings, similarly also, this Stainless who arose from the moon of the Conqueror's child eliminates the mental torment generated by broken morality.

As he is not included in samsara, he is not becoming, but is the glory of existence (becoming) because all excellent qualities follow after him and because of being the cause of excellent lordship of the four continents.

From the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way,"'* the Second Mind Generation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Chandrakirti's root text says:

Like the light of an autumn moon, the Stainless
Arising from the moon of a conqueror child,
Though not worldly, the glory of the world,
Removes the mental distress of migrators. [2.10]

Just as stainless autumn moonlight relieves creatures from the discomforts [caused by heat], so the second ground, the Stainless, removes the distress of migrators generated by faulty ethics. The Stainless arises from the moon of a conqueror child who is a second grounder and is so called because it has the light of pure ethics free from the stains of the faulty.

Because a second grounder is not included among those who wander in cyclic existence, he is not mundane – not of cyclic existence – but he is the glory of the world. This is because all marvelous attainments flow from this bodhisattva, and he, through the power of prayer petitions for the sake of sentient beings, has attained the sublime cause of universal monarchy over the four continents.

Such is the explanation of the second ultimate mind generation in the *Illumination of the Thought, An Extensive Explanation of Chandrakirti's 'Supplement to the Middle Way.'*

Here the second ground, the Stainless, is compared to the autumn moonlight, which is cooling and free from the veil, or pollution, of the dust that was settled by the summer rains. Likewise, a second ground bodhisattva is said to be free from the stains of the mist of faulty ethics. (Mist is one of the eight colors of which the first four colors mutually support each other, whereas the second four oppose each other; for example, the fifth and six, illumination and darkness, oppose each other and likewise the seventh and eighth, shadow and sunlight, oppose each other.)

A second ground bodhisattva is the glory of the world because "all marvelous attainments flow from this bodhisattva, and he, through the power of prayer petitions for the sake of sentient beings, has attained the sublime cause of universal monarchy over the four continents." There are four types of universal kings – those that respectively rule one, two, three, or four continents – each of which have their respective causes. A universal king who rules one continent is said to have an iron wheel or a conch, a universal king who rules two continents has a copper wheel, one who rules three continents has a silver wheel, and one who rules all four continents has a gold wheel.

Much is said in sutra regarding the ethics of vows. For example, Buddha said that when a fully ordained monk does full prostrations, he creates the karma to be born as a universal king for a number of times equal to the amount of dust particles beneath his outstretched body down to the golden base. In this context there is a discussion about whether someone with a large body creates more positive karma by doing prostrations than one who has a small body. The conclusion is that it is beneficial to have big body!

This concludes the explanation of the second mind generation.

THE THIRD MIND GENERATION

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) sets out the following outlines:

3B1C-2A3 Third ground, the Luminous

This section has four parts:

A Description of the third ground – the base of qualities
B Qualifying features of the third ground
C Distinguishing attribute of the first three perfections
D Conclusion by way of expressing the features of the third ground

3B1C-2A3A Description of the third ground – the base of qualities

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tib. page 32) says:

Now from the viewpoint of the third mind generation:

Because a light arises of the fire which burns the
Entire fuel of objects of knowledge, this third ground:
Luminous – … [3.1abc]

was mentioned.

Luminous is the name of the third bodhisattva ground. Further, if it is asked: "why is it luminous?" It acts to indicate concordance with the meaning since at that time there arises a light of the fire of exalted wisdom which burns the entire fuel of the objects of knowledge – possessing the essential nature of pacification. Therefore, this ground is explained as the Luminous.

… – to the Tathagata's child...

who generated the third mind,

There arises a copper-like appearance, like the sun. [3.1cd]

Just as prior to the occasion of sunrise, there arises a copper-like appearance, similarly, also to the bodhisattva on that [ground] there arises the appearance of exalted wisdom there.

The third bodhisattva ground is called Luminous because a third ground bodhisattva has the light of the fire of exalted wisdom that burns the knowledge obstructions. Just as there is a red glow prior to the actual sunrise, for a third ground bodhisattva there is a preliminary glow of the actual exalted wisdom that destroys the knowledge obstructions. The actual fire of exalted wisdom only exists on the eighth ground, since the knowledge obstructions are not actually abandoned before this point. As was explained in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* the heat level of the path of preparation is so-called because it is like a preliminary sign indicating that the conception of true existence is about to be burned. This explanation is similar to the reason for calling the third ground Luminous.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Chandrakirti's root text says:

Because the light of the fire wholly consuming
The fuel of objects of knowledge arises,
This third ground is called the Luminous, for a copper

Splendor like the sun appears to the sugata child. [3.1]

The third bodhisattva ground is called the Luminous. Why is it so named? It accords with the meaning of its name because when the third ground is attained, the fire of wisdom burning all the fuel of objects of knowledge arises along with a light which by nature is able to extinguish all elaborations of duality during meditative equipoise. Furthermore, just as a copper-like splendor appears shortly before sunrise, so on this ground an illumination of wisdom appears to a bodhisattva, a sugata child, who has generated the third ground. This indicates that on the third ground an appearance of all-pervasive red or orange light appears subsequent to meditative equipoise.

Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (444-6) says:

The third ground is called the Luminous because
The pacifying light of wisdom appears.
The concentrations and clairvoyances are generated,
While desire and hatred are extinguished completely.

Through the maturation of these qualities
He practices supremely the deeds of patience
And putting an end to desire completely
Becomes a great wise king of the gods.

On the third ground there is said to be the pacification of mistaken dualistic appearances. However, this pacification actually begins on the first ground. On the first ground, mistaken dualistic appearances are pacified by means of the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "an appearance of all-pervasive red or orange light appears subsequent to meditative equipoise." Mistaken dualistic appearances are pacified in meditative equipoise; as a result of this, in subsequent attainment this bodhisattva apprehends the appearance of all-pervasive red or orange light, even though at this time he does have mistaken dualistic appearances.

Nagarjuna says that on the third ground "the concentrations and clairvoyances are generated, while desire and hatred are extinguished completely." According to this, it would seem to be clear that for this bodhisattva desire and hatred are extinguished completely. Since on the third ground the bodhisattva has attained a surpassing practice of tolerance he can be said to have extinguished hatred, as well as the stains of hatred, even in a dream. However, in what sense is attachment completely extinguished? It can be said that this bodhisattva has completely extinguished attachment to the five pleasant sense objects, forms, sounds, and so forth, of the desire realm. Nagarjuna then says: "And putting an end to desire completely becomes a great wise king of the gods." It can be asked: "Does attachment not exist through the seventh ground?" It does, in that there are attachments that have the same observed object and aspect as the ignorance that is the conception of true existence that exists through the seventh ground. It can be asked: "Does attachment not observe objects that are also observed by the ignorance which is the conception of true existence?" In regard to this, there is a stanza in Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* that says that just as when the body sense power is destroyed, the body is destroyed, likewise when ignorance is destroyed, all other afflictions are also destroyed. This stanza comes in the context of a discussion about the attachment and ignorance that observe the same observed object. It can also be asked: "Are attachment in general and the attachment of the desire realm the same or different?"

In his autocommentary, Chandrakirti goes on to present various ways of cultivating tolerance. We need a lot of tolerance at all times. Tolerance is not merely the opponent of anger; there are also other types of tolerance. For example, when we experience difficulties in our studies we need patience or tolerance; specifically, the tolerance that bears suffering. We also need different kinds of tolerance

regarding different types of persons, for example, the teacher who explains, the translator, and even oneself, the person who is not able to understand! Therefore, we need patience with respect to each other. Patience should not just be a word on the tip of our tongues but something that we actually put into practice.

Wednesday morning, 15 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A3B Qualifying features of the third ground
>
> This section has four parts:
>
> 1 Surpassing patience on the third ground
> 2 Way of observing other patience
> 3 Divisions of the perfection of patience
> 4 Other pure features arising on the third ground
>
> 3B1C-2A3B-1 Surpassing patience on the third ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to indicate patience gone beyond as surpassing for the bodhisattva who obtained the appearance of exalted wisdom like that:
>
> *Even if someone of misplaced disturbance*
> *Will cut from his body flesh along with bone,*
> *For a long time, bit by bit, [due to] that,*
> *Patience strongly grows <u>toward</u> the cutter.* [3.2]
>
> Because the bodhisattva looks after the minds of others and because of having such exalted wisdom, he does not manifestly act to engage body, speech, and mind <u>in a nature resembling the basis of others' harmful intention due to possessing non-factual qualms regarding the three times</u>. Hence, it was qualified, saying: *Even if someone of misplaced disturbance... his.*
>
> Even if a sentient being of that type cut from the body of that bodhisattva, flesh together with bone, bit by bit, pausing and pausing, for a long time, not only will he not at all become disturbed within the mind, but very surpassing patience will be generated in the bodhisattva who refers to the sufferings of hell and so forth having the condition of that evil action, as greater [than the experience of others].

A bodhisattva who has attained the third ground has a surpassing perfection of tolerance. In order to indicate this, Chandrakirti says that even if someone with a harmful mind were to cut the flesh and bones of this bodhisattva slowly, bit by bit, over a long time, the bodhisattva does not become angry but instead generates compassion toward the mutilator, thinking that as a result of his actions the mutilator will be reborn in the lower realms. In this way the bodhisattva is able to tolerate the suffering of being cut.

There is debate about this subject such as the questions: "Does a third ground bodhisattva have a physical body of flesh of bones that can be cut? Does this bodhisattva not have a body that is the nature of mind?" The conclusion is that according to ordinary appearances this bodhisattva does have a physical body made of flesh and bone. When this body is cut the bodhisattva does not show anger but instead generates compassion and tolerance toward the person who is harming him.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In order to indicate that a bodhisattva who has found such illumination of wisdom has a surpassing perfection of patience, Chandrakirti says in his root text:
>
> *Though another, unjustifiably disturbed*
> *By anger, cuts from his body flesh and bone*
> *Bit by bit for a long time, he generates*
> *Patience strongly toward the mutilator.* [3.2]
>
> Since surpassing giving and ethics, which were explained earlier, are possessed on this higher ground, here from among the remaining eight perfections patience is surpassing. It is surpassing in that the measure of advancement in the practice of this perfection is not present in the remaining seven.
>
> A third ground bodhisattva protects the minds of others and possesses the peace of wisdom as explained in the previous stanza. Thus, though others might generate qualms that serve as a basis of harmful intent by thinking, 'In the past he harmed me and my friends,' 'He harms us now,' or 'He will harm us in the future,' he does not engage in such activities of body, speech, and mind. Therefore, Chandrakirti qualifies the bodhisattva as an unjustified source of anger.
>
> Even if someone, disturbed by such anger, cuts from the body of this bodhisattva not just flesh but also bone, not in large sections but bit by bit, not continually but pausing in between, and not finishing in a short time but cutting over a long period, the bodhisattva would not get angry at the mutilator. Instead, he would generate very strong patience by taking cognizance of the mutilator and realizing that due to this sin this person will experience suffering as a hell being and so forth even greater than that of other hell beings.

On the first ground the bodhisattva attains a surpassing practice of generosity, on the second ground he attains a surpassing practice of ethics, on the third ground he attains a surpassing practice of tolerance, on the fourth ground he attains a surpassing practice of effort, and so forth. Although a bodhisattva on the third ground is said to attain a surpassing practice of tolerance, this does not mean that bodhisattvas on the first and second grounds do not have tolerance. If their bodies are cut they also do not generate anger. The difference is that, although they do not get angry, first and second ground bodhisattvas do not have a *surpassing* practice of tolerance. The difference is that the third ground bodhisattva is able to increase his practice of tolerance in such situations. On the third ground, tolerance is surpassing in that this bodhisattva "protects the minds of others and possesses the peace of wisdom as explained in the previous stanza" which burns the fuel of the knowledge obstructions.

Chandrakirti says "the basis of others' harmful intention" and likewise Lama Tsongkhapa says "a basis of harmful intent." There are <u>three types of bases of harmful intent</u>, which are related to the three times. These are the thoughts:

(1) "He has harmed me and my friends in the past,"
(2) "He is harming me and my friends now,"
(3) "He will harm me and my friends in the future."

These three can be further elaborated into nine:

(1) "He has harmed me in the past,"
(2) "He is harming me now," and
(3) "He will harm me in the future";
(4) "He has harmed my friends in the past,"
(5) "He is harming them now," and
(6) "He will harm them in the future";
(7) "He has helped my enemies in the past,"
(8) "He is helping them now," and
(9) "He will help them in the future."

Due to such thoughts, one generates anger, but it is not correct to become angry based on such reasoning.

Third ground bodhisattvas are not the right source, or justifiable source, of anger in that they lack the bases of harmful intent that are mentioned above. However, those with harmful mind still cut their flesh and bones bit by bit over a long time, yet the bodhisattva's mind remains undisturbed and instead his tolerance increases. He generates compassion and tolerance toward the harmer, understanding that that person is creating the cause for being reborn in the bad migrations where he will experience great suffering.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> This is what it means to have surpassing patience. Therefore, it is clear that such patience is not generated on the Very Joyful or the Stainless grounds even though a first or second ground bodhisattva's mental continuum is not disturbed when his body is cut. Hence, it should be understood that surpassing patience first arises on the third ground.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:
>
> *Whatever is cut, by whom, when, and how,*
> *From the bodhisattva who sees selflessness,*
> *Since also phenomena are seen like their reflections,*
> *Hence he is patient.* [3.3]
>
> He not only becomes very surpassingly patient having observed the greater sufferings of hell and so forth having the condition of that evil action. Since he also sees phenomena as similar to reflections and separates from the discrimination of I and mine, he is therefore also very extremely patient. The terms whatever, [whom, when, and how] are in order to include the causes of patience.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *Also through viewing these phenomena*
> *As like reflections – what bodhisattva*
> *Seeing selflessness is cut, by whom,*
> *Just how, and when – he will be patient.* [3.3]
>
> Not only does a third ground bodhisattva have surpassing patience that observes the great suffering of hell beings and so forth, he also sees clearly the phenomena of the three spheres as like reflections. Because the three – by whom the body of a bodhisattva seeing selflessness is cut, what is cut, in what manner and at what time – are vividly seen in this way and because he does not discriminate falsely about 'I' and 'mine', the bodhisattva will be patient.
>
> Chandrakirti's commentary explains that the word 'also' [in the first line] of the stanza is 'for the sake of including the causes of patience'. Thus, his patience results from this cause as well as the former causes of non-disturbance which were just explained. Furthermore, Chandrakirti says, 'Because of this also', and thus the verse should be translated as 'also through viewing' [instead of 'because of viewing', as it was in Tibetan].

The third ground bodhisattva who knows that someone cutting his body is creating the cause to experience the sufferings of the lower realms generates compassion and his tolerance increases. In addition, this bodhisattva sees the three spheres of tolerance as non-truly existent: (1) the cutter, (2)

the one cut, and (3) the act of cutting. This bodhisattva is free from the acquired conception of 'I' and 'mine.' This too enables him to increase his practice of tolerance.

Q: This bodhisattva sees the three spheres as like reflections. Does he also see them as like illusions?
A: Sentient beings appear like illusions to this bodhisattva.
Q: Do they not appear as truly existent to this bodhisattva?
A: It can be said that sentient beings appear both as truly existent and as like illusions in subsequent attainment.
Q: Therefore, this bodhisattva has both appearances?
A: Yes. Why? Because this bodhisattva has the appearance of both conventional truth and ultimate truth. Because there is conventional appearance, there is also false appearance. False appearance is illusion-like appearance in that it appears but is not true. For example, in a magic show there are three types of people: the magician, the spectators whose eyes have been tricked by mantra, and those whose eyes have not been affected by mantra who arrive later on. The eyes of both the spectators and the magician are affected by the mantras of the magician, yet, for example, when the basis of a substance such as a pen is transformed into a lion, this lion appears to the magician yet he knows that the lion is not real. On the other hand, the spectators whose eyes have been affected see the lion and believe it to exist. To those whose eyes have not been affected by mantra a lion does not appear and only the pen appears. Ordinary beings are like the spectators whose eyes are affected by mantra in that to them there is the appearance of true existence and the adherence to it. A bodhisattva who has realized non-true existence is like the magician, in that he has the appearance of true existence but knows that it is not true. A bodhisattva in the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is similar to those whose eyes have not been affected by mantra because he has no appearance of true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A3B-2 Way of observing other patience

This section has two parts:

A Unsuitability of anger
B Suitability of observing patience

3B1C-2A3B-2A Unsuitability of anger

This section has four parts:

1 Unsuitability of anger due to its being senseless and very faulty
2 Contradiction of not wanting suffering in the future and making harmful response
3 Unsuitability of anger due to its destroying virtue accumulated over a long time
4 Stopping anger by reflecting on the many faults of impatience

3B1C-2A3B-2A1 Unsuitability of anger due to its being senseless and very faulty

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> This patience is not only a feature appropriate to bodhisattvas – since it is also a cause of safeguarding every quality of those other than them. To explain to the impatient reversal from anger as proper it is said:
>
> *Due to harm done, if you are belligerent toward one,*
> *Can hostility for them reverse what is already done?*
> *Therefore, resenting them is definitely meaningless here;*
> *It also becomes unfavorable in other worlds.* [3.4]

> If you are belligerent toward someone [who] did harm, this gives the opportunity of inner agitation for some time. Then, because the harm already done is without reversal, the hostile attitude referring to him is just meaningless, because what was to be done was already done.
>
> Not only is resentment of this pointless now, it will become unfavorable (contradictory) also to other worlds because of generating anger and throwing unattractive maturations.

One should not become angry because, as Chandrakirti says: "Due to harm done, if you are belligerent toward one, can hostility for them reverse what is already done?" For example, someone hits us with a stick whereby a bruise forms on our body. If, after this has happened, we were to hit the other person back and thereby the bruise were to transfer to the other person it would make some sense to hit the person. However, this does not happen; instead we risk being hit once again. In this way our bruise will become even bigger, whereby our pain as well as our anger will increase. Therefore, there is no benefit to hitting the person back, the only result is to lose our good qualities. In short, when someone hits us, we should not strike back but should instead strive to diminish our anger. Thus, Chandrakirti says that being patient is very important whereas retaliation is pointless. In addition, retaliation brings about a negative result in future lives in that due to this negative action we will experience suffering.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Patience is not just a practice suited to the minds of those on bodhisattva paths, for it causes those not abiding on a ground to maintain all attainments without diminishment. Therefore, it is fitting for those lacking patience to avoid anger. Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *If you get angry with someone who has done you harm,*
> *Is that harm stopped because of your resentment toward him?*
> *Resentment thus is certainly senseless here*
> *And unfavorable for future lives.* [3.4]
>
> If you become angry at someone who harmed you, then since the harm cannot be reversed, does resenting him reverse the harm already done? It does not. Therefore, resentment is certainly senseless here.
>
> Resentment is an irritable coarse disposition, synonymous with belligerence. Not only is it purposeless, but it is also unfavorable to your welfare in future lives because time spent in anger impels unpleasant fruition after death.

When someone becomes angry with us, we should remain patient without becoming angry. We should stop anger by contemplating the many disadvantages that anger brings in this and future lives. For example, as Lama Tsongkhapa says "it is also unfavorable to your welfare in future lives" and "impels unpleasant fruition after death." Thinking in this way we should diminish our anger. Not only is there suffering in future lives but even in this life when we become angry our mind becomes disturbed and agitated. In addition, our anger also makes the people around us unhappy. In short, anger disturbs both one's own and others' minds. Anger causes us to experience negative results even in our daily life such as others, our colleagues and assistants, harming us rather than helping us. Therefore, by contemplating the results of anger we should strive to decrease it. Another example of the unhappiness that anger causes is a case when one member of a family gets angry and he may not even want to eat, although food is offered to him. In the end, this is his loss as he will go hungry!

The object of anger is not necessarily a sentient being but can be any object whatsoever. For example, we can become angry at a pen if it does not work properly or we can become angry with our car if it does not start and so forth. In fact, there are numerous things that can cause us to become angry. In short, we should avoid the rough disposition of mind that characterizes anger.

Here the title of this section itself, "Unsuitability of anger due to its being senseless and very faulty," clearly indicates that anger is senseless and has many disadvantages and that it is therefore not proper to become angry.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A3B-2A2 Contradiction of not wanting suffering in the future and making a harmful response

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There are some, while experiencing the different results of faulty deeds done by themselves, due to confusion think, "The other did that harm to me," and with regard to that thought, employ belligerence toward the harmer. In order to avert whatever desire there is to defeat his harm through employing harm in response, it was explained:
>
> *The very one desiring to express as exhausted*
> *Those results of non-virtue done in the past,*
> *How is it possible he leads to suffering again*
> *Through harm and belligerence toward the other?* [3.5]
>
> The very great suffering of harms inflicted upon someone's body by enemies through bringing down the edges of sharp weapons upon it is the final result arising [from] the action of killing in the past.
>
> The severe fully ripened results of hell sentient beings, animal rebirth states, the world of the Lord of Death, and so forth were experienced and what are the causes of averting without exception the unpleasant results of those, having still remaining afflictions – results similar to the cause – since transforming into the aspect just like that again, like the last dose of medicine, the cause of curing the disease existing inside, through disturbance from within and harm to others, they will lead to the very causes which give rise to results harming much more than even the unpleasant results already passed.
>
> Because of that, as one acts toward a physician operating with a sharp instrument, through that being the cause of curing the disease, very great patience is proper toward causes which give rise to temporal suffering.

Because we do not desire suffering in the future, it is inappropriate to retaliate to harm done to us now. Chandrakirti says that we tend to think that we must harm someone who harmed us because we do not realize that the harm we receive is the result of our own previous actions. Due to our ignorance we even think that others harm us even though they may not actually be harming us, whereby we become angry. We then think to harm and defeat these people. This is our usual way of thinking. However, it is improper. Instead when we are harmed we should think that this harm is the result of non-virtue that we created in past lives. Therefore, when we receive harm, instead of becoming unhappy and angry we should feel fortunate in that it enables us to exhaust the result of these negative actions. Any harm that we return and anger that we develop will only bring suffering to ourselves and will not bring benefit. For this reason we should definitely refrain from retaliating and developing anger. Whether others actually harm us or not, we should not get angry in that if we become angry we are only planting the seeds of our own future suffering. Since we do not want suffering in the future we should definitely not retaliate by harming others. Retaliation is contradictory with our wish for happiness. Therefore, it is fundamental to understand the functioning of actions and results. When we experience harm or problems we should think, "This is the result of my own non-virtue," and when we experience happiness we should think, "This is the result of my

own virtue." Understanding that happiness comes only from virtue and that suffering comes from non-virtue, we should engage in virtue and avoid non-virtue as much as possible in this life in order to experience happiness in the future and be free from suffering. Being patient is our own individual responsibility.

Wednesday afternoon, 15 March 2000

In general, it is worthwhile to experience a small suffering in order to avoid a large amount of suffering. For example, people undergo surgery well aware that although they will experience some suffering the end result will be that they will be cured of a greater suffering. For example, in the past in Tibet bloodletting was common practice, the suffering of which was willingly born in order to cure the illness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Some people, when suffering due to former bad deeds, are influenced by their obscuration to think, 'Another has harmed me,' and generate anger toward the harmer. They want to prevent the arising of the suffering that involves such harm in the future by making a harmful response. In order to overcome this [tendency] Chandrakirti says in his root text:
>
> > *How could it be right for one, wishing to assert that*
> > *He is finishing the effects of non-virtuous*
> > *Actions done earlier, to sow the seeds of*
> > *Suffering through harming and hating others?* [3.5]
>
> The great suffering that enemies inflict on one's body is an effect of the non-virtuous action of killing one did in the past. That effect can be experienced as a strong fruition in the three bad migrations. Also, those for whom effects still remain [after a lifetime in a bad migration] undergo unpleasantness by way of fruits similar to that cause [upon rebirth as a human]. How could it be right for one, who wishes to say that he is finishing the remaining effects of those actions in order to overcome such unpleasantness, to sow the seeds or causes of future suffering? That suffering will be far greater than he is experiencing here, and he is led to it through making harmful answers to others and disturbing his continuum from within through anger. It is not suitable.
>
> Therefore, just as one bears the pain of bloodletting with a sharp instrument as a physician's means of healing disease, it is very suitable to bear small superficial suffering for the sake of overcoming limitless deep suffering.

Although the fact is that we undergo certain sufferings as a result of our own previous non-virtuous actions, we have the tendency to point to others as the cause of our problems. However, this is inappropriate. Such sufferings are the result of our own negative actions and are experienced when certain conditions come together. But thinking, for example, that one did not achieve success in a particular activity because someone else did something to prevent this happening, one becomes angry at that person in order to avert the suffering one is experiencing.

If one experiences strong physical pain it is the result of having killed in a past life. However, in order for this non-virtuous karma to ripen it has to meet particular conditions, for example, people who cause one pain. In short, the main cause of physical pain is the karma of having killed but the superficial condition is the people who cause one this pain. The pain one experiences presently is only a secondary result of killing, a result similar to the cause as an experience, whereas the main result, a fruitional result, was already experienced as rebirth in a lower realm. For this reason, Lama Tsongkhapa first sets out the fruitional result of killing and then the result similar to the cause as an experience which occurs when one is once again reborn as a human being.

In order to exhaust the result of negative karma one should avoid retaliating when harmed. On the other hand, if one does retaliate to harm which is the result of negative karma created in the past,

one will once again create the cause to experience suffering in the future. For this reason Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, just as one bears the pain of bloodletting with a sharp instrument as a physician's means of healing disease, it is very suitable to bear small superficial suffering for the sake of overcoming limitless deep suffering." The pain of bloodletting is limited and temporary but enables one to overcome the more severe pain of a particular illness and therefore is willingly borne.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A3B-2A3 Unsuitability of anger due to its destroying virtue accumulated over a long time

This section has two parts:

A Meaning of the text on the unsuitability of anger due to its destroying virtue accumulated over a long time
B Ancillary meanings

3B1C-2A3B-2A3A Meaning of the text on the unsuitability of anger due to its destroying virtue accumulated over a long time

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

In order to indicate that: "impatience is not only the cause of throwing extensive unpleasant maturations in the manner explained, it is also the cause of exhausting the collection of merit accumulated over a long time":

Since, due to belligerence to the Conqueror's children,
Virtues arisen from giving and morality accumulated for
One hundred eons are destroyed in an instant; therefore,
There exists no evil other than impatience. [3.6]

was mentioned.

If a bodhisattva mahasattva (great being) strongly superimposes true and untrue faults upon those who generated the mind toward enlightenment and generates a thought of anger a mere instant because of the absence of ascertaining the qualification due to the person (i.e., their being a bodhisattva) [or] although [that] has already been ascertained, because of engaging in the afflictions in reliance upon familiarization – if due to merely that, the collection of merit accumulated for one hundred eons generated from familiarization with giving and morality gone beyond, which were indicated before, will be destroyed – leave alone mentioning the generation toward a bodhisattva by one who is not a bodhisattva.

Therefore, as the quantity of water in the great ocean cannot be ascertained through measurement, the extent of maturation in that cannot be ascertained.

Therefore, since like that, there does not exist another evil greater than impatience which throws unpleasant results and harms virtue.

Also saying that, [the *Manjushri Sport Sutra*] taught:

Manjushri, anger, so-called 'anger', acts to thoroughly destroy virtues accumulated for a hundred eons. Therefore, it is called 'anger'.

Chandrakirti says that if a bodhisattva becomes angry at another bodhisattva for a single instant, he destroys the virtues of generosity and ethics accumulated over a hundred eons. This clearly shows that anger destroys the roots of virtue included in the collection of merit but not those included in the collection of wisdom. Likewise, we too should practice patience and avoid becoming angry. Anger is

likened to a strong fire that is able to burn mountains, trees, houses, and so forth in that anger burns or consumes the roots of virtue included in the collection of merit.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Impatience not only is a cause projecting vast unpleasantness as its fruition but also consumes collections of merit accumulated over a long time. Indicating this, Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *One moment of hating a conqueror child destroys*
> *The virtues arising from giving and ethics'*
> *Accumulated for a hundred eons.*
> *Thus there can be no [worse] sin than impatience.* [3.6]
>
> When a bodhisattva, a great being, generates an angry thought toward a conqueror child, who already has an altruistic mind of enlightenment, he does so through forcefully imputing true and untrue faults. Either he does not determine that the person is a bodhisattva or, despite so determining, he is influenced by his strong habituation to the afflictions. Even if a bodhisattva generates anger toward another bodhisattva for just a moment, accumulations of merit amassed over a hundred eons – virtues arising from the perfections of giving and ethics which were explained before – are destroyed. If that is the case, then what need is there to say anything about one who is not a bodhisattva getting angry with one who is?
>
> Just as one cannot measure the amount of water in a great ocean, so one cannot ascertain the limits [of suffering] that results from being angry with a bodhisattva. In terms of projecting unpleasant effects and harming virtue there is no greater sin than impatient anger.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that if a bodhisattva destroys a great quantity of roots of virtue by becoming angry for a single instant with another bodhisattva there is no need to mention how harmful it is for someone who is not a bodhisattva to become angry with a bodhisattva. For example, if a bodhisattva on the great level of the path of accumulation becomes angry with a bodhisattva on the small level of the path of accumulation he returns to the small level of the path of accumulation and must begin the path again. Likewise, if someone who has created virtue for many years generates strong anger he destroys all this virtue and must begin to collect it again.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "In terms of projecting unpleasant effects and harming virtue there is no greater sin than impatient anger." Anger is the most harmful of minds. This is because although attachment acts as a condition for the creation of non-virtue it does not destroy one's roots of virtue. For this reason, anger is compared to a blazing fire.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> [Jaya-ananda] says in his *Explanation* that 'imputing true faults' refers to falsely imputing bigness to small [faults].
>
> With respect to Chandrakirti's explanation that roots of virtue are destroyed by anger, the *Manjushri Sport Sutra (Manjushrivikridita)* says, 'Manjushri, anger destroys virtue accumulated over a hundred eons.' It is not clear in that sutra whether the object of anger and the base of anger [the person who is angered] are bodhisattvas or not; however, in his commentary Chandrakirti explains it within the context of both the object and the base being bodhisattvas.
>
> Prior to quoting this sutra, Nagarjuna quotes the *Lion's Roar of Maitreya Sutra* (*Maitreyamahasimhanada*) in his *Compendium of Sutra*:
>
> > Merely by attacking all sentient beings in the realms of a thousand world systems having a billion worlds with reproach, rebuke, sticks, and fists, a bodhisattva does not wound or scar himself. However, he is wounded and scarred even by generating harmful intent, obstinacy, or a mind of hatred for another bodhisattva. Why? Even if he does not lose [the path of] omniscience completely, the bodhisattva must from that time wear the armor [practice the six perfections] for as many eons as there were thoughts

> of harm, obstinacy, and hatred generated toward the other bodhisattva.
>
> Thus it is clear that Chandrakirti bases his commentary on this rendition in which both the object and the base of anger are bodhisattvas. [The reference in the *Lion's Roar of Maitreya* is to a lesser unprophesied bodhisattva's being angry with a prophesied bodhisattva.]

Two cases can be considered in term of the base of anger (the one who becomes angry) and the object of anger: a bodhisattva who becomes angry at another bodhisattva and a non-bodhisattva who becomes angry at a bodhisattva. In the first case the one who becomes angry is a bodhisattva and the object of anger is also a bodhisattva, whereas in the second case the one who becomes angry is not a bodhisattva. The *Lion's Roar of Maitreya Sutra* refers to the first case saying that if a bodhisattva were to attack all the sentient beings in the realms of a thousand world systems having a billion worlds with reproach, rebuke, sticks, and fists he would not harm himself. "However, he is wounded and scarred even by generating harmful intent, obstinacy, or a mind of hatred for another bodhisattva." This clearly shows that if he were to attack another bodhisattva with reproach, rebuke, sticks, and fists he would create great negative karma, but that he is even wounded by merely generating harmful intent toward another bodhisattva.

The *Lion's Roar of Maitreya Sutra* then says: "Why? Even if he does not lose [the path of] omniscience completely, the bodhisattva must from that time wear the armor [practice the six perfections] for as many eons as there were thoughts of harm, obstinacy, and hatred generated toward the other bodhisattva." Although due to his anger the bodhisattva does not lose the path to omniscience, he needs to practice the six perfections for a number of eons equal to the number of instants he was angry with another bodhisattva. For this reason, it is very dangerous to generate anger even for an instant toward a bodhisattva. Therefore, we should take great care not to do so.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> QUESTION: Why do the masters Shura [Ashvaghosha] and Shantideva say that the virtue accumulated over a thousand eons is destroyed? Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (VI.1) says:
>
> > One moment's hatred destroys
> > All the good deeds of giving,
> > Worshipping sugatas, and so forth
> > Amassed over a thousand eons.
>
> ANSWER: Although Prajnakaramati's commentary on Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says that being angry with sentient beings destroys the virtue accumulated over many thousands of eons, it is difficult to believe. The two masters [Ashvaghosha and Shantideva] do not clearly identify the object and the base; however, only a bodhisattva is an object of anger that destroys roots of virtue accumulated over a hundred or a thousand eons.
>
> If on the basis of the reference to 'a bodhisattva, a great being' we make an inference about the base of anger in [Chandrakirti's text], it appears that he is a bodhisattva of greater power than the bodhisattva who is the object. Furthermore, [in general] the base of anger is definitely a bodhisattva who is a common being [on the paths of accumulation and preparation], but the object can be either a bodhisattva who has attained a ground or who has not. Thus, there are three hatreds – by a bodhisattva of greater power to a lesser, by a lesser to a greater, and by one to another equal in power. When a bodhisattva of greater power becomes angry at one of lesser power, virtue accumulated over a hundred eons is destroyed, and when one who is not a bodhisattva is angry with one who is, it is clear that virtue accumulated over a thousand eons is destroyed.
>
> I will analyze in relation to scripture the destruction of virtuous roots when a lesser bodhisattva becomes angry with a greater one and when a bodhisattva is angry with an equal. I will also analyze the destruction of roots of virtue in relation to the status of the object when a lesser becomes angry with a greater.

When both the base of anger and the object of anger are bodhisattvas there are three hatreds: (1) anger by a bodhisattva of greater power to a lesser, (2) anger by a lesser bodhisattva to a greater, and (3) anger by one bodhisattva to another equal in power. When a greater bodhisattva becomes angry at a lesser bodhisattva the roots of virtue accumulated over a hundred eons are destroyed. When a lesser bodhisattva becomes angry at a greater bodhisattva or a non-bodhisattva becomes angry at a bodhisattva the roots of virtue accumulated over a thousand eons are destroyed. However, when a bodhisattva becomes angry with another bodhisattva of the same level it is not clear how many eons of roots of virtue are destroyed. This can only be understood from scriptural authority.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> [Lesser bodhisattva being angry with a greater]
>
> The first part of the quote from the *Lion's Roar of Maitreya Sutra* – 'Merely by attacking all sentient beings in the realms of a thousand world systems having a billion worlds with reproach, rebuke, sticks, and fists, a bodhisattva does not wound or scar himself' – sets forth an instance of a bodhisattva's being angry with non-bodhisattvas, abusing them with speech and striking them physically. This is shown to differ from wounding or scarring a bodhisattva; hence, it should be known that it is not necessary for a bodhisattva who becomes angry with one who is not to bear the armor from the very beginning. It is indicated that if a bodhisattva merely generates an angry thought toward a bodhisattva without any physical or verbal expression, he must bear the armor from the beginning for as many eons as the times that he generated the thought.

When a bodhisattva becomes angry at another bodhisattva, even without abusing him verbally or striking him physically, he must wear the armor from the very beginning. However, when a bodhisattva becomes angry at someone who is not a bodhisattva, although some amount of roots of virtue are destroyed, there is no need to begin over from the beginning.

We do not know who is and who is not a bodhisattva. Therefore, we need to be careful with regard to everyone since we cannot rule out someone being a bodhisattva thinking "He is not a bodhisattva because he is ugly" or "He is not a bodhisattva because he is sleepy" and so forth.

Thursday morning, 16 March 2000

In relation to the destruction of roots of virtue there is the base of anger, the person who becomes angry, and the object of the anger, the person to whom one gets angry. There are three different cases when both the base of anger and the object of anger are bodhisattvas:

1. a bodhisattva with a higher level of realizations becoming angry with one of lesser realizations,
2. a bodhisattva with lesser realizations becoming angry with a bodhisattva with superior realizations, and
3. a bodhisattva becoming angry with a bodhisattva of equal realizations.

In the first case the bodhisattva who becomes angry destroys the roots of virtue accumulated over a hundred eons. In the second case the bodhisattva who becomes angry destroys the roots of virtue accumulated over a thousand eons. In the third case the amount of roots of virtue destroyed by the bodhisattva who becomes angry is not specified.

There are also other cases:

4. a bodhisattva becoming angry with a non-bodhisattva,
5. a non-bodhisattva becoming angry with a bodhisattva, and
6. a non-bodhisattva becoming angry with another non-bodhisattva.

When a bodhisattva becomes angry with a non-bodhisattva less roots of virtue are destroyed than in the case of a non-bodhisattva becoming angry with a bodhisattva. There is even less destruction of roots of virtue when a non-bodhisattva becomes angry with a non-bodhisattva.

In the second case in which the object of anger is superior to the base of anger, i.e., a bodhisattva with lesser realizations becoming angry with a bodhisattva with superior realizations, the amount of roots of virtue destroyed can be determined on the basis of scriptural references such as the following.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The object of such is clearly a bodhisattva who has been prophesied, and the base is clearly one who has not.

A bodhisattva who has been prophesied has higher realizations than one who has not been prophesied. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) then says:

> The *Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* (*Sanchayagathaprajnaparamita*) says:
>
> If a bodhisattva who has not been prophesied
> Angers and disputes with another who has so been,
> He must bear the armor from the beginning for as many
> Eons as the times his mind was imbued with hatred.
>
> With respect to the necessity of bearing the armor from the beginning, if, for example, one who has the capacity to pass quickly from a bodhisattva's great path of accumulation to a path of preparation becomes angry at another who has been prophesied, he cannot pass to the path of preparation for as many eons as the number of instants of anger and must train in the path from the beginning.

When a bodhisattva who is about to achieve the path of preparation becomes angry with a bodhisattva who has been prophesied, he must train again from the beginning of the path for as many eons as the number of instants of anger.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> [A bodhisattva being angry with an equal]
>
> Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (I.34) says:
>
> The Subduer said that one who generates
> A bad mind to such a conqueror child patron
> Will stay in a hell for as many eons as there were
> Instants of the bad mind which he generated.
>
> Thus, it is said that one will abide in a hell for as many eons as there were instants of developing hatred for a bodhisattva. There is also the fault of destroying roots of virtue accumulated over many eons.
>
> If a non-prophesied bodhisattva is angry with a prophesied one, his detention in a hell is similar to that just explained, and he must also bear the armor from the beginning for as many eons. The *Compendium of All the Weaving Sutra (Sarvavaidalyasamgraha)* says that if one abandons the doctrine as set forth in the sutra but confesses the fault three times daily for seven years, the fruition of that deed is purified, but even at the fastest ten eons are necessary to attain endurance [facility allowing progress to the next path]. Thus, even though confession and restraint in many ways does not restore a path that has become slower, it will purify experience of the fruition. Hence, you should make effort at confession and restraint.

By confessing one can purify the fruition of the karma but cannot not restore a path that has become slower, therefore one should be careful not to create such negative karma. The Tibetan nomads say: "One does not know who is a buddha and who is a thief." One should not judge people by their appearance alone.

The Chinese punish the Tibetans by beating them and shouting at them to point out their gods. They turn buddha statues upside down and menace the Tibetans saying that since the buddhas cannot even turn themselves upright how can they help you Tibetans?

There was once a king called Gungta who had a beautiful son. The prince was very devoted to the Hindu gods and would gather people together to talk to them about religion. His father was not pleased by this as wanted the prince to study and prepare to become the next ruler. However, the prince continued to maintain his interest in religion. The king also had a daughter who had received particular powers from Ishvara which enabled her to not be burned by fire, carried away by water, and so forth. The father, being unhappy with his son, decided to kill him. Together with his daughter the king constructed a large walled in area, in the center of which he sat his son in the lap of his daughter and lit a fire under them. However, contrary to his wishes, the daughter died while the son remained unharmed. This was because the daughter had a negative mind which made Ishvara unhappy with her and therefore he prevented her from using her powers.

This king is said to have been a demon. Another time the king said to his son, "If the supreme rare one really exists, where is it?" The son replied that the supreme rare one exists everywhere. The father asked, "Is there a god in the pillar here?" The father then began to strike the pillar with his fist calling out, "If you are there come out." However, what came out of the pillar was a being with a human head and the legs of a lion who said, "Here I am." He then took the king up in his claws and said, "I am the god, what do you want?" The father remained speechless. The being then took the king to the doorstep and said, "Now I will kill you." The king replied that he could not be killed because he had powerful attainments, specifically that of not being able to be killed during the day or night, inside or outside, or by any weapons. However, as it was sunset, neither day or night, and they were on the doorstep, which is neither inside or outside, the being was able to rip him apart with its claws.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) then says (for the following outline there is no corresponding text in Chandrakirti's autocommentary):

3B1C-2A3B-2A3B Ancillary meanings

When anger is generated, it destroys roots of virtue even if neither the object nor the base are bodhisattvas. Shantideva quotes a Sarvastivada scripture [the *Questions of Upali Sutra (Upalipariprchchha)*] in his *Compendium of Instructions*:

> 'Monks, a monk pays homage with all his limbs to a reliquary of hair or nails, he makes his mind pure and thus is holy. Monks, this monk will enjoy the reign of a universal monarch for a thousand times the number of grains of sand beneath him extending 84,000 yojanas to the sphere of gold'... Then the distinguished Upali paid homage by joining his palms in the direction of the Blessed One and asked him, 'Since the Blessed One has said that the virtuous roots of monks are so great, then, O Blessed One, in what situation are virtuous roots diminished, thoroughly reduced, and completely extinguished?' 'Upali, I do not see such wounding and scarring [from other non-virtues], but when one whose behavior is pure generates a bad intention toward one having pure behavior, Upali, through that these great roots of virtue are diminished, thoroughly reduced, and completely consumed. Therefore, Upali, if it is unsuitable to mentally harm even sticks, what need is there to mention a conscious body?'

'Diminish' refers to lessening the increase of very great and marvelous roots of virtue and shortening those of long increase; not destroying all the effects it is a small extinguishment.

> 'Reduction' is a middling extinguishment [leaving no more than a little fruition], and 'complete consumption' is a great one [entirely destroying the possibility of fruition].

This passage indicates that many roots of virtue are destroyed even in the case of one who is not a bodhisattva becoming angry with someone else who is not a bodhisattva. Upali says to the Buddha that if a monk with pure conduct accumulates a great amount of virtue through prostrating to a reliquary in what situation are his virtuous roots diminished, thoroughly reduced, and completely extinguished? 'Diminished' means that one's anger diminishes or lessens the increase of great and marvelous roots of virtue and shortens those of long increase. In this case it does not destroy all the results of the roots of virtue. In the second case, reduction, there is some small result of one's roots of virtue. However, in the third case, complete consumption, there is no result at all of one's roots of virtue. These occur in relation to the intensity of the anger generated.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The *Moon Lamp Sutra* (*Chandrapradipa*, *Samadhiraja*) quoted in Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* says:
>
> > For one who thinks to harm his companions
> > Proper ethics and hearing will not protect him,
> > Neither will concentration and retreat,
> > Nor giving and worshipping the buddhas.
>
> 'Companions' are those engaging in pure behavior. Non-protection by the six – ethics and so forth – means that these cannot stop the destruction of roots of virtue by anger. The earlier parts of that sutra do not explain clearly which roots of virtue are destroyed, but Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* explains them as, 'Giving, worshipping sugatas, and so forth,' and Chandrakirti's *Supplement* [stanza 33] explains them as having arisen from giving and ethics; his commentary explains them as 'the collections of merit'. Therefore, it seems that this does not apply to the virtuous roots of having cognized selflessness well, but this is to be analyzed.

While it appears that according to Chandrakirti's *Supplement* only the roots of virtue included in the collection of merit are destroyed and not those included in the collection of wisdom, Lama Tsongkhapa says that this needs to be analyzed.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> OBJECTION: The *Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra (Akshayamatinirdesha)*, as quoted in Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra*, gives the example of a drop of water that has fallen into a great ocean and has not been consumed for a great eon. The sutra says that a virtuous root dedicated to enlightenment will not be consumed until enlightenment. The *Array of Stalks Sutra (Gandavyuha)* also takes as an example an ounce of a type of quicksilver called 'gold-appearing' which although it transforms a thousand ounces of iron into gold cannot be dissipated by that iron. The sutra says that the element of quicksilver of an altruistic mind generation to enlightenment cannot be consumed by all the iron of contaminated actions and afflictions. Thus, is it not that altruistic mind generation, virtues conjoined with it, and virtues dedicated to enlightenment cannot be destroyed by anger?

It is generally said that the roots of virtue of bodhisattvas are pervaded by being dedicated to enlightenment, whereby they are not destroyed until enlightenment is attained. Someone makes the objection that if such roots of virtue of bodhisattvas which are dedicated to enlightenment cannot be destroyed by anger, then anger does not destroy roots of virtue. However, since previously there was a discussion of the destruction of roots of virtue in the case of bodhisattvas becoming angry with other bodhisattvas and so forth, he asks what is the actual situation. The *Array of Stalks Sutra* gives the

example of quicksilver which transforms iron into gold but is not used up in the process. The *Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra* likens the fact that a bodhisattva's roots of virtue which have been dedicated to enlightenment are not destroyed by anger to a drop of water which when put in the ocean does not dry up until the ocean itself dries up [in that a bodhisattva's roots of virtue are not used up until enlightenment is attained]. Thus, according to this person there appears to be some contradiction in the various scriptures.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> ANSWER: It is not so because the destruction of virtuous roots in bodhisattvas who are great beings is also mentioned. The meaning of the former passage [in the *Teaching of Akshayamati*] is that virtuous roots are not consumed through the emergence of their effects; however, it is not that anger does not consume them.

In short, the answer to the objection is that the first case, the analogy of a drop of water in the *Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra*, indicates that the roots of virtue of bodhisattvas which are dedicated to enlightenment are not exhausted until enlightenment is attained in the sense that they are not consumed by the arisal of their results, however this does not mean that they are not destroyed by anger.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The meaning of the second passage [in the *Array of Stalks*] is that contaminated actions and afflictions cannot waste an altruistic mind generation in the way that contaminated actions and afflictions can be wasted in dependence on altruistic mind generation.

The analogy of quicksilver in the *Array of Stalks Sutra* indicates that contaminated actions and afflictions cannot destroy the mind generation, whereas the mind generation can destroy contaminated actions and afflictions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Some explain the meaning of destroying virtuous roots this way: 'The capacity of former virtues to generate their effects quickly is overcome, and the emergence of effects is postponed. [In the meantime] the effects of former hatred, for instance, emerge, but it is not that the effects of the virtues will not emerge when the proper circumstances are eventually encountered. Since no worldly path can abandon seeds to be abandoned, afflictions could not abandon [virtuous] seeds.'
>
> ANSWER: That is inconclusive because although the virtue of a common being's purification of non-virtue through the power of the four antidotes does not abandon the seeds [of non-virtue], a fruition [of the non-virtues purified] will never emerge even though the proper circumstances are encountered. Also, at the time of attaining the levels of peak and forbearance on the path of preparation, one has not abandoned non-virtuous seeds that would cause wrong views or bad migrations; however, even if the proper circumstances are encountered, one never generates wrong views or takes rebirth in a bad migration.

The objectors' assertion regarding the destruction of roots of virtue is incorrect. These people say that the destruction of roots of virtue refers to postponing the arisal of the result. They say that first the result of anger is experienced and only later on will the results of the roots of virtue arise. In this way anger postpones the fruition of the roots of virtue yet later on when conditions come together these roots of virtue will bring about their result. They say that the case of roots of non-virtue is similar in that a mundane path cannot abandon the seeds of afflictions. In short, the objector asserts that it is impossible for the results of both virtue and non-virtue to be wasted.

The answer is that when someone purifies non-virtue through confessing it with the four opponent powers, although he does not abandon the seeds of the non-virtue, this non-virtue will not ripen even if conditions were to come together for this to happen.

Likewise, when the peak level of the path of preparation is attained wrong views can no longer cut the roots of virtue of this person. Although the seeds of wrong views in the continuum of this person have not been abandoned, wrong views cannot arise. It is also said that one who has attained the tolerance level of the path of preparation will not be reborn in the lower realms. Although he has not abandoned the seeds of non-virtue that cause rebirth in the lower realms, this person will not be reborn there.

Thursday afternoon, 16 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Furthermore, a sutra quoted in Vasubandhu's commentary to his *Treasury of Knowledge* says:
>
> > Actions cause fruition
> > In cyclic existence – first the heavy,
> > Then the proximate, then the accustomed,
> > Then what was done before.
>
> Thus, through the prior fruition of a virtuous or non-virtuous action, the opportunity for fruition of other actions is temporarily blocked; however, one cannot posit that a virtue or non-virtue has been overcome merely because of this, and no such claim has been made. If this were the case, one would have to say that all powerful non-virtuous actions overpower virtuous roots.

Before someone said that the destruction of roots of virtue by anger means that the ripening of these roots of virtue is postponed. Here this is proven to be wrong. In general heavier actions ripen prior to lighter ones. In the case of two actions which are equally heavy whichever was created most recently will ripen first. If these two actions were also created more or less at the same time then that which is more habitual will ripen first. If they are also equal in terms of familiarity that which was created earlier will ripen first. For this reason Vasubandhu says: "first the heavy, then the proximate, then the accustomed, then what was done before."

It is said that through the ripening of one action "the opportunity for fruition of other actions is temporarily blocked." However, this does not mean that other actions are destroyed. If this were posited as the meaning of the destruction of actions then a powerful non-virtue would destroy all virtue because non-virtuous actions tend to be heavier than virtuous actions whereby, in accordance with the previous explanation, they would ripen first. In short, the ripening of one action merely delays the ripening of another but does not destroy it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Bhavaviveka's commentary on his *Essence of the Middle Way* [the *Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvala)*] says that just as a shoot will not be produced from a ruined seed even in the proper conditions, so when a non-virtue is purified by the four powers or when a virtuous root is overcome through wrong views or harmful intent, their effects cannot emerge even when the proper circumstances are eventually encountered.

If a seed has been scorched by fire, although the conditions come together for it to grow it will not produce a sprout. Likewise, when a non-virtue is purified by the four opponent powers, even if the conditions arise for its result to be produced, it will not bring about a result. In this context 'harmful intent' refers to anger. This is understood because it is often said in the scriptures that anger destroys

roots of virtue. Roots of virtue can also be destroyed by wrong views. This is quite serious since wrong views destroy both roots of virtue created through application and inborn roots of virtue. Anger, on the other hand, only destroys roots of virtue created through application.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Also, the overcoming of a virtue does not mean that a virtue in one's continuum ceases to exist after one generates anger; rather, anger harms the virtue's capacity to issue forth an effect. The extent to which later fruition is harmed accords with the amount of harm done, causing a small, middling, or great extinguishment of virtue as explained above.
>
> Thus, harm is incurred in two ways: the capacity to generate a new path quickly is overcome and the generation of effects such as happy migrations is undermined. Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* sets forth the limitless fault of hating, despising, and criticizing bodhisattvas with bad motivation. Ascertaining or not ascertaining that a person is a bodhisattva and having true or untrue reasons for anger are said to be similar. Therefore, you should strive as hard as you can to stop anger in general and in particular that aimed at bodhisattvas and those whose behavior is pure.

The meaning of anger destroying one's roots of virtue is that it makes them unable to ripen in a result. "A small, middling, or great extinguishment of virtue" refer respectively to the diminishment, reduction, and complete consumption of the result which were explained previously. Small extinguishment means that when anger is generated it delays the ripening of the roots of virtue, middling extinguishment means that the result that would have been produced is lessened, and great extinguishment means that there is no ripening of the result at all. In short, the meaning of anger destroying roots of virtue is that it destroys the potency of the roots of virtue. However, this does not mean that the roots of virtue are extinguished. For example, when a barley seed produces a sprout the external part of the barley seed still remains. That part of the seed is likened to the roots of virtue which still exist but have become impotent and unable to produce a result.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "harm is incurred in two ways: (1) the capacity to generate a new path quickly is overcome and (2) the generation of effects such as happy migrations is undermined. Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* sets forth the limitless fault of hating, despising, and criticizing bodhisattvas with bad motivation. Ascertaining or not ascertaining that a person is a bodhisattva and having true or untrue reasons for anger are said to be similar." The fault is the same whether one ascertains that the person is a bodhisattva or not and whether the anger is justifiable or not. In other words, even if one has a reason for becoming angry with someone, the fault is the same. Lama Tsongkhapa therefore says that "you should strive as hard as you can to stop anger in general and in particular that aimed at bodhisattvas and those whose behavior is pure." 'Those whose behavior is pure' refers to a community of fully ordained monks or nuns, one should also avoid becoming angry at them.

In short, becoming angry with ordinary people is a heavy negativity, becoming angry with the ordained is even heavier, and becoming angry with a bodhisattva is even heavier than that.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> The *Akashagarbha Sutra (Akashagarbha)* says that root infractions [of bodhisattva vows] destroy roots of virtue previously generated. Also, Shantideva's *Compendium of Instructions* states that aspiring to a household because of strong attachment to goods, being inflated with the pride of conceit [boasting that one has attainments not yet acquired], and forsaking the doctrine are acts that destroy virtues formerly generated and deprive one of progress based on virtuous practice. Therefore, having identified the conditions for destroying virtuous roots, you should forsake them with strong force.
>
> This is just a brief account. You definitely should look at Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* and Shantideva's *Compendium of Instructions*.

We should follow Lama Tsongkhapa's advice and study Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* and Shantideva's *Compendium of Instructions* as he recommends.

Here 'root infractions' refer to the bodhisattva vows. "Shantideva's *Compendium of Instructions* states that aspiring to a household because of strong attachment to goods, being inflated with the pride of conceit, and forsaking the doctrine are acts that destroy virtues formerly generated." These actions also prevent one's virtuous qualities from increasing. One should identify the conditions that destroy one's roots of virtue and then abandon them.

'Forsaking the doctrine' is a very heavy negative action. In fact in the *Guhyasamajatantra* it is said to be even heavier than four of the five actions of immediate retribution in that by practicing this tantra one purifies these four actions whereas it does not purify the action of abandoning the Dharma.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A3B-2A4 Stopping anger by reflecting on the many faults of impatience

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore, the impatient who are powerless to harm others act to destroy only themselves. The powerful who lack compassion act to harm themselves and others.
>
> By its mere production, it:
>
> *Produces an ugly form and leads to the unholy,*
> *Robs the full analysis which knows right and wrong and...* [3.7ab]
>
> ...later, having given up agreeable family,...
>
> *Impatience quickly acts to cast into bad migrations.* [3.7c]

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *It creates an ugly form, leads to the unholy,*
> *And robs discrimination that knows right and wrong.*
> *Through impatience one is quickly cast into a bad migration.* [3.7abc]
>
> Impatience in one who is powerless destroys only himself, but impatience in the powerful and non-compassionate destroys both self and others. Merely generating it, one's face becomes ugly, one is led to the unholy and robbed of the discrimination that thinks, 'This is a right and that is a wrong way to act.' Through impatience – anger – one is quickly cast into a bad migration after death.
>
> Having reflected on these faults, do whatever you can to stop anger through thinking that there is no occasion for it.

Anger, or impatience, only brings unpleasant results. For example, if one safeguards ethics but lacks patience one will be born as a human being with an ugly body. This is illustrated by the story of Pleasant Voice who had a beautifully melodious voice but a very repulsive body. When his voice alone was heard he attracted many people, whereas if his body was seen he frightened them. When Buddha was asked why this person had such a pleasant voice but an ugly body, he replied that he was ugly as a result of being very short-tempered in a previous life. On the other hand, he had a pleasant voice because in the past he had offered a bell to the stupa of the buddha Kashyapa.

Chandrakirti then says that anger "leads to the unholy." The measure of that which is unholy is to engage in non-virtue and not to engage in virtue. The measure of that which is holy is to engage

in virtue and not to engage in non-virtue. When someone becomes angry he is naturally led to the unholy.

Due to anger one will also be robbed of the discrimination that knows right and wrong. We can understand this is true based on our own experience in that when we get angry we tend to forget every good thing that we ever learned. Anger also causes us do to negative actions even in regard to our own parents.

Also as a result of anger one will be reborn in the bad migrations. Therefore, we should contemplate the disadvantages of anger and try to avoid situations that give rise to it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A3B-2B Suitability of observing patience

This section has two parts:

1 Reflecting on the many advantages of patience
2 Summary exhortation to observe patience

3B1C-2A3B-2B1 Reflecting on the many advantages of patience

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If asked: if those are the faults of impatience, what are the qualities of patience?
It is explained:

Patience produces qualities contrary to those already explained. [3.7d]

Through patience, one will be beautiful, dear to
Holy beings, and skilled in knowing
Right and wrong and after that
Reborn with gods and men; and evils will be exhausted. [3.8]

With regard to patience, one should know those qualities which are contrary to those which were indicated as faults regarding impatience.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

QUESTION: If those are the disadvantages of impatience, what are the advantages of its opposite, patience?

ANSWER: Chandrakirti's root text says:

Patience creates qualities opposite to those [3.7d]

Explained above. Through patience comes beauty, dearness
To the holy, skill in discriminating between
The right and wrong, birth afterwards as a human
Or god, and the extinguishment of non-virtues. [3.8]

Through cultivating patience, qualities opposite to the faults of impatience explained above are created. One attains a beautiful body, is dear to and cherished by holy beings, becomes skilled in knowing the right – the suitable – and the wrong – the unsuitable, after death takes birth as a human or god, and removes non-virtues accumulated through anger and so forth.

Reflecting on these, you should generate the power of patience.

Is patience physical, or verbal, mental? Patience is a factor of consciousness in that it is defined as an undisturbed mind. To be patient is to be undisturbed in the context of the four types of trainings in virtue:

(1) although upbraided, to not upbraid,
(2) although [others] become angry, to not become angry,
(3) although beaten, to not beat, and
(4) although [others] expose one's faults, to not expose their faults.

Instead one should practice patience in such situations. For example, in general we tend to become angry when we are criticized, but instead we should use such opportunities to practice patience. If we do this we will not give anger an opportunity to arise.

As a result of practicing patience one will be reborn with a beautiful body. In addition, one will be dear to and cherished by holy beings. One also "becomes skilled in knowing the right – the suitable – and the wrong – the unsuitable." Then "after death takes birth as a human or god, and removes non-virtues accumulated through anger and so forth."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A3B-2B2 Summary exhortation to observe patience

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, like that:
>
> *Ordinary beings and the Conqueror's children,*
> *Knowing the faults [and] qualities of belligerence and patience,*
> *Having abandoned impatience, should always quickly observe*
> *The patience venerated by the arya beings.* [3.9]
>
> Belligerence and patience are belligerence and patience. Faults and qualities being faults/qualities, the two phrases are joined: 'the faults and qualities of belligerence and patience.'
>
> By means of reversing from the faults of belligerence which were explained, bearing in mind the qualities of patience, having abandoned impatience, at all times, only patience is the object to be observed.

We should think about the advantages of cultivating patience and the means of cultivating it.

END

Monday afternoon, 20 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *Ordinary beings and conqueror children,*
> *Realizing the faults of anger and advantages of patience*
> *And forsaking impatience, should quickly and always observe*
> *The patience praised by superior beings.* [3.9]
>
> One should realize, as explained above, the disadvantageous faults of common beings' anger and the beneficial advantages of conqueror children's patience. Having forsaken impatience, one should always observe the patience praised by superior beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa urges us to consider the disadvantages of anger such as the result of rebirth in the lower realms, being ugly in a future life, and so forth. The disadvantages of anger can also be contemplated in terms of our daily life experience; it disturbs the mind, creates disharmony between ourselves and others, and so forth. In short, one should think about the disadvantages of anger and then try to practice the patience praised by superiors. The practice of patience is the best practice. For this reason, Shantideva says that there is no fortitude better than patience. To cultivate patience one should study the chapter on patience in Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds,* which clearly sets out the disadvantages of anger and the advantages of patience.

In conclusion, one should cultivate patience by thinking about the disadvantages of anger and the advantages of patience. It is important to apply the practice of patience in one's daily life. It is not sufficient to talk about it, instead it should be integrated with one's mind. There is a story related to the importance of integrating one's knowledge with practice in daily life. At the time of Shakyamuni Buddha, there was a fully ordained monk who was able to memorize the extensive, middling, and brief Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, but only saw the Buddha as faulty. Therefore, one can be a scholar without integrating the Dharma with one's mental continuum. For this reason, it is important to ensure that one puts patience into practice.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A3B-3 Divisions of the perfection of patience

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, in order to indicate the divisions of patience gone beyond:
>
> *Although dedicated to the enlightenment of complete buddhahood,*
> *If reference to the three exists, it is mundane.* [3.10ab]
>
> Although already fully dedicated for buddhahood itself, if there exists reference to the three: what patience, patience by whom, and patience toward what sentient being, the patience is called "mundane patience gone beyond."
>
> *That itself without reference, the Buddha*
> *Taught, saying "supramundane gone beyond."* [3.10cd]

If the three spheres of patience are observed as truly existent, it is a mundane perfection of patience. On the other hand, if the three spheres of patience are observed as non-truly existent it is a supramundane perfection of patience. Chandrakirti says: "Although dedicated to the enlightenment

of complete buddhahood, if reference to the three exists, it is mundane." This means that if one dedicates the roots of virtue of patience to enlightenment but observes the three spheres of patience to exist truly, it is a mundane perfection of patience. On the other hand, if one's dedication is conjoined with the awareness that the three spheres do not exist truly, it is a supramundane perfection of patience.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> In his basic text Chandrakirti indicates that the perfection of patience has two divisions, mundane and supramundane:
>
> *Though dedicated to enlightenment of perfect buddhahood,*
> *[Patience] is mundane if one apprehends the three.*
> *[Patience] that does not involve such apprehension*
> *Buddha taught as a perfection supramundane.* [3.10]
>
> This can be understood from the former explanations [of the perfections of giving and ethics].

Two divisions of patience, the mundane and supramundane, are posited in the same way as were the two divisions of generosity and two divisions of ethics. In short, whether it is a mundane or supramundane perfection depends on whether the respective three spheres are observed to exist inherently or not.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A3B-4 Other pure features arising on the third ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> On that ground, just as the bodhisattva's patience gone beyond will be completely pure, similarly:
>
> *On that ground, the Conqueror's children [obtain] concentrations and*
> *Clairvoyances; an attachment and hatred will be completely exhausted.*
> *Due to that, they will also be able to overcome*
> *The attachment of mundane desire.* [3.11]
>
> The term concentration of the so-called 'concentrations' [above], being an illustrative meaning, holds also the absorptions and immeasurables.
>
> As taught in the *Third Bodhisattva Ground* [of the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:
>
> 1. The bodhisattva who abides on this Luminous Ground of the bodhisattvas is isolated from desire, is isolated from evil, non-virtuous practices. Achieving the first concentration having joy and happiness, generated from isolation, having investigation, having analysis – he abides.
> 2. Separated from investigation and analysis, and completely pure inside; achieving the second concentration having joy and happiness generated from meditative stabilization, without investigation, without analysis as it is a single continuum of consciousness – he abides.
> 3. Abiding in equanimity separated from attachment to joy and having mindfulness and alertness, he experiences bodily happiness, the "equanimity possessing mindfulness

> and alertness" which is expressed by the Arya. Achieving the third concentration without joy, he abides.
>
> 4. Abandoning also that happiness, being neither happy nor suffering – since earlier suffering was abandoned and mental happiness and mental unhappiness disappeared – equanimity and mindfulness completely pure, achieving the fourth concentration, he abides.
>
> The aforesaid are the four concentrations.

Chandrakirti's root text says: "On that ground, the Conqueror's children [obtain] concentrations." In other words, a third ground bodhisattva attains many qualities such as the concentrations, clairvoyances, and so forth. The word "concentrations" in the root text also illustrates the absorptions and immeasurables. "The absorptions" includes the four absorptions of the form realm and the four of the formless realm. The four absorptions of the form realm are the first, second, third, and fourth concentrations. The first concentration is said to have five branches, the scriptural reference for this being the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds,* which is cited above.

The five branches of the first concentration are:
(1) Investigation and (2) analysis – the antidotal branches – which are antidotes to the attachment to pleasant sense objects,
(3) joy and (4) bliss – the benefit branches – are generated from isolation, meaning that they are generated through isolation from non-virtue and the attachment of the desire realm, and
(5) meditative stabilization, the basis branch.

The state possessing these five branches is an actual meditative absorption of the first concentration. Prior to achieving this, there are three types of preparations:
1. mental contemplation of a mere beginner,
2. mental contemplation pacifying afflictions, and
3. mental contemplation of Not Unable.

The mental contemplation of a mere beginner is included in calm abiding. It is defined as: a meditative stabilization supported on the bliss of pliancy that is able to abide on its object single-pointedly as long as wished by way of the nine mental abidings. Someone who attains this is said to have achieved the mental contemplation of a mere beginner.

The mental contemplation pacifying afflictions is the same as the preparation included in special insight. It has six divisions:
1. the mental contemplation of individual knowledge of the character,
2. the mental contemplation arisen from belief,
3. the mental contemplation of thorough isolation,
4. the mental contemplation of withdrawal or joy
5. mental contemplation of analysis, and
6. the mental contemplation of final training.

1. The mental contemplation of individual knowledge of the character means that, on the basis of calm abiding, one analyzes the disadvantages of the desire realm and the advantages of the first concentration. In this way one comes to see the desire realm as coarse and the form realm as peace. This is not an actual special insight but a similitude of special insight.

2. The mental contemplation arisen from belief is the generation of the bliss of mental and physical pliancy induced by analysis. At this point one has attained a union of calm abiding and special insight.
3. The mental contemplation of thorough isolation is divided into small, middling, and great. Each of these is further divided into an uninterrupted path and a path of release, both of which are mundane. The attachment of the desire realm is also divided into three – great, middling, and small – each of which are further subdivided into three for a total of nine levels of attachment of the desire realm, the great of the great and so forth. The three divisions of mental contemplation of thorough isolation, the small, middling, and great, oppose respectively the great of the great, the middling of the great, and the small of the great levels of attachment of the desire realm. After each of these uninterrupted paths, a path of release is generated.
4. The mental contemplation of withdrawal or joy is also divided into small, middling, and great. These oppose respectively the great of the middling, the middling of the middling, and the small of the middling levels of attachment of the desire realm. After each of these uninterrupted paths, a path of release is generated. In this way, six levels of attachment of the desire realm have been abandoned.
5. With the mental contemplation of analysis this person now examines whether all the afflictions of the desire realm have been abandoned. Thereby, he comes to realize that the great of the small, the middling of the small, and the small of the small levels of attachment of the desire realm have yet to be abandoned.
6. The mental contemplation of final training is also divided into three levels, the great, middling, and small. These oppose respectively the great of the small, the middling of the small, and the small of the small levels of attachment of the desire realm. After each of these uninterrupted paths, a path of release is generated.

This last path of release is the actual meditative absorption of a first concentration, which has the five branches: (1) investigation and (2) analysis, the antidotal branches; (3) joy and (4) bliss, the benefit branches; and (5) meditative stabilization, the basis branch.

The <u>second concentration has four branches</u>:
(1) internal clarity, the antidotal branch,
(2) joy and (3) bliss – the benefit branches – which are generated by a meditative stabilization lacking investigation and analysis, and
(4) meditative stabilization, the basis branch.
In order to achieve the second concentration, one sees investigation and analysis as coarse and strives to become free from them. There are also six preparations leading up to the second concentration. In some texts, there are said to be eight preparations.

The <u>third concentration has five branches</u>:
(1) mindfulness, (2), introspection, and (3) equanimity, the antidotal branches,
(4) happiness of mind (*sems bde*) – happiness without joy – the benefit branch, and
(5) meditative stabilization, the basis branch

The <u>fourth concentration has four branches</u>:
(1) thoroughly pure equanimity (the equanimity that is a compositional factor) and (2) thoroughly pure mindfulness, the antidotal branches,
(3) thoroughly pure equanimity feeling, the benefit branch, and
(4) meditative stabilization, the basis branch.

One who has achieved the first concentration has abandoned all the afflictions of the desire realm, one who has achieved the second concentration has abandoned the afflictions of the first concentration,

one who has achieved the third concentration has abandoned the afflictions of the second concentration, and one who has achieved the fourth concentration has abandoned the afflictions of the third concentration. In order to abandon the afflictions of the fourth concentration, one must achieve an actual meditative absorption of the formless realm.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The four formless absorptions are like this:
>
> 1. Perfectly passing beyond the discrimination of form in any way, since the discriminations of obstruction disappeared and the various discriminations are not attended to; having considered "space is infinite", achieving the entrance of infinite space, he abides.
> 2. Perfectly passing beyond the entrance of infinite space in all ways, having considered "consciousness is infinite", achieving the entrance of infinite consciousness, he abides.
> 3. Perfectly passing beyond the entrance of infinite consciousness in all ways, having considered "nothing at all exists", achieving the entrance of nothing at all, he abides.
> 4. Perfectly passing beyond the entrance of nothing at all in all ways, having considered "[gross] discrimination does not exist, [subtle] discrimination is not non-existent", achieving the entrance of without [gross] discrimination, not without [subtle] discrimination, he abides.
>
> The aforesaid are the four formless absorptions.

In order to achieve the first formless absorption one must achieve the various preparations through seeing the fourth concentration as coarse and infinite space as peace.

The formless absorptions are distinguished in terms of their observed objects, whereas the concentrations are distinguished in terms of their branches. The four formless absorptions are infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, and the peak of existence. The meditative absorption of infinite space discriminates all phenomena as infinite space, the meditative absorption of infinite consciousness discriminates all phenomena as infinite consciousness, and the meditative absorption of nothingness discriminates all phenomena as nothingness. The meditative absorption of the peak of existence is without coarse discrimination but not without subtle discrimination. It is said in the texts that the fourth formless absorption is not suitable as a base of an uncontaminated path because it is unclear. In addition, the mind of the desire realm is also not suitable as a base of an uncontaminated path because it is too coarse.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *On this ground the conqueror child has the concentrations*
> *And clairvoyances. Desire and hatred are extinguished.*
> *Always he is able to overcome*
> *The world's lustful desires as well.* [3.11]
>
> Just as on the third ground a conqueror child has the pure perfection of patience, so he attains the four pure concentrations. This implies that he also attains the four pure formless absorptions – limitless space, limitless consciousness, nothingness, and the peak of cyclic existence – as well as the four pure immeasurables – love, compassion, joy, and equanimity – and the five pure clairvoyances – magical creations, the divine ear, knowing others' minds, remembering former lives, and the divine eye.

The concentrations are a very stable mind; to achieve these one needs mindfulness and introspection. For this reason, one should never be parted from mindfulness and introspection in daily life.

Tuesday morning, 21 March 2000

In the *Compendium of Mahayana Sutras* it says that all four concentrations and four formless absorptions have eight preparations:

1. the mental contemplation of a mere beginner
2. the mental contemplation of individual knowledge of the character,
3. the mental contemplation of belief,
4. the mental contemplation of isolation,
5. the mental contemplation of joy-withdrawal
6. the mental contemplation of analysis,
7. the mental contemplation of final training, and
8. the mental contemplation of the result of final training.

The first seven are actual preparations, while the last is an actual meditative absorption. That the eighth is called a preparation is a case of giving the name of the cause to the result.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary then sets out the four immeasurables through quoting the *Third Bodhisattva Ground*:

> The four immeasurables are like this:
>
> 1. A vast and extensive mind possessing love; impartial, immeasurable and unresentful, matchless, unobscured, and harmless. Since pervading to all – having been bounded by the sphere of dharma, reached the limits of space and pervaded the worlds possessing all – achieving, he abides.
>
> Similarly, "the vast minds
>
> 2. possessing compassion,
> 3. possessing joy, and
> 4. possessing equanimity"
>
> are like the former.

Immeasurable love is a vast and extensive mind in the sense that it extends without partiality to all the sentient beings who pervade the limits of space. This love is immeasurable and without resentment. It is matchless in that it has no equal. It is without harm. Just as everything is pervaded by the sphere of reality, likewise love pervades the limits of space. Love is an awareness that observing all sentient beings wishes them to have happiness. In the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* it says that the empowering condition of immeasurable love is an actual meditative absorption of a concentration or the final concentration. Therefore, without achieving an actual meditative absorption of a concentration one cannot have immeasurable love. For this reason Chandrakirti first sets out the four concentrations and four formless absorptions before setting out the four immeasurables. However, the recitation of the formula of the four immeasurables is included in many practices and sadhanas, whereby at least one generates them in one's imagination.

The remaining immeasurables have the same qualities in that they too are: "impartial, immeasurable and unresentful, matchless, unobscured, and harmless. Since pervading to all – having been bounded by the sphere of dharma, reached the limits of space and pervaded the worlds possessing all." Therefore, immeasurable compassion also observes all sentient beings and possesses

these qualities. Compassion itself is defined as an awareness that, observing sentient beings, wishes them to be free from suffering. Likewise, immeasurable joy has the above qualities. Joy is an awareness that, observing sentient beings, wishes them to be not be separated from happiness. This happiness is in particular the happiness that they already possess, such as the happiness of a rebirth of high status or the happiness of definite goodness. Immeasurable equanimity also has the above qualities. Equanimity is a state free of being close and distant to sentient beings due to, respectively, attachment and hatred for them. In the Yamantaka sadhana, equanimity is said to be the state in which one abides having become free from the eight conceptions of apprehenders and apprehendeds, whereas in the Heruka sadhana, it is said to be the state in which one abides having become free of the root and secondary afflictions.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary then sets out the five clairvoyances through quoting the *Third Bodhisattva Ground*. The first is the clairvoyance of magical emanation:

> The five clairvoyances are like this:
>
> 1. He experiences many types of performances of magical emanations: he shakes the earth; having been one, they become many; having been many, they become one; being visible and becoming invisible; traveling directly into walls, traveling directly into barriers, and traveling directly into mountains; unobstructed, as if in space.

Here the sutra lists the various types of clairvoyance of magical emanation such as shaking the earth, transforming one into many and many into one, becoming visible or invisible, and passing through walls, barriers, and mountains without obstruction. Chandrakirti continues to quote the *Third Bodhisattva Ground* in this regard:

> He travels crossed-legged in space, as if a feathered bird. He raises above the ground and enters it burrowing, as if in water. He travels on the water, not sinking, as if on earth. With his body he acts to emit smoke, acts to blaze, as if a mass of fire; and sending forth great streams of water, as if a great cloud. Even [fires] strongly spreading everywhere and blazing, blazing everywhere, and strongly blazing in these great thousand, three thousand world systems, becoming one flame, are extinguished by those streams of water. Even the two, the moon and sun, with great emanations like this, great strength like this, he holds and strokes with his hand. Up to the world of Brahma, he dominates with his body.
>
> The aforesaid is the clairvoyance of magical emanation.

One who achieves the clairvoyance of magical emanation is able to, for example, emanate fire blazing upward from his upper body and water flowing downward from his lower body. In addition, one is able to penetrate the earth as if sinking in water. In short, one with this clairvoyance dominates all the worlds up through the first concentration, the realm of Brahma. There is a story related to this about a king called Naluno who was a previous incarnation of Shakyamuni Buddha. This king dominated all four human continents but was not satisfied. He then gained control over the gods of the desire realm and then the realm of Brahma. However, upon reaching this level his karma to be ruler was exhausted and he fell back to the human continent.

With the clairvoyance of magical emanation one is said to be able to hold and shake the sun and the moon.

The second clairvoyance, the clairvoyance of divine ear, is set out by Chandrakirti through quoting the *Third Bodhisattva Ground*:

> 2. Since the completely pure divine ear element surpasses the human, he hears the sounds of gods and men; hears sounds minute and loud and those however far, however close, even to the extent of flies, flesh flies, bees, and insects.
>
> This is the clairvoyance of divine ear.

With the clairvoyance of divine ear one can hear faint and loud sounds at a distance of 100 *paktse* (yojana).

The third clairvoyance, the clairvoyance of knowing others' minds, is set out by Chandrakirti through quoting the *Third Bodhisattva Ground*:

> 3. With his mind thoroughly knowing just exactly as they really are the minds of other sentient beings and the minds of other persons, he thoroughly knows just exactly as they really are minds with attachment as minds with attachment – knows just exactly as they really are minds separated from attachment as minds separated from attachment. Similarly, [those] with hatred and separated from hatred, with confusion and separated from confusion, with delusions and without delusions, small and broad, become great, immeasurable, brief and extensive, equipoised and not equipoised, fully liberated and not fully liberated, faulty and faultless. He thoroughly knows just as they really are coarse minds called coarse minds, thoroughly knows just as they really are minds which are not coarse called minds which are not coarse. Hence, with his mind, he thoroughly knows just exactly as they really are the minds of other sentient beings and minds of other persons.
>
> The aforesaid is the clairvoyance of knowing others' minds.

With the clairvoyance of knowing others' minds one knows another person who has attachment as having attachment. Likewise, one knows another person who is separated from attachment as being separated from attachment. It is the same in the case of hatred and ignorance.

Attachment is defined as a mental factor that, motivated by improper conceptualization, observes a contaminated phenomenon and exaggerates its attractiveness. Hatred is defined as a mental factor that, motivated by improper conceptualization, observes a contaminated phenomenon and exaggerates its unattractiveness. Confusion is a state of mind that does not know the reality of an object. An affliction, in general, is defined as a mental factor that renders the mind unruly and agitated. One with the clairvoyance of knowing others' minds knows whether another person's mind is together with attachment, free from attachment, together with hatred, free from hatred, and so forth.

"Small and broad" mean respectively an uptight, agitated mind and a spacious, relaxed mind.

"Great" and "immeasurable" are not opposites while the following are: "brief and extensive, equipoised and not equipoised, fully liberated and not fully liberated, faulty and faultless." These are all said in relation to the mind and mental factors. "Brief and extensive" means that there are minds that like brief explanations and minds that like extensive explanations. "Equipoised and not equipoised" means that there are minds that are equipoised and those that are not equipoised single-pointedly on their objects. "Fully liberated and not fully liberated" are minds that are free from and not free from the bondage of the afflictions. "Faulty and faultless" means minds that are respectively together with and free from faults.

The sutra then says: "He thoroughly knows just as they really are coarse minds called coarse minds, thoroughly knows just as they really are minds which are not coarse called minds which are not coarse." These refer respectively to coarse and subtle minds, which can be posited in terms of their objects, such that if the object is coarse the mind is posited as coarse and vice versa. Coarse and subtle

minds can also be understood respectively in relation to sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness.

In short, Buddha says: "Hence, with his mind, he thoroughly knows just exactly as they really are the minds of other sentient beings and minds of other persons." Vasubandhu, in his text *Treasury of Knowledge* (v. 7.5), says:

> *It does not know levels, faculties, past persons, the ceased and the ungenerated.*

This means that, although one possesses clairvoyance, there are certain minds that cannot be known due to a difference in:

1. faculty,
2. time,
3. level, and
4. person.

For example, the first, faculty, means that someone with the clairvoyance knowing others' minds does not know the mind of someone with a sharper faculty who has higher realizations.

The fourth clairvoyance, the clairvoyance of remembering former states, is set out by Chandrakirti through quoting the *Third Bodhisattva Ground*:

> 4. Remembering many types of former states, he remembers one lifetime, two lifetimes, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, one hundred, one thousand. He remembers many hundreds of lifetimes, thousands of lifetimes, many hundred thousands of lifetimes, many hundred thousands of *kotis* (ten million) of lifetimes, many hundred thousands of *niyuta* (one hundred thousand million) of *kotis* of lifetimes, the eon of annihilation, the eon of formation, many eons of annihilation and formation. He remembers one hundred eons, remembers one thousand eons, remembers one hundred thousand eons, one *koti* of eons, one hundred *koti* of eons, one thousand *koti* of eons, from one hundred thousand *koti* of eons to many hundred thousand *niyutas* of *kotis* of eons.
>
> In such and such a place I was called such and such a name, called such and such a family, called such and such a caste – ate food like this, was capable of this much life, abided this long an extent, experienced happiness and suffering like this. "Having died and transferred from that, I was born in such and such a place; having died and transferred from that, I was born here", with their aspects, with their motives and with their reasons – thus he remembers many types of former lives.
>
> This is the clairvoyance of remembering former states.

With this clairvoyance one is able to remember one's own past lives, extending back many eons and is also able to remember one's name, caste, the food one ate, and so forth. In addition, one is able to remember the lives and situations of others. The name itself "the clairvoyance of remembering former states" indicates that one is able to remember the places where one was born in the past. With this clairvoyance, one sees one's former states and thereby determines to improve in the future. However, if one with such a clairvoyance says to someone else "In the past you were born in such and such a place and ate such and such food" and so forth it is quite likely that that person would not believe it. Thus, it is easier to verify the existence of the clairvoyance of magical emanation in that magical emanations can be seen with the eyes. Also one can verify the existence of clairvoyance knowing others' minds through the person who has it, who says "You are thinking such and such."

Clairvoyance comes about due to the specific cause of an actual meditative absorption of a concentration. In order to attain this one must first achieve a union of calm abiding and special insight. Prior to this, one must achieve calm abiding and special insight respectively through cultivating their respective causes. According to sutra, calm abiding and special insight are developed sequentially in that first one achieves calm abiding and then special insight. On the other hand, according to tantra, they can be attained simultaneously.

Tuesday afternoon, 21 March 2000

The fifth clairvoyance, the clairvoyance of divine eye, is set out by Chandrakirti through quoting the *Third Bodhisattva Ground*:

> 5. Since the completely pure divine eye surpasses the human, he sees sentient beings dying and transferring and being reborn, of pleasant color and unpleasant color, gone to happy and gone to bad [migrations], good and bad. He thoroughly knows just exactly as they really are, the sentient beings migrating just exactly in accordance with their karma. He thoroughly knows: "O, these sentient beings having faulty behavior of body, having faulty behavior of speech, having faulty behavior of mind, reviling the aryas, they possess wrong views. Due to the karma of wrong view, upon the disintegration of the body which was perfectly received, after death they are born in bad migrations, completely fallen, as hell beings.
>
> O these sentient beings having proper behavior of body, having proper behavior of speech, having proper behavior of mind, not reviling the aryas, they possess right view. Due to the karma of right view, upon the disintegration of the body which was perfectly received, after death they are born in happy migrations, in the world of high status, among the gods."
>
> Hence, since the completely pure divine eye surpasses the human, seeing sentient beings dying and transferring and being reborn, of p1easant color and unpleasant color – from the aforesaid until: "seeing all, with their aspects, with their motives and with their reasons, thoroughly knowing sentient beings migrating just exactly in accordance with karma."

With the clairvoyance of divine eye one knows when sentient beings will die and when they will be reborn. In addition, one knows what kind of rebirth they will take, with a pleasant and unpleasant color and so forth, and where they will be reborn, i.e., in a good or a bad migration. In short, one knows whether sentient beings will have a good or bad rebirth in accordance with the actions they created. Due to the three negative actions of body – killing, stealing, and sexual misconduct – and the four negative actions of speech – lying, divisive speech, harsh words, and idle talk – sentient beings are born in bad migrations. In addition, due to the three negative actions of mind, they are reborn in the bad migrations. Also due to reviling or deprecating superiors, sentient beings are reborn in the bad migrations. In relation to this citation, there is discussion as to whether or not reviling superiors is actually wrong view. In general, reviling or deprecating superiors means to deprecate qualities that they actually possess. The *Third Bodhisattva Ground* sutra says: "upon the disintegration of the body which was perfectly received, after death they are born in bad migrations."

On the other hand, when sentient beings have proper conduct of body, speech, and mind through engaging in the ten virtues, they will be reborn in good migrations.

One who possesses the clairvoyance of divine eye knows the kind of rebirth that sentient beings will take through knowing what kinds of causes sentient beings create and what their results will be.

The *Third Bodhisattva Ground* concludes (page 40), saying:

> Although absorbing and rising in these concentrations and absorptions, he is intent on them seen as fully completing the limbs of enlightenment; hence, other than rebirth through the power of having made prayers, he is not reborn by the power of those.
>
> If asked: "why is that?" Because the bodhisattva like this possesses a continuum of consciousness which strongly achieves through skill in means.
>
> is set forth.
>
> Hence, here, the concentrations and clairvoyances will arise in the bodhisattva.

Bodhisattvas take rebirth in cyclic existence, not due to proper or improper conduct, but by the force of prayer.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary then says:

> If asked: how will attachment and hatred be fully exhausted?
> The term 'and' means 'also', in order to include the unmentioned, his confusion, being exhausted.
>
> If asked: how?
> Also this, according to the *Sutra* it was taught:
>
> > By that, since all phenomena merely rely on conditions, a good deal more than by conceiving as merely without transference and merely without destruction, all fetters of desire will be diminished. All fetters of forms, fetters of existence, and fetters of ignorance will be diminished. The fetters which were views were abandoned earlier.
> >
> > The bodhisattva abiding on this Luminous Ground of the bodhisattvas will abandon wrong attachment not decreased in many hundred eons, many thousand eons, many hundred thousand eons, many *kotis* of eons through many hundred thousand *niyutas* of eons. He will abandon wrong hatred which was not [so] abandoned. He will abandon wrong confusion which was not abandoned.
> >
> > Hence, his attachment, hatred and confusion will be fully exhausted.
>
> If asked: in what way is he always able to overcome the attachment of the world's desire?
> As was taught:
>
> > O children of the Conqueror, this is a brief presentation of the third bodhisattva ground, called the Luminous. The bodhisattva abiding on it mostly becomes the deva king, deva lord, Indra; is trained and are the principal in achieving the means of completely averting all sentient beings' attachment to desire; and is skilled in extricating sentient beings from the mud of desire.
> >
> > Hence, the children of the Conqueror will be able to overcome attachment of the world's desire.

In this context, attachment, hatred, and confusion are the objects of abandonment of the mundane path of meditation. There are four fetters:

1. fetters of forms,
2. fetters of existence,
3. fetters of ignorance,
4. fetters of the desire realm.

"Fetters" here refers to the afflictions. To what do the afflictions bind one? They bind one to the pole of cyclic existence. The *fetters of the desire realm* are the attachment that binds one to pleasurable sense objects: forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. The *fetters of the form realm* [fetters of forms] are the attachment to the happiness of the concentrations. The *fetters of existence* are the fetters of the formless realm, i.e., the attachment to the happiness of the formless absorptions. Some people count the four fetters differently:

1. the fetters of the desire realm, which are attachment to the five pleasant sense objects,
2. the fetters of existence, which are attachment to the happiness of the concentrations and formless absorptions,
3. the fetters of ignorance, and
4. the fetters of views.

A fetter is that which impedes one from being free.

On the third ground, the fetters of forms, fetters of existence, and fetters of ignorance have become thin, whereas the fetters of view were abandoned previously. The fetters of view are acquired views that are abandoned on the path of seeing.

The sutra then says: "The bodhisattva abiding on this Luminous Ground of the bodhisattvas will abandon wrong attachment not decreased in many hundred eons..." This means that the third ground bodhisattva overcomes wrong attachment, wrong hatred, and wrong ignorance, which did not diminish over many hundreds of eons.

Q: Why is "wrong" attachment and so forth said?
A: Although this seems to imply a "right" attachment, "right" hatred, and "right" confusion, this has to be examined. Perhaps wrong is said in relation to the motivation; for example, the motivation that is improper conceptualization. Or perhaps the sutra says "wrong" in order to stop the thought that there are instants of right attachment and so forth. Some people think that attachment is something that brings benefit and is necessary, as without attachment there would be no sense to living. They think that without attachment one would be impotent whereas with attachment one can become a universal king. Also since human beings are the result of attachment, they think attachment is good. Some people also think that hatred or anger is good because due to it one is able to protect oneself and others from harm. Others think that the three mental poisons are positive because they can be taken into the path through the tantra vehicle.

However, it is difficult to explain why Buddha said "wrong confusion." Due to this, debate arises in terms of whether confusion can be taken as a path. Most answer that it is difficult to take confusion into the path. However, in the *Aralitantra* it is said that confusion can be taken into the path. When commentary is given on this tantra, it is explained that this is not *actual* confusion in that it is not ignorance. Then what is it? It is said to imply using sleep as a path. Sleep is said to be a type of ignorance in that it does not perceive anything.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Though he enters into and rises from the concentrations and formless absorptions, he is intent on seeing the thorough completion of the causes of enlightenment. Thus, he is born by the power of prayer petitions and not by that of these worldly concentrations and formless absorptions. Though he did indeed attain these on the first ground, here he attains a training in higher meditative stabilization far superior to what he had on the preceding grounds. Since there are [now] greater doubts about whether he might be reborn by the power of these concentrations and absorptions, it is discussed here [in connection with the third ground].
>
> On this ground an extinguishment of desire and hatred is attained. The word 'and' [in the second line of stanza 38] means 'also' and includes an unmentioned extinguishment of ignorance. This 'extinguishment' is not complete because the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says that all the four fetters

> – desire, form [attachment to the form realm], existence [attachment to the formless realm], and ignorance – are diminished [not completely destroyed].
>
> According to Asanga's *Bodhisattva Levels (Bodhisattvabhumi)* the meaning of these is that through the power of meditative stabilization in the worldly concentrations and formless absorptions one becomes free from attachment to [the realms of] desire, form, and formlessness – this being an abandonment of the manifest as explained before. Therefore, the sutra distinctly says 'diminished'. Also, the fetters are clearly those explained in the *Knowledges* [and not the uncommon afflictions as explained in the Prasangika system].

There is the doubt concerning whether a third ground bodhisattva takes rebirth in cyclic existence by the power of the concentrations and formless absorptions since he has attained a superior higher training in meditative stabilization. However, the third ground bodhisattva takes rebirth not by the power of the concentrations and formless absorptions but by the power of prayer. This, in fact, occurs from the first ground onward.

On the other hand, when someone takes rebirth in cyclic existence by the power of the concentrations and formless absorptions, it is by the power of actions (karma) and afflictions. One takes rebirth in cyclic existence due to projecting karma and actualizing karma. The preparations for the concentrations and formless absorptions are projecting karmas, whereas the actual meditative absorptions are actualizing karmas. In terms of the twelve links, the preparations are the second link, that of karmic formations, whereas the actual meditative absorptions are the tenth link, that of existence. Thus, the unfluctuating karma that brings rebirth in the upper realms is the preparations for these eight levels, the four concentrations and four formless absorptions. This subject can be debated, asking: "If it is a preparation is it pervaded by being a projecting karma and if it is an actual meditative absorption is it pervaded by being an actualizing karma?"

There are three higher trainings: (1) the higher training in ethics, (2) the higher training in mind, or concentration, or meditative stabilization, and (3) the higher training in wisdom. The surpassing higher training of ethics is attained on the second ground. The surpassing higher training of meditative stabilization is attained on the third ground. The higher training of wisdom is composed of three parts: (1) the wisdom skilled in the coarse and subtle aspects of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, which is posited on the fourth ground; (2) the wisdom skilled in the coarse and subtle four noble truths, which is posited on the fifth ground; and (3) the wisdom skilled in both the forward and reverse orders of the twelve links, which is posited on the sixth ground. When the latter wisdom is attained on the sixth ground, one attains a surpassing higher training in wisdom.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Also, the fetters are clearly those explained in the *Knowledges* [and not the uncommon afflictions as explained in the Prasangika system]."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> On this, the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* [quoted in Chandrakirti's commentary] says, 'The fetters which are views were abandoned earlier.' Some explain this as meaning that the latter three views [perverse view, conceiving bad ethics as well as codes of behavior as superior, and conceiving bad views as superior] were abandoned on the path of seeing, but it should be taken as referring to having abandoned [all] five artificial views on the first ground [including that of the transitory collection as real 'I' and 'mine' and views holding to extremes].

Among the five views, the view of the transitory collection is that which holds to a real 'I' or 'mine.' A view holding to extremes is a view holding that the 'I' or 'mine' conceived by the view of the transitory collection does not exist or holding that the 'I' or 'mine' conceived by the view of the transitory collection exists truly. These are respectively the extreme of annihilation and the extreme of permanence.

Wrong view is the view holding the Three Jewels and the law of actions and results to not exist. The view holding bad views as supreme is the view holding either the view of the transitory collection or the view of extremes as supreme. The view holding bad ethics and conduct as supreme is the view conceiving bad ethics to be good ethics and bad conduct to be good conduct. The five acquired views are abandoned by the bodhisattva on the first ground.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Asanga's *Bodhisattva Levels* says, 'The fetters which are views were abandoned [in manifest form] first from the level of engagement through belief [on the paths of accumulation and preparation] by believing in the suchness that is the nature of phenomena.' Further on, the sutra says that wrong desire, hatred, and ignorance which had not decreased over a hundred trillion eons are abandoned on the third ground. This refers to abandoning the seeds, which in turn refers to the objects of abandonment of this ground in the context of the abandonment of the six levels of gross and middling innate afflictions – these being abandoned on the path of meditation by means of the second through seventh grounds.
>
> In commenting, Chandrakirti does not clearly state either that the artificial afflictions are abandoned on the first ground or that the innate afflictions are abandoned from the second ground. However, Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* explains that until the eighth ground is attained, the seeds of all afflictions are not removed [stanzas 455-6], that the conception of true existence is assigned as an affliction [stanza 35], that until that conception is removed the view of the transitory is not removed [stanza 35], and that the three links [view of the transitory collection as real 'I' and 'mine', afflicted doubt, and viewing bad ethics and codes of discipline as superior] are abandoned on the first ground [stanza 441]. Therefore, it is extremely clear that afflictions in general are divided into two [artificial and innate] and that the view of the transitory in particular must be divided in the same way.

(Note: "the three links" can also be translated as "the three thorough entanglements" [Tib. *kun sbyor*].)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) continues:

> In this system which identifies the conception of true existence as an affliction, when an affliction is abandoned by a non-contaminated path, a seed of the conception of true existence is necessarily abandoned. This abandonment can in no way remove a portion of the predispositions for erroneous dualistic appearance which are other than the seeds of the conception of true existence and which are assigned as the obstructions to omniscience. Therefore, the obstructions to omniscience are not abandoned until all the afflictions are extinguished. The obstructions to omniscience are abandoned on the three pure grounds [eighth, ninth, and tenth].

Wednesday morning, 22 March 2000

The first stanza of the third chapter mentions burning the fuel of the knowledge obstructions, saying:

> *Because a light arises of the fire which burns the*
> *Entire fuel of objects of knowledge, this third ground:*
> *Luminous – …* [3.1abc]

This needs to be explained in more detail.

In presenting our own tradition's presentation of the two obstructions, Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (pp. 171-172) sets out two outlines (see supplementary study material, Feb. 21, 2000):

1 Explaining the presentation of the two obstructions
2 On what path and in what way are the two obstructions abandoned

1 Explaining the presentation of the two obstructions
A Explanation of the afflictive obstructions
B Explanation of the knowledge obstructions

1A Explanation of the afflictive obstructions

The definition of an afflictive obstruction: an obstruction which mainly hinders the attainment of liberation. When divided: acquired and innate.

The definition of an acquired afflictive obstruction: that which is included in either (1) possessing a concomitance with afflictions arising due to the influence of tenets polluting one's continuum or (2) a seed produced by that. When divided: the manifested acquired and the factor of a seed.

The definition of an innate afflictive obstruction: that which is included in either (1) possessing a concomitance with afflictions arising due to the influence of beginningless latencies in one's continuum and not arising due to the influence of tenets polluting one's continuum or (2) a seed produced by that. When divided: the manifested and the factor of a seed.

There is debate concerning this, asking: "Is an afflictive obstruction pervaded by being 'an obstruction which mainly hinders the attainment of liberation'?" In the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* the definition of an afflictive obstruction is given as: one of the two obstructions abiding in a type of obstruction that mainly hinders the attainment of liberation. The words "abiding in a type" imply that an afflictive obstruction is not pervaded by being "an obstruction which mainly hinders the attainment of liberation."

If someone says that an afflictive obstruction is pervaded by being an obstruction which mainly hinders the attainment of liberation, then it can be asked: "Is the attachment which is a branch of altruism in the continuum of a bodhisattva superior an afflictive obstruction? Is it that which mainly hinders the attainment of liberation? If it is, whose liberation does it hinder?" This attachment does not hinder other beings' liberation and it does not mainly hinder the bodhisattva superior's attainment of liberation. This is because it is an attachment that is a branch of others' benefit and helps to attain liberation.

The definition of an acquired afflictive obstruction says: "possessing a concomitance with afflictions arising due to the influence of tenets polluting one's continuum." This means that due to studying tenets, one accepts that a person or pot truly exists. For example, due to studying the tenets of the Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, or Chittamatrins one comes to assert that person and pot are truly existent. This person has a conception of true existence of persons that is an acquired afflictive obstruction. Concomitant with this conception of true existence of persons there can be attachment, hatred, or pride. The conception of true existence itself is ignorance. In short, the conception of true existence, the afflictions concomitant with it, and the seeds of this conception are all acquired afflictive obstructions. Do sentient beings who have not studied tenets, such as birds, antelopes, and so forth, have these acquired afflictive obstructions? They do not, they only have innate afflictive obstructions.

Acquired afflictive obstructions are divided into: the manifested acquired and the factor of a seed. The manifested acquired afflictive obstruction is a consciousness, while the factor of a seed is a potential deposited by a previous affliction that is able to induce a subsequent affliction.

When a bodhisattva attains the path of release of the path of seeing, he has abandoned all the acquired afflictive obstructions. Likewise, when a hearer attains the sixteenth moment of subsequent knowledge of true paths, he has abandoned all acquired afflictive obstructions. This is because hearers abandon the objects of abandonment serially. In other words, hearers attain the sixteen forbearances and knowledges serially. On the other hand, bodhisattvas attain all eight forbearances simultaneously and attain all eight knowledges simultaneously. This is because bodhisattvas abandon the objects of abandonment simultaneously. In short, they simultaneously abandon the afflictions of the three realms in relation to the four noble truths.

Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen gives the definition of an innate afflictive obstruction as: that which is included in either (1) possessing a concomitance with afflictions arising due to the influence of beginningless latencies in one's continuum and not arising due to the influence of tenets polluting one's continuum or (2) a seed produced by that.

Afflictions such as attachment, hatred, and pride can be concomitant with the conception of true existence. When attachment is concomitant with the innate conception of true existence, hatred is not concomitant with it. There is debate about this in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* in the context of determining how many root and secondary afflictions are present in the retinue of a single main mind. Thus, there can be more than one. We know from our own experience that attachment arises without depending on reasoning but through merely perceiving an object. This is an example of an innate affliction. Acquired afflictions, on the other hand, arise in dependence on a process of reasoning and the study of tenets. The Tibetan word for 'tenet' (*grub mtha'*) literally means "establishing boundaries," the etymology being to reach a conclusion by way of reasoning.

There are many latencies in our continua that have been deposited since beginningless time due to which afflictions arise. There are two divisions of innate afflictive obstructions: the manifested and the factor of a seed. The manifested are the afflictions that arise in the mind. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, there is a difference between the manifest (*mngon gyur*) and the manifested (*mngon gyur ba*). If it is manifested (*mngon gyur ba*) it is not pervaded by being manifest (*mngon gyur*). This is because the manifest (*mngon gyur*) is: that which is the object of direct perception of any of the six engaging consciousnesses. An illustration of that which is manifested but not manifest is a manifested conception of the true existence of pot due to being polluted by tenets. It is not manifest because the conception of true existence of pot is not directly perceived by any of the six engaging consciousnesses. On the other hand, if it were manifest it would be pervaded by being directly perceived by any of the six engaging consciousnesses. It is manifested because it is a consciousness apprehending both an observed object and aspect. A factor of seed is not manifested because it does not apprehend an observed object and aspect, i.e., it is not a consciousness. This discussion of manifest and manifested is specific to this context of manifested and seed. In other contexts, there is no such distinction; for example, is a rice seed manifest (*mngon gyur*) or hidden? For the Prasangika Madhyamikas the manifest and the directly perceivable are mutually inclusive. In the lower schools 'direct perceiver' (*mngon sum*) is pervaded by being a consciousness, whereas for the Prasangika Madhyamikas it is not. To avoid confusion this latter is translated into English as "directly perceivable."

Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 172) then continues:

1B Explanation of the knowledge obstructions

The definition of a knowledge obstruction: an obstruction which mainly hinders the attainment of omniscience. When divided: the manifest and the factor of a seed.

> The definition of a manifest knowledge obstruction: that abiding in a type of obstruction occurring in the continuum of a learner superior who has abandoned all conceptions of true existence without exception, being a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance which is the appearance of one's object, forms and so forth, as truly existent. For example, a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance which is the appearance of the objects of the six engaging consciousnesses, forms and so forth, as truly existent.
>
> The definition of a seed of a knowledge obstruction: that abiding in a type of obstruction occurring in the continuum of a learner superior who has abandoned all conceptions of true existence without exception which arises through the depositing of an uncommon imprint by the conception of true existence which is its cause and is the substantial cause for mistaken dualistic appearance which is its result.
>
> The division of knowledge obstruction into the two, acquired and innate, is not feasible because there is no acquired knowledge obstruction since there is no knowledge obstruction which is an object of abandonment of the path of seeing. Therefore, there is no knowledge obstruction which is a consciousness because the conception of true existence is not a knowledge obstruction.

There are no knowledge obstructions which are consciousnesses. Thus, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas a knowledge obstruction is a latency or potentiality. Yet knowledge obstruction is divided into the manifest and the factor of a seed.

Q: Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa says that there is a knowledge obstruction which is consciousness. However, here Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen says that there is no knowledge obstruction which is a consciousness. Why is this?
A: This is because Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen says that the conception of true existence is not a knowledge obstruction. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas, if it is a conception of true existence it is pervaded by not being a knowledge obstruction because it is an afflictive obstruction. For the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, the conception of true existence is a knowledge obstruction; therefore, for the Svatantrikas there is a knowledge obstruction that is a consciousness.

Q: Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen gives as an example of a manifest knowledge obstruction "a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance which is the appearance of the objects of the six engaging consciousnesses, forms and so forth, as truly existent." Jamyang Shepa says that there is a knowledge obstruction which is a consciousness because that which is mistaken, "a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance," is necessarily a consciousness.
A: Is a person pervaded by being a consciousness because a person makes mistakes? Is an eye consciousness of a bodhisattva of the tenth ground a knowledge obstruction because it is a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance? It follows that it is because to his eye consciousness forms and so forth appear to exist truly. Kensur Pema Gyeltsen discusses the factor of mistaken dualistic appearance and the appearance of true existence.

Q: The Tibetan term *den 'dzin* is usually translated as "conception of true existence." Does the eye consciousness have *den 'dzin*?
A: It does not. It has the appearance of true existence but it does not conceive, grasp, hold, or apprehend (*'dzin*) true existence (*den*). That which appears is not pervaded by being apprehended. For this reason different types of objects are posited – appearing object, object of the mode of apprehension, and so forth. For the Svatantrika Madhyamikas the object of negation, true existence,

does not appear to an eye consciousness, whereas for the Prasangika Madhyamikas it does appear. This difference is due to the object of negation being posited differently by these tenets. For the Svatantrika Madhyamikas the measure of true existence, the object of negation, is: an object established by way of its own objective uncommon mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. Since this does not appear to an eye consciousness, for the Svatantrika Madhyamikas true existence does not appear to an eye consciousness.

Eye consciousnesses apprehend color and shape; they do not apprehend true existence. True existence does appear to an eye consciousness, but the eye consciousness does not apprehend it. On the other hand, if an eye consciousness did apprehend true existence, the eye consciousness would be an object of abandonment.

Q: Why can this object of negation not appear to an eye consciousness?
A: A form which is not posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness cannot appear to an eye direct perceiver. In other words, that which is superimposed by conception cannot appear to an eye consciousness.

For the Prasangika Madhyamikas the measure of true existence, the object of negation, is: existence from its own side or independent existence. A form that appears to eye consciousness appears to exist from its own side. The factor of appearing from its own side is the factor of true existence. [Therefore, true existence does appear to an eye consciousness.]

Wednesday afternoon, 22 March 2000

Kensur Pema Gyeltshen's commentary says that both Lama Tsongkhapa and Gyeltshap Je assert that there is no knowledge obstruction which is consciousness. In a *Dose of Emptiness,* Khedrup Je presents the definitions of the two types of obstructions, these being similar to those in *General Meaning*. He also divides the afflictive obstructions into the manifested and a factor that is a seed and likewise their definitions are similar.

Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 173) continues:

2 In what way on which path are the two obstructions abandoned
- A In what way on which path are the afflictive obstructions abandoned
- B In what way on which path are the knowledge obstructions abandoned

2A In what way on which path are the afflictive obstructions abandoned

From the point of view of the hinayana, one begins to abandon the afflictive obstructions from the dharma forbearance of true sufferings of the hinayana path of seeing and the attainment of hinayana foe destroyer and the abandonment of the afflictive obstructions occur simultaneously.

From the mahayana point of view, one begins to abandon the afflictive obstructions from the dharma forbearance of true sufferings of the mahayana path of seeing and the attainment of the eighth ground and the abandonment of the afflictive obstructions occur simultaneously.

2B In what way on which path are the knowledge obstructions abandoned

One begins to abandon the knowledge obstructions from the attainment of the eighth

> ground and the attainment of an exalted knower of all aspects and the abandonment of the knowledge obstructions occur simultaneously. Until the attainment of the eighth ground one does not begin to abandon the knowledge obstructions because until one who did not previously precede in the hinayana path attains the eight ground the conception of true existence is not abandoned and without having abandoned all conceptions of true existence without exception, one does not begin to abandon the knowledge obstructions.

The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that for a bodhisattva definite in the mahayana lineage, the attainment of foe destroyer, which is the abandonment of the afflictive obstructions, and the attainment of tathagata, which is the abandonment of the knowledge obstructions, occur simultaneously. This is discussed in detail in the *Compendium of Knowledge* in the context of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas' assertion that the conception of true existence is a knowledge obstruction and not an afflictive obstruction.

Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 173-4) continues:

> Therefore, there exists a way in which one on the uninterrupted path of the mahayana path of seeing abandons the conceptions to be abandoned by the path of seeing; it is that he abandons them from the point of view of abandoning their seeds. This is because (1) approaching the generation of an uninterrupted path of the mahayana path of seeing in one's continuum and (2) approaching the cessation of the seeds of the conceptions to be abandoned by the path of seeing in one's continuum occur simultaneously, whereby their seeds are abandoned from the point of view of having simultaneously already generated the uninterrupted path of the mahayana path of seeing in one's continuum and already ceased the seeds of the conceptions to be abandoned by the path of seeing in one's continuum.
>
> It is a fact that there are no seeds of the conceptions to be abandoned by the path of seeing in the continuum of one on the uninterrupted path of the mahayana path of seeing, however, it can be asked, "Does he or does he not have the seeds of the conceptions to be abandoned by the path of meditation in his continuum?" (1) In the Svatantrika system he does not have them because, in that system, the consciousness in the continuum of one on the uninterrupted path of the mahayana path of seeing has already been transformed into an uncontaminated entity because the mental consciousness in his continuum is asserted to be the person who is the illustration of one on the uninterrupted path of the mahayana path of seeing, and, the mental consciousness having already been transformed into an uncontaminated entity, if there did exist the seeds of the conceptions to be abandoned by the path of meditation on it there would be the fault that it would follow as contaminated.
>
> (2) In the Prasangika Madhyamika system he *does have* the seeds of conceptions to be abandoned by the path of meditation in his continuum because, although the mental consciousness in his continuum has already become an uncontaminated entity, there is no contradiction in asserting that there are the seeds of the conceptions to be abandoned by the path of meditation existing on the mere 'I' in his continuum in that they assert the mere 'I' as the illustration of the person.

The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that there are no seeds of conceptions to be abandoned by the path of seeing in the continuum of one on the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing. Is there the conception of true existence in the continuum of one on the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing? Does this person have latencies in his continuum? What happens in subsequent attainment?

For the Prasangika Madhyamikas, latencies are stored on the mere 'I'; therefore, they do assert latencies but how do they posit them? This is discussed in the sixth chapter of *Supplement,* in which Chandrakirti says:

> *Since that is not inherently ceased, therefore,*
> *Because this [effect] is capable even without a basis of all.*
> *Ceased actions pass a long time in some, yet the action*
> *Should be understood as giving rise to the correct effect.* [6.39]

In *General Meaning*, there is an objection saying that there is no common locus of afflictive obstruction and knowledge obstruction (i.e., there is nothing which is both an afflictive obstruction and a knowledge obstruction), and so forth.

Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 178) says:

> Our own system: If it is asked what is the meaning of the passage in the autocommentary (in relation to v. 12.31) that says: "the latency of ignorance...?" It does have [a meaning] because saying "the latency of ignorance" indicates the illustration of knowledge obstruction; saying "[it] hinders the thorough distinguishing of objects of knowledge" indicates its definition; and saying "attachment and so forth," by the term 'and so forth,' not only indicates the latencies of afflictions as knowledge obstructions but also indicates them as the cause of the negative reflexes (*gnas ngan len*) of body and speech that occur in the continua of foe destroyers. A negative reflex of body is, for example, a foe destroyer's body jumping like a monkey due to the influence of latencies of attachment. A negative reflex of speech is, for example, a foe destroyer's calling others stupid females due to the influence of the latencies of hatred. A negative reflex of mind is an unclear mine regarding the difficult to realize, subtle objects of knowledge; for example, Maudgalyana, who, in spite of looking with clairvoyance for a long time for his mother who had been born in the hell of the worldly realm of Light Rays, did not realize where she was.

The passages from the autocommentary which are the bases of Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's commentary above are:

> Now, in terms of the strength that know the exhaustion of contaminations, it is explained:
>
> *Knowing the afflictions along with imprints of the conquerors that*
> *Will perish quickly due to the strength of knowing all aspects and*
> *The afflictions of the learners and so forth that are ceased by awareness –*
> *Unimpeded and infinite – is asserted as a strength.* [12.31]
>
> There, the afflictions are ignorance, attachment, and so forth because of afflicting the three worldly realms. That which subsequently proceeds to defile [or] stain the mind is an imprint. "Reaching the border of afflictions," "familiarity," "root" and "imprint" are equivalent. Even though the uncontaminated path has already abandoned the afflictions, all hearers and solitary realizers are unable to abandon them (i.e., imprints). Like, even though sesame oil, flowers, and so forth have already been removed, one observes subtle qualities by meeting with them in pots, woolen cloths, and so forth. Thus, since imprints exist although the afflictions are abandoned, even though arhats have already overcome the behavior of proceeding [by] jumping around, having been monkeys before arhats, and speaking to female servants, having been brahmins in the past, the opposite is also observed.

> There, the imprint of ignorance becomes an obstacle of fully distinguishing the objects of knowledge. The existence of the imprints of attachment and so forth are also causes of such kinds of operation of body and speech. Furthermore, the imprints of ignorance, attachment, and so forth are overcome only in the omniscient mind and buddha; they are not in others.

Note that Chandrakirti says: "'Reaching the border of afflictions,' 'familiarity,' 'root' and 'imprint' are equivalent."

The question here is as to whether the negative reflexes of body, speech, and mind of a foe destroyer are afflictive obstructions or knowledge obstructions. The answer is that they cannot be afflictive obstructions, since foe destroyers have abandoned all afflictive obstructions. According to the Vaibhashikas, these negative reflexes of body and speech are form. Is a negative reflex of mind, such as Maudgalyana not being able to see where his mother had been born, an ignorance or a knowledge obstruction? According to Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge,* it is an unafflicted ignorance. Kensur Pema Gyeltshen, in his commentary on the *Supplement,* gives the example of Shariputra who was not able to see the very subtle aggregate of morality of the tathagata. According to the Vaibhashikas, this inability to perceive [something subtle] is an ignorance. If it is asked, "Is ignorance not a root affliction?," it can be said that it is not a root affliction because there are two types of ignorance – that which is not a root affliction and that which is. If the Svatantrika Madhyamikas are asked to posit the six root afflictions, they could cleverly answer: "The attachment which is a root affliction, the hatred which is a root affliction," and so forth. Usually the root afflictions are posited as attachment, hatred, ignorance, pride, doubt, and afflicted view.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> One abiding on the third ground has mostly become an Indra, chief of the gods. He has become skilled in an ability always to overcome the lustful desires of worldly sentient beings. Becoming a leader, he is skilled in removing sentient beings from the mud of desire.
> The word 'also' appears in Nak-tso's translation as, 'He always abandons also lustful desire,' and this is most suitable.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Hence, it is indicated that "without doubt this bodhisattva on the bodhisattva's third ground will attain completely pure patience gone beyond, the concentrations, immeasurables, absorptions, clairvoyances and full exhaustion of attachment and so forth."

(Note: This phrase was incorrectly included under the next outline [2B1C-2A3C].)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A3C Distinguishing attribute of the first three perfections

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, having reached patience gone beyond, in order to clarify the presentation of (1) the differences of support of the first three [practices] gone beyond, (2) the nature of the collections and (3) the fully accomplished result, it is explained:

> *The three practices of generosity and so forth mostly,*
> *Were venerated by the Tathagata for householders,*
> *Also the collection of merit, just they*
> *[Are] the causes of the buddha body whose essence is form.* [3.12]

Indeed, only bodhisattvas are supports of giving and so forth which were explained, yet, nevertheless, it was expressed as stated in terms of two possibilities for them, due to the divisions of householders and monks.

There, for householders, mostly the three practices of generosity and so forth are easy to achieve; for monks, joyous effort, concentration, and wisdom are – still, one is not impossible for the other.

The collection of causes of buddhahood are two, the collection of merit and the collection of exalted wisdom. With regard to that, it is thoroughly presented saying, "the collection of merit is those very three gone beyond; the collection of exalted wisdom is concentration and wisdom: joyous effort is the cause of both."

There, that which is the collection of merit is the cause of the form body of the buddha bhagavan, the marvelous possessor of the character of hundreds of merits and having various unimaginable forms. The cause of the body which possesses the essence of Dharma, having a character without generation, is the collection of exalted wisdom.

The first three perfections are practices suitable for lay people, therefore, the Tathagata recommended that they practice them. In this context, the practice of generosity mainly refers to the generosities of giving material things and giving protection from fear; the practice of ethics is that of a householder or lay person; and the practice of patience is that of definitely thinking about Dharma. Here "Dharma" mainly refers to the emptiness which is the emptiness of inherent existence. Phenomena are empty of inherent existence because of being dependent-arisings. This means that all phenomena arise in dependence, in that all phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions and cease in dependence on causes and conditions. Therefore, when householders encounter difficulties they should think that such difficulties do not exist inherently but are dependent-arisings. Since they arise in dependence on causes and conditions, they also cease in dependence on causes and conditions. Thinking in this way, one is able to bear difficulties and the mind remains peaceful.

The Tathagata recommended that the ordained practice the fourth, fifth, and sixth perfections – joyous effort, concentration, and wisdom. These three are said to be easier to practice for ordained bodhisattvas [than for householder bodhisattvas]. However, this does not mean that lay and ordained bodhisattvas should not practice the other three perfections.

Thursday morning, 23 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti now clearly presents (1) the differences between those who are bases of [practicing] the first three perfections, (2) the nature of the collections, and (3) the fruit that is achieved. His root text says:
>
> > *The Sugata mainly praised these three practices*
> > *Of giving, ethics, and patience for householders.*
> > *These are also the collection of merit, the cause*
> > *Of a buddha body the nature of which is form.* [3.12]
>
> Both householder and monk bodhisattvas are indeed bases of [practicing] giving and so forth, but in terms of difficulty and ease of achievement, the three practices of giving, ethics, and patience are easier for householder bodhisattvas to achieve. Therefore, the Sugata praised these three for them.

> Of the two collections, that of merit consists of these three. It is the predominant cause of a buddha body whose nature is form.
>
> Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (399) says:
>
> > At that time [when you are a king] you should internalize
> > Firmly the practices of giving, ethics, and patience
> > Which were especially taught for householders
> > And which have an essence of compassion.
>
> Among the three practices which are easy for householder bodhisattvas, giving covers the donation of articles and bestowal of non-fright [taking bugs out of water, etc.]. Ethics is that of householders, and patience is mainly a mind determined about the doctrine. Effort, concentration, and wisdom are easier for monk bodhisattvas, but this does not mean that householders and monks do not have the other three perfections.
>
> The collection of wisdom consists of concentration and wisdom, which mainly cause the truth body. Effort is a cause of both collections.

There are bodhisattvas who are ordained and those who are householders, i.e., lay people. For householder bodhisattvas, it is easier to practice the first three perfections; for this reason the Buddha recommended them to these bodhisattvas. On the other hand, the remaining three perfections are easier for ordained bodhisattvas to practice; therefore, the Buddha recommended them to these bodhisattvas. However, these recommendations do not mean that both types of bodhisattvas should not practice all six perfections.

The first three perfections, generosity, ethics, and patience, comprise the collection of merit. This is because these practices are the main cause of achieving the form body of a buddha. The last two perfections, those of concentration and wisdom, comprise the collection of wisdom, which is the main cause of the truth body. Effort is the cause of both the form body and the truth body and is therefore included in both collections. Thus, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Effort is a cause of both collections."

Lama Tsongkhapa says that for householder bodhisattvas it is easier to practice two types of generosity: (1) the generosity of giving material things and (2) the generosity of giving protection from fear. Bestowing non-fear is, for example, to protect someone from the sufferings of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, sickness, and so forth. Because householders can do such practices, the Buddha recommended these to them.

The practice of ethics is also recommended for lay bodhisattvas. Here ethics refers to three types of vows:

(1) the male lay vows (Skt. *upasaka,* Tib. *dge bsnyen*),
(2) the female lay vows (*upasika*, Tib. *dge bsnyen ma*), and
(3) the 24-hour vows (Skt. *upavasa,* Tib. *bsnyen gnas*).

The 24-hour vows are taken on the eighth, fifteenth, and thirtieth of the lunar calendar. These vows are the same abandonments as those of the eight mahayana precepts. However, the eight 24-hour vows and the eight mahayana precepts differ from the point of view of both motivation and result. In the case of the 24-hour vows the motivation is renunciation (definite emergence), whereas in the case of the mahayana precepts, the motivation is the mind of enlightenment. The result of the 24-hour vows is the attainment of liberation, whereas the result of the eight mahayana precepts is omniscience. As in the case of the mahayana precepts, the 24-hour vows are taken for the period of one day and one night. An ordained person is not permitted to take these 24-hour vows, because he will degenerate his ordination in that he has already taken these vows for his life. Ordained people do the restoring and purifying ceremony *(gso sbyong)* on the 15th and 30th days of the lunar calendar in order to restore their vows. On the other hand, I have heard that the taking of the 24-hour vows is a lay person's method for restoring and purifying their vows. There is a question as to whether or not a lay person who has taken the lay vows for life can take these 24-hour vows. I think that this is possible, because when one

takes the lay vows for life, one does not take a vow to refrain from sexual conduct but promises not to engage in sexual *mis*conduct, whereas when one takes the 24-hour vows, one promises to refrain from sexual conduct for the period of 24 hours. Therefore, a lay person with vows for life should be able to take the 24-hour vows. However, nowadays it is common practice to take the eight mahayana precepts instead of the 24-hour vows.

When Lama Tsongkhapa says "Ethics is that of householders" this includes the taking of some or all of the five lay vows for life as well as the vow of pure conduct (*brahmacharya*). A lay person who takes all five vows does not take the vow of abandoning sexual conduct, but takes that of refraining from sexual misconduct. Those who take the vow of pure conduct must also refrain from sexual conduct.

On the other hand, the ethics of the ordained covers five types of vows:
(1-2) the two of fully ordained monks and nuns (Skt. *bhikshu, bhikshuni*, Tib. *dge slong, dge slong ma*),
(3-4) the vows of probationary nuns (Skt. *shikshamana*, Tib. *dge slob ma*), and
(5) the two of novice monks and nuns (Skt. *shramanera*, *shramanerika*, Tib. *dge tsul, dge tsul ma*).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A3D Conclusion by way of expressing the features of the third ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, having expressed the essence as great through the great essence of the support and so forth, to complete the section of the third bodhisattva ground, it is explained:
>
> *This Luminous One abiding in the sun – the Conqueror's child*
> *Having first perfectly dispelled all darkness included in himself,*
> *Strongly desires to completely destroy the darkness of migrators.* [3.13abc]
>
> This Luminous Ground, abiding in the sun of the Sugata's child, on the very occasion of generating, having dispelled the essence of unknowing which existed in his support which was the hindrance of arising [the third ground], desires to destroy the darkness which hinders the arising of the third ground of others, through finely showing an aspect like this.
>
> The bodhisattva:
>
> *Although very sharp on this ground, he will not become angry.* [3.13d]
>
> Although already engaged very sharply like the sun, since he overcame the darkness of faults – the destroyer of qualities – he will not become disturbed with faulty beings, because of very surpassing familiarity with patience and because his continuum has been oiled by compassion.

Just as the sun dispels darkness, the third ground bodhisattva dispels the darkness of unknowing in himself and others. This bodhisattva abandons all hindrances, the darkness of unknowing, upon actualizing the third ground. The darkness of unknowing is of as many types as there are objects of knowledge, but when condensed there are two:
(1) the ignorance that is an obscuration with respect to suchness and
(2) the ignorance that is an obscuration with respect to actions and results.
There are two types of motivations: (1) a causal motivation and (2) a temporal motivation. The causal motivation is the ignorance that is an obscuration with respect to suchness, while the temporal motivation is the ignorance that is an obscuration with respect to actions and results. Due to the temporal motivation, one creates non-virtuous actions. In some texts it says that the first link, ignorance, includes both the ignorance that is an obscuration with respect to suchness and the ignorance that is an obscuration with respect to actions and results. However, our own system says

that the ignorance that is the first link of dependent-arising is only the ignorance that is an obscuration with respect to suchness because the ignorance that is an obscuration with respect to actions and results has not existed since beginningless time.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *Abiding in the sun which is the conqueror child,*
> *The Luminous first completely dispels his darkness,*
> *Then seeks to overcome the darkness of migrators.*
> *On this ground, though very sharp, he does not get angry.* [3.13]
>
> As soon as it is generated, the Luminous Ground abiding in the sun – the bodhisattva – completely dispels the darkness of ignorance, included in his own continuum, that obstructs the arising of this ultimate ground. Through showing this aspect to others he then seeks to overcome the darkness obstructing the third ground for other migrators.
>
> Because a bodhisattva on the third ground overcomes the darkness of faults that destroy virtues, he becomes very sharp like the sun, but he does not get angry with faulty beings. This is because he has become extremely well accustomed to patience, and his continuum has been oiled with compassion.

Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary is similar to Chandrakirti's autocommentary.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> From the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way,"'* the Third Mind Generation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Such is the explanation of the third ultimate mind generation in the *Illumination of the Thought, An Extensive Explanation of Chandrakirti's 'Supplement to the Middle Way.'*

This concludes the third chapters of both the *Supplement* and *Illumination* on the third mind generation.

The main point of the third chapter is the surpassing perfection of patience. The first verse of this chapter says:

> *Because the light of the fire wholly consuming*
> *The fuel of objects of knowledge arises,*
> *This third ground is called the Luminous...* [3.1]

On the third ground there occurs a sign of the light of the exalted wisdom that burns the fuel of the knowledge obstructions. In this context, there is a discussion of the two types of obstructions: (1) afflictive obstructions and (2) knowledge obstructions.

Afflictive obstructions are those that mainly hinder the attainment of liberation, whereas knowledge obstructions are those that mainly hinder the attainment of omniscience. The subject of the afflictive obstructions becomes quite complex in the context of the assertions of the various schools. For example, the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that the two conceptions of self – the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena – are both afflictive obstructions. On the other hand, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, the conception of a self-sufficient

substantially existent person is an afflictive obstruction, whereas the conception of the true existence of phenomena is a knowledge obstruction. This means that for them the conception of a self of phenomena is not an afflictive obstruction but a knowledge obstruction. The two lower schools, the Vaibhashika and Sautrantika, do not assert the conception of a self of phenomena to be an object of abandonment because for them there does not exist a selflessness of phenomena in that phenomena are pervaded by being established as a self. This is discussed in detail in *Tenets*.

The subject of non-afflicted ignorance, which was mentioned briefly before, requires some further clarification. It can be asked: "If there is an ignorance that is not an affliction, what is posited as its illustration?" Non-afflicted ignorance is, for example, Maudgalyana's ignorance regarding his mother having been born in the hell beneath the northern continent Light Rays. Vasubandhu, in his *Treasury of Knowledge,* posits this is an example of a non-afflicted obscuration in that the Vaibhashikas assert both afflictive obscurations and non-afflictive obscurations. In one text, it says that this is an example of a non-afflicted ignorance in name only but is not ignorance. It also says that the latencies of the afflictions are *termed* non-afflicted ignorance but are not ignorance because latencies are not consciousnesses. In this view, there is no common locus of ignorance and knowledge obstruction.

The third chapter of the *Supplement* sets forth the inappropriateness of becoming angry and the appropriateness of patience. There are six different types of situations related to anger: (1) a bodhisattva with higher realizations becoming angry with a bodhisattva of lower realizations, (2) a bodhisattva with lesser realizations becoming angry with a bodhisattva of higher realizations, (3) the two, the base of anger and the object of anger, being of equal realizations, (4) a non-bodhisattva becoming angry with a bodhisattva, (5) a bodhisattva becoming angry with a non-bodhisattva, and (6) a non-bodhisattva becoming angry with a non-bodhisattva. However, in the text only five of these are set forth (the fifth being omitted) as in the case of Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 183) which says:

> (1) A bodhisattva of great power becoming angry with one of little power, (2) a bodhisattva of little power becoming angry with bodhisattva of great power, (3) a bodhisattva becoming angry with one of equal power, (4) a person who is not a bodhisattva becoming angry with a bodhisattva, (5) a person who is not a bodhisattva becoming angry with one who is not a bodhisattva.

Anger is said to destroy roots of virtue. Which roots of virtue are these? They are the roots of virtue accumulated by means of the practice of generosity and ethics over hundreds of eons. In brief, roots of virtue in this context are those that mainly comprise the collection of merit.

How are roots of virtue destroyed? There are three levels of destruction: (1) diminishment, (2) reduction, and (3) complete consumption. When it is said that anger destroys roots of virtue does this mean that the roots of virtue are made completely non-existent? Does anger completely annihilate the roots of virtue in one's continuum? It does not. It means that: (1) the potential of roots of virtue to bring about a result is weakened or diminished, (2) the fruition of the result of the roots of virtue is delayed, and (3) the potential of the roots of virtue to bring about a result is destroyed whereby there is no result. In short, we need to be careful about whom we get angry with since we do not know who is and who is not a bodhisattva!

There is a story in relation to this. Once there were four monks from Sera Monastery who went to Lhasa. When returning, they were heavily loaded and stopped to rest. They talked among themselves about the sangha. It is said in the teachings that a group of four monks is sangha and that one of them is a bodhisattva; these monks discussed who amongst themselves was that bodhisattva. They said maybe it was Chodze, who was well-dressed. They also decided that one of the monks,

Langdon, was definitely not a bodhisattva, and the conversation continued. In reality, however, Langdon was a bodhisattva who later became very well-known but at that time "Crazy Langdon," as he was called, was extremely humble, badly dressed, and so forth. He behaved very normally at that time, but later on he became a famous lama and people would line up to see him. Therefore, since one never knows from outer appearance alone who is a bodhisattva and who is not, one should be careful not to get angry and try to develop patience in all situations.

Q: In *Illumination* (Tib. page 98) there is a citation from sutra that appears in the *Treasury of Knowledge* which says:

> Actions cause fruition
> In cyclic existence – first the heavy,
> Then the proximate, then the accustomed,
> Then what was done before.

What is the difference between the proximate and that which was done before?
A: A heavy karma ripens before a lighter one. When two karmas are equal in heaviness the most proximate or recent ripens first. "Proximate" refers to whichever action was done nearest to the time of death. At the time of death, if two actions are equal in terms of proximity then the action that is most familiar will ripen first. If the two actions are equally familiar then that which was done first will ripen first.

Q: Previously, Geshe-la said that wrong view destroys both the roots of virtue created through application and those attained at birth, whereas harmful intent or anger only destroys those created through application. Why is this? There is a passage that says that when a bodhisattva who is about to achieve the path of preparation becomes angry at another bodhisattva he destroys the roots of virtue created over a hundred eons. However, some of these roots of virtue are attained at birth and not by application, so how is this?
A: I will check the scriptures. What I said was according to either the *Treasury of Knowledge* or the *Stages of the Path*. This doubt is relevant because when talking about so many eons it definitely involves roots of virtue attained at birth.

We have created many roots of virtue which are projecting karmas to be reborn as a human being. However, due to becoming angry one is reborn in the lower realms. However, the virtuous projecting karmas to be born as a human being remain in our continuum; these projecting karmas are not destroyed. If they were also destroyed, it would mean that once born in the lower realms, one could no longer be reborn in the upper realms.

Thursday afternoon, 23 March 2000

THE FOURTH MIND GENERATION

3B1C-2A4 Fourth ground, the Radiant

This section has three parts:

A Surpassing effort on the fourth ground
B Description of the fourth ground
C Features of abandonment

3B1C-2A4A Surpassing effort on the fourth ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, by means of indicating joyous effort gone beyond as surpassing the aspects of giving, morality, and patience gone beyond, from the viewpoint of the fourth mind generation it is explained:
>
> *Qualities without exception follow after joyous effort and*
> *[It is] the cause of the two collections: merit and intelligence.*
> *The ground where joyous effort blazes*
> *Is the fourth, Radiant.* [4.1]
>
> Since someone not delighted in virtuous actions does not engage in giving and so forth in all ways, the arisal of all qualities is impossible, yet since in someone delighted to accumulate the qualities which were set forth previously, it is possible that the attained and not attained increase and be attained, the cause of all that is a quality which is only joyous effort. It is the very cause of the two collections, already explained above.
>
> That joyous effort, by way of fully purifying one's own qualities, is explained to blaze exceedingly on that ground, called the Radiant Fourth Ground of the bodhisattva.

Chandrakirti says that the surpassing practice of generosity attained on the first ground depends on joyous effort, the surpassing practice of ethics attained on the second ground depends on joyous effort, and the surpassing practice of patience attained on the third ground depends on joyous effort. On the fourth ground, the fourth mind generation is explained by presenting the surpassing perfection of joyous effort. The stanza in the root text says: "Qualities without exception follow after joyous effort." It then says that "[it is] the cause of the two collections." The accumulation of merit and the collection of wisdom are the causes of the two bodies, the truth body and the form body. These in turn depend on joyous effort.

The root text then gives the etymology of the fourth ground, Radiant: "The ground where joyous effort blazes is the fourth, Radiant." Effort is the mental factor that delights in virtuous activity. The mental factor which does not delight in virtuous activity is laziness. Someone who lacks pleasure in virtuous activity will not engage in the practices of generosity, patience, ethics, and so forth. In short, someone who possesses effort practices generosity and so forth while those who lack effort do not practice generosity and so forth. This is why the root text says that qualities follow effort. Someone who has effort gains qualities not yet gained. Someone who already has qualities increases them. On the other hand, someone who lacks effort loses all the qualities already gained and does not gain any further knowledge or qualities. In brief, one should understand the benefits of effort and the disadvantages of laziness.

In the autocommentary there is a passage saying, "the cause of all that is a quality which is *only* joyous effort." This passage means that through joyous effort one attains those qualities that have not been attained and increases those that were attained previously. Note that the emphasis here is on the term "only."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Now Chandrakirti indicates that on the fourth ground effort surpasses the first three perfections and is lower than the remaining six. His root text says:
>
> *All attainments follow after effort,*
> *Cause of the two collections of merit*
> *And wisdom. The ground where effort*
> *Flames is the fourth, the Radiant.* [4.1]
>
> One who does not delight in virtue does not engage in all the various forms of giving and so forth; therefore, no attainments arise. However, for one who delights in accumulating or having accumulated the auspicious qualities of giving and so forth explained before, the qualities of attainments increase and qualities not yet attained are realized. All auspicious attainments follow after effort, the cause of the two collections of merit and wisdom. The ground where effort is said to flame increasingly is the fourth, called the Radiant.
>
> On the third ground a training in higher meditative stabilization is attained that greatly exceeds that of the first two grounds. On the fourth ground a bodhisattva thereby attains pliancy generated from meditative stabilization. This is a special factor totally removing laziness; hence, the perfection of effort is surpassing.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that a bodhisattva on the third ground attains the higher training of meditative stabilization, or the higher training of the mind. In attaining the higher training of the mind, this bodhisattva attains pliancy. With this pliancy, the bodhisattva totally dispels laziness on the fourth ground. This is why effort is said to be surpassing on the fourth ground.

The *Ornament for Clear Realizations* mentions three types of effort that oppose the three types of laziness: (1) the effort of not being attached to bad actions or behaviors, (2) the effort of not becoming fatigued, and (3) the effort of thoroughly upholding the path. When we posit the three contrasting lazinesses, they are: (1) the laziness attached to bad actions – this refers to the worldly actions of this life alone; (2) the laziness of lethargy, and (3) the laziness of discouragement. Lama Tsongkhapa says that by abandoning these three types of laziness, one comes to possess the three types of effort.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> 3B1C-2A4B Description of the fourth ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Further, if asked: "why is it expressed as Radiant?" In order to indicate the reason of engaging the name:
>
> *There, for the Sugata's children generated from*
> *Higher meditation on the harmonies of complete enlightenment,*
> *Arises an appearance surpassing the copper light and* [4.2abc]
>
> – was mentioned.
>
> Thus, for the bodhisattva on this ground, from meditation upon the thirty-seven practices harmonious with enlightenment, there will arise an appearance surpassing the copper appearance

explained before. Therefore, since the light of the fire of perfect exalted wisdom arises, that bodhisattva ground is called the Radiant.

As extensively taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:

There, the thirty-seven practices harmonious with enlightenment are like this:

1. the four close placements of mindfulness,
2. the four perfect abandonments,
3. the four legs of magical emanation,
4. the five powers,
5. the five strengths,
6. the seven branches of enlightenment and
7. the eight-branched arya path.

(1) There, the four close placements of mindfulness are:

i. O children of the Conqueror, the bodhisattva abiding on this bodhisattva ground having radiance, having become ardent and in possession of alertness and mindfulness, completely forsaking covetousness and unhappiness concerning the world, with regard to the inner body, contemplates the body and abides. Having become ardent and in possession of alertness and mindfulness, completely forsaking covetousness and unhappiness concerning the world, with regard to the outer body, contemplates the body and abides. With regard to inner and outer bodies, contemplates the body and abides,... as said before.

The fourth ground is called Radiant due to the surpassing practice of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment. Therefore, there is the [surpassing] appearance of a copper light, like a red light similar to the light of a sunset. The meaning is that the light of exalted wisdom is analogous to the light of the sunset.

The thirty-seven harmonies are of two types: the subtle and the coarse. This could mean that the object to be realized has two levels, subtle and coarse. We can take the example of a bodhisattva meditating on the close placement of mindfulness of the body, the first of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment. On the coarse level, the bodhisattva meditates on the body qualified by the emptiness of a self-sufficient substantially existent person. The subtle level is to meditate on the body qualified by the emptiness of an inherently existent person.

Close placement of mindfulness on the body merely means that one meditates on the body. The body is of three types: inner body, outer body, and both inner and outer. These are posited in a way similar to the first three of the twenty emptinesses which were discussed previously [in the *Ornament*]: the emptiness of the internal, emptiness of the external, and emptiness of both the internal and external. The inner body refers to forms such as the eye faculty; the outer body to outer objects such as forms, sounds, etc. They are called "outer body" because they are objects not conjoined with a consciousness. A body that is both outer and inner refers to the eye organ, the nose, the tongue, the body itself, etc. Why are these called "both inner and outer"? They are outer because compared to the inner faculty, they are outside; they are inner because they are conjoined with feelings. In short, we meditate on these three by placing our mindfulness on them while also applying introspection.

First we meditate on the inner body by meditating on our body parts. Meditating on the body can also be done in several other ways, such as examining whether the body is light or heavy. A third meditation is to meditate on the body as being composed of elements. One can also examine whether the body is contaminated or uncontaminated. Another way is to examine whether the body is material or non-material. One can also meditate on one's own body being a composite of the thirty-six impure substances. This last meditation is mentioned in Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*. One

meditates on these thirty-six in order to avoid the negativities of covetousness, mental unhappiness, etc. When the Buddha says "completely forsaking covetousness," he is referring to the fact that the bodhisattva abandons attachment. The bodhisattva also abandons mental unhappiness, which is fuel for the development of anger. When we do not provide the fuel for anger, mental unhappiness, there is no way for anger to arise.
The way to meditate is to apply mindfulness and introspection, or alertness. With mindfulness, one holds onto the object without forgetting it. With introspection, one is alerted to distraction and brings the mind back to the object of meditation whereby the mind remains on its object.

The passage in the *Sutra on the Ten Ground* continues:

> ii. Similarly, having become ardent and in possession of alertness and mindfulness, with regard to inner feelings, outer feelings, inner and outer feelings and... as before.
> iii. With regard to inner thoughts, outer thoughts, and inner and outer thoughts... he abides.
> iv. With regard to inner phenomena, outer phenomena, and inner and outer phenomena... he abides.

The Buddha mentions three types of feelings: inner, outer and both inner and outer. What is inner feeling? Perhaps inner feeling is mental feeling, while outer feeling is a feeling related to the sense consciousnesses. Then we need to reflect on what could be a feeling that is both inner and outer. We can also posit inner feeling as the feeling that is experience related to the inner sense powers; outer feeling as the experience related to external objects; and the feeling that is both as the feeling that is the experience related to the sense organs. This latter assertion, which is my own personal opinion, is perhaps correct in that it corresponds to the third type of body that was discussed previously.

In general, feelings are of two kinds: those that arise in the retinue of mental consciousness and those that arise in the retinue of the sense consciousnesses. An illustration of the first is mental unhappiness. An illustration of the second is suffering feeling.

According to *Abhidharmakosha*, there are five types of faculties of feeling: (1) happiness, (2) suffering, (3) mental happiness, (4) mental unhappiness, and (5) equanimity. Happiness and suffering refer to the happiness and suffering feeling that are in the retinue of a sense consciousness. Those that are in the retinue of the mental consciousness are mental happiness and mental unhappiness.

We can also discuss three types of feeling: happiness, unhappiness, and equanimity. Happiness refers to both that which occurs in the retinue of the sense consciousness and that which occurs in the retinue the mental consciousness. The definition of the feeling of happiness is: the experience of contentment. The definition of the feeling of unhappiness is: the experience of pain. The definition of the feeling of equanimity is: a feeling that is neutral, neither contentment or pain. Feeling is a fundamental factor in that it gives rise to many mental factors: attachment, hatred, etc. Using mindfulness and introspection, one should meditate on these different feelings in order to stop the arising of attachment, hatred, and so forth. We can tell from our experience that we like happy feelings and dislike unhappy feelings.

Regarding the close placement of mindfulness on thoughts/mind, there are also three: inner, outer, and both inner and outer. “Mind” here refers to a main mind, not the mental factors. Inner mind can be posited as the mental consciousness, outer mind as the sense consciousnesses. Mind that is both inner and outer is a mind that apprehends the container of the sense faculties; i.e., the organs themselves. This main mind can have different aspects: a main mind along with attachment, a main mind along with hatred, a main mind without attachment, or a main mind without hatred, and so

forth. Or it can be a virtuous mind, a non-virtuous mind, or a neutral mind. What is a virtuous mind? What is a non-virtuous mind? We need to examine this. Doing so is the close placement of mindfulness on the mind.

Regarding close placement of mindfulness on phenomena there are also three: inner, outer, and both inner and outer. We can apply the same formula as before. Inner phenomena can be posited as true paths; outer phenomena as true cessations; phenomena that are both inner and outer as the person itself. But we must think about this since all remaining phenomena (those not included in the first three close placements of mindfulness) are included as objects of meditation of close placement of mindfulness on phenomena. This fourth close placement of mindfulness also includes nirvana.

The purpose of meditating on the four close placements of mindfulness is to engage in the four noble truths. By closely placing the mind on the body, one engages in true sufferings. By closely placing the mind on feelings, one engages in true origins. By closely placing the mind on the mind, one engages in true paths. By closely placing the mind on phenomena, one engages in true cessations. This is because by meditating on the body, one comes to the conclusion that it is the nature of suffering. One finds that the body is the foundation for all different types of sufferings. The body acts as a basis for past sufferings and as a cause for future sufferings. By way of the close placement of mindfulness on feelings, one finds that feelings give rise to mental factors such as attachment and hatred. Due to these mental factors, one creates karma that gives rise to many sufferings. Thus, feelings are true origins. Regarding the close placement of mindfulness on the mind, this must be a main mind that trains in the three higher trainings – ethics, meditative stabilization, and wisdom. In that way, one engages in the truth paths. By cultivating true paths, one attains nirvana, the true cessation which is the principal object of meditation of the fourth close placement of mindfulness, the close placement of mindfulness on phenomena.

END

Monday afternoon, 27 March 2000

We have now finished the subject of the four close placements of mindfulness; next come the four thorough abandonings.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to cite the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*:

> (2) The four perfect abandonments are like this:
> i. In order to not generate evil, non-virtuous dharmas not [yet] generated, he generates aspiration, endeavors, and puts forth effort. The mind firmly grasped, [it is] perfectly, firmly settled.
> ii. "In order to abandon evil, non-virtuous dharmas [already] generated…," as before.
> iii. "In order to generate virtuous dharmas not [yet] generated...," as before.
> iv. "In order to bring about abidance, increase, future arisal (non-disappearance), and strong completion of virtuous dharmas [already] generated, he generates aspiration, endeavors…," as before.

The first thorough abandoning is to not generate non-virtues that have not yet been generated. If one has not created non-virtue, one needs to make effort in order to continue not creating non-virtue. The second thorough abandoning is to abandon the non-virtue that one has already generated; one needs to make effort in order to abandon it. The Buddha says that one needs to generate the aspiration that is the effort to abandon negative actions already committed. The text says "endeavors and puts forth effort;" these two essentially mean the same thing, although "endeavors" is perhaps stronger. Regarding "puts forth effort," one takes pleasure in abandoning non-virtue and continuing to refrain from non-virtue. "The mind firmly grasped" means that the mind is single-pointedly fixed on the activities of (1) not generating non-virtue not yet generated and (2) abandoning non-virtue already generated. "(It is) perfectly and firmly settled" has the sense of wisdom. There are four factors needed in order to practice these two abandonments: (1) aspiration, (2) effort, (3) meditative stabilization, and (4) wisdom. The last two factors could perhaps also be posited as mindfulness and introspection. Therefore, one can choose between either of two interpretations – (i) meditative stabilization and wisdom or (ii) mindfulness and introspection – but it is better to posit them as the first, meditative stabilization and wisdom.

The third thorough abandoning is that of generating as many virtuous qualities as one is able. The fourth thorough abandoning is to increase those virtuous qualities that one has already generated and to not allow them to degenerate. These two thorough abandonings are to be understood as abandoning (1) non-aspiration, (2) non-effort, (3) non-meditative stabilization, and (4) non-wisdom. Regarding the first two thorough abandonings, one needs to generate the four: aspiration, effort, meditative stabilization, and wisdom.

The third group of the thirty-seven harmonies of enlightenment consists of the four legs of magical manifestation. According to the commentaries on the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*, the first group, the close placements of mindfulness, is posited on the small path of accumulation; the second group, the four thorough abandonings, on the middling path of accumulation; and the third group, the four legs of magical manifestation, on the great path of accumulation.

Regarding the four legs of magical manifestation, Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes from the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*, which says:

> (3) The four legs of magical emanation are like this:

i. The leg of magical emanation possessing meditative stabilization of aspiration [and] the applications [of antidotes] which abandon – abiding in isolation, abiding separated from attachment, abiding in cessation, through complete abandonment, fully transformed – meditates. Similarly,
ii. the leg of magical emanation possessing meditative stabilization of joyous effort [and] the applications which abandon,
iii. the leg of magical emanation possessing meditative stabilization of intention [and] the applications which abandon, and
iv. the leg of magical emanation possessing meditative stabilization of analysis [and] the applications which abandon.
also as before.

The "legs of magical manifestation" refer to a type of meditative stabilization. Thus, the close placements of mindfulness are wisdom, the thorough abandonings are effort, and the legs of magical manifestation are meditative stabilization. In regard to this passage there could be a discussion of calm abiding, but perhaps we will leave that aside for now.

The word 'leg' is used in this context because when one cultivates meditative stabilization, one can travel a great distance very quickly. This is likened to walking with one's legs whereby one arrives at a particular place, whereas with the legs of magical manifestation, by the force of meditative stabilization, one arrives at a place merely by *thinking* to go there. Usually when these four legs of magical manifestation are counted, they are listed as: (1) aspiration, (2) effort, (3) intention/thought, and (4) analysis. Although these are the names given to the four legs, one should not think that the four legs of magical manifestation are these mental factors. Rather, the legs of magical manifestation are meditative stabilizations concomitant with these four mental factors.

"Abiding in isolation, abiding separated from attachment" can refer to abiding at a physical level or at a mental level. At a physical level, it means that one abides alone, by oneself. At a mental level it means that the mind is free from conceptions. "Abiding separated from attachment" refers to having few attachments and being content. "Abiding in cessation" means abiding in the cessation of the three mental poisons. "Cessation" could also mean being free from distraction. This means that having abandoned all distractions, one focuses on the observed object of meditative stabilization.

Aspiration refers to seeking an object. When we have aspiration for something such as study, this causes us to have *effort*. This in turn produces *intention*, which leads the main mind to its object. As a result of intention, the mind begins to *analyze* its object. These four factors (aspiration, effort, intention, and analysis) are necessary in order to develop our mind.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

(4) The five powers are like this:
i. "The power of faith, abiding in isolation," similarly,
ii. "the power of joyous effort,"
iii. "the power of mindfulness,"
iv. "the power of meditative stabilization" and
v. "the power of wisdom, abiding in isolation, abiding separated from attachment."
and so forth.

Why are these called powers? [*Note:* The Tibetan word translated here as "power" (*dbang po*) is translated by Hopkins as "faculty."] They are so-called because with these five, one is empowered with respect to completely pure phenomena. The first of the five powers is faith. Faith is a prerequisite

for all mahayana virtuous qualities. Effort is also fundamental in that every kind of virtuous quality follows upon effort. Faith can be likened to a mother. A mother gives birth to a child and then takes care of the child in many ways from birth until it grows up. Faith has a similar function. It produces, maintains, and increases all virtuous qualities. The Buddha said in one sutra that a person without faith does not give rise to virtuous qualities. How can a person who lacks faith generate a virtuous quality? He cannot, in that it would be like a scorched seed being able to generate a sprout.

These five – faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom – are essential. In the fourth chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* it says that these are the foundation of the mahayana teaching/path. The main point here is that these five empower one with respect to completely pure phenomena. All five of these mental factors can arise simultaneously in the retinue of a single main mind; i.e., they can be concomitant with a single main mind. When concomitance between a main mind and mental factors is discussed, it refers to there being five similarities between them: (1) base, (2) observed object, (3) aspect, (4) time, and (5) substantial entity. This was discussed previously.

Faith is very important. It is even included in the discussion of calm abiding. When one develops calm abiding, one must do so by means of the eight antidotes that oppose the five faults. There are four antidotes to the first fault, laziness, these being faith, aspiration, effort, and pliancy. Therefore, one must have faith in the very beginning; on that basis, aspiration, effort, and pliancy can arise.

These five powers, which belong to the completely pure class, are attained on the heat and peak levels of the path of preparation.

The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* then says:

> (5) The five strengths are those themselves, having defeated the discordant class.

When one develops the five forces, or five strengths [Hopkins translates the Tibetan word *stobs* as "powers"] , there is no longer any occasion for their discordant classes to arise. On the other hand, at the level of the powers, their discordant classes could still arise. Although the discordant classes of the five forces cannot arise, they have not yet been abandoned. The discordant class of faith is non-faith; the discordant class of effort, laziness; the discordant class of mindfulness, forgetfulness; the discordant class of meditative stabilization, distraction; and the discordant class of wisdom, faulty wisdom.

In short, on the occasion of the five powers, the five discordant classes can manifest, whereas on the occasion of the five forces, the five discordant classes can no longer manifest. The five forces are posited on the tolerance and supreme mundane qualities levels of the path of preparation.

The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* then says:

> (6) The seven branches of enlightenment are like this:
> i. "Correct mindfulness, the branch of enlightenment – abiding in isolation," and so forth. Similarly,
> ii. "finely discriminating phenomena, the branch of enlightenment,"
> iii. "correct joyous effort, the branch of enlightenment,"
> iv. "correct joy, the branch of enlightenment,"
> v. "correct pliancy, the branch of enlightenment,"
> vi. "correct meditative stabilization, the branch of enlightenment" and
> vii. "correct equanimity, the branch of enlightenment – abiding in isolation," as before.

The first branch of enlightenment is correct mindfulness. Mindfulness is defined as non-forgetfulness with respect to a familiar phenomenon. First, we familiarize with an object and then we become mindful of it. The term "*correct* mindfulness" indicates that mindfulness has been transformed into a superior's path. The second branch of enlightenment is correct discrimination. In essence, this is wisdom. Wisdom allows one to discriminate things well, i.e., to know what to abandon and what to adopt or practice. The third branch of enlightenment is correct effort. It is an effort that has become the entity of a superior's path. The fourth branch of enlightenment is correct joy. The third branch of enlightenment is also joy in that effort includes joy. Perhaps the difference between the joy in the third and fourth branches is the way in which the joy is expressed. The fifth branch of enlightenment is correct pliancy. Both body and mind are trained so perfectly that they have become serviceable. Within the two types of pliancy, physical and mental, the fifth branch of enlightenment is mental pliancy because it is necessarily the entity of a superior's path. The sixth branch of enlightenment is correct meditative stabilization. Meditative stabilization means that one is able to abide single-pointedly on one's observed object for as long as one wishes. The seventh branch of enlightenment is correct equanimity. This is an equanimity that is a compositional factor rather than a feeling. The equanimity that is a compositional factor refers to the equanimity that is one of the eleven virtuous mental factors. This equanimity is a state free from laxity and excitement.

These are the seven branches of enlightenment. They are called 'branch' in the sense of being a cause; therefore, they are seven causes for enlightenment. The definition of a branch of enlightenment is: that which functions as a cause for enlightenment. The seven branches of enlightenment are posited on the path of seeing, while the eight-fold path of superiors is posited on the path of meditation. These levels are posited here according to the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*.

The five factors – faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom – are given different names in dependence on the path on which they are found. In the *Treasury of Knowledge,* it says that on the path of seeing these five factors are called "the power making all that is unknown known;" on the path of meditation they are called "the power knowing all," and on the path of no-more-learning, they are called "the power possessing all knowledge."

The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* continues:

(7) The eight branch arya path is like this:
i. "Correct view, abiding in isolation, abiding separated from attachment, through complete abandonment, fully transformed – meditates," also
ii. "correct thought," as before,
iii. "correct speech,"
iv. "correct end (i.e., aim) of actions,"
v. "correct livelihood,"
vi. "correct exertion,"
vii. "correct mindfulness" and
viii. "correct meditative stabilization, abiding in isolation…," as before.

The eight-fold path of superiors consists of: (1) correct view, (2) correct thought, (3) correct speech, (4) correct aims of actions, (5) correct livelihood, (6) correct exertion, (7) correct mindfulness, and (8) correct meditative stabilization. These were discussed previously. In this context, a qualm arises: "Are all eight of these exalted knowers?" These eight are said to be superior's paths. According to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, this means that they are all consciousnesses. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, one needs to examine whether or not they are all consciousnesses. For example, it can be asked whether the fifth and sixth, correct livelihood and correct exertion, are consciousnesses. Also

the third, correct speech, cannot be consciousness. One also needs to examine whether the fourth, correct aims of actions, is consciousness. Correct livelihood is said to be included in ethics. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, ethics is not pervaded by being consciousness because, for them, a vow is not pervaded by being consciousness. At the beginning of the *Ocean of Vinaya,* it says: "The abstention from verbal non-virtue and physical non-virtue due to the motivation of renunciation are physical according to the lowest and highest schools, the Vaibhashika and Prasangika Madhyamika." "Abstention" refers a vow; it is posited as form. Therefore, ethics is form. However, there is a distinction between ethics and a vow. To conclude, ethics is not pervaded by being form, whereas a vow *is* pervaded by being form. Therefore, one needs to reflect on whether the correct livelihood included in the eight-fold path of superiors is form.

The eight-fold path of superiors can be condensed into four:

1) the branch of thorough analysis – correct view,
2) the branch that causes others to understand – correct thought,
3) the branches that cause others to trust – correct speech, correct aims of actions, and correct livelihood, and
4) the branches that are antidotes to the discordant class –correct effort, correct mindfulness, and correct meditative stabilization.

Correct speech, correct aims of actions, and correct livelihood are called "branches that cause others to believe" because when one's speech is correct, when one behaves properly, and when one engages in correct livelihood, others come to believe in one. Correct effort/exertion is a branch which is the antidote to the root afflictions. Correct mindfulness is a branch which is the antidote to the secondary afflictions of laxity and excitement. Correct meditative stabilization is the antidote to the obstructions to absorption.

Tuesday morning, 28 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

QUESTION: Why is this ground called the Radiant?
ANSWER: Chandrakirti's root text says:

There for the sugata child an illumination arises
Produced from a greater cultivation of the harmonies
Of perfect enlightenment, surpassing the copper light. [4.2abc]

On the fourth ground, an illumination of wisdom arises for a sugata child, produced from a more intense cultivation of the thirty-seven practices harmonious with perfect enlightenment. It surpasses the copper-like light described on the third ground. Since the intense light of the fire of true wisdom arises, this bodhisattva ground is called the Radiant.

Chandrakirti's description in his *Supplement* is similar to Nagarjuna's explanation in his *Precious Garland* (447-8):

The fourth is called the Radiant
Because the light of true wisdom arises
In which he cultivates supremely
The harmonies of enlightenment.

Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes
A king of the gods in [the Land] Without Combat,
He is skilled in quelling the arising of the view
That the transitory collection [is a real self].

The thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are divided into seven groups:
I Four mindful establishments

1 Mindful establishment on the body
2 Mindful establishment on feeling
3 Mindful establishment on mind
4 Mindful establishment on phenomena

II Four thorough abandonings
5 Generating virtuous qualities not yet generated
6 Increasing virtuous qualities already generated
7 Not generating non-virtuous qualities not yet generated
8 Thoroughly abandoning non-virtuous qualities already generated

III Four legs of manifestation
9 Aspiration
10 Effort
11 Thought
12 Analytical meditative stabilization

IV Five faculties
13 Faith
14 Effort
15 Mindfulness
16 Meditative stabilization
17 Wisdom

V Five powers
18 Faith
19 Effort
20 Mindfulness
21 Meditative stabilization
22 Wisdom

VI Seven branches of enlightenment
23 Correct mindfulness
24 Correct discrimination of phenomena
25 Correct effort
26 Correct joy
27 Correct pliancy
28 Correct meditative stabilization
29 Correct equanimity

VII Eightfold path
30 Correct view
31 Correct realization
32 Correct speech
33 Correct aims of actions
34 Correct livelihood
35 Correct exertion
36 Correct mindfulness
37 Correct meditative stabilization.

The first ground is the basis of training. In terms of the entities of the trainings, the second is in higher ethics, the third is in higher meditative stabilization, and the fourth through the sixth are in higher wisdom. On the fourth ground a bodhisattva has the training in wisdom and becomes very skilled in the coarse and subtle thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment.

Lama Tsongkhapa posits the three higher trainings in terms of the grounds. The basis of the trainings, the perfection of giving, is posited on the first ground. The higher training of ethics is posited on the second ground. The higher training in mind, or meditative stabilization, is posited on the third

ground. The higher training of wisdom is posited on the fourth through the sixth grounds. On the fourth ground, the bodhisattva gains the wisdom that knows the subtle and coarse aspects of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment. On the fifth ground, the bodhisattva gains the wisdom that knows the subtle and coarse aspects of the four noble truths. On the sixth ground, the bodhisattva gains the wisdom meditating on the forward and reverse processes of the twelve links of dependent-arising.

On the fourth ground, the bodhisattva becomes very skilled in the subtle and coarse aspects of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, and has the higher training of wisdom.

The wisdom knowing the coarse aspect of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment is the wisdom knowing the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as qualified by the emptiness of the person of self-sufficient substantial existence. The wisdom knowing the subtle aspect of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment is the wisdom knowing the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as qualified by the emptiness of the person of inherent existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A4C Features of abandonment

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> On this ground, not only meditation upon the harmonies of enlightenment arises:
>
> *[That] related to viewing oneself is fully exhausted.* [4.2d]
>
> On this ground, viewing toward his own self will also be exhausted, as was taught:
>
> > O children of the Conqueror, the bodhisattva who abides on this bodhisattva ground possessing radiance is separated from excessive movement of motivation due to strong settling upon self, sentient beings, living creatures, effigies, beings, persons, aggregates, elements, and entrances; and is separated from complete investigation, complete analysis, holding as stable, holding as mine, holding as jewels, and all which is abiding of the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *What is related to the view of a self is extinguished.* [4.2d]
>
> The view of a self is the subtle view of the transitory collection, which precedes the coarse conceptions of a self of persons and of a person's belongings, and Chandrakirti refers to these latter as being related with a view of self. They are the conceptions that sentient beings and so forth exist substantially, self-sufficiently. Both this conception of a self of persons and that of phenomena – an adherence to the truth of the aggregates, constituents, and sources – are thoroughly extinguished.
>
> The meaning of 'extinguishment' is an abandonment of the seeds of the two conceptions of self that are to be abandoned on this ground and not extinguishment of all [forms of the two conceptions. For] the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* indicates that [a fourth grounder] has the innate view of the transitory collection as a real 'I' and 'mine'.

The conception viewing the person as a self-sufficient substantially existent self is only an *imputed* view of the transitory collection; it is not a real view of the transitory collection. There is an innate view of the transitory collection viewing the person as self-sufficient substantially existent which is an

object to be abandoned. The objects to be abandoned by the fourth ground include both the conception of self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena.

Is the conception of the person as self-sufficient substantially existent a conception of a self of persons? If one realizes the non-existence of the referent object of the conception of the person as self-sufficient substantially existent, is one pervaded by having realized the selflessness of persons? If someone accepts this, one asks: "Has he also realized emptiness? Has he realized the emptiness existing on the person? Is there a Vaibhashika who has entered a path?" It follows that if there is, he has realized the person as empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent. Since he has realized the person as being empty of self-sufficient substantial existence, it follows that he has realized the selflessness of persons. If he has realized the selflessness of persons, it follows that he has realized the emptiness on the person. The solution to this dilemma is to say that he has realized the *coarse* selflessness of persons, i.e., he has realized the non-existence of the referent object of the conception of a *coarse* self of persons, but he has not realized the non-existence of the referent object of the conception of a self of persons. In short, he has realized the coarse selflessness of persons, but he has not realized the selflessness of persons. If it is a realization of selflessness of persons, it is pervaded by being a realization of the subtle selflessness of persons.

When the root text says "What is related to the view of a self is extinguished," some people interpret the word 'self' in relation to the emptiness of the person of self-sufficient substantial existence. However, this interpretation is not correct. The correct interpretation is that this passage refers to the subtle selflessness of persons. On the fourth ground the bodhisattva realizes the subtle selflessness of persons which is the emptiness of the person of inherent existence. "Extinguished" means that the bodhisattva on the fourth ground extinguishes the view of a self of persons only with respect to himself, not with respect to all persons. This implies that the view of self exists on the higher grounds; in fact, it exists through the seventh ground. There are some who say that such a view of a self-sufficient substantially existent self is extinguished by the fourth ground; they claim there is no such conception on the later grounds. I do not think this is correct because there is a view of self which is innate that is not extinguished by the end of the fourth ground; rather it continues through the seventh ground. Upon reaching the eighth ground, all conceptions of a self have been completely abandoned. Lama Tsongkhapa also says: "The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* indicates that a fourth grounder has the innate view of the transitory collection as a real 'I' and 'mine.'" This means that sutra also presents that there exists an innate view of the transitory collection.

Student: What is the difference between an *acquired* conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent self and the *innate* conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent self?
Geshe-la: An innate conception of the person as self-sufficient substantially existent is not a view of the transitory collection. It is only *imputed* as a view of the transitory collection and is not a *real* view of the transitory collection. It is not a view of the transitory collection because a view of the transitory collection must be an afflicted wisdom that, observing 'I' or 'mine,' conceives them to be inherently existent.
Student: So that would be called the object of abandonment of the path of seeing that is the *imputed* view of the transitory collection?
Geshe-la: The Tibetan word *kun btags* can be translated as either 'imputed' or 'acquired.' On the path of seeing, the *acquired* view of the transitory collection is abandoned but not the *imputed* one. This will be elaborately explained in the sixth chapter in the context of establishing the selflessness of persons.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

From the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way,"'* the Fourth Mind Generation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Such is the explanation of the fourth ultimate mind generation in the *Illumination of the Thought, An Extensive Explanation of Chandrakirti's 'Supplement to the Middle Way.'*

To synthesize, the main focus of the fourth chapter is the thirty-seven practices harmonious with enlightenment. These are common to all superiors – hearer superiors, solitary realizer superiors, bodhisattva superiors, and buddha superiors. These thirty-seven were also discussed in the *Ornament* in the context of the thirty-seven aspects of the exalted knower of all aspects common to hearers.

With respect to the passage in the *Illumination* that says "becomes very skilled in the coarse and subtle aspects of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment," what does this mean and how does it relate to our life? How do we understand the close placement of mindfulness of the body? How do we understand its coarse and subtle aspects? Since the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment have coarse and subtle aspects, the close placement of mindfulness of the body must also have a coarse and subtle aspect. These are posited from the point of view of cause. A coarse body is a body that is produced by the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person. A subtle body is produced by the conception of an inherently existent person. When one closely places the mindfulness on a body qualified by being empty of self-sufficient substantial existence, one is meditating on the *coarse* aspect of the close placement of mindfulness of the body. If one meditates on a body qualified by being empty of inherent existence, one is meditating on the *subtle* aspect of the close placement of mindfulness of the body.

In general, it is said that when meditating on the close placement of mindfulness on the body, one analyzes the two – the general and specific characteristics of the body. Meditating on the *general* characteristics of the body is meditating on the body as empty of being self-sufficient substantially existent and also as empty of being inherently existent. 'General characteristics' include two features: (1) the emptiness of a self-sufficient substantially existent self and (2) the emptiness of an inherently existent self. These two are called *general* characteristics because they are also characteristics with regard to feelings, mind, and phenomena; i.e., they are not limited to merely the body. 'Specific characteristics' in the case of the body are, for example, that it is light, heavy, an element, and an evolute. These specific characteristics pertain to the body; they are not common to feelings, mind, and phenomena. In brief, there are two meditations with regard to the close placement of mindfulness on the body: meditation on the general characteristics of the body and meditation on the specific characteristics of the body.

Geshe-la: To which of the four close placements of mindfulness - body, feeling, mind, or phenomena – does meditation on the breath belong? Think about this. When one meditates on the breath, one understands that it is part of the body. How would you characterize the breath?
Student: It is a movement of the gross body.
Geshe-la: Khor sum! Do you think that the breath is an element or an evolute? We should be aware that the term 'body' does not necessarily refer to the physical body that we possess. The Sanskrit term for body is *kaya*, which has many connotations. *Kaya* is defined as: that which is composed of many branches. Do you not think that the breath is the wind element? It is tangible because all four elements are tangible objects. Evolutes (i.e. secondary elements, products of the elements, that derived from the elements) are of seven types: (1) smoothness, (2) roughness, (3) heaviness, (4) lightness, (5) cold, (6) hunger, and (7) thirst. All the elements belong to the category of the close placement of mindfulness of the body.

Meditation on the breath can be done in many ways, for example, in conjunction with the four noble truths, the four elements, five aggregates, the six spheres, and the twelve links of dependent-arising. The main point is to closely place one's mindfulness on the body while examining the characteristics of the body very thoroughly. When a bodhisattva meditates on the close placement of mindfulness of the body, he takes both his own and others' bodies as his object of meditation. In contrast, hearers meditate on only their own bodies; they do not observe others' bodies.

Tuesday afternoon, 28 March 2000

In regard to the outline "Features of abandonment" (3B1C-2A4C) Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The view of the self is the subtle view of the transitory collection, which precedes the coarse conceptions of a self of persons and of a person's belongings, and Chandrakirti refers to these latter as being related with a view of self. They are the conceptions that sentient beings and so forth exist substantially, self-sufficiently." Regarding "the coarse conceptions of a self of persons," it can be asked: "How do these conceptions apprehend the person as self-sufficient substantially existent?" One interpretation is that these conceptions are of two types: (1) conceptions acquired through learning tenets and (2) innate conceptions that arise automatically. When one apprehends the person as self-sufficient substantially existent, one apprehends the person as a carrier of a load, the load being the aggregates. Or one apprehends the person to be the owner of the aggregates, the aggregates being that which is owned. The person as owner thinks: "I own this and that," "These are my eyes," "These are my aggregates," and so forth. In this way, the person has a natural idea of being the owner of the aggregates. When one has the conception thinking 'mine,' one conceives of the person as completely independent from the aggregates. In other words, the person is conceived to be completely self-sufficient, not dependent on the aggregates. This passage about the person and the aggregates is elaborately explained in two scriptural references: the Prasangika section of the *Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence* by Lama Tsongkhapa and *A Dose of Emptiness* by Khedrup Je, both of which are available in English.

The conception apprehending the person to be permanent, unitary, and independent is necessarily acquired; it cannot be innate.

THE FIFTH MIND GENERATION

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A5 The fifth ground, the Difficult to Overcome

This section has two parts:

A Description of the fifth ground
B Surpassing concentration and skill in the truths

3B1C-2A5A Description of the fifth ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Now, from the viewpoint of the fifth mind generation:

The mahatma, even by all maras,
Cannot be defeated on the Difficult to Overcome Ground. [5.1ab]

> If the bodhisattva abiding on the fifth bodhisattva ground cannot be defeated even by the devaputra maras (demons of the sons of the gods] abiding in all realms of the world, leave alone mentioning by other than them, such as Obeyers of Mara's Requests and so forth. Therefore, the name of this ground is Difficult to Overcome.

Chandrakirti says that a bodhisattva on the fifth ground cannot be defeated by any kind of god; for this reason, this ground is called Difficult to Overcome. When Chandrakirti says "cannot be defeated even by the devaputra maras," he is referring to one of the four maras, the mara of the sons-of-the-gods. The devaputras, or sons-of-the-gods, are also called "those with the five arrows" in that they have five arrows with which they harm sentient beings. However, the sons-of-the-gods cannot harm the bodhisattva on the fifth ground by shooting their arrows. Since the sons-of-the-gods cannot overcome this bodhisattva, there is no need to mention that their servants are not able to harm him. The five arrows are: (1) the arrow that causes confusion, (2) the arrow that causes fainting, (3) the arrow that causes craziness, (4) the arrow that kills, and (5) the arrow that causes forgetfulness. Due to being hit by the arrows of the sons-of-the-gods, one may, for example, feel strong desire and attachment. Also, if right from the time one wakes up one feels very clumsy and ignorant, then it is a sign that one has been hit by an arrow. One should not think of these as physical arrows; rather it is a kind of energy being sent to us by the sons-of-the-gods as a result of which one feels ignorant and so forth. However, this only happens to people like us; the fifth ground bodhisattva is not open to such harm.

There is also another list of the five arrows from a different source: (1) an intoxicating arrow, (2) a shaking arrow [i.e., one that causes one to shake], (3) an arrow that makes one proud, (4) an obscuring arrow, and (5) a dying arrow. At the beginning of his *Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence,* Lama Tsongkhapa sets forth a homage, one verse of which says:

> *[The gods known as] Bliss-Arising, Cloud Mount, Golden Womb,*
> *Bodiless Lord, Garlanded Belly, and so on –*
> *Even they became like fireflies [overwhelmed] by the sun and thereupon*
> *Paid respect with their beautiful crowns to his lotus feet.*

The 'Bodiless Lord' refers to the sons-of-the-gods; therefore, at this point the commentaries on *The Essence of Eloquence* discuss the five arrows. The sons-of-the-gods are called bodiless lords because they are so huge compared to the beings of the desire realm that these beings appear tiny, almost bodiless.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) (Tib. page 107) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> *This great being on the ground Difficult to Overcome*
> *Cannot be defeated even by all the demons.* [5.1ab]
>
> This great being abiding on the fifth ground, the Difficult to Overcome, cannot be defeated even by all the *devaputra* demons abiding in all the realms of the world. If so, what need is there to mention that he cannot be overcome by other demons such as Obeyers of [Demonic] Requests and Servant Demons? Therefore, the name of this ground is 'Difficult to Overcome'.
>
> Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (449-50) says:

> The fifth is called the Extremely Difficult to Overcome
> Since all demons find it extremely hard to conquer him;
> He becomes skilled in knowing the subtle
> Meanings of the noble truths and so forth.
>
> Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes
> A king of the gods abiding in the joyous Land,
> He overcomes the sources of the afflicted views
> Of all the Forders.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that a fifth ground bodhisattva cannot be overcome by demons and, therefore, the fifth ground is called Difficult to Overcome. Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* says: "The fifth is called the Extremely Difficult to Overcome since all demons find it extremely hard to conquer him; he becomes skilled in knowing the subtle meanings of the noble truths and so forth." This means that a fifth ground bodhisattva is skilled in the four noble truths.

Nagarjuna then says: "He becomes a king of the gods abiding in the joyous land." This can be translated either in this way or alternatively as: "He *conquers* the gods abiding in the Joyous Land."

Nagarjuna then says: "He overcomes the sources of the afflicted views of all the Forders." What are the views of the Forders? They are the sixty-two bad views discussed in the context of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* which, when condensed, are the fourteen unspecified views. These fourteen can be further condensed into four groups: three groups of four, and one group of two. The first group consists of the four: the view of the I and the world as permanent, impermanent, both, and neither. The second group consists of the view of the I and the world as having a beginning, not having a beginning, having both, and having neither. The third group consists of the view of the Tathagata arising after his death, not arising after his death, both, and neither. The last group includes the view of the body and life force as being one substantial entity and the view that they are different substantial entities. These are called "the bad views of the Forders" or "the fourteen unspecified views." They are called "unspecified" in that when the Buddha was asked whether, for example, there is a beginning, he did not answer but remained silent. The Buddha did not answer these questions because the questioner posed the question on the basis of conceiving of a self of persons. If the Buddha had said that there is no beginning, the questioner would have thought that then there is no self. Such an answer regarding selflessness would not have been an adequate answer for these people. On the other hand, if the Buddha had said that there *is* a beginning, they would have thought that there is a self. Although one of these *is* the correct answer, the Buddha chose not to answer these questions in order not to harm his questioners.

According to the *Treasury of Knowledge* the source of views is all contaminated phenomena. This text (v. 1.8) says:

> *The contaminated are also the appropriated*
> *Aggregates, with combat too.*
> *Sufferings, origins, the world,*
> *The source of views, and existence are also those.*

These lines set forth various epithets for contaminated phenomena. True sufferings and true origins are posited as mutually inclusive in the *Treasury of Knowledge*. "Are also those" means that sufferings, origins, the world, and the source of views are also contaminated phenomena. Contaminated phenomena are the source of views because, due to one's apprehending contaminated phenomena, many bad views arise.

In *Precious Garland* "the source of afflicted views" can refer to either the sixty-two bad views mentioned previously or to the five bad views:

1) the view of the transitory collection,
2) the view holding to an extreme,
3) the view holding a bad view as supreme,
4) the view holding bad ethics and modes of conduct as supreme, and
5) wrong view.

In conclusion, the fifth ground bodhisattva overcomes *all* of these bad views, the five and the sixty-two.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

3B1C-2A5B Surpassing concentration and skill in the truths

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

That bodhisattva:

Attains surpassing concentration and extreme skill also
To realize the precise nature of the truths of the good minded. [5.1cd]

should be known.

For him, from the ten [practices] gone beyond, concentration gone beyond itself will become greatly surpassing. The good minded are the aryas. Their truths – the truths of the good minded – means the "arya truths." Nature is self entity. The nature which is to be borne in mind by a precise knower is the precise nature; hence, he will become greatly skilled in knowing the subtle self entity of the truths of [those with] good intelligence.

There, the four arya truths are called: suffering, origin, cessation, and path.

If asked: the Bhagavan indicated the truths are only two; that is, conventional truth and ultimate truth. As was taught in the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra:*

The Exalted Knower of the World, not listening to others,
Demonstrated these two truths by himself.
They are conventional and likewise ultimate –
A third truth does not exist at all.

Among the ten perfections, the fifth ground bodhisattva attains the surpassing practice of concentration. When the text says "the good-minded," it means superiors. "Nature is self entity" refers to the four noble truths, which are realized by superiors. "The nature which is to be borne in mind by a precise knower is the precise nature" refers to the subtlety of the four noble truths. When the root text says "the truths of the good-minded," this refers to the four noble truths. The four noble truths have coarse and subtle aspects. The fifth ground bodhisattva knows both these aspects.

The four noble truths are: true sufferings, true origins, true cessations, and true paths. When the Buddha turned the first Dharma wheel of the four noble truths, he said: "Such are sufferings, truths for superiors; such are origins, truths for superiors; such are cessations, truths for superiors; such are paths, truths for superiors." Then he said: "True sufferings are to be known, true origins are to be abandoned, true cessations are to be actualized, and true paths are to be meditated." Next, the Buddha taught: "Sufferings are known, there are no more sufferings to be known. Origins are abandoned, there are no more origins to be abandoned. True cessations are actualized, there are no more cessations to be actualized. True paths are meditated, there are no more paths to be meditated." In this way the Buddha taught the four noble truths by means of three repetitions within the first Dharma wheel: (1) the repetition regarding the entity, (2) the repetition regarding what is to be done, and (3) the repetition regarding that done.

Coarse and subtle true sufferings and coarse and subtle true origins can be understood by applying the same formula as in the case of the coarse and subtle [close placement of mindfulness on the] body. Thus, coarse true sufferings are those produced from the conception of the person as self-sufficient substantially existent. Subtle true sufferings are those produced from the conception of the person as inherently existent. We can find more detail concerning this in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way* and Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning*.

Chandrakirti next sets forth an objection: "Why is there discussion about four truths when the Buddha taught that there are only two truths?" This question arises because in the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra,* Buddha taught that there are only two truths. This sutra was taught in the Sakya village, Kapila, in which the Buddha's father, Shuddhodana, lived. A monk named Udayin who also lived in this village had invited the Buddha to teach there. The Buddha, seeing his father among the crowd, taught the two truths. This is the reason that this sutra is called the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra*. The Sanskrit name is *Pitaputrasamagamasutra*, *pita* referring to the father Shuddhodana and *putra* referring to Siddhartha, the Buddha.

Wednesday morning, 29 March 2000

As was said before, someone raises an objection in regard to the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra,* asking why there are said to be four truths since, in this sutra, Buddha taught that there are only two truths. The two truths taught in this context are the *conventional truth* and the *ultimate truth*. Conventional truth is an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing for a conventionality. Ultimate truth is an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing for an ultimate.

This objection continues in the autocommentary (Tib. page 47) saying:

> And also explained in the [*Treatise on the*] *Middle Way* [24, 8]:
>
> > The Dharma taught by the buddhas depends wholly on the two truths,
> > worldly conventional truth and ultimate truth.
>
> Therefore, how can another four arya truths exist differently from the two truths?

When the *Treatise on the Middle Way* says "worldly conventional truth and ultimate truth" the word "worldly" implies a conventional awareness. That which is a truth for it is a conventional truth. An ultimate truth is a truth for an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. The exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is taken as the ultimate and that which is a truth for it is an ultimate truth. When the objector asks "how can another four arya truths exist differently from the two truths?," the answer is that although there are no truths that are not included in the two truths, there is a reason for presenting the four truths.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> I shall explain. Although it is indeed like that, nevertheless, in order to indicate the properties of cause and result of that to be accepted and that to be abandoned, the four arya truths are described here.
>
> Regarding that, the side which is to be abandoned is the fully deluded. Its result is the truth of suffering. The cause is the truth of origin. The side which is to be accepted is the completely pure. Its result is the truth of cessation. The cause of attaining that is the truth of the path.

> There the truths of suffering, origin and the path, are included within conventional truth. The truth of cessation is the self-entity of ultimate truth. Similarly, whatever few other truths exist are to be ascertained as solely included in either of the two truths.

Although the four truths are included in the two truths, the Buddha taught them in order to understand what is to be adopted and what is to abandoned. What is to be abandoned are true sufferings, the result, and true origins, the cause of that result. What is to be adopted are true cessations, the result, and true paths, the cause of attaining that result. A true cessation is only a nominal result which is called 'a result of separation,' but is not an *actual* result. In the sense that true paths are the means for attaining a true cessation, they are said to be its cause. However, true cessations are not an actual result because they are permanent phenomena, whereas both causes and results are phenomena that are able to perform a function. Therefore, true cessations are only nominally given the name 'result.'

Next follows an explanation of the four noble truths and their sixteen attributes. The presentation of the sixteen attributes differs in the various scriptures. The presentation of the four noble truths in the two *Knowledges* is a presentation of the coarse four noble truths, whereas the presentation in the *Supplement* is of the subtle four noble truths. When the four noble truths are explained individually, their attributes are also explained in terms of both the coarse and the subtle. However, Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen says that the first of the sixteen attributes, impermanence, does not have both coarse and subtle aspects because there is no difference in the degree of subtlety of the impermanence explained by the lower schools and that explained by the higher schools in that both present impermanence as momentariness or that which disintegrates momentarily. On the other hand, Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa says that there *are* both coarse and subtle impermanences.

The two aspects of the second attribute of true sufferings, misery, are presented in terms of cause in that the misery produced by the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person is coarse, whereas the misery produced by the conception of an inherently existent person is subtle. For this reason, the two aspects of coarse and subtle misery are posited in terms of their causes.

The remaining attributes of true sufferings, empty and selfless, also have two aspects; however, they are not presented in terms of cause. The coarse aspect is the common assertion that empty means empty of a permanent, independent, unitary self that is a different entity from the aggregates and that selfless means the lack of a self-sufficient substantially existent person. The subtle aspect is the uncommon assertion of the Prasangika Madhyamikas that both empty and selfless are the emptiness of inherent existence or the emptiness of existing from its own side. In short, they do not distinguish a difference between the attributes of empty and selfless, whereas the lower schools do distinguish them. The Prasangika Madhyamikas also assert that the person is empty of being permanent, independent, unitary; however, they explain that this is the emptiness of a permanent, independent, unitary person *qualified by non-inherent existence*.

The four coarse attributes of true origins – coarse cause, coarse origin, coarse strong producer, and coarse condition – are all the eighth link craving as it is commonly asserted by the lower schools, or the attachment produced by the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person.

The four subtle attributes of true origins – subtle cause, subtle origin, subtle condition, and subtle strong producer [again, is this correct order?] – are all the attachment produced by the conception of an inherently existent person. These four attributes are subtle in the sense that they are more difficult to realize than the coarse attributes. Thus, in this case coarse and subtle are in relation to the difficulty of realizing them. In short, because the first four are easier to realize, they are called the coarse attributes of true origins, whereas the second four are more difficult to realize and are therefore called the subtle attributes of true origins.

True origins are explained as actions and afflictions. Within the true origins that are afflictions, there are two types: the six root afflictions and the twenty secondary afflictions. The true origins that are actions are of many types, such as projecting actions, actualizing actions, completing actions, and so forth.

The attributes of true cessations are cessation, pacification, auspicious highness, and definite emergence. True cessations are also of two types: the coarse and the subtle. Coarse true cessations are those explained in the two *Knowledges* (the *Treasury of Knowledge* by Vasubandhu and the *Compendium of Knowledge* by Asanga), whereas the subtle are those explained by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. Some say that the true cessations explained in the lower schools (i.e., in the two *Knowledges*) are imputed true cessations, not fully qualified true cessations. Likewise, they say that the true paths explained in the two *Knowledges* are not fully qualified true paths. This would mean that the foe destroyers explained in the two *Knowledges* are imputed foe destroyers and not fully qualified foe destroyers.

However, if someone were to insist that there are another kind of coarse and subtle true cessations they can be posited respectively as: (1) a cessation which is a state in which the conception of self-sufficient substantial existence is abandoned and (2) a cessation in which the conception of inherent existence is abandoned. However, this assertion leaves room for debate.

In regard to the attribute of definite emergence of true cessations, the term 'definite emergence' is the same as that which comes in the context of the three principal aspects of the path (definite emergence or renunciation, the mind of enlightenment, and correct view). What is the difference between them? In the context of the *Stages of the Path,* a thought of definite emergence is presented, this being the thought to achieve nirvana. On the other hand, in the context of the attribute of definite emergence there is a discussion as to where one emerges, from what, by what means, and who emerges.

The four attributes of true paths are: path, suitability, achievement, and deliverance. These four also have a coarse and subtle aspect. The four coarse attributes are exalted knowers of the emptiness of self-sufficient substantial existence, whereas the four subtle attributes are exalted knowers of the emptiness of inherent existence. An exalted knower is called 'path' because by means of it one reaches liberation. In the fourth chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* true paths are posited in terms of theses and proofs in that a thesis is set out, a question asked, and a proof given. However, the fourth attribute of true paths, deliverance, does not have a proof as there was no need for Buddha to set this out in order for his close disciples to understand it.

For the Prasangika Madhyamikas true sufferings, true origins, and true paths, are conventional truths, whereas true cessations are ultimate truths. For the Svatantrika Madhyamikas all four truths are conventional truths, i.e., they do not assert true cessations to be ultimate truths. However, the following is quoted in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way* in the context of the fifth mind generation (page 343): "*A Dose of Emptiness* says: 'Regarding the assertion that if it is a true cessation it is pervaded by being thusness, there are no Chittamatra and Madhyamika scholars who would disagree with this." But if asked whether the Svatantrika Madhyamikas accept true cessations as thusnesses, although they should in that they are Madhyamikas, they do not. The assertions of *A Dose of Emptiness* often differ from other texts. Here it would seem to say that the Chittamatrins assert true cessations to be ultimate truths.

For the Vaibhashikas, true cessations are probably ultimate truths, because they give the definition of conventional truth as: a phenomenon that is such that when it is broken up or mentally separated into individual parts, the awareness apprehending that object is canceled. An ultimate truth is a phenomenon that is such that when it is broken up or mentally separated into individual parts,

the consciousness apprehending that object is not canceled. A true cessation cannot be destroyed, for example, by a hammer. In addition, it cannot be mentally separated into parts, therefore the consciousness apprehending it cannot be canceled by this means.

On the contrary, for the Sautrantikas a true cessation is a conventional truth because it is a phenomenon that is not able to perform a function ultimately. In the Sautrantika school an ultimate truth is defined as that which is able to perform a function ultimately, while a conventional truth is defined as that which is not able to perform a function ultimately. There is a text in English called *The Two Truths,* by Guy Newland, which draws on several sources including Geshe Ngawang Palden, and sets out the definitions of the two truths according to the four schools.

For what reason do the Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that true cessations are not ultimate truths but conventional truths? They say that a true cessation arises through abandoning an object of abandonment that is a conventional truth, therefore, because the object of abandonment is a conventional truth, its abandonment must also be a conventional truth.

For what reason do the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that true cessations, i.e., abandonments, are ultimate truths and not conventional truths given that they assert that the object of abandonments are conventional truths? They say that the reality of the mind is emptiness, ultimate truth. Although all minds have this reality, only when an object of abandonment has been removed is it posited as a true cessation. Only then is the reality of the mind posited as ultimate truth, as a true cessation. For example, today Sherab, our translator, is in his usual aspect of wearing lay clothes, having a girl friend, and so forth but what happens if tomorrow he were to cut his hair and put on monk's clothes? Although Sherab has changed, Sherab still remains. Are there two Sherabs, one a lay person and one a monk, or only one? Sherab is still Sherab, whether he is a lay person or monk, yet there has been a change in his appearance. Likewise, the reality of the mind remains the same but the difference is in terms of whether or not the stains of the objects of abandonment have been removed. When the stains have been removed, the reality of the mind is a true cessation, whereas when the stains have not been removed the reality of the mind is not a true cessation.

Q: Therefore, are true cessations merely imputed ultimate truths but not actual ultimate truths?
A: Everything is imputed according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas.
Q: Are they not fully qualified true cessations?
A: They are both fully qualified and merely imputed.

This concludes the discussion of the coarse and subtle four noble truths, which are further clarified in *Two Truths*.

The word 'conventional truth' in Tibetan is *kun 'dzob den pa*; literally *kun* means 'all,' *dzob* means 'concealer' or 'that which obscures,' and *den pa* means 'truth.' Conventional truths are so-called because they obscure the seeing of reality. This is what Dharmakirti says in *Compendium of Valid Cognition,* but there are different interpretations. When the mind apprehends a conventional mode of subsistence it is prevented from apprehending the ultimate mode of subsistence. In the *Compendium of Valid Cognition,* conception is posited as the concealer that obscures all. For example, conception cannot see a form, an object of the eye consciousness, nakedly. What perceives a form directly or nakedly? Only the eye consciousness sees a form nakedly. A conception is not able to see a form directly or nakedly because it conceals the form's mode of subsistence.

Wednesday afternoon, 29 March 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Further, if asked: what other truths exist different from the four truths?

I shall explain. They exist as was taught in the *Fifth Bodhisattva Ground* [of the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:

> "This is suffering, the arya truth" is thoroughly known just as it really is. "This is the origin of suffering. This is the cessation of suffering. This is the path which progresses to the cessation of suffering, the arya truth," are thoroughly known just as they really are.
>
> He is skilled in conventional truth; skilled in ultimate truth; skilled in the truth of characteristics; skilled in the truth of complete divisions; skilled in the truth which, differentiating, realizes; skilled in the truth of functioning things; skilled in the truth of strong production; skilled in the truth which knows exhaustion and non-generation; skilled in the truth of engaging the knower of paths; skilled in the truths from achieving connecting the borders of all sequences of bodhisattva's grounds till the exalted wisdom of the Tathagata arises.
>
> There, [he] thoroughly knows conventional truth through producing satisfaction exactly in accordance with knowing the thoughts of other sentient beings; thoroughly knows ultimate truth through fully absorbing in the sole progression; thoroughly knows the truth of characteristics through realizing specific and general characteristics; thoroughly knows the truth of complete divisions through realizing the presentation of the complete divisions of phenomena; thoroughly knows the truth which, differentiating, realizes through subsequently realizing the presentation of the aggregates, elements, and entrances; thoroughly knows the truth of functioning things through descending into experience the harms to body and mind; thoroughly knows the truth of strong production through realizing rebirth (joining the essential boundary) in migrations; thoroughly knows the truth which knows exhaustion and non-generation through extremely pacifying all extensive torments of epidemics; thoroughly knows the truth which engages the knower of paths through strongly establishing the non-dual; and thoroughly knows the truths from achieving connection of the borders of all sequences of bodhisattva's grounds till the exalted wisdom of the Tathagata arises through bearing in mind manifestly and completely all aspects.

The *Fifth Bodhisattva Ground* of the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* mentions various types of truths but all of them are included in the two truths, conventional truths and ultimate truths.

"Skilled in the truth of characteristics" either means being skilled in the divisions of the two truths or in the characteristics or definitions of the two truths.

"Skilled in the truth of complete divisions" means that the bodhisattva is skilled in the divisions of conventional truth and ultimate truth. For example, conventional truth is divided into two, that which is real and that which is unreal to the face of worldly knowledge. Ultimate truth also has its respective divisions such as the sixteen ultimate truths or sixteen emptinesses, the twenty ultimate truths, four ultimate truths, and so forth.

"Skilled in the truth which, differentiating, realizes" means that the bodhisattva is skilled in differentiating and realizing. "Skilled in the truth of functioning things" means being skilled in the three divisions of functioning things: matter, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factors. "Skilled in the truth of strong production" means knowing that which is produced by causes and conditions.

"Skilled in the truth which knows exhaustion and non-generation" means that the bodhisattva knows certain afflictions have been exhausted and that they will not be produced again. Vasubandhu, in his *Treasury of Knowledge,* posits ten kinds of knowledge, the last two being the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-generation. These ten knowledges are:

(1-4) the knowledges of the four noble truths,

(5-6) dharma knowledge and subsequent knowledge,

(7) the knowledge of conventionalities,
(8) the knowledge of others' minds,
(9) the knowledge of exhaustion, and
(10) the knowledge of non-generation.

This topic of exhaustion and non-generation is also discussed in the fifth chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* in the context of the definition of great enlightenment.

"Skilled in the truth of engaging the knower of paths" means that the bodhisattva knows the three types of knower of paths: (1) a knower of paths knowing hearers' paths, (2) a knower of paths knowing solitary realizers' paths, and (3) a knower of paths knowing mahayana paths.

"Skilled in the truths from achieving connecting the borders of all sequences of bodhisattva's grounds till the exalted wisdom of the Tathagata arises" means that the bodhisattva knows the means of progressing sequentially through the bodhisattva grounds up to the buddha ground.

"There, [he] thoroughly knows conventional truth through producing satisfaction exactly in accordance with knowing the thoughts of other sentient beings" means that due to knowing all the diverse phenomena, the bodhisattva is able to benefit sentient beings in accordance with their aptitudes. For example, if the bodhisattva knows that a sentient being needs a cup of coffee he can materialize it! In this way a bodhisattva can satisfy sentient beings.

Someone recently asked me what he should do in order to attain clairvoyance. I told him that he needed to cultivate concentration. However, one should be careful when doing so because it is said that between reasoned knowledge and clairvoyance it is better to have knowledge gained through reasoning. There is a story about this regarding Vasubandhu and Dignaga. Dignaga, with his eye clairvoyance, could see a pregnant cow on the other side of a mountain and that the calf had a patch on its forehead. However, Vasubandhu, who did not have clairvoyance, said that it was not a patch on the forehead but that the tip of its white tail was resting on its forehead (he was able to say this because when a calf is in the womb, its tail generally rests on its forehead). They made a bet as to who was right and then went to the house of the family who owned the pregnant cow. They told the story to the householder and asked him to let them know when the calf was born whether its forehead or the tip of its tail were white. When the calf was born it was the tip of the tail that was white. This shows that reasoned knowledge can at times be better than eye clairvoyance. Likewise, the clairvoyance knowing others' minds can at times be mistaken or the person with it can misinterpret what is seen. For example, there are clairvoyants who do mirror-reading, meaning that they see images in a mirror. However, merely seeing these images is not enough; they must know how to interpret what they see. Also in Nepal there are people who paint their left palm and put some grains of rice on it and then ask a young child to look at it whereupon the child recounts what he sees. For the children, it is like watching TV and therefore, at times, they remain entranced by what they see instead of reporting it to the adult! At times, letters appear rather than images, these being easier to understand.

The *Fifth Bodhisattva Ground* [of the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*] then says: "Thoroughly knows ultimate truth through fully absorbing in the sole progression." This means that the bodhisattva realizes emptiness, the path to enlightenment. In general it is said that the wisdom realizing emptiness is the unique path which all the buddhas of the three times travel.

"Thoroughly knows the truth of characteristics through realizing specific and general characteristics" does not refer to specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena, but to specific and general characteristics. Specific characteristics are those that are unshared by other phenomena, while general characteristics are those that are common to other phenomena. In the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* true sufferings were explained in terms of their specific characteristics and general characteristics, saying that the specific characteristics of true sufferings are their four attributes (impermanence, misery, empty, and selfless) whereas their general

characteristic is their lack of true existence. The word 'characteristic' (Tib. *mtshen nyid*) can mean either attribute or definition. However, usually it means definition. In the context of the specific and general, *mtshen nyid* is translated as characteristic.

The bodhisattva "thoroughly knows the truth of complete divisions through realizing the presentation of the complete divisions of phenomena." How many divisions of phenomena are there? There can be said to be many – the 108 divisions from forms through the exalted knower of all aspects – or there can be said to be very few, the modes and varieties.

The bodhisattva "thoroughly knows the truth which, differentiating, realizes through subsequently realizing the presentation of the aggregates, elements, and entrances." 'Aggregates' are defined as a heap or pile or mass of many things. 'Entrance' or sphere is defined as a door of production. 'Element' or constituent is defined as a type or class. In general when aggregates are divided there are five, the form aggregate through the consciousness aggregate. However, there are many other types of aggregates such as the five uncontaminated aggregates, the aggregates or heaps in the context of the *Sutra of the Three Heaps* which is also called the *Bodhisattva's Confession of Downfalls*.

Entrances (or spheres) are divided into twelve, which are grouped into six inner entrances and six outer entrances. The six outer entrances are: (1) the form entrance, (2) sound entrance, (3) odor entrance, (4) taste entrance, (5) tangible object entrance, and (6) phenomena entrance. The six inner entrances are: the (1) eye entrance, (2) ear entrance, (3) nose entrance, (4) tongue entrance, (5) body entrance, and (6) mental entrance.

There are eighteen constituents, or elements, which are grouped into three groups of six:

- form constituent, sound constituent, odor constituent, taste constituent, tangible object constituent, and phenomena constituent;
- the eye constituent, ear constituent, nose constituent, tongue constituent, body constituent, and mental constituent; and
- the eye consciousness constituent, ear consciousness constituent, nose consciousness constituent, tongue consciousness constituent, body consciousness constituent, and mental consciousness constituent.

There is also a more elaborate way of dividing the constituents into sixty-two.

"Thoroughly knows the truth of functioning things through descending into experience the harms to body and mind" means that the bodhisattva knows the truth of things that harm body and mind, of which there are many types. He also knows what benefits body and mind.

"Thoroughly knows the truth of strong production through realizing rebirth (joining the essential boundary) in migrations" means that the bodhisattva knows the truth of the rebirths of sentient beings. There are six migrations into which sentient beings can be reborn; the bodhisattva knows these. In addition, there are four types of rebirth taught in sutra: (1) rebirth from a womb, (2) rebirth from an egg, (3) rebirth from heat and moisture, and (4) spontaneous rebirth. The six migrations include the four types of rebirth, whereas the four types of rebirth do not include the six migrations. This is because the intermediate state being is included in the four types of rebirth but is not included in the six migrations. If asked whether the intermediate state being is an animal, hungry ghost, human being, and so forth this question cannot be answered, whereas if asked to which type of rebirth does the intermediate state being belong, we can say that he belongs to that of spontaneous rebirth.

The bodhisattva "thoroughly knows the truth which knows exhaustion and non-generation through extremely pacifying all extensive torments of epidemics." How does the bodhisattva extremely pacify all extensive torments of epidemics? There are many types of epidemic or contagious diseases mentioned in a text related to the White Umbrella deity, such as a one-day contagious disease, a two-day contagious disease, a three-day contagious disease, and so forth. "A one-day contagious disease" is perhaps a disease that kills after a single day of sickness or perhaps it is one

that only lasts a day. In general there are said to be 400 diseases (however, some say that the Tibetan number used in this context means 424 diseases or that there are 400 diseases plus four root diseases. These four root diseases can be posited as the root afflictions of attachment, hatred, confusion, and a combination of all three, each of which are the root of 100 diseases). The fifth ground bodhisattva knows these diseases and the methods for pacifying them.

Thursday morning, 30 March 2000

The bodhisattva "thoroughly knows the truth which engages the knower of paths through strongly establishing the non-dual." Here the Tibetan word *mi gnyis,* translated as 'non-dual,' literally means "not existing as two."

The bodhisattva "thoroughly knows the truths from achieving connection of the borders of all sequences of bodhisattva's grounds till the exalted wisdom of the Tathagata arises through bearing in mind manifestly and completely all aspects." "All sequences of bodhisattva's grounds" means that the bodhisattva knows the connections of borders between the first and second ground and so forth. "Connections of borders" means that when the bodhisattva completes the practices of the first ground, he connects to the second ground and so forth.

The first ten grounds are causal grounds, while the eleventh is the resultant tathagata ground called Universal Light. In the context of tantra, there are thirteen grounds, the last being called the Vajradhara Ground.

In regard to this section Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Chandrakirti's root text says:
>
> > *His concentration excels, and he attains great skill in knowledge*
> > *Of the subtle nature of the truths of those with a good mind.* [5.1cd]
>
> On the fifth ground, from among the ten perfections, that of concentration is greatly surpassing. When Chandrakirti presents it thus [in his commentary], one should understand that since a bodhisattva is known to have already attained the surpassing perfections of giving, ethics, patience, and effort, he is indicating that 'from among the latter six perfections the perfection of concentration is surpassing'. Here on the fifth ground a bodhisattva has a measure of attainment with respect to complete non-oppression by faults discordant with the perfection of concentration, such as distraction and so on, that he does not have with respect to the perfections of wisdom and so forth.
>
> Not only is his concentration surpassing, but also he attains great skill with respect to the subtle nature of the truths of those with a good mind – the truths of superiors [the four noble truths] – which must be understood with a fine mind. Hence, he here comes to possess a higher wisdom which is comprised of skill in the coarse and subtle truths.

A fifth ground bodhisattva has attained five surpassing perfections: generosity, ethics, patience, joyous effort, and concentration. In particular, this bodhisattva is no longer oppressed by the discordant class of concentration, which is distraction. However, this bodhisattva is oppressed by the faults discordant with the perfection of wisdom. The remaining perfections of method, prayer, power, and exalted wisdom are included in the sixth perfection, the perfection of wisdom. This is the usual order of the last four perfections, but in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* the order is stated as method, power, prayer, and exalted wisdom.

The fifth ground bodhisattva not only has a surpassing perfection of concentration, but has also attained skill with respect to the coarse and subtle natures of the four noble truths.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) continues:

> QUESTION: The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* specifically sets forth that a fifth grounder is skilled in the four truths – sufferings, sources, cessations, and paths – and in conventional truths and ultimate truths as well. However, the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra (Pitaputrasamagama)* and Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* (XXIV.8) say that truths are limited to two, conventional and ultimate. How could the four truths be separate from the two?
>
> ANSWER: Chandrakirti explains in his commentary that although there are no truths that are not included in the two, there is a purpose in setting out the four truths. It is done to indicate that the division of thoroughly afflicted phenomena which are to be abandoned consists of causes or sources, and effects or sufferings. Also, the division of very pure phenomena which are to be assumed consists of causes or true paths, and effects or true cessations. Furthermore, he explains that true sufferings, sources, and paths are conventional truths and that true cessations are ultimate truths.
>
> Chandrakirti also explains in his commentary on Nagarjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* that nirvanas are ultimate truths and that the other three truths are conventional ones.

All four truths are included in the two truths, conventional truths and ultimate truths. However, there is a purpose to setting out the four truths – this is in terms of their being two sets of causes and results. Maitreya, in his *Sublime Continuum* (*Uttaratantra*), says that the illness is to be recognized, its cause is to be abandoned, the state of well-being is to be attained, and the medicine is to be taken. This is an analogy of the fact that true sufferings are to be known, true origins are to be abandoned, true cessations are to be attained, and true paths are to be cultivated.

Buddha taught the four noble truths in terms of causal and resultant truths. In the *Descent into Lanka Sutra,* it says that just as a doctor prescribes medicines according to the illness of the patient, Buddha gave teachings according to the dispositions and interests of trainees. This means that Buddha taught the four noble truths in order for sentient beings to be cured of the chronic illness of the afflictions.

Among the four noble truths, the three – true sufferings, true origins, and true paths – are conventional truths while true cessations are ultimate truths. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Chandrakirti also explains in his commentary on Nagarjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* that nirvanas are ultimate truths and that the other three truths are conventional ones." There are those who say that true cessations are ultimate truths but are not suchnesses, emptinesses, and realities. On the other hand, others say that ultimate truth, suchness, emptiness, and reality are synonyms, as are unmistaken suchness, perfect suchness, and so forth. Those who assert that true cessations are not suchnesses give the reason that it is because the object of negation of a true cessation has existed since beginningless time. They say that if the opposite were the case, that is, if true cessations were suchnesses, then their objects of negation should *not* have existed since beginningless time. The object of negation in relation to a true cessation is something that exists; it is an affliction. Panchen Sonam Dragpa says: "True cessation, as a subject, it follows that it is not thusness because its object of negation exists." Thus, he says a true cessation is an ultimate truth but is not suchness, emptiness, and reality.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Nirvanas are true cessations, and he adds that the Teacher, Buddha, asserted that there is direct knowledge of true cessations. This is not feasible in the systems of proponents of true existence who assert that a direct valid cognizer has as its object an exclusively characterized [impermanent] phenomenon. In Chandrakirti's own system direct knowledge of cessation is established within the context of cognizing the meaning of suchness by way of a wisdom consciousness of uncontaminated meditative equipoise. Therefore, if true cessations were conventional truths, his presentation would be impossible. He also proves with great effort that when a nirvana is actualized, one must cognize the meaning of suchness directly. Therefore, those

> who propound that [according to Chandrakirti] true cessations are conventional truths have not come to the right decision.

True cessations or nirvanas are established by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. This can be debated: "If it is established by an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is it pervaded by being an emptiness? For example, is omniscient mind an ultimate truth because it is established by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise?" Lama Tsongkhapa says: "In Chandrakirti's own system direct knowledge of cessation is established within the context of cognizing the meaning of suchness by way of a wisdom consciousness of uncontaminated meditative equipoise. Therefore, if true cessations were conventional truths, his presentation would be impossible. He also proves with great effort that when a nirvana is actualized, one must cognize the meaning of suchness directly." It can be asked: "Is the omniscient mind that realizes modes not a conventional truth because it is to be attained by means of a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise?" In the *Illumination* it says that true cessations are ultimate truths because they are actualized by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Indirectly, this implies that such true cessations appear to the face of this exalted wisdom. However, according to Panchen Sonam Dragpa this is not correct. He says that the *Illumination* states that true cessations are ultimate truths but does *not* clearly state that they are emptinesses or suchnesses. In *A Dose of Emptiness*, which is quoted in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way* in the context of the fifth mind generation (Tib. page 343), it says: "Regarding the assertion that if it is a true cessation it is pervaded by being thusness, even among Chittamatra and Madhyamika scholars there are none who would disagree."

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, those who propound that [according to Chandrakirti] true cessations are conventional truths have not come to the right decision."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Although an elimination of true existence – the object of negation – with respect to any base is considered an ultimate truth, it does not necessarily follow that the objects of negation of all ultimate truths do not exist among knowable objects. Nagarjuna's *Praise of the Element of Qualities* says:
>
> > Homage and obeisance to the element of qualities.
> > When it is not thoroughly understood,
> > One wanders in the three existences
> > Although it does in fact abide in all sentient beings.
> >
> > Just this is also the body of truth
> > And the nirvana that is the purity
> > From having purified that which serves
> > As the cause of cyclic existence.
>
> The nature of phenomena is accompanied with defilement, and when that is purified, Nagarjuna says that this nature becomes a nirvana and a truth body. There are many similar teachings that defilement is the object to be negated with respect to the purified nature of phenomena. If their nature could not become free from defilement, toil would be fruitless. Also, if the nature of phenomena can be freed from defilement, then its objects of negation can exist among knowable objects.
>
> For example, in the non-existence of the horns of a rabbit these horns are the object of negation and do not occur among knowable objects. However, the non-existence of a pot – the negative of pot with pot as the object of negation and existing among knowable objects – can be posited as the non-existence of the horns of a rabbit.
>
> In general, pure and impure phenomena are qualified by this nature [which is the absence of inherent existence], and in this context the negatives of the two selves, for instance, are negations in the sense that the object negated [inherent existence] simply does not occur among knowable objects. However, when the phenomena qualified by this nature are gradually purified of defilement, their nature also becomes purified. Therefore, with respect to a certain phenomenon qualified by

> this nature, it is not sufficient for its nature to be a partial purity, it must also be purified of the adventitious defilements which accord with a particular position [on the path]. These are called true cessations.

On a basis, such as a table, when the object of negation – true existence – is negated, that is an ultimate truth. If it is asked: "Is it necessary that the object of negation of all that is ultimate truth does not exist at all among objects of knowledge?" It is *not* necessary [that that object of negation does not exist among objects of knowledge]; for example, a true cessation is an ultimate truth yet its object of negation *does* exist among objects of knowledge. To prove that the object of negation of ultimate truth is not pervaded by not existing, Lama Tsongkhapa quotes from the *Praise to the Element of Qualities*: "When it is not thoroughly understood, one wanders in the three existences although it does in fact abide in all sentient beings." Due to not understanding the sphere of reality, one wanders in the three existences: (1) under the ground, (2) on the ground, and (3) above the ground or (1) in the desire realm, (2) in the form realm, and (3) in the formless realm. In short, due to not knowing the sphere of reality, sentient beings continue to take rebirth in cyclic existence. The *Praise to the Element of Qualities* further says: "I prostrate to my own mind, a buddha abiding in afflictions." This means that amidst the afflictions lies a buddha. According to Jonangpa, there is a buddha complete with all the major and minor marks in the continuum of each sentient being, meaning that there is the tathagata nature in the continua of sentient beings. These days the incarnation of Jonangpa (also called Taranatha) lives in Dharamsala and is called Karga Jedzun Dampa (Karga is the name of the village in Mongolia where he was born, in which there used to be a large monastery of 100,000 monks. The monastery is said to have been destroyed by the Russians and all the monks killed in a single day.) Because Jonangpa asserted that ultimate truth is an affirmative, independent phenomenon, he is said to have been a master who had pure conduct but mistaken view.

The sphere of reality acts as a cause of cyclic existence and nirvana in that [when it is not purified it acts as a cause of cyclic existence and] when it is purified it acts as a cause of nirvana. If this passage is accepted literally to mean that the sphere of reality is the cause of cyclic existence, then this is an incorrect interpretation. Rather, it means that if one does not understand the reality of the mind, one wanders in cyclic existence whereas, through realizing it, one achieves nirvana. Some Nyingma texts say: "The sphere of reality is not non-existent and it is the foundation of both cyclic existence and nirvana. It is not existent and it is not seen by the Buddha." The discussion of the views of existence and non-existence arise from such texts. In other words, these texts say that the sphere of reality is not non-existent because it is the foundation of both cyclic existence and nirvana, yet it is also not existent because it is not seen by the buddhas. If this is explained correctly, it has a very profound meaning but if it is explained incorrectly it becomes absurd. The meaning is that when one does not understand the sphere of reality one wanders in cyclic existence, whereas when one understands it one becomes free.

There is an emptiness that is purified and an emptiness that is not purified. The "purified nature of phenomena" is an emptiness that is free from the object of negation, i.e., the stains. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "If their nature could not become free from defilement, toil would be fruitless." This means that if it were not possible for the emptiness of the mind to become free from stains then all the hardships experienced while striving to attain this would be fruitless. Hardship or toil refers to the practices of meditating, prostrating, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "Also, if the nature of phenomena can be freed from defilement, then its objects of negation can exist among knowable objects. For example, in the non-existence of the horns of a rabbit these horns are the object of negation and do not occur among knowable objects." The object of negation that is the horns of a rabbit is not feasible among objects of knowledge, i.e., the horns of a rabbit are non-existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "However, the non-existence of a pot – the negative of pot with pot as the object of negation and existing among knowable objects – can be posited as the non-existence of the horns of a rabbit." Is the non-existence of a pot the non-existence of the horns of a rabbit? The object of negation of the non-existence of pot is pot, and that exists.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "In general, pure and impure phenomena are qualified by this nature [which is the absence of inherent existence], and in this context the negatives of the two selves, for instance, are negations in the sense that the object negated [inherent existence] simply does not occur among knowable objects." The object of negation is inherent existence, which does not exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "However, when the phenomena qualified by this nature are gradually purified of defilement, their nature also becomes purified. Therefore, with respect to a certain phenomenon qualified by this nature, it is not sufficient for its nature to be a partial purity, it must also be purified of the adventitious defilements which accord with a particular position [on the path]. These are called true cessations." "A certain phenomenon qualified by this nature," literally a specific substratum, is the mind qualified by this nature. With respect to the mind, just as it becomes free from stains, the *emptiness* of the mind also becomes free from stains. "It is not sufficient for its nature to be a partial purity, it must also be purified of the adventitious defilements which accord with a particular position [on the path]" refers to the two stains or defilements, which are the natural and the adventitious. The freedom from natural stains is already there, therefore, only when the freedom from adventitious stains is attained is there a true cessation. In short, the freedom of the mind from an adventitious stain is a true cessation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Many designations of truths such as skill in the truth of definitions and so forth occur with respect to this ground in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*. However, this does not mean that these are not included in the two truths.

In short, all truths are included in the two truths.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> From the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way,"'* the Fifth Mind Generation, called "Difficult to Overcome."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> Such is the explanation of the fifth mind generation in the *Illumination of the Thought, An Extensive Explanation of Chandrakirti's 'Supplement to the Middle Way.'*

The main point in the chapter on the fifth mind generation is to understand the four noble truths well and to understand what is to be abandoned and what is to be adopted. This understanding has to then be integrated with the mind by examining the causes of our daily sufferings. These sufferings arise due to particular conditions; recognizing them, we should put effort into eliminating them.

Thursday afternoon, 30 March 2000

THE SIXTH MIND GENERATION

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

3B1C-2B Explaining the sixth ground: the Manifest

The explanation of the sixth ground, the Manifest, has four parts:

1 Etymology of the ground and indication that the perfection of wisdom is surpassing
2 Praise of the perfection of wisdom
3 Explanation of suchness in which the profound dependent arising is seen
4 Conclusion by way of expressing the features of this ground.

3B1C-2B1 Etymology of "The Manifest" and indication that the perfection of wisdom is surpassing

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Now, the explanation from the viewpoint of the sixth mind generation:

Abiding in the mind equipoised on the approach,
[He] approaches the features of complete buddhahood and
Sees the thusness of this arising in dependence[14] *– he*
Will attain cessation through abiding in wisdom. [6.1]

The bodhisattva who abides in the equipoised mind on the sixth ground as a result of attaining the fully purified concentration gone beyond on the fifth ground and who sees the thusness of profound dependent arising will attain cessation with the fully purified wisdom gone beyond. It is not [attained] previously because of lacking surpassing wisdom. Cessation cannot be attained by possessing [merely] the [five] excellent perfections, generosity and so forth.

Because of understanding the reflection-like nature, because the bodhisattva observes the truth of the path of the fifth bodhisattva ground, and because of approaching the features of complete buddhahood, this ground is called 'Manifesting.'

The sixth ground is called Approaching or Manifesting because the sixth ground bodhisattva *approaches* the attainment of the qualities of fully complete buddhahood. This is because the sixth ground bodhisattva, in dependence on the condition that is a meditative equipoise on dependent-arising, approaches the uncommon absorption of cessation. On the fifth ground, the bodhisattva became skilled in the wisdom knowing the coarse and subtle four noble truths, whereby he now gains skill in the wisdom thoroughly knowing the forward and reverse processes of dependent-arising. Thereby, he attains the surpassing higher training in wisdom.

Through practicing the four remaining perfections – method, prayer, power, and exalted wisdom – the bodhisattva develops the wisdom knowing varieties. With the fifth mind generation, the bodhisattva attained the thoroughly pure perfection of concentration, whereby on the sixth ground he gains the wisdom realizing the forward and reverse orders of dependent-arising.

Chandrakirti says: "Cessation cannot be attained by possessing [merely] the [five] excellent perfections, generosity and so forth." Here the word 'cessation' refers to the uncommon absorption of cessation.

[14] Sanskrit: ldam-pratyaya: Tibetan: 'di rten 'byung wa – 'the state of being dependently arisen from this or that,' is used here instead of the usual phrase 'dependent arising,' Sanskrit: pratitya-samutpada; Tibetan: rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba.

Chandrakirti then gives three reasons regarding the etymology of the name of the sixth ground: "(1) Because of understanding the reflection-like nature, (2) because the bodhisattva observes the truth of the path of the fifth bodhisattva ground, and (3) because of approaching the features of complete buddhahood, this ground is called 'Manifesting.'"

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Chandrakirti's *Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"* says:
>
> *Approaching the qualities of a perfect buddha*
> *And seeing the suchness of arising-dependent-upon-this*
> *Due to which they abide in wisdom, [bodhisattvas]*
> *On the Manifest, abiding in equipoise, attain cessation.* [6.1]
>
> Because [bodhisattvas] attained the thoroughly pure perfection of concentration on the fifth ground, they abide in a fully developed mind of meditative equipoise [on emptiness] on the sixth ground, the Approaching, or the Manifest. Based on this, they abide on the sixth bodhisattva ground seeing the profound suchness of mere conditionality – dependent arising. Because of this, they abide in the fully developed perfection of wisdom, whereby they attain [an uncommon absorption of] cessation. Prior to this, on the fifth ground and below, they did not attain [an uncommon absorption of] cessation because of not having the surpassing form of the fully developed perfection of wisdom. One cannot attain [an uncommon absorption of] cessation merely through the five fully developed perfections of giving, and so forth [that is, ethics, patience, effort, and concentration].
>
> This ground is called "The Manifest" or "The Approaching" because (1) the reflection-like nature of phenomena has become *manifest* by way of their wisdom, which is surpassing in the way [just described]; (2) on the fifth ground they *observed* true paths [and thus have newly gained complete wisdom with respect to the four truths], and (3) they are *approaching* attainment of a perfect buddha's qualities [in that they now have the surpassing form of the perfection of wisdom].

These three reasons for the etymology of the names of the sixth ground are the same as those set out by Chandrakirti.

"[Bodhisattvas] on the Manifest, abiding in equipoise, attain cessation" means that these bodhisattvas attain an uncommon absorption of cessation. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, an uncommon absorption of cessation is not a non-associated compositional factor, as is asserted by the Svatantrika Madhyamikas. The Prasangika Madhyamikas define an absorption of cessation in general as: a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise which is single-pointedly absorbed on emptiness in dependence on its empowering conditions, which are an actual absorption of a concentration and a supramundane path. In Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport* (page 104) it says:

> [The definition of] an absorption of cessation (Prasangika-Madhyamika) is: an exalted wisdom of single-pointed meditative equipoise on reality (*dharmata*) that abides in a type free from attachment to the Peak of Existence in dependence on (1) the supramundane path which is the means of attaining it and (2) an actual mind of the Peak of Existence. When divided there are: an uncommon absorption of cessation and a common absorption of cessation.

Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 196) says:

> If it is asked: "Why is it called 'absorption of cessation?'" The exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of the sixth ground, as the subject, there is a reason for calling it 'an absorption of cessation;' it is so-called due to the reason that thusness is called 'cessation'

> and it is an exalted wisdom equipoised on that. There is a reason for calling thusness 'cessation;' it is because the exalted wisdom directly realizing thusness is an exalted wisdom which has stopped the elaborations of dualistic appearance.

Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport* (page 104) says:

> The definition of an uncommon absorption of cessation (Prasangika-Madhyamika) is: an exalted wisdom equally and directly placed on reality (*dharmata*) that is qualified by a surpassing practice of the perfection of wisdom

On the other hand, according to the lower schools the absorption of cessation is a non-associated compositional factor and *not* a consciousness.

A common absorption of cessation is one that exists from the first through the tenth grounds. For this reason, it is called a common absorption of cessation. On the other hand, an uncommon absorption of cessation only exists from the sixth ground upward. However, some say that a common absorption of cessation is the absorption of cessation asserted by the lower schools, whereas an uncommon absorption of cessation is that asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. This is the second interpretation of the meaning of 'common' and 'uncommon' absorptions of cessation.

When the lower schools posit the absorption of cessation, they also say that it depends on a supramundane path that is the means for attaining it and an actual concentration of the Peak of Existence, but they posit its entity as a non-associated compositional factor.

Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport* (page 106) says:

> The definition of an absorption of cessation (Svatantrika-Madhyamika) is: a non-associated compositional factor which is an absorption in the continuum of a superior abiding in a type distinguished by the cessation of the gross objects to be stopped along with their concomitant factors on the subtle mental consciousness, the basis of cessation.

Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport* (page 104) says:

> The definition of absorption of cessation (Chittamatra) is: that observed to be a non-associated compositional factor which is an absorption in the continuum of a superior that is the cessation of the objects to be stopped – the seven coarse collections [of consciousness] – on either a mental consciousness or a mirror-like exalted wisdom which is the basis of cessation.

Bodhisattvas on the eighth ground and upward no longer have a mind-basis-of-all in that on these levels it is called a 'fruitional consciousness.' Foe destroyers also do not have a mind-basis-of-all.

The Chittamatrins assert eight consciousnesses: the usual six – eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses – plus a mind-basis-of-all and an afflicted mentality. Bodhisattvas on the eighth ground and beyond, as well as foe destroyers, no longer have an afflicted mentality due to which they no longer have a mind-basis of all. A mind-basis-of-all is defined by the Chittamatrins as: a main mental cognizer that is a different entity from the collection of six consciousnesses and which is the basis on which the latencies of virtue and non-virtue are stored. In fact, it is called 'mind-basis-of-all' because it is the mind that is the basis on which all the latencies of virtue and non-virtue are stored. The eighth consciousness, an afflicted mentality, is defined by the Chittamatrins as: a main mental cognizer that observes the mind-basis-of-all, its observed object, and has the aspect apprehending the 'I' or 'mine' as self-sufficient substantially existent.

Student: Is there debate as to when the uncommon absorption of cessation is attained? Before it was said that it was attained on the seventh ground.
Geshe-la: This subject is discussed further ahead in this text in the context of the seventh ground or seventh mind generation. Earlier on, in the context of bodhisattvas outshining hearers and solitary realizers, it was said that seventh ground bodhisattvas outshine the hearers and solitary realizers by the power of their intelligence or awareness due to being able to enter and rise from the uncommon absorption of cessation on the perfect end in the shortest moment of a complete action. This occurs only on the seventh ground upward, although the bodhisattva already has an uncommon absorption of cessation on the sixth ground. Chandrakirti's root text says:

> *On this, the Gone Afar, instant by*
> *Instant he will enter cessation and*
> *The method gone beyond will also blaze well.* [7.1abc]

Having attained an uncommon absorption of cessation on the sixth mind generation, on the seventh ground the bodhisattva attains the ability to enter and arise from it in an instant. Gyelwa Gendun Drub, in his *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* says:

> This bodhisattva, dwelling in this seventh stage, Gone Far, attains qualities which are superior to those of the sixth stage; for in each instant, he can enter meditation on cessation, and also he attains the full blossoming of the transcendent action of means.

According to the lower schools, why does one enter the absorption of cessation? One does so in order to avoid the mental despondency caused by coarse feelings and discriminations. Due to having feelings and discriminations, one experiences many difficulties. However, this explanation is not valid according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, who do *not* say that the reason for entering the absorption of cessation is to stop coarse feelings and discriminations. However, when absorbed single-pointedly on reality, coarse feelings and discriminations are stopped because they arise only due to seeing forms and so forth.

There is debate regarding the Chittamatrins' assertion that there is no mind-basis-of-all existing in the continua of bodhisattvas on the eighth ground and upward, and that there is no mirror-like exalted wisdom on these grounds since it exists only on the buddha ground. From the eighth through the tenth grounds, the mind-basis-of-all is given another name, the fruitional consciousness (*rnam smin gyi rnam shes*). To prove that there is a mind-basis-of-all, the Chittamatrins quote from the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* (*Illumination*, page 307), which says:

> The receiving consciousness is profound and subtle.
> All the seeds fall on it like a stream,
> Conceiving it to be a self is inappropriate.
> I did not present this to the childish.

The Chittamatrins assert that the mind-basis-of-all is the basis for the stopping of feelings and discrimination. If there were no mind-basis-of-all, then future rebirths would not be feasible. Using such reasonings, the Chittamatrins establish the existence of a mind-basis-of-all. We can ask: "Which of the seven awarenesses and knowers is the mind-basis-of-all?" The seven are: direct valid cognizer, inferential valid cognizer, subsequent cognizer, correct assumption, wrong consciousness, doubt, and an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained. The mind-basis-of-all is an awareness

to which an object appears but is not ascertained (an *inattentive awareness*). How many mental factors are there in the retinue of a mind-basis-of-all? There are nine.

Friday morning, 31 March 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> With respect to the meaning of the second reason [why the sixth ground is called "The Manifest," Jayananda's] *Commentarial Explanation* [incorrectly] explains this [second reason] to be that [bodhisattvas] manifest a path in which knower and known are not observed. However, that on the fifth ground true paths are observed is a case of [referring to the four truths by way of] mentioning the last of the four truths. Hence, since on that [fifth ground, bodhisattvas] attain skill with regard to the coarse and subtle four truths, on the sixth the wisdom that is comprised of skill with regard to the four truths is complete. This is what is meant [by Chandrakirti's referring to the fact that fifth ground bodhisattvas "observe true paths." This skill is attained on the fifth ground, but on the sixth one has such skill by way of a fully developed perfection of wisdom.]
>
> The first reason [above, which states that the reflection-like nature of phenomena – the emptiness of inherent existence which is *itself* like a reflection in that it exists but is not truly established – has become manifest] indicates that they have completed the training in wisdom which consists of skill in the forward procedure [of entry into cyclic existence when there is ignorance] and the reverse procedure [of liberation from cyclic existence when ignorance is overcome, these being in terms of the twelve links of] dependent arising. Hence, [the name, the Manifest] means that the truths and dependent arising have become manifest by way of [bodhisattvas'] completing these two trainings in wisdom [regarding the four truths and regarding the twelve links of dependent arising].
>
> Thus, on this ground they complete the three trainings in wisdom [that is, skill regarding emptiness, the four truths, and dependent arising]. Further, as much as calm abiding is enhanced, so much is their special insight enhanced, and on the fifth ground they attained full development of the perfection of concentration whereby, in dependence on it, here [on the sixth ground] their perfection of wisdom is fully developed. Therefore, an uncommon absorption in cessation [that is, a wisdom consciousness directly realizing emptiness within the context of the cessation of coarse discrimination and feeling] is attained from this [ground].
>
> Moreover, Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* says:
>
> > The sixth is called the Approaching because
> > They are approaching the qualities of a buddha.
> > Through familiarity with calm abiding and special insight
> > They attain cessation and hence are advanced [in wisdom]. [451]
> >
> > Through the maturation of these [qualities] they become
> > A king of the gods [in the land of Enjoying] Emanation.
> > Since hearers cannot surpass them, they pacify
> > Those having the pride of superiority. [452]
>
> [In that] "Emanation" means "Enjoying Emanation".

The explanation in Jayananda's commentary is incorrect in that he says that the sixth ground is called the Manifest because bodhisattvas manifest a path in which knower and known are not observed. Lama Tsongkhapa says that they *do* observe coarse and subtle true paths. Mentioning that they know true paths, the last of the four noble truths, also means that they know all of the coarse and subtle four noble truths. Thus, this bodhisattva is completely skilled in the coarse and subtle four noble truths. On the sixth ground, the bodhisattva has completed the three higher trainings in wisdom:
(1) the wisdom skilled in the coarse and subtle thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, which is gained on the fourth ground,

(2) the wisdom skilled in the coarse and subtle four noble truths, which is gained on the fifth ground, and
(3) the wisdom skilled in the forward and reverse processes of dependent-arising, which is gained on the sixth ground.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Further, as much as calm abiding is enhanced, so much is their special insight enhanced." One fully develops calm abiding on the fifth ground, whereas one develops special insight on the sixth ground.

In relation to the ten grounds, one can discuss the three higher trainings together with their basis. On the first ground, the bodhisattva attains the surpassing practice of generosity, this being the *basis* of the higher trainings. On the second ground, the bodhisattva attains the surpassing perfection of ethics and achieves the entity of the *higher training in ethics*. On the third ground, he attains the surpassing perfection of patience and the *higher training in mind* or the higher training in *meditative stabilization*. On the fourth to tenth grounds, the bodhisattva develops the *higher training in wisdom*. In this way, the bodhisattva cultivates all three higher trainings. When omniscience is attained, the *result* of the three higher trainings is achieved. In this way the three are present: (1) the basis of the higher trainings, (2) the entity of the higher trainings, and (3) the result of the higher trainings.

A bodhisattva on the fourth, fifth, and sixth grounds develops the higher training in wisdom mainly observing *emptiness*. On the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds the bodhisattva attains a surpassing higher training of wisdom observing *varieties*.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, an uncommon absorption in cessation [that is, a wisdom consciousness directly realizing emptiness within the context of the cessation of coarse discrimination and feeling] is attained from this [ground]."

Nagarjuna says that the sixth ground is called 'Approaching' because this bodhisattva approaches the qualities of a fully complete buddha due to having attained familiarity with calm abiding and special insight. He also says: "Since hearers cannot surpass them, they pacify those having the pride of superiority." This refers to the fact that bodhisattvas from the seventh ground upward outshine the hearers by the power of their intelligence or awareness. Nagarjuna says that such bodhisattvas "become a king of the gods [in the land of Enjoying] Emanation" (Enjoying Emanation being the fifth level of the desire realm gods). The first four levels of desire realm gods are (1) the Four Great Kings, (2) the Gods of the Thirty-Three, (3) Without Combat, and (4) Joyous; the sixth is Controlling Others' Emanations.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: In the third chapter, when discussing the knowledge obstructions, Geshe-la quoted Chandrakirti's *Supplement* (Tib. page 246), which says:

> The existence of the imprints of attachment and so forth are also causes of such kinds of operation of body and speech. Furthermore, the imprints of ignorance, attachment, and so forth are overcome only in the omniscient mind and buddha; they are not in others.

Does this mean that the imprints of attachment are knowledge obstructions?
Geshe-la: It would seem that they are. What objection do you have?
Student: In Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 172), the definition of a seed of a knowledge obstruction is given as:

> That abiding in a type of obstruction occurring in the continuum of a learner superior who has abandoned all conceptions of true existence without exception, which arises through the depositing of an uncommon imprint by the conception of true existence, which is its cause, and is the substantial cause for mistaken dualistic appearance, which is its result.

If it is a manifest knowledge obstruction it has to be a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance or a latency laid down by the conception of true existence. So is the imprint of attachment a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance or a latency laid down by the conception of true existence?
Geshe-la: It is *not* a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance but it *is* a latency laid down by the conception of true existence.
Student: Why is that?
Geshe-la: The latency of attachment has been laid down by its own uncommon conception of true existence which is its cause.
Student: In the uncommon [Prasangika] tenets it says that there is an attachment and a hatred conceiving true existence. Is it that?
Geshe-la: It is. There is a specific passage that mentions this.

Student: In Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 172) it says:

> The definition of a manifest knowledge obstruction is: that abiding in a type of obstruction occurring in the continuum of a learner superior who has abandoned all conceptions of true existence without exception, being a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance, which is the appearance of one's object, forms and so forth, as truly existent. For example, a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance which is the appearance of the objects of the six engaging consciousnesses, forms and so forth, as truly existent.

Would it not be enough to give the definition of a manifest knowledge obstruction as merely "a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance which is the appearance of one's object, forms and so forth, as truly existent" without saying "that abiding in a type of obstruction occurring in the continuum of a learner superior who has abandoned all conceptions of true existence without exception"?
Geshe-la: There must be a reason that Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen says this! In fact, if the definition were given as merely "a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance which is the appearance of one's object, forms and so forth, as truly existent," then there would be no pervasion that it is a manifest knowledge obstruction, because there is a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance that is the appearance of one's object, forms and so forth, as truly existent that is an *afflictive* obstruction. For example, one who has studied tenets who asserts that forms are truly existent has a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance that is the appearance of his object, forms and so forth, as truly existent.

We can set out a syllogism regarding this: A factor of dualistic appearance appearing to an acquired conception of true existence apprehending its object, forms and so forth, to exist truly, as the subject, it follows that it is a knowledge obstruction because it is a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance that is the appearance of one's object, forms and so forth, as truly existent. In short, it is necessary for the definition of a manifest knowledge obstruction to include the words "that abiding in a type of obstruction occurring in the continuum of a learner superior who has abandoned all conceptions of true existence without exception."

Student: The example that Geshe-la posited was of an afflictive obstruction. Is it an acquired afflictive obstruction?
Geshe-la: It is.

Student: Is it a manifest acquired afflictive obstruction or a factor of a seed?
Geshe-la: It is a consciousness.
Student: I would say [as a consequence] that the factor of mistaken dualistic appearance is a consciousness.
Geshe-la: The factor of mistaken dualistic appearance itself is not a consciousness, but a consciousness is that which has mistaken dualistic appearance. In one text, *Clarification of Doubts Regarding the Middle Way* by Khensur Pema Gyeltshen of Loseling, it says that it is not correct to say "the factor of mistaken dualistic appearance." In fact, in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's Gomang College textbooks, there is debate about the *factor* of mistaken dualistic appearance.

Student: On the fourth ground, the bodhisattva develops the higher training in wisdom observing the coarse and subtle aspects of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment. If we take faith from among the five powers as an example, how does the bodhisattva realize it in terms of the coarse and subtle?
Geshe-la: The coarse and subtle are in relation to the *objects* of the faith. If its object is realized to be empty of self-sufficient substantial existence, it is coarse faith, whereas if its object is realized to be empty of inherent existence, then it is subtle faith.
Student: But faith does not realize emptiness.
Geshe-la: All five powers including faith *do* realize emptiness. This is because concomitant with, for example, the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of the path of preparation realizing emptiness, there are the five, faith and so forth, which realize emptiness, although they are not *realizing awarenesses*. The five, faith and so forth, existing on the path of preparation have particular functions, those on the path of seeing have other functions, and so forth. On the path of seeing they realize emptiness.

In the context of the five powers, such as faith, the coarse and subtle can perhaps also be posited respectively as: (1) the five powers such as faith qualified by being empty of self-sufficient substantial existence and (2) the five powers such as faith qualified by being empty of inherent existence.

Student: The definition of hatred is the intention to harm. Does this include the wish for someone to experience mental discomfort?
Geshe-la: When there is the wish for others to have pain, this wish itself is not anger yet anger is present.
Student: Can harm include mental suffering as well as physical?
Geshe-la: Definitely, since causing others to have mental suffering is even worse than causing them physical harm.
Student: If one is trying not to be angry but is still becoming angry, is one collecting the karma of anger or the karma of practicing patience?
Geshe-la: You have to look at that within your own mind. If one knows the faults of anger and is trying to suppress the anger, then it is the practice of patience. On the other hand, if one holds on to anger, even though it is not manifest, it is still anger or resentment or belligerence, i.e., one of the twenty secondary afflictions. In regard to holding a grudge towards others, some say that it is better to manifest anger, as then the pain of resentment will be relieved! However, from the point of view of Dharma, that explosion of anger is not advisable. If you express your anger verbally there will only be a *temporary* relief of anger at the most. In every situation one has to look at the prohibitions and necessities.
Student: What does the person who is the object of anger need to do?
Geshe-la: If someone is angry with you, take this as an opportunity to practice patience. One can also say to the other person that there is no need to be angry and so forth. However, what is most

important in that situation is to practice patience oneself. In addition, we can also teach others how to practice patience. Sometimes, one can help short-tempered people by irritating them again and again whereby they may gradually become tired of getting angry! I myself have seen this happen.

Student: We accumulate many seeds of acquired obstructions in one life time. Do they ripen in the same lifetime or dissolve or transfer to another life?
Geshe-la: A seed is a potentiality that continues in other lives. What do you think about this?
Student: I think that is right. If in one life one upholds mistaken tenets such as thinking there are no buddhas, then in a future life it will be difficult for one to receive teachings from buddhas and so forth.
Geshe-la: Then you agree that the seeds continue to a future life?
Student: I think that they do continue, but this seems to contradict the statement that acquired afflictive obstructions and their seeds are related to one life.
Geshe-la: Although acquired, the seeds can remain for many lives. Do you think that there is an error in the definition of acquired afflictive obstructions?
Student: There is no error in Jedzun Chokyi Gyeltshen's definition, but I remember that it was said that the acquired afflictive obstructions are related to one life.
Geshe-la If the seeds of acquired afflictive obstructions dissolved at death that would be wonderful!

Student: In relation to the four close placements of mindfulness, I understood that coarse and subtle are related respectively to the conception of self-sufficient substantial existence and the conception of inherent existence. Therefore, in regard to the close placement of mindfulness on the body, are there different observed objects in terms of the coarse and subtle?
Geshe-la: The coarse placement of mindfulness on the body is to observe the body that has been produced by a conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person, whereas the subtle placement of mindfulness on the body is to observe the body that has been produced by the conception of an inherently existent person. Or else, coarse and subtle can be distinguished in terms of the mind in that observing the body as qualified by self-sufficient substantial existence is the coarse close placement of mindfulness on the body and observing the body qualified by inherent existence is the subtle close placement of mindfulness on the body.
Student: If it is coarse and subtle respectively from the point of view of the conception of self-sufficient substantial existence and the conception of inherent existence, it would seem that there is a different body that one observes, one that is coarse and one that is subtle. Is this what happens?
Geshe-la: One body cannot have two aspects. If these are posited in terms of a factor of cause saying, that there is a coarse body that comes from a coarse cause and a subtle body that comes from a subtle cause, it would mean that there are two heads, two right arms, and so forth. One could make this consequence, which is also mentioned in the *Compendium of Valid Cognition* in relation to the body being of two types, one that is fruitional and one that develops. Are there two bodies? One can say that there are two, the fruitional and the developmental. Then one has two heads, the fruitional and the developmental? The conclusion is that there are two bodies. The fruitional body which is a result of projecting karma and does not change, and the developmental body which does grow and change due to eating food and so forth.

In short, the body can be said to be produced by both the conception of self-sufficient substantial existence and the conception of inherent existence. The coarse close placement of mindfulness on the body is to meditate on the body that is a result of a virtuous action motivated by the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person. The subtle close placement of mindfulness on the body is to meditate on the body that is a result of a virtuous action motivated by the conception of an inherently existent person.

Student: Our society teaches particular types of behavior, and advertisements and so forth cause the arisal of desire for a motorbike, a good career, and so forth. Do these induce innate or acquired afflictive obstructions?
Geshe-la: There can arise both innate and acquired afflictive obstructions from these. In our life we depend on material things without which one cannot study and so forth. Therefore, the desire to have them is not necessarily an affliction as we need these things to survive. The improvements in housing, travel, communication, and so forth due to better technology do not arise only from afflictions but also come from virtuous thoughts.
Student: But is an advertisement that produces desire for a particular object a factor that produces an acquired afflictive obstruction since it strengthens the conception of true existence or is it something that induces an innate seed within us?
Geshe-la: It can activate latencies. For example, when we see advertisements they act as a condition for desire to rise. However, the main causes are the three mental poisons – attachment, hatred, and ignorance.

END

Monday afternoon, 3 April 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> 3B1C-2B2 Praise of the perfection of wisdom

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, in order to indicate that the collections of qualities other than that merely depend upon the wisdom gone beyond, it is explained:
>
> *Just as a blind group is easily led to the*
> *Desired location by a single being with eyesight,*
> *Similarly, here too, intelligence, taking along the qualities*
> *Of impaired eyesight, goes to the Conqueror's state.* [6.2]
>
> Just as a single being possessing eyesight easily leads the entire group of the blind to the location it strongly desires to go to, similarly, the wisdom gone beyond, having taken along the qualities of the perfections other than that, also goes to the Tathagata ground called 'Universal Light,' because of being the very nature that sees the correct path and the incorrect path.

The first five perfections, generosity through concentration, which are led by wisdom to buddhahood, are likened to a group of blind people who need a sighted person to take them where they want to go. In other words, by means of the first five perfections alone one cannot achieve buddhahood. Rather, one needs the perfection of wisdom in order to achieve the resultant state. Chandrakirti says: "Similarly, here too, intelligence, taking along the qualities of impaired eyesight, goes to the Conqueror's state." Intelligence is likened to a sighted person who guides the blind where they want to go, in that the perfection of wisdom guides the other perfections to buddhahood.

The ground called Universal Light is the resultant ground, omniscience, on which everything is seen correctly. The *Ornament* likens wisdom to a sighted bird that guides a flock of a particular type of blind birds.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> To indicate that the collections of giving, and so forth – which are other than wisdom – progress to the ground that is the fruit [namely, buddhahood] in dependence on the perfection of wisdom, Chandrakirti's *Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"* says:
>
> *Just as a person having eyes easily leads*
> *All in a blind group to their desired destination,*
> *So here also the mind [of wisdom], taking hold of virtues*
> *That lack the eye [of wisdom], goes to the state of a Conqueror.* [6.2]
>
> Just as one sighted person easily leads all of – that is, an entire – group of blind persons to a place where they wish to go, so also at this point on the path awareness – the perfection of wisdom – fully taking hold of the good qualities of giving, and so forth, which themselves lack the eye seeing suchness, goes to the state of a conqueror, the fruit [namely, buddhahood]. For, the perfection of wisdom unerringly perceives correct and incorrect paths. Moreover, the *Superior Sutra of the Condensed Perfection of Wisdom* says:
>
> How could billions of blind and guideless persons,
> Not even knowing the path, enter the city?
> Without the perfection of wisdom, these five sightless perfections
> Lack a guide and thus cannot reach enlightenment.
>
> Also, the *Diamond Cutter Sutra* says:

> A bodhisattva who gives gifts upon falling into [misapprehending] things [such as gift, giver, and recipient, as inherently existent] should, for example, be viewed as like a person with eyes who sees nothing upon having entered into darkness.
>
> Subhuti, it is this way: A bodhisattva who, not having fallen into [such misapprehension of] things, gives gifts should be viewed as like a person with eyes who, when the sun shines at dawn, sees varieties of forms.
>
> The same is so also for ethics and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary is very similar to that by Chandrakirti. In the *Diamond Cutter Sutra,* the Buddha says that just as when a sighted person enters darkness he is unable to see anything, likewise the first five perfections are not able to see the way to buddhahood. On the other hand, just as a sighted person sees forms clearly at dawn, the perfection of wisdom sees the way to buddhahood. The *Superior Sutra of the Condensed Perfection of Wisdom* also likens the blind who cannot see the path to a city to the five perfections which, when separated from the sixth, wisdom, are unable to progress to the city of nirvana or great enlightenment alone. They need to be led there by the perfection of wisdom. Just as one cannot find a path in the forest due to darkness and fog, so too one cannot progress to enlightenment without the perfection of wisdom.

In relation to this there is story about an event that took place in 1969, when Tibetan monks first moved from Buxar to the settlements in the south of India. Soon after arriving there, one young monk was out walking at dusk one evening when it suddenly became very foggy and he found himself not knowing in which direction to go. In that area there were many piles of logs alongside the road, and he lay down to sleep on one of them. However, the next morning upon waking, he found that he was right near his own house!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> 3B1C-2B3 Explanation of suchness in which the profound dependent-arising is seen
>
> This section has five parts:
>
> A [Chandrakirti's] promise to explain the meaning of the profound [emptiness]
> B Identification of those who are vessels for an explanation of the profound meaning
> C [Description of] how good qualities arise when it is explained to them
> D Exhortation to those who are vessels to listen
> E [Description of] how the suchness of dependent-arising is explained.

> 3B1C-2B3A Promise to explain the profound emptiness

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: In what was mentioned here [6.1cd], [the sixth ground bodhisattva] sees the thusness of this arising in dependence – he will attain cessation through abiding in wisdom, if the bodhisattva sees dependent-arising phenomena, how will he see the suchness that arises dependent on it?
>
> Explanation: The eye of intelligence completely covered by a thick film of ignorance, the self-entity of that does not come into our sphere, yet it has become the object of bodhisattvas who abide on the higher grounds such as the sixth and so forth. Therefore, one should not ask us about that, it should be addressed to those very bodhisattvas and buddha bhagavans possessing the stainless eye of intelligence, free of the film of the cataract of ignorance, anointed by the eye-medicine of unmistakenly seeing emptiness that destroys the film of the cataract of ignorance.

If said: in the recitation of the Sutras such as the *Exalted Wisdom Gone Beyond [Sutra]* and the *Exalted [Sutra] on the Ten Grounds*, is it not taught "how the bodhisattva practicing the exalted wisdom gone beyond sees the thusness of dependent appearance?" Therefore, it is proper to explain it through following after scripture.

This is also not so. Because the intent of scripture is difficult to ascertain, those like us are unable to present thusness even from the scriptures. [The Sutras] were expressed from the point of view of independence, yet the intention of the scriptures is to be ascertained from seeing the treatises composed by valid beings and [their] unmistaken scriptural explanations, hence:

[Nagarjuna presented] through scripture as well as reasoning
How the very profound dharma is realized by that [bodhisattva], hence,
Like that, from the textual tradition of Arya Nagarjuna,
I shall speak in accordance with how the tradition abides. [6.3]

Just as the bodhisattvas who practice the wisdom gone beyond see the essential nature of phenomena – the state that is viewed (ultimate truth) – like that, Arya Nagarjuna, through unmistakenly knowing the scriptures, clearly revealed in the *Treatise on the Middle Way* by reasoning and scriptural citation, the essential nature of phenomena – the state that is correctly viewed – having the characteristic of lacking self-nature.

Chandrakirti promises to explain profound thusness by means of reasonings and scriptural references in accordance with the system of Arya Nagarjuna. The *Supplement* is a commentary on Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* and on the three mothers – the extensive, middling, and brief Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. Nagarjuna set out the explicit meaning of these three mothers mainly in his *Treatise on the Middle Way*, whereas their implicit meaning – the stages of the path – is explained by Maitreya in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. Here Chandrakirti promises to explain emptiness as Nagarjuna did in his Five Collections of Reasonings or Six Collections of Reasonings (the number depends on whether or not the *Precious Garland* is included).

The main point is to see the thusness of dependent-arising. It is said that when one sees the thusness of dependent-arising, one abides on the wisdom which attains cessation, i.e., the absorption of cessation, which was discussed in relation to the first verse of the sixth chapter. The Prasangika Madhyamika school's definition of an uncommon absorption of cessation (Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen, *Ocean of Sport*, page 104) is: an exalted wisdom equally and directly placed on reality that is qualified by a surpassing practice of the perfection of wisdom. A bodhisattva must see the thusness of dependent-arising since, without it, he is unable to progress to buddhahood. A bodhisattva who lacks wisdom is likened to a person with cataracts who is unable to see forms clearly. The cataract of ignorance is removed by realizing the thusness of dependent-arising, emptiness. For this reason, the wisdom realizing emptiness is likened to an eye-medicine that removes the cataract of ignorance. When the bodhisattva removes the cataract of ignorance, he sees reality and is able to progress to buddhahood. Since in order to realize emptiness it is essential to first understand what it is, Chandrakirti makes this promise to explain profound thusness. He promises to do so in accordance with the textual tradition of Nagarjuna, i.e., in accordance with Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

[First, Chandrakirti indicates that he cannot, on his own, explain emptiness, the profound suchness of dependent-arising. He further points out that since scriptures on this topic are so difficult, he cannot give an explanation based solely on scripture either; rather, he will base his explanation on the more accessible writings of Nagarjuna.]

Question: [You said] before [in the first stanza of this chapter] that when sixth-ground bodhisattvas see dependent-arising, they see the suchness of the arising of this [particular phenomenon] in dependence on that [particular phenomenon]. How is this?
In answer to this, Chandrakirti's [*Auto*]*Commentary* states that:

> The entity of that [suchness of dependent-arising – namely, the emptiness of inherent existence,] is not an object for us whose mental eye is completely covered by the thick cataracts of ignorance; it is an object for those who dwell on the higher grounds – the sixth, and so forth. Therefore, this question should not be put to us. You should speak with just buddhas and bodhisattvas whose mental eye is free from the dimming cataracts of ignorance because they have applied the eye-medicine of the good perception of emptiness that overcomes the cataracts of ignorance.

This indicates that one who would ask about making manifest the meaning of suchness should ask them.

[Since Chandrakirti is indicating that one should definitely ask such beings about *perceiving* suchness, it would be a mistake to conclude that in Chandrakirti's system there is no mind perceiving suchness in meditative equipoise.] Hence, just as, when eye-medicine is applied, one's eyes become clearer but the eyes are not extracted, so, by applying the eye-medicine which is perception of emptiness, the mental eye becomes clearer – the eye of exalted wisdom is not extracted. If you understand this, you will not be polluted by the bad view consisting of the deprecation that there is no exalted wisdom consciousness in a superior's meditative equipoise.
Question: Does it not say in sutras such as the Mother Sutras [that is, the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras], the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds,* and so forth, that bodhisattvas coursing in the perfection of wisdom see the suchness of dependent-arising? Therefore, give an explanation following scripture [rather than Nagarjuna's *Treatise*].
Answer: Because it is difficult even to ascertain the thought of scripture, someone like myself [that is, Chandrakirti] is unable to teach suchness even through scripture. This is said in terms of [being unable to give] an independent explanation; however, the thought of scripture can be ascertained through seeing a treatise teaching suchness that was written by a valid being [that is, Nagarjuna] and that unerringly explains scripture.

> To indicate this, Chandrakirti's *Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"* says:
> *Since with scripture as well as reasoning*
> *[Nagarjuna taught] how those [sixth-ground bodhisattvas] realize*
> *The very profound doctrine, I [Chandrakirti] will speak*
> *In accordance with the system of the Superior Nagarjuna.* [6.3]

In his *Treatise on the Middle Way* the Superior Nagarjuna, with unerring knowledge of the scriptures, taught very clearly the suchness of phenomena in accordance with how sixth grounders realize the very profound doctrine [of emptiness]. He did so through scriptures from the sets of discourses and, beyond that, in addition to scriptures, through the use of reasoning. Therefore, the honorable Chandrakirti will relate how suchness is taught in the textual system of the Superior Nagarjuna, just as it is in the system that Nagarjuna taught.

Chandrakirti says that emptiness is difficult to realize. Someone who does not have cataracts is able to see forms clearly, whereas someone with cataracts has difficulty seeing forms. Likewise, emptiness cannot be seen by one who lacks the wisdom realizing emptiness. Ignorance is likened to a cataract, in that as long as it is present one is unable to see emptiness. Chandrakirti says that on his own, he is unable to explain emptiness as it is set out in the sutras. Therefore, he will do so by relying on the textual system of Nagarjuna. The subject of emptiness needs to be explained by means of valid reasonings and scriptural references. In short, Chandrakirti says that he will explain it on the basis of Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* (also called *Fundamental Wisdom*). The name of Chandrakirti's text is translated as the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* or the *Entrance to the 'Middle Way*.' The words 'middle way' have many meanings; for example, the middle way of base, the middle way of path, the middle way of result, the *Treatise on the Middle Way* itself, or the middle way (Madhyamika) tenets. In

the context of Chandrakirti's *Entrance to the 'Middle Way,'* which 'middle way' is entered? It enters the *Treatise on the Middle Way*. In short, in the context of the *Entrance to the Middle Way*, the words 'middle way' do not refer to the middle way of the base, path, result, or tenets, but only to the *Treatise on the Middle Way*. For this reason, at the beginning of the autocommentary Chandrakirti says:

> In order to supplement the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, since I wished to compose the *Supplement to the 'Middle way,'*…

Geshe-la: Then, it can be asked: "If the sixth chapter is a commentary on the *Treatise on the Middle Way,* what is the source of the first five chapters?
Student: Chandrakirti supplements Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* in terms of method and for this reason explains the first five perfections.
Geshe-la: But what is the source of the explanation on the first five perfections?
Student: Buddha's scriptures.
Another student: The source is Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland*.
Geshe-la: It can be said that the five chapters on the first five mind generations have the *Precious Garland* as their source. It is said that Nagarjuna wrote only three texts that completely explain the entire corpus of the path, these being the *Precious Garland*, *Praise to the Sphere of Reality*, and *Compendium of Sutra*.

Student: What is the meaning of 'dependent-arising' in the context of the sixth chapter?
Geshe-la: The two main subjects of the sixth mind generation, the sixth chapter, are the reasonings regarding the selflessness of persons and the reasonings regarding the selflessness of phenomena. First, Chandrakirti sets out the reasonings settling the meaning of the selflessness of phenomena. The basis of this reasoning is dependent-arising, which is mentioned in Nagarjuna's homage at the beginning of the *Treatise on the Middle Way*: (Garfield, *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way*)

> I prostrate to the perfect buddha
> The best of teachers, who taught that
> Whatever is dependently arisen is
> Unceasing, unborn,
> Unannihilated, not permanent,
> Not coming, not going,
> Without distinction, without identity,
> And free from conceptual construction.

Nagarjuna pays homage to the Teacher who has seen the dependent-arising that possesses these features. The Buddha established the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena mainly using the reasoning of dependent-arising. However, the *Treatise on the Middle Way* mainly sets out the reasoning analyzing causes, the diamond slivers reasoning. This is explained in the sixth chapter of the *Supplement,* beginning with the eighth verse, which says:

> *That itself does not arise from that, how could it from others?*
> *Neither is it from both, how could it exist without cause?* [6.8ab]

Tuesday morning, 4 April 2000

Chandrakirti says that on his own he is unable to explain dependent-arising but can only do so by basing his explanation on a valid scripture composed by a valid being. The valid being in this case is Nagarjuna. A valid scripture is one that is pure by way of the three-fold analysis:
(1) when the main subject taught is a manifest phenomenon, it is not harmed by a valid direct perceiver;
(2) when the main subject taught is a slightly hidden phenomenon, it is not harmed by inference through the power of the fact; and
(3) when the main subject matter taught is an extremely hidden phenomenon, it is not harmed by scriptural authority.
A valid scripture is composed by a valid being, who in this context is Nagarjuna. He is a valid being in that he was prophesied by the Buddha himself. The meaning of valid being is: one who is able to fulfill the desires of disciples in a non-deceptive manner. The word 'non-deceptive' in the definition of a valid being is the same as that which occurs in the context of the definition of a valid cognizer: a knower that is incontrovertible, or non-deceptive, with respect to its own object. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas, a valid cognizer is not pervaded by being a *new* cognizer. Therefore, for them, subsequent cognizers are also valid cognizers.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, just as the thusness of phenomena was presented by reasoning and scripture from the holy speech of Arya Nagarjuna, only like that, I shall speak in accordance with how the tradition finely presented by him abides.
>
> If asked: but first of all, how [is it known that] Arya Nagarjuna had unmistaken ascertainment of the scriptures?
>
> [It is known] from the scriptures. As was taught in the *Exalted Descent into Lanka Sutra:*
>
> In the southern place of Veta, famed as the great Bhikshu Shrimant,
> He, called the name 'Naga,' will abolish the positions of existence and non-existence.
> Having superbly revealed my vehicle – the unsurpassed mahayana – in the world,
> And attaining the Extremely Joyous ground, he will go to Sukhavati.
>
> and taught in the *Exalted Twelve-Thousand Great Cloud [Sutra]*:
>
> > Ananda, four hundred years after I have passed beyond sorrow, this youth of Licchavi called 'Pleasing to be Seen by All Sentient Beings,' having become a bhikshu called 'Naga' and superbly revealing my doctrine extensively, finally in the realm of the world called 'Exceedingly Clear Light' will become the tathagata arhat perfectly completed buddha called 'Jñanakara.'
>
> Therefore, it is established that he ascertained the scriptures unmistakenly.

Chandrakirti explains dependent-arising according to the system presented by Nagarjuna. How is it known that Arya Nagarjuna is a valid being? It is known in dependence on many scriptural references by the Buddha, two of which are quoted here: the *Exalted Descent into Lanka Sutra* and the *Exalted Twelve Thousand Great Cloud [Sutra].* Nagarjuna is said to have "opened the chariot track" of the Middle Way school, meaning that he clarified the system of the Middle Way (the Madhayamika). What is the Middle Way and how did he clarify it? He clarified the middle way that is free from the two extremes – the extreme of permanence and the extreme of annihilation. He established that, although phenomena do not exist truly, all phenomena from forms through the exalted knower of all aspects do exist conventionally and are feasible to function as agents, objects, and actions.

What is the definition of an "opener of a chariot track"? The definition of an opener of a chariot track is: one prophesied by the Buddha who is able to clarify the system on his own without depending on a commentary by another being in human form. Nagarjuna fulfills the requirements of this definition.

In the *Descent into Lanka Sutra,* the Buddha said: "In the southern place of Veta, famed as the great Bhikshu Shrimant, he, called the name 'Naga'…" Nagarjuna's name literally means "the achieved naga." There are many interpretations of his name, one of which is that he is so-called because he, who knew all the Buddha's doctrine, went to the naga land where he became an object of worship of the nagas. Another interpretation is that he was so-called because he was very good at reasoning and was therefore likened to a past Indian prince named Arjun who was extremely good at hitting his target with his arrow.

Buddha taught the extensive, middling, and brief Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. It is said that he taught the extensive version at Vulture's Peak in India after which the nagas took this scripture back to their land. Later, in order to bring it back to the human world, Nagarjuna went to the naga land, fulfilled their needs, and brought this scripture back. However, two of the chapters of the extensive Perfection of Wisdom scripture are said to have remained in the naga land. The actual scripture that was brought back by Nagarjuna from the naga land can still be seen in Kathmandu, Nepal, where it is shown to the public one month each year but can only be viewed from quite a distance. Thanks to Nagarjuna, the extensive Perfection of Wisdom Sutra remains extant in our world.

The *Descent into Lanka Sutra* then says that Nagarjuna "will abolish the positions of existence and non-existence," meaning that Buddha prophesied that Nagarjuna would abolish the extreme of permanence, true existence, and the extreme of annihilation, non-existence. When the sutra says "Having superbly revealed my vehicle – the unsurpassed mahayana – in the world," "the unsurpassed mahayana" can also be taken to mean that Nagarjuna opened the track of highest yoga tantra by clarifying the *Guhyasamajatantra*, which is also known as "the king of tantras." It is said that if the practice of *Guhyasamajatantra* exists in the world, tantra exists in the world; it is not enough that the practice of other tantras exists. Nagarjuna opened the chariot track of highest yoga tantra by writing a text on the five stages of the *Guhyasamajatantra*: (1) the generation stage, (2) the isolation of mind together with its branches, (3) the impure illusory body, (4) the meaning clear light, and (5) the unification of the clear light and illusory body, which exists both at the level of a learner and no-more-learner. The completion stage of *Guhyasamajatantra* has six stages: (1) isolation of body, (2) isolation of speech, (3) isolation of mind, (4) illusory body, (5) clear light, and (6) unification. Nagarjuna explained all of these various stages.

The sutra continues: "attaining the Extremely Joyous ground, he will go to Sukhavati." Buddha prophesied that having attained the first ground, Extremely Joyous, Nagarjuna would go to Sukhavati, the Joyous Land. Sukhavati is the pure land of supreme emanation body Amitabha, where Avalokiteshvara and Tara are also said to abide. According to some, the pure land of Amitabha is the Potala Pure Land which is in the southern direction (in relation to oneself this would be to one's right!).

Some people mistakenly say that the *Exalted Twelve Thousand Great Cloud Sutra* was never translated into Tibetan. It is recounted that when Buddha was teaching this sutra, a child appeared before him and referring to this child, Buddha prophesied to Ananda: "Ananda, four hundred years after I have passed beyond sorrow, this youth of Licchavi called 'Pleasing to be Seen by All Sentient Beings,' having become a bhikshu called 'Naga' and superbly revealing my doctrine extensively, finally in the realm of the world called 'Exceedingly Clear Light' will become the tathagata arhat perfectly completed buddha called 'Jñanakara.'" Just as Buddha had prophesied, 400 years after his passing away, Nagarjuna appeared and fulfilled the prophesy. Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, it is established that he ascertained the scriptures unmistakenly."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> *Question*: How is it [determined] that the Superior Nagarjuna errorlessly ascertained the meaning of the definitive scriptures [that is, those explaining the emptiness of inherent existence]?
> *Answer*. This is known from scripture. The *Descent into Lanka Sutra* says:
>
> In the south, in the area of Vidarbha
> Will be a monk known widely as Shriman
> Who will [also] be called Naga.
> Destroying the [extreme] positions of existence and nonexistence,
>
> He will thoroughly teach in the world
> The unsurpassed Great Vehicle – my vehicle.
> Having done this, he will achieve the Very Joyous ground
> And then go to the Blissful [Pure Land upon passing away].
>
> Thus [Buddha] said that Nagarjuna would comment on the definitive vehicle, free from the extremes of existence and nonexistence.
>
> He is a rebirth of a Licchavi youth, known as Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World, during the time of the Teacher [Buddha] who is mentioned in the *Excellent Golden Light Sutra*.
> The *Great Cloud Sutra* says:
>
> Four hundred years after I [Shakyamuni Buddha] pass from sorrow [that is, die], this youth [Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World] will become a monk known as Naga and will disseminate my teaching. Finally, in the land called Very Pure Light he will become a Conqueror named Light-Which-Is-A-Source-Of-All-Wisdom.
>
> Hence it is established that [Nagarjuna] had unmistaken ascertainment of the definitive scriptures [because such ascertainment is necessary to attain the first ground]. Also, in the *Manjushri Root Tantra* the time of Nagarjuna's appearance and his name are the same, and it is explained that he will live for six hundred years.

Buddha prophesied that Nagarjuna would appear 400 years after his own death and would live for 600 years.

> The *Great Drum Sutra* says:
>
> 1. that after the Teacher's passing away, when the [average] lifespan is eighty years and the teaching [of the Mahayana] has degenerated, this Licchavi youth Liked-When-Seen-By-All-The-World, having become a monk bearing the Teacher's name [in the sense of being of the Shakya clan], will disseminate the teaching, and
>
> 2. that, after one hundred years, he will die and be born in the Blissful [Pure Land].
>
> That this scripture also prophesies the master [Nagarjuna, even though it does not explicitly mention his name] is asserted by Sthavira Bodhibhadra and the Great Elder [Atisha]; they are relying on the explanation that the Licchavi Liked-When-Seen and Nagarjuna are of one continuum [that is to say, earlier and later births in a single stream of rebirth].
>
> The *Great Drum Sutra* states that this monk [Nagarjuna] is a seventh-ground [bodhisattva]. It cannot be established that such an explanation contradicts the former [statement in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* that Nagarjuna was a first-ground bodhisattva], for variations among scriptures do occur [because some scriptures describe how great beings appeared to ordinary sight, and others describe their actual attainment]. In some scriptures, for instance, certain great kings are said to be stream enterers, whereas in other scriptures they are said to be buddhas.

Scriptures say different things; for example, some say that certain great kings are stream enterers and others say that they are buddhas. The 'great kings' mentioned here are the four great kings that are mentioned in the ritual of the *Sixteen Elders*: (1) Dhritarashtra, (2) Virudhaka, (3) Virupaksha, and (4)

Vaishravana. In short, Lama Tsongkhapa says that although some scriptures say that Nagarjuna was a first ground bodhisattva and others say that he was a seventh ground bodhisattva, there is no contradiction in that Nagarjuna lived for 600 years and therefore at one time in his life he could have been a first ground bodhisattva, at another a seventh ground bodhisattva, and at another a buddha.

There is one passage that says that Nagarjuna will appear 400 years after Buddha's passing and another that says he will appear "when the [average] lifespan is eighty years and the teaching [of the Mahayana] has degenerated." When Buddha was alive, the average lifespan was one hundred years; after that it diminished over time. These two passages would mean that between the time when the average lifespan is one hundred years and the time when it is eighty years there was a lapse of 400 years, the time at which Nagarjuna came. However, nowadays people say that the average lifespan is increasing, which would appear to contradict the scriptures. In general, the average lifespan can be said to be sixty years although this might be argued. This can be explained in terms of the fact that by the age of sixty, the majority of people have lost most of their teeth, whereas those who have all their teeth at this age are very few. The expression "At the age of sixty the mouth is broken" is used to prove that the actual average lifespan is sixty years (although this reason could also be argued). Of course, this does not mean that people do not live less than or more than sixty years. The scholar Shantarakshita is said to have lived for 900 years and, although Nagarjuna was born when the average lifespan was eighty years, he lived for 600 years.

In short, there are various scriptural references to Nagarjuna. It is said that during his lifetime Nagarjuna made <u>three great Dharma proclamations</u>:
(1) he clarified the Discipline and expelled monks of broken morality from Nalanda Monastery in India,
(2) he composed the Six Collections of Reasonings on the Middle Way, and
(3) he composed the *Praise to the Sphere of Reality*.
I heard this myself from Kunu Lama Tenzin Gyeltshen Rinpoche.

<u>Note</u>: In the endnotes to Anne Klein's *Path to the Middle* it says:

> In his first proclamation of doctrine Nagarjuna protected the monks at Nalanda from famine through alchemy, exhorting the indolent and expelling the wayward. Then, having gained adepthood, somewhere between his fiftieth and hundredth year he went to the land of dragons (*naga*) and, bringing back the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*, appeared in South India a second time. Having composed the *Treatise on the Middle Way, the Fundamental Text Called "Wisdom,"* he proclaimed the second proclamation of the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness for up to a hundred years. Then, he went to the northern continent called Unpleasant Sound, furthering the interests of sentient beings for two hundred years, and again appeared in South India for a third time. During this final period, he brought back the *Great Drum Sutra*, the *Great Cloud Sutra*, and so forth, from the northern continent and proclaimed the third proclamation of doctrine, a discourse examining the basic constituent of the buddha nature. During this final period of a hundred years, he taught about the existence of the buddha nature in all sentient beings in such works as his *Praise of the Element of Reality*.

Tuesday afternoon, 4 April 2000

Nagarjuna's three proclamations of Dharma are clarified in his biography, which is found in the text, *Biographies of the Lineage Lamas of the Stages of the Path* (Tib. page 122). Here, it says that Nagarjuna's first proclamation was to clarify the Discipline (vinaya) by expelling thousands of monks with bad conduct from Nalanda Monastery. His second proclamation consists of the six treatises he composed on the middle way, which establish the meaning of emptiness. The third proclamation is his

composition of the *Praise of the Sphere of Reality,* which he did in the later part of his life in southern India.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

3B1C-2B3B Identification of those who are vessels for an explanation of the profound emptiness

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Further, the treatise that bears the result of presenting dependent-arising just as it really is should be taught to only those who have planted the seeds of emptiness in their continua through prior familiarization – not to others, because although they hear about emptiness, they possess the great folly of having thoughts that engage it erroneously. Like this: since sometimes unskilled, they will go to bad migrations having abandoned the Dharma. Sometimes, saying, "the meaning of emptiness is non-existence" – mistakenly identifying like that, having [first] generated the wrong view that denies all things, it will increase. Therefore, the teacher, definitely making the distinction of special appreciation, should explain the view of emptiness to listeners.
>
> If asked further: how is one able to ascertain the difficult to ascertain, [namely], "since it is suitable to reveal emptiness to him, I shall reveal emptiness to him?"
>
> Since that is to be ascertained through outer signs, in order to finely indicate the reasons for that, it is explained:
>
> *Upon hearing about emptiness even while an ordinary being,*
> *Whoever gives rise repeatedly to inner extreme joy,*
> *Eyes moistened by tears from extreme joy and*
> *The hairs of the body standing on end,* [6.4]
>
> *They have the seed of the mind of complete buddhahood –*
> *They are a vessel to whom to finely reveal thusness –*
> *One should reveal the ultimate truth*
> – having characteristics that will be explained –
>
> *To them.* [6.5abc]

Chandrakirti says that it is important to recognize who is and who is not a suitable vessel for the teachings on emptiness since, if someone is not a suitable vessel, the teachings can harm that person. The right vessel is someone who has the seed of familiarity with emptiness, this being gained through having received teachings on emptiness in the past. Unsuitable vessels who hear teachings on emptiness only bring harm upon themselves. For example, they may abandon emptiness whereby they create the negative karma to be reborn in the lower realms. Others who are not suitable vessels come to a wrong understanding of emptiness and then deprecate it, whereby they generate wrong views that will then increase more and more. For this reason, one has to be very careful to whom one gives teachings on emptiness. Therefore, first identify whether the listener is a correct vessel or not. In regard to this, Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* says:

> Those of little wisdom are harmed
> When their view of emptiness is faulty,
> Just as [harm comes to] those who faultily hold a snake
> Or faultily use a knowledge-mantra. [XXIV.11]

Due to misunderstanding emptiness, one will experience harm, like one who catches a snake wrongly. In order to know who is a correct vessel, Chandrakirti says that it is one with the seed of the mind of complete buddhahood, which is revealed by:

> *Upon hearing about emptiness even while an ordinary being,*
> *Whoever gives rise repeatedly to inner extreme joy,*
> *Eyes moistened by tears from extreme joy and*
> *The hairs of the body standing on end,* [6.4]

Such a person is a correct vessel for the teachings on emptiness. However, there is no pervasion that one who has eyes moistened by tears and the hairs of the body standing on end is a correct vessel for the teachings on emptiness, since people cry for other reasons and also, when someone becomes cold, all their body hairs stand on end! One with the seed of the mind of enlightenment is specifically someone who *upon hearing teachings on emptiness* experiences inner joy, whereupon his eyes are moistened by tears and his body hairs stand on end. If this occurs, then that person is a suitable vessel for the teachings on emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Furthermore, [Nagarjuna's] *Treatise* on the definitive meaning [that is, emptiness] should be taught just to those who through prior cultivation have established seeds in their [mental] continuums for the realization of emptiness. It should not be taught to others, for, even if they have heard texts that teach emptiness, they have thoughts wrongly oriented with respect to emptiness, and hence [teaching it to them] is disastrous.
> With respect to how such disaster comes about, some through lack of skill abandon emptiness and thereby go to a bad transmigration [upon rebirth]. Others, erroneously apprehending the meaning of emptiness, which is the non-establishment of inherent existence, think that these phenomena [due to lacking inherent existence] simply do not exist or are nonexistent. First they generate the wrong view deprecating all things – causes and effects – and then, since they do not give it up, this view increases more and more.

Emptiness should only be taught to those who have the seed or the latency of an awareness realizing emptiness, as otherwise it will only bring harm. Emptiness should not be taught to someone who, listening to the teachings on emptiness, misunderstands them, because the result will be disastrous. If one who listens to teachings on emptiness is not skilled, he will create the negative karma of abandoning emptiness due to which he will be reborn in the lower realms. There is a story related to this subject. At the time of the Buddha, Manjushri taught emptiness to many ordinary beings who were not suitable vessels, due to which they generated wrong views and were reborn in the lower realms. Shariputra, knowing this had happened, told the Buddha that Manjushri had created a disaster and said that if instead he himself had taught those people the hinayana, this would have been suitable in that they would have entered the hinayana. The Buddha said to Shariputra that he had not understood the intention of Manjushri, which was that, although these ordinary beings would be reborn in the lower realms, when reborn again as human beings they would possess the seed of familiarity with emptiness and would thereby again meet the mahayana teachings on emptiness and attain enlightenment. He also said that if Shariputra had taught the hinayana to them, although these people would have entered the hinayana, they would then have taken a long time to attain enlightenment. Similarly, if we make the mistake of teaching emptiness to unsuitable vessels it does bring the positive result of establishing a seed for these people to hear teachings on emptiness again in a future life.

Others who are unsuitable vessels generate wrong views upon hearing the teachings on emptiness. To prove this, Lama Tsongkhapa quotes Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*):

> [Nagarjuna's *Treatise* says:]
> Those of little wisdom are harmed
> When their view of emptiness is faulty,
> Just as [harm comes to] those who faultily hold a snake
> Or faultily use a knowledge-mantra. [XXIV.11]

When someone possesses a faulty view of emptiness, there is danger to that person, just like someone who is unskilled in trying to catch a snake or who uses knowledge-mantras in a faulty way in order to do so. Knowledge-mantras, when used correctly, prevent the snake's poison from harming the person, whereas when used incorrectly the person is harmed by the poison. In general, there is a particular mantra that counteracts snake's poison.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Furthermore, Chandrakirti's *Clear Words*, commenting on this, says that (1) in order not to fall to the extreme of deprecating conventionalities, it is necessary not to undermine [the validity of nominally existent] actions and their effects which are like reflections and (2) in order not to fall to the extreme of superimposing ultimate existence [onto phenomena, which only nominally exist], it is necessary to see that actions and their effects pertain only to things that lack inherent existence. Chandrakirti describes the opposite of these two [that is, undermining the validity of nominally existent phenomena and misconstruing that actions and their effects pertain only to inherently existent phenomena] as falling to the extremes of annihilation and permanence [respectively].

Lama Tsongkhapa says that one should not fall to the extreme of deprecating conventionalities or the extreme of superimposing ultimate existence. By understanding causes and results, one will not fall to the extreme of deprecating conventionalities and by understanding that causes and results are established on the basis of non-inherent existence, one will not fall to the extreme of superimposing ultimate existence. These two extremes are respectively:
(1) the extreme of annihilation and
(2) the extreme of permanence.
Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Chandrakirti describes the opposite of these two [that is, undermining the validity of nominally existent phenomena and misconstruing that actions and their effects pertain only to inherently existent phenomena] as falling to the extremes of annihilation and permanence [respectively]."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> [Chandrakirti] says that one who considers compositional phenomena to be nonexistent has a wrong view; hence, even though there is a verbal difference between "not existent" and "not being existent", the appearance to the mind of the aspect of "not existent" does not differ at all [from the appearance to the mind of the aspect of "not being existent"] even though one looks into it in detail.

Are 'not existent' and 'not being existent' really the same? It is only a difference in the words; the meaning is the same. For example, if we say "on the table in front of me, a pot is not existent" and "on the table in front of me there does not exist a pot," they have the same meaning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> [Chandrakirti,] in commenting on Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* where it states:
>
> The one goes just to a bad transmigration [upon rebirth]
> Whereas the non-ordinary goes to peace,
>
> says:
>
> On hearing the teaching of selflessness, the unwise abandon it or realize it incorrectly, whereby they go just to a bad transmigration [upon rebirth].
>
> Thus [Chandrakirti] explains that both [those who abandon the teaching of emptiness and those who realize it incorrectly] go to a bad transmigration [upon rebirth].

Here in Aryadeva's text, "the one" who goes to a bad migration is an ordinary being, whereas the "non-ordinary" being who "goes to peace" is a superior. Chandrakirti says that this means that those who are unwise listen to teachings on emptiness but then either abandon them or misunderstand them, due to which they go to a bad migration.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> To realize [emptiness] erroneously is to apprehend the meaning of emptiness as signifying nonexistence.

There is a discussion in this text as to whether the word 'realize' should perhaps be 'investigate,' these being similar in Tibetan. Think about this.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Therefore, when prideful persons – who lack the mental capacity to discriminate the very subtle meaning [of emptiness] and yet fancy that they have [such capacity] – develop a strong facsimile of belief in the mere words of the profound meaning which [actually] is unsuited to their faculties, this leads to disaster. Consequently, you should take care regarding these points.

One should be careful not to reveal emptiness to such persons.

Lama Tsongkhapa (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) then poses a question and answer:

> *Question:* How can one ascertain what is difficult to ascertain – that it is suitable to teach emptiness to this person and not to that person?
> *Answer:* To indicate that one can ascertain this through external signs, Chandrakirti's *Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"* says:
>
> *Even while an ordinary being,*
> *On hearing about emptiness inner joy arises again and again,*
> *Tears arising from this happiness moisten the eyes,*
> *And the hairs of the body stand on end.* [6.4]
>
> *Such [persons] have the seed of the awareness of a perfect buddha.*
> *They are vessels for the teaching of suchness.*
> *The ultimate truth is to be taught to them.* [6.5abc]
>
> Even while they are ordinary beings and beginners, when they hear non-erroneous discourse about emptiness, from hearing it strong joy arises again and again internally with regard to that discourse; tears arising from that strong joy moisten the eyes, and the hairs of the body stand on end. Such [persons] have the seed of realizing emptiness, called the seed of the awareness of a

> perfect buddha, the non-conceptual exalted wisdom. Those persons are vessels for the teaching of suchness by a skilled master. The ultimate truth, having the characteristics about to be explained, should be taught to them.

The answer is that suitable vessels are ascertained in dependence on particular external signs, which are special signs of body. Inner realizations can be inferred from special external signs; this is called a *correct sign of result*. The *Sutra on the Ten Dharmas* sets out two examples and two meanings saying: "Just as one can know the existence of water through seeing water fowl and the existence of fire through seeing smoke, one can also know that the mahayana lineage has been activated through seeing special external signs." The meaning of this is that one can infer inner realizations in dependence on special signs of body and special signs of speech. One can set out a syllogism: a bodhisattva on the path of accumulation, as the subject, is a correct vessel for the teachings on emptiness because, upon hearing about emptiness, he experiences inner joy whereupon his eyes are moistened by tears and his body hairs stand on end. Such a person is a suitable vessel for the teachings on emptiness because he has the seed of an awareness of a perfect buddha.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "Those persons are vessels for the teaching of suchness by a skilled master. The ultimate truth, having the characteristics about to be explained, should be taught to them."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> If these physical marks are seen to arise when [a person] has the composite of (1) having heard non-erroneous discourse on emptiness and (2) not having misunderstood it, this is an unambiguous sign. If the meaning is not understood or, even if understood, these marks do not arise, one cannot determine that [such persons] are vessels for the profound for the time being; still, if they will not depart from what is set out by an excellent lama [that is, will not merely follow their own conjecture], they are suitable vessels for newly infusing many potencies [that will serve as] a causal lineage for [developing] realization of emptiness.

Those who have the wisdom arisen from listening to teachings on emptiness and the wisdom arisen from reflecting on emptiness will unambiguously have these physical marks, or signs. On the other hand, those who hear the teachings on emptiness but do not understand the meaning and those who understand the meaning but do not have the physical signs are not suitable vessels for the teachings on profound emptiness. However, if they rely on and do not depart from the lama's advice they can still be taught emptiness, since this will leave latencies in their continua for them to realize emptiness in the future.

In short, it is dangerous to teach emptiness. Those who are suitable vessels are those who experience joy when hearing the teachings on emptiness. Likewise, in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* those who are suitable vessels for the teachings on the mother sutras are described as those who have made offerings to the buddhas, created roots of virtue, and are under the care of a virtuous spiritual friend. Such persons, being suitable vessels for the teachings on the mother sutras, the subject of which is emptiness, are therefore suitable vessels for the teachings on emptiness.

In short, it is necessary to have the support of a collection of merit in order be a suitable vessel to listen to teachings on emptiness.

Wednesday morning, 5 April 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> 3B1C-2B3C How good qualities arise when the profound emptiness is explained to proper vessels

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The effort of revealing suchness to the listener who is like that will not be without result.
>
> If asked: why?
> Like this:
>
> *In him, qualities that follow after that will arise.* [6.5d]
>
> Not only will that listener not possess the misfortune produced by the error of grasping to emptiness, also the qualities bearing the cause of listening to emptiness will arise.
>
> If asked: how?
> He thinks about listening to the view of emptiness as like finding a treasure, and in order not to degenerate that:
>
> *Always he will dwell having correctly assumed morality,*
> *Will bestow gifts, cultivate compassion,*
> *Meditate on patience, fully dedicate his virtue*
> *In order to liberate migrators and* [6.6]
>
> *Pay respect to the completed bodhisattvas.* [6.7a]
>
> There, having understood, "If I fall into the bad migrations through the condition of broken morality, the continuity of the view of emptiness will be cut," he will always dwell having correctly assumed morality. Thinking, "Although reborn in happy migrations due to morality, if I am poor, due to the endeavor to search for such necessities as food, medicine, robes, and so forth the continuity of listening to emptiness will be cut," and bestows gifts. Saying, "The view of emptiness fully held by compassion induces buddhahood – it is not otherwise," he cultivates compassion. Considering, "As a result of anger, I shall go to bad migrations and attain a bad complexion – hence, the aryas will not be pleased by that condition," he meditates on patience. Since those [virtues of] morality and so forth that are not fully dedicated to the omniscient state will not uninterruptedly give rise to unimaginable causes of attaining buddhahood and results, he thoroughly dedicates also the roots of virtue to enlightenment in order to liberate migrators.
>
> Having thought, "Excluding the bodhisattvas, others are unable to finely present the self-nature of dependent-arising – the state that is viewed (ultimate truth)," they act to respect the completed bodhisattvas.

If one teaches emptiness to a suitable vessel who possesses the previously mentioned characteristics, there will definitely be a result. To demonstrate this, the root text says: "In him, qualities that follow after that will arise." In fact, many qualities related to the teaching on emptiness will arise; for example, one will think that listening to the teachings on the view of emptiness is like having found a treasure. Such correct vessels then abide in proper ethical conduct in order to prevent the continuity of their view of emptiness from being severed. More specifically, "Always he will dwell having correctly assumed morality" means that a correct vessel for the teachings on emptiness takes the bodhisattva vows. Correct vessels also practice generosity knowing that if they practice ethics alone, although they will be reborn as a human being, they will lack the basic necessities to be able to continue to cultivate the view of emptiness. They think, "If I am poor, due to the endeavor to search for such necessities as food, medicine, robes, and so forth the continuity of listening to emptiness will be cut," and therefore put effort into practicing generosity.

Knowing that to achieve buddhahood it is not sufficient to realize emptiness, correct vessels also develop compassion. They also practice patience through understanding that if they do not, even though due to generosity and ethics they will be reborn as human beings, they will have an ugly body

that will be repulsive to others. Therefore, they practice patience in order to be reborn with a beautiful body. However, they also practice patience in order to avoid rebirth in the lower realms. Those who are correct vessels also make sure to dedicate their roots of virtue to the attainment of enlightenment in order to prevent those virtues from going to waste. Chandrakirti says that a correct vessel "fully dedicates his virtue in order to liberate migrators and pays respect to the completed bodhisattvas." Knowing that only perfect bodhisattvas teach emptiness unmistakenly, those who are correct vessels for the teachings on emptiness pay respect to them.

Aryadeva, in his *Four Hundred Stanzas,* says that one who even develops a doubt thinking that emptiness is feasible creates a great quantity of merit and that therefore there is no need to mention how much merit is created by someone who is free of doubt regarding emptiness. Aryadeva also says that those with little merit do not develop even a doubt about emptiness, whereas the presence of a mere doubt about it shakes or shatters the very foundation of cyclic existence, that being the conception of true existence. For example, it is like when a piece of cloth is used for such a long time that it becomes well-worn and then easily falls apart. In short, having a doubt about emptiness harms the root of cyclic existence. In general we think that phenomena are established as a self. This conception of a self is harmed by the doubt that they are empty of such a self.

In conclusion, as a result of hearing the teachings on emptiness, others create many merits and generate a doubt regarding emptiness, which harms the root of cyclic existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tib. page 116) (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Teaching emptiness to listeners such as are described above will not be fruitless. Why? Chandrakirti's *Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"* says:
>
> *The good qualities that follow [hearing this teaching]*
> *will arise for them.* [6.5d]
>
> Not only will such listeners not incur the disaster generated by erroneous conception of emptiness, but also the good qualities that follow as effects upon [hearing] about the view of emptiness will arise for them.
>
> *Question*: How do these good qualities arise?
> *Answer*: Chandrakirti's *Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"* says:
>
> *Having adopted ethics, they always abide in ethics.*
> *They give gifts, sustain compassion, meditate patience,*
> *And fully dedicate the virtue of these toward enlightenment*
> *For the sake of releasing transmigrating beings.* [6.6]
>
> *They respect the perfect bodhisattvas.* [6.7a]
>
> Those who are vessels [of the teaching of emptiness] consider hearing about the view of emptiness to be like finding a treasure. To prevent that view from deteriorating even in other rebirths, they adopt ethics and always abide in ethics. Concerning this, they think, "If through the circumstance of faulty ethics I fall into a bad transmigration, the continuum of [my] view of emptiness will be severed." Thus, they adopt proper ethics and guard against degeneration.
>
> One need not have sworn to [a code of] ethics previously in order to have faulty ethics. For, *naturally* unseemly [behavior] which is discordant with proper ethics also constitutes faulty ethics.
> [Persons who are vessels of the teaching of emptiness also] think, "Through maintaining proper ethics I will be born in a happy transmigration; yet, if I am poor, I will be bereft of necessities such as food, drink, medicine, and clothing. Due to my being preoccupied with seeking these, the continuum of hearing about the view, meditating on its meaning, and so forth, will be severed." Thus, as explained above [in the section on the perfection of giving], they give gifts to high and low fields [of merit, for such giving acts as a cause of possessing resources in future lives].
> Thinking, "The view of emptiness induces buddhahood when conjoined with the great compassion explained earlier [in the section on compassion] and not otherwise," they sustain familiarization with great compassion, the root.

When emptiness it taught to an intelligent vessel the teachings will not be fruitless, i.e., they will definitely bring about a result. Lama Tsongkhapa clearly sets out these results. First of all, those who are correct vessels for the teachings on emptiness will consider that hearing such teachings is like finding a treasure. They will also understand that it is important to avoid severing the continuity of this view of emptiness and, for this reason, they will engage in safeguarding ethics through understanding that faulty ethics will bring rebirth in a lower realm, whereby the continuity of the view of emptiness will be severed. Faulty ethics does not only involve breaking a vow; there are both *natural* and *formulated* transgressions. Those who have not taken vows create natural transgressions; for example, when a cat kills a pigeon, this is a natural transgression that brings the result of rebirth in the lower realms. In short, a natural transgression is a negative action that does not involve the transgression of a vow. For example, killing is a natural transgression that is a negative action even without one's having taken the vow to abandon killing. On the other hand, formulated transgressions are committed only in relation to vows. For example, in the case of cutting grass, only a fully ordained monk or nun commits a fault that is a formulated transgression, whereas if a lay person cuts grass, there is no fault and no formulated transgression. The ten non-virtuous actions of body, speech, and mind (killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, divisive speech, harsh words, idle talk, covetousness, malice, and wrong view) are all natural transgressions.

Another result of the teachings on emptiness is that correct vessels understand that if they practice ethics but do not practice generosity they will be reborn in the upper realms but will lack the necessities to continually cultivate the view of emptiness; therefore they also practice generosity. Due to not practicing generosity, in a future life one will need to spend one's time working to attain the necessities of life whereby the continuity of the view of emptiness will be cut.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says that the practice of generosity can be done either in relation to higher fields, such as the Three Jewels, and to lower fields, such as beggars. When someone makes offerings to the Three Jewels, is it generosity? It is because it is an action of giving accompanied by the intention to give. Even making water offerings to the Three Jewels is a type of generosity. Atisha himself admired the tradition of making water offerings in Tibet because it is a practice of generosity that can be done without any sense of loss. One should practice as much generosity as possible to both higher and lower fields.

Those who are correct vessels for the teachings on emptiness also cultivate compassion through understanding that with the view of emptiness alone, one cannot attain enlightenment. They understand that emptiness needs to be conjoined with compassion and therefore strive to cultivate compassion. It is important to develop compassion now, since only those with a precious human rebirth possessing the eight freedoms and ten endowments have the opportunity to do so.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Thinking, "Through anger one goes to a bad transmigration [upon rebirth]; virtue is destroyed, and one acquires a very ugly complexion, and because of this, superiors are displeased [and do not teach the view of emptiness to such a person]," they meditatively cultivate patience.
> Ethics, and so forth, that are not dedicated again and again toward [attainment of] omniscience will not become causes of attaining buddhahood and will not uninterruptedly give rise to the immeasurable effects of [a healthy, non-defective] body, resources, and so forth. Therefore, they also fully dedicate the virtue of these ethics, and so forth, toward enlightenment for the sake of releasing transmigrating beings from cyclic existence.
> They see that, except for bodhisattvas, others – that is, hearers, solitary realizers, and so forth – cannot teach the profound dependent-arising as a bodhisattva does. Thus, they greatly respect the perfect bodhisattvas.

Anger brings many unpleasant results. For example, its *fruitional result* is rebirth in the lower realms. Then, even when one is [subsequently] reborn again in the happy migrations, one will have an ugly body, this being a *result similar to the cause*. There is a story in sutra about a person called Pleasant Voice, who had a very attractive voice but an extremely ugly and repulsive body. Upon being asked by others why this had happened, the Buddha responded that his ugly body was the result of anger in a previous life, while his pleasant voice was the result of having offered a melodious bell to a stupa at the time of Kashyapa. Such stories as those that appear in the *Sutra of the Wise and the Foolish* and the *Hundred Action Sutra* can help increase one's belief in the law of actions and results and also help to develop one's mind of enlightenment and patience.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says that due to one's having an ugly complexion, superiors are displeased.

One should immediately dedicate whatever root of virtue one creates to enlightenment. If this is done, those roots of virtue will remain until enlightenment is achieved, just as when a drop of water is put into an ocean it remains as long as the ocean does not dry up. Therefore, it is extremely important to dedicate one's roots of virtue.

Geshe-la: Lama Tsongkhapa says that only complete bodhisattvas teach emptiness perfectly, whereas hearers and solitary realizers do not teach emptiness perfectly. Why do hearers and solitary realizers not teach emptiness perfectly?
Student: Although they do realize emptiness, hearers and solitary realizers cannot present the vast amount of reasonings proving emptiness which are presented in the mahayana.
Geshe-la: That is right.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Once pure understandings, such as these explained above, are generated in beings of the mahayana whose understanding of the view of emptiness has arrived at the essential points, they have great respect for achieving the class of extensive [compassionate deeds of giving, and so forth]. That [combination of the wisdom of emptiness and practice of compassionate deeds] is a source of great praise, for Nagarjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* says:
>
> Resorting to actions and their effects
> Upon understanding this emptiness of phenomena
> Is more wonderful than the wonderful,
> More marvelous than the marvelous.
>
> Such [a combination] comes to those who:
>
> 1. have abandoned the two faults of the two types of non-vessel – (1) forsaking the view because of disbelief or (2) although having a facsimile of belief, [mistakenly] understanding that cause and effect are refuted by the reasoning [establishing emptiness] – and
> 2. in addition realize, in dependence on the view of the emptiness of inherent existence itself, the great feasibility of all actions and agents.

Those who have a good understanding of the view of emptiness will also understand the extensive or vast teachings. Due to this, they will also develop respect for the vast teachings on the grounds and paths. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "That [combination of the wisdom of emptiness and practice of compassionate deeds] is a source of great praise" and then quotes from Nagarjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* to prove this. The text is perhaps a commentary on the second chapter of the *Guhyasamajatantra*.

Nagarjuna says that this combination is 'wonderful' and 'marvelous.' Is there a difference between 'wonderful' and 'marvelous'? In some texts, a difference is clarified but here it is not mentioned. Such texts say that 'wonderful' is said in regard to a perfect cause, whereas 'marvelous' is

said in regard to a perfect result. This is discussed in the context of the fact that when the Buddha turned the wheel of Dharma, the gods proclaimed their amazement saying "A la la ho!"

Lama Tsongkhapa says that such a combination of [the wisdom of] emptiness and [practice of compassionate] actions comes to those who "have abandoned the two faults of the two types of non-vessel – (1) forsaking the view because of disbelief or (2) although having a facsimile of belief, [mistakenly] understanding that cause and effect are refuted by the reasoning [establishing emptiness]" and to those who "realize, in dependence on the view of the emptiness of inherent existence itself, the great feasibility of all actions and agents."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Otherwise, if something else is taken as the manner of having found the view, all presentations of actions and their effects such as ethics [erroneously] come to be [seen as] like counting the creases in the horn of a rabbit. This being so, one [mistakenly] thinks that such [teachings on ethics, and so forth] are for the sake of those who have not understood the definitive meaning [that is, emptiness] but are unnecessary for those who have understood it. For, [one mistakenly thinks that] all these [phenomena of cause and effect] are created by conceptuality and that all conceptual consciousnesses apprehend signs – that is, [wrongly] adhere to true existence – and, like the Chinese Ha-shang, one destroys all virtue.

There are those who think that emptiness means that the vast side of practice, causes and results, is as non-existent as the horns of a rabbit. The creases in the horns of horned animals, when counted, reveal the animals' age, whereas since rabbits do not have horns, the creases of their horns cannot be counted. Likewise, if one misunderstands emptiness, one will think that practicing ethics through observing causes and results is just like counting the creases in the horn of a rabbit! Such a person's wrong idea is that since in emptiness all phenomena are non-existent, it is useless to consider generosity, ethics, and so forth. However, this is a sign that one has not understood the meaning of emptiness.

Others think that all conceptions are conceptions of true existence and that everything is posited by conceptions. As a consequence, they assert that all conceptions are to be eliminated. Such an assertion was made by the Chinese Hashang, who came from China to Tibet at the same time that Kamalashila was invited from India to Tibet. A debate, which was previously prophesied by Padmasambhava, took place between Hashang and Kamalashila at Samye Monastery in Tibet. Hashang asserted that all conceptions – including the mind of enlightenment and compassion – are to be negated, since all conceptions are conceptions of true existence, these being what bind one to cyclic existence. He said that since both white and black conceptions (i.e., positive and negative conceptions) bind us to cyclic existence in the same way that a chain, whether made of gold or iron, binds one to a pole, they are all to be abandoned. He gave the analogy of being bitten by a white dog or by a black dog – in either case one is bitten. Likewise, he said that all conceptions, white and black, are conceptions of true existence and are therefore to be abandoned. On the day of the debate, Kamalashila and Hashang made an agreement in the presence of the king and ministers that if Kamalashila were to lose the debate, he would follow Hashang's position and vice versa. In fact, Hashang lost the debate but as he did not want to follow Kamalashila's position, he quickly escaped, leaving behind one of his shoes. It is said that his leaving behind a shoe is a sign that Hashang's view remains extant in Tibet.

Wednesday afternoon, 5 April 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Some say that adopting [virtue] and discarding [non-virtue] are done for the time being in the perspective of a mistaken [awareness]. However, if conceptual consciousnesses are [rightly] taken to be of two types – those that do and do not conceive of true existence – it is prattle to say that the reasoning refuting inherent existence refutes all objects. If conceptual consciousnesses are [wrongly] not treated as having those two types, then the two – the conceptual consciousnesses of the view and of the class of [ethical] behavior – [absurdly] would mutually damage each other, like hot and cold [which are such that the one cannot exist unaltered in the presence of the other]; also, there would be no ground for positing (1) the mistaken perspective in which [adopting virtue and discarding non-virtue] are posited, (2) the positer, and (3) those which are posited as such [since all thought would be mistaken]. Hence, such talk is a creation of darkness. Therefore, [those who put forth these notions] are holding the position of the opponents in the above passages [cited from Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti, for they misunderstand the reasonings proving emptiness to be negating cause and effect].

Some say that the adopting of virtue and the discarding of non-virtue only exist to the face of (*or* in the perspective of) a mistaken awareness, which would imply that they do not exist in reality. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "However, if conceptual consciousnesses are [rightly] taken to be of two types – those that do and do not conceive of true existence – it is prattle to say that the reasoning refuting inherent existence refutes all objects." The reasoning refuting inherent existence refutes the referent object of the conception of true existence but it does *not* refute the referent objects of all conceptions. In other words, this reasoning only refutes the referent object of the conception of true existence; it does not refute the referent objects of concordant conceptions, i.e., conceptions that concord with reality. On the other hand, if conceptions are *not* taken to be of two types – those that do conceive of true existence and those that do not conceive of true existence – the conception of the profound, the view, and the conception of the vast, conduct, would contradict each other. Then the ultimate truth, which is the side of the view, and conventional truth, which is the side of conduct, would harm each other. If conceptions are not distinguished into those having the sign of the conception of true existence and those without the sign of conception of true existence, then either *all* conceptions would have to be (1) conceptions of true existence or *all* conceptions would have to be (2) not conceptions of true existence. In short, maintaining that non-inherent existence means non-existence harms conventional truths, because if that were the case, then nothing would exist. Contrarily, maintaining that if things exist they must inherently exist harms ultimate truths. In this way the view and the conduct would harm each other like hot and cold harm each other.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "also, there would be no ground for positing (1) the mistaken perspective in which [adopting virtue and discarding non-virtue] are posited, (2) the positer, and (3) those which are posited as such [since all thought would be mistaken]. Hence, such talk is a creation of darkness." The Tibetan here actually seems to say "such talk is a *snake* in the darkness." The example of a snake in the darkness is given further on in the *Supplement* in regard to someone who is frightened due to seeing a snake in a dark hole. Someone else dispels his fear, saying, "There is no elephant in here:"

> *Seeing a snake dwelling in a hole in one's house's wall,*
> *Dispelling apprehension saying "there is no elephant in here,"*
> *Acting to abandon even fear of the snake –*
> *Oh my, [it] will just become the jest of others.* [6.141]

> Whoever, although the condition of fear is already close, does not perceive the fear existing in that, and not producing the remedy, due to stupidity, manifests themselves as just fearless – they will be grasped by the snake since they merely find comfort [in the words of another fool], because the fear due to that snake cannot be dispelled by [saying] an elephant does not exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "Therefore, [those who put forth these notions] are holding the position of the opponents in the above passages [cited from Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti, for they misunderstand the reasonings proving emptiness to be negating cause and effect]."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

3B1C-2B3D Exhortation to vessels to listen [to this explanation of the profound emptiness]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Thus, having doubtlessly accumulated the collection of virtue without pause over a long time:

Since the beings skilled in the ways of the profound and extensive
Gradually attain the Extremely Joyous Ground,
Those who strive for that should listen to this path. [6.7bcd]

[The last line] means: "those who strive for the Extremely Joyous Ground." "This" [of the words "this path"], has characteristics that will be explained later.

Those who have accumulated merit for a long time are correct vessels and should therefore listen to the teachings on the profound, emptiness, and the vast, the grounds and paths. In other words, those who strive to gradually attain the various grounds, beginning with the Extremely Joyous Ground, should listen to these teachings.

Trainees *intent on* the *Supplement* are definitely bodhisattvas. Trainees *in* the *Supplement*, on the other hand, are not necessarily bodhisattvas. Bodhisattvas intent on the *Supplement* are necessarily ordinary bodhisattvas, as is the case of trainees intent on the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. A mere trainee in the *Supplement* is anyone who has interest and faith in it, whereas a trainee who is intent on the *Supplement* is one who has generated a path in his continuum.

The words in the root verse "this path" refer to the profound view, which will be explained later on in the context of the ten samenesses, or ten equalities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

Chandrakirti's *Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"* says:

Beings skilled in the modes of the profound
[meaning of emptiness] and the vast [compassionate deeds]
Will gradually attain the Very Joyous ground.
Hence, those seeking that [ground] should listen to this path. [6.7bcd]

Beings skilled in the modes of the profound and the vast as explained above will definitely accumulate for a long time, without interstice, while on the level of a common being, the collections of virtues in [both] the profound and the vast classes. Thereby, they will attain the Very Joyous ground in stages. Therefore, those seeking the Very Joyous ground should listen to the profound path about to be explained. In this way [Chandrakirti] exhorts one to listen.

Furthermore, Chandrakirti's *Commentary on (Aryadeva's) Four Hundred* (chapter 12), says:

When [persons] develop an interest in discourse on the emptiness of inherent existence, they establish conditions concordant with it so as to increase clarity with respect to emptiness. They are very compassionate and grateful to the Supramundane Victors – the Ones Gone Thus. Due to wishing to abandon completely the causes for [falling into] the great abyss [of bad rebirths], a circumstance that interrupts their [practice of] excellent doctrine, they resort to repentance and give even what is difficult to give [that is, even their own flesh]. They also gather [students] through the four

> modes of gathering. They teach this excellent doctrine with all endeavor to beings who have become vessels for the excellent doctrine.
>
> Accordingly, this doctrine must be taught with great endeavor to those free of the two faults of non-vessels [that is, forsaking the view due to disbelief and, although having a facsimile of belief, mistakenly understanding that cause and effect are refuted by the reasoning establishing emptiness]. Through use of a technique that does not undermine ascertainment of dependent-arising, explanations should be given even to those who, though having belief, do not understand [the view] just as it is.

Those who are skilled in the modes of the profound and vast should listen to the teachings on emptiness. People who accumulate the collections of merit and exalted wisdom over a long period and are interested in attaining the grounds in stages, will gradually attain the path of accumulation, the path of preparation, and then the path of seeing, the first ground. Therefore, Chandrakirti says that they should listen to the teachings on emptiness.

Chandrakirti then says: "When [persons] develop an interest in discourse on the emptiness of inherent existence, they establish conditions concordant with it so as to increase clarity with respect to emptiness." Concordant conditions for the view of emptiness are, for example, clear faith with respect to emptiness, the generation of great compassion, and the thought to repay the kindness of the tathagatas. Those who have the basis of the collections of merit and wisdom are able to understand emptiness properly without falling into the great abyss of the two extremes, the extreme of permanence and the extreme of annihilation (note that "the great abyss" is the two extremes and not bad rebirths, as is said in the annotation above). In short, such persons abide in the middle way free of extremes. In order to do so they must engage in practices in relation to repentance, give away that which is difficult to give, and so forth. In fact, they should engage in the practice of generosity as recounted in the *Birth Tales* [or *Jataka Tales*], the stories of Buddha's previous lives, in which he is said to have given away even his wife, child, and so forth. Likewise, one should also practice giving away even one's own body. One can recite the prayer, the *Blazing of the Doctrine*, in which one prays for the doctrine to blaze or flourish through the giving away of one's daughter, wealth, chariot, and so forth.

Such a correct vessel for the teachings on emptiness should also engage in the four means of gathering disciples:

1. giving gifts,
2. speaking pleasantly,
3. fulfilling their welfare by teaching, and
4. acting according to what one teaches.

One who teaches emptiness should do so only to such suitable vessels. In the teaching on the stages of the path, it is said that a listener should be free from the three faults of an improper vessel, although here it says that the person to whom emptiness is taught should be free of *two* faults:

(1) not believing in the view of emptiness and thereby abandoning it, and

(2) misunderstanding the view of emptiness and thereby deprecating the law of actions and results and so forth.

In the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, the Buddha says: "Listen well, listen carefully, and retain it in your mind well." In this way Buddha implies that the listener should be free from the three faults mentioned in the *Stages of the Path*:

1. being like a stained vessel,
2. being like a vessel with a hole in it, and
3. being like an upside down vessel.

The first, being like a stained vessel, means that the listener is one who looks for mistakes in the teaching. This person is likened to a stained vessel in that just as a stained vessel spoils whatever food is put into it, likewise whatever such a person hears will be spoiled by his polluted mind. The second, being like a vessel with a hole in it, exemplifies a listener who has forgotten everything by the end of the teaching in that whatever is put into such a vessel leaks out. One who is like an upside-down vessel is a listener who does not even listen to the teachings, or else falls asleep or is completely distracted during the teachings.

To someone who believes in emptiness but is unable to understand it, the teacher should teach dependent-arising very skillfully. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Through use of a technique that does not undermine ascertainment of dependent-arising, explanations should be given even to those who, though having belief, do not understand [the view] just as it is."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> For those who know how to explain [this topic] well, there is great merit in explaining it to those listeners who are suitable vessels, from the minimally qualified on up. Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* says:
>
> > Belief in the profound doctrine gathers all virtues. Until the achievement of buddhahood it accomplishes all mundane and supramundane marvels. The *Given by the Precious Child Sutra* says:
> >
> > > Manjushri, whoever listens [even] with doubt to this rendition of the teaching generates much greater merit than a bodhisattva who, lacking skill in means, practices the six perfections for a hundred thousand eons. This being so, what need is there to say anything about a person who listens without doubt! What need is there to say anything about a person who imparts the scripture in writing, memorizes it, and also teaches it thoroughly and extensively to others!

Someone who is skilled in teaching the topic of emptiness even to those who are minimally qualified creates great merit by doing so. A minimally qualified vessel is one who, although he does not understand emptiness well, believes in it. Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* says that one who has belief in the profound doctrine of emptiness creates much merit. The *Given by the Precious Child Sutra* says that while a bodhisattva who practices the six perfections for a hundred thousand eons creates much merit, even someone who listens to the teachings on emptiness with a doubt creates more merit. Although one does not understand emptiness in accordance with view of the Prasangika Madhyamikas, one can still practice the six perfections, including wisdom, in that it is said to be sufficient to have a wisdom understanding emptiness as it is presented by the lower schools. In fact, even the view of emptiness as presented by the Chittamatra school, non-duality, is said to be a sufficient basis for generating the stages of the tantric path from the illusory body through the meaning clear light. However, to progress further it is necessary to realize emptiness as it is presented by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. It is said in general that when a bodhisattva reaches the tenth ground, he must engage in the stages of the tantric path. At what level of the tantric path does he begin? He begins on the fourth stage, that of meaning clear light. In short, in dependence on the view of the Chittamatrins, one can achieve a union of bliss and the wisdom realizing emptiness.

If, on the other hand, someone listens to the teachings on emptiness without doubt, what need is there to mention the great amount of merit he accumulates? The sutra says: "This being so, what need is there to say anything about a person who listens without doubt! What need is there to say anything about a person who imparts the scripture in writing, memorizes it, and also teaches it

thoroughly and extensively to others!" Similarly, in the *Noble King of Vows of the Conduct of Samantabhadra*, or the *King of Prayers*, it says:

> One may offer supreme ornaments of the buddha fields
> Of the ten directions to the conquerors
> And also offer the highest joys of humans and gods
> For eons numerous as atoms of the world
>
> But to read or hear *The King of Prayers*
> With eyes looking towards supreme illumination
> And faith stirring in one's heart for even an instant
> Gives birth to far more superior merit.
>
> Should anyone recite this aspiration of sublime ways
> They will pass beyond all states of sorrow
> Rise above all inferior beings and gain
> A vision of Amitabha, Buddha of Infinite Light.
>
> Even in this very lifetime
> All sublime joys will be theirs
> The experiences of the all sublime Samantabhadra
> Without obstructions will quickly be theirs.

'Hearing,' 'reciting,' 'memorizing,' 'writing,' and so forth are included in the ten Dharma practices. However, although we engage in such virtuous practices, due to the heavy negative karma we accumulated in the past, we are not able to understand emptiness immediately.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Also, the *Diamond Cutter Sutra* says:
>
> > The Supramundane Victor said, "What do you think, Subhuti? If the banks of the river Ganges themselves became as numerous as the grains of sand on the banks of the Ganges, would their grains of sand be many?"
> >
> > Subhuti replied, "Supramundane Victor, since even [the banks] which would be as numerous as the grains of sand of the Ganges would be many, what is there to say about the grains of sand on those [banks]!"
> >
> > The Supramundane Victor said, "Subhuti, I will instruct you; you will understand. If a certain man or a woman completely filled worldly realms as numerous as the grains of sand on those banks of the Ganges with the seven varieties of precious objects and gave these to the One Gone Thus, would that man or woman thereby develop much merit or not?"
> >
> > Subhuti replied, "Supramundane Victor, it would be much; it would be much, One Gone to Bliss."
> >
> > The Supramundane Victor said, "If someone retains [in memory] merely a stanza of four lines from this rendition of the teaching and also teaches it to others, much more merit than that is generated."

Here, the Buddha says that when if someone were to fill the worldly realms with the seven types of precious objects and offer them to the buddhas, he would accumulate a great amount of merit, yet someone who merely memorizes a four-line stanza from the *Diamond Cutter Sutra* creates even more merit. Since this was said by the Supramundane Victor himself, one should not doubt it since a buddha does not deceive others. One should also not doubt the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. As a preliminary to the recitation of the *Heart Sutra* in Tibetan monasteries, the monks recite a verse that says:

To the perfection of wisdom, inexpressible in words and thought,
The entity of the unproduced and unceasing,
An object of the mind individually cognizing it,
Mother of the conquerors of the three times, I prostrate.

Thursday morning, 6 April 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Also the *Treasury of the One Gone Thus Sutra* lists the ten great non-virtues and then says that:
>
> > A living being – who, possessing all these, enters into the doctrine of selflessness and has faith and belief that all phenomena are from the beginning pure – does not go to a bad rebirth.
>
> Also, the *Chapter on Taming Demons* says that:
>
> > A monk – who knows all phenomena as utterly subdued [of inherent existence] and knows that the extremes, which are the origin of faults, are also devoid of inherent existence – is free of contrition for faults that have occurred and consistently does not commit them. Therefore, if even deeds of immediate retribution [that is, those most vile actions causing one to take rebirth in a hell immediately after death] are overwhelmed [through knowledge of emptiness], what is there to say about [its overwhelming] the trifling [faults] of wrongly engaging in rites and ethics?
>
> And the *Sutra of Ajatashatru* says:
>
> > When someone, who has committed a deed of immediate retribution, enters into and has belief in this excellent doctrine upon hearing it, I do not call that deed a karmic obstruction.
>
> Thus, these are benefits of having belief in and thinking about the profound meaning [of emptiness] on the occasions of hearing and explaining, as well as on other occasions.

The *Treasury of the One Gone Thus Sutra* says that one who commits the ten non-virtues but then engages in the teaching on emptiness will not go to the bad migrations. "Enters into the doctrine of selflessness" is to have faith and belief that phenomena are free from inherent existence from the beginning. This sutra was taught by the Buddha in order to make others engage in the meaning of emptiness. This is not a definitive meaning sutra but an interpretive meaning sutra in that it says: "enters into the doctrine of selflessness and has faith and belief that all phenomena are from the beginning pure – *does not go to a bad rebirth*." It is an interpretive meaning sutra because it says that *by merely having faith in emptiness* one is protected from the bad migrations, whereas this is not the case. What this sutra actually means is that when one engages in the doctrine of selflessness and realizes the reality of phenomena, non-inherent existence, one no longer creates the karma to be reborn in the lower realms.

The *Chapter on Taming Demons* says that since the deeds of immediate retribution are overwhelmed by one's knowing that phenomena are empty, what need is there to mention the karma of trifling wrongs in rituals and ethics? One who knows that faults are empty of true existence is free from contrition for these faults in that he does not develop regret for faults and no longer commits faults. For one who knows the meaning of emptiness, contrition is dispelled and the deeds of immediate retribution are overwhelmed. This does not mean that such a person no longer has

contrition for negative actions, but that, having initially developed contrition, through knowing that the faults do not exist inherently, the contrition for them is dispelled.

The *Sutra of Ajatashastru* says: "When someone, who has committed a deed of immediate retribution, enters into and has belief in this excellent doctrine upon hearing it, I do not call that deed a karmic obstruction." Buddha said this to Ajatashastru, who had killed his own father, a king and foe destroyer. The story is that at the same time as Ajatashastru was planning to kill his father, Devadatta was also planning to kill the Buddha. Ajatashastru had his father put in prison. Meanwhile Devadatta tried by many means to kill the Buddha through, for example, sending many drunken elephants with weapons on their tusks into the road where the Buddha was walking. However, Buddha emanated five huge lions from his fingers and created a wall of fire around the elephants, whereby the elephants were subdued and bowed to the Buddha. Devadatta also catapulted huge boulders at the Buddha but they were unable to harm him because Vajrapani threw his vajra at the boulders and shattered them. (It is said that a fragment of a boulder hit Dzambala and wounded his head, which Buddha then cleansed with water, this being the origin of the ritual of offering water to Dzambala.) Ajatashastru meanwhile developed strong regret for having imprisoned his father and said that anyone who could tell him that his father was not dead would be given half the kingdom in reward. However, this proclamation caused a stampede, the noise of which frightened the king, whereupon he had a heart attack such that when the crowd arrived at his cell he was already dead. Hearing that his father was dead, Ajatashastru's remorse became even greater. Buddha, knowing that this was the right time to subdue him, went to Ajatashastru and taught the *Sutra Dispelling Regret* saying: "Father and mother are to be killed..." Due to hearing this, Ajatashastru was relieved and, emerging from his depression, began to think about the meaning of what the Buddha had said. He came to understand that the Buddha did not mean that one's *actual* father and mother are to be killed but that the father-like karma and the mother-like afflictions are to be killed. In this way, Ajatashastru came to realize selflessness, or the four noble truths. However, as a consequence of his previous actions he experienced the sufferings of the hell realms with his human body. Since he had created the definite karma to experience the suffering of the hells, he had to undergo the suffering of having his human body burned by fire while nothing else around him was burned.

Ajatashastru is said to have created two deeds of immediate retribution: that of killing his father and that of killing a foe destroyer, in that his father was a foe destroyer. However, there is debate as to whether a single base, one human body, can commit two deeds of immediate retribution.

In the *Sutra of Ajatashatru,* the Buddha says: "When someone, who has committed a deed of immediate retribution, enters into and has belief in this excellent doctrine upon hearing it, I do not call that deed a karmic obstruction." Here the 'excellent doctrine' refers to the meaning of emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "Thus, these are benefits of having belief in and thinking about the profound meaning [of emptiness] on the occasions of hearing and explaining, as well as on other occasions." Whatever activity one does, Dharma or not, it is beneficial to think about emptiness. In short, emptiness is extremely important; in fact in one text it says that the best amulet (or protection-knot) against harm is emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> There are two requirements for obtaining well the benefits of [giving such] an explanation: (1) a pure motivation – not looking for goods, services, fame, and so forth – and (2) non-erroneous explanation of the meaning of the doctrine to be explained without misapprehending it.

There are many benefits to teaching emptiness, but one must do so with a pure motivation and unmistakenly. In other words, one should be free from an afflicted motivation seeking reward and should teach without mistakes.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> For, it is said that an explanation within having either or both of these faults will serve to interrupt [the fruition of] a great deal of merit.

Teaching emptiness with one or both of these two faults hinders the creation of merit.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> In this vein, the master Vasubandhu says:
>
> > Therefore, persons who explain the doctrine erroneously or who – having an afflicted mind – explain it out of desire for goods, services, or fame, cause a large amount of their own merit to degenerate.
>
> It is important that the listener also have a pure motivation for listening and not misapprehend the meaning. Therefore, both [teacher and student] should have the minimum qualifications at the time of explaining and listening.

Vasubandhu says that when someone teaches the doctrine with an afflicted motivation, that teaching becomes a negative action of speech, idle talk. Therefore, it is extremely important to have a pure motivation when teaching the Dharma. In addition, one should explain the Dharma free from mistakes, otherwise, one will degenerate the merit one has already created. However, it can happen that ordinary beings who teach the Dharma sometimes do so erroneously. One day I visited Pembar Geshe in Kathmandu, who said to me that when he teaches those who have studied philosophy he does not worry so much about making mistakes since they can use their own understanding to determine what is right and wrong, whereas he does worry when he teaches those who have not studied philosophy since they uphold these mistaken teachings for the rest of their life. This is something worth thinking about.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "It is important that the listener also have a pure motivation for listening and not misapprehend the meaning. Therefore, both [teacher and student] should have the minimum qualifications at the time of explaining and listening." The minimum requirement on both the side of the teacher and the side of the listener is a good motivation. Then it is best if the teacher explains unmistakenly and the listener understand unmistakenly. This is similar to what Dharmakirti says in his promise to compose his *Commentary on [Dignaga's] 'Compendium of Valid Cognition*:

> Since most beings are attached to the ordinary and do not exert effort in wisdom, not only do they not strive for the excellent teachings, they are also full of hatred due to the stains of jealousy. Therefore, even without thinking, "I will benefit others," because of having had the thought for a long time to devote myself to composing this excellent explanation, I generate joy in doing so.

Such persons are faulty vessels, whereas Dharmakirti then sets out the qualities of correct vessels, saying: "Those who are not attached to mundane activities, have a great quantity of merit, are free from jealousy, are interested in the excellent teachings, and are free from hatred, for such people there is benefit to my composing this text." Such vessels are those with a pure motivation.

In short, no matter what kind of activity one is engaged in, listening to or teaching the Dharma or other activities, it is beneficial to think about emptiness. "Other activities" includes the yogas mentioned in various rituals, for example, the yoga of eating food, the yoga of dressing, and so forth. Perhaps it could be said that whenever one thinks about emptiness and does an activity, that activity becomes a yoga. However, one can debate whether it is a yoga if one kills an animal while thinking about emptiness! It can be said that when engaging in the four behaviors (walking, standing, sitting, and lying down), if one strives to not be separated from the mind of enlightenment and the mind thinking about emptiness, they become Dharma practices.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

3B1C-2B3E [Description of] how the suchness of dependent-arising is explained

The presentation of how the suchness of dependent-arising is explained has three parts:

1 How the meaning of reality is explained through scripture
2 Establishing the meaning of scripture through reasoning
3 Explaining the divisions of the emptiness so established

3B1C-2B3E-1 How reality is explained in scripture

This section has two parts:

A Stating how reality is set out in scripture
B Identifying what is discordant with knowing suchness.

3B1C-2B3E-1A How reality is set out in scripture

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Regarding that, this is a brief quotation to indicate the state that views the reality of phenomena, as was taught in the *Exalted Sutra on the Ten Grounds.*

> O children of the Conqueror, the bodhisattva who really fully completed the path on the fifth bodhisattva ground enters into the sixth bodhisattva ground – he enters through ten equalities of phenomena. If asked: what ten? Like this:
>
> 1. the equality of all phenomena as signless;
> 2. the equality of all phenomena as without characteristics; similarly,
> 3. the equality of all phenomena as without production,
> 4. not produced,
> 5. isolated,
> 6. completely pure from the very beginning,
> 7. without elaboration,
> 8. without acceptance or rejection;
> 9. the equality of all phenomena as like illusions, dreams, cairns, echoes, water-moons, reflections, and manifestations;
> 10. the equality of all phenomena in not existing as the two, things and non-things.

> When he thoroughly realizes the self nature of all phenomena like that, through sharpness and harmonious patience, he will subsequently attain the sixth bodhisattva ground, the Manifest.

Phenomena are said to have ten equalities (note that Anne Klein translates the same Tibetan word, *mnyam pa nyid,* as 'samenesses.')

1. The equality of all phenomena in being signless means that all phenomena are the same in lacking the sign of inherent existence.
2. The equality of all phenomena in being without characteristics means that all phenomena are the same in lacking the characteristic of inherent or true existence.
3. The equality of all phenomena in being without production means that all phenomena are the same in being free from inherent production. Note that although they have production, they do not have inherent production.
4. The equality of all phenomena in not being produced means that in the case of compounded phenomena, although they are pervaded by being produced, they are not inherently produced.
5. The equality of all phenomena in being isolated means that all phenomena are the same in being isolated, or devoid, of inherent or true existence.
6. The equality of all phenomena in being completely pure from the very beginning means that all phenomena are the same in not having existed truly from the beginning. (Note that for the Prasangika Madhyamika school 'true existence' and 'inherent existence' are both unacceptable, whereas in the Svatantrika Madhyamika school, true existence is not acceptable while inherent existence is).
7. The equality of all phenomena in being without elaboration means that all phenomena are the same in being free from the elaboration of inherent existence.
8. The equality of all phenomena in being without acceptance or rejection means that although in general there are phenomena to be accepted, or adopted, such as virtue, there is no inherently existent virtue to be accepted or adopted. Likewise, although non-virtue is to be rejected, it is not an inherently existent object to be rejected.
9. The equality of all phenomena in being like illusions, dreams, cairns, echoes, water-moons, reflections, and manifestations involves the seven analogies discussed in the third chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* in the context of the seven types of appearances.
10. The equality of all phenomena in not existing as the two – things and non-things – means that all phenomena are the same in not being inherently existent things and non-things.

Thursday afternoon, 6 April 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says:
>
> > When fifth-ground bodhisattvas enter the sixth ground, they do so by way of the ten samenesses of phenomena. What are the ten? All phenomena are the same in being signless; all phenomena are the same in being characterless, likewise in being productionless, non-produced, void, pure from the very beginning, without the elaborations [of inherent existence], and non-adopted and non-discarded; and all phenomena are the same in being like a magician's illusions, dreams, optical illusions, echoes, moons in water, reflections, and emanations; and all phenomena are the same in being without the duality of [functioning] things and non[functioning] things. When in that way they thoroughly realize the nature of all phenomena, through sharp and concordant forbearance they attain the sixth bodhisattva ground, the Manifest.

> The word "likewise" [means that] "all phenomena" is to be applied up to [the eighth which is the sameness in being] non-adopted and non-discarded. [With regard to how the list is taken as ten samenesses] those two samenesses [of being non-adopted and non-discarded] are taken as one, and the seven samenesses of being like an illusion, and so forth, are taken as one sameness, and the last two [the sameness of being without the duality of things and non-things] are taken as one.
>
> With respect to the identification of the ten samenesses, even [Vasubandhu's] *Commentary on the "Sutra on the Ten Grounds"* and Asanga's *Bodhisattva Grounds* do not appear to agree. Because these two [texts] do not accord with the mode of commenting on emptiness in this [Prasangika-Madhyamika] system, [the ten samenesses] are explained differently here [in the context of Chandrakirti's Prasangika text].
> Concerning that, the first sameness is that all phenomena are similar in that appearance of [their] dissimilar characteristics does not exist in the perspective of a superior's meditative equipoise. The second is that all phenomena are the same in being without establishment by way of their own character. These two are the general teaching; the other eight are taught in the context of making differentiations within the meaning of the general teaching itself.
> "Productionless" refers to future [production], and "non-produced" refers to the other times [past and present]. That these are the same, or similar, with respect to all phenomena also should be understood with respect to the other [samenesses]. Voidness is an emptiness of the produced and the to-be-produced, i.e., void of [these as] qualified by being established by way of their character as in the context of the second sameness. That such is not created adventitiously by scripture or reasoning but [that phenomena] abide in such purity from the very beginning is the sixth [sameness].
> The seventh [sameness, that all phenomena are the same in] lacking the elaboration of dualistic appearance, applies to the first [sameness in the sense of being that way in meditative equipoise on suchness], whereas [that all phenomena are] the same in being unelaborated by terms and thoughts should be affixed with the qualification of the second [sameness in the sense that all phenomena are the same in that their being elaborated by terms and thoughts is not established by way of its own character]. Such qualification should also be applied to the eighth sameness [that all phenomena are the same in not involving adopting and discarding that exist by way of their own character]. The ninth [sameness] is many forms of examples for ascertaining the meanings explained earlier. The tenth [sameness] is the similarity of all phenomena in not being inherently existent as things or non-things [that is, as inherently existent impermanent functioning phenomena or inherently existent permanent non-functioning phenomena].
> *Sharp* refers to quickness of wisdom. *Concordant* means concordant with an eighth-ground bodhisattva's forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production. There appear to be many different [interpretations] of "concordant forbearance" due to [different] contexts [that is, due to its being explained in the context of the different bodhisattva grounds].

Among the ten samenesses, the first two – the sameness of all phenomena in being signless and the sameness of all phenomena in not being established by way of their own character – are general teachings.

1. The sameness of all phenomena in not having signs of inherent existence is in relation to the fact that no signs, such as blue, yellow, and so forth, appear to an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. In short, to an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise there is no appearance of signs, meaning that there is no appearance of conventional truths.

2. The sameness of all phenomena in not being established by way of their own character is also a general teaching. The remaining eight samenesses are particulars, or instances, of these general teachings.

3. The sameness of all phenomena in being productionless refers to future production, meaning that all phenomena are the same in lacking inherently existent future production or that they are the same

in lacking a future production that exists by way of its own character. Future phenomena are those that are yet to be produced due to the causes and conditions for their arisal not having come together.

4. The sameness of all phenomena in being non-produced refers to the other times, past and present, meaning that although phenomena are produced in the past and present, they are not inherently produced in the past and present. A past phenomenon is one that has been produced and has ceased. A present phenomenon is one that has been produced but has not yet ceased.

5. The sameness of all phenomena in being void or isolated means that phenomena are empty or devoid of being an inherently existent 'produced' and devoid of being an inherently existent 'to-be-produced.' Lama Tsongkhapa says: "void of [these as] qualified by being established by way of their character as in the context of the second sameness." This voidness is to be understood in the sense of not being a produced or a to-be-produced that is established by way of its own character.

6. The sameness of all phenomena in being pure from the very beginning is in the sense of their purity not having been created adventitiously by scripture or reasoning, but of their having been pure from the very beginning.

7. The sameness of all phenomena in being free from elaboration has two meanings: the first is that there is no elaboration of dualistic appearance to the face of, or to the perspective of, the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, which is related to the first sameness. Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "whereas [that all phenomena are] the same in being unelaborated by terms and thoughts should be affixed with the qualification of the second [sameness]." Thus, the non-elaboration of dualistic appearance is related to the first sameness and the non-elaboration of emptiness in terms of being inexpressible by terms and thoughts is related to the second sameness.

8. The sameness of phenomena in not being adopted and discarded is also related to the second sameness in terms of such phenomena not being established by way of their own character.

9. The sameness of all phenomena in terms of the seven examples (a magician's illusions, dreams, optical illusions, echoes, moons in water, reflections, and emanations) is given in order to ascertain the meanings explained previously. Many examples are given in order to understand that phenomena do not exist inherently and are not established by way of their own character. The seven examples were discussed in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. An illusion is an object created by a magician through tricking the eyes with mantras whereby, for example, a clod of earth appears as a horse or elephant. Dreams are well known to us; objects in dreams appear but do not exist. An example of an optical illusion is the appearance of falling hair to someone with cataracts and seeing things move when in fact it is oneself who is moving. An echo appears to be, for example, a sound made by an empty room whereas actually it comes from a previous sound; likewise, all phenomena seem to be inherently existent but are not. A moon in water refers to the reflection of the moon in water, which appears to be an actual moon but is not. A reflection is, for example, the reflection of one's face in a mirror, which appears to be one's actual face although it is not. An emanation is a magical emanation that appears but is not real.

There is a story about the reflection in water regarding an intelligent rabbit and a proud lion. Once there was a lion who thought himself extremely handsome. One day, a rabbit heard an ox bellowing. Upon asking the ox why he bellowed, the ox replied that it was because he was afraid of the lion. So, the clever rabbit went to the lion and said to him that there exists someone far more handsome than him. The lion asked the rabbit where this being was, and the rabbit took him to the edge of a well. When the lion looked into the well he saw a very handsome lion. When the lion puffed

himself up to show off his power and magnificence, so did the lion in the well. The lion became very angry at this "other" lion and, thinking to attack him, jumped into the well and drowned.

10. Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "The tenth [sameness] is the similarity of all phenomena in not being inherently existent as things or non-things."

The ten samenesses are included in each other, the first two being generalities and the remaining eight being particularities. In the Gomang textbook *Analysis of the Limits* (quoted by Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 132), it says that the seventh is included in the first; the third, fourth, and fifth are included in the second; and the rest – the sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth – are included in both the first and the second. However, here in the *Illumination,* Lama Tsongkhapa says that the seventh and eighth are included in both the first and the second, and the fifth is included in the second.

In the context of "sharp and concordant forbearance," 'sharp' refers to the quickness of wisdom. Dharmakirti, in his *Commentary on [Dignaga's] 'Compendium of Valid Cognition,* says that sharp and dull faculties are related respectively to the quickness and slowness of an awareness in analyzing its object. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "*Concordant* means concordant with an eighth-ground bodhisattva's forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production." A sixth ground bodhisattva has a forbearance that is concordant with, or similar to, the forbearance that is gained on the eighth ground with respect to the doctrine of non-production. In a commentary on the *Ornament for Clear Realizations,* there is a passage that sets out three occasions of forbearance:
(1) a sharp-facultied bodhisattva gains forbearance with respect to emptiness on the path of preparation,
(2) a middling-facultied bodhisattva gains forbearance with respect to emptiness on the path of seeing, and
(3) a dull-facultied bodhisattva gains forbearance with respect to emptiness on the eighth ground.
Therefore, by the eighth ground all bodhisattvas have attained this forbearance. There is a reason for positing these three occasions – it is because bodhisattvas, in dependence on their respective faculties, manifest signs of being irreversible from enlightenment on different occasions: the sharp-facultied do so on the path of preparation, the middling-facultied on the path of seeing, and the dull-facultied on the path of meditation. These external signs reveal an internal stable realization of method and wisdom.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "With respect to the identification of the ten samenesses, even [Vasubandhu's] *Commentary on the "Sutra on the Ten Grounds"* and Asanga's *Bodhisattva Grounds* do not appear to agree. Because these two [texts] do not accord with the mode of commenting on emptiness in this [Prasangika-Madhyamika] system, [the ten samenesses] are explained differently here [in the context of Chandrakirti's Prasangika text]." These two texts do not agree because their respective authors explain emptiness differently, due to which they explain the ten samenesses differently. Also, in the Chittamatra school there is an explanation of the ten samenesses but, although the terms are the same, the meanings are slightly different.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Although there are many scriptures that teach the suchness of phenomena, [the explanation] here is in the context of describing how suchness is realized by a sixth-ground bodhisattva's wisdom; hence [Chandrakirti] cited a scripture that describes entry into the sixth ground by way of the ten samenesses.

Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary then sets out various sections that are not directly related to Chandrakirti's autocommentary. He does so because, in the context of presenting emptiness in relation to the ten samenesses, one has to first understand that all phenomena are the same in not existing inherently and then one has to identify the object of negation. The object of negation is to be identified both from the point of view of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas and from the point of view of the Prasangika Madhyamikas. Shantideva, in the ninth chapter of his *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds,* says that it is necessary to recognize the object of negation because:

> Without making contact with the thing imputed
> [by the mind – that is, true existence]
> The nonexistence of that thing is not apprehended. [IX.140]

In other words, if one does not first recognize the object of negation one will not know what emptiness is. For example, in order to realize that the horns of a rabbit do not exist, one has to first know what a horn is. First one generates a meaning generality of the horns of a rabbit, and then one negates their existence. Another example is if someone says "There is no pot on the table," in order to understand that there is no pot there one first has to know what pot is. In short, it is important to first identify the object of negation. Therefore, Lama Tsongkhapa discusses the identification of the object of negation in the Svatantrika Madhyamika school and the Prasangika Madhyamika school. In the Svatantrika Madhyamika school, the object of negation is true existence. Having understood that, one then needs to understand the measure of true existence for this school, this being: an object established by its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness.

Friday morning, 7 April 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "With respect to the identification of the ten samenesses, even [Vasubandhu's] *Commentary on the "Sutra on the Ten Grounds"* and Asanga's *Bodhisattva Grounds* do not appear to agree." The way in which the ten samenesses are presented in the *Illumination* is also different from these two presentations. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Because these two [texts] do not accord with the mode of commenting on emptiness in this [Prasangika-Madhyamika] system, [the ten samenesses] are explained differently here [in the context of Chandrakirti's Prasangika text]." 'The two texts are Vasubandhu's *Commentary on the "Sutra on the Ten Grounds"* and Asanga's *Bodhisattva Grounds*; they do not accord with the way of presenting emptiness in the Prasangika Madhyamika system. The ten samenesses are also explained in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way* (page 358):

> The seventh sameness is an attribute of the first; the third, fourth, and fifth are attributes of the second sameness; and the remaining are attributes of both.

It also says (page 359):

> In the *Bodhisattva Grounds* it says: "(1) the sameness of all phenomena of not having signs of the entitiness of existing ultimately; (2) the sameness of not having characteristics of the appearance of thorough application in verbalization; (3) the sameness of not being generated naturally due to not having the characteristics of those; (4) the sameness of not being produced even from causes; (5) the sameness of being thoroughly pacified from the beginning, which is to not be produced from self and causes; (6) the sameness of not being elaborated by a consciousness apprehending an existent functioning thing; (7) the sameness in being free from thorough application in that which is to be adopted and that

> which is to be discarded; (8) the sameness of being devoid or isolated due to their being free from thoroughly afflicted that are afflictions and sufferings; (9) the sameness of entity of imputed objects of knowledge being like illusions and emanations; and (10) the sameness of being without the duality of things and non-things, which are the entity of objects of a non-conceptual exalted wisdom."

It also says (page 360):

> In the *Commentary on the Sutra on the Ten Grounds* it says: "The sameness of being without the imputed entity of all twelve spheres is the sameness of all phenomena in being signless. Furthermore, these are the nine types of antidotes to the different signs."

The presentations of how the ten samenesses are included in each other are also different according to Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen and Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa. For example, Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen says that the third sameness is included in both the first and second; the fourth, fifth, and sixth are included in the second; the seventh in the first; and although the remaining are not mentioned, they are probably included in both the first and second. This is presented in Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning*.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, does a foe destroyer still experience the fruitional result of his past karma? For example Maudgalyana, a foe destroyer, was beaten to death. If a foe destroyer does not experience the fruitional result, at which point of the path are these karmic seeds abandoned?
A: A result such as that of Maudgalyana being beaten to death is not a fruitional result. It is a result similar to the cause as an experience, in that it was the result of having beaten his own mother in the past.

Q: In the teachings on the stages of the path, it says that self-cherishing is the root of suffering. What is the relationship between self-cherishing and the ignorance that is the root of cyclic existence? Is this a cause and effect relationship? Do foe destroyers have self-cherishing? What is the pervasion between self-cherishing and self-purpose (one's own welfare)?
A: There is no relationship between self-cherishing and the ignorance that is the root of cyclic existence. This means that they do not have either of the two types of relationships set forth in the texts: a causal relationship and a same-entity relationship. In the *Stages of the Path,* it is said that self-cherishing is the root of suffering in order to set out the disadvantages of self-cherishing in that self-cherishing is the door to one's own and others' downfalls. As Panchen Losang Chogyi Gyeltshen says in the *Guru Puja*: "Cherishing myself is the doorway to all downfalls." Thus, only in the context of showing its faults is self-cherishing said to be the root of suffering.

That ignorance is the root of cyclic existence is explained in many other texts besides those on the stages of the path. Self-cherishing acts to impede the attainment of omniscience, while ignorance acts to impede the attainment of liberation, or nirvana. Self-cherishing does exist in the continuum of a foe destroyer, given that it is not an impediment to liberation. However, self-cherishing is the biggest impediment to entering the mahayana and is therefore worse than ignorance in the context of generating the mind of enlightenment. This is my own personal opinion; I have not seen it written in the texts. However, there is a distinction to be made between theory and practice. Due to the condition of ignorance, one does not know how to enact others' welfare.

Self-cherishing and self-purpose, or one's own welfare, are different. Self-purpose exists in the continua of bodhisattvas, as was said in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* in the context of discussing whether or not Maitreya has self-purpose or not. In conclusion, it is said that one who says that Maitreya is not striving for his own purpose has not looked carefully at the mahayana scriptures. Maitreya *does* have self-purpose because he is striving to attain the truth body, which is the fulfillment of his own purpose or welfare. The form body, on the other hand, fulfills others' purpose. Therefore, although a bodhisattva does have self-purpose, he does not have self-cherishing. Speaking in general, the stains of self-cherishing can exist in the continuum of a bodhisattva through the seventh ground. In fact, the first seven of the ten grounds are called impure because there still exists the stains of self-cherishing. This stain no longer exists on the eighth ground; therefore the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds are called pure grounds. The stain of self-cherishing is likened to the stain of the mother's womb. This is explained in the *Grounds and Paths,* and accords with the Svatantrika Madhyamika school. However, according to the Prasangika Madhyamika school, the first seven grounds are called impure because of the presence of afflictions.

A dull-facultied bodhisattva abandons the striving for liberation for oneself alone on the eighth ground, a middling-facultied bodhisattva on the path of seeing, and a sharp-facultied bodhisattva on the path of preparation. This is similar to what was said earlier in the context of the forbearances of the doctrine of emptiness which are generated at different levels.

Q: In the *Stages of the Path,* it is often taught that ignorance is the cause of self-cherishing and that if there is no ignorance, there is no self-cherishing. Is that right?
A: I say NO! In that case it would have to be said that the person is the cause of self-cherishing because if there is no person there is no self-cherishing. Likewise, it would follow that if there is no ignorance there is no self-cherishing. Ignorance is not the cause of self-cherishing.

Q: Jedzunpa gives definitions according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas of an absorption of cessation and an uncommon absorption of cessation, both of which are consciousnesses. Do the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert an absorption of cessation that is a non-associated compositional factor? If so, is it a *common* absorption of cessation?
A: According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, a common absorption of cessation is the absorption of cessation that exists in the continua of bodhisattvas on all ten grounds, whereas an uncommon absorption of cessation exists only in the continua of bodhisattvas on the sixth ground upward. It is said to be 'uncommon' due to the bodhisattva having attained a surpassing perfection of wisdom. Earlier, I perhaps said that the absorption of cessation explained in the two *Knowledges* is a common absorption of cessation, but it needs to be examined whether or not the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert this to be a common absorption of cessation. When the two *Knowledges* mention "a common absorption of cessation," perhaps their authors mean that this absorption of cessation is common in terms of being common to the hinayana and mahayana. Or it can be said that if it is a common absorption of cessation according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, it is not *pervaded* by being an absorption of cessation. This implies that common should be understood in terms of being common to the hinayana and mahayana.

There is a discussion about the absorption of cessation in the context of the nine serially abiding absorptions, the last of which is called the absorption of cessation. According to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, this [absorption of cessation] is a non-associated compositional factor, whereas the first eight absorptions are exalted wisdoms of meditative equipoise realizing emptiness.

Q: Does the overcoming of the deeds of immediate retribution by the view of emptiness occur on the level of an ordinary being or the level of a superior?

A: When the sutra says that the realization of emptiness overcomes the deeds of immediate retribution, I think that this means that their potency is diminished, not that they are completely eliminated. Therefore, even at the level of an ordinary being the realization of emptiness by a meaning generality diminishes the potency of the deeds of immediate retribution.

The *Chapter on Taming Demons* says "A monk – who knows all phenomena as utterly subdued [of inherent existence] and knows that the extremes, which are the origin of faults, are also devoid of inherent existence – is free of contrition for faults..." In general when confessing negative actions, one needs contrition or regret, this being one of the opponent powers for purifying negativities. In this context, contrition means having remorse for faults yet not doing anything about them; this kind of contrition is what is overcome by the realization of emptiness. Since this is overcome even in an ordinary being, there is no need to mention that it is overcome at the level of a superior. It is specified that the opponent power of repudiation or regret is a regret for having done a negative action that acts to bring about the determination to not commit that negative action again in the future. This, in turn, acts as a basis for the application of an antidote. Regret in the context of a negative action is positive, but regret itself is not pervaded by always being positive; for example, someone might regret having made a generous donation the day before. Some people even regret having been a monk or nun in the past because they did not have children!

END

Wednesday morning, 12 April 2000

(Masters Program Correspondence Course participants please note that there were no teachings 10, 11, and 14 April 2000)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-1B Identifying what is discordant with knowing suchness

Note that there is no corresponding text in Chandrakirti's autocommentary. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> With regard to settling the absence of true existence in phenomena, if you do not understand well just what true establishment is, as well as how [phenomena] are conceived as truly existent, the view of suchness will definitely go astray. Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:
>
> Without making contact with the thing imputed
> [by the mind – that is, true existence]
> The nonexistence of that thing is not apprehended. [IX.140]
>
> He says that if the thing imputed – the generality [or image] of the object of negation – does not appear to the mind well, it is impossible to apprehend well the nonexistence of the object of negation. Therefore, unless true establishment, which is what does not exist, and the aspect of the object of negation, which is that of which [phenomena] are empty, do not appear, just as they are, as objects of the mind, good ascertainment of the lack of true establishment and of the entity of emptiness cannot occur.
>
> Furthermore, the mere identification of a true existence that is superficially imputed by proponents of tenets and of the consciousness conceiving such true existence is not sufficient. Because of this, it is a very important essential to identify well the innate conception of true existence that has operated beginninglessly and exists both in those whose awarenesses have been affected through [study of philosophical] tenets and in those whose awarenesses have not been affected in this way, and to identify the true existence that is conceived by that mind. For, if you have not identified this, even if you refute an object of negation through reasoning, the adherence to true existence that has operated beginninglessly is not harmed at all; therefore, the meaning at this point would be lost.
> Furthermore, having initially identified the conception of inherent existence in your own [mental] continuum, you should know how the reasonings serve to disprove the object of that [conception] directly and indirectly. For, the refutation and proof of one who is only directed outside is of very little benefit.

The object of negation, which does not exist, must appear clearly as a meaning generality to the mind. If the meaning generality of the object of negation (true existence) is well ascertained, then the emptiness of that will also be well ascertained. As Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says: "Without making contact with the thing imputed [by the mind – that is, true existence] the nonexistence of that thing is not apprehended." That which is imputed is true existence; if there is not a clear meaning generality of true existence then its non-existence will not appear to the mind. Here the main point is to identify the object of negation well.

However, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The mere identification of a true existence that is superficially imputed by proponents of tenets and of the consciousness conceiving such true existence is not sufficient." One has to identify the innate conception of true existence and then ask oneself whether the referent object exists as it is conceived. It does not. It is important to have a clear meaning generality of the non-existence of the referent object of the conception of true existence. As Lama Tsongkhapa says: "It is a very important essential to identify well the innate conception of true existence... and to identify the true existence that is conceived by that mind." The referent object of the

innate conception of true existence does not exist; this very understanding harms this innate conception of true existence. This harm to the innate conception of true existence is what one is striving to accomplish. On the other hand, if one does not identify the non-existence of the referent object of the innate conception of true existence, the point is lost. In Lama Tsongkhapa's *Essence of Eloquence,* it says that there is no point to give a reward to the demons who live in the eastern direction when one means to give it to those who live in the western direction. Likewise, if one does not harm the referent object of the innate conception of true existence, refuting an object through reasoning becomes meaningless. Once the referent object of the innate conception of true existence is identified, one should strive to harm it both directly and indirectly. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "For, if you have not identified this, even if you refute an object of negation through reasoning, the adherence to true existence that has operated beginninglessly is not harmed at all; therefore, the meaning at this point would be lost." If the object of negation is not identified well based on one's own experience, one will not be able to refute it through reasoning, i.e., one will not be able to harm the innate conception of true existence. In one of his many songs, Milarepa says: "Logicians are skilled in establishing sound as impermanent, yet continue to hold themselves to be permanent." Likewise, one can be skilled in identifying the referent object of the conception of true existence and in refuting it through reasoning but, at the same time, continue to hold oneself to be truly existent due to the view of the transitory collection of a real I.

If the conception of true existence exists in the continuum of the person, is there pervasion that the person conceives true existence? There is not. We need to differentiate the way that the person conceives true existence and the way an awareness conceives true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> If you know well the identification of this [conception of true existence and true existence itself] by both the Svatantrika-Madhyamika and Prasangika-Madhyamika systems, you will discriminate them well. Hence, the explanation of these has two parts:
>
> 1 Identification of the conception of true existence in the Svatantrika-Madhyamika School
> 2 Identification of the conception of true existence in the Prasangika-Madhyamika School.

3B1C-2B3E-1B1 Identification of the conception of true existence in the Svatantrika school

This section has three parts:

A Identifying true existence and its conception
B Indicating truth and falsity relative to worldly persons through the example of an illusion
C Applying the example to the meaning

3B1C-2B3E-1B1A Identifying true existence and the conception of true existence

Other reliable sourcebooks of the Svatantrika School do not have a clear identification of the object of negation, but the existence that is the opposite of the mode of conventional existence explained in Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way* is to be known as ultimate or true existence, and, therefore, let us explain that. Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way* says:

> The mistaken awareness that superimposes – on things which in reality [or ultimately] are without their own entityness – an aspect opposite to that [absence of ultimate entityness] is called the "concealer" because it obstructs [itself] from [perception of] suchness or because it veils [other awarenesses] from perception of suchness. [*The Descent into Lanka*] *Sutra* also says:

> Things are produced conventionally.
> Ultimately they are without inherent existence.
> That which is mistaken about the lack of inherent existence
> Is asserted as the concealer of reality.
>
> Since [an artificial awareness in the continuum of a Proponent of True Existence] arises from that [conception of true existence], all false things which [such an artificial awareness] sees displayed by that [conception of true existence as if they are truly established] are called "mere conventionalities." Moreover, that [conception of true existence] arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error, whereby all living beings see [phenomena] displayed as if [they had] an [inherently established] nature in reality. Therefore, all entities of false things [which exist] through the power of those [sentient beings' non-defective] thoughts [that is to say, conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses unaffected by the conception of true existence] are said "only to exist conventionally."

"The mistaken awareness that superimposes – on things which in reality [or ultimately] are without their own entityness – an aspect opposite to that" refers to [a consciousness that] mistakes what does not ultimately exist inherently to exist ultimately. "... is called a 'concealer' because it obstructs [itself] from [perception of] suchness or because it veils [other awarenesses] from perception of suchness" is the meaning of "the concealer of reality" [in the citation from the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*]. *Samvrti* [here] is taken as [meaning] "obstructor", concealing reality.

Since [an artificial awareness in the continuum of a Proponent of True Existence] arises from that [conception of true existence], that which sees the display by the conception of true existence as if [objects] are truly established is a conceptual consciousness, not a sense consciousness. For, Jnanagarbha's *[Auto]Commentary on "Distinguishing the Two Truths"* explains that true [existence] – the object of negation – does not appear to sense consciousnesses, and it is the same here [in the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika School.

"Moreover, that [conception of true existence] arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error" indicates that this conception of true existence [from which the artificial conception of true existence arises] is innate. Therefore, [Kamalashila] speaks of "all living beings."

Here, Lama Tsongkhapa says that Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way* alone clearly presents the object of negation, true existence, as it is asserted by the Svatantrika Madhyamika school. However, there is debate concerning the statement "Other reliable sourcebooks of the Svatantrika School do not have a clear identification of the object of negation," because there are other such texts.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says that "the existence that is the opposite of the mode of conventional existence explained in Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way* is to be known as ultimate or true existence." A conventional existent is that which exists through being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective mind, whereas the opposite is an ultimate existent. The measure of true existence, or the object of negation, is: that which is established by way of its own objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. For the Svatantrika Madhyamika school, all phenomena are established to exist through a combination of existing from the object's side and existing from the subject's side. Therefore, in this school if something does not exist from the object's side but is only posited from the side of the subject it is not established as an existent. Phenomena exist only due to being a combination of both. Existing from the object's side is to exist inherently, while existing from the subject's side is to exist by the force of being posited by for the non-defective awareness of a living being. However, for the Prasangika Madhyamika school there is no such combination in that they say that all phenomena are posited from the side of an awareness and do not exist from the side of the object.

The concealer is that which covers or veils from seeing reality (note that the Tibetan word *kun rdzob* is variously translated as concealer, the conventional, and conventionality, in different contexts). Lama Tsongkhapa says: "is called a 'concealer' because it obstructs [itself] from [perception of]

suchness or because it veils [other awarenesses] from perception of suchness." What is that concealer? Is it a conceptual consciousness or a non-conceptual consciousness? In the Svatantrika Madhyamika school conventionalities (*kun rdzob*) are of two types: real conventionalities and unreal conventionalities. How are these distinguished? The definition of a real conventionality is: that which is either a real or unreal conventionality which cannot be realized by a worldly, ordinary being to not be established as it appears to the mind which takes it as its appearing object; for example, forms, space, and so forth. The definition of an unreal conventionality is: that which is either a real or unreal conventionality and is either (1) that which *can* be realized by a worldly, ordinary being to not be established as it appears to the mind which takes it as its appearing object or (2) that which is harmed by a valid cognizer in regard to its existing nominally; for example, the reflection of a face in the mirror, the self of persons, and so forth.

Q: The *Descent into Lanka Sutra* is translated as saying: "That which is mistaken about the lack of inherent existence is asserted as the concealer of reality." Would 'concealer of reality' (*yang dag kun rdzob*) be better translated as 'real conventionality'?
A: Here the subject of the sutra is an *awareness* that conceals or veils. For the Svatantrika Madhyamika school, conventionality is divided into two: real and unreal conventionalities. Simply put, a real conventionality is an object that appears and *is not* realized by an ordinary being to not exist as it appears. An unreal conventionality is an object that appears and *is* realized by an ordinary being to not exist as it appears. An illustration of an unreal conventionality is the reflection of a face in a mirror in that an ordinary being is able to realize that the reflection of the face does not exist as it appears (i.e., that it is not an actual face). A cup is an illustration of a real conventionality because ordinary beings are not able to realize that it does not exist as it appears. This is because, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, the cup appears to exist truly. Ordinary beings are not able to realize that the cup does not exist as it appears. Note that real and unreal conventionalities are not distinguished in terms of permanence but in terms of true existence.

The Descent into Lanka Sutra says: "Things are produced conventionally. Ultimately they are without inherent existence. That which is mistaken about the lack of inherent existence is asserted as the concealer of reality." Therefore, in this context 'concealer of reality' is correct as a translation. An awareness that is mistaken with respect to the lack of true existence is a concealer of reality, that is, it veils reality.

Regarding the first part of the phrase in Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way*, "The mistaken awareness that superimposes – on things which in reality [or ultimately] are without their own entityness – an aspect opposite to that," Lama Tsongkhapa says that this "refers to [a consciousness that] mistakes what does not ultimately exist inherently to exist ultimately."

Regarding the second part of the phrase in Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way* "is called the 'concealer' because it obstructs [itself] from [perception of] suchness or because it veils [other awarenesses] from perception of suchness," Lama Tsongkhapa says that this "is the meaning of 'the concealer of reality.'"

Then in regard to the phrase "Moreover, that [conception of true existence] arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error," Lama Tsongkhapa says that this "indicates that this conception of true existence [from which the artificial conception of true existence arises] is innate."

Wednesday afternoon, 12 April 2000

The conception of true existence is a concealer, or obstructor, to perceiving reality.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "Since [an artificial awareness in the continuum of a Proponent of True Existence] arises from that [conception of true existence], that which sees the display by the conception of true existence as if [objects] are truly established is a conceptual consciousness, not a sense consciousness. For, Jnanagarbha's *[Auto]Commentary on 'Distinguishing the Two Truths'* explains that true [existence] – the object of negation – does not appear to sense consciousnesses, and it is the same here [in the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika School]." That the object of negation, true existence, does not appear to a sense consciousness but does appear to a conceptual consciousness means that a consciousness that conceives phenomena to exist truly is a conceptual consciousness. Why does the object of negation not appear to a sense consciousness? Do forms appear to be established as external objects to a sense consciousness? Is it the case that forms appear to be external objects to a conceptual consciousness and are apprehended to be such, whereas forms appear to be external objects to a sense consciousness but are not apprehended in this way? Think about this.

If true existence were to appear to a sense consciousness, it would follow that the measure of true existence should appear to a sense consciousness, but it does not. Why does the measure of true existence not appear to it? It is because it is not possible for the measure of true existence – that which is established by way of its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of a non-defective awareness – to appear to a sense consciousness. Jnanagarbha's *[Auto]Commentary on "Distinguishing the Two Truths"* sets out true existence as asserted by the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika school. This assertion is similar to that of the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika school. However, the difference between the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika and Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika school is that the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert that forms appear to an eye consciousness to be external objects, but the eye consciousness is not mistaken with respect to that appearance, whereas the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert that forms appear to an eye consciousness as external objects and that the eye consciousness *is* mistaken with respect to that appearance. The Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert such because forms that are external objects are a factor of an object of negation. For them, forms appearing to be external objects is a coarse self of phenomena, whereby they assert that the emptiness of forms existing as external objects is the coarse selflessness of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> The "thoughts" of those living beings are not just conceptual consciousnesses but also refer to non-conceptual consciousnesses. False things which do not exist ultimately but are posited as existing through the force of those two [that is, conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses] exist only conventionally. This is the meaning of the statement in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*, "Things are produced conventionally." Moreover, this does not mean that [such falsities] exist conventionally in the sense of existing for that [sort of invalid] conventional [awareness], which is a consciousness conceiving of true existence. [Rather, they exist for conventional valid consciousnesses.]
> Thus, [in the Svatantrika School] to exist in the manner of an objective mode of subsistence without being posited through appearing to an awareness – or through the force of an awareness – is to exist truly, to exist ultimately, and to exist as [the object's own] reality. Also, conceiving such is an innate conception of true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The 'thoughts' of those living beings are not just conceptual consciousnesses but also refer to non-conceptual consciousnesses." Phenomena that are posited by the force of these two, conceptual consciousnesses and non-conceptual consciousnesses, are conventionalities (*kun rdzob*). An existent posited by the force of these two is a conventional existent. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Moreover, this does not mean that [such falsities] exist conventionally in the sense of existing for that [sort of invalid] conventional [awareness], which is a consciousness conceiving of true existence."

Lama Tsongkhapa then sets out the measure of true existence, ultimate existence, and existence as a reality in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system, saying: "Thus, [in the Svatantrika School] to exist in the manner of an objective mode of subsistence without being posited through appearing to an awareness – or through the force of an awareness – is to exist truly, to exist ultimately, and to exist as [the object's own] reality." This is the referent object of the innate conception of true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> *Objection*: Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way* says:
> That "ultimately there is no production" is to be explained as [meaning] that "the production of these is not established by a consciousness of reality [that is, a reasoning consciousness]."
>
> Implicitly, [Kamalashila] is explaining that [to be] ultimately existent and ultimately produced [means, to be] established by a reasoning consciousness understanding suchness as existent and as produced. [Since, just above, you have explained the meaning of being ultimately existent and ultimately produced differently] how [do you take Kamalashila's explanation]?
>
> *Answer*: That is true. You need to understand that the qualification "ultimately" is affixed in two [senses] to the object of negation:
>
> 1. The reasoning consciousnesses of hearing, thinking, and meditating are taken as the ultimate, [and thus what is established by them is ultimately existent, and] what is not established by them, as [the objector just] mentioned above, [is not ultimately established].
> 2. Being existent in an objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of an awareness is posited as being ultimately existent [and not existing this way is called not being ultimately established].
>
> The first of these two ultimates [that is, a reasoning consciousness of hearing, thinking, or meditating], as well as something that is established in its perspective [namely, emptiness], exists. However, both the latter ultimate [that is, existence in an objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of an awareness] and something that exists that way do not occur.
>
> Therefore, although whatever exists ultimately in the latter sense would [hypothetically] exist ultimately in the former sense, the conception of the former type of existence [that is, of an object established for a reasoning consciousness] is not an innate conception of true existence [since, indeed, emptiness exists this way and even it is not truly established, and since conceiving any other phenomenon to be established for such a reasoning consciousness would be an artificial conception of true existence]. To have such an [innate] conception of true existence, one must conceive of the latter type of existence [that is, of an objective mode of subsistence not posited through the force of the mind].

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the qualification 'ultimately' is affixed in two [senses] to the object of negation." In the first sense, ultimate is a reasoning consciousness of hearing, thinking, and meditating. If a conventionality existed to the perspective of a reasoning consciousness analyzing suchness, it would be ultimately existent, whereby it would be an object of negation, and if the object were not posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness, it would be ultimately existent.

Although there is no conventionality that exists in the perspective of a reasoning consciousness realizing suchness, something does exist for it, this something being emptiness. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The first of these two ultimates [that is, a reasoning consciousness of hearing, thinking, or meditating], as well as something that is established in its perspective [namely, emptiness], exists." Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "However, both the latter ultimate [that is, existence in an objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of an awareness] and something that exists that way do not occur." The second type of ultimate does not exist, this being existence as an objective

mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to an awareness and that which exists that way.

If something exists as the second type of ultimate (existence as an objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness), it should exist in the perspective of a reasoning consciousness realizing suchness. The conception apprehending a conventionality to exist in the perspective of a reasoning consciousness realizing suchness is not an innate conception of true existence; this is because such a reasoning consciousness is of one whose mind has been affected by tenets. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, although whatever exists ultimately in the latter sense would [hypothetically] exist ultimately in the former sense, the conception of the former type of existence [that is, of an object established for a reasoning consciousness] is not an innate conception of true existence."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Not differentiating these [two meanings of "ultimate"], many have held that the measure of the object of negation is something able to bear reasoned analysis or something able to bear analysis. In dependence upon this, many appear to have made the mistake of asserting that ultimate truths are not established bases [that is, do not exist] or that they are truly established. If you understand this well, you will understand the essential points that the statements that "nothing exists as [its own] basic disposition" and that "nothing exists ultimately" do not contradict the assertion that the real nature exists and the proposition that it is the basic disposition [of phenomena] and is the ultimate.

If the two ways of setting forth the object of negation are clearly understood, one will not make a mistake concerning the meaning of ultimate. However, there are many who have held that the measure of true existence, the object of negation, is that which is able to bear analysis or that which is able to bear reasoned analysis. Such mistaken ideas lead them to say that ultimate truths are not established bases. They say that since true existence is able to bear reasoned analysis, it is an object of negation and therefore cannot be an established base. Due to being unclear about the object of negation, some also say that ultimate truth is truly existent because ultimate truth is able to bear reasoned analysis.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "If you understand this well, you will understand the essential points that the *statements* that 'nothing exists as [its own] basic disposition' and that 'nothing exists ultimately' do not contradict the assertion that the real nature exists and the proposition that it is the basic disposition [of phenomena] and is the ultimate." Real nature, or reality (*chos nyid*), exists and is the basic disposition (*gzhi lugs*) and the ultimate. However, 'existing as the basic disposition' and 'existing ultimately' do not exist. However, this does not contradict the assertion that the real nature (reality) exists and is the basic disposition and the ultimate. If phenomena existed as the basic disposition, they would exist by way of their own mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. Likewise, if phenomena existed ultimately, they would exist by way of their own mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. Such modes of existence do not exist, yet reality exists. This real nature, or reality, is the basic disposition and the ultimate.

Q: What does basic disposition (*gzhi lugs*) mean?
A: It means actuality or reality. In the Tibetan colloquial language, this word refers to a person's natural disposition.

When Lama Tsongkhapa says "is the ultimate," it refers to ultimate truth. How is ultimate truth defined? Ultimate truth is defined as: that which is a truth in the perspective of an ultimate, a

superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Conventional truth is defined as: that which is a truth in the perspective of a concealer, the conception of true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-1B1B Indicating truth and falsity relative to worldly persons through the example of illusion
>
> Since using the example of a [magician's] illusion is praised for understanding the status of existence that is posited through the force of an awareness and of existence that is not posited through the force of an awareness, let us explain it. When a magician causes a pebble, twig, or the like to appear as a horse or elephant, there are three [types of persons present]:
>
> 1. the magician
> 2. the audience whose eyes have been affected [by the mantra the magician has cast]
> 3. a person [who comes later and thus] whose eyes have not been affected [by the mantra].
>
> For the first [that is, the magician] there is the mere appearance as a horse or elephant, but he/she does not adhere to such [as being true]. The second [the audience whose eyes have been affected] have both the appearance [as horse or elephant] and adherence to that appearance. The third [a person whose eyes have not been affected] has neither the appearance as a horse or elephant nor adherence to it.
>
> When, for example, a rope is mistaken for a snake, it is said that the rope is a snake in the perspective of that consciousness but in general is not a snake. However, it is not suitable to say that similarly, when a basis of conjuring appears as a horse or elephant, the appearance as a horse or elephant is only in the perspective of a mistaken consciousness but in general the basis of conjuring *does not appear* as a horse or elephant [because it does]. Even though that qualification [that is, "in general"] is not affixed, it must be asserted that the basis of conjuring does appear as a horse or elephant [even though it only appears so for a mistaken consciousness]. For, if this were not the case, mistake regarding appearances would not occur.

There are three types of persons in the context of the example of a magician's illusion:
(1) An ordinary being who has realized emptiness by way of a meaning generality, he being likened to the magician.
(2) An ordinary being who has not realized emptiness and has the appearance of true existence, he being likened to a spectator whose eyes have been affected by the mantras of the magician.
(3) A superior who has realized emptiness directly, he being likened to a person who comes later and whose eyes have therefore not been affected by the mantras.

When a magician creates an illusion, it also appears to him. When he, for example, transforms a pebble into a horse, the horse appears to him but he does not adhere to it as being a real horse. Those who have realized emptiness by means of a meaning generality are likened to the magician in that although they have the appearance of true existence, they do not adhere to it. To those who come later, whose eyes have not been affected by mantra, neither the horse or elephant, nor the basis of conjuring, appears. If the basis of conjuring appears, there is pervasion that the horse and elephant appear. When a pebble becomes a basis of conjuring, the eyes of the spectators have already been tricked. Thus, those who come later do not see the pebble because it has already been affected by the conjuration. If the pebble appears, there is no pervasion that the basis of conjuring appears. This is because if the basis of conjuring appears, then those who come later would see a horse and an elephant. One can debate: "Does there exist the pebble that is a basis of conjuring?" If one says that it does, then one says: "Does it appear to a buddha superior? If it appears to a buddha superior, does it appear as a horse or elephant because the basis of conjuring is appearing to him?" If someone says that the basis of conjuring does not appear to a buddha superior, then one asks: "Is the basis of

conjuring not an established base? Do not all established bases appear to a buddha?" However, debate aside, for the spectators there is the appearance of the basis of conjuring as a horse or elephant, whereas those who come later do not have the appearance of the basis of conjuring. How does the magician affect the mind of the spectators? In order to make that basis appear as a horse or elephant does the magician only affect the eyes of the spectators or does he first affect the substance and only then the eyes? I myself attended a magic show when I was in hospital in India after escaping from Tibet. The magician was able to draw milk from his elbow until it filled a bucket; he then transformed the milk into flowers and scattered it on the audience. I kept one flower and watched it but nothing happened, other than that it wilted like any normal flower!

Thursday morning, 13 April 2000

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport* (vol. I, page 172) says:

> The definition of a conventional truth is: that which is realized in terms of being together with dualistic appearance by the direct valid cognizer directly realizing it. When divided nominally, there are two kinds of conventional truths: (1) real conventionality and (2) unreal conventionality.
> The definition of a real conventionality is: that which is either a real or unreal conventionality, which cannot be realized by a worldly ordinary being to not be established as it appears to the mind that takes it as its appearing object; for example, forms, space, and so forth.
> The definition of an unreal conventionality is: that which is either a real or unreal conventionality and is either (1) that which can be realized by a worldly ordinary being to not be established as it appears to the mind which takes it as its appearing object or (2) that which is harmed by a valid cognizer in regard to its existing nominally; for example, the reflection of a face in the mirror, the self of persons, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Therefore, that the basis of conjuring can be posited as appearing as a horse or elephant is, according to the magician, through the force of appearing that way to a mistaken awareness; it is not posited otherwise through the force of the mode of subsistence of the basis of conjuring itself. As for the audience, the appearance as a horse or elephant does not seem to be posited through the force of an internal awareness; rather, they conceive that there is a fully qualified horse or elephant dwelling on that place where the appearance is, covering that spot.
> In terms of an example, those are how something is conceived to be posited by the force of an awareness and is conceived not to be posited by the force of an awareness. When a basis [that is, an object] appears in a certain way, there are two [types] – those that do and do not correspond with the mode of subsistence as it appears.
> When you understand well this [presentation of how phenomena are posited through the force of the mind according to the Svatantrika School], you will come to differentiate the two positions [of the Svatantrika School and the Proponents of True Existence which some] confuse. They think:
>
> > Objects of comprehension [that is, all objects] are posited through the force of valid cognitions, and since valid cognitions are awarenesses, the positing of objects of comprehension through them is a case of positing [objects] through the force of an awareness. Hence, even the systems of the Proponents of True Existence refute true establishment.
>
> [However,] that objects of comprehension are posited [that is, certified] through the force of valid cognitions means that valid cognitions realize the mode of subsistence of the two [types of] objects of comprehension [specifically and generally characterized objects or impermanent and

> permanent objects or manifest and hidden objects]. Therefore, the two – this [meaning of positing, or certifying, objects of comprehension according to the Proponents of True Existence] and the former [meaning of positing objects through the force of an awareness according to the Svatantrika School] are utterly dissimilar.

The magician understands that the basis of conjuring, a pebble, appears as a horse or elephant by the force of a mistaken awareness. He understands that they do not exist from the side of the basis. For the audience, the existence of horse or elephant is posited from the side of the basis and not in terms of an inner awareness that is mistaken. In other words, the audience thinks that there is a real horse or elephant existing from the side of the basis. This is the way of positing things in terms of an awareness or not in terms of an awareness in relation to this example. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "In terms of an example, those are how something is conceived to be posited by the force of an awareness and is conceived not to be posited by the force of an awareness."

When a basis appears in a certain way it can either correspond or not correspond with the mode of subsistence as it appears. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "When a basis [that is, an object] appears in a certain way, there are two [types] – those that do and do not correspond with the mode of subsistence as it appears." For example, when a horse appears from the side of the basis, the magician understands that the horse exists by the force of appearing to a mistaken awareness and that it does not exist from the side of the basis; this corresponds with its actual mode of subsistence. On the other hand, the audience does not understand that the horse exists by the force of appearing to a mistaken awareness but thinks that the horse exists from the side of the basis; this does not correspond with its actual mode of subsistence.

It follows that the Proponents of True Existence, the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas, refute true existence in that they assert that an object of comprehension is posited by a valid cognizer and that a valid cognizer is an awareness. According to our own system, this is not correct because the mode of positing by a valid cognizer and the mode of positing by an awareness are different. The realist schools accept that an object of comprehension is posited by a valid cognizer and posited by an awareness because in one of their texts it says: "Because there are two objects of comprehension, there are two valid cognizers." This is in relation to the fact that the Sautrantikas posit ultimate truth as that which is ultimately able to perform a function and conventional truth as that which is not ultimately able to perform a function.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "[However,] that objects of comprehension are posited [that is, certified] through the force of valid cognitions means that valid cognitions realize the mode of subsistence of the two [types of] objects of comprehension [specifically and generally characterized objects or impermanent and permanent objects or manifest and hidden objects]."

The definition of a specifically characterized phenomenon is: a phenomenon which is established by way of its own character without being merely imputed by a term or thought consciousness.

The definition of a generally characterized phenomenon is: a phenomenon which is merely imputed by a term or thought consciousness and is not established as a specifically characterized phenomenon.

The definition of a manifest object is: an object explicitly realized by a direct valid cognizer.

The definition of a hidden object is: an object realized in a hidden manner by a thought consciousness apprehending it.

Another definition of manifest object is: an object realized independently by one's own experience without depending on a sign.

Another definition of a hidden phenomenon is: an object realized by depending on a sign.

In conclusion, the mode of positing an object by the force of a valid cognizer is not the same as the mode of positing an object by the force of an awareness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> According to the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika School [which does not assert external objects], the appearance of such an illusion is established [or certified] by a self-knowing direct perception, and according to the Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika School, which asserts external objects, the appearance of such an illusion is established [or certified] by a sense direct perception apprehending the basis – for instance, the area [on which the illusion appears] or intermediate space [in which it appears].
> With respect to its not existing in accordance with how it appears, [that the illusory horse or elephant exist as they appear] is refuted with signs [that is, reasons] such as, "If it did exist that way, it would be seen by those whose eyes are not affected [by the mantra], but they do not see it." At this time, a combination of the two – appearing that way and an emptiness of that – is established, whereby [the illusion] is established as a falsity relative to an ordinary conventional awareness which is not involved in [philosophical] tenets. Hence, the awarenesses that establish [or certify] this [composite of appearance and emptiness] and a reflection's emptiness of what it appears to be are not asserted to be either coarse or subtle reasoning consciousnesses.

According to the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas, illusory appearance is established by a direct self-cognizer. How does a direct self-cognizer realize the illusion that is a horse or elephant? Some say that the appearance of illusory horse or elephant appears to the eye consciousness and that a direct self-cognizer explicitly realizes that eye consciousness, implicitly realizing the appearance. On the other hand, Bhavaviveka says that it is enough for someone who sees the place at which the appearance took place to remember that this was the place where he saw an illusory horse. In other words, the eye consciousness perceives the place where the illusion was seen and the person thinks, "There I saw a horse." According to the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamikas, that appearance of illusory horse is established by a direct sense perceiver apprehending the spot or the intermediate space in which the illusory horse appeared. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the appearance of such an illusion is established [or certified] by a sense direct perception apprehending the basis – for instance, the area [on which the illusion appears] or intermediate space [in which it appears]." In the *Clarification of the Path to Liberation*, a commentary on the *Compendium of Valid Cognition*, it says: "The proponents of reasoning repeatedly say that the objects of apprehension of conception are the objects of comprehension of a direct self-cognizer." An object of apprehension and an appearing object are mutually inclusive for a conception. This is discussed in *Collected Topics*.

If an illusory horse or elephant exists as it appears, it would also be seen by those who come later, whose eyes have not been affected by mantra; however, it is not. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "At this time, a combination of the two – appearing that way and an emptiness of that – is established, whereby [the illusion] is established as a falsity relative to an ordinary conventional awareness which is not involved in [philosophical] tenets." Anything which is a combination of the two, appearing in one way and being empty of existing in that way, is a falsity in the perspective of those whose minds have not affected by tenets. In other words, those whose minds are not affected by tenets can realize it to be false, as appearing and being empty of existing as it appears; for example, the realization that the appearance of a reflection of a face in a mirror is empty of being a face. That reflection is said to be "established as a falsity relative to an ordinary conventional awareness which is not involved in [philosophical] tenets." The awareness realizing the combination of the appearance of the reflection of a face and the emptiness of it being a face, or the combination of the appearance of a horse or elephant and the emptiness of it being a real horse or elephant, is not any of the reasoning consciousnesses. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Hence, the awarenesses that establish [or certify] this [composite of appearance and emptiness] and a reflection's emptiness of what it appears to be are not asserted to be either coarse or subtle reasoning consciousnesses." Although one could understand this to mean that such an awareness cannot be a coarse or subtle reasoning consciousness, it actually means that they cannot be a coarse or subtle consciousness realizing selflessness.

Q: In the context of reasoning consciousness (*rigs shes*) what is the meaning of the Tibetan word *rigs* translated here as 'reasoning'?
A: The word *rigs* can also mean sign or type. In general, a *rigs shes* is a consciousness thinking about the meaning of selflessness. When the term *rigs shes* is translated as 'reasoning consciousness,' it gives the false impression that it is a consciousness generated in dependence on reasoning. If that were the case one could debate whether an inferential valid cognizer is pervaded by being a reasoning consciousness. One can ask: "Is the inferential valid cognizer understanding that there is fire on the other side of a hill by the presence of smoke a reasoning consciousness?" In short, according to my understanding of English, translating the term *rigs shes* as reasoning consciousness is perhaps not completely accurate in that it does not bear debate. One meaning of *rigs* is reason or sign, another is type or kind. In this context is should be understood as type, a consciousness which is a type. What type is it? In this case it is one that does not realize selflessness. There are two types of objects, the conventional and ultimate. Here in this context it is not a consciousness realizing the ultimate. In conclusion, it is not a consciousness realizing either of the two objects, coarse or subtle selflessness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Even with respect to what is truly established in terms of a conventional ordinary awareness, if [an object] appears as something, it could not be empty of that, and also if it is empty of something, it could not appear that way. Hence, if a combination of those two [that is, appearing one way and existing another] occurs, it is only a falsity in terms of an ordinary awareness.

Is there a difference between an ordinary awareness and an ordinary awareness of a worldly being? There is in that an ordinary awareness is an awareness not realizing emptiness, whereas an ordinary awareness of a worldly being is a mind that has not been affected by tenets.

When something appears to a conventional ordinary awareness to be truly established, that conventional awareness is not able to realize it as being empty of that. On the other hand, when there is the appearance of that object as empty, there is no appearance of that object as being truly established. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Hence, if a combination of those two [that is, appearing one way and existing another] occurs, it is only a falsity in terms of an ordinary awareness." What is a falsity? Something is a falsity when the way in which it appears and the way in which it exists do not correspond. On the other hand, something is a truth when the way in which it appears and the way in which it exists correspond. In short, conventional truths are falsities, and ultimate truths are truths. This is the conclusion of this passage.

Whether the way of appearing and the way of existing of a phenomenon correspond or do not correspond is mainly in terms of the mind to which it appears. To which main mind does an ultimate truth appear? That mind is a mind directly realizing emptiness or a superior's mind of meditative equipoise on emptiness. In the perspective of a mind directly realizing emptiness, ultimate truth or emptiness exists as it appears, i.e., the way in which it appears and the way in which is exists correspond. A superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is unmistaken.

A mind realizing conventional truth is posited in different ways. For example, in regard to a mind that takes a table as its object, what is posited as the main mind perceiving table? Is the main mind the eye consciousness perceiving table or the conception apprehending table?
Student: It is the eye consciousness.
Geshe-la: The table does not exist as it appears in the perspective of the eye consciousness. This is the position of the Prasangika Madhyamikas, who say that when the table appears to the eye consciousness, it appears to exist from its own side, so the eye consciousness is mistaken with respect to the appearance. The Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that when the table appears to the eye consciousness it appears to be an external object, therefore the eye consciousness is mistaken with

respect to this appearance because the table does not exist as an external object. In both cases, the table does not exist as it appears to the main mind, the eye consciousness. If it is said that the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that the eye consciousness is not mistaken with respect to the table, which appears to exist from its own side, what is the consequence?

The discussion here regards falsity and truth. In each school, falsity and truth are defined differently. The Madhyamika schools in general say that an ultimate truth is a truth and a conventional truth is a falsity. A table, for example, which is a conventional truth, is said to be a truth in the perspective of a concealer, the conception of true existence. However, it is only a truth in that perspective; it is not a truth in general. Although the table appears to be a truth for that concealer it is not actually a truth.

Thursday afternoon, 13 April 2000

In both *General Meaning* by Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen and the *Great Commentary* by Lama Tsongkhapa, the measure of true existence in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system is abbreviated. In Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan, page 126), the measure of the object of negation is given as (Klein, *Path to the Middle*):

> [That which] exists in an objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of an awareness is posited as ultimately existent.

In the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* true existence is defined as: that which is established by its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. In *General Meaning* (page 204) it says:

> An object established by way of its own objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to an awareness is the object of negation in analyzing for the ultimate. This is the explanation of Lama Tsongkhapa and his son. It is the final thought of the Svatantrika Madhyamika texts: "Just as it appears the conventional is only that, the other is the contrary."

This means that which is posited by the force of appearing to the mind alone is the conventional, the other is the ultimate. This quotation is taken from the *Two Truths of the Middle Way* by Jnanagarbha.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-1B1C Applying the example to the meaning
>
> When external and internal phenomena appear as truly existent, sentient beings, like the audience of magic whose eyes are affected [by the mantra cast by the magician], conceive that a mode of subsistence of those phenomena that is not posited by the force of an awareness exists. This conception is the innate conception of true existence, which has operated beginninglessly.
> What the Svatantrikas posit this way is very coarse relative to the Prasangikas' apprehension of the object of negation; hence, it is not the innate subtle conception of true existence [according to the Prasangikas].
> When the true existence apprehended by the conception of true existence is refuted through reasoning, one – like the magician – does not conceive of external and internal phenomena as having a mode of subsistence that is not posited through the force of an internal awareness; rather, one understands [phenomena] as mere existents posited through the force of an awareness. Moreover, those [phenomena] posited through the force an awareness not damaged by valid

> cognition are asserted as conventionally existent; however, everything posited through the force of an awareness is not asserted as existing conventionally.
> Although the production of a sprout from a seed is posited through the force of an awareness, it is not contradictory that the sprout also is produced from the seed from its own side. This is like the fact that there is an appearance as a horse or elephant even from the side of the basis of conjuring [that is, a pebble or twig]. Through that, all conventionally existent phenomena are to be understood.
> Even reality is posited as existing through the force of the awareness to which it appears. Hence, it is not an exception to being posited as conventionally existent.
> Therefore, the significance of applying the example – a magician's illusion – to the meaning – other phenomena – is not at all that just as a magician's illusion appears to be a horse or elephant but is empty of being such, so all phenomena such as pots appear to be pots, and so forth, but are empty of being pots, and so forth. For, if that were the case, being that phenomenon [for example, being a pot] would not occur, and the application of the example to the meaning would be that [phenomena] appear to be such-and-such but are not the actual thing.
> When the non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is generated, in its perspective all dualistic appearances are extinguished. This is like one whose eyes, not having been affected [by the magician's mantra], have neither the illusory appearance nor adherence to it.

Here, the example is connected to the meaning. The first example is the audience whose eyes have been affected by mantra. They have the appearance of horse or elephant and adhere to that appearance as true. The meaning of this example is that ordinary sentient beings have the appearance of phenomena as truly existent and adhere to phenomena as existing by their own uncommon mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. This is the innate conception of true existence, which has been present in sentient beings since beginningless time. This is the way in which the Svatantrika Madhyamikas posit the measure of true existence. Such an object of negation is coarse compared to that posited by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. In other words, the conception of true existence that is explained here is not the subtle conception of true existence explained by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

The meaning of the example of a magician is that ordinary beings who negate the referent object of the conception of true existence – who are likened to a magician – have the appearance of phenomena being truly existent but do not adhere to it.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "When the non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is generated, in its perspective all dualistic appearances are extinguished." To a non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise there is no appearance of true existence and there is no adherence to it; this is likened to the spectators whose eyes have not been affected by the magician's mantra [in that the illusory horse or elephant do not appear to them and there is no adherence to this].

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Moreover, those [phenomena] posited through the force an awareness not damaged by valid cognition are asserted as conventionally existent; however, everything posited through the force of an awareness is not asserted as existing conventionally." What could one posit as that which is posited through the force of an awareness but does not exist conventionally? One can posit the horns of rabbit. Are they posited by the force of an awareness?

Student: They are.

Geshe-la: How?

Student: They appear to a conception and are apprehended but are harmed by a valid cognizer and are therefore not conventionally existent.

Geshe-la: Is true existence posited by the force of an awareness?

Student: It is.

Geshe-la: If it is selfless is it pervaded by being posited by the force of an awareness? One would have to say that it is. There was once a debate in which the challenger asked: "If it is selfless is it pervaded by being perceived by conception?" To this, the respondent replied that it is. Then the challenger asked: "Is there a conception that a huge yak is entering your mouth?" The respondent replied, "There

is;" the challenger then asked: "Who has this conception,?" to which the respondent replied: "You do, since you asked the question!"

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Although the production of a sprout from a seed is posited through the force of an awareness, it is not contradictory that the sprout also is produced from the seed from its own side." This is an assertion of the Prasangika Madhyamikas. Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "This is like the fact that there is an appearance as a horse or elephant even from the side of the basis of conjuring [that is, a pebble or twig]. Through that, all conventionally existent phenomena are to be understood." This last phrase is the cause of a lot of debate. There are two terms in this context, *conventionally existent* and *nominally existent*. In this context, the Tibetan term *tha snyad du yod pa* has been translated as 'conventionally existent,' but could have been translated as 'nominally existent.' Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Even reality is posited as existing through the force of the awareness to which it appears. Hence, it is not an exception to being posited as conventionally existent."
Student: But do all phenomena not exist conventionally?
Geshe-la: Even ultimate truth, emptiness, exists conventionally, but it is not a conventional truth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> There is no indication later [in Chandrakirti's text] of the Svatantrikas' uncommon mode of refutation [of true existence] by reasoning; therefore, let us express briefly and [in words] easy to understand how in this system all phenomena are caused to appear as like illusions.
> Objects of knowledge are inclusively divided into the two: [functioning] things and non[functioning] things [or impermanent and permanent phenomena]. Let us explain [emptiness] with respect to [functioning] things first. [Functioning] things are inclusively divided into the physical and nonphysical. Applying the refutation, as explained elsewhere, of physical things that are directionally partless – eastern direction, and so forth – and of consciousnesses that are temporally partless, [the Svatantrikas] prove that [functioning] things necessarily have parts. Then, if parts and whole were different entities, they would be unrelated; thereby [such] is refuted, and [parts and whole] are shown to be one entity.
> At that time, no matter how the mind looks into it, it is undeniable that, although the mode of being [of parts and whole] is to be one entity, in their mode of appearance [to thought] they appear to be different entities. Thereby, it is settled that [functioning things] are, like a magician's illusions, a combination of the two – appearing one way and being empty of [existing] that way.
> Then, although such is not contradictory in the context of the mode of subsistence of a falsity posited through the force of appearing to an awareness, if a certain base [that is, a certain phenomenon] had a mode of subsistence not posited through the force of appearing to an awareness, [such a combination of appearance and emptiness] would not at all be suitable because discordant modes of abiding and of appearance cannot occur in what is truly established such as was explained earlier. For, if something is truly established, it must abide in a manner devoid of falsity in all respects, and [since appearance and being would necessarily be concordant] the awareness to which [parts and whole] appear as different entities would have to be unmistaken, thereby damaging their being one entity.
> Once this is established, in dependence on that reasoning it can be refuted that non[functioning] things are truly established. For, even with respect to uncompounded space, it must be asserted that it pervades certain physical objects, and it must be further asserted that it has a part pervading the east and parts pervading the other directions.

Although there is no further presentation by Chandrakirti of the way of refuting the object of negation according to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system, Lama Tsongkhapa presents it here. What reasonings are there for refuting the object of negation in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system? There are different types of reasonings presented in various texts such as in the *Two Truths of the Middle Way*, *Illumination of the Middle Way*, and *Ornament for the Middle Way*. The five main reasonings were already discussed in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. The first of these is the reasoning of being free from

one and many, which analyzes the entity of phenomena. This reasoning is extensively explained in the *Ornament for the Middle Way* by Shantarakshita. This reasoning can be summarized in a syllogism: things as propounded by the non-Buddhist schools and our own lower schools, as the subject; they do not exist truly because they are free from being a truly existent one and free from being a truly existent many; for example, like the reflection of a face in a mirror. 'Things' are objects of knowledge. Objects of knowledge can be inclusively divided into two: functioning things and non-functioning things (or things and non-things). The definition of a functioning thing as given in *Collected Topics* is: that which is able to perform a function. The definition of a non-functioning thing is: that which is empty of being able to perform a function. A non-functioning thing is not pervaded by being permanent; for example, the horns of a rabbit or the tail of a human being. Functioning things are inclusively divided into: physical functioning things and non-physical functioning things. Physical functioning things are pervaded by having parts, such as an eastern part. Since all physical things have parts, they are pervaded by not being a truly existent one. Since they have parts, they exist in dependence on parts whereby they cannot be an independent one. This is asserted because if things were a truly existent one they should be an independent one.

Physical things are pervaded by having parts because they are composed of atoms. On the basis of an atom there is an upper direction, a lower direction, an eastern direction, and so forth. If it is a physical thing it has parts; if it has parts it depends on parts; if it depends on parts it is a dependent-arising; if it is a dependent-arising it is not a truly existent one; and if it is not a truly existent one it cannot be a truly existent many. If a physical thing is not a truly existent one or a truly existent many, it cannot be truly existent.

Consciousnesses that are temporally partless are asserted by the Vaibhashikas; these too are refuted by the Svatantrika Madhyamikas. In short, functioning thing is pervaded by having parts. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Then, if parts and whole were different entities, they would be unrelated; thereby [such] is refuted, and [parts and whole] are shown to be one entity." That parts and whole are different entities is negated, whereby parts and whole are established to be one entity, although they are two different isolates. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "No matter how the mind looks into it, it is undeniable that, although the mode of being [of parts and whole] is to be one entity, in their mode of appearance [to thought] they appear to be different entities." Parts and whole have the mode of being of being one entity, but they appear to thought as being different entities. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Thereby, it is settled that [functioning things] are, like a magician's illusions, a combination of the two – appearing one way and being empty of [existing] that way." For example, a cup is a whole which has parts, such as a rim, a handle, sides, and so forth. When the cup is seen, the parts, such as the rim, handle, and so forth, appear separately. These parts are all one entity with the cup. Note that it cannot be said that the parts of the cup are one entity, but rather that they are one entity with the cup. Likewise, one can discuss the eastern direction of the cup, as well as its western, northern, and southern directions, these being different. If someone touches the eastern part of the cup is he also touching the parts of the other three directions? He is not. If while someone is touching the eastern part he is simultaneously touching the other three parts, they would be one, but they are not. These parts are not one but are many, there being an eastern part and so forth.

END

Tuesday morning, 18 April 2000

(Masters Program Correspondence Course participants please note that there were no teachings 17 and 21 April 2000)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Likewise, reality [or emptiness] also has many parts pervading [phenomena], as well as many different parts realized by different earlier and later awarenesses. Also, other uncompounded [phenomena] are similar. Therefore, since the two, the many parts and the whole – are not fit to be different entities, they are one entity. Also, that [same discrepancy between modes of being and of appearance] is suitable in a falsity but not suitable in what is truly established. Hence, [the true establishment of uncompounded phenomena] is refuted as before [with compounded phenomena], whereby all objects of knowledge are established to be without true existence. Since this treatment is the assertion of the father Shantarakshita and his spiritual son Kamalashila, reckoning part and whole only for [functioning] things is a flaw of those with small intelligence.

Parts and whole also apply to the non-physical such as space and reality. Reality also has parts in the sense of the reality realized by a former moment of awareness and the reality realized by a later moment of awareness. In this way parts also exist on the basis of uncompounded phenomena, such as a part realized by a first moment of awareness but not realized by a later moment of awareness. Therefore since it is unsuitable to assert parts and whole to be different entities, they are one entity. Possessing parts applies to those phenomena that are falsities but not to those that are truly existent. Since true existence does not exist at all it does not have a part realized by a former moment of awareness but not realized by a later moment of awareness.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Hence, [the true establishment of uncompounded phenomena] is refuted as before [with compounded phenomena], whereby all objects of knowledge are established to be without true existence." The analysis set out forth here is an assertion of the father Shantarakshita and his spiritual son Kamalashila. Shantarakshita in his *Ornament for the Middle Way* and his commentary extensively sets forth the reasoning of freedom from one and many. This is further discussed by Kamalashila in his *Illumination of the Middle Way*. Earlier it was said that other than the *Illumination of the Middle Way* no text clearly identifies the object of negation in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says that if someone thinks that the discussion of parts and whole is only relative to functioning things that person is of little intelligence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> The falsity renowned among those whose minds have not been affected by tenets is not the same in meaning as the falsity asserted by the Madhyamika School. Although [a falsity such as a magician's illusion, which is renowned as false among those whose minds have not been affected by tenets], is posited by an awareness, [the status of being posited by an awareness] is in accordance with how that is renowned to those [whose minds have not been affected by tenets]. In the [Svatantrikas'] own system it is not merely that status which is asserted as [the meaning of being] posited by an awareness.

There is a falsity renowned to worldly beings whose minds have not been affected by tenets but it is different from the falsity asserted by those whose minds have been affected by tenets. Examples of falsities renowned to worldly beings whose minds have not been affected by tenets are the reflection of a face in a mirror and the reflection of the moon in water, in that in order to understand that these

are false one does not need to have studied tenets. In the Svatantrika Madhyamika system such mere falsities are not asserted as [the meaning of] being posited by an awareness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Thus, even though there is no mode of subsistence not posited by the force of appearing to an awareness, in this system it is not contradictory for there to be a mode of subsistence posited by the force of that but which is not merely nominally imputed. Hence, the objects of negation in the two Middle Way Schools come to differ greatly for the mind.

There is no mode of subsistence that is not posited by the force of appearing to an awareness. However, there is a great difference between the object of negation in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system and that in the Prasangika Madhyamika system.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Having seen that contemporary persons – who have been briefly instructed well in [the Svatantrikas'] identification of true [existence] and [their estimation of] the conception of true existence, as well as [their] reasonings refuting those – discern the Prasangikas' view well when, afterwards, that system is taught, [I] have explained it here.

One should teach someone the identification of the true existence and the conception of true existence according to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system, before teaching him these according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 206-8) discusses this saying:

> In dependence on this passage from *Illumination of the Middle Way* many assertions arise regarding the measure of the object of negation being to bear reasoned analysis and the things that bear analysis. Some, such as the Great Translator, through holding that even ultimate truth does not exist in the perspective of a reasoning consciousness analyzing suchness, say that ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge. Some, such as Jampa Chogyi Sengge, through holding that ultimate truth does exist in the perspective of a reasoning consciousness analyzing suchness, assert the ultimate to be truly existent. However, they are incorrect.

Both the assertion that the ultimate is not an object of knowledge and the assertion that the ultimate is truly existent are incorrect. The refutation of these assertions is discussed extensively in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment* in the sections on refuting an object of negation that is overly broad and refuting an object of negation that is too narrow. An object of negation that is overly broad is one that it is so extensive that ultimate truth becomes an object of negation which is not an object of knowledge. On the other hand, if the object of negation is too narrow it follows that things have the three attributes of inherent existence.

The Svatantrika Madhyamika system has two subdivisions:
1. the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika system and
2. the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika system.

The reasoning proving that phenomena are free from being a truly existent one and a truly existent many belongs to the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika system. Within this system there are said to be two sets of fathers and sons:

(1) the father Shantarakshita and the son Kamalashila and
(2) the father Arya Vimuktisena and the son Haribhadra.
However, Haribhadra was also a disciple and therefore a son of Shantarakshita. In general it is said that Shantarakshita had two main disciples, Kamalashila and Haribhadra. In fact the texts say that Haribhadra devoted himself to the great abbot Vairochana, also called Shantarakshita, for a period of thirteen or seventeen years. For this reason, Haribhadra also refutes the object of negation using the reasoning of freedom from being one and many in his commentary on the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*, called the *Commentary Clarifying the Meaning*,, which says:

> Also followers of Dharma generate extremely clear faith by means of the valid cognition of [reasonings] such as "because of being free of an entitiness of one or many;" not seeing defects in the mother characterized in the meaning of the stanzas, thoroughly understanding the non-generation of bases, paths, and aspects; the entity of the exalted knower of all, the perfection of wisdom which possesses the three modes; definitely apprehending that "the three exalted knower-mothers without doubt give birth to the buddhas" and so forth."

On the other hand, Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way* presents the reasoning refuting production of an existent and non-existent which is for analyzing results. He says that products do not exist ultimately: existents are not ultimately produced and non-existents are like a flower in the sky. This when summarized means that a result is not produced as an existent at the time of the cause and a result is produced without existing at the time of the cause but not ultimately.

The reasoning refuting production from the four alternatives, which is for analyzing causes and results, is explained in the *Two Truths of the Middle Way* by Jnanagarbha. This reasoning says that a single cause does not produce a single result, a single cause does not produce many results, a single result does not arise from a single cause, and many results do not arise from a single cause. This reasoning belongs to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system.

The reasoning of diamond slivers, which is for analyzing causes, is set forth by Nagarjuna in *Fundamental Wisdom*. Nagarjuna's pays homage at the beginning of the his text: (Garfield, *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way*) saying:

> I prostrate to the perfect buddha
> The best of teachers, who taught that
> Whatever is dependently arisen is
> Unceasing, unborn,
> Unannihilated, not permanent,
> Not coming, not going,
> Without distinction, without identity,
> And free from conceptual construction.

This is followed by a verse that sets forth the diamond slivers reasoning:

> Not from self, not from other,
> Not from both, not causelessly;
> Production of any thing anywhere
> Does not exist ever.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

3B1C-2B3E-1B2 Identification of the conception of true existence in the Prasangika-Madhyamika school

With respect to this, if you understand how in this system phenomena are assigned as merely posited through the force of conceptuality, you will easily understand the conception of true existence that conceives the opposite of this. Therefore, the presentation of the identification of the conception of true existence in the Prasangika School has two parts:

A How phenomena are posited through the force of conceptuality
B The conception of true existence that conceives the opposite of this

3B1C-2B3E-1B2A How phenomena are posited through the force of conceptuality

The *Questions of Upali Sutra* says that phenomena are posited through the force of conceptuality:

Here the various mind-pleasing blossoming flowers
And attractive, shining, supreme golden houses
Have no [inherently existent] maker at all.
They are posited through the power of conceptuality.
Through the power of conceptuality the world is imputed.

There are also many other statements that all phenomena are merely imputed by conceptuality or that they are posited through the force of conceptuality.

The *Questions of Upali Sutra* says that the mansions, groves, and so forth of the gods have no maker at all, they are only posited through the force of conceptuality. In other words, they are merely imputed by conception; not even a single atom of them exists from its own side. Thus, beginning with the phenomena of the god realms and progressing down through the phenomena of the human realm to those of the hell realms, all of them are merely imputed by conception and do not exist from their own side. Therefore, in the Prasangika Madhyamika system the object of negation is that which exists from its own side without being merely imputed by conception. In general the Svatantrika Madhyamika system asserts that all phenomena are merely imputed by conception, however the way in which they are imputed differs from the way in which they are imputed according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system. For example, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system all phenomena are merely imputed by conception but they are not merely imputed over there by conception, whereas in the Prasangika Madhyamika system all phenomena are merely imputed over there by conception. Although some scholars say that the Svatantrika Madhyamika system does not assert that phenomena are merely imputed by conception this is not correct.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

Furthermore, Nagarjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:

The perfect buddha stated that the world
Has the condition of ignorance.
Therefore, how could it not be feasible
That this world is [imputed by] conceptuality?

The meaning of this statement is explained in Chandrakirti's commentary as being that the worlds [that is, beings and environments] are imputed by conceptuality, not established by way of their own entities.

Nagarjuna says that "the world has the condition of ignorance," meaning that the world arises from ignorance. "The world" is of two types: the sentient beings who are the inhabitants and the external environment. Both of these arise through the condition of beginningless ignorance because due to the ignorance of not knowing actions are created which bring the results of sentient beings and the environment. Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* (v. 4.1) says: "The various worlds are produced

from actions." The world does not exist by way of its own entity but arises through conceptuality. When the world is taught to be merely imputed by conceptuality it indicates conventionalities, the opposite of that indicates the object of negation. How could it not be feasible that the world be merely imputed by conceptuality? Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The meaning of this statement is explained in Chandrakirti's commentary as being that the worlds [that is, beings and environments] are imputed by conceptuality, not established by way of their own entities."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Also, Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* says:
>
> Since desire, and so forth,
> Do not exist without conceptuality,
> Who with intelligence would hold
> That these are real objects and are [also] conceptual? [VIII.3]
>
> Also, Chandrakirti's *Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred"* says:
>
> Those that exist only when conceptuality exists and do not exist when conceptuality does not exist are undoubtedly ascertained as not established by way of their own entity, like a snake imputed to a coiled rope.
>
> "Real objects" are those established by way of their own entity. "Conceptual" [means] "produced in dependence upon that [conceptuality]."

Something exists due to being imputed by conceptuality. If they were no imputing conceptions there would not be any existents, phenomena would be like a snake imputed to a coiled rope. The imputation of snake to a coiled rope is made by a mistaken conception, yet causes the person to be frightened. The analogy of a snake imputed to a coiled rope is set out by the Prasangika Madhyamika system in order to prove that phenomena are merely imputed by conceptuality and do not exist from their own side. This is because there is nothing about the rope which is a snake. This analogy of a snake imputed to a coiled rope is said to be better than the illustration of a magic show. Seven analogies, like illusions and so forth, were set out previously, but they do not include the analogy of the coiled rope.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> The statement in the commentary that *desire, and so forth* are [imputed] like the imputation of a snake to a rope is just an illustration; all other phenomena are also explained to be posited by conceptuality like the imputation of a snake to a rope.
> [The rope's] speckled color and mode of coiling are similar to those of a snake, and when the rope is perceived in a dim area, the thought arises, "This is a snake." As for the rope, at that time [when it is imputed to be a snake], the collection and parts of the rope are not even in the slightest way positable as an illustration of a snake [that is, as a snake]. Therefore, that snake is merely imputed by conceptuality.

The conception of a snake arises due to the presence of a coiled rope in a dim area but there is not even the slightest atom of the rope which exists as a snake.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> In the same way, when the thought, "I," arises in dependence upon the [mental and physical] aggregates, nothing in terms of the aggregates – neither the collection which is the continuum of the earlier and later [moments], nor the collection [of the parts] at one time, nor the parts of those

> [mental and physical aggregates] – is even in the slightest way positable as an illustration of that I [that is, as I]. This will be explained at length below.

Likewise, when the thought "I" arises, it is only imputed in dependence on the aggregates, there is no part of the aggregates nor the whole that is exists as I. For this reason, when the I is sought on the base of imputation it cannot be found. On the other hand, if it were the case that the I is found within the base of imputation it would be a truly existent I or an inherently existent I. Such an I is never found. This assertion is uncommon to the Prasangika Madhyamika system, the other schools say that if a phenomena is not found within the base of imputation when sought it is non-existent. Thus, all the lowers schools say that the imputed object is found by thorough analysis. This is the main difference between the assertions of the Prasangika Madhyamika system and the remaining schools. If it is asked "Is there a thought thinking 'I'?" there is because there is an I. Then it can be asked: "How does this I exist? Which parts of the aggregates are the I?" The lower schools say that if when one searches within the basis of the five aggregates the I is not found how can the I be imputed to the five aggregates? Can it be imputed to the feeling aggregate? The discrimination aggregate? The consciousness aggregate? Is the person not imputed on the basis of one of the five aggregates? Why can a table not be taken as a basis for imputing I? What would the problem be? The lower schools ask how it is feasible to impute the I on the aggregates but not on the table? The Prasangika Madhyamika system says that the I cannot be imputed on the table because the table is not conjoined with consciousness. The lower schools say that that it follows that that which is conjoined with consciousness is a suitable basis for imputing I, therefore, it follows that the eye organ is a basis for imputing the I. This is how the lower schools refute the Prasangika Madhyamikas assertions regarding the I. The lower schools say that the Prasangika Madhyamikas are wrong in saying that something does not exist objectively but exists merely through being imputed. The Prasangika Madhyamikas maintain that their assertion that although phenomena are only merely imputed they can still perform various functions. However, the Chittamatrins say that the Prasangika Madhyamikas have fallen to the extreme of annihilation, while the Vaibhashikas have fallen to the extreme of permanence. Thus, each school considers its tenets to be the best.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Because of this and because there is not even the slightest something that is an entity different from the parts of the aggregates or the whole and that is apprehendable as an illustration of that [I], the I is merely posited by conceptuality in dependence upon the aggregates; it is not established by way of its own entity. This is also said in Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland*:
>
> A being is not earth, water,
> Fire, wind, nor space,
> Not consciousness and not all of them;
> What being is there other than these? [80]
>
> In that, a "being" is a person, sentient being, I, and self. "...not earth, water, fire, wind, nor space, not consciousness" refutes positing the parts – which are the six constituents of a sentient being – as a person, and "...not all of them" refutes positing the collection of the constituents as a person. "What person is there other than these?" refutes positing something that is a different entity from the constituents as a person.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the I is imputed to the aggregates in dependence on the aggregates; the aggregates themselves do not claim to be an I. In the case of the I imputed by conceptuality, the conception is a valid cognizer. It can be asked: "Is it a conception that is concordant with reality or is it merely a valid cognizer?"

A being is composed of six constituents or elements: earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness. It can be asked: "Is the earth constituent the person? Is the water constituent the person?" and so forth. In conclusion, none of the six constituents are the person. This is what is set forth by Nagarjuna in his *Precious Garland*. which says that none of the individual constituents nor the collection of the constituents is the person and then asks: "What being is there other than these?" The response to this, comes in the subsequent lines which say that the being is imputed upon the aggregation of the six constituents (A. Klein, *Path to the Middle*):

> Just as the person is not [established as its own reality]
> Because of being [only imputed in dependence upon]
> an aggregation of the six constituents,
> So each of the constituents also
> Is not [established as its own] reality because of being
> [imputed in dependence upon] an aggregation. [81]

In brief, the person, the being, and the I are imputed on a composite of the six constituents.

Lama Tsongkhapa sets out various synonyms saying: "a 'being' is a person, sentient being, I, and self." Is there a difference between these? The person is defined in *Awarenesses and Knowers* as: the I which is merely imputed in dependence on any of the five aggregates. "On any" is mentioned in order to include the beings in the formless realm who do not have a form aggregate. The etymology of the word "being" is: one possessing potential or energy. This is because in Sanskrit the word for a being is *parusha* which means "possessing potential."

Tuesday afternoon, 18 April 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa says that the being is a person, sentient being, I, and self. If it is a person is it pervaded by being a sentient being? If someone says that there is pervasion, one asks: "Are buddha superiors sentient beings?" If they were then there would be no distinction between buddha and sentient being. However, sentience, literally possessing a mind (*sems can*), is not enough to qualify someone as a sentient being. Therefore, one possessing a mind is not pervaded by being a sentient being; for example, a buddha.

The etymology of the Tibetan word *gang zag*,, usually translated as 'person,' literally means "full" and "fall," indicating that due to the consciousness being filled with afflictions one falls into the mire of cyclic existence.

Q: Why is a buddha superior a person (*gang zag*)?
A: Because he is an I that is merely imputed on any of his aggregates. A buddha superior is a person but is not a sentient being.

What is a sentient being? A sentient being is a person possessing a mind that is together with stains.

The being is also I (*nga*) and self (*bdag*), which are the same. In *Awarenesses and Knowers* it says that the I, self, person, and being are mutually inclusive. The terms 'I' and 'self' indicate a particular individual, it excludes others. Generally speaking we are concerned about the I and neglect others.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "'... not earth, water, fire, wind, nor space, not consciousness' refutes positing the parts – which are the six constituents of a sentient being – as a person, and '...not all of them' refutes positing the collection of the constituents as a person." The individual constituents are not the person, nor is the collection of the constituents the person. In other words, the person is not any one of the six constituents, nor is it the group of six constituents.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "'What person is there other than these?' refutes positing something that is a different entity from the constituents as a person." This last line of Nagarjuna's verse from *Precious Garland* refutes the person being a different entity from the six constituents. Thus, the being is one entity with the six constituents.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Nevertheless, it is not that persons are not asserted [to exist]. Also, a mind-basis-of-all, and so forth, are not asserted to be persons. Therefore, in accordance with the commentary by the commentator [Chandrakirti], superiors are also asserted.

(Note: The phrase "By the commentator [Chandrakirti], superiors are also asserted" could perhaps be translated as "Just as the commentator [Chandrakirti] commented so too does the superior [Nagarjuna] assert.")

It is not that in the Prasangika Madhyamika system persons are not asserted; however, they do not assert a mind-basis-of-all to be the person.

The Svatantrika Madhyamika system posits the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness, as the illustration of the person. The mental consciousness is defined as: a consciousness that is the basis for depositing the latencies of virtue and non-virtue. Not all sixth consciousnesses, i.e., all mental consciousnesses, are the illustration of the person. In other words, if it is a sixth consciousness, a mental consciousness, it is not pervaded by being the illustrative mental consciousness which is the person.

According to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness, is self sufficient substantially existent. However, although the illustrative mental consciousness is self sufficient substantially existent, the person is not self sufficient substantially existent. This will be discussed later on. Acharya Bhavaviveka in his *Blaze of Reasoning* says: "I am not harmed in accepting..."

The Chittamatrins posit the mind-basis-of-all, the seventh consciousness, as the illustration of the person. The mind-basis-of-all is defined as: an unspecified mental consciousness which is the basis for depositing the latencies of virtue and non-virtue. The mind-basis-of-all is a different entity from the collection of the six consciousnesses.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> When the mode of positing persons through conceptuality is understood in this way, the mode of positing all other phenomena through conceptuality is also similar to that. The *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra* says:
>
> Just as you have known the discrimination of self,
> Apply this mentally to all [phenomena].

Through understanding that a person is merely imputed, one will understand that all phenomena are also merely imputed. Likewise, through understanding the selflessness of persons, one will understand the selflessness of phenomena. Therefore, having understood that the person does not exist truly or inherently, one can apply this understanding to other phenomena, such as the aggregates, without the need to apply other reasonings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Also, the *Superior Sutra of the Condensed Perfection of Wisdom* says:

> Understand all sentient beings as like the self,
> Understand all phenomena as like all sentient beings.

Understanding that the self does not exist truly, one will understand that other sentient beings do not exist truly. Then understanding that sentient beings do not exist truly, one will also understand that all phenomena do not exist truly.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Also, Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* clearly says:
>
> Just as the person is not [established as its own reality]
> Because of being [only imputed in dependence upon]
> an aggregation of the six constituents,
> So each of the constituents also
> Is not [established as its own] reality because of being
> [imputed in dependence upon] an aggregation. [81]

This is the stanza that follows the verse that was quoted earlier:

> A being is not earth, water,
> Fire, wind, nor space,
> Not consciousness and not all of them;
> What being is there other than these? [80]

Thus, the answer to the question "What being is there other than these?" is that the person is imputed in dependence on the aggregation of the six constituents. The collection of the six constituents exists in dependence on its many parts and each constituent also exists in dependence on its many parts; therefore, they do not exist from their own side.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> The meaning of the second line [that is, "because a person is an aggregation of the six constituents"] is "because a person is imputed in dependence upon an aggregation of the six constituents." The meaning of the third and fourth lines is that, because there is no occurrence of [a phenomenon] devoid of parts and a whole, each of the constituents is also imputed in dependence upon an aggregation of its own many parts and, therefore, is not established as [its own] reality – that is to say, is not established by way of its own entity.

(Note "the second line" of the English translation is actually the first line in the Tibetan text.)

Lama Tsongkhapa says that in the third and fourth lines of this verse Nagarjuna indicates that there is nothing which is devoid of parts and a whole. Therefore, everything that exists has parts and a whole. Because everything is imputed in dependence on its parts it is not established as its own reality or by way of its own entity. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas define a dependent-arising as: that which is established in dependence on its own parts. The Prasangika Madhyamikas would also similarly define a dependent-arising. On the other hand, the Chittamatra and Sautrantika schools define a dependent-arising as: that which is produced by its respective causes and conditions. Therefore, according to these two schools dependent-arisings do not include uncompounded phenomena. In short, there are different ways of asserting dependent-arising in the various schools.

According to the Vaibhashikas functioning things are not pervaded by being compounded phenomena. This is because they assert that functioning thing and existent are mutually inclusive in that the Sanskrit word for functioning thing *bhava* can mean both functioning thing and existent. Thus,

they assert that even uncompounded space is a functioning thing that is able to perform a function, this being to allow movement. For example, space allows us to stretch our legs, build a house, and so forth. The Vaibhashikas posit three types of uncompounded phenomena: (1) space, (2) non-analytical cessations, and (3) analytical cessations. They say that an analytical cessation is a functioning thing because it functions to cease the objects of negation which are the contaminations. A non-analytical cessation is a functioning thing which acts to hinder the production of the object of negation. The objects of negation of non-analytical cessations include both contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena. The Vaibhashikas posit two types of substrata: a future substrata that will be produced and a future substrata that will not be produced. An example of a non-analytical cessation is that now we are born as human beings we have a non-analytical cessation of rebirth in the lower realms.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Furthermore, with regard to whatever is imputed in dependence upon an aggregation of parts, the parts or the whole are not suitable to be posited as an illustration of it [that is, as something that is it], and anything that is a different entity from those two also could not be an illustration of it either.

(Note: "the parts or the whole are not suitable to be posited as an illustration of it [that is, as something that is it], and anything that is a different entity from those two also could not be an illustration of it either" is more literally translated as "the parts or the whole are not suitable to be posited as a basis of it, and anything that is a different entity from those two also could not be a basis of it either.")

Being imputed upon an aggregation of parts is explained in connection with the person. For example, a being is imputed on the aggregation of parts which are the aggregates. The meaning of "the parts or the whole are not suitable to be posited as an illustration of it" is that since the person exists only in dependence on its parts, the parts themselves as well as the whole cannot be taken as the illustration of the person. Anything which is a different entity from the parts and whole also cannot be an illustration of it either.

Wednesday morning, 19 April 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> The mere factor of how a pot, and so forth, are posited by conceptuality is similar to the imputation of a rope as a snake. However, whether those two – a pot, and so forth, and a rope-snake – exist or do not exist, are able or unable to perform functions, and so forth, are not at all similar. This is because they are in all ways not equivalent in terms of whether or not the designations of those two must be made, whether or not making those designations is invalidated [by conventional valid cognition], and so forth.

Rope-snake is posited as an illustration of truly existent pot but this does not mean that the example is equivalent in all ways to a truly existent pot. The way in which objects such as a pot are merely designated is similar to the way in which conceptuality, although mistaken, designates snake to a rope. However, when one designates pot and so forth to a [correct] basis of imputation such imputed objects are able to perform their respective functions, whereas in the case of designating a snake to a rope, the rope is not able to perform the function of a snake. The name "pot" can be applied to a golden flat-bottomed bulbous bellied water holder and the imputed object is able to perform the function of pot, whereas when the name "snake" is applied to a speckled coiled rope the imputed object is not able to perform the function of snake. The application of this convention "pot" to a

golden flat-bottomed bulbous bellied water holder cannot be harmed by a valid cognizer in terms of its ability to perform the function of pot, whereas the application of the convention "snake" to the rope can be harmed by a valid cognizer in terms of its ability to perform the function of a snake.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> The feasibility of [an object's] respective functionality within the context of being posited by conceptuality is an uncommon mode of commentary by Buddhapalita, Shantideva, and this master [Chandrakirti] from among the commentators on the words and meaning [of the works] of the two – the father, the superior [Nagarjuna], and his spiritual son [Aryadeva]. Just this is also the final difficult point in the view of the Madhyamika School.

That phenomena posited by conceptuality are feasible as agents, actions, and objects is taught by Buddhapalita, Shantideva, and Chandrakirti. The assertion that although phenomena are merely imputed by conceptuality agents, actions, and objects operate is an uncommon assertion of the Madhyamika school. The five masters mentioned here, Buddhapalita, Shantideva, Chandrakirti, Nagarjuna, and Aryadeva, are in many contexts called the five masters including father and son.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that the assertion that all phenomena are merely imputed over there and do not exist from their own side is "the final difficult point in the view of the Madhyamika School."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) (Tibetan text page 134) says:

> This being the case, Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* says that even mere nominality does not exist ultimately and that nothing exists except for only being posited conventionally through the force of nominal conventions:
>
> Because the phenomena of forms are only names,
> [Uncompounded] space too is only a name.
> Without the elements how could forms exist?
> Therefore, even name-only-ness does not [inherently] exist. [99]
>
> Feelings, discriminations, compositional factors,
> And consciousnesses are to be considered
> As like the elements and the self.
> Hence the six constituents are selfless. [100]

"The phenomena of forms" refers to the form aggregate. Just as the form aggregate is only merely imputed by name and does not exist from its own side, likewise space too is only a name and does not exist from its own side.

Nagarjuna then says: "Without the elements how could forms exist?" If elements exist inherently how could there be forms and so forth which are derived from the elements? That forms and so forth derive from the elements is explained in *Collected Topics*.

Nagarjuna then says: "Therefore, even name-only-ness does not [inherently] exist." Even names do not exist inherently. Just as the imputed name does not exist inherently, likewise the base of imputation to which the name is imputed does not exist inherently.

Having presented the form aggregate, Nagarjuna then presents the remaining four aggregates saying: "Feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses are to be considered as like the elements and the self." Feeling is that which is merely imputed on experience. Discrimination is that which is merely imputed on the apprehension of signs or the apprehension of distinctions; it does not exist from its own side. Therefore, there are two types of discrimination: one that apprehends signs and one that apprehends distinctions. The definition of discrimination as the apprehension of

signs is from Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*. It is also defined similarly in the *Supplement* (v. 6.202) which says:

> *Form has the definition: suitable as form.*
> *Feeling has the nature of experience.*
> *Discrimination apprehends signs.*
> *Compositional factors strongly compose.* [6.202]
>
> *Individually cognizing objects*
> *Is the specific definition of consciousness..* [6.203ab]

The apprehension of distinctions means that discrimination apprehends its object clearly.

In short, all five aggregates are merely imputed and do not exist from their own side. Nagarjuna says that the five aggregates are to be considered "as like the elements and the self," meaning that just as the self and the elements are empty of inherent existence so too are the five aggregates empty of inherent existence.

Nagarjuna in conclusion says: "Hence the six constituents are selfless." Each of the six constituents individually cannot be posited as a self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> And:
>
> Except for being a convention designated,
> What world exists in fact (that is, ultimately)
> Which would be "is" or "is not"? [114bcd]
>
> As Nagarjuna says, [phenomena] abide as mere nominal imputations.

The world itself is only imputed by convention and does not exist by way of its own entity.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> If you understand those [points] well, you will understand well:
> 1. that all phenomena must be posited dependently,
> 2. that because they are just dependently imputed and dependently produced, they are not established by way of their own entity and do not have a self-powered entity which is not posited through the force of conventions which are other [than themselves], and
> 3. that no matter what phenomenon is posited as existing, it is posited in the context of not seeking the object imputed.

A phenomenon that is posited as existing is posited by a non-analytical, conventional, innate awareness that is not seeking it. Phenomena are not imputed by an analytical awareness seeking them. In this context the assertions of the Svatantrika Madhyamika system and those of the Prasangika Madhyamika system differ:

- The Svatantrika Madhyamika system says that when an imputed object is sought it is found to exist within the basis and that the mind seeking the imputed object is an awareness analyzing for a conventionality.
- The Prasangika Madhyamika system says that when the imputed object is sought it is not found and that the mind seeking the imputed object is an awareness analyzing for the ultimate. When the imputed object is sought, it is sought with a reasoning awareness.

In short, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system an awareness seeking an imputed object is a valid cognizer analyzing for a conventionality whereas according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system it is a valid cognizer analyzing for the ultimate.

Note that one needs a great collection of merit in order to understand the teachings on emptiness. At Worka Cho Lung in Tibet Lama Tsongkhapa himself made many mandala offerings on a stone base and did many prostrations together with the *Confession of a Bodhisattva's Downfalls* until the stones themselves were worn by his hands and body while requesting the deities to enable him to realize the profound meaning. Having done such practices Lama Tsongkhapa actually saw and talked with Manjushri and the thirty-five buddhas. He received many instructions on emptiness from Manjushri. In fact it is said that Lama Tsongkhapa had a very clear and precise realization of emptiness.

In sutra it says "Not seeing is holy seeing." This means that when the imputed object is sought with thorough analysis and is not found, this 'not seeing' is holy seeing. One then meditates on that which is not seen, this being the meditation on emptiness. One should look for the "I" with an awareness analyzing for the ultimate. When this I is not found, one has found the mode of abidance of the I. One should then meditate on it.

Wednesday afternoon, 19 April 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-1B2B The conception of true existence that conceives the opposite of this
>
> The conception of existence not posited merely through the force of nominal conventions explained above is the innate conception of true establishment, ultimate establishment, or establishment as [the object's own] reality, as well as the innate conception of existing by way of [the object's] own entity, existing by way of [the object's] own character, and existing inherently. The referent object conceived by that [consciousness] is the hypothetical measure of true [establishment].

The referent object of the conception of true existence is the measure of true existence. The referent object or the object of the mode of apprehension of the conception of true existence does not exist. According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system the following terms are synonymous:

- true existence or true establishment,
- ultimate existence or ultimate establishment,
- existence as reality or establishment as [the object's own] reality,
- establishment by way of its own entity,
- establishment by way of its own character, and
- inherent existence.

However, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas although phenomena do not have true existence, ultimate existence, and existence as reality, they are established by way of their own entity, established by way of their own character, and exist inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> The need to know the two modes of the ultimate in the qualification of the object of negation with [the term] "ultimately" is also the same here [in the Prasangika School as in the Svatantrika School, explained in the previous chapter]. However, although the Svatantrika-Madhyamikas assert that true, ultimate, and real establishment do not occur in objects of knowledge, they assert that the three – establishment by way of [the object's] own entity, establishment by way of [the object's] own

> character, and inherent establishment – exist conventionally. This is seen as a very skillful means for leading those who are temporarily unable to realize easily the very subtle suchness to that [realization of suchness].

The qualification of the object of negation with the term "ultimately" is the same as in the case of the Svatantrika Madhyamika system. That there are two modes of the ultimate in the qualification of the object of negation means that there are two ways of applying the term 'ultimately,' this being the case for both the Svatantrika Madhyamika system and the Prasangika Madhyamika system. This was set out previously by Lama Tsongkhapa in the context of the Svatantrika Madhyamika system saying (Klein, *Path to the Middle*):

> You need to understand that the qualification "ultimately" is affixed in two [senses] to the object of negation:
>
> 1. The reasoning consciousnesses of hearing, thinking, and meditating are taken as the ultimate, [and thus what is established by them is ultimately existent, and] what is not established by them, as [the objector just] mentioned above, [is not ultimately established].
> 2. Being existent in an objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of an awareness is posited as being ultimately existent [and not existing this way is called not being ultimately established].

Likewise, for the Prasangika Madhyamika system:
(1) if a conventionality were to exist in the perspective of a reasoning consciousnesses (consciousnesses of a type) of hearing, thinking, and meditating it would be ultimately existent and
(2) an object existing by way of an objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of an awareness is ultimately existent.
The Svatantrika Madhyamikas accept that phenomena exist inherently, are established by way of their own entity, and are established by way of their own character. This is because Buddha taught his various disciples very skillfully with the intention to lead them gradually to the realization of subtle selflessness by teaching them that although phenomena do not have true existence, ultimate existence, and existence as reality, they are established by way of their own entity, established by way of their own character, and exist inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> In this way, just that inherent existence which is an entity of phenomena not depending on or not posited through the force of another – that is, a subjective terminological conceptual consciousness – is called the self that is the object of negation. The nonexistence of just this with a person as the substratum is said to be a selflessness of persons, and the nonexistence of it with a phenomenon such as an eye or ear [as the substratum] is said to be a selflessness of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa identifies inherent existence – "an entity of phenomena not depending on or not posited through the force of another" – and then says that the lack of inherent existence on the basis of the person is the selflessness of persons and the lack of inherent existence on the basis of a phenomenon is the selflessness of phenomena. In short, the non-inherent existence of persons is the selflessness of persons, and the non-inherent existence of phenomena is the selflessness of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Thereby, it is implicitly understood that the conceptions of that inherent existence as existing in persons and in phenomena are the conceptions of the two selves [of persons and other phenomena].

Through presenting the two selflessnesses, the conceptions of the two selves are indirectly presented. The conception of the person as inherently existent is the conception of a self of persons, whereas the conception of the eye, ear, and so forth as inherently existent is the conception of a self of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> It is as Chandrakirti's *Commentary on (Aryadeva's) "Four Hundred"* says:
>
> > Here "self' is inherent existence, an entity of things that does not depend on another. Its non-existence is selflessness. This [selflessness] is understood as twofold through a division into persons and [other] phenomena – a selflessness of persons and a selflessness of phenomena.

This is quite clear in itself. Chandrakirti says that selflessness is of two types: (1) the selflessness of persons and (2) the selflessness of phenomena. Selflessness is only of two types because the bases on which non-inherent existence is established is of only two types: (1) the person and (2) the aggregates, the eye, ear, and so forth. In the Prasangika Madhyamika system the two selflessnesses are differentiated in terms of the substratum of emptiness and not in terms of the object of negation. In the Svatantrika Madhyamika system it is the different; the two selflessnesses are differentiated in terms of the object of negation and not in terms of the substratum of emptiness. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that the object of negation of the selflessness of persons is a self sufficient substantially existent person while the object of negation of the selflessness of phenomena is true existence. For them the emptiness of true existence of the person is a subtle selflessness of phenomena. The emptiness of self sufficient substantial existence of the basis of imputation of the person, the five aggregates, is the selflessness of persons. A subtle selflessness of persons can be posited in relation to all phenomena because not existing as an object of use of a self sufficient substantially existent person can be posited in relation to all phenomena. A selflessness of persons is not pervaded by being a subtle selflessness of persons. The subtle selflessness of persons is a non-affirming negative which is the emptiness of the person of being self sufficient substantially existent, whereas the coarse selflessness of persons is the emptiness of the person of being permanent, unitary, and independent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Also, just this [*Entrance* VI.179bc] says, "Through a division of persons and [other] phenomena, it is said to be of two aspects." [Chandrakirti] speaks of the two selflessnesses as divided not by way of the object negated but by way of the subject that is the substratum [of selflessness – persons and other phenomena].

This will be discussed later in the *Supplement* in the context of differentiating the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena in relation to which Chandrakirti's root text says:

> *This non-self, in order to completely liberate migrators,*
> *Is taught two ways: by divisions [of] phenomena and persons.* [6.179ab]

Buddha taught two types of selflessness in order to liberate sentient beings from cyclic existence: the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> With respect to the innate view of the transitory collection which is a conception of [an inherently existent] self, in the root text [Chandrakirti's *Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"*] it is refuted that the object of observation is the [mental and physical] aggregates, and in the commentary [Chandrakirti] says that the self imputed in dependence [upon the aggregates] is the object of observation. Therefore, the mere I or mere person, which is the object of observation generating the mere thought "I," is to be taken as the object of observation.

Chandrakirti refutes the aggregates as being the observed object of the innate view of the transitory collection. The observed object of the innate view of the transitory collection is the mere I. The innate view of the transitory collection is a conception of a self of persons. Thus, the aggregates are not taken as the observed object of the view of the transitory collection. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "in the commentary [Chandrakirti] says that the self imputed in dependence [upon the aggregates] is the object of observation." Thus the observed object of the view of the transitory collection is the mere I. The innate view of the transitory collection can be divided into two:
(1) a view of the transitory collection apprehending I and
(2) a view of the transitory collection apprehending mine.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> With respect to the subjective aspect [of a consciousness misconceiving the inherent existence of the I], Chandrakirti's *Autocommentary on the "Entrance to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'"* says:
>
> > Having imputed that a self which is [actually] nonexistent exists, a [consciousness] conceiving I adheres to just this as true.
>
> Hence, it conceives the I to be truly established.

The view of the transitory collection observes the mere I and adheres to it as existing inherently or truly. Adhering to it as existing inherently or truly is the subjective aspect. This was discussed in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* in the context of the 173 aspects of the three exalted knowers. The subjective aspect refers to the subject, the consciousness, which is an apprehender, whereas the objective aspect refers to the object, the apprehended. The aspect of the apprehender and the aspect of the apprehended are explained differently in *Awarenesses and Knowers* as being respectively a self-cognizer and an other-cognizer.

In the context of the view of the transitory collection the truly existent I is the aspect of the apprehended and the view of the truly existent I is the aspect of the apprehender.

Thursday morning, 20 April 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Moreover, Chandrakirti's [*Auto*]*Commentary* says:
>
> > With respect to that, the view of the transitory collection is an afflicted intelligence which is engaged in such thoughts of [inherently existent] I and mine.
>
> Thus, the object of observation of an innate view of the transitory collection must be something that naturally generates an awareness thinking "I"; therefore, the innate conception of persons – who are of a different continuum [from your own continuum] – as established by way of their own

> character is an innate conception of a self of persons but not an innate view of the transitory collection [as an inherently existent I].
>
> [In the citation, just above, from Chandrakirti] "...engaged in such thoughts of I and mine" does not indicate that mere I and mere mine are the objects of the subjective aspect of the mode of apprehension. Rather, it indicates that [a view of the transitory collection] has the aspect of conceiving those two to be established by way of their own character.

The innate view of the transitory collection takes the mere I and mere mine as its observed objects. The objective aspect of the innate view of the transitory collection is the mere I and mine established by way of their own character. The subjective aspect of the innate view of the transitory collection is the intelligence apprehending the mere I and mere mine established by way of their own character. There is debate concerning this, for example: "If the innate view of the transitory collection takes the mere I as its observed object, what is the innate view of the transitory collection taking the mere mine as its observed object?" Think about it. How is a distinction made between the innate view of the transitory collection apprehending I and the innate view of the transitory collection apprehending mine?

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> The object of observation of an innate view of the transitory collection conceiving [inherently existent] mine is just the mine; it should not be held that one's own eyes, and so forth, are the object of observation. The subjective aspect is, upon observing that object of observation, to conceive the mine to be established by way of its own character.

There are two terms for mine in Tibetan, *bdag gi ba* and *nga gi ba*, however, the meaning is the same. The mere mine is the observed object of the innate view of the transitory collection conceiving mine, it is not the eyes and so forth. This is because if the innate view of the transitory collection were to take 'my eyes' and so forth as its observed object, then it would apprehend my eyes and so forth to be established by way of their own character whereby it would be a conception of a self of phenomena, which is not a view of the transitory collection.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> *Objection*: In Chandrakirti's own commentary on "This is mine," [which is the last line of stanza 3:
>
> *Homage to that compassion for transmigrators who are*
> *Powerless like a bucket traveling in a well*
> *Through initially adhering to a self, an "I,"*
> *And then generating attachment for things, "This is mine."]*
>
> he says, "Thinking, 'This is mine,' one adheres to all aspects of things other than the object of the conception of an [inherently existent] I." [Given your explanation above that the object of observation of a false view of the transitory collection as inherently existent mine is not eyes, and so forth, but the mine itself,] how can you take [Chandrakirti's] explanation that upon observing a base, such as an eye, adherence to it thinking, "This is mine," is a conception of [inherently existent] mine?
>
> *Answer*: This refers to adherence to the mine as truly established *upon perceiving eyes, and so forth, as mine*; it does not indicate that eyes, and so forth, which are illustrations of the mine are the object of observation. For, if that were not the case, the two – the view of the transitory collection and the conception of a self of phenomena – would not be mutually exclusive [whereas they are].

Are my eyes, my nose, and so forth mine? They are. However, my eyes and so forth are not observed objects of the innate view of the transitory collection conceiving mine. In short, the observed object of

the innate view of the transitory collection conceiving mine is just mine, it is not my eyes and so forth. If the innate view of the transitory collection conceiving mine were to take my eyes and so forth as its observed object, it would follow that the innate view of the transitory collection and the conception of a self of phenomena would not be mutually exclusive, whereas they are. This is because the view of the transitory collection is pervaded by being a conception of a self of persons. There is a difference between a conception of a self of persons and a conception of a self of phenomena. The conception of a self of phenomena is a conception conceiving phenomena, from within the distinction of the two, persons and phenomena, to exist inherently. On the other hand, a conception of a self of persons is a conception conceiving persons, from within the distinction of the two, persons and phenomena, to exist inherently.

In conclusion, what is the mine? According to Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa the mine is the I, whereby it is the person. On the other hand, my eyes, nose, and so forth are not persons. According to other scholars the mine is not the person, from within the distinction of the two, persons and phenomena, and it is not a phenomenon, from within the distinction of the two, persons and phenomena. This is perhaps asserted by Khedrup Je in *A Dose of Emptiness*.

Q: If the mine is not the person from within the distinction of the two, persons and phenomena, and it is not a phenomenon from within the distinction of the two, persons and phenomena, what is it?
A: In general even person is a phenomenon. If it is an established base it is pervaded by being a phenomenon, because if it is an established base it upholds its own entity, this being the definition of phenomenon. However, in the context of a person from within the distinction of the two, persons and phenomena, and a phenomenon from within the distinction of the two, persons and phenomena, Khensur Pema Gyeltshen says that the mine is neither. In fact, there is a long discussion about this in his text which quotes extensively from *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*, the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment*, the *Great Commentary on Fundamental Wisdom*, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> The objects of observation of an innate conception of a self of phenomena are the form aggregate, and so forth, and eyes, ears, and so forth, in your own and others' continuums, as well as the environment that is not included in the [personal] continuum. Its subjective aspect is as explained before [to conceive these to be established by way of their own character].

The observed objects of the innate conception of a self of phenomena are the form aggregate and so forth, the eyes, ears, and so forth, in one's own continuum and others' continuum, as well as the environment not included in the personal continuum, such as mountains, trees, and so forth. The conception of a self of phenomena is to apprehend phenomena as established by way of their own character.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> In this way, the conception of the two selves [of persons and other phenomena] is the ignorance binding one in cyclic existence. Nagarjuna's *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness* says:
>
> That which conceives things produced
> From causes and conditions to be real
> Was said by the Teacher to be ignorance.
> From it the twelve links arise.
>
> The conception that a thing that is a phenomenon [other than a person] is established as [its own] reality is said to be the ignorance that is the root of cyclic existence. Since the ignorance that

> is the conception of a self of persons arises from the conception of a self of phenomena, the twelve [links of dependent arising] are described as arising from it.

The two conceptions, the conception of a self of phenomena and the conception of a self of persons, are the root of cyclic existence. In Lama Tsongkhapa's *Essence of Eloquence* it says:

> That a consciousness conceiving a self of phenomena acts as the basis of a consciousness conceiving a self of persons is also asserted by those Proponents of the Middle [that is, Autonomists] who assert that hearers and solitary realizers do not have realization of the selflessness of phenomena. Concerning that, when the conception of a self of phenomena is extinguished, the conception of a self of persons is overcome, but if the conception of a self of phenomena has not been extinguished, it is not that the conception of a self of persons has not been overcome. Hence, it is not contradictory for one to have been released from cyclic existence although the *final* basis of cyclic existence has not been overcome.

Both the Chittamatra and Svatantrika Madhyamika systems accept that the conception of a self of persons is the root of cyclic existence. The conception of a self of phenomena is the basis of the conception of a self of persons. This can be understood on the basis of the example of what happens when we see a complete stranger for the first time. Immediately upon seeing his aggregates an innate conception of his aggregates as existing inherently is generated. Then, when he introduces himself to us as Dorje Namgyel we think that he, Dorje Namgyel, exists inherently; this is the innate conception of a self of persons. Thus, for the person to appear to the mind, the aggregates must first appear to the mind. When the aggregates appear the conception of a self of phenomena arises, and then when the person appears the conception of a self of persons arises. In his *Middling Stages of the Path* Lama Tsongkhapa says that from the point of view of the production of the two conceptions, the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena, first a conception of a self of phenomena is produced and then a conception of a self of persons, whereas from the point of view of realizing the two selflessnesses, the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena, one first realizes the selflessness of persons and then the selflessness of phenomena. Lama Tsongkhapa says that they are realized in this order because it is easier to identify the substratum of the selflessness of persons than to identify the substratum of the selflessness of phenomena. Why is this? When the person is realized what is realized? When the person is realized, it is realized to depend upon the aggregates. Understanding the person to be dependent on the aggregates, one understands that the person is not independent and that the person is merely imputed by an imputing conception. There are two types of existence: substantial existence and imputed existence. For the Prasangika Madhyamika system there is no substantial existence, only imputed existence. However, the lower schools also assert substantial existence. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not assert substantial existence because they say that if phenomena were substantially existent they would exist by way of their own entity and independently.

On the other hand, it is said that when a yogi meditates on selflessness, he first settles the meaning of the self in terms of his own person. Having settled the selflessness of his own person, he then applies this to other phenomenon. However, in terms of reasoning the order is perhaps different. A yogi first establishes selflessness in terms of himself in order to harm his own conception of a self of persons which is the cause of his wandering in cyclic existence. This conception of a self of persons is the view of the transitory collection and the root of cyclic existence. Further on in the *Supplement* Chandrakirti says:

With intelligence, having seen afflictions and defects without exception
As arisen from the view of the transitory collection and
Having realized the self as its object,
The yogi acts to refute the self. [6.120]

"Having realize the self as its object" means that the yogi first realizes the self that exist conventionally and then strives to refute the conception that this self exists inherently. The yogi therefore first identifies the observed object, the self, and then refutes the subjective aspect, the conception of the self to be inherently existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Since the ignorance that is the conception of a self of persons arises from the conception of a self of phenomena, the twelve [links of dependent arising] are described as arising from it." "From it" refers to the conception of a self of phenomena. The first of the twelve links is ignorance. The twelve links from the point of view of the Prasangika Madhyamika system are discussed in the twenty-sixth chapter of Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*.

Thursday afternoon, 20 April 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> In order to overcome this ignorance, it must be seen that [phenomena] are empty of how they are conceived by that [conception of inherent existence], and it must be seen that self [that is, inherent existence] conceived in this way does not exist. Nagarjuna's *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness* says:
>
> If through seeing reality one knows well
> That things are empty, ignorance does not arise.
> That is the cessation of ignorance,
> Whereby the twelve links cease.

When one realizes that the referent object of the conception of true existence does not exist, the conception of true existence ceases and ignorance is removed. Due to this, the next link, karmic formations, and then the successive links no longer arise, whereby the twelve links cease.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Also, Nagarjuna's *Praise of the Element of Reality* says:
>
> Through the conception of "I" and "mine"
> All external [phenomena] whatsoever are imputed
> [to inherently exist].
> When the two aspects of selflessness are seen,
> The seeds of cyclic existence are ceased.

When the referent objects of the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena are realized to not exist, the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena are realized, whereby the seeds of cyclic existence are ceased.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Also:
>
> The supreme doctrine purifying the mind
> Is the absence of inherent existence.

"Supreme doctrine," literally the supreme phenomenon (*mchog tu... chos*), for purifying the mind is to realize the absence of inherent existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Furthermore, Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* says:
>
> When selflessness is seen in objects,
> The seeds of cyclic existence are ceased. [XIV.25cd]
>
> Also:
>
> Therefore, all afflictions are destroyed
> By destroying obscuration.[VI. 10cd]
>
> When dependent arising is seen,
> Obscuration does not arise.
> Therefore, with all endeavor here
> Just discourse on this should be proclaimed. [VI. 11]

When objects – persons and phenomena – are realized to be selfless the seeds of cyclic existence are ceased. This could be more precisely translated as: "When selflessness is seen in objects, the seeds of cyclic existence *will* cease" (the verb being in the future case). This is because when the selflessness of objects is seen directly, the seeds of cyclic existence gradually cease in that first the acquired conception of true existence is abandoned and later the innate conception of true existence.

Aryadeva then says: "Therefore, all afflictions are destroyed by destroying obscuration." This means that when confusion or ignorance (*ti mug*), here translated as obscuration, is destroyed, all other afflictions, attachment, hatred, pride, and so forth, are destroyed. This confusion or obscuration is the conception of true existence of a self; when it is abandoned all other afflictions, such as attachment for friends, hatred for enemies, and so forth, are abandoned. Here the word "therefore" follows from the previous lines of the stanza (*Illumination* Tibetan text page 183): "Just like the body sense power regarding the body, confusion is the abode for all." Here Aryadeva mentions the fifth sense power, the body sense power, from among the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense powers because when the body sense power is destroyed all the other sense powers are destroyed, and, similarly, all afflictions, attachment, hatred, and so forth, are destroyed when confusion is destroyed. In other words, when the conception of true existence is abandoned all the afflictions supported on it are also abandoned.

Aryadeva says: "When dependent arising is seen, obscuration does not arise. Therefore, with all endeavor here just discourse on this should be proclaimed." This means that when one sees dependent-arising, confusion no longer arises. Therefore, one should put effort into settling the meaning of dependent-arising.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Since the obscuration mentioned [in that stanza] is on the occasion of identifying the obscuration that is one of the three poisons [desire, hatred, and obscuration], it is afflictive ignorance. Also, it is stated that in order to overcome this ignorance one must realize the meaning of profound dependent arising in which emptiness appears as the meaning of dependent arising.

The word "obscuration" (*ti mug*) is perhaps better translated as confusion in that the mental poisons desire, or attachment, and hatred are also obscurations. Also the Tibetan word *'dod chags*, translated here as desire is not a completely accurate translation because desire is not always negative (note that

this word is often translated as 'attachment'). One can ask: "If it is desire is it necessarily included in the three poisons? Is the desire to attain enlightenment one of the three poisons? The Tibetan word *'dod* alone is usually translated as desire. Think about these doubts.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Furthermore, the commentator [Chandrakirti] says that [when his *Entrance* (VI.120d) says] "The yogi refutes self," [this means] that selflessness must be realized in the manner of eradicating the object of the conception of self [that is, inherent existence]. Therefore, although, without eradicating the object of the conception of self, you merely withdraw the mind here from going there to objects, through this it cannot be posited that you are engaged in selflessness.

It is important to refute the referent object of the conception of a self because if it is not eradicated selflessness cannot be realized. In Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] 'Compendium of Valid Cognition* it says: "Without eliminating the referent object of that (the conception of true existence), one will not be able to abandon that (the conception of a self)." In order to abandon the conception of a self one has to realize selflessness, and in order to realize selflessness one has to realize the non-existence of the referent object of the conception of self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> The reason is this: When the mind operates on an object, there are three [modes of conception]:
> 1. conceiving that the object of observation is truly established
> 2. conceiving that it is not truly established
> 3. conceiving it without qualifying it as either of these two.
>
> Hence, although [the object] is not conceived to be without true establishment, it is not necessarily conceived to be truly established. Similarly, although [when merely withdrawing the mind in meditation] you are not engaged in [conceiving] the two selves, you are not necessarily engaged in the two selflessnesses. For, there are limitless [ways of] abiding in a third category of awareness.

When the mind engages an object it can do so without the object being qualified either by true existence or by non-true existence; for example, when one thinks "How pitiful sentient beings are." This is the third possibility, that is, the object being free from being qualified by either true existence or non-true existence. Lama Tsongkhapa says that there are limitless examples of this.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Having identified the two conceptions of self in your own continuum, you need to settle that the bases with respect to which you make the mistake [of apprehending the two selves] do not exist as they are apprehended. Otherwise, refutation and proof that are directed outward are like searching for a robber on the plain after he has gone to the woods and hence are not to the point.

As in the analogy of looking for but not finding a robber on the plain after he has gone to the woods, one should ensure that one directs the analysis looking for the self inward and not outward, otherwise it will miss the point. Analysis should be directed inward in the sense that one should look for the self in one's own continuum.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> When, in that way, you have identified well the conception of true existence, you will understand that there are many conceptions that are not the two conceptions of self. Consequently, all wrong ideas of asserting that the reasoning analyzing suchness refutes all objects apprehended by conceptuality will be overcome.

If one does not identify the conception of true existence well, one could come to think that all conceptions are conceptions of true existence. This is incorrect because there are positive conceptions and negative conceptions which are not conceptions of true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) says:

> Although there are many [points] stemming from these [topics] that should be explained, I will not elaborate on them here as some have already been explained at length elsewhere [in my *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment*, *The Essence of the Good Explanations*, and *Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"*] and some will be discussed below.

This concludes Anne Klein's translation of the first part of the sixth chapter in *Path to the Middle*.

One should think about what to do with all this information. As a result of hearing these teachings one should meditate on the two selflessnesses in order to abandon the conception of true existence, ignorance. The great lamas say that of the two types of meditation, analytical meditation and stabilizing meditation, analytical meditation is more important. This is because analytical meditation leads to stable ascertainment. There are some who disregard analytical meditation and say that meditation is only stabilizing meditation, but this is not correct. To support this idea they say, for example, that Milarepa meditated without having studied yet gained realizations. It should be examined as to whether or not Milarepa studied or not. The Kadampa lamas say: "One who meditates without hearing is like someone trying to climb a rock cliff without hands." One should follow the advice of Lama Tsongkhapa who said: "In the beginning, I sought much hearing. In the middle, I strove to see all the teachings as personal advice. In the end, I practiced all the teachings I had heard day and night and dedicated all this merit to the flourishing of the Buddha's teachings."

END

Tuesday afternoon, 2 May 2000

(Masters Program Correspondence Course participants please note that there were no teachings 1 and 5 May 2000)

(Note: From here on Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* is a provisory translation prepared for the Masters Program by Joan Nicell, Thubten Sherab, and Jampa Gendun.)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Sera Mey Computer Centre text, 1998, page 138) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2 Establishing the meaning of the scriptures through reasoning

A Establishing the selflessness of phenomena through reasoning
B Establishing the selflessness of persons through reasoning

3B1C-2B3E-2A Establishing the selflessness of phenomena through reasoning

1 Refuting production from the four extremes with regard to both truths
2 Dispelling arguments regarding those refutations
3 How to cease wrong conceptions that hold to an extreme by means of the production of dependent-arising itself
4 Identifying the result of reasoned analysis

3B1C-2B3E-2A1 Refuting production from the four extremes with regard to both truths

A Positing the theses regarding non-inherent production
B Indicating the proof established by that reasoning
C The meaning established by refuting production from the four extremes

3B1C-2B3E-2A1A Positing the theses regarding non-inherent production

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (G. Churinoff, 1994) says:

> Therefore, here it is intended that the other equalities be easily indicated by merely indicating, through reasoning, only the equality of phenomena as unproduced, since the Acharya [Nagarjuna] finely set forth at the beginning of the *Treatise on the Middle Way* [1.1]:
>
> > Not from self, not from others, not from both, nor without cause.
> > Production is not ever existing, anywhere of anything.
>
> "Not ever" means "at no time whatsoever." The locative case term "anywhere" – synonymous with the term "somewhere" – explains place, time and tenet. The locative case term "anything" expresses outer and inner things. Hence one should arrange like this: "outer and inner things are not possibly produced from self in any place, time, or tenet."

Nagarjuna's thought is that when the equality, or sameness, of phenomena in not being inherently produced is indicated the remaining nine samenesses are easy to understand. Therefore, he mentions only this sameness in his root verse from the *Treatise on the Middle Way* which is cited above. Nagarjuna sets out non-inherent production here because there are various schools that assert inherent production saying:

1. phenomena are produced from self,
2. phenomena are produced from other,
3. phenomena are produced from both self and other, and
4. phenomena are produced causelessly.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that all these are incorrect because in order to establish a thesis the reason (or sign) must be established, whereas in all these cases it is not since inherent production does not exist.

The Samkhya system is a non-Buddhist school that asserts production from self. The Nigrantha system asserts production from both self and other, while the Charvaka system asserts causeless production. Chandrakirti upholds the Prasangika Madhyamika position saying that these assertions are incorrect because the reason is not established since inherent production does not exist at any time, in any place, and for any tenet. In short, inherently existent production does not exist at all. For example, although crops are produced in summer but not in winter, they are not inherently produced at any time. Likewise, certain fruits are produced in valleys but not on mountain peaks, but they are not inherently produced anywhere. In addition, inherent production does not exist for any acceptable tenet.

The Samkhyas accept a general principal which is the creator of all. This general principal is partless, possesses five attributes, and produces all results. They say that a result exists at the time of its cause although it is not yet apparent. Later on when the result is produced it becomes apparent. The Samkhyas also assert twenty-five types of objects of knowledge which can be condensed into four types:

1. those that are only causes,
2. those that are only results,
3. those that are both cause and result, and
4. those that are neither.

That which is only a cause is the general principal; that which is only a result is the sixteen transformations; that which is both cause and result is the seven, such as the great one (or intellect); and that which is neither is the person (self, consciousness, and knower). This is explained in Ishvarakrishna's *Tantra* which says (L. Sopa, *Cutting Through Appearances*):

> The fundamental nature is not a transformation.
> The seven – the great one and so forth – are natures and transformations.
> Sixteen are transformations.
> The person is not a nature and not a transformation.

This is set forth in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition*. The Samkhyas assert that the person attains liberation. He does so through analyzing who is the creator of phenomena whereupon he discovers that they are created by the general principal. Upon being discovered, the general principal becomes embarrassed and dissolves into a rainbow whereby all transformations are withdrawn. When this happens only the person remains; at this time the person has attained liberation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Here, this [phrase of negation] "is not," establishing the state of existence, is not an existence related with production from self because the refutation of that is established implicitly. This should also be applied similarly to the three assertions.

What is refuted here is production from self which is used as a proof by the Samkhyas to establish that there *is* inherent production. Although inherent production is not explicitly refuted, through refuting production from self it is implicitly refuted. Chandrakirti then says: "This should also be applied similarly to the three assertions." This statement is to be applied respectively to the three remaining assertions as follows:

- "Here, this [phrase of negation] "is not," establishing the state of existence, is not an existence related with production from *other* because the refutation of that is established implicitly."
- "Here, this [phrase of negation] "is not," establishing the state of existence, is not an existence related with production from *both* because the refutation of that is established implicitly."
- "Here, this [phrase of negation] "is not," establishing the state of existence, is not an existence related with *causeless* production because the refutation of that is established implicitly."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 138) says:

> Thinking that the other samenesses of phenomena are easily indicated through presenting by way of reasoning just the sameness of non-inherent production from among the ten samenesses that were explained previously, Arya [Nagarjuna] clearly states at the beginning of his *Treatise on the Middle Way*:
>
> > Not from self, not from other,
> > Not from both, not causelessly;
> > Production of any thing anywhere
> > Does not exist ever.
>
> 'Not... ever' is synonymous with 'never.' The term 'anywhere' is synonymous with the term 'somewhere.' The locative, indicating the bases, which are productionless, explains place, time, and tenet. The locative term 'any' referring to whatever is productionless with respect to the three bases expresses outer and inner things.

This is similar to what Chandrakirti says in his *Supplement*. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "'Not... ever' is synonymous with 'never.' The term 'anywhere' is synonymous with the term 'somewhere.'" This means that there is no inherent production at any time and in any place. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The locative, indicating the bases, which are productionless, explains place, time, and tenet." This means that inherent production does not exist at any place, at any time, and for any tenet. The term 'any' refers to outer and inner things. Outer things are those things, such as houses, mountains, and so forth, which are not included in the continuum whereas inner things are those things, such as the body, hands, and so forth, which are included in the continuum. All these phenomena are not produced from self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> Therefore, the meaning of the phrases 'from self' and so forth are to be explained through affixing them as [follows]: "It is not possible for outer and inner things to be produced from self in any place, at any time, for any tenet." This applies similarly to the other three assertions: "It is not possible for things ever to be produced from other, from both, or causelessly." Although the [Tibetan] translation [of Nagarjuna's verse] in *Clear Words* says 'any thing from self,' this translation is the best.
>
> From the point of view of place thinking, for example, there is no production of saffron in any place, and, from the point of view of time, thinking there is no production of crops at any point in time, are refuted saying 'in any place, at any time.' Therefore, to say 'not... ever' is not meaningless.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that although in the Tibetan translation of *Clear Words* it says 'any thing from self,' the way in which this verse from Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* is translated here is the best.

Nagarjuna's text says: "Does not exist ever." This is what is discussed here saying "Therefore, to say 'not... ever' is not meaningless."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 139) says:

> Although there is no production from the point of view of the Middle Way tenets, thinking there is production from the point of view of the realists' tenets is refuted by saying 'any tenet.' Therefore, 'non-production in the realists' system' is not indicated.
>
> [Chandrakirti's] autocommentary says:
>
> > Here 'does not' [in the above verse from the *Treatise on the Middle Way*] establishes just existence, not existence in relation to production from self since the refutation of that is established by the meaning.
>
> The meaning of this is that the last two lines, ["Production of any thing anywhere / Does not exist ever,"] indicate the thesis and the first two lines, ['Not from self, not from other, / Not from both, not causelessly,'] indicate the reason. Without individually delineating them as explained, production from self "does not exist" – that which is to be conjoined – is to be conjoined similarly to the other three.

Dividing the four lines of the stanza from Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* into two saying that the first two lines indicate the reason and the last two lines indicate the thesis is incorrect according to Lama Tsongkhapa because the theses are:

1. things are not produced from self,
2. things are not produced from other,
3. things are not produced from both, and
4. things are not produced causelessly.

These are the four extremes that were mentioned earlier. This discussion comes in the context of the outline "Positing the theses regarding non-inherent production" in the section "Refuting production from the four extremes with regard to both truths."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 140) says:

> If inherent production did exist, for it to be established it would be necessary to assert production from one of the four extremes, thereby what need would there be to mention establishing its existence? If production from the four extremes is refuted, the refutation of inherent production is implicitly established as well. In affixing in this way there is not the fault of not establishing the non-existence of inherent production – this being the meaning of the final line [of Nagarjuna's verse, "Does not exist ever"].

If inherent production did exist it would be established by asserting production from one of the four extremes. On the other hand, through refuting production from the four extremes inherent production is also refuted.

Does the syllogism "outer and inner things, as the subject, are not produced inherently because they are not produced from self, other, both, and causelessly" have a correct reason? In general, it is a correct reason yet it is not how the syllogism should be set out in this context. Rather, in regard to production from self the syllogism is:

> Outer and inner things, as the subject, are not produced from self because production is purposeful and has an end.

In regard to production from other the syllogism is:

> Outer and inner things, as the subject, are not produced from other because they are not produced from everything.

Likewise, there are specific reasons or signs for the remaining two syllogisms regarding production from both and causeless production. The Prasangika Madhyamikas refute the Samkhyas' assertion of production from self by flinging the consequence:

> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production is purposeless and endless because it is produced from self.

In short, here the theses regarding non-inherent production are set forth, whereas later on in the text the various consequences that the Prasangika Madhyamikas fling are set forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> Therefore, as explained in [Kamalashila's] *Illumination of the Middle Way*, taking that as a reason refuting production from the four extremes is not to say "It is unsuitable in establishing the non-existence of inherent production," since, as before, the individual delineation of them is not the purpose of this passage.

The syllogism "a sprout, as the subject, is not produced inherently because it is not produced from self, other, both, and causelessly" in general has a correct reason. However, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas have to specify:

> A sprout, as the subject, is not produced ultimately because it is not produced from self, it is not produced *ultimately* from other, it is not produced from both, and it is not produced causelessly.

They have to affix the word 'ultimately' to the phrase "not produced from other," saying "not produced *ultimately* from other," because although they refute production from self in terms of both the conventional and the ultimate, they only refute production from other in terms of the ultimate and not in terms of the conventional. They say that conventionally there is production from other because causes established by way of their own character produce results established by way of their own character. On the other hand, production from both and causeless production are refuted in terms of both the conventional and the ultimate.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> "It is not feasible for things to be produced from other in any place, at any time, or for any tenet" is to be affixed [to each]. Also *Clear Words* says:
>
> > The establishment of conventional phenomena is asserted by way of mere conditionality, not by way of asserting the four positions because of the [absurd] consequence in advocating that things have inherent existence.
>
> Production from other is not a scriptural designation but a designation of proponents of tenets. Moreover, if it is asserted due to thinking about an other established by way of its own character, then because of advocating [that things] have inherent existence there would be no production from other in this system even conventionally.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas refute production from other even conventionally because they refute the existence of an other established by way of its own character. However, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert the existence of causes established by way of their own character and production established by way of its own character. This should be kept in mind as the discussion of production from other is a distinctive feature in comparing the Prasangika Madhyamikas and Svatantrika Madhyamikas. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas debate with the Prasangika Madhyamikas saying: "It follows that smoke is not produced from fire. Are fire and smoke not other? Are they one? Are mother and son other or one? If mother and son are not other it would follow that they are one." To this the Prasangika Madhyamikas would respond: "Otherness does not refer to just not being one, it refers to otherness that is inherently existent and established by way of its own character."

Wednesday morning, 3 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 140) says:

> Although the two, causes and results, are indeed asserted to be different entities conventionally, simply that is not the meaning of production from other. Although conventionally every phenomenon that holds each of the two entities, as is said, has an established entity, it is not asserted to be the entity of inherent production.

In general cause and result are different entities conventionally [but "simply that is not the meaning of production from other"]. Conventionally all phenomena have or hold each of the two entities, the conventional truth and ultimate truth. Further on the *Supplement* Chandrakirti says:

> *All things – things found by perfect*
> *And false perception – possess two entities.*
> *Any object of perfect perception is thusness,*
> *That of false perception is said to be conventional truth.* [6.23]

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 140-1) says:

> In *Clear Words* the thesis regarding the non-production of things from self is explained to be a non-affirming negative, as are the other three theses. Therefore, that which is to be established in the context of settling non-inherent existence is a non-affirming negative that is the mere elimination of the object of negation.
>
> As *Clear Words* says:
>
> > Since statements such as 'In this world whatsoever terms exist, all are insubstantial, nothingness' which occur in *Clear Words* and so forth state non-affirming negatives, therefore, the meaning of insubstantiality is the meaning of non-inherent existence.

The thesis or probandum that is presented in *Clear Words* regarding production from self, "a sprout, as the subject, is not produced from self," is a non-affirming negative. The reason in this case is "because production is purposeful and has an end." Together the subject and predicate of the syllogism form a non-affirming negative. Just as the thesis of the first of the four positions is a non-affirming negative so too are the theses of the remaining three, although the reason differs for each. The syllogism regarding production from other is: a sprout, as the subject, is not produced from other because everything is not produced from everything. In short, the theses regarding non-production from the four extremes are all non-affirming negatives because when these types of production are negated nothing else is suggested in their place.

To prove that non-production from the four extremes are non-affirming negatives Lama Tsongkhapa quotes Chandrakirti's *Clear Words*, a commentary on the *Treatise on the Middle Way* which says: "In this world whatever there is that exists as a term, all are insubstantial, nothingness." This means that all objects expressed by terms do not exist inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 141) says:

> The autocommentary says "After having stated the four theses, they are explained in order to establish them through reasoning," and later taking the refutation of production from the four extremes as a reason, things are said to be free from inherent production. Also *Clear Words* says:
>
> > At the conclusion of refuting production from the four extremes stating 'Therefore, production does not exist' establishes that [things are free from inherent production].

Through refuting production from the four extremes inherent production is refuted. Although the Prasangika Madhyamikas later on in the text take 'freedom from inherent production' as a thesis, here they take production from the four extremes as the theses. "Later taking the refutation of production from the four extremes as a reason" means that later on there is the syllogism: all things are free from inherent production because they are free from being produced from the four extremes. To prove this Lama Tsongkhapa cites *Clear Words* saying: "At the conclusion of refuting production from the four extremes stating 'Therefore, production does not exist' establishes that [things are free from inherent production]."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> Therefore, it is not that the non-existence of inherent production of things is not asserted to be established. *Clear Words* says:
>
> > ... because of possessing the result of simply refuting the theses of other logicians.
>
> These syllogisms simply refute the theses of opponents regarding inherent existence. The meaning is that nothing other than that is proven. The proof which is a mere refutation is not refuted.

The Prasangika Madhyamika system says that a valid inferential cognizer can be generated by means of stating a consequence, whereas the Svatantrika Madhyamika system says that it is necessary to state a correct reason which is an autonomous reason in order for a valid inferential cognizer to be generated. In other words, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that by flinging a consequence the opponent can generate a valid inferential cognizer. This generation of a valid inferential cognizer is a result of setting forth a mere consequence. Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that through setting forth syllogisms the opponents' theses regarding inherent production are refuted. Syllogisms in this context are those that refute production from the four extremes. When these syllogisms are set forth they just refute the opponents' theses regarding inherent production without establishing anything in its place.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 141) says:

> Similarly, it is also said:
>
> > We do not establish non-existence or existence, rather we refute that which others impute as existent and non-existent because, through eliminating the two extremes, we claim to establish the middle path.

"We refute that which others impute as existent and non-existent" describes the positions of others who impute inherently existent production and those who impute non-existence thinking that if phenomena do not exist inherently they do not exist at all. "Eliminating the two extremes" refers to eliminating the extreme of permanence and the extreme of annihilation.

In regard to this Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> The mere elimination of the two extremes – of existence and non-existence – asserted by opponents is the meaning of "Except for that, nothing else is established." However, it is not simply that by refuting the two extremes they are not established, for it is said that through eliminating the two extremes the middle path is established.

"It is not simply that by refuting the two extremes they are not established" means that by refuting the two extremes that which is established is the middle path.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> In addition, if inherent existence is not non-existent, since there is no third possibility inherent existence would exist because [Nagarjuna's] *Refutation of Objections* clearly says:
>
> > If it is not inherently existent how does it rule out non-inherent existence? If non-inherent existence is overturned, inherent existence is thoroughly established.

The opposite of inherent existence is non-inherent existence, thus if inherent existence is overturned non-inherent existence is established as there is no third possibility. Inherent existence and non-inherent existence are direct contradictions. For example, when a pot is ruled out as being permanent it is established to be permanent. On the other hand, if pot is held to be permanent it cannot be held to be impermanent, there being only two possibilities – it is either permanent or impermanent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> Although asserting such a thesis and proof, the reason that one does not become a Svatantrika is not elaborated since it has already been explained extensively and repeatedly elsewhere.

By asserting such a thesis and proof one does not become a Svatantrika Madhyamika in that the Prasangika Madhyamikas also assert such a thesis and proof. This is explained extensively and repeatedly by Lama Tsongkhapa himself in other texts such as in his *Great Commentary* on the *Treatise on the Middle Way*.

Why does one not become a Svatantrika Madhyamika? A Svatantrika Madhyamika is defined as: a middle wayer who accepts the three modes of a correct reason as autonomous (the three modes are: the presence of the reason in the subject, the forward entailment, and the reverse entailment). The consequence "a sound, as the subject, it follows that it is a non-product because it is permanent" is a correct consequence that suggests the proof "sound, as the subject, is impermanent because of being a product." A Svatantrika Madhyamika asserts that the three modes implied by a consequence are autonomous. Therefore, the mere acceptance of a thesis and proof is not sufficient to become a Svatantrika Madhyamika, one has to fulfill the above definition.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> QUESTION: Well then, what are the definitions of the two negatives?
> REPLY: In general, a negative phenomenon is an object realized by an awareness upon the explicit elimination of an object of negation. Therefore, the mere elimination of an object of negation in regard to things, such as the elimination of it not being itself, is not a negative. Although an object of negation is not explicitly eliminated by terms such as "reality" or "ultimate truth," when its meaning appears to the mind it is a negative appearing as having an aspect of the elimination of elaboration.

The definition of a negative phenomenon is: an object realized by an awareness upon the explicit elimination of an object of negation.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, the mere elimination of an object of negation in regard to things, such as the elimination of it not being itself, is not a negative." For example, the word 'thing' eliminates it not being itself, i.e., it not being a thing. Is thing a negative phenomenon or a positive phenomenon? It is not a negative phenomenon because in order to realize thing there is no need to eliminate an object of negation. Although the word 'reality,' like the word 'thing,' is not a negative word, when reality appears to an awareness it has an aspect of the elimination of an object of negation. This is because when reality appears to an awareness it appears as an aspect of the *absence* of inherent existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> From among the two [negatives], a non-affirming negative (*med dgag*) is: upon explicitly eliminating the object of negation by an awareness another phenomena *is not* suggested nor established. For example, when asked whether it is suitable or not for brahmins to drink beer, the statement "They do not drink beer" merely eliminates their drinking beer but does not establish either "they do drink" or "do not drink" drinks other than that.

Saying that brahmins do not drink beer does not establish that brahmins drink tea or juice. It merely negates that brahmins drink beer, nothing else is established in its place. This is an example of a non-affirming negative. It is called a non-affirming negative because the phrase, for example, "Brahmins do not drink beer" is a negative such that when the object of negation is refuted another phenomenon is not established.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> An affirming negative (*ma yin dgag*) is: upon eliminating an object of negation by an awareness another phenomenon *is* suggested or established. For example, when wishing to indicate someone as being of the servant caste the statement "He is not a brahmin" does not merely negate him being a brahmin but [suggests that] he is other than a brahmin; through hearing other than that and so forth, he is established as being of the low servant caste.

If in regard to a certain person someone says "He is not a brahmin" this does not only negate him being a brahmin but also indicates that he is of a lower caste. This is because in India the highest of the four castes is the brahmin caste. The four castes are: the brahmin caste (*bram ze*), the royal caste (*rgyal rigs*), the servant caste (*dmang rigs*), and the cobbler caste (*rdol rigs*) [or the brahmin caste (*bram ze*), the royal caste (*rgyal rigs*), the merchant caste (*rje'u rigs*), and the servant caste (*dmang rigs*)].

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> In regard to suggesting another phenomenon there are three [ways of] suggesting it:
> (1) explicitly,
> (2) implicitly, and
> (3) contextually.
>
> (1) [Explicit suggestion]: for example, the single phrase "selflessness exists" establishes both the elimination of an object of negation and the suggestion of another phenomenon.

The statement "selflessness exists" acts to eliminate the object of negation and to suggest another phenomenon.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> (2) [Indirect suggestion]: indicates [something] by way of the meaning, for example, "Corpulent Yajmana does not eat during the day."

Saying that fat Yajmana does not eat during this day indirectly implies that he eats at night.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> These two respectively suggest explicitly and implicitly.

The statement "selflessness exists" is an explicit suggestion, whereas the statement "Corpulent Yajmana does not eat during the day" is an implicit suggestion.

> [A negative] possessing both [explicit and implicit suggestions] is, for example, "Corpulent Yajmana who does not eat during the day is not emaciated."

"Corpulent Yajmana who does not eat during the day" suggests implicitly that he eats at night, whereas saying that he "is not emaciated" suggests this explicitly.

> (3) [Contextual suggestion]: in the context of having ascertained someone to be either of the royal or brahma lineage but not ascertaining the particular one, for example, the phrase "He is not a brahmin" itself does not indicate [that he is of the royal lineage, but does so in the context].
> These are drawn from the explanation in [Avalokitavrata's] *Commentary on [Bhavaviveka's] 'Lamp for [Nagarjuna's] "Wisdom"'* which says:
>
> > Negatives that indicate by the meaning,
> > Establish with a single phrase,
> > Possess [both of] them, do not indicate by the phrase itself;
> > Those other than the affirming are the other.

This verse sets out the three types of affirming negatives. The definition of an affirming negative is: a term that in negating an object of negation suggests another phenomenon. This topic is discussed in *Collected Topics* and *Tenets*.

Wednesday afternoon, 3 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> Some say that if the basis is combined with an affirmative phenomenon it is incorrect to say that it is not a non-affirming negative because the affirmative phenomenon, brahmin, does not negate; it merely eliminates the object of negation, brahmins do not drink beer. For example, sound being a manifest phenomenon does not negate impermanent sound being a hidden phenomenon.

Some say that if a basis is combined with an affirmative phenomenon it is incorrect to say that it is not a non-affirming negative because a basis such as a brahmin is an affirmative phenomenon whereas "A brahmin does not drink beer" is a non-affirming negative. For example, a sound is a manifest phenomenon, whereas impermanent sound is a hidden phenomenon, however, "sound being a manifest phenomenon does not negate impermanent sound being a hidden phenomenon." Sound is a manifest phenomenon because it can be realized by experience without depending on a base which is a reason, whereas impermanent sound is a hidden phenomenon in that in order to realize it one must depend on a base which is a reason.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> Others say that it is also incorrect to say that if the basis is combined with an affirmative phenomenon another phenomenon is suggested because brahmin, for example, is the basis of judging the suggesting or non-suggesting of another phenomenon, it is not a different phenomenon which is suggested.

Some say that in the phrase "A brahmin does not drink beer" brahmin is the basis of judging the suggesting or non-suggesting of another phenomenon but it is not the phenomenon suggested.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Having re-expressed the four assertions, it is explained:
>
> *That itself does not arise from that, how could it from others?*
> *Neither is it from both, how could it exist without cause?* [6.8ab]
>
> That which is the meaning of, "is not produced from self" is, "that itself does not arise from that." This should be applied similarly to the rest.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *That itself does not arise from that. How can it from other?*
> *Neither does it from both. How can it causelessly?* [6.8ab]
>
> Thus, Arya [Nagarjuna's] four theses are set out here [as follows]. *That* result *itself does not arise from* the entity of *that*. *How can* a cause which is established by way of its own character arise *from other*? It does not. *Neither does it* arise *from both* self and other. *How can it* arise *causelessly*? It does not.
> If inherently established things existed they would be pervaded by being produced from one of the [following] four extremes: inherent production is fixed as two – having and (1) not having a cause; having a cause is fixed as three – produced respectively from (2) self or (3) other, and produced from (4) a combination of both, whereby four theses are sufficient [in refuting all possibilities of inherent production].

The root text cited here is Chandrakirti's commentary in the *Supplement* on the verse from Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*:

> Not from self, not from other,
> Not from both, not causelessly;
> Production of any thing anywhere
> Does not exist ever.

These lines set out the four theses regarding non-inherent production: things are not produced from self, from other, from both, and causelessly. Having posited the theses, they are then proved by reasonings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B Indicating the proof established by that reasoning
>
> 1 Refuting production from self
> 2 Refuting production from other
> 3 Refuting production from both
> 4 Refuting production causelessly

Production from self is asserted by the Samkhyas. Production from other is asserted by the Svatantrika Madhyamikas and the other lower schools because they say that a cause that is established by way of its own character produces a result that is established by way of its own character. Production from both is asserted by the Nigranthas, a non-Buddhist school. For example, they say that a clay tile is produced from itself, i.e., the clay, and produced from other, i.e., the tile makers and so forth. Based upon this reasoning a clay tile is said to be produced from both self and others.

Causeless production is asserted by the Charvakas who say that phenomena, such as the sharpness of thorns, the roundness of peas, the design of a peacock's feathers, and so forth are without cause.

These four types of production are refuted by our own system.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 144) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1 Refuting production from self

A Refuting [production from self] by the reasonings in the composed commentary
B Refuting [production from self] by the reasonings in *Fundamental Wisdom*

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A Refuting [production from self] by the reasonings in the composed commentary

1 Refuting the system of tenet holders who assert the realization of thusness
2 Indicating [production from self] as non-existent even conventionally for those whose minds have not been affected by tenets
3 Summarized meaning of such refutations

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A1 Refuting the system of tenet holders who assert the realization of thusness

A Refuting production from causes that are same entity as itself
B Refuting that the two, cause and result, are one entity

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A1A Refuting production from causes that are the same entity as itself

1 The consequent of being purposeless if produced from causes that are the same entity
2 It contradicts reasoning if produced from the same entity
3 Refuting the response that dispels their faults

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A1A-1 The consequent of being purposeless if produced from causes that are the same entity

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Further, if asked: from where is this ascertained?
> Like this:
>
> *If it arises from that, there is not any quality,*
> *And there is just no reason for the produced to be produced again.* [6.8cd]
>
> "It" means "the sprout," that being produced, the agent of the action of being produced. "From that" means "from the self-entity of that itself generating." Therefore, "that itself, the essential nature of the sprout, does not arise from that itself, the sprout's own essential nature." This is the meaning of the assertion.
>
> If asked: why?
> Because that itself attained its own existence while existing the sprout's own essential nature. There does not exist any special quality regarding arising from that itself because the state of existence was already attained before.

What does it mean that a sprout is produced? A sprout being produced means that it attains its entity and becomes existent.

The Samkhya position is as follows. They assert that a result already exists at the time of its cause but is not apparent at that time. When a sprout is produced it becomes apparent, at this time it is said that a sprout has been produced. Therefore, according to them a result already exists at the time of its

cause. In addition, they say that a general principal, which is unitary in that it is partless, pervades everything. All results are one nature in the sense of being here and there. The general principal is one nature; however, temporally it has many aspects. For example, there are many types of sprouts yet their nature is all one – the general principal. Such a general principal is composed of three qualities: particles, essential power, and darkness. When these three qualities are balanced there is one nature. The general principal gives rise to the intellect, or the great one. From those two come pride, which is of three types: pride of transformation, pride of essential power, and pride of darkness. Out of the pride of transformation come the five mere objects: forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. From these five come the five elements: earth, water, fire, wind, and space. Out of the pride of essential power come eleven powers: the five bodily powers, the five powers of awareness, and the mental power. The five bodily powers are: speech, arms, legs, anus, and genitalia. The five powers of awareness are: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. To these is added the person who is the self, consciousness, and knower. Ishvarakrishna's *Tantra* says (L. Sopa, *Cutting Through Appearances*):

> The fundamental nature is not a transformation.
> The seven – the great one and so forth – are natures and transformations.
> Sixteen are transformations.
> The person is not a nature and not a transformation.

The fundamental nature is the general principal. The seven are the great one, pride, and the five mere objects: forms, sounds, odors, tastes and tangible objects. These seven are natures because they are causes and transformations because they are results. The sixteen transformations, the eleven powers and five elements, are only results, they are not causes. The being or person composed of self, consciousness, and knower is not a nature because it is not a cause and it is not a transformation because it is not a result.

This is the way in which the Samkhyas present the twenty-five objects of knowledge. Some say that particles, essential power, and darkness refer to the three mental poisons: darkness being ignorance; essential power, hatred; and particles, attachment. The Samkhyas say that when the being and the general principal meet attachment is produced in the self. Due to the production of this attachment the general principal creates the objects of this attachment, the five sense objects. The subject and object having been produced, the being enjoys the five sense objects. When a being enjoys the five sense objects for a long time slowly the desire for them diminishes. When the being becomes tired of these objects he begins to investigate who created the five sense objects and discovers that they were created by the general principal. When the general principal is thus discovered, it becomes embarrassed and as a result disappears in the form of a rainbow withdrawing the transformations, the five sense objects. In addition, the arm power and so forth are withdraw whereby only the being remains; this is the attainment of liberation.

This is a brief presentation of the Samkhyas' assertions. The existence of a result at the time of its cause is refuted with sharp reasonings in Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* and Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition*. Shantideva says that if a result exists at the time of its cause it follows that when eating food one is eating excrement because you Samkhyas assert that a result exists at the time of its cause, the result of eating food being excrement. Dharmakirti says that if a result exists at the time of its cause it follows that you Samkhyas would have to say that a hundred elephants exist on the tip of a blade of grass. The Samkhyas would respond that they do exist but are not visible. This discussion arises from the fact that on the tip of a blade of grass there could be an ant in whose continuum there is the potency to take rebirth as an elephant a hundred times, whereby there would be a hundred elephants existing on the tip of the grass because the Samkhyas assert that if a result does not exist at the time of its cause it cannot be produced. Dharmakirti is saying that since an ant can be supported on the tip of a blade of grass

likewise a hundred elephants can be supported on it because the ant has the potency to be reborn a hundred times as an elephant. In this way the position of the Samkhyas is refuted.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 144) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *If that were to arise from that, there would not exist any of the qualities.* [6.8c]
>
> QUESTION: Through what reason is this non-production from self of things ascertained?
> REPLY: While being produced *if that*, the sprout, *were to arise* from *that*, the agent of the action of production, *there would not exist any of the* special *qualities* which must occur in arising thus because the self-entity of the sprout has already been attained at the time of the former cause [the seed].

If the sprout were to exist already at the time of the seed what special qualities would arise at the time of the sprout? This is the meaning of Chandrakirti's saying: "If that were to arise from that, there would not exist any of the qualities." This refutes production from the same entity. In other words, the production of a sprout is its arisal from the planting of a seed whereas if the result, the sprout, were to exist at the time of its cause, the seed, there would be no reason for the sprout to be produced.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> Regarding this, the Samkyas [claim] that mutually different individual causes and conditions have a single shared result. And, moreover, causes and conditions indispensably involve the unitary principal which is of a single nature. Therefore, that which is the nature of barley, the cause, is also the nature of water, manure, and so forth, the conditions. And, similarly, the nature of a sprout and the nature of its causes and conditions are asserted as being here and being there [since] such is asserted as the nature of all transformations.

The Samkhyas say that causes and conditions are of a single nature. Among the twenty-five objects of knowledge that they assert, the first and last are not transformations, i.e., results, whereas the other twenty-three are transformations. They are a single nature because although being here and there they mutually cooperate with each other.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 144-5) says:

> Therefore, since they merely assert seed and sprout to be mutually different, they do not claim that a sprout is produced from a sprout. However, in propounding that a sprout is produced from a seed and [the seed's] nature, the two natures are one. Therefore, production from its own nature and production of a sprout that exists non-apparently at the time of the cause is the mode of asserting production from self.

That a result exists non-apparently at the time of its cause is the meaning of production from self. Production refers to its actual appearance. There are two types of sprouts: the apparent and the non-apparent. An apparent sprout is a manifest sprout while a non-apparent sprout is the sprout that exists at the time of the seed. The Samkhyas go on to assert that a clearly apparent sprout is not produced from self, whereas a non-apparent sprout is produced from self. Therefore, they say that a non-apparent sprout is produced from self but an apparent sprout is not produced from self. An apparent sprout is the actual green sprout that is seen to grow in a field, whereas the non- apparent sprout is that which exists in the seed under the ground.

In short, while our system does not say that a cause, such as a barley seed, contains a barley sprout, the Samkhyas says that it does although it is not yet seen. To debate this assertion one can

posit, for example, that in the body of a human being there is the potency to be reborn as a sheep. One can then ask the Samkhyas whether a sheep exists in the human being's body saying that it must because if the potency exists the result exists. One can also say to the Samkhyas: "Do you have a tail? Do you have horns? You should accept that you do because the tail and horns of a sheep exist in you in a non- apparent way."

Thursday morning, 4 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 145) says:

> Some specific Samkhyas do not propound production but assert that from a cause the previously non- apparent is later apparent; however, the meaning is the same. By this, the generality and instances are asserted to be the same entity and are also such. However, the Buddhists' assertion that thing and pot are the same entity is not at all similar. Thus, if everything which is the entity or nature of a sprout were to exist at the time of the seed, even a apparent sprout which is a different object from the entity of sprout would not be feasible. Therefore, at the time of the cause not only do the nature or entity of the sprout exist, but the sprout necessarily exists as well. Therefore, at that time, it is utterly purposeless to it being produced again after it has [already] been established.

Within the Samkhya school there are two subdivisions: the theistic and non-theistic. One subdivision says that the sprout is not produced but becomes apparent later on after not having been apparent at the time of its cause. Our own system says that whether you Samkhyas say that a sprout is produced at the time of its cause and later becomes apparent or that it is not produced at the time of its cause but later becomes apparent the meaning is the same. Lama Tsongkhapa says that the Samkhyas' assertion that the generality and instances are one entity is completely different from the Buddhists' assertion that thing and pot are one entity. For the Samkhyas the partless generality is one nature and all the instances that are the nature of the partless generality are mutually one nature. For example, they say that a horse and donkey are mutually one nature, a pillar and pot are mutually one nature, a man and a woman are mutually one nature, and so forth. The Buddhist schools say that thing and pot are one entity but a pot is a distinct instant of thing. Also a pillar is a distinct instant of thing but a pillar and a pot are not mutually one nature, a horse and a donkey are not mutually one nature, and so forth. For this reason there is a great difference between the assertions of the Samkhyas and the Buddhist schools.

The Samkyas say that a sprout exists at the time of its cause. Our system says that if a sprout exists at the time of the seed it would be impossible for an apparent sprout which is different from the entity of sprout to exist. In other words, if the nature of the sprout exists at the time of the cause what kind of apparent sprout exists that is different from the sprout? Such an apparent sprout is not feasible.

Our own system says that the sprout having already been produced there is no purpose to it being produced again. In other words, since the sprout already exists at the time of the seed there is no purpose to it being produced again.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 145) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A1A-2 It contradicts reasoning if produced from the same entity

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The statement, "this position of production from self is also contradictory with reasoning," is explained [in 6.8d]: *and there is just no reason for the produced to be produced again.*
>
> But since this is no more than a mere assertion, from the point of view of reasoning:

> *If the already produced is imagined to be produced again,*
> *Production of sprouts and so forth would not be found here.* [6.9ab]
>
> – is mentioned.
>
> If the seed that had already been produced is asserted as being produced again, due to what [reason] would one be made to think that this [seed] stops its production and then the sprout is produced? What obstacle exists to that [seed] being produced again? Its sprout, stalk, skin and so forth would not be produced at all.

Asserting production from self contradicts reasoning because if something is already produced there is no purpose to it being produced again. In other words, since something is already produced why would it be produced again? This would be meaningless.

Our own system having set out the thesis "there is just no reason for the produced to be produced again" in the previous stanza (v. 6.8d), Chandrakirti follows upon this saying: "If the already produced is imagined to be produced again, production of sprouts and so forth would not be found here." This means that there would be no end to production as the seed would be produced again and again.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 145) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Also there is no reason for the produced to be produced again.* [6.8d]
>
> *There is no reason for* that which has already been *produced to be produced again*, that is, to be reproduced after it has already been produced. The term '*also*' [in the root verse indicates] production from its own nature as just meaningless. Also if one holds to the position of the apparent:
> (1) if the apparent result exists at the time of the cause, it would contradict the assertion, and
> (2) if [the apparent result] does not exist [at the time of the cause], the two – the appearance of the result and the nature of the result – would be refuted in analysis as being one and different.

Lama Tsongkhapa sets out the two assertions of the Samkhyas:

(1) the apparent result exists at the time of cause and
(2) the apparent result does not exist at the time of the cause.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Also if one holds to the position of the apparent: (1) if the apparent result exists at the time of the cause, it would contradict the assertion." The assertion that is contradicted is the position that the sprout is not apparent at the time of the cause but becomes apparent later. Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "If [the apparent result] does not exist [at the time of the cause], the two – the appearance of the result and the nature of the result – would be refuted in analysis as being one and different." This analysis refers to analyzing whether the apparent sprout is the same or a different entity from the seed. The Samkhyas' position is that causes are natures and results are transformations. One analyzes whether the apparent sprout is one nature or a different nature from the cause. If one says that it is not one nature with the cause this would contradict the Samkhyas' assertion that all, both causes and results, are one nature. If one says that the apparent sprout is a different entity from the sprout this would contradict their assertion that all results exist non-apparently at the time of their cause. The Samkhyas cannot say that they are different natures because they assert that all results are created by a partless unit whereby all results are one nature with the creator.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

Chandrakirti says:

> *If that already produced is thoroughly conceived to be produced again*
> *Production of the sprout and so forth would not be found here.* [6.9ab]

Since "production from self contradicts reasoning" is nothing but a mere thesis, the presentation of the reasoning that refutes [production from self is as follows]. *If* the seed which has *already* been *produced is thoroughly conceived*, i.e., asserted, *to be produced again*, by what reason is it asserted that upon the seed being prevented from reproducing the sprout is produced? What hindrance is there to the seed being produced again? There is none, whereby, [production of] stalks, husks, and so forth, through *the production of the sprout and so forth*, *would not be found here* in the world ever.

If something already produced is produced again and again then in the world there would be no occasion for production because everything produced would be produced again and again.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Furthermore:

The seed would alone be produced until the end of existence, [6.9c]

– because of the very cause that was explained.

Here Chandrakirti sets out the second part of consequence that if there is production from self production would be not only be purposeless but it would also be *without an end*. In this case, production of the seed would continue without end until the end of existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 145) says:

Chandrakirti says:

> *The seed would be strongly produced until the end of existence.* [6.9c]

There is also another fault. *The seed* itself *would be strongly produced* uninterruptedly *until the end of existence* because that which has already been produced must be produced again.
Having presented the two faults – (1) those that accord with the reasoning of results, non-production, and (2) those that accord with the reasoning of causes, uninterrupted production – [production from self] is said to contradict reasoning.

If there were production from self it would follow that production would be purposeless and endless. A consequence can be set out as follows: a sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production is purposeless and endless because it is produced from itself. The faults are set out in Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 216):

1 Reasoning refuting production from self
A. How the reasoning refuting production from self is set forth in the commentary by Acharya Buddhapalita
B. The manner in which its faults are exposed by Bhavaviveka
C. How Buddhapalita does not incur those faults
D. Indicating the faults incurred by Bhavaviveka himself in his commentary on the refutation of production from self

A How the reasoning refuting production from self is set forth in the commentary by Acharya Buddhapalita

Buddhapalita says:

> Things are not produced from self because their production would be purposeless and because there would be an extremely absurd consequence. There would be no purpose to those things existing as their own entity being produced again. Supposing that they exist [as their own entity] if produced they would never not be produced.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: It was said that karmic seeds are deposited on the mere I which is imputed on the basis of the aggregates. At the time of death the aggregates are abandoned so how does a mere I that is imputed on them transport the karmic seeds?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: First of all, for the Prasangika Madhyamika system there is no need to posit a basis for the latencies of actions because the disintegratedness of the action is itself a functioning thing that can bring about a result. However, they also say that the latencies of actions are deposited on the mere I. The present I is merely imputed on the basis of the collection of the five aggregates. When one dies, although it is true that the physical form aggregate is abandoned, the remaining aggregates are not abandoned. The I that is imputed on these aggregates is what continues on to the next life. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that there is:

1. an I that pervades all lives,
2. an I that comes from a past life to the present life,
3. an I that goes from this life to another life, and
4. an I that is qualified by this present life.

The I qualified by this life stops at death. For example, the I qualified by this life that is a fully ordained monk stops at death. Likewise, the Maurizio qualified by this life stops at death. However, there is an I that continues from this life to the next life. These various types of I are discussed in the *Treatise on the Middle Way* in the context of the refutation of a self of persons. The conclusion is that there does not exist the fault that the latencies of actions stop at death because, although the I qualified by this life stops, the latencies continue in that they are deposited on the I that goes from this life to the next life.

Student: Is a cause destroyed before, during, or after its result?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system a cause ceases upon the arising of its result whereas according to the Samkhyas a result exists at the time of cause. [For the Prasangika Madhyamikas] when a seed is planted, having become dregs, the sprout arises. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas cause and result do not exist simultaneously, first the cause exists and then subsequently the result arises. This is accepted in the majority of Buddhist schools except for the Vaibhashika school which asserts the simultaneous existence of cause and result. They assert a simultaneously-arising cause and a concomitant cause which exist simultaneous with their results. However, in the case of a fruitional cause and an ever-functioning cause they say that the result arises after the cause.

Student: If a cause terminates before the result arises then there could not be a result in that there is no longer any cause.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Although a cause no longer exists at the time of its result, the cause does exist. In terms of time first there is a cause and then its result. This can be experienced in terms of planting a seed in a field, watering and fertilizing it, whereby a result arises. However, there is debate about this. For example, are mother and son cause and effect? Do they exist simultaneously or not? The answer is the time of the existence of the mother and the time of the existence of son are different in that first

there is the existence of the mother and then the existence of the son. A question arises: "Can mother and son not exist together?" They do.

The conclusion of the discussion of production from self is that if there were production from self it would follow that production would be purposeless and endless. The consequence of Buddhapalita's reasoning is: a sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production is purposeless and endless because it is produced from self. When the consequence is transformed into a reason: a sprout, as the subject, is not produced from itself because it has already achieved its own nature. When Buddhapalita set forth such reasoning Bhavaviveka countered it saying that the way Buddhapalita refutes production from self is incorrect. Bhavaviveka pointed out three faults in Buddhapalita's reasoning refuting production from self. One fault is the fault of not being able to eliminate the question asked by the Samkhyas: "When you say a sprout is not produced from itself does this mean that an apparent sprout is not produced from itself or that a non-apparent sprout is not produced from itself?" Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita's reasoning does not answer this question.

Thursday afternoon, 4 May 2000

In short, these faults do not actually occur in Buddhapalita's presentation but occur in Bhavaviveka's. However, we will discuss this later on when concluding the discussion of production from self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 146) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A1A-3 Refuting the response that dispels these faults

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Suppose [a Samkhya] considers: the beneficial conditions for the production of the sprout, such as water, season, and so forth, act to completely transform the seed and act to produce the sprout. The sprout, moreover, because of the contradiction in abiding together with the agent (the seed), acts to destroy the seed and arises. Therefore, there is no occasion of the mentioned faults and, because the seed and the sprout are just not other, there is not non-production from self either.
>
> This too is unsuitable, because:
>
> *How will that itself act to destroy it?* [6.9d]
>
> Because the seed and the sprout are just not other, it is also unreasonable for the sprout to destroy it, thinking, "like a self nature [destroyed] by itself."

The Samkhyas respond that there is no fault in asserting production from self. They say that conditions such as springtime, water, and so forth act to transform the seed and produce the result. They say that the sprout abiding together with the seed contradicts reasoning, therefore the sprout acts to destroy the seed whereby it ceases and the sprout arises, this not being contradictory to reasoning. The Samkhyas say that the seed and the sprout are not different entities in that they are the same entity, therefore the sprout is produced from itself. Our own system refutes this response saying that it is not feasible for the sprout to destroy the seed because according to you Samkhyas the seed and the sprout are not different. It is not feasible for the sprout to destroy the seed because the sprout does not destroy itself, its own nature. In other words, because the seed is the nature of the sprout itself the sprout does not destroy itself. For this reason, Chandrakirti says: "thinking, "like a self nature [destroyed] by itself."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> [The Samkhyas] think: "Conditions that assist the production of the sprout, such as water, springtime, and so forth, act to completely transform the seed into dregs, for example, and act to produce the sprout. Because it is contradictory for the sprout to abide simultaneously with the seed, its producer, [the sprout] acts to cease the seed and arises. Therefore, there is no context for the errors mentioned [above], the two faults of contradicting reasoning. Also since the seed and the sprout are not different natures or entities, it is not that there is no production from self."

"The two faults" are the faults mentioned before by our system regarding the Samkhyas assertion of production from self:

1. it follows that production is purposeless and
2. it follows that production is endless or uninterrupted.

Here the Samkhyas respond that no such fault is incurred. They say: "Also since the seed and the sprout are not different natures or entities, it is not that there is no production from self." Thus, the Samkhyas say that seed and sprout are one nature or one entity.

The Samkhyas say: "Because it is contradictory for the sprout to abide simultaneously with the seed, its producer, [the sprout] acts to cease the seed and arises." They say that the seed ceases whereupon the sprout arises. Thus, they say that the seed and sprout are one nature yet accept that the sprout arises only upon the transformation of the seed. The transformation of the seed into dregs and the arisal of the sprout is due to the conditions of springtime, water, and so forth. The Samkhyas say that because the seed and sprout are one nature there is production from self in that the sprout is the nature of the seed and is produced from it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 146) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *How does that itself act to destroy that?* [6.9d]
>
> REPLY: That too is unsuitable. Since the two natures of the two, the seed and the sprout, are one in all ways *how does that* sprout *itself act to destroy that* seed? It does not; the thought being "The sprout does not act to destroy the sprout."

Our own system says that the sprout destroying the seed is unsuitable because it would be like thinking that the sprout acts to destroy itself. For the Samkhyas the seed and sprout are one nature in all ways. In that case since the sprout destroys the seed it would also destroy itself; this is what is unsuitable.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> Although such harm is seen, it is not averted because it is a foolish disputant who thinks, "The sprout destroying the seed is in terms of transformation, therefore how could it be like itself destroying itself?" If all the entities or natures were over there and over here, even transformation would not be established individually, whereby harm could not be abandoned.

The Samkhyas say that a sprout destroying a seed is in terms of the transformation of the seed which is not the same as a sprout destroying itself. However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say such thinking is foolish. If the Samkhyas try to abandon the harm this cannot be done because "if all the entities or natures were over there and over here, even transformation would not be established individually." The Samkhyas say that everything is of the same entity, therefore they do not recognize the harm. The Samkhyas turn back the harm to their assertions against our own system. However,

although there are faults in their assertion of production from self when our own system points them out they are not recognized by the Samkhyas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 146) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A1B Refuting that the two, cause and result, are one entity

1 Since it follows that the shape and so forth of the two, the seed and the sprout, would not be different, refuting [that the two, cause and result, are one entity]
2 Refuting the response that rejects these faults
3 Since it follows that both would be similarly apprehended and not apprehended on each of the two occasions, refuting [that the two, cause and result, are one entity]

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A1B-1 Since it follows that the shape and so forth of the two, the seed and the sprout, would not be different, refuting [that the two, cause and result, are one entity]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Furthermore:

For you there would not exist differences of shape, color, taste, potential, and Maturation of the sprout different from those of the seed, the creative cause. [6.10ab]

Here, shape means long, round, and so forth. Color means yellow and so forth. Taste means sweet and so forth. Potential means distinctions of capacity – particulars of ability – for example, like hemorrhoid medicine eliminates hemorrhoids due to mere proximity to the body and [like] traveling in space by merely holding the essential medicine and so forth. Maturation means a distinction of the substance to be attained through complete transformation: for example, as *piper-logam* and so forth are sweet.

Our own system says that if seed and sprout are one nature in all ways it follows that they would not have different shapes, colors, and so forth. In other words, it follows that the sprout would not be different from the seed in terms of shape, being long, round, and so forth, because it is one nature with the seed, its cause. It also follows that the sprout would not be a different color from the seed. Chandrakirti only mentions yellow but color includes green, white, and so forth. It also follows that there would be no difference between the taste of the sprout and the taste of the seed because sprout is one nature with the seed. In addition, there would be no difference in their potential because the seed and the sprout are one nature in all ways. It would follow either that there is no potential in hemorrhoid medicine or that everything would have the potential to cure hemorrhoids. Chandrakirti also mentions: "traveling in space by merely holding the essential medicine." According to the Samkhyas everyone would have the ability to travel in space by merely holding the particular essential medicine. In short, according to the Samkhyas' assertions it follows that medicines would not have the ability to cure particular sicknesses because they would be one with their causes.

Chandrakirti says: "Maturation means a distinction of the substance to be attained through complete transformation: for example, as *piper-logam* and so forth are sweet."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If the seed and sprout are just not other (i.e., are identical states), the shape and so forth [existing] with the sprout would also be observed as undifferentiated like [the shape etc.] existing with the self-nature of the seed. Yet, it is not observed. Therefore, like sprouts of banana and so forth from seeds of white garlic and so forth, [seed and sprout] are unreasonable as just not other.

According to you Samkhyas seed and sprout should be observed to be undifferentiated, whereas they are observed to be different. To point this out Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, like sprouts of banana and so forth from seeds of white garlic and so forth, [seed and sprout] are unreasonable as just not other." In short, a banana tree cannot be produced from a white garlic seed and likewise a white garlic sprout cannot be produced from a banana seed. [The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that] according to you Samkhyas a banana tree should be produced form a white garlic seed and a white garlic sprout from a banana seed because according to you seeds and sprouts are one nature. Although you Samkhyas say that seed and sprout are one nature but this is not the actual case.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 146) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *For you the differences of shape, color, taste, potential, and ripening of the sprout*
> > *Which are different from those of the seed, the cause that produces it, would not exist.*
> > *[6.10ab]*
>
> There is also another fault. *For you the differences of shape*, length and so forth, *color*, green and so forth, *taste*, sweet, sour, and so forth, *potential*-strength, *and ripening of the sprout which are different from* the color, shape, and so forth *of the seed*, *the cause that produces* the sprout, *would not exist* because the entity and nature of the two, the seed and the sprout, are not differentiated in all ways.

In general some barley seeds, for example, are short, some are round, some are dark, some are light, some are very small and so forth. Due to there being these different types of seeds there are different types of results. The Prasangika Madhyamikas therefore say that according to you Samkhyas it follows that there would not be long and short seeds and long and short sprouts and so forth because everything is one nature. This reasoning further refutes production from self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> This would follow even though they are not observed to be identical. Saying "The entities of the two are also not completely the same" suggests the opposite.

According to the Samkhyas assertion these consequences follow but in reality seed and sprout are not like this. In short, seed and sprout are not observed to not be different, i.e., they are not observed to be one in all ways. Suggesting the opposite means that they are different.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> There is a very great difference between suggesting the opposite and suggesting an autonomous opposite.

"Suggesting the opposite" means that one sets forth a consequence by means of which the opposite is suggested. In the Prasangika Madhyamika system it is possible to suggest an opposite but not an autonomous opposite, the three modes of which are established by way of their own character.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> In regard to that, 'potential-strength' is like hemorrhoid medicine which heals that illness by mere proximity to the body and like traveling in the sky by merely holding some elixir and so forth.

Different types of medicines have different types of potential such as being able to cure hemorrhoids, enabling one to fly, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* says:

> 'Ripening' is to become a distinct substance through dissimilar conditions such as ***kyurura*** through sprinkling it with milk and piper longum and so forth becoming sweet tasting.

Dissimilar conditions refers to, for example, the fact that when *kyurura* trees are planted in a field if they are sprinkled with milk their fruit becomes sweet whereas usually it is sour. There is a discussion about this in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* saying: "*Kyurura* trees sprinkled with milk, as the subject,..." *Kyurura* is a small fruit used to cleanse the blood and to cure back pain. Likewise, piper longum is generally sour but it too can be transformed into a sweet taste.

END

Tuesday morning, 9 May 2000

(Masters Program Correspondence Course participants please note that there were no teachings Monday, 8 May 2000)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 147) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A1B-2 Refuting the response that rejects these faults

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Suppose it is considered: having given up the state of a seed, by attaining another state, the seed itself is transformed into a sprout.
>
> If like that, also:
>
> *If, having dispelled the previous property of the self, it transforms into*
> *An entity other than that, then, how would its [nature] be that itself?*[15] [6.10cd]
>
> The "property of" that means, "that itself just not being other [than] that." Since it is impossible for the sprout's state of not being other [to be different] than this concept, it's state of not being other is damaged.
>
> Suppose it is considered: even if the shape and so forth of the seed and sprout are different, [it is not contradicted by being] undifferentiated substances.
>
> It is not like that, because, if the shape and so forth are not perceived, the substance is not perceived.

If the Samkhyas say that the entity of the seed is transformed into the entity of the sprout because the state of the seed having been given up the state of the sprout arises, our own system responds that this is also incorrect. If it were so, it would follow as Chandrakirti says: "Having dispelled the previous property of the self, it transforms into an entity other than that, then, how would its [nature] be that itself?" In other words, if it were so, how could the nature of the seed transform into the nature of the sprout? It is not feasible. Chandrakirti says: "The 'property of' that means, 'that itself just not being other [than] that.'" The property of the seed means that itself. The property of the seed and the property of the sprout are not different because the nature of the seed and the nature of the sprout are the same.

Chandrakirti says: "Since it is impossible for the sprout's state of not being other [to be different] than this concept, it's state of not being other is damaged." The Samkhyas assert that the seed and sprout have different shapes and so forth but that they are not different substances, i.e., they are one nature. Our own system says that this is incorrect because shape and so forth are that which differentiates phenomena because, without apprehending different shapes and so forth, one cannot apprehend different substances. The Samkhyas say that seed and sprout do have different shapes and so forth but are one substance or one nature. They accept a partless unit that pervades all, both generalities and particularities. On the other hand, our own system says that a sprout is posited only upon the basis of its shape and color. For example, when a barley seed is roasted and ground into tsampa is it still the substance of the barley seed? Is the tsampa the substance of the barley seed? Is it the substance of the sprout? What is the difference between the seed and the substance of the seed? Think about it.

[15] How would the nature of the seed become that nature of the sprout itself.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 147) says:

> [The Samkhyas] say: Since through giving up the state of the seed there is transformation into other, the state of the sprout, because of the mere different states of the two, seed and sprout, there is the transformation of that very seed into a sprout.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *If, having eliminated the thing which is the self of the previous,*
> > *It transforms into an entity other than that, at that time how is that that itself?*
> > *[6.10cd]*
>
> REPLY: *If, having eliminated* the state of *the thing which is the self of the previous* seed, *it transforms into the entity* of the state of the sprout which is *other than that* state [of the seed], *at the time of* asserting such *how is* it logical to say "The very nature of *that* seed is *that*, the nature of the sprout, *itself*" because that very thing which is the state of that is the very thing which is that, and because there is nothing that is that which is a different object from the entity of that?

The Samkhyas say that the state of the seed is given up and then there is the state of the sprout. This too is incorrect. If it were the case that upon the state of the seed having been given up there arises the state of the sprout, then how could the nature of the sprout be the nature of the seed? This is not feasible, because the nature of the seed has been eliminated. The thing that is the *state* of the seed is the very thing that *is* the seed; this it what is eliminated. If the nature of the seed has become non-existent, how can it be transformed into sprout? Asserting that when the state of the seed is eliminated there arises the state of the sprout, as well as saying that the nature of the sprout is the nature of the seed is incorrect because the nature of the seed has ceased, whereby it cannot transform into the sprout.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 147) says:

> Therefore, [the thesis] that the entity of the two, the seed and the sprout, is not different in all ways is damaged.

The Samkhyas' position or thesis that the entity of the two is not different in all ways is damaged.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 147) says:

> [The Samkhyas] think: Although the shape and so forth of the seed and sprout are different, this is not incompatible with them not being different substances.
> REPLY: That is not suitable because if the shape and so forth are not apprehended then also the substance which is the seed and sprout is not apprehended.

The Samkhyas assert that although the seed and sprout are different in terms of their shapes and so forth, they are not different substances. They say that these two positions are not incompatible. One can ask: "What substances are apprehended without apprehending their shapes and so forth?" Here the words 'and so forth' includes color, taste, and so forth. For example, a pen as a substance is apprehended on the basis of its color, shape, parts, and so forth. On the other hand, it cannot be apprehended without apprehending its color, shape, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 147) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A1B-3 Since it follows that both would be similarly apprehended and not apprehended on each of the two occasions, refuting [that the two, cause and result, are one entity]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Furthermore:

> *If your seed and sprout are not other here,*
> *Like the seed, the so-called sprout would not exist to perception or*
> *Alternatively, since they are one, just like the sprout,*
> *That also would exist to perception. Therefore, this is not accepted.* [6.11]

Just as on the occasion of the sprout, the essence of the seed does not exist to perception by its own entity, likewise because of just not being other than the seed, also the self-essence of the sprout, like the self-essence of the seed, would not exist to perception.

Alternately, just as the sprout exists to perception, likewise also the seed, like the self-essence of the sprout, would exist to perception, because of just not being other than the sprout and so forth.

Since desiring to fully reject [their] following as faulty, the seed and the sprout are not to be accepted as just not being other.[16]

(Note: 'The self-essence of the sprout' (*myu gu gyi rang gi bdag nyid*) could be translated as 'the sprout's own essence.')

In response to the Samkhyas' assertion that the seed and the sprout are not other, i.e., they are not different, our system flings two consequences at them:

1. it follows that just as the seed is not apprehended at the time of the sprout, so too the sprout would not be apprehended at the time of the sprout because the seed and the sprout are the same substance and
2. it follows that just as the sprout is apprehended at the time of the sprout so too the seed would be apprehended at the time of the sprout, because the seed and the sprout are the same substance.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *If for you seed and sprout are not different here,*
> *The seed and likewise the sprout would not be apprehended, or,*
> *Alternatively, due to their being one, in the case of the sprout likewise*
> *That [seed] would also be apprehended. Because of that this is not to be asserted.* [6.11]
>
> There is also another fault. *If*, as *for you*, the two entities of *seed and sprout are not different* entities *here* in the world: (1) just as on the occasion of the sprout the *seed* is not apprehended, *likewise the sprout would* also *not be apprehended,* '*or,*' that is, *alternatively*, (2) *since their* entities, those of the seed and sprout, *are one* in all ways, *just as* on the occasion of *the sprout* that sprout is apprehended, *likewise that* seed *would also be apprehended* by a sense consciousness. *Because of that* not existing, these two errors are asserted to be abandoned, therefore *this* – that the entities of the two, the seed and the sprout, are not different – *is not to be asserted*.

In short, Lama Tsongkhapa says that one should give up asserting that the seed and sprout are not different substances.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 148) says:

[16] I.e., they are not to be accepted as non-diverse states.

> If these reasonings are well realized, all the wrong conceptions which assert that all substrata are mutually different entities and all their realities are one in being over there and over here and those that assert the reality at the time of a previous state to be the reality at the time of a later state will be averted.

Wrong conceptions are, for example, thinking that all substrata – phenomena ranging from forms through the exalted knower of all aspects – are different entities but that their realities are one. An example is the assertion that the reality of a pot is the reality of a pillar, and vice versa. Understanding well the reasonings set forth previously, such wrong conceptions will be averted.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 148) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A2 Indicating [production from self] as non-existent even for the conventions of those whose minds have not been affected by tenets

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 57) says:

> Therefore, having averted production from self that is imputed in other systems (e.g. Samkhya) that assert thusness as understood like that, in order to indicate, "this concept is inadmissible even in the conventions of the worldly whose minds are not trained in other systems [of tenets]," – it is explained:
>
> *Because even the worldly do not accept that "they are one"*
> *Because of seeing its effect even if the cause has disintegrated,* [6.12ab]
>
> Like this: although the cause called "the seed" has already ceased, the effect called "the sprout" is seen. Therefore, even the worldly do not see seed and sprout as states of not being other (non-diverse states), for if they were just one, like the cause, the effect would also not be seen – yet it is seen. Therefore, they are not states of not being other.

The assertion of production from self is refuted by Chandrakirti, who says that it is not even accepted by worldly beings, such as farmers, whose minds have not been affected by tenets. In other words, even those who have not studied any tenets, whether the Samkhya or Buddhist tenets, would not say that seed and sprout are one. Thus, farmers and so forth who have not studied either non-Buddhist or Buddhist tenets do not accept production from self in that they do not say that seed and sprout are one. Instead, they say that upon the seed having been transformed into a dreg the sprout is produced, in that they see that upon the seed having degenerated there is the arisal of a green sprout in a field. Thus, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the Samkhyas' assertion of production from self is not even accepted by those who are not trained in tenets.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 148) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Therefore, because of seeing the result of that even when the cause has disintegrated,*
> *Even the worldly do not assert "They are one."* [6.12ab]
>
> Therefore, having refuted the production from self – which is imputed differently in the Buddhist system – [asserted] by the Samkhya system which asserts thusness as conceived in this way, it is indicated that even for the conventions of worldly beings whose minds have not been affected by other tenet systems the conception of production from self is incorrect. *Therefore*, *because of seeing the result of that* seed *even when the cause*, the seed, *has disintegrated*, *even the worldly do not assert* "*They*, the seed and the sprout, *are one* entity."

Production from self is not feasible in that even worldly beings do not accept that seed and sprout are one; they instead accept that upon the disintegration of the seed, there is the arisal of the green sprout.

Because The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not deny but accept the conventions of the world, they are also sometimes called "Madhyamikas who take what is well known in the world" (*'jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa*).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 148) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1A3 Summarized meaning of such refutations

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 57) says:

Because, according to both positions, production from self contradicts reasoning:

Therefore, this firm conception that "things arise from self"
Is unreasonable in thusness and also in the world. [6.12cd]

Therefore, the Acharya [Nagarjuna], not distinguishing, refuted production in general, saying, "not from self."

There is someone (Acharya Bhavaviveka) who says:

Things are not *ultimately* produced from self because of existing, like a possessor of mind.
The qualification "ultimately" which he takes as the distinction should be considered "meaningless."

Production from self is not acceptable and contradicts reasoning from the point of view of both the conventional and the ultimate. With respect to this, Chandrakirti says: "This firm conception that 'things arise from self' is unreasonable in thusness and also in the world." Here 'thusness' refers to the ultimate and 'in the world' to the conventional.

Acharya Bhavaviveka applies the qualification 'ultimately' to production from self, saying "Things are not ultimately produced from self," whereas Chandrakirti does not. The passage cited here by Chandrakirti is from Bhavaviveka's *Lamp for [Nagarjuna's] 'Wisdom,'* which criticizes Buddhapalita's commentary, saying that it possesses three fallacies or faults:
(1) it does not state a reason and an example,
(2) it does not eliminate the fallacies adduced by others (the Samkhyas), and
(3) it affords the opportunity for censure.

Bhavaviveka says that if, for example, the Samkhyas were to ask Buddhapalita "When you say that a sprout is not produced from self, do you mean an already clearly apparent sprout or a non-apparent sprout?", then Buddhapalita's commentary does not answer this hypothetical question. Bhavaviveka also says that Buddhapalita's statements afford an opportunity for defeat on particular occasions, in that he contradicts the tenets of Arya Nagarjuna. In this way Bhavaviveka tries to demonstrate that Buddhapalita is wrong, whereas in fact he is right. Bhavaviveka's *Lamp for [Nagarjuna's] 'Wisdom'* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 463)"says:

That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example; (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another, [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because [Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system].

In short, Bhavaviveka says:

> The twenty-three objects of knowledge asserted by the Samkhyas, as the subject, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing, like a possessor of mind. The reason that I set forth does not raise questions by the Samkhyas.

The Samkhyas accept that the being who is the self, consciousness, and knower is not produced from self.

Student: What is the difference between a possessor of mind (*sems pa can*) and a sentient being (*sems can*)?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Possessor of mind is a synonym of self, consciousness, knower, and being.

Tuesday afternoon, 9 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 148) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *Therefore, thoroughly imputing "Things arise from self"*
> > *Is not appropriate to either thusness or the worldly.* [6.12cd]
>
> For this reason, according to both the sides of the ultimate and of worldly conventionalities, production from self contradicts reasoning. *Therefore*, *thoroughly imputing "*Outer and inner *things arise from self" is not appropriate with respect to either thusness*, the ultimate, *or worldly* conventionalities. Therefore, Arya Nagarjuna in refuting production from self does not apply the qualifications 'ultimately' and 'conventionally' but refutes production from self in general, saying "Not from self."

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, when refuting production from self there is no need to apply the qualification 'ultimately' or 'conventionally' to the non-production of self. Rather, it is sufficient to just say that there is no production from self. However, according to other systems there exist phenomena that are conventionally produced from self but are not ultimately produced from self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 148) says:

> Then, Acharya Bhavaviveka made a distinction saying: "Things are not *ultimately* produced from self because of existing, like a possessor of mind," however, the qualification 'ultimately' is to be considered "meaningless."

In the context of refuting production from self there is no need to apply the qualification 'ultimately,' saying that "ultimately there is no production from self." However, in the case of production from other, it is necessary to apply the qualification 'ultimately.' There is no need for the qualification 'ultimately' in the case of production from the other three extremes – production from self, production from both, and causeless production – because these are also refuted conventionally. It can be asked: "When the Svatantrika Madhyamikas apply the term 'ultimately,' does it mean that Bhavaviveka asserts production from self conventionally?" Since there is no such production, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that Bhavaviveka's "qualification 'ultimately' is to be considered 'meaningless.'" In short, Chandrakirti says that the fallacies that Bhavaviveka points out in Buddhapalita's refutation of production from self do not exist in Buddhapalita's refutation but instead exist in Bhavaviveka's own refutation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 149) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-1B Refuting [production from self] by the reasonings in *Fundamental Wisdom*

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 58) says:

Furthermore:

If production from self is asserted, the object to be produced, producer,
Action, and also agent would be identical, yet they are not identical –
Hence, production from self is not to be accepted
Because the faults that were abundantly explained would follow. [6.13]

As taught [in *The Treatise on the Middle Way*, 20.19]:

A oneness of cause and effect would never be admissible.
If cause and effect were oneness, producer and produced would become one.

Oneness does not exist because father and son or eye and consciousness would also follow as identical. Therefore, it is taught [in *The Treatise on the Middle Way*, 10.1]:

If the wood were the fire, agent and action would become one.[17]

Therefore, out of fear of the consequence of faults like that and so forth, since desiring to realize the two truths non-distortedly, things should not be accepted as produced from self.

Chandrakirti says that if it is asserted that the sprout is produced from itself, it follows that producer and produced, as well as agent and object, are one. In other words, the producer, the seed, and the produced, the sprout, would absurdly follow as being one. In addition, the object, the sprout, and the agent, the seed, would also absurdly follow as one. The seed is the agent which brings about the sprout, the object. If sprout is produced from itself then also a pot, the object, and the potter, the agent, would be one. Chandrakirti says that therefore it is not appropriate to accept that sprout is produced from self, as there would follow the many fallacies that were set out before.

Nagarjuna, in his *Treatise on the Middle Way,* says: "A oneness of cause and effect would never be admissible." In other words, cause and effect being one is not feasible. "Would never be admissible" indicates that there is no reasoning whatsoever that can establish cause and effect as one. Nagarjuna continues: "If cause and effect were oneness, producer and produced would become one." Chandrakirti gives the examples that if producer and produced are one then it would follow that father and son are one and eye and eye consciousness are one. Having demonstrated the faults of asserting production from self, Chandrakirti says "things should not be accepted as produced from self."

The *Treatise on the Middle Way* says: "If the wood were the fire, agent and action would become one." This means that if the agent, the burner, the fire itself, and the object of the action of burning, the wood, were one it would follow that agent and object of the action are one. However, agent and object of the action cannot ever be one, just as wood and fire cannot be one.

Such consequences are set forth to demonstrate the faults of the Samkhyas' thesis that a partless unit produces everything. Chandrakirti says: "out of fear of the consequence of faults like that and so forth, since desiring to realize the two truths non-distortedly, things should not be accepted as produced from self."

[17] According to the order of the words, the wood would be an agent of fire. One possible meaning might be, that wood used to create fire by friction – an indirect agent of the fire. Alternatively, some Tibetan masters explain that the term 'action' sometimes refers to the object acted upon. In that case, the fire would be the agent and the wood, the object acted upon, however, the order of the words would be reversed since the wood would be the object acted upon (the second term) and the fire would be the agent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 149) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *If asserted as produced from self, that which has been produced, that which produces,*
> > *Action, and also agent would be identical,*
> > *Yet they are not identical. Therefore, production from self is not to be asserted*
> > *Because the faults that are extensively explained would follow.* [6.13]
>
> There is also another fault. *If* results are *asserted as produced from self*, (1) the result, *that which has been produced*, (2) the cause, *that which produces*, (3) whatever *action* is done, and (4) *also* whatever *the agent* that acts *would be identical, yet they are not identical. Therefore, production from self is not to be asserted because the faults that are extensively explained* in this treatise and *Fundamental Wisdom would follow*.

"The faults that are extensively explained" refers to the faults set out at length in Chandrakirti's *Supplement* and Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 149) says:

> With respect to the first fault, *Fundamental Wisdom* says:
>
> > Cause and result being identical
> > Is never correct.
> > If cause and result were identical
> > Producer and produced would be one.
>
> This says that if cause and result were one entity, father and son, or eye and eye consciousness, would be identical.

The meaning of this was explained previously.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> With respect to the second fault, *Fundamental Wisdom* says:
>
> > If wood were fire
> > Agent and action would be one.

This means that if wood and fire were one, the agent and the *object* of the action would be one.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 149) says:

> If it is said "If refuted in this way, also the pair father-son and agent-action would follow as being one entity," this is acceptable [to the Samkhyas], however, if it is said that in general, they follow as one, their response is "There is no pervasion."

If the Prasangika Madhyamikas fling the consequence "agent and action, as the subject, it follows that they are one because they are produced from self," the Samkhyas would respond "There is no pervasion." This is because they say that if it is produced from self, there is no pervasion that the agent, the fire, and the object of the action, the wood, are one.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 149) says:

> However, if they are asserted as one nature in accordance with the previous explanation, the reasoning that is able to impel even the transformations as being one cannot be abandoned.

When the Samkhyas say that there is no pervasion, this cannot dispel the faults in their thesis that the general principal produces everything and that all transformations, here and there, are one. This is because the Samkhyas cannot say that they are all one nature but are not one, because if they accept that the nature is partless, then they cannot say that it has parts.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 149) says:

> In regard to [Chandrakirti's] statement "Therefore, fearing the above mentioned faults and wishing to realize unerringly the two truths do not assert production from self," since existence and non-existence of production from self are also a direct contradiction wherein excluding one, it being non-existent, the other of the pair is established, you should definitely assert that there is no production from self.

Production from self and non-production from self are direct contradictions, wherein when the non-existence of production from self is established, the existence of production from self is refuted.

This concludes the presentation of the refutation of production from self according to both the *Supplement* and *Fundamental Wisdom*. We will now discuss some points regarding the refutation of production from self that are not covered in these texts.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 216) says:

> Middle Way Opposite of the Consequences – Reasonings Refuting Production From Self
> What are the reasonings refuting production from the four extremes?
> 1. Reasoning refuting production from self
> 2. Reasoning refuting production from other
> 3. Reasoning refuting production from both
> 4. Reasoning refuting causeless production

Production from self is asserted by the Samkhyas, production from others by the Svatantrika Madhyamikas downward, production from both by the Nigranthas, and causeless production by the Charvakas. In the context of the Samkhyas' assertion of production from self, 'self' is the nature which is a partless unit. In the case of production from other, 'other' refers to a cause established by way of its own character which produces a result established by way of its own character. The Nigranthas give the example of a gold pot as that which is produced from both self and other, saying that it is produced from itself in that it is produced from gold, the cause, which brings the result, pot, and that it is produced from other in that it is produced by the work of the goldsmith. The Nigranthas say that a person who makes a gold pot is other than the gold; for this reason, they assert production from both. This assertion can be applied to any object.

As examples of causeless production, the Charvakas mention, for example, the roundness of peas, the sharpness of thorns, and the eyes of a peacock's feathers. They posit these as examples because they say that no one has acted to bring these about.

All four types of production are refuted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 216) continues:

> 1 Reasoning refuting production from self

A. How the reasoning refuting production from self is set forth in Acharya Buddhapalita's commentary

B. The manner in which the fallacies are exposed by Bhavaviveka

C. How Buddhapalita does not incur those fallacies

D. Indicating the fallacies incurred by Bhavaviveka himself in his commentary on the refutation of production from self

A How Acharya Buddhapalita's commentary sets forth the reasoning refuting production from self is

Buddhapalita says:

> Things are not produced from self because their production would be purposeless and because there would be an extremely absurd consequence. The production again of things [already] existing in their own entities is purposeless. If, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced.

The consequence is: things, as the subject, it follows that their production is purposeless and endless because they are produced from self.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 218) continues:

Our own system

The meaning of the commentarial speech of Buddhapalita is [as follows]. The Samkhyas say:

> Since it is incorrect for things to be produced without existing at the time of their cause, all results exist in a manner of not being clearly apparent in the entity of their own cause. A result that is established in a manner of being clearly apparent is designated 'produced.' That which is already apparent does not need to be produced again.

This passage sets out the thesis of the Samkhyas.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 218-9) continues:

The way in which that previous commentarial speech is refuted is:

> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production again is purposeless because it has already attained its own entity.

If [the Samkhyas] say that there is no pervasion:

> It follows that it is produced again endlessly because although it has already attained its own entity it needs to be produced again.

When this is condensed it is [as follows]:

> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production again is purposeless because it is existent.

If [the Samkhyas] say no pervasion:

> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that it is produced endlessly because though existent, it needs to be produced again.

Buddhapalita says that if things are produced from self, it follows that their production is purposeless and endless. To prove these two consequences, Buddhapalita then says "If, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced." In other words, if though already existent they are produced again, it would follow that they are produced again and again forever.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 219) continues:

Furthermore, the *Great Commentary on Fundamental Wisdom* says:

> The consequence expressing the contradiction between the two, (1) production again being purposeful and (2) an existent, is able to refute production from self. If it could not, even though an autonomous [syllogism] were set forth it could not [refute production from self]; therefore, there is no need to state an autonomous reason and example.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Great Commentary* says that Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita is not correct because if production from self cannot be refuted by a consequence expressing the contradiction between the two, it cannot be refuted by way of stating an autonomous reason and example. Therefore, there is no need for Buddhapalita to have stated such.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 219) continues:

Acharya Bhavaviveka, not understanding that presentation, the consequence which was just explained by Acharya Buddhapalita's commentarial speech, but understanding it as presenting the consequence,

> a sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production is purposeless and endless because it is produced from self,

expresses the fallacies that are explained below.

Buddhapalita's commentary sets out a consequence which does not say "it follows that its production *again* is purposeless and endless," although this is the meaning. Due to this, Bhavaviveka takes the consequence "it follows that its production is purposeless and endless" literally and criticizes Buddhapalita based on this.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 219) continues:

The *Great Commentary on Fundamental Wisdom* says:

> Bhavaviveka, not understanding the consequence that is flung as being "production *again* is purposeless and endless," through taking the consequence that is flung to be "production in general is purposeless and endless," presents this, saying that it is necessary to assert the opposite meaning.

Bhavaviveka says that "it is necessary to assert the opposite meaning," due to thinking that otherwise Buddhapalita would contradict Nagarjuna's tenets.

Wednesday morning, 10 May 2000

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 219) continues:

B The manner in which the fallacies are exposed by Acharya Bhavaviveka

Bhavaviveka's *Lamp for [Nagarjuna's] 'Wisdom'* says (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 461):

> About this, the other, [Buddhapalita], makes the explanation, "Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless." That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example; (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another, [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because [Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system. His explanation affords such an opportunity] because since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated, what emerges is the opposite of the thesis and the property of that thesis (the reason) – that things are produced from other because production is fruitful and because production has an end – due to which he would contradict [Madhyamika] tenets.

Bhavaviveka says that in Buddhapalita's commentarial speech which refutes production from self, a reason and an example are not set out. In other words, Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita does not set out a reason and an example. Bhavaviveka also says that Buddhapalita does not eliminate the fallacies adduced by others. Here the word 'others' refers to the Samkhyas, who can question the Prasangika Madhyamikas, saying: "When you say that there is no production from self does it mean that an apparent result is not produced from self or that a non-apparent result is not produced from self?" Bhavaviveka says that the answer to this question is not clearly stated by Buddhapalita. If it is said that a non-apparent result is not produced from self, then the Samkhyas would accept this but (Meditation on Emptiness page 456) if it is said that an apparent result is not produced from self then this would not be acceptable to them. In addition, Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita affords an opportunity for censure by others.

According to Bhavaviveka, Buddhapalita says (see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 456):

> Things are not produced from self because it follows that their production would be purposeless and endless.

However, Bhavaviveka says that the reason should be the opposite: "because it follows that their production is purposeful and has an end." Having reversed the reason, the thesis – "things are not produced from self" – should also be reversed to: "things are produced from other." In conclusion, Bhavaviveka says that the correct syllogism is:

> Things are produced from other because their production is purposeful and has an end.

Thus, Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita's syllogism contradicts Nagarjuna's tenets because Nagarjuna said that when the Prasangika Madhyamika system refutes production from the four extremes, the thesis should always be a non-affirming negative. Buddhapalita's thesis, however, is not a non-affirming negative but an affirming negative in that it suggests "things are produced from other." In short, Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita's syllogism "things are not produced from self because their production is purposeless and has an end" implies "things are produced from other" because the reason is "because their production is purposeless and has an end." Bhavaviveka

considers Buddhapalita a Svatantrika Madhyamika who accepts production from other, although he is in fact a Prasangika Madhyamika.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 220) continues:

1 The meaning of this as posited by our own system

2 Refuting the way in which the meaning of other scriptures are explained

1 The meaning of this as posited by our own system

Bhavaviveka says:

> The commentarial speech of Buddhapalita is not suitable:
>
> (1) because that commentarial speech does not state a correct reason and example which are able to refute production from self and
>
> (2) because, having investigated the thesis, it does not eliminate the criticism of the Samkhyas, who say:
>
> > If the meaning of the statement "not produced from self" is "a result is not produced from an [already] apparent entity" then that already established is [again] established, whereas if the meaning is "[a result] is not produced from the entity of a potency, a non-apparent cause," then it contradicts the pervasion.

Bhavaviveka says that in regard to Buddhapalita's statement that "things are not produced from self because it follows that their production is purposeless and endless," the Samkhyas can ask:

> Do you mean that an apparent result is not produced from self or that a non-apparent result is not produced from self? If you say a non-apparent result is not produced from self, this does not need to be established since it is already established for us. Therefore, there would be the fallacy that that already established is established again. However, if you mean that an apparent result is not produced from self, it follows that the reason contradicts the pervasion.

When Bhavaviveka says "having investigated the thesis, it does not eliminate the criticism," it refers to Buddhapalita's thesis, "things are not produced from self."

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 220) then sets out the third fallacy:

> (3) Moreover, [Buddhapalita's] commentarial speech is not suitable because it affords an opportunity for censure by other opponents. How does it afford this opportunity? Since [the thesis and the property of the thesis] must be reversed from what is explicitly stated in the commentarial speech, it affords that opportunity because:
>
> (i) due to the thesis and the property of the thesis emerging as the opposite of the reason explicitly stated in the commentarial speech, it becomes a correct reason establishing that production is fruitful and has an end, things not being produced from self, and...

When the reason is reversed, the syllogism having a correct reason is:

> It follows that things are not produced from self because their production is purposeful and has an end.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 220) continues:

> (ii) due to the emerging of the opposite of the thesis, the thesis of this context becomes an affirming negative in the sense of the words of the thesis "things are not produced from self" implicitly flinging "things are produced from other,"...

In short, Buddhapalita says:

> Things are not produced from self because it follows that their production is purposeless and endless.

Whereas Bhavaviveka says that the thesis and reason should be reversed to say:

> Things are produced from other because their production is purposeful and has an end.

Since the thesis "the production of things is not the mere elimination of production from self" implies "things are produced from other," the thesis is not a non-affirming negative but an affirming negative.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 221) continues:

> ...whereby it contradicts the tenets of the protector Nagarjuna.

In conclusion, Bhavaviveka says that while Nagarjuna's tenet is that when refuting production from the four extremes the thesis must always be a non-affirming negative, Buddhapalita sets out a thesis which is an affirming negative.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 221) continues:

> The way of reversing the explicitly stated reason [is as follows]. The purposeless and endless production explicitly stated in the commentarial speech is not a correct reason proving that things are not produced from self because the production of things *is* purposeful and *has* an end. If produced from self, production that is purposeful and has an end, rather than production that is purposeless and endless, is also not a correct reason proving that things are not produced from self. This is because when the reason establishes the property of the subject of that, it also definitely establishes the thesis.

When the reason establishes the property of the subject, the thesis is also necessarily established. Therefore, when the production of things is established as being purposeful and having an end, things are necessarily established as not being produced from self.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 221) continues:

> Therefore, Buddhapalita actually asserts the opposite meaning – "production is purposeful and has an end" – as a correct reason proving that things are not produced from self. This is because when the consequence, "a sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production is purposeless and endless because it is produced from self," is the explicitly presented consequence that refutes production from self in the context of the commentarial speech, the proof flung by this consequence is implicitly flung by the potential of the two phrases, the former and later: (1) "because [their production] would be [purposeless]" and (2) "because there would be [an extremely absurd consequence]."

> It also follows that the thesis explicitly stated in the commentarial speech must be reversed, it being necessary to reverse the reason explicitly stated in that. This is because if it is necessary to reverse the reason explicitly stated in that, it is also necessary to reverse the thesis explicitly stated in that. [Lama Tsongkhapa's] *Ocean of Reasoning* says:
>
> > If it is necessary to reverse the explicitly stated reason, it is also necessary to reverse the explicitly stated thesis because they are concordant.

Buddhapalita's explicitly stated reason is "because their production would be purposeless and endless" and his explicitly stated thesis is "things are not produced from self." When the reason is changed to "because their production is purposeful and has an end" the thesis must be explicitly changed to "the production of things is not the mere elimination of production from self" whereas implicitly it is changed to "things are produced from other."

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (pages 221-2) continues:

> If that is accepted, it follows that [the production of] things is not the mere elimination of production from self is the opposite meaning of the explicitly stated thesis that establishes things are not produced from self. This is asserted because that things are produced from self is not the opposite meaning of the explicitly stated thesis. Furthermore, the *Great Commentary on Fundamental Wisdom* says:
>
> > Regarding that, since it is not like the reversed reason, the opposite meaning is not the mere elimination of production from self.

The opposite of the thesis "things are not produced from self" is not "things are produced from self." Rather, it is "the production of things is not the mere elimination of production from self," which implies "things are produced from other."

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 222) continues:

> If that is accepted, through the words of the thesis "things are not produced from self," it follows that the production which is not the mere elimination of the production of things from self, from the point of view of flinging a thesis proving that things are not produced from self, implicitly suggests that things are produced from other.

Bhavaviveka says that while Nagarjuna sets out a thesis refuting production from self which is a non-affirming negative, Buddhapalita sets out an affirming negative, this being "the production of things is not the mere elimination of production from self."

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 222) continues:

> If that is accepted, it contradicts Arya Nagarjuna's explanation that the thesis establishing that things are not produced from self is a non-affirming negative.

In short, Bhavaviveka criticizes Buddhapalita's commentary, saying:

1. it does not present a correct reason and a correct example,
2. it does not eliminate the fallacies adduced by others,
3. it affords an opportunity for censure by other disputants.

Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita's explicit words are not correct because he literally says: "Things are not produced from self because their production would be purposeless and endless." Therefore, in order to give this statement sense, Bhavaviveka says that the explicitly stated reason must be reversed, whereby the syllogism becomes: "Things are not produced from self because their production is

purposeful and has an end." Then, since the explicitly stated reason has been reversed, the thesis must also be reversed because when the reason is reversed the thesis cannot remain as originally stated. Therefore, having made these changes, the statement becomes: "The production of things is not the mere elimination of production from self because their production is purposeful and has an end; therefore, things are produced from other." When the thesis is changed to "The production of things is not the mere elimination of production from self," the thesis is no longer a non-affirming negative but is an affirming negative in that it suggests another phenomenon, [production from other]. The definition of an affirming negative is: that which, upon eliminating the object of negation by an awareness, suggests or establishes another phenomenon.

In conclusion, Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita contradicts Nagarjuna's tenets because Nagarjuna says that the thesis in negating production from the four extremes must be a non-affirming negative whereas Buddhapalita sets forth an affirming negative.

This discussion of Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita's commentary comes in the context of the reasoning refuting production from self that is opposite of the consequences. In order to explain this section, Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen received a vision of Dharmaraja [Kalarupa]. Now comes the section explaining how Bhavaviveka's criticism does not apply to Buddhapalita.

Wednesday afternoon, 10 May 2000

To review: in the context of the discussion of the Opposite of the Consequences, the commentary by Buddhapalita is divided into two: (1) a brief presentation and (2) an extensive explanation. Buddhapalita's brief presentation is:

> Things are not produced from self because their production would be purposeless and because there would be an extremely absurd consequence.

Buddhapalita's extensive explanation is:

> The production again of things [already] existing in their own entities is purposeless. If though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced.

Bhavaviveka does not understand that the term 'again,' which is explicitly stated in the extensive explanation, is also implied in the brief presentation (i.e., "because their production *again*") and therefore criticizes Buddhapalita. Bhavaviveka says that the reason "because their production would be purposeless and because there would be an extremely absurd consequence" is not related to the thesis, "Things are not produced from self," nor is it established. He says that because the reason is not related to the thesis it has to be reversed. When the subject and predicate, i.e., the thesis, remain the same but the reason is reversed, it becomes: "Things are not produced from self because their production is purposeful and has an end." However, when the reason is reversed, the thesis cannot remain the same but must also be reversed. The mere opposite of the thesis "things are not produced from self" would be "things are produced from self" but this is not correct, therefore, the opposite of the thesis is: "The production of things is not the mere elimination of production from self." Thus, when the thesis is reversed it becomes an affirming negative because it suggests that things are produced from other, this being the production that is not the mere elimination of production from self. Due to this, Bhavaviveka then says that Buddhapalita contradicts the tenets of Nagarjuna because according to Nagarjuna the thesis for refuting production from self must be a non-affirming negative, whereas Buddhapalita sets out an affirming negative. According to Bhavaviveka, production is delimited to either production from self or production from other (see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 461). Therefore, since there is no production from self there is production from other. Thus, in Bhavaviveka's *Lamp for [Nagarjuna's] 'Wisdom'* it says that it appears that Buddhapalita accepts production from other. This is a brief presentation of Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 241) says:

C How Buddhapalita does not incur those fallacies

[Chandrakirti's] *Clear Words* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 474) says:

> I view all of these fallacies as not being reasonable. How? His saying "because [Buddhapalita] did not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example" is not reasonable. Why? [Buddhapalita] is inquiring in the following way of an opponent who asserts production from self:
>
> > You [Samkhyas] propound that "from self" [means] that the existence [of things that involve production acts] as a cause and that just it, [i.e., the existent], is produced. However, we do not see that there is purpose in the production again of the existent, and we also see that [such production] would be endless. However, you [Samkhyas] do not assert that the already produced is produced again and also do not assert that [the production of a thing] is endless. Therefore, your debate, [that is to say, your position of production from self,] is devoid of correctness and contradicts your own assertions.
>
> When [Buddhapalita] debates through just these [consequences] which have the effects [derived] from stating a reason and example, would the opponent not accept it? However, if the opponent is not overcome even through debate by way of contradicting his own assertions, then due to [his] shamelessness he also just would not be overcome by [stating] reasons and examples. We [Prasangikas] do not debate with the crazily stubborn. Therefore, when the master [Bhavaviveka] sets out inferences at inappropriate times, he is manifesting just his own liking for inference.

Chandrakirti says that the fallacies expressed by Bhavaviveka do not exist in the commentary by Buddhapalita. He asks Bhavaviveka: "When you say that reasons and examples are not established in this commentary does it mean that autonomous reasons and examples are not established or do you mean that reasons and examples renowned to others are not established?" Chandrakirti says that Buddhapalita's commentarial speech does not establish autonomous reasons but merely eliminates the others' position, that of the Samkhyas, by revealing inner contradictions. In other words, Buddhapalita eliminates the Samkhyas' position by means of consequences that establish contradictions in their assertion of production from self. In dependence on the consequences set forth by Buddhapalita, a Samkhya is able to generate an inferential cognizer.

Buddhapalita demonstrated the inner contradictions in production from self with two consequences (see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 470). The first consequence is:

> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production again is purposeless because of already existing in its own entity.

[If it is answered that the consequence is not entailed by the reason], the second consequence is:

> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production is endless because though it already exists in its own entity, there is a need for its re-production.

Chandrakirti says: "However, if the opponent is not overcome even through debate by way of contradicting his own assertions, then due to [his] shamelessness he also just would not be overcome by [stating] reasons and examples." This means that if the Samkhyas' own assertions are shown to be contradictory and they perceive these contradictions yet they persist in their error, they are crazy. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not debate with such crazy people.

In short, Chandrakirti says that Buddhapalita's commentarial speech does not have these fallacies in that, [although it does not set forth autonomous reasons and examples,] it sets forth reasons and examples renowned to the other, the Samkhyas. For example:

> A non-apparent sprout, as the subject, it follows that it is not produced from self because its own entity has already been attained; for example, like an apparent sprout.

'Apparent,' or manifest, refers to a thing that is visible to the eye sense consciousness, for example, the green sprout growing in a field. The Samkhyas do not assert that an apparent sprout is produced from self. However, they do assert that a non-apparent sprout is produced from self. The above consequence demonstrates inner contradictions in the Samkhyas' assertions in that they assert both a sprout that is produced from self and a sprout that is not produced from self, both of which are established in their own entities.

In the consequence above there is a reason, or sign, and an example, therefore Chandrakirti says that there is no fallacy with respect to there not being a reason and an example. The conclusion is that Buddhapalita's commentarial speech does not have the fallacy of not stating a reason and example *renowned to the other*, the Samkhyas.

The second consequence set out by Buddhapalita is:

> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production is endless because though it already exists in its own entity, there is a need for its re-production.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 242) says:

> The meaning of that it [as follows]. It is not appropriate for Bhavaviveka to criticize Buddhapalita's commentarial speech in terms of his not stating a reason and example, either saying "because he does not state an autonomous reason and example" or because he does not state a correct reason and example renowned to the other. Regarding the first case, there is no fault of Buddhapalita's commentarial speech not stating an autonomous reason and example because, although it does not state an autonomous reason and example, through eliminating the Samkhyas' wrong conception asserting the existence of production from self in dependence on contradictory consequences, they are able to generate an inferential cognizer in their continua realizing the non-existence of production from self. [Thus,] it presents the two contradictory consequences that refute production from self.

Chandrakirti says that although Buddhapalita's commentarial speech does not state an autonomous reason and example, it is able to generate an inferential cognizer realizing the non-existence of production from self through presenting the two types of contradictory consequences refuting production from self. In short, according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system one can generate an inferential cognizer in dependence on a mere consequence. In fact, they are called 'Consequentialists' (Prasangikas) because they hold that an opponent can generate an inferential cognizer realizing a thesis in dependence on a mere consequence.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 242) says:

> OBJECTION: In dependence on a contradictory consequence, it is not possible to generate an inferential cognizer realizing that there is no production from self. In order to generate such an inferential cognizer it is necessary to definitely set out an autonomous reason.

The 'Autonomists' (Svatantrikas) are so-called because they assert that an opponent necessarily generates an inferential cognizer realizing the thesis in dependence on an autonomous reason possessing all three modes.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 242-3) says:

ANSWER: Well then, if the wrong conception asserting production from self is not overturned in dependence on a contradictory consequence, even by setting out an autonomous reason it will not be averted. If those who assert production from self, although seeing the inner contradictions in their assertions, do not avoid the wrong conception asserting production from self, the Madhyamikas do not debate with such opponents. Therefore, *Clear Words* says:

> We do not debate with the crazily stubborn.

Furthermore, that commentarial speech does not have the fallacy of not stating an autonomous correct reason and example because if one is a Madhyamika there is pervasion that it is not suitable to assert autonomous reasons. This is because if one is a Madhyamika, there is pervasion that it is not suitable to assert phenomena established by way of their own character. *Clear Words* says:

> If one is a Madhyamika it is also not suitable to make autonomous syllogisms because of not asserting other positions.

'Other position' refers to asserting true existence.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 243) continues:

> Therefore, if one is a Madhyamika, although there is pervasion that it is not suitable to assert autonomous reasons, there is no contradiction that there are Madhyamikas who assert them; for example, if one is a fully ordained monk possessing precepts, although there is pervasion that it is not suitable to transgress the Buddha's precepts, there are fully ordained monks possessing precepts who have transgressed them.

It is not suitable for a fully ordained monk with the 253 vows to break his vows, yet there are fully ordained monks who do break them.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 243) says:

> Regarding the second case, there is no fallacy in Buddhapalita's commentarial speech not stating a correct reason renowned to the other, [the Samkhyas]. This is because in general, in order to generate an inferential cognizer realizing the non-existence of production from self, it is not necessary to explicitly set out a reason renowned to the other (an other-approved reason). But even if it were necessary, the commentarial speech does not have the fallacy of not presenting a reason renowned to the other because it is purposeless for things that [already] exist in their own entity to be produced again. Therefore, the commentarial speech that is the extensive explanation which says this does present a correct reason renowned to the other.

General Meaning (page 225) describes Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's vision of Dharmaraja, which he had while composing this section on the Opposites of the Consequences.

Thursday morning, 11 May 2000

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 244) says:

> Well then, how does [the commentarial speech] present a reason renowned to the other? The way it does so [is as follows]. The brief presentation is:
>
> > Things are not produced from self because their production would be purposeless and because there would be an extremely absurd consequence.

The extensive explanation is:

> Things existing in their own entities do not need to be produced again. If though existing they are produced, they would never not be produced.

Furthermore, the statement in the brief presentation, "Things are not produced from self," is explained in the extensive explanation, saying "Things existing in their own entities." The statement "because [their] production would be purposeless" is explained in the extensive explanation, saying "[they] do not need to be produced again." The statement "because there would be an extremely absurd consequence" is explained in the extensive explanation, saying "If though existing they are produced, they would never not be produced."

Here, Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen shows how the brief presentation and extensive explanation are related.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 244) says:

> [The word] "things" in the brief presentation presents the subject, which is that things are not produced from self, whereas [the word] "their" presents the reason and concordant example. This is because in the extensive explanation [the phrase] "Things existing in their own entities" presents the three, the subject, reason, and concordant example, which establish that things are not produced from self, this passage being the extensive explanation of "their production" and so forth. The way in which this passage in the extensive explanation presents the three is:
>
> - [the word] "things" of "things existing in their own entities" presents the subject that is the basis of the debate;
> - "existing in their own entities" presents the reason; and
> - the pluralizing particle (*rnams*) presents the concordant example.

Within the extensive explanation "things existing in their own entities" presents (1) the subject which is the basis of debate, (2) the reason, and (3) the concordant example. "Things" presents the subject that is the basis of dispute; "existing in their own entities" presents the reason; and the pluralizing particle presents the concordant example. A consequence presenting the three, subject, reason, and concordant example, is:

> A non-apparent sprout, as the subject, it follows that it is not produced from self because its own entity has already been attained; for example, like an apparent sprout.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 245) continues:

> The pluralizing particle presents the concordant example because when explaining the meaning of "existing in their own entities" *Clear Words* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 484) says:
>
> > In [Buddhapalita's longer statement], "already existing in their own entities" bears the reason.
>
> In terms of bearing the reason, it is necessary to explain it through eliminating [the word] "thing" and the pluralizing particle. *Clear Words* says:
>
> > The passage which was just explained..
>
> In addition, *Clear Words* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 484) says:
>
> > [In the shorter statement itself] "because production would be just senseless" holds the predicate of the probandum [once it is changed to "production again is senseless" in accordance with the longer statement].

In:

> A sound is an impermanent thing because products are [necessarily] impermanent things. It is seen that products are impermanent things, as in the case, for example, of a pot. Likewise a sound is also a product. Therefore, because of being a product, [a sound] is an impermanent thing.

product which is manifested, due to its connection [with the predicate of the probandum], is the reason.

In short: sound is impermanent because of being a product, for example, like a pot.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 484) continues:

Just so, here also [the syllogism] is:

> Things (such as a non-manifest pot and so forth) are not produced from self because the production again of what already exist in their own entities is just senseless. Just as it is seen that pots and so forth which already abide in front [of oneself] and which already exist in their own manifest entities do not rely on being produced again...

The Samkhyas assert that an apparent, or manifest, pot abiding in front of oneself is not produced from self.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 245) says:

> Shang-tang-sag-pa says: The statement presenting a pervasion presents a concordant example because a statement presenting a concordant example is included in a statement that presents a pervasion.

Shang-tang-sag-pa says that a statement presenting pervasion presents a concordant example. Shang-tang-sag-pa was from Gomo Tulku's monastery, Pemba Ganden Chö Kor, in Tibet.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 245) says:

> Matishila says: The commentarial speech demonstrates a concordant example in the perspective of a Samkhya's mind because it is explained in the Samkhyas' scriptures that the phrases that demonstrate a pervasion which are limited to five members – "sound is impermanent because product is impermanent" – present a concordant example because the Samkhyas' scriptures explain:
>
> The non-existence of a reason, thesis,
> Forward [and counter pervasion] is not stated.
> The fifth states an example.
> Through connecting the reason...

The Samkhyas set out a syllogism having five members that will be explained later on (see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 729). The five members are:
(1) thesis,
(2) pervasion,
(3) example,
(4) exemplification (Likewise, a sound is also a product), and

(5) summary (Therefore, because of being a product, [a sound] is an impermanent thing). Such a syllogism possessing the five members is a correct statement of proof. An example of a correct statement of proof is:

> Whatever is a product is pervaded by being impermanent, for example, a pot. Likewise, a sound is also a product.

This is how the five are presented in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition*. However, according to Dharmakirti a correct statement of proof has only two members (see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 730):

1. the expression of pervasion and
2. the expression of the presence of the reason in the subject.

Dharmakirti's definition of a correct statement of proof is: a correct statement possessing two members presenting the three modes without remainder. An example of a correct statement of proof is:

> Whatever exists in its own entity is pervaded by not being produced from self; for example, an apparent sprout. A non-apparent sprout also exists in its own entity.

Within this correct statement of proof there are the two members:
(1) pervasion –
This is presented by "Whatever exists in its own entity is pervaded by not being produced from self."
Through this, the forward pervasion is presented, whereby the counter pervasion is also presented.
(2) property of the subject –
This is presented by "A non-apparent sprout also exists in its own entity."
In this the way the three modes are presented without anything missing.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 246) continues:

> That is unsuitable because when explaining a concordant example of our own system, it is inappropriate to quote what is made known in a scripture of the Samkhyas. If by stating "things are not produced from self" and so forth, Buddhapalita presents a reason renowned to the other, how is it presented? [It is presented by] a syllogism of example and a syllogism of meaning.
>
> The first, [the syllogism of] example, is:
>
> > Sound is impermanent because if it is a product it is pervaded by being impermanent. If it is a product it is pervaded by being impermanent, for example, a pot. Just as a pot is a product, likewise, sound is a product. Therefore, because sound is a product, sound is impermanent.

All five members of a correct statement of proof are present in this syllogism of example because:

1. The thesis is presented by: "sound is impermanent"
2. The pervasion is presented by: "because if it is a product it is pervaded by being impermanent"
3. The concordant example is presented by: "if it is a product it is pervaded by being impermanent, for example, a pot."
4. The exemplification is presented by: "Just as a pot is a product, likewise, sound is a product."
5. The summary is presented by: "Therefore, because sound is a product, sound is impermanent."

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 246) says:

> The second, the syllogism of meaning possessing the five members, is:
>
> > Things being produced again is purposeless because if they have already attained their own entity, their production again is pervaded by being purposeless. There is pervasion because – for example, a sprout which is

> already clearly apparent – just as an already clearly apparent sprout has already attained its own entity, likewise, things have attained their own entities. Therefore, because things have already attained their own entities, things being produced again is purposeless.

The five members are:

1. "Things being produced again is purposeless" presents the thesis,

2. "because if they have already attained their own entity their production again is pervaded by being purposeless" presents the pervasion,

3. "There is pervasion because – for example, a sprout which is already clearly apparent" presents the example through connecting the pervasion and the example,

4. "just as an already clearly apparent sprout has already attained its own entity, likewise, things have attained their own entities" presents the exemplification,

5. "therefore, because things have already attained their own entities, things being produced again is purposeless" presents the summary.

When condensed [it is as follows]:

> Things, as the subject, there is no purpose in them being produced again because they have already attained their own entities; for example, a sprout which is already clearly apparent.

Moreover, *Clear Words* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 483) says:

> [Bhavaviveka] might say, "Nevertheless, [the fault of] contradicting one's own inference (that is to say, an inference acceptable to a Samkhya) must, without question, be expressed."
>
> [ANSWER:] The master Buddhapalita also just expressed such. How? For he said, "Things are not produced from self because their production [again] would be just senseless." In that, the [word] 'their' [in the reason clause] holds (or indicates) "those which already exist in their own entities." Why? This is because [Buddhapalita's subsequent statement] "The production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless," is [his] commentary on that abbreviated statement [and we must, therefore, carry it over to the shorter statement]. Also, this [longer] statement ("those which already exist in their own entities") bears a concordant example ("a manifest pot") renowned to the other [party, the Samkhya,] which possesses the qualities of [the predicate] of the probandum ("senseless production again") and the proof ("already existing in its own entity").

Chandrakirti says that the fallacies expressed by Bhavaviveka are not incurred by Buddhapalita. One such fallacy is that Buddhapalita's commentarial speech does not eliminate the fallacies adduced to the Samkhyas. However, Chandrakirti says that even though Buddhapalita does not set out an autonomous reason, his consequences eliminate such fallacies. In other words, when Buddhapalita sets forth his consequence in which the reason and example are known to the other, the Samkhyas,

they cannot question it because Buddhapalita takes a non-apparent sprout as the subject and an apparent sprout as an example and thereby refutes the Samkhyas' position. In other words, when the consequence refuting production from self is flung at them, the Samkhyas cannot ask Buddhapalita whether he is referring to an apparent sprout or a non-apparent sprout because he sets these two out separately in that he takes a non-apparent sprout as the subject and an apparent sprout as the example. Therefore, Chandrakirti says that there is no fallacy in Buddhapalita's statement of not eliminating the fallacies adduced to the other.

Thursday afternoon, 11 May 2000

Here we will leap over an objection and continue the text a little further on. Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 248) says:

> The second fallacy, [that of not eliminating the fallacies adduced by the other party, the Samkhyas]:
> Regarding the thesis, in terms of not eliminating the thesis adduced by the other [party, the Samkhyas,] Buddhapalita does not have this fallacy because, due to his not asserting an autonomous reason refuting production from self, it is not necessary to eliminate the fallacies adduced by the other [party, the Samkhya.] This is because in regard to a correct reason renowned to the other, which was explained above, the fallacies adduced by the other [party, the Samkhya,] are not incurred. This is because he takes the sprout which is asserted by the Samkhyas to exist in a non-apparent manner at the time of its cause as the subject and the sprout which is already clearly apparent as the concordant example. *Clear Words* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 485) says:
>
> > Not only is it just not that a reason and example were not expressed, but also it is not that the fallacies adduced by the other [party, the Samkhya] were not avoided. How? For, the Samkhyas do not assert that a pot dwelling in front [of oneself] which has a manifest form manifests again, and [thus] here it is an entity established as an example [of something which already exists in its own entity and is not produced again]. Since the probandum is:
> >
> > > those which are potential entities and do not have a manifested nature, predicated with a negation of production,
> >
> > how could [the Samkhyas] have the qualm that [Buddhapalita's syllogism has] the fault of a position (thesis) that is proving what is already established [for them] or has the sense of a contradictory reason [proving for them not that things are not produced from self but that they are]?
> >
> > Therefore, even if [Buddhapalita] did express contradiction [of the Samkhya view] through self-[renowned] inference (that is, a syllogistic statement approved by the Samkhyas), they would not set forth the fallacies that [Bhavaviveka] mentioned. Hence, it is just not that [Buddhapalita] did not avoid fallacies adduced by the other [party since they would not adduce them]. For these reasons, it should be known that these [two] objections [to Buddhapalita's remarks by Bhavaviveka] are just senseless.

Chandrakirti says that Buddhapalita does not have the fallacy of not eliminating the fallacies adduced by the other party because Buddhapalita does not set forth an autonomous reason and the reason that

was stated before does not have such faults. Bhavaviveka's objections are senseless because Buddhapalita takes a result that is non-apparent at the time of its cause as the subject that is the basis of debate and an apparent result as the concordant example, whereby there is no reason for the Samkhyas to question Buddhapalita as to which type of result he is referring to. The Samkhyas accept that an apparent result does not need to be produced again. In other words, an apparent result is not produced from self. On the other hand, the Samkhyas say that a non-apparent result is produced from self. Our own system refutes this, saying that a non-apparent result does not need to be produced again since it is already existent. In this way, our own system negates production from self.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 249) says:

> The third fallacy, [that of affording an opportunity for censure, i.e., that since it is necessary for Buddhapalita to assert the opposite of his thesis and reason, he contradicts the Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of the four extreme types of production is a non-affirming negative]:
> In terms of asserting the opposite meaning, Buddhapalita does not have a fault. The way that the fault is not incurred in the commentary by Buddhapalita is presented in *Clear Words* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 492) saying:
>
> > The opposite meaning of the consequences [– that things are produced sensibly and not endlessly –] is related only with the other [party, the Samkhya], not with us because we do not have [such] a thesis. Therefore, how would we be contradicting the [Madhyamika] tenet [that the refutation of production is a non-affirming negative]?

Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita asserts the opposite meaning of the consequences. This would mean that Buddhapalita asserts the opposite reason; i.e., instead of asserting "because their production would be purposeless and endless," he asserts "because their production is purposeful and has an end." In other words, Bhavaviveka interprets Buddhapalita as saying: "Things are not produced from self because their production is purposeful and has an end." Then, having reversed the reason, the thesis must also be reversed because, having reversed the reason, the predicate cannot remain the same. In short, Bhavaviveka says that the thesis "things are not produced from self" must be changed to "the production of things is not a mere elimination of production from self." The reason remains: "because their production is purposeful and has an end." Bhavaviveka says that therefore Buddhapalita indirectly suggests a thesis which is an affirming negative, and that this contradicts Nagarjuna's tenets that all theses in the context of refuting production from self should be non-affirming negatives.

Chandrakirti then says Buddhapalita does not have any such fault because the opposite meaning is related only to the opponent, the Samkhyas, and is not Buddhapalita's thesis; therefore, Buddhapalita does not contradict Nagarjuna's tenets.

This concludes the discussion of the way in which Buddhapalita does not incur the fallacies indicated by Bhavaviveka.

Since Bhavaviveka criticized Buddhapalita when he was still alive, why did Buddhapalita not respond? One way of explaining this is to say that it is because Buddhapalita was a commoner while Bhavaviveka was born in the royal family. Bhavaviveka criticized Buddhapalita as if he too were a Svatantrika Madhyamika. On the other hand, if Bhavaviveka had known that Buddhapalita was a Prasangika Madhyamika, he would not have understood how to debate with him.

Chandrakirti is said to be the opener of the chariot track of the Prasangika Madhyamika system in that prior to him, no one clarified the fact that a consequence is correct while an autonomous reason is not. Some say that Chandrakirti was Buddhapalita's incarnation. In that case, it

can be asked how Chandrakirti and Buddhapalita could have both been disciples of Nagarjuna? However, it is possible because Nagarjuna is said to have lived for six hundred years.

Chandrakirti then points out that Bhavaviveka's commentary on the refutation of production from self has the very fallacies he accuses Buddhapalita of having. This is the next topic.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 249) says:

COMMONLY APPEARING SUBJECTS

D Indicating the manner in which the fallacies are incurred by Bhavaviveka himself in his commentary on the refutation of production from self

Buddhapalita's commentarial speech refuting production from self does not have any fallacies, whereas Bhavaviveka's own commentarial speech refuting production from self has faults because it is not correct to apply the qualification 'ultimately' saying:

> Ultimately the inner spheres are not produced from self because of existing, like an existent consciousness.

Applying the qualification 'ultimately' to the thesis is also not correct because applying it to the subject is not correct.

Applying the qualification 'ultimately' to the subject is to say:

Ultimately the inner spheres, as the subject, are not produced from self because of existing, like existent consciousness.

Applying the qualification 'ultimately' to the thesis is to say:

The inner spheres, are not *ultimately* produced from self because of existing, like existent consciousness.

In both cases the application of the qualification 'ultimately' is incorrect. In short, Chandrakirti says to Bhavaviveka that applying the qualification 'ultimately' to the subject or to the predicate is incorrect.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 250) says:

Clear Words (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 500) says:

> Furthermore, the logician, [Bhavaviveka], while wishing merely to demonstrate that he has great skill in treatises of logic, expresses autonomous syllogisms which are realized to be the locus of collections of a great many fallacies, despite his asserting the Madhyamika view. How? Respectively, here he states this syllogism:
>
> > Ultimately the internal sources are not produced from self because of existing, like existent consciousness.

In short, Chandrakirti says that Bhavaviveka is showing off his knowledge in setting out a syllogism based on the Samkhyas' assertion:

The inner spheres, as the subject, are not produced from self because of existing, like existent consciousness.

The "inner spheres" or "internal sources" are the twenty-three objects of knowledge, such as the eleven powers, asserted by the Samkhyas. Bhavaviveka takes these as a subject because the Samkhyas accept that these twenty-three as produced from self, whereas they assert the [first, the general principal,] and the twenty-fifth, the being, to not be produced from self. The word 'existing' in "Because of existing" refers to the general principal, it being like existent consciousness. In this way, Bhavaviveka shows that he knows the Samkhya scriptures very well. Bhavaviveka is a Svatantrika Madhyamika, but to prove his point quotes from these non-Buddhist scriptures. Chandrakirti says

that when Bhavaviveka presents such autonomous syllogisms, it brings many faults. This is because when such a syllogism is made there is no subject that commonly appears to both himself, Bhavaviveka, and the Samkhyas. In general, in order to debate, one needs to have a commonly appearing subject. This topic of commonly appearing subjects can be discussed at length.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 250) says:

The meaning is [as follows]. Bhavaviveka says:

> The inner spheres, such as the eye, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing; for example, like a possessor of mind. When refuting production from self, the qualification 'ultimately' is definitely to be applied.

That is not correct because either the qualification 'ultimately' is applied to the thesis or the qualification 'ultimately' is applied to the subject. If it is the first case, applying it in that way is not correct because applying [the qualification 'ultimately' to the thesis] is purposeless for the first opponent, a Madhyamika, and is also purposeless for the second opponent, the Samkhya. The first is established because it is suitable for a Madhyamika to refute production from self even conventionally. The second is established because it is suitable for the Forder system, which has degenerated from both truths, to refute both truths. Moreover, *Clear Words* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 502) says:

> Why is the qualification 'ultimately' put in this [syllogism]?
>
> [Hypothetical answer by Bhavaviveka: It is affixed to the predicate] because production which is asserted in accordance with worldly conventions is not to be refuted and because if it were refuted [conventionally], it would follow that one would be damaged by [one's own] assertion [of conventionally existent production].
>
> RESPONSE: This is not suitable because [a Madhyamika] does not assert production from self even conventionally. [The *Rice Seedling*] *Sutra* says:
>
> > Also, when a sprout arising from its cause – a seed – is produced, it is not created by self, not created by [naturally existent] others, not created by both, not created by Ishvara, and not metamorphosed by time. It does not arise from particles, does not arise from the nature, does not arise from its own entity, and is not produced causelessly.

Chandrakirti says that it is not correct to apply the qualification 'ultimately' to the thesis because then it appears that production from self exists conventionally. In other words, applying the qualification 'ultimately' to the thesis (for example, "The inner spheres, such as the eye, are not ultimately produced from self") is incorrect for the Madhyamikas because they refute production from self even conventionally. Applying the qualification 'ultimately' is also senseless in relation to the Samkhyas because there is value in refuting the Samkhyas, who have fallen from the two truths, both ultimately and conventionally. They are said to have fallen from the two truths in that they do not know how to posit the presentation of the two truths.

The *Rice Seedling Sutra* says that a sprout is not created by self, not created by others, not created by both, not created by Ishvara, not metamorphosed by time, not arisen from particles, does not arise from the nature, does not arise from its own entity, and is not produced causelessly. In this way, the *Rice Seedling Sutra* refutes the assertion of opponents who variously assert that a sprout is (1) created by self, (2) created by naturally existent others, (3) created by both, (4) created by Ishvara, (5)

metamorphosed by time, (6) arisen from particles, (7) arisen from the nature, (8) arisen from its own entity, and (9) produced causelessly. Thus, there are nine different assertions regarding production, all of which are wrong.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 251) (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 502) says:

> Similarly, [the *Extensive Sport Sutra*] says:
>
> If a seed exists, the sprout does also.
> The sprout is not what the seed is.
> It is not [inherently established] as other than it or just it.
> Hence, the nature of phenomena is not permanent and not annihilatory.

This means that if the seed exists, so does the sprout. "The sprout is not what the seed is" means that the sprout is not the seed. "It is not other than it or just it" means it is not inherently established as other than it or just it. The nature of phenomena, reality, is free from the two extremes of permanence and annihilation. It is free from permanence because it is not inherently or truly existent and it is free from annihilation because it exists conventionally.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 251) (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 502) says:

> Also, this very [text, Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*] says:
>
> Whatever arises dependently is respectively
> Not just that and is not
> Also other than that. Hence, it is
> Not annihilatory or permanent.

Since such-and-such arises in dependence on such-and-such, it is not inherently existent. Reality is neither annihilatory nor permanent.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 251) (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 502) says:

> [Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka:] The qualification is made relative to the others' (that is, the Samkhyas') system.
>
> ANSWER: That also is not suitable because their presentations are not asserted [by Madhyamikas] even conventionally. It is to be realized that it is advantageous to refute in both ways (that is, conventionally and ultimately) the Forders who have fallen from non-erroneous perception of the two truths. Thus, to express the qualification relative to the others' system is also not suitable.

It is also best not to apply the qualification 'ultimately' in relation to the Samkhyas because they have fallen from non-erroneous perception of the two truths.

Therefore, it is senseless to apply the qualification 'ultimately' to the thesis in the cases of both the Madhyamikas and Samkhyas. Next comes a discussion as to why it is senseless to apply the qualification 'ultimately' to the subject.

Friday morning, 12 May 2000

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 251) says:

In the second case above (the application of the qualification 'ultimately' to the subject), someone says:

> Stating "Ultimately the inner spheres, such as the eyes, as the subject" is to apply the qualification 'ultimately' to the subject.

RESPONSE: That too is not suitable because there is the fault that that subject is not established with respect to the first opponent, the Madhyamikas. *Clear Words* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 504) says:

> ANSWER: Then, you would have a fallacious position (thesis) in which the base (subject) is not established and a fallacious reason in which the base (subject) is not established since you do not assert sources – eyes and so forth – ultimately.

Chandrakirti says that if Bhavaviveka applies the qualification 'ultimately' to the subject there is also a fault because for a Madhyamika there is the fault that this subject is not established because for them "Ultimately [existent] inner spheres, such as the eyes," do not exist. Because they do not exist, the reason cannot be established. If the reason is not established, the property of the subject cannot be established. Chandrakirti says that Bhavaviveka has the fault of the subject not being established because he takes ultimate inner spheres and so forth as a subject, although they do not exist for his school.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 251) says:

> Also taking eyes and so forth which are mere conventionalities as the subject is not suitable because there would be the fault that the subject is not established with respect to the second opponent, the Samkhyas. *Clear Words* says:
>
> > Since there would be the fallacious position of the basis not being established for the other, [party, the Samkhya,] it is not suitable.

The Samkhyas do not assert eyes and so forth that are mere conventionalities. Thus, if the following syllogism is made:

> The eyes and so forth, which are mere conventionalities, as the subject, are not produced from self because of existing,

is set forth for the opponents, the Samkhyas, they would say that the reason is not established.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 252) says:

> When Bhavaviveka states:
>
> > The inner spheres, the eyes and so forth, as the subject, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing, like a possessor of mind,
>
> the mere eyes and so forth that are established to commonly appear to both the first and second opponents, [the Madhyamikas and Samkhyas,] without being qualified by either of the two, truth or falsity, are suitable to be taken as the subject because, for example, when the lower Buddhists prove sound is impermanent in the perspective of the Vaisheshikas, they take mere sound that is established to commonly appear to both the first and second opponents without being qualified by either permanence or impermanence as the subject.

When the lower Buddhist schools prove that sound is impermanent to the Vaisheshikas, who assert that sound is permanent, they do so by taking mere sound as the subject without qualifying it by saying 'permanent sound' or 'impermanent sound.'

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 252) says:

Moreover, *Clear Words* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 507) says:

> [Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka: For example,] in [the proof] that sound is an impermanent thing, just generalities are to be taken as the subject and the predicate, not specified [with the particular tenets of the debaters]. If specifics were used, the conventions of inference, [that is, inferring consciousness,] and object inferred would be non-existent. For, if [as the subject] one used 'sound which is derived from the elements', it would not be established for the other party [the Vaisheshika]. However, if one used 'sound which is a quality of space', it would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist.
>
> Similarly, even when a Vaisheshika posits the thesis that sound is an impermanent thing, if [as the subject] he used 'sound which is a product', it would not be established for the other [party, the Jaina]. However, if [the subject were specified as 'sound] manifested [by conditions]' it would not be established for himself.
>
> Similarly, [in the case of the non-apparent] if the predicate is taken as "has a cause" it would not be established for the Buddhist himself. However, if [it were specified as] causeless, it would not be established for the other party (a Samkhya). Therefore, just as here [in these examples] mere generalities are to be used as the subject and the predicate, so here also [in the refutation of production from self] a mere subject devoid of qualification is to be used.

When a Buddhist tenet-holder debates with the Vaisheshikas in order to prove that sound is impermanent, he should not take specific types of sound as the subject, such as "sound derived from the four great elements" or "sound which is a quality of space," but should take sound in general as the subject. This is because, for example, if he takes "sound derived from the four great elements" as the subject it is not established for the Vaisheshikas. On the other hand, if he takes "sound which is a quality of space" as the subject it is not established for the Buddhist himself. Therefore, mere sound without any qualifications should be taken as the subject. This is an example that indicates that a Madhyamika such as Bhavaviveka should not qualify the subject "eye" by saying "ultimate eye" or "the eye which is a mere conventionality," but should take the mere generality of the eye as the subject because in the first case, "ultimate eye," it is not established for the Madhyamikas and in the second case, "the eye which is a mere conventionality," it is not established for the Samkhyas.

Here the discussion concerns the need for a commonly appearing subject. With respect to this, one needs to understand the presentation of objects according to the different schools. As was mentioned previously, the Samkhyas assert that all object of knowledge are enumerated in twenty-five categories. The Vaisheshikas, on the other hand, assert that all objects of knowledge are included among six categories of existents (see Sopa, *Cutting Through Appearances*, page 156):

1. substance,
2. quality,
3. activity,
4. generality,
5. particularity, and
6. inherence.

According to the Vaisheshikas, a generality is a common cause of designating terms and engaging an awareness in a similar way with regard to a class of phenomena. A generality is of two types: the all-pervasive and a single restricted basis. The all-pervasive is called "existence itself," whereas a single restricted basis refers to particular objects such as Jampa himself, Sherab himself, pot itself, and so forth. With respect to, for example, a pillar, the causes for designating the term 'pillar' are the all-pervasive and the pillar itself. Substance is further divided into nine types: earth, water, fire, wind, space, time, direction, self, and mind. Quality is of twenty-five types. The Vaisheshikas say that the substance is the basis of qualities; therefore, the qualities are the supported and the substance the support. This is related to the discussion of "sound which is a quality of space." The Vaisheshikas say that sound abides in the sphere of space and is a quality of space, which is permanent.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: Regarding the magician's illusion:

a) How much of the appearance of the horse and elephant comes from the side of the basis of conjuring? How much comes from the side of the mind?
b) What role does the mind play in establishing the existence of the horse and elephant? What is the role of the mind besides merely certifying the existence of the object?
c) What is the factor that comes from the side of the object?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The appearance of horse and elephant cannot come from the side of the basis of conjuring alone. It comes about due to various conditions: the magician's mantra, medicine, and his tricking of the eyes of the spectators. It was said before that if the basis of conjuring appears, horse and elephant definitely appear. That appearance of horse and elephant does not come from the side of the basis of conjuring, a pebble, alone because it is necessary for the pebble to have had mantras blown on it and so forth. Is the appearance of horse and elephant only from the side of the mind? It is not because the appearance comes about due to the pebble having been conjured by the magician's mantra. Therefore, there are various factors necessary for the appearance of horse and elephant: the magician's mantra, medicine, and the tricking of the eyes of the spectators. More specifically, the pebble from its own side does not appear as a horse and elephant. This is because if one's eyes have not been affected by the magician's mantra there is no appearance of horse and elephant on the place of the pebble. Therefore, the appearance of horse and elephant does not come from the pebble alone. The appearance of horse and elephant also does not come from the side of the mind alone because if the eyes have not been affected by the magician's mantra one does not have the appearance of horse and elephant. Therefore, the appearance of horse and elephant does not arise from the side of the basis of conjuring nor the side of the mind alone, but comes from affecting the pebble and affecting the mind.

Student: During the previous explanation it was said that the pebble and the basis of conjuring are different because when there is the pebble there is no pervasion that there is the appearance of horse and elephant, but when there is the basis of conjuring, there is pervasion that there is the appearance of horse and elephant.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is correct.

Student: Which part of the magician's analogy illustrates the inherent quality that comes from the side of the object?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There are three factors in the analogy of the magician:

(1) appearance but not adherence,
(2) both appearance and adherence, and
(3) neither appearance nor adherence.

These are represented by respectively:
(1) the magician himself, who has the appearance of horse and elephant but does not adhere to them as true;
(2) the spectators, who have the appearance of horse and elephant and adhere to them as true; and
(3) the latecomer, who has neither the appearance of horse and elephant nor the adherence to them as true.

- The magician is analogous to ordinary beings who have realized emptiness by way of a meaning generality, in that such ordinary beings have the appearance of true existence but do not adhere to phenomena as truly existent.
- The spectators are analogous to ordinary beings who do not have a realization of emptiness in that they have the appearance of true existence and adhere to phenomena as truly existent.
- The latecomer is analogous to superiors in meditative equipoise who are directly realizing emptiness in that they do not have the appearance of true existence and do not adhere to phenomena as truly existent.

Student: What, exactly, does the latecomer observe?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Only the pebble appears to him. The basis of conjuring does not appear to him because it is said that if the basis of conjuring appears to him it is pervaded by horse and elephant appearing. Therefore, there is a distinction made between "the pebble" and "the pebble which is the basis of conjuring." Thus, either the latecomer sees the pebble or he is merely bewildered by the whole magic show!

Student: The magician's illusion is taken by the Svatantrika Madhyamika system as an example of the absence of true existence, but if the Prasangika Madhyamika system were to make the same analogy for the absence of inherent existence what would change?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The Prasangika Madhyamika system uses a speckled, coiled rope as an example of the lack of inherent existence. They give the analogy of a speckled, coiled rope in a dim area which is mistakenly taken to be a snake. The Prasangika Madhyamika system also takes the magician's illusion as an analogy in Nagarjuna's *Refutation of Objections* in terms of a magically produced woman. There is a story about this. Once there was a young man who went with his father to a magic show. The magician created a beautiful young woman. Upon seeing her the son asked his father to arrange a marriage with her. The father said he could not do so because she was not real. However, the son insisted. Nagarjuna gives this analogy in his text in order to present the lack of inherent existence. We have the appearance of inherent existence and adhere to this appearance, to illustrate this Nagarjuna gives the example of the young man who falls in love with a magically created woman. From the side of the object there is no such beautiful woman, just as there is no horse and elephant in the other analogy. This is taken as an example of the lack of inherent existence in the Prasangika Madhyamika system.

Student: What is the meaning of inherent existence according to Svatantrika?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The meaning of inherent existence for the Svatantrika Madhyamikas is existence itself. For them, if it is existent it is pervaded by being inherently existent, being established by way of its own character, and being established by way of its own entity..

Student: What is the difference between conventional analysis and ultimate analysis according to Svatantrika?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system, conventional analysis is analyzing whether an object exists from its own side or is established by way of its own character

using reasoning analyzing for the conventional. In general, conventional analysis also means to analyze whether sound is impermanent or permanent. Such analysis is conventional for this school.

Ultimate analysis is to analyze whether or not things exist ultimately; for example, to analyze whether a pot is established by way of its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. Such an analysis is ultimate analysis. Ultimate analysis also includes analysis of the four types of production: production from self, production from other, production from both, and causeless production. One analyzes whether phenomena are produced ultimately from self, from other, from both, or causelessly. Ultimate analysis includes the five types of reasonings analyzing the reality of phenomena.

Student: Could Geshe-la please give some examples of production from self in our continuum?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Since there is no production from self, there are no examples of it! Production from self means production from the nature which is a partless unit. There is nothing in our continuum which arises from such a partless unit. However, in the case of gaining realizations, for example, one could say that they are produced from a self which is a person, but not from a self which is the nature. Also by thinking too much, for example, one comes to experience suffering, this too is produced from oneself! If by the self one means person, then there are some examples of production from self, but in the context of production from the four extremes, production from self does not exist.

Student: On which occasion on the various grounds is there meditation on the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, the four noble truths, and the twelve links?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They can be meditated on at any time! When meditating on the four close placements of mindfulness, one engages the four noble truths. The close placement of mindfulness on the body engages true sufferings, the close placement of mindfulness on the feelings engages true origins, the close placement of mindfulness on the mind engages true cessations, and the close placement of mindfulness on phenomena engages true paths. The four noble truths and thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are meditated beginning from the path of accumulation. In terms of the subtle thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, the subtle four noble truths, and the subtle twelve links, they are meditated on respectively the fourth, fifth, and sixth grounds as is taught in the *Supplement*.
Student: Are they meditated on in subsequent attainment or meditative equipoise?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are meditated during both occasions.

END

Monday afternoon, 15 May 2000

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 253) says:

1 Response to that

A Refuting the meaning
B Refuting the example

A Refuting the meaning

Clear Words (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 508) says:

> That is not so, because at the time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] when it is just the case that a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the probandum, [Bhavaviveka] himself just asserts the degeneration (or non-establishment) of the entity of subjects (eyes and so forth) – the basis of that [predicated, non-production from self] – which are found by a mere erroneous [consciousness. Bhavaviveka instead holds that the subjects of his syllogism, eyes and so forth, are found by a non-erroneous consciousness in which case they would not be falsities; however, they *are* falsities since they appear to exist inherently but do not, and thus the subject is not established.] The erroneous and the non-erroneous are different (that is, a dichotomy).

The meaning of this is [as follows]. It is not suitable for Acharya Bhavaviveka, when proving to the Samkhyas that the eyes and so forth are not ultimately produced from self, to use as a subject the eyes and so forth established as commonly appearing to both the first party, [himself,] and the second party, [the Samkhyas,] without being qualified either by being truths or falsities because, if it were suitable to use such [a subject], those eyes and so forth would have to be a common locus of being:

(1) an object found by a non-erroneous valid cognizer comprehending the mode of abidance of the eyes and so forth and

(2) an object found by an erroneous valid cognizer in the continuum of a Samkhya,

whereas they are not.

Bhavaviveka sets out the syllogism:

> The inner spheres, the eyes and so forth, as the subject, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing, like possessor of mind.

Here the subject, the mere eyes and so forth, are not established as commonly appearing to Bhavaviveka and the Samkhyas because for Bhavaviveka they are falsities whereas for the Samkhyas they are truths.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 253) continues:

> The first is necessarily not so because if such [a subject] is used, those eyes and so forth would also have to be the object found by a non-erroneous valid cognizer comprehending the mode of abidance of the eyes and so forth.

If the mere eyes and so forth are used as a subject they would have to be apprehended by a valid cognizer comprehending the mode of abidance of the eyes and so forth, whereas they are not. The mere eyes and so forth cannot be taken as a subject because they should commonly appear to both

Bhavaviveka and the Samkhyas, whereas they do not. Therefore, in this context a subject that is not qualified by either being a falsity or a truth cannot be used as a subject. If the eyes and so forth which are true are used as a subject they would be found by a valid cognizer comprehending the mode of abidance of the eyes and so forth.

In short, the eyes and so forth would have to be an object of both a non-erroneous consciousness and an erroneous consciousness, whereas this is not possible. If something is found by an erroneous valid cognizer it cannot be found by a non-erroneous valid cognizer and vice versa. There is no subject that is established as commonly appearing to both Bhavaviveka and the Samkhyas.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 253) continues:

> If such [a subject] is used it would also have to be the object found by an erroneous valid cognizer in the continuum of a Samkhya. The latter is established because when Acharya Bhavaviveka proves to the Samkhyas that the eyes and so forth are not ultimately produced from self, the eyes and so forth commonly appear to both the acharya and the Samkhyas in the way they are established by a valid cognizer.

For there to be a commonly established subject, the eyes and so forth would have to be established by way of their own character. If the eyes and so forth are established by way of their own character, they should be found by a non-erroneous valid cognizer comprehending the mode of abidance of the eyes and so forth. This is because if the eyes and so forth are established by way of their own character, their mode of appearing and their mode of existence would be concordant. If these are concordant then the eyes and so forth would be truths. In this case the eyes and so forth would be ultimate truths, but this is not so.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 253) continues:

> [Hypothetical objection by Bhavaviveka]: Regarding the first reason, the eyes and so forth are not objects found by a valid cognizer comprehending the mode of abidance of the eyes and so forth.
>
> RESPONSE: The eyes and so forth, as the subject, it follows that for you they are objects found by a valid cognizer comprehending the mode of abidance of the eyes and so forth because for you they are established by way of their own character. The reason has been accepted.

According to Bhavaviveka, a Svatantrika Madhyamika, the eyes and so forth are established by way of their own character. The Prasangika Madhyamikas refute this, saying that in this case the eyes and so forth would be found by a non-erroneous valid cognizer comprehending the mode of abidance of the eyes and so forth, whereas they are not. Debate arises concerning the fact that the eyes and so forth are not found by a valid cognizer comprehending the mode of abidance of the eyes and so forth; for example, it can be asked: "Are the eyes and so forth not found by an omniscient mind?" They must be an object found by an omniscient mind because they are objects found by an omniscient mind analyzing the ultimate. There is also the following debate: "If it is not an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing conventionalities is it not an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate? If it is not one, is it not the other? A syllogism can be set out: The eyes and so forth, as the subject, it follows that they are found by a valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate because they are found by an omniscient mind analyzing modes. Is there anything that is not found by an omniscient mind analyzing modes? Is it not that if it is an omniscient mind it is pervaded by realizing all phenomena? Is the definition of omniscient mind not a fully-developed exalted knower directly realizing all phenomena, such as mind generation?

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 254) continues:

B Refuting the example

Clear Words (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 514) says:

> There also is no similarity with the example. Even if there [in the example] a generality of sound and a generality of impermanence which are not asserted as qualified [with particular tenets] do exist for both [the Buddhist and the Vaisheshika], nevertheless proponents of emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness do not [agree on] asserting a generality of eyes as conventionally [existent in the sense of not being established by way of its own character] or as ultimately [existent]. Hence, there also is no similarity with the example.

The meaning [is as follows]. The example and meaning [which are respectively]:

- when the lower Buddhists prove sound is impermanent to the Vaishashikas they use as the subject mere sound which is established to commonly appear to both the first party, [the Buddhist,] and the second party, [the Vaishashikas,] without being qualified by either permanence or impermanence and
- when Acharya Bhavaviveka proves to the Samkhyas that the eyes and so forth are not ultimately produced from self he uses as the subject the mere eyes and so forth which are established to commonly appear to both the first party, [himself,] and the second party, [the Samkhyas,] without being qualified by either truth or falsity

are not similar because such an example is suitable, but such a way of using the meaning is not suitable.

When the lower Buddhists prove sound is impermanent to the Vaishashikas it is not correct to use mere sound as the subject. This is because the Vaishashikas do not accept mere sound. Thus, if the Buddhists use mere sound as the subject the Vaishashikas would ask whether this refers to impermanent sound or permanent sound. For this reason Chandrakirti says: "Hence, there also is no similarity with the example." In short, both the example and the meaning are refuted.

This example was mentioned by Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* previously, saying (page 252):

> for example, when the lower Buddhists prove sound is impermanent in the perspective of the Vaishashikas, they take as the subject mere sound which is established to commonly appear to both the first and second opponents without being qualified by either permanence or impermanence.

To repeat:

- The example is: When the lower Buddhists prove to the Vaishashikas that sound is impermanent, they use mere sound as the subject without it being qualified by impermanence or permanence.
- The meaning is: When Bhavaviveka proves to the Samkhyas that the eyes and so forth are not ultimately produced from self, he uses as the subject the mere eyes and so forth without their being qualified as either falsities or truth.

Both the example and the meaning are incorrect because in both cases the subject is not established as commonly appearing to the two parties.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen says: "because such an example is suitable but such a way of using the meaning is not suitable." Using sound that is not qualified by impermanence and permanence as the subject is a suitable example [of a non-commonly appearing subject]. The example given in *Clear Words* is suitable but the way Bhavaviveka uses the meaning of that example is not suitable.

This concludes the discussion in Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning*. To review, this arose in relation to the outlines:

1 Reasoning refuting production from self

A. How the reasoning refuting production from self is set forth in Acharya Buddhapalita's commentary

B. The manner in which the fallacies are exposed by Bhavaviveka

C. How Buddhapalita does not incur those fallacies
(Here Chandrakirti shows how the fallacies indicated by Bhavaviveka are not actually incurred by Buddhapalita.)

D. Indicating the fallacies incurred by Bhavaviveka himself in his commentary on the refutation of production from self
(Here Chandrakirti points out Bhavaviveka's own fallacies.)

Buddhapalita's commentarial speech is divided into a brief presentation and an extensive explanation. When Bhavaviveka criticizes Buddhapalita he makes the mistake of only doing so in terms of the brief presentation without referring to the extensive explanation.

Buddhapalita's brief presentation is:

> Things are not produced from self because their production would be purposeless and because there would be an extremely absurd consequence.

Buddhapalita's extensive explanation is:

> The production again of things [already] existing in their own entities is purposeless. If though existent they are produced, they would never not be produced.

One of Bhavaviveka's criticisms of Buddhapalita's commentarial speech is based on the following syllogism:

> Things are not produced from self because their production would be purposeless and endless.

Bhavaviveka says that this statement is senseless [in that production is purposeful and does have an end]. He says that the reason "because their production would be purposeless and endless" needs to be changed to: "because their production is purposeful and has an end." In this way the syllogism becomes:

> Things are not produced from self because their production is purposeful and has an end.

Then Bhavaviveka says that the reason having been changed, the thesis also has to be changed because the thesis mentioned before cannot remain as it is. When the thesis is changed it cannot be changed to merely the opposite of "Things are not produced from self," which would be "Things are produced from self." Rather, the thesis should be changed to: "The production of things is not the mere elimination of production from self." Thus, Bhavaviveka says that in this way Buddhapalita sets forth a thesis which is an affirming negative, whereby he contradicts Nagarjuna's tenets in that Nagarjuna says that the thesis in the context of refuting production from self must be a non-affirming negative.

Bhavaviveka also says that Buddhapalita's commentarial speech does not eliminate the fallacies adduced to the other, the Samkhyas. This is because Bhavaviveka says that when Buddhapalita takes sprout as a subject in order to prove that there is no production from self, the Samkhyas would ask Buddhapalita whether he is referring to an apparent or non-apparent sprout but Buddhapalita's commentarial speech does not respond to this question.

In this way, Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita's commentarial speech affords an opportunity for censure. Chandrakirti, however, says that Buddhapalita's commentarial speech does not have such a fallacy.

In short, Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita's commentarial speech has the fallacies of:
1. not stating a reason and example
2. not eliminating the fallacies adduced by the other, and
3. affording an opportunity for censure.

In the context of Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita's commentarial speech as not stating a reason and example, Chandrakirti asks Bhavaviveka whether he means that Buddhapalita does not state an autonomous reason and example or does not state a reason and example renowned to the other. Chandrakirti says that if Bhavaviveka means that Buddhapalita's commentarial speech does not state an autonomous reason and example there is no fault because a Prasangika Madhyamika does not assert autonomous reasons and examples. On the other hand, Chandrakirti says that if Bhavaviveka means that Buddhapalita's commentarial speech does not state a reason and example renowned to the other then the reason is not established because a reason and example renowned to the other are stated.

In conclusion, Chandrakirti says that if the Samkhyas do not accept the fallacies of the inner contradictions in their own assertions after they have been pointed out, then the Prasangika Madhyamikas no longer debate with the crazy. In brief, having flung two consequences revealing the inner contradictions in the Samkhyas' assertions, Chandrakirti says that if they still do not recognize their faults then there is no point to debating with them any longer.

The first consequence (see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 470) is:

> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production again it purposeless because of already existing in its own entity.

The second consequence is:

> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that its production is endless because though it already exists in its own entity, there is a need for its re-production.

Chandrakirti says that there is no fallacy in the syllogism set out by Buddhapalita:

> A non-apparent sprout, as the subject, it follows that it is not produced from self because its own entity has already been attained; for example, like an apparent sprout.

Chandrakirti says that Buddhapalita's consequence does not have any fault because that consequence is only related to the Samkhyas and not to the Prasangika Madhyamikas since no Buddhist asserts production from self. This consequence is related only to the Samkhyas because it must be made to someone who asserts production from self. This comes in the context of Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita that the reason and then the thesis must be reversed.

In conclusion, Chandrakirti says that Bhavaviveka's commentary has fallacies. For example, Bhavaviveka sets out the syllogism:

> Ultimately the inner spheres, the eyes and so forth, are not produced from self because of existing, for example, like possessor of mind.

Chandrakirti questions Bhavaviveka asking him whether he applies the qualification 'ultimately' to the subject or to the predicate. Chandrakirti says that if Bhavaviveka applies the qualification 'ultimately' to the subject (saying 'ultimately the inner spheres,' as above) this would be senseless for both the first party, the Buddhists, and for the second party, the Samkhyas. Thus, if Bhavaviveka applies the qualification 'ultimately' to the subject, the eyes and so forth, there is the fault that the subject is not established. On the other hand, Chandrakirti says that if Bhavaviveka applies the qualification 'ultimately' to the thesis (saying 'the inner spheres, the eyes and so forth, are not ultimately produced from self') this would also be unsuitable because production from self is to be refuted both conventionally and ultimately. Therefore, applying the qualification 'ultimately' to the

thesis is senseless because production from self is refuted even conventionally. In conclusion, Chandrakirti says that Bhavaviveka's syllogism for refuting production from self is faulty.

This concludes the discussion regarding the refutation of production from self. The next topic in Chandrakirti's *Supplement* and Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* is the refutation of production from other.

Tuesday morning, 16 May 2000

PRODUCTION FROM OTHER

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 150) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2 Refuting production from other

A Expressing the previous positions
B Refuting those systems

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2A Expressing the previous positions

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [Some Buddhist sects propounding things say:] Here, regarding this statement: "things will not arise from self" being definite, if it is also just reasonable, that which was mentioned previously: *How could it [arise] from others?* [v. 6.6a], is unreasonable.
>
> Through relying on scriptures that say:
>
> > Like this: the four conditions that transform into others [are] causal, referent, immediate, and likewise dominant, hence conditions are the generators of things.
>
> – one must accept production from others although not desiring to.
>
> There, someone says:
>
> 1. Causal conditions are the five causes, excluding acting cause.
> 2. There, since objects to be referred to are referents, the referents of any of the six consciousnesses – all phenomena – are referent conditions.
> 3. The minds and mental factors other than the mind that enters the nirvana without the remainder of the aggregates are immediate conditions.
> 4. Acting cause is the dominant condition.

The lower Buddhist schools say that although there is no production from self, no production from both, and no causeless production, there is production from other. They assert this because there is production from the four conditions. They say that since there are causes established by way of their own character from which arise results established by way of their own character, there is production from other. The lower Buddhist schools set out four conditions which are other:

1. causal condition,
2. observed object condition or referent condition,
3. immediate condition, and
4. empowering or dominant condition.

The causal condition is five of the six causes, excluding the acting cause. In general, there are six causes:

1. acting cause,

2. simultaneously occurring cause,
3. concomitant cause,
4. congruent or equal fortune cause,
5. ever-functioning or omnipresent cause, and
6. fruitional or fully-ripening cause.

(1) acting cause
Here, the five causes included in the causal condition are the six, excluding the acting cause. The acting cause is excluded because it is not an actual cause. An acting cause is any phenomenon that does not act to interfere with the production [of a result]. Terminologically acting cause has two divisions: an acting cause possessing ability and an acting cause not possessing ability. An acting cause not possessing ability is not an actual cause, therefore acting causes are not causes.

(2) simultaneous occurring cause
A simultaneous occurring cause is that which assists the phenomenon to be produced; for example, the four elements and the four characteristics of compounded phenomena that exist in the pot and the collection of pot are a simultaneous arising cause.

(3) concomitant cause
An example of concomitant causes are the five omnipresent mental factors because they arise concomitantly and assist each other. Concomitant causes have five similarities or concomitances:
1. base,
2. observed object,
3. aspect,
4. substance, and
5. time.

Concomitant observed object means that the main mind and the mental factors in its retinue both observe the same observed object. Concomitant aspect means that, for example, a blue aspect is apprehended by both the main mind and the mental factors in its retinue. Concomitant base means that the same sense power is the base for both the main mind and the mental factors in its retinue. Concomitant substance means that the main mind and the mental factors in its retinue share the same substance. Concomitant time means that the main mind and the mental factors in its retinue arise, abide, and cease simultaneously.

(4) congruent cause
Congruent or equal fortune cause is a cause that is of a similar type to its result. In other words, a previous type brings a later type that is similar to itself.

(5) ever-functioning cause
An ever-functioning or omnipresent cause is an affliction that acts to produce a later affliction.

(6) fruitional cause
A fruitional or fully-ripening cause is a specified cause included in either contaminated virtue or non-virtue.

Excluding acting causes, the other five causes are posited as causal conditions.

Regarding the definition of observed object or referent condition, Chandrakirti says: "the referents of any of the six consciousnesses – all phenomena – are referent conditions." Similarly, in the *Ornament* it was said that observed objects, or referents, are all phenomena.

The immediate condition is defined by Chandrakirti as: "The minds and mental factors other than the mind that enters the nirvana without the remainder of the aggregates are immediate conditions." This is the definition of immediate condition according to the Vaibhashikas, who say that the mind and mental factors present just before entering a nirvana without remainder are not immediate conditions because in the second moment, one attains a nirvana without remainder in which all minds and mental factors are annihilated. In order to posit an immediate condition it must bring a result, whereas there is no result of the minds and mental factors that are present just before entering a nirvana without remainder.

According to Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*, an acting cause is the empowering or dominant condition. In general the definition of an empowering condition is: that which generates by its own power. However, according to the Vaibhashikas an acting cause is the empowering condition.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Others say:
>
> 1. Through the definition, "that which establishes is the cause," whatever abides as the entity of the seed – the generator of that – is its causal condition.
> 2. Like the elderly getting up, mind and mental factors are produced from causes. The referent, like a supporting staff by which there will be production, is the referent condition, the meaning of saying, "it is the support of phenomena that are generating."
> 3. The cause just now ceased is the [immediate] condition that produced the result. As, for example, the seed just now ceased is the condition of immediate similarity with the sprout.
> 4. If something exists, that which issues forth that is the dominant condition of that. Also, those other conditions produced together, produced afterwards and so forth – they also are included within these.

This is another way of defining the four conditions. Here cause is defined as "that which establishes." These people say that "whatever abides as the entity of the seed – the generator of that – is its causal condition." This means that since the entity of the seed is that which produces the sprout, the seed is the causal condition of the sprout.

The observed object condition is described as like a supporting staff which enables an elderly person to stand, in that due to it there is the production of minds and mental factors. In order for minds and mental factors to arise, it is necessary to have the support of an observed object condition.

Here the immediate condition is defined as a cause which has just ceased; for example, a seed that has just ceased is the immediate condition for the sprout.

The empowering or dominant condition is that which issues forth something that exists. In addition, Chandrakirti says: "those other conditions produced together, produced afterwards, and so forth – they also are included within these."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [Bhavaviveka] mentioned:
>
> > "Ishvara and so forth are not conditions, therefore, a fifth condition does not exist," is definitely apprehended.

This statement proves that there does not exist more than four conditions. The Buddhist schools do not accept Ishvara to be the creator of the world since he is permanent and eternal and therefore cannot be a condition. 'And so forth' includes the general principal, which is a partless unit, and others.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 150) says:

> The realists in our own school say: "Since production from self is purposeless, production from self is not suitable. Since that does not exist, production from both is also not suitable. If causeless [production] is also suitable to be decisively refuted, it is not suitable to refute production from other saying '*How can it from other?*' because in dependence on scriptures that teach the four conditions – which are other by way of their own character – as being the producer of things, even unwillingly one would have to assert production from other."
> How are the four conditions posited? Some sects say: "Causal conditions as said in the *Treasury of Knowledge* (v. 2.62b) are: 'The "causal" are the five causes,' that is, they are the five causes which exclude the acting cause. Observed object conditions as said (*Treasury of Knowledge* v. 2.63a) are: 'Observed objects are all phenomena,' that is, all phenomena are the observed objects of the six consciousnesses. Immediate conditions as said (*Treasury of Knowledge* v. 2.62cd) are: 'Produced minds and mental factors, not the final, but the similar and immediate,' that is, minds and mental factors that were produced previously which are other than those that enter a nirvana without remainder. Empowering conditions as said (*Treasury of Knowledge* v. 2.63B) are: '"The acting cause" is explained as the empowering,' that is, they are asserted as explained to be the acting causes. The six causes are as said in the *Treasury of Knowledge* (v. 2.49cd-2.50ab):
>
> > Acting cause, simultaneously occurring,
> > Congruent, concomitant,
> > Ever-functioning, and fruitional:
> > These are asserted as the six types of causes.

From the point of view of the Prasangika Madhyamikas, how many among the six causes are actual causes and how many are terminologically causes? According to this school congruent causes, ever-functioning causes, and fruitional causes are actual causes. A fruitional cause is an actual cause because it brings about a fruitional result; for example, a virtuous fruitional cause brings the result of rebirth as a human being, the fruitional result. An ever-functioning cause is also an actual cause because a previous affliction brings the result of a later affliction. A congruent cause is also an actual cause because, for example, a rice seed brings about a rice sprout that is of similar type. Another example of a congruent cause is the development of mind generation from a mind of compassion. However, there is debate about congruent causes, such as the question: "If a human being dies and is reborn as a horse, is the previous human being a congruent cause of the horse?" Think about it.

For the Prasangika Madhyamikas acting causes, simultaneously occurring causes, and concomitant causes are only terminological or nominal causes, i.e., they are not actual causes.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 150) says:

> Some sects present the definition of cause as: that which acts to establish. From this, whatever abides in the entity of the seed, the producer of that, is the causal condition of that. The produced minds and mental factors, which are like an old person standing up, are produced by any observed object, which is like a supporting cane; this being their observed object condition.

The definition of cause as "that which acts to establish" means "that which acts to produce" or "the producer," this being the usual definition of cause. Minds and mental factors necessarily arise due to observed objects. For example, for the arisal of an eye consciousness apprehending blue there is need of blue, the observed object. In the texts it is said that the aggregation of three conditions is needed for the arisal of a consciousness. These three conditions are:

1. the observed object condition,
2. the immediate condition, and
3. empowering condition.

The fourth condition, the causal condition, is included in these three. This subject is discussed in detail in the first chapter of *Fundamental Wisdom*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 151) says:

> The cause that has just ceased is the immediate condition that produces the result; for example, the seed that has just ceased is the condition for the arisal of the sprout. For example, the autocommentary says: "The seed that has just ceased is the immediate condition concordant with sprout." Also *Clear Words* says that on the occasion of the cessation of the immediate condition, the immediate condition concordant with the sprout ceases. Since Buddhapalita also makes a similar assertion, there is a system that asserts an immediate condition concordant even with form.

According to this there exists an immediate condition concordant with sprout and an immediate condition concordant with form. This would seem to imply that even form has an immediate condition, although this would be contrary to what is usually asserted. According to this passage a seed is an immediate condition concordant with sprout, specifically this being the seed that has just ceased. In the text *Awarenesses and Knowers* it specifies that an immediate condition is a mind. In one text in the context of the twelve links there arises the question: "When the links are connected serially, in dependence on what conditions are they connected? If the previous link is form and the subsequent link is a consciousness, how many conditions are present? If the previous link is a consciousness and the subsequent link form, how many conditions are present?" In this discussion it is not said that form has an immediate condition.

What "system" is referred to here? Is it that of the Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, or Svatantrika Madhyamikas? When this statement is discussed some say that even the Prasangika Madhyamikas accept that form has a concordant immediate condition. Here a distinction needs to be made between "an immediate condition" and "a concordant immediate condition."

Tuesday afternoon, 16 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 151) says:

> If something exists, whatever issues it forth is its empowering condition. *Clear Words* says that even that which was produced previously, that which is produced simultaneously, that which is produced later, and so forth are included in these [empowering conditions]. Also the autocommentary, except for the first (that which was produced previously), makes a similar statement. This is translated in [Bhavaviveka's] *Lamp for [Nagarjuna's] 'Wisdom'* as:
>
> > The conditions which are imputed by other sects are that which is produced in front, the existent, and the non-existent.
>
> Although the meaning is the same, this translation is the best. The meaning of this, as explained in [Jayananda's] *Commentarial Explanation* (*'grel bshad*), is that the imputed conventions of the Staviras are that:
>
> the condition that is produced in front is the observed object condition, which is produced directly in front of the sense powers;
>
> the existent condition is the causal and the empowering conditions; and
>
> the non-existent condition is the immediate condition.
>
> Those [conditions] that do not accord with such mere conventions, when investigated in terms of their defining characteristics are condensed into the four (causal condition, observed object condition, immediate condition, and empowering condition). That "Ishvara and so forth are not

conditions, therefore there does not exist a fifth condition" is definitely to be apprehended. In the *Treasury of Knowledge* (v. 2.64cd-2.65ab) a similar explanation is asserted:

> By four, minds and mental factors;
> By three, the two types of absorptions;
> Others are produced from the two;
> Not by Ishvara and so forth because they are serial and so forth.

"By four, minds and mental factors" means that minds and mental factors arise from four conditions: (1) the causal condition, (2) observed object condition, (3) immediate condition, and (4) the empowering condition.

In the line "By three, the two types of absorptions," the two types of absorptions are: (1) the absorption without discrimination and (2) the absorption of cessation. These absorptions arise in dependence on three conditions: the causal condition, immediate condition, and the empowering condition. They do not have an observed object condition because these two absorptions are not consciousness. They have an immediate condition because they arise from mental application.

In the line "Others are produced from the two," 'others' are forms and non-associated compositional factors, which arise from two conditions: an empowering condition and a causal condition. They do not arise from an observed object condition and an immediate condition. Thus, Vasubandhu's text, *Treasury of Knowledge*, does not posit an immediate condition for form. Therefore, when it was said above that a form has an immediate condition it is not clear whose system this is.

This concludes the section on "Expressing the previous positions," which sets out the assertion of the lower Buddhist schools that phenomena *are* produced from other, 'other' being the four conditions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 151) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B Refuting those systems

1 Refuting the position asserting production from other in general
2 Refuting the Chittamatrin system in particular

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1 Refuting the position asserting production from other in general

A The actual refutation of production from other
B Dispelling harm from the world regarding the refutation
C Indicating the excellent qualities of such a refutation
D Indicating that there is never inherent production
E Indicating the excellent qualities of refuting inherent production even in regard to the two truths

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A The actual refutation of production from other

1 Refuting production from other in general
2 Refuting production from other in particular
3 Through analyzing the four possibilities regarding results, production from other is refuted

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-1 Refuting production from other in general

A Refuting [production from other] by means of absurd consequences
B Refuting the response that dispels the faults

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-1A Refuting [production from other] by means of absurd consequences

1 The actual absurd consequences
2 Critical analysis of those [absurd consequences]

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-1A1 The actual absurd consequences

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (page 59) says:

> This [production from others] is not to be presented, because of contradicting reasoning and scripture. There, expressed from the viewpoint of reasoning:
>
> *If another arises in dependence on others,*
> *Then dense darkness would arise even from a flame and* [6.14ab]
>
> because of being just other. This is not seen nor is it reasonable – therefore, it does not exist. Therefore, it is taught [in *The Treatise on the Middle Way*, 20.19cd]:
>
> Cause and effect as otherness would never be admissible.
> – [and in verse 20cd:]
>
> If cause and effect were just other (i.e., otherness), cause and non-cause would be similar.

Chandrakirti says that is not admissible to posit production from other because this would contradict both reasoning and scripture. The reasoning is set out by Chandrakirti in the root text, saying: "If another arises in dependence on others, then dense darkness would arise even from a flame." In other words, if a result established by way of its own character arises from a cause established by way of its own character, it follows that dense darkness arises from a flame. Thus, it follows that from causes and non-causes there arise results and non-results. If there is production from other then everything would arise from everything. If it were so, darkness would arise from lighting a lamp and so forth because a result established by way of its own character arises from a cause established by way of its own character. Chandrakirti says "This is not seen nor is it reasonable." In other words, dense darkness arising from a flame is not seen and is not reasonable. Therefore, there is no production from other. For this reason, the *Treatise on the Middle Way* says: "Cause and effect as otherness would never be admissible" and "If cause and effect were just other (i.e., otherness), cause and non-cause would be similar." This means that from cause and non-cause would come results and non-results. In other words, it follows that from a barley seed there would arise the result of peas and wheat. A barley seed is an example of a non-cause of peas and wheat.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 152) says:

> Production from other cannot be posited because it contradicts reasoning and scripture. The latter is, for example, the *Rice Seedling Sutra*, which says:
>
> Even the sprout of name and form is not produced by self nor is it produced by other.
>
> [Production from other] contradicts many such later scriptures.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *If in dependence on other there arises another,*
> *In that case even from tongues of fire there would arise thick darkness.*
> *Also from all, all would be produced. Because of that*
> *There would not be anything at all that acts to produce and they would be similar to otherness.* [6.14]

Chandrakirti first sets out the reasoning refuting production from other, whereas Lama Tsongkhapa first sets out a scriptural citation refuting production from other. The scripture in this case is the *Rice Seedling Sutra*, which says: "Even the sprout of name and form is not produced by self nor is it produced by other." In short, Buddha clearly said that a sprout is not produced from self or other.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 251), quoting *Clear Words* (Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, page 502), says:

[The *Rice Seedling*] *Sutra* says:

> Also, when a sprout arising from its cause – a seed – is produced, it is not created by self, not created by [naturally existent] others, not created by both, not created by Ishvara, and not metamorphosed by time. It does not arise from particles, does not arise from the nature, does not arise from its own entity, and is not produced causelessly.

Although this is not exactly the same quotation from the *Rice Seedling Sutra* the meaning is similar.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 152) says:

> [The refutation of production from other] from the point of view of reasoning is stated [as follows]. *If in dependence on other*, a cause which is established by way of its own entity, *there arises another*, a result which is established by way of its own entity, *in that case even from* blazing *tongues of fire* (that which dispels) *there would arise thick darkness* (that which is dispelled). Furthermore, *also from all* causes and non-causes, *all* things and non-things which are results *would be produced*. Why is that? *Because of that*:
> *there would not be anything at all that acts to produce* those results and the two would be asserted as causes and results, and
> they would be *similar to otherness* that is established by way of its own character.
> These are the two very absurd consequences that are based on the signs (*gtan tshig*) asserted by others.

In short, if there is production from other it follows that "from all causes and non-causes, all things and non-things which are results would be produced." This is because a result would come from both that which produces it and that which does not produce it. 'Causes' are causes that established by way of their own character, and 'non-causes' are non-causes that are established by way of their own character. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas this is refuted because there are no phenomena that are established by way of their own character. If causes are established by way of their own character, then it follows that everything is produced from everything. The two absurd consequences posited here are based on the signs asserted by others, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (page 59) says:

> Furthermore:
>
> *Everything would also be produced from everything...* [6.14c]
>
> Also, from everything that is a cause and a non-cause, every functioning thing that is an effect and a non-effect would be produced.
>
> If asked: why?
>
> *Because all that does not create production*
> *Is also similar in otherness.* [6.14cd]
>
> Just as the rice seed that creates production is just other than its effect, the rice sprout, likewise, non-producers, such as fire, coal, barley seed, and so forth, are also [just other]. Also, just as the rice sprout is produced from what is other – the rice seed – likewise, it would also [be produced] from fire, coal, barley seed, and so forth. Also, just as the rice sprout arises from a rice seed that is other, likewise, vase, cloth, and so forth would also, but that too is not perceived, therefore, this too is not so.

In short, if there is production from other it follows that everything is produced from everything. A rice seed is an established-by-way-of-its-own-character-other-than-a-rice-sprout. A non-producer of a rice sprout is, for example, fire, coal, barley seed, and so forth. It follows that a rice sprout is produced from such non-producers. In short, if a rice seed established by way of its own character produces a rice sprout established by way of its own character then it follows that a rice sprout is produced from a fire, coal, barley seed, and so forth. ("Fire, coal, barley seed, and so forth" are non-producers of a rice sprout.) This is because they too are an other established by way of its own character. The absurd consequence is:

> It follows that a rice sprout is produced from a rice seed, which is a producer, and it follows that a rice sprout is produced from fire, coal, barley seed, and so forth, which are non-producers.

In short:

> It follows that everything is produced from producers and non-producers.

Although fire can be produced from a rice seed, as can coal when it is burned, a barley sprout cannot be produced from a rice seed.

Chandrakirti says: "Also, just as the rice sprout is produced from what is other – the rice seed – likewise, it would also [be produced] from fire, coal, barley seed, and so forth." Then he says: "Also, just as the rice sprout arises from a rice seed that is other, likewise, vase, cloth, and so forth would also." Just as a rice sprout arises from a rice seed, so too would vase, cloth, and so forth arise from a rice seed; however, this does not happen. This consequence comes about from the fact that production arising from a cause established by way of its own character is independent production. The cause is independent and the result is independent, therefore from an independent cause comes an independent result. Since cause and result are independent, from a rice seed there would be the production of vase, cloth, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 152) says:

> If these two consequences are explained [it is as follows]. Just as the seed that produces the rice would be an established-by-its-own-character-other-than-the-rice-sprout which is its result, likewise, that which does not produce the rice sprout, even fire, coal, a barley seed, and so forth, is an established by its own character other than the rice sprout. This is the way of asserting of the proponents of production from other.

If a rice sprout arises from a rice seed established by way of its own character then it should also arise from fire, coal, a barley seed, and so forth because they too are established by way of their own character and are independent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 152) says:

> If [production from other] is asserted to accord with the two modes of being other, it accords with the following. Just as a rice seed produces a rice sprout through transforming into other, likewise, there would be the production of a rice sprout even from fire, coal, and so forth. Also just as the rice sprout transformed into other is produced from the rice seed, so too pot, woolen blanket, and so forth would be produced from the rice seed.

It follows that a result would be produced from causes and non-causes.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 153) says:

> *Fundamental Wisdom* says:

> Cause and result are
> Never correct as other.
> If cause and result were other
> Cause and non-cause would be similar.

> These are the reasonings that teach the absurd consequences regarding production from other. The explanation in the [auto]commentary suggests the opposite of both these consequences.

"The explanation in the commentary" refers to the autocommentary. In relation to "suggests the opposite of both these consequences" there arises a long discussion concerning the two consequences (see below).

The discussion of the "critical analysis of those absurd consequences" is divided into two sections: "The reason for entering into the absurd consequences regarding production from other" and "Not contradicting the assertion opposite to those consequences." In these sections Lama Tsongkhapa sets out a series of analyses that are not discussed by Chandrakirti in his autocommentary. There are various opinions of past Tibetan scholars regarding this discussion.

What is the fault of asserting production from other? Production from other is the production of a result established by way of its own character from a cause established by way of its own character. If production from other is not qualified by 'established by way of its own character,' there is no discussion since things *are* produced from other. The Prasangika Madhyamika system simply says there is no production from other. Because they do not qualify 'other' with "establishment by way of its own character," the lower schools debate them saying, for example: "Is a son not produced from a mother? Is smoke not produced from fire? Are smoke and fire one or other? Are mother and son one or other?" In response to these questions, one would have to say that they are other. In this way the lower schools debate with the Prasangika Madhyamikas. The lowers schools also take the example of a sprout growing in a field due to the work of the farmer, and ask: "Are the farmer and the sprout not other?"

Wednesday morning, 17 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The explanation in the [auto]commentary suggests the opposite of both these consequences."

The <u>first consequence</u> is:

> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that from luminous flames arises darkness because a cause established by way of its own character produces a result established by way of its own character.

The <u>second consequence</u> is:

> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that it is produced from causes and non-causes because a cause established by way of its own character produces a result established by way of its own character.

The <u>opposite suggested by the first consequence</u> is:

> A sprout, as the subject, a cause established by way of its own character does not produce a result established by way of its own character because dense darkness does not arise from tongues of fire.

Or:

> Object of knowledge, as the subject, a cause established by way of its own character does not produce a result established by way of its own character because dense darkness does not arise from tongues of fire.

The opposite suggested by the second consequence is:

> Object of knowledge, as the subject, a cause established by way of its own character does not produce a result established by way of its own character because everything that is cause and non-cause does not produce results and non-results.

Or:

> Object of knowledge, as the subject, a cause established by way of its own character does not produce a result established by way of its own character because everything does not produce everything.

When the *Illumination* says that Chandrakirti's autocommentary suggests the opposite of these two consequences it is referring to these two.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 153) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-1A2 Critical analysis of those [absurd consequences]
>
> A The reason for incurring the absurd consequences regarding production from other
> B Not contradicting the assertion opposite to those consequences
>
> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-1A2A The reason for incurring the absurd consequences regarding production from other
>
> With respect to the reason for incurring the faults of the absurd consequences regarding the assertion of production from other here, some Tibetans say that it is due to the fact that cause and result are pervaded by being sequential as otherwise they would necessarily occur at the same time. However, this is extremely unsuitable
> because all the faults [pointed out by them in] refuting that would be incurred similarly upon themselves and
> because if that is denied saying "We do not accept that" there would be the meaningless fatigue of searching for a reason for that.

Some Tibetans say that cause and result arise sequentially in that first there is the cause and then the result, as otherwise they would occur simultaneously. However, by saying that, all the previously mentioned faults incurred by those who assert production from other would come back upon them. Also if they deny this there would be the meaningless fatigue of searching for reasons to refute production from other. (See Cabezon, *A Dose of Emptiness*, page303.)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 153) says:

> Also many Tibetans say: "When a logician establishes that "the existence of the instance smoke is pervaded by the existence of fire" and "product is pervaded by impermanence," they are established unmistakenly in regard to all places and times. When this is established, through establishing them in terms of a single isolated case (*nyi tshe ba*), for example, [fire and smoke in regard to] a kitchen and [product and impermanence in regard to] a pot, then for the reason that [the specific pervasions] and the two pervasions in regard to other places and times are a similar [type of] reasoning, those two pervasions are asserted to be unmistakenly established in terms of all places and times. In this case, [Chandrakirti] flings absurd consequences by means of the reason of the similarity with respect to being *mere* other. This kind [of reasoning is called] *induction* (*ldog pa gcig pa'i dpung 'phul ba*)."

Some Tibetans say that when someone proves that "product is pervaded by impermanence" and "the existence of smoke is pervaded by the existence of fire" they are established unmistakenly in all places and times. In general if there is smoke there is fire. However, in relation to a particular time, at the time of the smoke (the result), the fire (its cause) has ceased because a result arises upon the ceasing of

its cause. In this way cause and result are sequential. Therefore, when establishing cause and result in terms of time it cannot be established that if there exists smoke there exists fire because at the time of the smoke the fire no longer exists and at the time of the fire the smoke does not yet exist. Therefore, that they are unmistakenly established in relation to all times is not correct.

Likewise, the cause, fire, and the result, smoke, are not established unmistakenly in all places because, for example, it follows that fire exists in the mouth of a smoker because smoke exists there. The existence of fire can in general be established by the existence of smoke but it cannot be established in relation to a specific place, for example, the mouth of a smoker. Also, for example, smoke exists in a chimney but fire does not exist in it. Therefore, the establishment of the cause, fire, and result, smoke, in relation to all times and places is not correct. However, if they are established in relation to a particular place such as kitchen it is correct because in a kitchen there is both fire and smoke. Also in relation to a pot, [a single isolated case,] the pervasion of product by impermanence can be established; for example: a pot, as the subject, is impermanent because of being a product.

These Tibetans continue: "In this case, [Chandrakirti] flings absurd consequences by means of the reason of the similarity with respect to being *mere* other. This kind [of reasoning is called] *induction*. (*ldog pa gcig pa'i dpung 'phul ba*)." The Tibetan phrase *ldog pa gcig pa'i dpung 'phul*, here translated as "induction," means that someone collects many reasons which are then used to defend their position, such as establishment in all times and places. The phrase "induction" is discussed in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment*. Thus, by means of the reason of similarity with respect to being *mere* other, many absurd consequences are suggested. This is not correct.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> CLARIFICATION: Furthermore, you have not ascertained the meaning of the passage and this is illogical talk because the two, the instance smoke and product, are unmistakenly established in regard to fire and impermanence in general without the qualification of place and time. Therefore, the qualm thinking "Even though 'the existence of fire' and 'being impermanent' are opposed, is it not possible that the two stated as a reason are not ruled out?" can be readily resolved. Although two phenomena are precluded as being cause and result, since there are many who take them to be mere other how can there exist an occasion of those two being similar? Therefore, that, the very phrase "induction," clarifies it as a repudiation of one who does not know reasoning. This has already been explained extensively elsewhere.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that these Tibetans have not understood the meaning of "induction." They only know the name. Lama Tsongkhapa says that he has already explained the meaning of this extensively in other texts, such as his *Essence of Eloquence* and the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment* in the section on special insight.

Although the two, pillar and pot, are ruled out as being cause and result they abide as mere other. Saying that many absurd consequences follow due to the two being *mere* other is not correct. This is because if things are mere other they are not necessarily cause and result; for example, saying: "Because they are mere other such-and-such produces such-and-such" is incorrect. If someone says for example that "Pot produces pillar because it is mere other," such a statement is inadmissible. The person who says this thinks that he is using the technique of induction, however, the absurd consequence applies only to an other established by way of its own character (i.e., not to a mere other). Therefore, Lama Tsongkhapa says that such Tibetans use the term "induction" but have not understood its actual meaning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

How is this? *Clear Words* says:

> Due to its mere conditionality [a thing] is asserted to be conventionally established. It is not due to asserting the four positions because it would follow that things have inherent existence and because that too is unsuitable. When this mere conditionality is asserted, the two, cause and result, because of being mutually dependent, are not established by way of their own entity, whereby things do not appear as having inherent existence.

> With respect to the two distinctions of asserting and not asserting production from self and the reasons for these two, it is said that if one asserts production from the four positions one must propound inherent existence. Therefore, it is clearly said that if production from other is asserted it is necessary to assert inherent production, whereas if mere production, which is a dependent-arising, is asserted it is not necessary to assert inherent production.

In general, conventionalities arise from mere conditions. Nevertheless, there is no need to assert production from any of the four positions: production from self, production from other, production from both, and causeless production. If any of these four positions are accepted it follows that things are inherently produced, whereas this is not suitable. If conventionalities arise from mere conditions then cause and result are dependent. Since conventionalities, such as causes and results, depend on each other they are not established by way of their own entities. Therefore, they are not inherently produced. Chandrakirti says: "Whereby things do not appear as having inherent existence." "Things do not appear as having inherent existence" means that they do not have inherent existence, although they do appear to us as having inherent existence.

To review, there are those who assert production from self and those who do not. Those who assert production from self in the context of the four positions, or four extremes, must say that things are inherently produced. Likewise, those who assert production from other have to assert inherent production. On the other hand, those who assert production that is a dependent-arising do not need to assert inherent production. It is necessary to make this distinction.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 155) says:

> Therefore, the *other* of production from other is not a mere other but is an inherently existent other, whereby in asserting [production from an inherently existent other] an absurd consequence is suggested, whereas in asserting [production from a] mere other it is not suggested at all.

There are two types of other:

1. a mere other and
2. an established by way of its own character other.

The assertion that a result is produced from a mere other is correct but asserting that a result is produced from an established by way of its own character other has many absurd consequences. For example, if a cause established by way of its own character produces a result established by way of its own character then it follows that tongues of fire produce dense darkness because the two are not related.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 155) says:

> Also further on [in Chandrakirti's *Supplement*] it is asserted that, although former and later moments are different, they are one continuum. It says:
>
> > *Those individual [phenomena] established by way of their own character*
> > *Are not suitable to be included in one continuum.* [v.6.61cd]

Here Lama Tsongkhapa quotes Chandrakirti's *Supplement* (G. Churinoff's translation, 1994), which says:

> *The qualities based on Maitreya and Upagupta*
> *Are not included in one continuum because of otherness.*
> *Whatever is distinct by their own characteristic,*
> *They are illogical to include in one continuum.* [6.61]

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 155) continues:

> This says that if they are individual [phenomena] which are established by way of their own character, it is unsuitable for former and later [moments] to be included in one continuum, whereas they would be suitable as two. Furthermore, if they are an established by way of its own character other, their relationship of dependency can be refuted. If it becomes a different unrelated object, then if one result is produced from its respective cause it would also be produced from all non-causes. Also if one cause produces its respective result, then all things that are results which are not its results would be produced. These absurd consequences would be incurred.

Lama Tsongkhapa quotes the *Supplement* regarding former and later moments being included in one continuum. If two things are established by way of their own character they cannot be included in one continuum. If a cause established by way of its own character produces a result established by way of its own character, then it is not related to its result. For example, the mental continuum that comes from a past life to a future life is composed of different moments. These different moments of a single continuum are not established by way of their own character. Likewise, two persons, such as Maitreya and Upagupta, have different continua that are not one. Are these two continua established by way of their own character? They are not. In terms of a single physical basis, such as Maitreya, there is a process of aging in terms of the different moments of the continuum. For example, there are the moment of being a child, those of being a youth, those of being an adult, and so forth. All these different moments are part of the same continuum. Therefore, this single continuum is not established by way of its own character. On the other hand, if the different moments of Maitreya's continuum were established by way of their own character, then the continuum at the time of his childhood would be different from his present continuum and so forth. In short, if two individual things are established by way of their own character they cannot be one continuum. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Furthermore, if they are an established by way of its own character other, their relationship of dependency can be refuted." If this were the case there would be the following absurd consequences:

- "if one result is produced from its respective cause it would also be produced from all non-causes" and
- "if one cause produces its respective result, then all things that are results which are not its results would be produced."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 155) says:

> Therefore, not understanding such reasonings well is the fault of not analyzing well the two individual presentations of:
> apprehending the measure of conceiving the object of negation which is to be refuted like that explained previously and
> dependent-arising which is so asserted.
> Therefore, when refuting the object of negation be mindful of the explanation apprehending the measure of the object of negation.

There are two individual presentations:

1. the measure of conceiving the object of negation and
2. dependent-arising.

Through not understanding them many absurd consequences arise.

To review, production from other is:

> production of a result established by way of its own character from a cause established by way of its own character.

If there were such a result produced from such a cause, many absurd consequences would follow, such as tongues of fire producing dense darkness, everything being produced from everything, and so forth. However, this is not the case, therefore the conclusion is that there is no production from other. However, there are two types of production from other:

1. production from a mere other and
2. production from an established by way of its own character other.

If one accepts production from an established by way of its own character other, then many absurd consequences follow. On the other hand, if one asserts production from mere other it is not pervaded by asserting production from other. Yet, the Prasangika Madhyamikas merely say "production from other."

Due to asserting production from other, many absurd consequences arise such as that the continua of Maitreya and Upagupta are one, whereas this is not the case. In terms of a single person it can be asked: "Is his continuum one with the continuum of another?" It is not. However, the continuum of a single person is one. It can be asked: "Is Maitreya's continuum the continuum of the six classes of beings?" This question arises because a single person, such as Maitreya, has been all six classes of beings due to having taken different types of rebirth. Thus, there is no type of rebirth that Maitreya has not taken.

Some say that when a sentient being becomes buddha all his continua become one, and that the continua of all buddhas is one. Others say that this is not so. If the continua of all the buddhas were one, many absurd consequences follow. I myself would never say that the continua of all the buddhas are one but some scholars do say this.

Wednesday afternoon, 17 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 155) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-1A2B Not contradicting the assertions opposite to the consequences
>
> QUESTION: If the meaning which is opposite to the two consequences explained above is asserted in what sense are [the following] statements quoted? *Clear Words* says:
>
> > The meaning opposite to the consequences is also related to the opponent and not to us because we do not have this thesis.
>
> And:
>
> > If the proponents of non-inherent existence establish a consequence in regard to the proponents of inherent existence, how can it follow as meaning the opposite to the consequence?
>
> And:
>
> > Therefore, because establishing a consequence has the result of merely refuting the opponents' thesis, it does not become the meaning opposite to the consequence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 156) says:

> RESPONSE: There is no fault. The meaning of the first citation [from *Clear Words*] is [as follows]. Teaching in this way is only in the context of refuting production from self. Therefore, they are not at all consequences flung by the Middle Wayers but are the two consequences that refute production from self. The predicate (*thal chos*) is not that production follows as being merely purposeless and endless, but that *repeated* production is purposeless and endless. The opposite meaning to that predicate – repeated production which is meaningful and has an end – is only an assertion of the Samkyas. For the reason that we do not have their thesis, it does not contradict the tenets that we accept.

In the first citation from *Clear Words* above, the meaning opposite to the consequences refers to the two consequences set out in the context of refuting production from self:

1. it follows that their production is purposeless and
2. it follows that their production is endless.

These two consequences were set out for those who assert production from self. On the other hand, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas, who do not accept production from self, there is no reason to assert the opposite thesis. This is because the opposite thesis, "repeated production which is meaningful and has an end," is only related to the Samkhyas who assert that, although a sprout has already attained its own entity, it needs to be produced again. The Samkhyas say that a result exists at the time of its cause without being clearly apparent. Their thesis is that if a result did not exist at the time of its cause in a non-apparent way it could not be produced later on. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not have the thesis "repeated production which is meaningful and has an end," therefore, there is also not the fault of their contradicting Nagarjuna's tenets.

Likewise, when a Prasangika Madhyamika flings the consequences "it follows that everything is produced from everything" and "it follows that dense darkness arises from a flame" [at the lower Buddhist schools who accept production from other], he does so only in the context of refuting production from other. It is not necessary that he accept the opposite consequence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 156) says:

> Buddhapalita also mentions the term 'again' stating that "production again is purposeless" and in *Clear Words* the term 'again' is also mentioned. Since here [in the *Supplement*] it also says "If [that already produced] is thoroughly conceived to be produced again," the two, existence and *repeated* production, would be contradictory, whereas existence and production are not contradictory. Similarly, existence and *repeated* production having an end would be contradictory, whereas existence and production having an end are not contradictory.

Chandrakirti's *Supplement* previously said:

> *If that already produced is thoroughly conceived to be produced again*
> *Production of the sprout and so forth would not be found here.* [6.9ab]

In short, there is nothing that already exists yet needs to be produced again. There exists a common locus between existent and production, for example, a sprout. A sprout is a production because it is produced from a seed and an existent because of existing. Is a sprout produced again? It is not. That which already exists but needs to be produced again is contradictory. Existent and *repeated* production having an end are contradictory, whereas existent and production having an end are not. Does the production of sprout have an end? It does. Does the sprout exist? It does. That sprout exists and is a production having an end are not contradictory.

This concludes the explanation of the first quotation from *Clear Words*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 156) says:

> The meaning of the second citation [from *Clear Words* is as follows]. When the Middle Way proponents of non-inherent existence fling the two consequences explained before to the Samkya proponents of inherent existence, they do not desire to assert an implied meaning opposite to [their own system]. It is also not that this is done without independence. Therefore, this is the meaning of saying "They do not assert the opposite to those two consequences."

The second citation from *Clear Words* is:

> If the proponents of non-inherent existence establish a consequence in regard to the proponents of inherent existence, how can it follow as meaning the opposite to the consequence?

In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not have the Samkhya's thesis.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 156) says:

> The meaning of the third citation [from *Clear Words* is as follows]. Although the reason of repeated production which is purposeful and has an end – the opposite meaning to the predicate of the two consequences – does not establish the non-existence of production from self, it is not meaningless. Since it establishes the purposeless and endless production which the Samkyas do not assert, it has the purpose of establishing the mere elimination of production from self which is the thesis of the Samkyas.

The third citation is:

> Therefore, because establishing a consequence has the result of merely refuting the opponents' thesis, it does not become the meaning opposite to the consequence.

The third citation means that when a consequence is flung it is done in order to refute the opponent's thesis; it does not imply that the challenger has to accept the meaning opposite to the thesis. For example, when one who asserts non-inherent existence flings a consequence at someone who asserts inherent existence it is not necessary for the challenger to accept the meaning opposite to that consequence. In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not need to accept the meaning opposite to the consequence that they fling since the Samkhyas alone accept the meaning opposite to the consequence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 157) says:

> In regard to the two absurd consequences, through our asserting the meaning opposite to the consequences, the meaning that is opposite to the consequences is to be understood as the two, asserted and not asserted, by us.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not need to accept the opposite to the two absurd consequences that are set out in the context of refuting production from self, whereas in the context of refuting production from other the Prasangika Madhyamikas do accept the opposite to the consequence. The opposite meaning to the two consequences in refuting production from other that they accept are:

1. dense darkness is not produced from tongues of fire and
2. everything is not produced from everything.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the meaning that is opposite to the consequences is to be understood as the two, asserted and not asserted." This means that the Prasangika Madhyamikas accept the meaning opposite to the two consequences in the context of refuting production from other but do not accept the meaning opposite to the two consequences in the context of refuting production from self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 157) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-1B Refuting the response that dispels the faults

1 The response dispelling the faults
2 Refuting that response

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-1B1 The response dispelling the faults

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [An objection] is mentioned here. Although the two, cause and effect, have otherness, everything arising from everything will also not follow because of seeing the certainty [of individual causes and effects]. Here, this is certain because:
>
> *If said: "Able to be fully created, therefore, definitely expressed as the*
> *Effect and that which is able to produce it, even if other, is the cause –*
> *Produced from [that] belonging to one continuum and the producer,*
> *Therefore, a rice sprout is not thus [produced] from barley and so forth."* [6.15]

This passage is a response according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas and the other lower Buddhist schools. They say that although a cause established by way of its own character produces a result established by way of its own character there is no pervasion that everything produces everything because it is seen to be definite. It is seen to be definite in the sense that it is seen that a particular cause brings a particular result. There are in fact individual causes because when a pea is planted in a field the result of a pea sprout is seen to be definite. Likewise, when a barley seed is planted that the result is a barley sprout is seen to be definite.

Chandrakirti says: "Able to be fully created, therefore, definitely expressed as the effect and that which is able to produce it, even if other, is the cause." This means that a cause is able to produce a certain result. "Even if other" means an other qualified by being established by way of its own character, that other is able to produce a result. "Produced from [that] belonging to one continuum and the producer" means that a rice sprout is produced from the rice seed, a producer, which is the same continuum as itself. "Therefore, a rice sprout is not thus [produced] from barley and so forth," means that the lower schools assert that a rice sprout is not produced from a non-producer, a barley seed and so forth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Here, "effect" possesses the active affix (*kritya-praryaya*) with regard to the sense of ability. That itself which is able to be created by something is its effect. That which is able to produce this effect, even if held as being other, is the cause. Hence, solely due to a special otherness are things cause and effect, not due to a general otherness.

Here Chandrakirti explains that the word 'effect' in Sanskrit possesses the active affix among the twenty-two affixes. Chandrakirti says: "That itself which is able to be created by something is its effect. That which is able to produce this effect, even if held as being other, is the cause." Although a cause that is able to bring about a result is other it is still its cause. Chandrakirti then says: "Hence, solely due to a special otherness are things cause and effect, not due to a general otherness." Only due to a specific or particular otherness are things posited as cause and result, things that are general otherness are not posited as such. A specific otherness is, for example, a barley seed that brings the result of a barley sprout. What is an example of general otherness? For example, the generality object

of knowledge and the instance pot, they are general otherness that cannot be posited as cause and result.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Although there is production from that belonging to the same continuum and a producer, there is neither [production] from that belonging to another continuum, a barley seed and so forth, nor from that belonging to the same continuum but not creating production, [such as] the former instant not being [produced] from the latter instant. Hence, the consequence that everything would arise from everything – this is inappropriate. It is like this: "the cause of the rice sprout is only the rice seed, there is no other. The effect of the rice seed is only the rice sprout, there is no other."

A barley sprout is not produced from a rice seed because they are different continua, likewise a rice sprout cannot arise from a barley seed. There are also cases of two things being the same continuum but not being cause and effect, for example, a latter instant does not produce a former instant of the same continuum. Chandrakirti says: "Hence, the consequence that everything would arise from everything – this is inappropriate."

In conclusion Chandrakirti says: "It is like this: 'the cause of the rice sprout is only the rice seed, there is no other. The effect of the rice seed is only the rice sprout, there is no other.'" In this way the lower schools dispel faults but the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they do have faults.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 157) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *"That which can be strongly created, therefore, is said to definitely be a result and*
> > *Whatever is able to produce that, even if other, is a cause.*
> > *Because included in the same continuum and produced from a producer,*
> > *A rice sprout is not, as is that, from barley and so forth."* [6.15]
>
> Here we [the proponents of production from other] say: "Although the two, cause and result, are an otherness that is established by way of its own character, everything does not arise from everything because cause and result are seen to be definitely distinct. Furthermore, it is so because any thing that *can be strongly created* by anything *is* itself *said to definitely be a result* of that; therefore, results are definite.
>
> [The word] 'therefore' [in the root text] does not accord with the commentary.

The lower schools say that although cause and result are an otherness established by way of its own character it does not follow that everything arises from everything because cause and result are seen to be definitely distinct. A specific cause brings a specific result, for example, a barley seed produces a barley sprout, and rice seed produces a rice sprout. It is not the case that a barley seed is seen to produce a rice sprout and so forth.

Perhaps the comment "[The word] 'therefore' [in the root text] does not accord with the commentary" means that the word 'therefore,' which exists in the *Supplement*, does not exist in the autocommentary. Perhaps Lama Tsongkhapa means that the word "therefore" does not appear in autocommentary but is used in a slightly different way.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 157) says:

> *Whatever* cause *is able to produce that* result, *even if* it is an *other* that is established by way of its own entity, *is a cause*; therefore, causes are definite.

For all the lower schools from the Svatantrika Madhyamikas down a cause established by way of its own character is feasible. However, it is not feasible for the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 157) says:

> Thus, only particular others are posited as cause and result; general otherness due to being mere other is not posited as cause and result.

This was also clearly set forth in the autocommentary. A particular other such as fire is posited as a cause of its result, smoke. General otherness, just being mere other, is not posited as cause and result, for example, fire and the tangible object cold are other but cannot be posited as cause and result. This is because from fire only the tangible object heat can arise.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 157) says:

> Furthermore, a rice sprout is produced from a rice seed *included in the same continuum* as itself, it is not produced from [something included in] a different continuum, such as a barley seed and so forth.

The meaning of this is quite clear.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 157) says:

> Although the same continuum, a later moment, a non-producer, does not produce a former [moment]. Therefore, a later moment is *produced from* a former [moment] of the same continuum, *a producer*.

Although they are the same continuum a former moment can produce a later moment but a later moment cannot produce a former moment.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 157) says:

> *Because of that*, a *rice sprout is not* produced, *as is that* barley sprout and so forth, *from barley and so forth*. Therefore, everything is not produced from everything."

A rice sprout is not produced from a barley seed and a barley sprout is not produced from a rice seed. Since even farmers know this there is no need to say anything more!

Thursday morning, 18 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 157) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-1B2 Refuting that response

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> At first, one should ask this propounder of cause and effect just this: "This [statement of yours] which is a certainty, from what [reasoning] is it [derived]?"
>
> If the propounder says: Because of perceiving the certainty.
>
> Again, why? If such a statement, "perceiving the certainty," is debated and investigated, by mentioning merely that much, "because the certainty is perceived, therefore, the certainty is

perceived," one is not able to abandon, even slightly, the faults that were already explained as the cause of the certainty is not indicated.

Furthermore, in order to indicate that "not distinguishing the common and particular otherness, this overly renowned one itself is present as the harmer to his exact assertion," it is explained:

Just as barley, kesara, kimshuka, *and so forth*
Are not asserted as producers of the rice sprout, do not have the capacity,
Do not belong within the same continuum and are just not similar,
Likewise, the rice seed is also not of it, because of otherness. [6.16]

The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask the Svatantrika Madhyamikas: "What is your reason for saying that a rice seed and rice sprout are an established by way of its own character other? Why do you say that although cause and result are individually established by way of their own character everything does not arise from everything?" To this the Svatantrika Madhyamikas respond: "Because of perceiving the certainty." The Prasangika Madhyamikas then ask: "What is the certainty that is perceived?" The Svatantrika Madhyamikas respond: "The certainty is perceived." The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "Saying that cannot dispel the faults of everything arising from everything, which were explained before. You do not have a reason that supports your assertion that everything does not arise from everything. Your assertion is harmed by that renowned in the world."

Barley, *kesara* (stamens), *kimshuka* (flowers), and so forth do not produce a rice sprout. 'Kesara' are the stamens or anthers that serve in the reproduction of a plant. Barley and so forth are:

1. not producers of a rice sprout,
2. do not have the capacity to produce a rice sprout,
3. do not belong to the same continuum as a rice sprout, and
4. are not of similar type to a rice sprout.

The *Supplement* says: "Likewise, the rice seed is also not of it, because of otherness." In the same way, a rice seed cannot produce a rice sprout because they are an established by way of its own character other. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas a cause which is established by way of its own character cannot produce a result.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Just as barley, *kesara* (stamens), *kimshuka* (flowers), and so forth, because of being other,

- are not asserted as the agent producing a rice sprout,
- do not have the capacity of producing a rice sprout,
- do not belong to the same continuum, and
- are not similar,

likewise, the rice seed will also not be distinguished by the qualities that were explained for that [sprout], because of being just other.

Barley and so forth because of being other are not able to produce a rice sprout and so forth. Chandrakirti says: "likewise, the rice seed will also not be distinguished by the qualities that were explained for that [sprout], because of being just other."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 157) says:

[To this the Prasangika Madhyamikas say:] To those who propound that causes and results are established by way of their own entity one should ask the question: "For what reason are a rice seed and sprout definitely distinct?" [The autocommentary says:]

> If the propounder responds, "Because they are seen to be definite," again one asks: "Why?" If the statement "they are seen to be definite" is examined and investigated as it is, merely stating "Because they are seen to be definite, therefore, they are seen to be definite" is not even slightly able to abandon the errors that were already explained without presenting the reason for their being definite.

> This means that since the reason, that although their being other by way of their own character does not contradict their being seen to be definite, is not indicated, it is not a response that dispels the faults [of production from other].

In brief, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the response of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas does not dispel the faults of asserting production from other. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that a rice seed and rice sprout are an established by way of its own character other, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas this means that they are unrelated. However, their not being related is harmed by that which is renowned in the world, i.e., that there is no production from an unrelated other. For example, it is well known that a rice seed does not produce a barley sprout and that a barley seed does not produce a rice sprout.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 158) says:

> Moreover, the explanation [in the autocommentary] that the highly renowned otherness established by way of its own character that is not differentiated as being common or particular in regard to all that is and is not cause and result harms the assertion of those disputants is [as follows].
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Just as barley, kesara, kimshuka and so forth*
> *Are not asserted to be producers of a rice sprout, do not have that ability,*
> *Are not included within the same continuum, and are not similar, likewise,*
> *A rice seed also would not be of that because of otherness.* [6.16]
>
> *Just as*, for example, *barley and kesara* – the stamens of lotuses and so forth, *and kimshuka* flowers *and so forth*, because they are other,
> *are not asserted to be producers of a rice sprout*,
>
> *do not have the ability* to produce a rice sprout,
>
> *are not included in the same continuum*, and
>
> *are not* previous [moments] of *similar* type,
>
> *likewise, a rice seed also would* not possess the four features in relation to *that* rice sprout *because* they would be an *otherness* that is established by way of its own entity. Furthermore, this is a reasoning that is not able to posit different unrelated objects as having or not having the four features.

The four features can be understood in a positive sense in the case of the relationship between a rice seed and rice sprout or in a negative sense in terms of a barley seed and rice sprout. In the case of a barely seed and rice sprout, the barley seed:

1. is not a producer of a rice sprout,
2. does not have the ability to produce a rice sprout,
3. is not included in the same continuum, and
4. is not a previous moment of similar type.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the barley seed does not have these four features in relation to the rice sprout, it follows that the rice seed would also not have them because they too are unrelatedly other.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Furthermore, this is a reasoning that is not able to posit different unrelated objects as having or not having the four features." There is a case in which two unrelated

objects have the four features and another case in which they do not, however this reasoning is not able to posit this. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas if a rice seed and rice sprout are an established by way of its own character other, then they would be unrelated objects because if they are established by way of their own character they would exist unrelatedly and independently.

A rice seed and rice sprout have the four features in that a rice seed:

1. is a producer of a rice sprout,
2. has the ability to produce a rice sprout,
3. is included in the same continuum as a rice sprout, and
4. is a previous moment of similar type.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 158) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-2 Refuting production from other in particular

A Refuting production from other in regard to former and later cause and result
B Refuting production from other in regard to simultaneous cause and result

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-2A Refuting production from other in regard to former and later cause and result

1 Actual meaning [of refuting production from other in regard to former and later cause and result]
2 Dispelling disputes regarding the refutation

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-2A1 Actual meaning [of refuting production from other in regard to former and later cause and result]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thus, having at first repeatedly expressed the established otherness renowned to others as though it were established, it was disputed. Now, to explain the otherness of cause and effect as impossible:
>
> *Sprout and seed do not exist simultaneously.*
> *Without otherness, how could the seed be merely other?*
> *Hence, since sprout produced from seed will not be established,*
> *Give up this position that "there is production from others."* [6.17]
>
> Here, only the presently existing Maitreya and Upagupta are seen as merely others through mutual reliance; the seed and the sprout are not even observed together like that because the sprout does not exist without the seed totally transforming. When, thus, the sprout does not exist simultaneously with the seed, therefore, the seed does not have an otherness from the sprout and, if otherness does not exist, this so-called "sprout produced from other" does not exist. Therefore, give up this position that says, "produced from other."

The established by way of its own character otherness that is repeatedly asserted by Svatantrika Madhyamikas was disputed. Chandrakirti then says: "Now, to explain the otherness of cause and effect as impossible." This means that he will explain the position of the Prasangika Madhyamikas that cause and result being an established by way of its own character other is impossible.

The *Supplement* then says: "Sprout and seed do not exist simultaneously." The meaning of this is clear. Then Chandrakirti says: "Without otherness, how could the seed be merely other? Hence, since sprout produced from seed will not be established…" Since the Svatantrika Madhyamikas are unable to establish that a rice sprout is produced from a rice seed, the Prasangika Madhyamikas exhort them to: "Give up this position that 'there is production from others.'"

"Without otherness, how could the seed be merely other?" means that according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas a rice seed is not an established by way of its own character other than the rice sprout. Therefore, how can the rice sprout be an established by way of its own character other

than the rice seed? If the rice seed and rice sprout are not an established by way of its own entity other, there cannot be production from other. For this reason, the Prasangika Madhyamikas tell the Svatantrika Madhyamikas and the other lower Buddhist schools to give up asserting production from other.

Chandrakirti then says that Maitreya and Upagupta are two people who exist simultaneously and are established as other in mutual dependence, but that such simultaneous and mutually established existence is not the case for the rice seed and rice sprout. Simultaneous existence does not apply to the rice seed and rice sprout because only upon the deterioration of the capacity of the rice seed does the rice sprout arise. In other words, only after the rice seed transforms does a rice sprout arise, whereby they do not exist simultaneously.

Chandrakirti then says: "When, thus, the sprout does not exist simultaneously with the seed, therefore, the seed does not have an otherness from the sprout and, if otherness does not exist, this so-called 'sprout produced from other' does not exist. Therefore, give up this position that says, 'produced from other.'" In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas exhort the Svatantrika Madhyamikas to give up their assertion of production from other.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The meaning of this is explained [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 1.3]:[18]
>
> > The nature of [resultant] things
> > Does not exist in conditions and so forth.
> > If the property of a self does not exist,
> > How could the property of other exist?[19]
>
> Here, "conditions and so forth" signifies the causes or conditions or a collection of causes and conditions or whatever is suitable as other than that.
>
> If the nature does not transform, the natures of effects just would not exist because of non-production. If that does not exist, otherness would not exist on the conditions and so forth. The statement, "existing *at* some place is the definition of existent," is the seventh [case, the locative]. When [the conditions] are a basis, at that time the natures of the effects do not exist on the conditions and so forth like a juniper [tree] and [its] vessel.

(Note: *Treatise on the Middle Way* v. 1.3 is translated in the *Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way* as:

> The essence of entities
> Is not present in the conditions, etc.
> If there is no essence
> There can be no otherness-essence.)

The *Treatise on the Middle Way* says: "The nature of [resultant] things does not exist in conditions and so forth." This means that if things are inherently existent they could not have conditions and so forth. In other words, if things are inherently existent they could not be produced by conditions. Nagarjuna then says: "If the property of a self does not exist, how could the property of other exist?" This means

[18] This verse may also be numbered as #5 as it is preceded by two verses of introduction. The Tibetan translation of root text has line d as: 'other things would not exist' – [Tibetan: gZhan dNgos yod pa ma yin no].

[19] Here, 'property of a self' [Tibetan: bDag.gi dNgo.bo; Sanskrit: svabhave] and 'property of other' [Tibetan: gZhan dngo; Sanskrit: parabhavo] could he translated as 'self-entity,' and 'entity of otherness/production from other. See Hopkins, p. 645 and note 628. Notice that Hopkins numbers this verse as 1.5, counting the first two introductory verses as part of chapter one.

that if things are not produced from self how can they be produced from other? 'Self' in this context refers to production from self, i.e., from itself, itself being established by way of its own character.

Chandrakirti says: "Here, 'conditions and so forth' signifies the causes or conditions or a collection of causes and conditions or whatever is suitable as other than that."

Chandrakirti then says: "If the nature does not transform, the natures of effects just would not exist because of non-production." This means that without the transformation of a rice seed there is no production of its result, a rice sprout.

Chandrakirti then says: "If *that* does not exist, otherness would not exist on the conditions and so forth." It is not clear whether the word "that" refers to the result, the rice sprout, or to the transformation of the rice seed without which there is no production of the rice sprout.

Chandrakirti then says: "The statement, "existing *at* some place is the definition of existent," is the seventh [case, the locative]." The particle "*na*," translated here as "at," in this context is the locative case, the seventh, whereas in other contexts it can be the second or fourth cases.

Chandrakirti then says: "When [the conditions] are a basis, at that time the natures of the effects do not exist on the conditions and so forth like a juniper [tree] and [its] vessel." The way in which a cause and result exist is not the same as the way in which a juniper tree and its vessel exist. The relationship of a juniper tree to the vessel in which it is planted is that of support and supported. The vessel is the support of the juniper tree, the supported, which prevents it from falling over. This is not the case for the relationship of cause and result. In the first chapter of Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* it says that support and supported assist each other. Although the vessel assists the juniper tree in terms of supporting it, the vessel and the juniper do not have the same relationship as a cause and its result. For example, in the case of a tea cup and the tea in it, they exist simultaneously and in a relationship of support and supported. The cup supports the tea in the sense of holding it; this type of relationship does not apply to cause and result.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That which does not exist anywhere is not produced from that, for example, like sesame oil [is not produced] from sand, as was taught [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 1.12]:
>
> > In case it were produced from those conditions
> > Even as a non-existent,
> > Why would it not also be produced
> > From what are not conditions?
>
> Therefore, this position of support is not finely set forth since it is exceedingly well exposed by just studying the verses by the Acharya [Nagarjuna].

(Note: *Treatise on the Middle Way* v. 1.12 is translated in the *Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way* as:

> However, if a non-existent effect
> Arises from these conditions,
> Why does it not arise
> From non-conditions?)

"That which does not exist anywhere is not produced from that" means that a result does not arise from a cause that does not have the capacity to produce it, like sand does not produce oil. "Existing at some place" refers to the cause. A seed that does not exist in some place cannot produce a result. In regard to this there is a Tibetan expression: "No matter how much one squeezes a handful of sand it will not produce oil." This analogy occurs in tantra in the context of explaining that without having

received empowerment there is no realizations, this being likened to oil not being produced from sand.

The citation in the *Treatise on the Middle Way* means that if a non-existent sprout arises it follows that a rice sprout can arise from a non-cause. Although a rice sprout arises it does so only from its particular conditions, not just any conditions. A result arises from conditions that have the capacity to produce it; it does not arise from conditions that do not have this capacity.

Chandrakirti concludes: "Therefore, this position of support is not finely set forth since it is exceedingly well exposed by just studying the verses by the Acharya [Nagarjuna]." In other words, Chandrakirti does not set out any further commentary on this verse from the *Treatise on the Middle Way* because it is clear in itself.

Thursday afternoon, 18 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 158) says:

> Chandrakirti says;
>
> > *Sprout and seed do not exist simultaneously.*
> > *Without otherness, how can the seed be other?*
> > *Therefore, since sprout is not established as produced from seed,*
> > *Give up the position that says "There is production from other."* [6.17]
>
> Therefore, having briefly expressed the other established by way of its own entity, which is renowned to other disputants as it is established, it is refuted. That the two, cause and result, are not feasible as other established by way of their own entity is explained [as follows.] Maitreya and Upagupta are seen to be other, saying "He is other than him" in mutual dependence, whereas *sprout and seed do not exist simultaneously* because without the transformation of the seed the sprout does not exist.

This was discussed earlier in relation to the autocommentary. According to the lower Buddhist schools from the Svatantrika Madhyamikas on down there is an otherness established by way of its own character. This is refuted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The two, cause and result, are not feasible as other established by way of their own entity." This is because if cause and result are not established by way of their own entity they cannot be an established by way of its own entity other.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas take Maitreya and Upagupta as an example of two persons who exist simultaneously but compared to each other are other. However, they say that they are not an established by way of its own character other, but are a *mere* other. Although Maitreya and Upagupta are seen to exist simultaneously, seed and sprout are not because the sprout only arises following upon the transformation of the seed. From the point of view of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas and the other lower Buddhist schools in general seed and sprout also do not exist simultaneously. However, they assert that all phenomena are established by way of their own entity. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if things, such as seed and sprout, are established by way of their own character many absurd consequences follow. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if seed and sprout exist unrelatedly then it follows that seed and sprout exist simultaneously, whereas this is not the case. The consequence that is flung here by the Prasangika Madhyamikas is accepted by the Svatantrika Madhyamikas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 158-9) says:

> The seed does not exist as an *otherness* than the sprout established by way of its own entity. *Without* that, *how can the seed be other* than the sprout? It cannot.

The Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert that the seed and sprout exist as an otherness established by way of its own entity. However, on the occasion of the seed there is no otherness than the sprout established by way of its own entity. (Note that the reason for the particle "la" in the phrase *sa bon* la *myu gu las ngo bos grub pa'i gzhan nyid med*, page 158, is not clear.)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 158) says:

> Since they are not an otherness established by way of its own entity, *sprout is not an established* by way of its own entity *produced from seed*. *Therefore*, *give up the position that says* "Things are *produced from other*."

If the seed does not have a sprout that is an other established by way of its own entity, it follows that the seed and sprout are one. Are the seed and sprout one or other established by way of its own character? Is the seed itself an other established by way of its own entity from the sprout or is it one? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 158) says:

> If that, a seed's difference from sprout, existed inherently, inherent existence would never be averted. Therefore, even at the time of the seed, [seed] would be a different substance from the sprout. Therefore, because the two do not exist at the same time, these two are indicated saying "They are not other established by way of their own entity." The assertion that the two, cause and result, are different entities conventionally is not refuted, but it should be understood as coming down to that in regard to the object of negation.

A seed is different from the sprout, but if this difference were inherently existent then inherent existence could not be averted. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, even at the time of the seed, [seed] would be a different substance from the sprout." In this case, seed and sprout would exist simultaneously whereas they do not. The seed and sprout are not an otherness established by way of its own character. In reality at the time of the seed there is no sprout. Since there is no sprout at the time of the cause, the sprout cannot be different from the seed because it does not exist. Or it follows that the seed is a different substance from the sprout even at the time of the seed because of being established by way of its own character. In short, there is no otherness established by way of its own character. Therefore, otherness established by way of its own character is the object of negation. However, the seed and sprout are other conventionally. Cause and result, seed and sprout, are mere other, but they are not an established by way of its own character other.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 158) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-2A2 Dispelling disputes regarding the refutation

The Prasangika Madhyamikas having refuted an otherness established by way of its own entity in terms of former and later cause and result, in this section the lower schools now respond to this refutation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [An objection is] mentioned here: The comment that stated, "The sprout does not exist simultaneously with the seed," is unreasonable. Just like the rising and falling of the pans of a balance scale, the sprout will be produced at just the same time as the seed is ceasing. Like this: at

only that very time when the seed is ceasing is the sprout being produced. Therefore, because the two, ceasing of the seed and production of the sprout, are the same time, the seed and the sprout will also be simultaneous. Therefore, in order to indicate, "there is otherness," it is mentioned:

If said: "Just as the rising and falling of the two pans of a balance scale
Are seen not to be non-simultaneous, likewise
Are the production and cessation of that produced and the producer." [6.18abc]

If it is said: Therefore, there is no fault.

The lower schools make the objection to the Prasangika Madhyamikas saying that they are not right because seed and sprout do exist simultaneously. They say that, for example, just as the rising and falling of the two pans of a scale occur simultaneously, likewise, when the producer, the seed, is ceasing the sprout, the produced, is being produced. From the Prasangika Madhyamikas' point of view, although seed and sprout are not simultaneous their ceasing and being produced are simultaneous. However, when the seed is ceasing is there a seed? When the sprout is being produced is there a sprout? Is there a difference between 'being produced' and 'produced'?
Student: Something 'being produced' is not yet 'produced,' otherwise it would be produced.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is right. Here in the autocommentary it says that the ceasing of the seed and the sprout being produced are simultaneous. According to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas seed and sprout exist simultaneously just as the rising and the falling of the two pans of a scale occur simultaneously. In addition, they say that the cessation of the seed and the production of the sprout are simultaneous. However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that that is incorrect.

In short , in order to prove that there is production from other, in that the producer and the produced are other, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas set out the example of a scale. However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas dispel their objection saying:

[Response] Also in that case:

If [its] times are the same, it does not have simultaneity, it is not so. [6.18d]

If, through the example of the balance scale, production and disintegration of the two, object to be produced and producer, are thought of as simultaneous, that is unfitting.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it is not suitable to take the two pans of a scale as an example proving that the producer and the produced exist simultaneously and that production and disintegration occur simultaneously.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas then say (Chandrakirti's autocommentary, Tibetan text page 62):

If asked: Why?

Even though rising and falling are indeed simultaneous in the example of the balance scale, but in that case, there is no simultaneity in the actual meaning arising from the example; hence it is unreasonable.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that although the rising and falling of the two pans are simultaneous, in the case of the meaning of the example, the seed and sprout, it is not similar in that these two do not exist simultaneously. Therefore, they say that the example is not appropriate.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 159) also sets out the objection of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, saying:

OBJECTION: Chandrakirti says:

> *"Just as the rising and falling of the two pans of a scale*
> *Are not seen to not be simultaneous, likewise,*
> *Are the production and cessation of that which is produced and the producer."*[6.18abc]

"Propounding 'sprout and seed do not exist simultaneously' is unsuitable because *just as*, for example, *it is not that the rising* of one *and the falling* of the other *of the two pans of a scale are not simultaneous*, that is, they *are seen* to be simultaneous, *likewise*, because the two actions of *production and cessation* respectively *of that which is produced*, the sprout, *and the producer*, the seed, are at the same time, the two, seed and sprout, are also simultaneous. Therefore, since they exist as otherness there is no fault."

The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that just as the actions of production and cessation of the sprout and seed are simultaneous, so to do the seed and sprout exist simultaneously. They say: "Therefore, since they exist as otherness there is no fault." In other words, there is no fault of seed and sprout not being other, that is, they are otherness. This is an objection made by the lower schools, which the Prasangika Madhyamikas then refute saying (*Illumination*, Tibetan text page 159):

RESPONSE: Chandrakirti says:

> *[Even] if they coincide, [since] here they do not exist at the same time it is not so.* [6.18d]

If, through the analogy of the scale, the two actions of production and destruction of the two, the seed and sprout, are conceived to occur at the same time that would be unsuitable. Even *if* it were as in the analogy of the scale that the two, the higher and lower ends [of the scale], occur at the same time, whereby the two actions of rising and falling *coincide*, that is, occur at the same time, *here* the actual meaning of the analogy is not suitable since the seed and the sprout *do not exist at the same time*.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that although in the case of the analogy it is true that the rising and the falling of the two pans of a scale occur simultaneous, it is not the case that the seed and sprout exist simultaneously.

The lower schools say that seed and sprout exist simultaneously because the actions of production of the sprout and cessation of the seed occur simultaneously. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that even conceiving that the actions of production and cessation occur simultaneously is not suitable because they do not occur simultaneously since the seed and sprout do not exist simultaneously. On the other hand, the lower schools say that seed and sprout exist simultaneously because the actions of cessation and production occur simultaneously. That being the position of the lower schools, the Prasangika Madhyamikas then turn this assertion back on them saying that cessation and production are not simultaneous because seed and sprout are not simultaneous.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas' refutation continues in Chandrakirti's autocommentary saying:

In order to indicate just how [simultaneity] does not exist, it is explained:

> *If that being produced is not existent since approaching production and*
> *Although that being ceased exists, it is asserted as approaching*
> *Disintegration, in that case, how is this similar to a balance scale?* [6.19abc]

There, "being produced," means it is yet to come (i.e., in the future) since it is approaching production; "being ceased," means it is present because of approaching cessation. Therefore, a state that does not [yet] exist will be produced because it was not [yet] produced; an existent state will be

> ceased since it is presently [existing]. When it is like that, then how would it be similar to a balance scale? Because the two pans of the balance scale are present, the actions of rising and falling exist simultaneously, and since the present and future seed and sprout do not exist simultaneously, this [case] is not similar to the balance scale.
>
> In case it is considered: Although indeed the phenomena (i.e., the two pans; the seed and sprout) do not exist simultaneously, nevertheless their actions (i.e., rising and falling; ceasing and being produced) have simultaneity.
>
> That too is unsuitable, because actions are not accepted as different from the phenomena by those [disputants].

"Being produced" means it is approaching production, whereby it does not exist in the present in that it is yet to come. "Being ceased" or "ceasing" means approaching cessation, in this case the seed that exists in the present but is in the process of ceasing. Based on this, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask: "Since the seed is present and the sprout future how can they be simultaneous?" For this reason they say that the analogy of the rising and falling of the pans of a scale is not similar because the seed being ceased is present whereas the sprout being produced is future, therefore they do not exist simultaneously whereby they are not similar to the pans of a scale. In other words, the rising of one pan and the falling of the other occur simultaneously in the present, whereas the seed being present and sprout being future they do not exist at the same time. Therefore, that analogy of the scale is not similar to the meaning.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the Svatantrika Madhyamikas think that although seed and sprout do not exist simultaneously their actions exist simultaneously, that too is wrong. Chandrakirti says: "That too is unsuitable, because actions are not accepted as different from the phenomena by those [disputants]." In short, this too is unsuitable because the action of cessation of the seed and the action of production of the sprout are not asserted by the Svatantrika Madhyamikas to be different from the seed and sprout themselves. Therefore, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas' assertion that seed and sprout exist simultaneously because their actions exist simultaneously is not correct.

Friday morning, 19 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 159) says:

> In order to indicate that they do not exist in this way there is the [following] explanation. Chandrakirti says:
>
> *If that being produced is approaching production, whereby, it does not exist, and,*
> *In addition, that being ceased, which is asserted to be approaching destruction, does exist,*
> *At that time, how are they similar to a scale?* [6.19abc]
>
> *If that "being produced" is approaching production* in the present, *whereby*, because of not yet being the entity of the sprout, *it does not exist* in the present, whereas, *in addition, that being ceased,* because it is *asserted to be approaching destruction*, *does exist* in the present – thus, at the time of approaching the production of the sprout the seed is present and the sprout is future – *at that time, how are those* two, the seed and the sprout, *similar to* the two, the rising and falling of *the scale?* They are not because the two higher and lower ends of the scale are [both] in the present. It is also because, whereas the two actions of rising and falling of [the scale] exist at the same time, the two, seed and sprout, do not exist at the same time.

The sprout that is "being produced" is approaching production and is not yet existent, therefore it is future. On the other hand, the seed that is ceasing exists in the present. The Prasangika Madhyamika system say to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas: "Since the seed is a present factor and the sprout a future

factor how can they exist at the same time? On the other hand, in the case of the analogy, the two pans of a scale exist at the same time in the present and, likewise, their actions of rising and falling occur simultaneously. However, the actions of the seed and sprout do not exist at the same time because the seed and sprout do not exist at the same time." In short, the lower schools say that the actions of seed and sprout exist at the same time because the seed and sprout exist at the same time. To prove this they take the pans of a scale as an analogy. However, our own system says that this is not correct.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 160) says:

> For these [reasons], the two actions being simultaneous whereby the two, seed and sprout, are also simultaneous, and the analogy of that – the example that sets forth the two, the rising and falling of the pans of a scale – are indicated to not be established. "If two actions at the same time are feasible, also the two phenomena regarding them are definitely simultaneous" is not indicated.
> DOUBT: Although two phenomena, such as seed and sprout, do not exist at the same time, their actions exist at the same time.
> REPLY: That too is not suitable because those disputants do not assert actions to be different objects from phenomena and because here the two actions are in the context of refuting inherent existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that it is also not suitable to assert that although two phenomena, such as a seed and sprout, do not exist at the same time, their actions exist at the same time because the disputants assert that the action of the seed is not different from the seed. The "action of the seed" refers to its ceasing. Since the word 'phenomena' in the phrase "those disputants do not assert actions to be different objects from phenomena" includes the sprout, also the action of production of the sprout is not asserted by the disputants to be different from the sprout itself. Since the Svatantrika Madhyamikas do not assert actions to be different from the phenomena themselves, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that is not suitable for them to assert that the actions of seed and sprout exist simultaneously because the actions are not asserted to be different from the phenomena themselves.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: What do the terms 'entity' and 'nature' mean according to the Samkhyas? Are these terms synonymous for them?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: For the Samkhyas, the nature is the occasion on which the three, activity, darkness, and lightness, are equal or balanced. 'Activity' (*rdul*) refers to attachment, 'darkness' (*mun pa*) to ignorance, and 'lightness' (*snying stobs*) to hatred. Nature is defined to be a balanced state of these three but it also refers to the general principle, which is a partless unit having five characteristics. Nature also means cause, and such a nature is a creator. Results are transformations. That which is nature and that which is transformation have four possibilities:

1. that which is a cause but not a result,
2. that which is a result but not a cause,
3. that which is both a cause and result, and
4. that which is neither a cause nor result.

An example of the first is the general principle, which is nature but not a transformation. An example of both is the seven: the great one, pride, and the five subtle objects – forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. The great one is a synonym of awareness or intellect, which for the Samkhyas is not consciousness. Instead they say it is like a two-sided mirror that reflects objects from both sides.

I do not know whether nature (*rang bzhin*) and entity (*ngo bo*) mean the same for the Samkhya.

Student: What do the Prasangikas mean by the term 'entity'?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: For the Prasangikas the term 'entity' means the real nature of phenomena.

Student: What is the entity of a pot?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The entity of a pot is that which is bulbous, flat bottomed, and capable of holding fluid. The nature of a sprout is greenness. For the Prasangikas entity and nature are mutually inclusive.

Student: How can the different moments of a continuum of a sprout be different entities while still being the entity of sprout?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The different moments of a sprout are not different entities from the sprout.
Student: Are they different substances from each other?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are different substances because one is cause and one is result. Former and later moments being cause and result are different substances but they are one continuum. The former moment of a pot is a congruent cause of the second moment of a pot. A congruent cause produces a result of similar type.

In regard to the former and later moments of a pot there is a lot of debate about whether they are one or different entities and one or different substances according to the different schools. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Clearing Away the Darkness of Trainees' Minds* says that one substance means: phenomena that appear to a direct cognizer but do not appear separately. This text also says that one substance means: phenomena that are not produced as distinct entities. He then defines different substances as: phenomena that are produced as distinct substances. Lama Tsongkhapa does not specify according to which school these definitions are made.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that there are no phenomena that are substantially established because if it is substantially existent it exists ultimately. In conclusion, the Prasangika Madhyamikas says that nothing is substantially existent because if it is substantially existent it follows that it is truly existent, ultimately existent, and so forth. On the other hand, if it is an established base it is pervaded by being imputedly existent. In short, whatever is existent is pervaded by being merely imputed by conceptuality.

Student: Would the Samkhyas say that all results are the same entity since they are the same nature?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They say that the nature exists in the result but is not apparent. It pervades all phenomena and is independent and partless. See Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Exposition of Tenets* in the section on non-Buddhist schools and Ngawang Belden's *Annotations for [Jamyang Shepa's] "Great Exposition of Tenets*."

Student: It seems that in refuting production from self, the Prasangika Madhyamikas are using their own particular meanings of terms (such as nature and same entity), which may not have the same meanings for the Samkhyas. The Samkhyas, on the other hand, use terms such as transformation, the non-apparent becoming apparent, etc., whereas the Prasangikas use different terms in refuting them. Please discuss this.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: When refuting production from self, production from self means 'itself producing itself.' Self is any phenomena that produces itself. The Samkhyas say that things are produced from their own nature. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas nature and entity are the same. The nature that is the object of negation is of two types: conventional nature and ultimate nature. From the point of view of affirmation or establishment there are also two natures in that all phenomena have the nature of conventional truth and the nature of ultimate truth. When refuting production from self, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that a sprout is not produced from nature. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that nothing is produced from its own nature. On the other hand, in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system a sprout is not produced ultimately but is produced naturally or from its own nature. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas a sprout is neither produced ultimately nor naturally. In order to prove that a result is naturally produced, the other schools give various reasons:

- the Samkhyas say that there is a sprout produced from its own nature because there is production from self;
- the lower Buddhist schools say that it is because there is production from other;
- the Nigranthas say that it is because there is production from both; and
- the Charvakas say that it is because there is causeless production.

Student: What is the difference between the way an object is posited in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system and Prasangika Madhyamika system?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are the same.
Student: For the Svatantrika Madhyamikas an object can be posited by a non-conceptual awareness, whereas for Prasangika Madhyamikas it must be posited by a conceptual awareness.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In both the Svatantrika Madhyamika and the Prasangika Madhyamika systems both conceptual and non-conceptual awarenesses can posit an object, an established base.
Student: Is there a difference between 'merely posited by conceptuality' and 'merely posited by conceptuality over there'?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: For the Prasangika Madhyamikas they are the same. For the Svatantrika Madhyamikas if it is an existent it is pervaded by being merely posited by conceptuality but there is discussion as to whether it is pervaded by being merely posited by conceptuality over there as there are different assertions in the various texts. In general for the Madhyamikas the positing of an object of comprehension depends on a valid cognizer. This is discussed in Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* and Nagarjuna's *Refutation of Objections*. Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* says that because there are two objects of comprehension there are two valid cognizers. This also indicates that because there are two valid cognizers there are two objects of comprehension. In Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 127) (Klein, *Path to the Middle*) it says:

> When you understand well this [presentation of how phenomena are posited through the force of the mind according to the Svatantrika School], you will come to differentiate the two positions [of the Svatantrika School and the Proponents of True Existence which some] confuse. They think:
>
> > Objects of comprehension [that is, all objects] are posited through the force of valid cognitions, and since valid cognitions are awarenesses, the positing of objects of comprehension through them is a case of positing [objects] through the force of an awareness. Hence, even the systems of the Proponents of True Existence refute true establishment.
>
> [However,] that objects of comprehension are posited [that is, certified] through the force of valid cognitions means that valid cognitions realize the mode of subsistence of the two [types of] objects of comprehension [specifically and generally characterized objects or impermanent and permanent objects or manifest and hidden objects]. Therefore, the two – this [meaning of positing, or certifying, objects of comprehension according to the Proponents of True Existence] and the former [meaning of positing objects through the force of an awareness according to the Svatantrika School] are utterly dissimilar.

END

Monday afternoon, 22 May 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:
>
> *Without an agent, this production is also not a reasonable entity.* [6.19d]
>
> The agent of the action of being produced, the sprout, is just not [yet] existent because of being future. If it does not exist, without the support this [action of production supported on it] also does not exist. How will that [action of being produced], which is not existent, be simultaneous with cessation? Therefore, the actions [of ceasing and being produced] are only unreasonable as simultaneous.

Furthermore, there are other faults in accepting production from other. For this reason, Chandrakirti says: "Without an agent, this production is also not a reasonable entity." The action of being produced is the supported and the sprout is the support. Since the support, the sprout, does not exist, how can the action supported on it exist? The assertion that, although seed and sprout do not exist simultaneously, the action of cessation of the seed and the action of production of the sprout exist simultaneously is incorrect. This is because if the seed and sprout do not exist simultaneously, how can their actions exist simultaneously?

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 64) says:

> It is taught [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 7.17]:
>
> If some not [yet] produced thing were existent somewhere,
> it would be produced. If that thing does not exist, what would be produced?
>
> The meaning is this: if some unproduced thing called 'sprout' were to exist somewhere prior to production, it would [already] be produced. Yet, prior to production, it cannot be posited as existing anytime, anywhere, because of being unproduced. Therefore, if the support of the action of production, the thing, does not exist, is not taken possession of, prior to production, what would be produced?

That which does not exist now but is yet to exist is a future object. Phenomena do not exist before their production. For example, a sprout that will be produced does not exist before its production. Chandrakirti says: "prior to production, it cannot be posited as existing anytime, anywhere, because of being unproduced." A sprout is not produced at the time of its cause but will be produced. Before it is produced, it cannot exist anytime, anywhere, and so forth because it is not yet produced. Chandrakirti says : "Therefore, if the support of the action of production, the thing, does not exist, i.e., is not present, prior to production, what would be produced?"

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The term 'it' is a common basis since it is a qualification of thing; 'thing' is the seventh [case, the locative];[20] "if... does not exist" is also a qualification of thing; the term 'what' is joined with

[20] Perhaps 'thing' is in the locative case because the phrase means 'if that thing does not exist somewhere,' i.e., at some place.

> "would be produced." Hence, "if that thing does not exist, what would be produced?" means "not even a little would be produced."

Here Chandrakirti gives his commentary on the verse from *Treatise on the Middle Way*. He says 'thing' is the seventh case, the locative. 'What,' which is conjoined with 'would be produced,' refers to the sprout.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If said: Is the example of the balance scale not finely set out in the *Exalted Rice Seedling Sutra* saying "In the manner of the rising and falling of the pans of a balance scale, in the very same instant a seed ceases, a sprout is produced"?
>
> That it is finely set forth is indeed right, yet it is not in order to indicate production from other and it is also not in order to indicate production by way of its own character.
>
> If asked: What then?
>
> It is in order to fully clarify the establishment [of production] as a simultaneous uninvestigated dependent-arising[21] – like an illusion.
>
> It is explained [in the *Praise of the Supramundane*, 18]:[22]
>
> > From disintegrated and non-disintegrated seeds a sprout will not arise,
> > Hence, you taught all production as similar to the arising of an illusion.

Although the analogy of the pans of a scale is set forth in the *Exalted Rice Seedling Sutra*, it is not set forth in order to present the production of a sprout established by way of its own character and the production of a sprout established by way of its own entity. What is its purpose? Chandrakirti says: "It is in order to fully clarify the establishment [of production] as a simultaneous uninvestigated dependent-arising – like an illusion." The analogy of the pans of a scale, which exist simultaneously, differs from the meaning that the analogy exemplifies, the seed and sprout and their actions, in that they do not exist simultaneously. However, in general, the action of approaching the cessation of the seed and the action of approaching the production of the sprout occur simultaneously.

In short, the analogy of the two pans of a scale is in terms of two things that exist simultaneously and dependently, whereas the meaning that it exemplifies, the seed and sprout, do not exist simultaneously.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 160) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *That production without the agent is not even a reasonable entity.* [6.19d]
>
> There are also other faults. The agent, the sprout, which depends on the action of production, is a future [phenomenon] at the time of approaching production, therefore, at that time it does not yet exist. Also if [the sprout] does not exist at that time, since *that* action of *production*, the supported, existing *without the* supporting *agent*, the sprout, *is not even a reasonable entity*, [production] does

[21] Or, 'as being a dependent arising at the same time as being uninvestigated.'

[22] Poisson, p.294, mentions this as cited in *Bodhicharyâvatârapañjikâ*, chapter 9, verse 108, attributing it to the *Four Sets of Praises.* See Lindtner, p. 134-135.

> not exist at the same time as cessation. Therefore, the two actions occurring at the same time is not feasible.

The action of cessation of the seed and the action of production of the sprout do not occur simultaneously because, at the time of approaching production of the sprout, there is no action of production since the sprout does not yet exist. The action of production of the sprout is supported on the sprout; therefore, since the sprout does not exist, the action of production of the sprout does not exist. Therefore, that the action of production and the action of cessation occur simultaneously is incorrect.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 160) says:

> OBJECTION: Is that very analogy of a scale not set forth in the *Exalted Rice Seedling Sutra* saying: 'In the manner of the rising and falling of the pans of a scale in the very instant that the seed ceases, in that very instant the sprout is produced'? Therefore, it is not suitable to refute the assertion that the two, seed and sprout, are like the rising and falling of the pans of a scale.
> RESPONSE: That it is set forth is in fact true, but it is not for the purpose of indicating production from other and production by way of its own character. Therefore, when "that production" [in the root verse] refutes production, it refutes mere production which is established by way of its own entity; it does not at all refute mere production of a sprout from a seed.

Someone makes the objection that since the analogy of the pans of a scale is set out in the *Rice Seedling Sutra* in the context of discussing the production of a sprout, "it is not suitable to refute the assertion that the two, seed and sprout, are like the rising and falling of the pans of a scale." The answer to this objection is that this sutra only refutes the production of a sprout established by way of its own character, it does not refute the production of a sprout from a seed. In other words, the *Rice Seedling Sutra* does not refute the mere production of a sprout from a seed but does refute the inherent production of a sprout from a seed.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 161) says:

> QUESTION: If in that sutra it is not said that the two, seed and sprout, occur at the same time in the manner of the rising and falling of the pans of a scale, what is the intention regarding that analogy of simultaneity?
> RESPONSE: They are called "simultaneously arising in dependence," which is explained in the commentary saying "in order to clarify them as being established without investigation as simultaneously arising in dependence, like illusions," [meaning that] the two actions are necessarily actions that exist simultaneously. However, although in that sutra the analogy of the rising and falling of the pans of the scale necessarily indicates simultaneity, it is not suitable that it explains the two, seed and sprout, as simultaneous.

Here, Lama Tsongkhapa says "the two actions are necessarily actions that exist simultaneously" whereas this is what was being refuted before. However, he then goes on to clarify this statement.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 161) says:

> Therefore, the two actions which are refuted as occurring at once are the two actions that are established by way of their own character; the two actions that in general exist simultaneously are not refuted.

The action of cessation of the seed and the action of production of the sprout are not simultaneous; however, the action of approaching the cessation of the seed and the action of approaching production

of the sprout are simultaneous. These are the two actions that Lama Tsongkhapa says in general exist simultaneously.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 161) says:

> Henceforth, the assertion of production regarding that is that the two, approaching the cessation of the cause and approaching production of the result, are necessarily simultaneous. It is not the case that it is unsuitable to assert mere production and nominal production, however, it is contradictory to assert ultimate production and production by way of its own character because:
> 1. in regard to the first, [mere production and nominal production], although the two actions of production of the result and cessation of cause are simultaneous, the two, cause and result, are not necessarily simultaneous, and
> 2. in regard to the latter, [ultimate production and production by way of its own character], if actions are simultaneous also cause and result would necessarily be simultaneous.

The Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert that seed and sprout are established by way of their own character, whereas according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas this is incorrect because it follows that seed and sprout would be simultaneous. In other words, if seed and sprout were established by way of their own character they would be unrelated, whereby they could exist simultaneously. Another consequence flung by the Prasangika Madhyamikas is that if the cessation established by way of its own character of the seed and the production established by way of its own character of the sprout exist simultaneously, then the seed and sprout would exist simultaneously. In short, if the two actions are established by way of their own character and exist simultaneously, then it follows that seed and sprout would also exist simultaneously. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that although conventionally the two actions of approaching production of the result and approaching cessation of cause are simultaneous, the two, cause and result, are not necessarily simultaneous.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 161-2) says:

> Therefore, since the action of producing a result is necessarily supported on the agent which is "that produced," the sprout and so forth, they are support and supported. If support and supported were ultimately established, it would be inadmissible for them to transform into a different nature. Therefore, since at all times the action also needs a support, even at the time of approaching the production of the sprout and so forth, the sprout and so forth necessarily exist as the support of the action of production. Therefore, since the two, cause and result, being simultaneous and so forth is harmed, it is inadmissible.
>
> In regard to nominal production, if they became support and supported one time, they do not necessarily become [support and supported] in all times; therefore, it is not similar. The action of producing the sprout, which is simultaneous with the seed, is the action approaching the production of the sprout. The two, that [action of producing the sprout] and the sprout, are in general support and supported. Although the sprout does not exist at the time of that action, this does not contradict the action existing. For example, in general if the relating object (*'brel yul*) is hindered, the related (*'brel po*) is canceled. The seed is the relating object and the sprout is the related; however, at the time of the sprout, although the seed has been canceled, there is no contradiction that the sprout is not canceled.
>
> Having understood well the refutation by means of reasoning in this way and that the reasoning that refutes is not turned back against oneself, if one understands how to posit the Middle Way position without faults one is a Middle Wayer. At the time of refuting, having mentioned only superficial [reasonings] when they are turned back against oneself one can only set out denials. It is as said in *Clear Words*: "We do not debate with the crazy."

If support and supported were established by way of their own character, they should be support and supported at all times, in all places, etc. Therefore, it would follow that a sprout would exist at the

time of its cause, a seed. In regard to nominal production – support and supported being nominally existent – there is no such fault because they *can* be support and supported at one time. The fact that at the time of the seed, there is the action of production of the sprout but there is no sprout is not contradictory in regard to a conventionally existent support and supported. The transformation of a seed into a dreg is not incompatible with the production of a sprout. In other words, conventionally it is feasible. In other words, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas the fact of the cessation of the seed is not incompatible with the existence of the sprout. It is important to consider time in relation to causes and results; otherwise there will arise many opportunities for debate.

This concludes a discussion concerning the refutation of production from other in regard to former and later, or sequential, cause and result. Next there is a discussion concerning the refutation of production from other in regard to *simultaneous* cause and result.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 162) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-2B Refuting production from other in regard to simultaneous cause and result

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 64) says:

> [Someone] propounds: Since a state of simultaneity mentioned here does not exist for the seed and the sprout, if production [from other] is unreasonable because otherness does not exist – production does exist since otherness exists there where simultaneity exists, for example, like eye consciousness and the feelings and so forth arisen together with it. Eye [faculty], visible form and so forth and feeling and so forth, those that arise together, produce eye consciousness at only the same time. Similarly, eye [faculty] and so forth and mind will also become the very conditions of feeling and so forth at only the same time.
>
> [Response:] That is not so.

Someone says that since seed and sprout do not exist simultaneously, there is no production from other; however, an eye awareness exists simultaneously with the mental factors in its retinue such as feeling, discrimination, and so forth, as well as with the eye sense power and form. In other words, there is production from other because causes and results exist simultaneously, for example, eye, eye consciousness, feeling, and form. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this too is incorrect.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: why?
>
> *If eye awareness had otherness from its producers, the simultaneous*
> *Eye [faculty] etc. and discrimination and so forth arisen together,*
> *What purpose would there be to arise into existence [again]? In case it is*
> *Said: it does not exist, the faults concerning this were already explained.* [6.20]
>
> If the eye [faculty] and so forth and the simultaneous discriminations and so forth are asserted as the very conditions of the present eye awareness, then existence would indeed become an otherness that relies on that. However, since there is not even a little purpose served by arising [again] into existence, production does not exist.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "If the eye consciousness exists at the time of its causes, what purpose would there to it being produced again? There would be none." Chandrakirti says: "The

faults concerning this were already explained." This refers to the refutation of production from other in terms of former and later cause and result, which was set out previously.

Chandrakirti says: "If the eye [faculty] and so forth and the simultaneous discriminations and so forth are asserted as the very conditions of the present eye awareness, then existence would indeed become an otherness that relies on that. However, since there is not even a little purpose served by arising [again] into existence, production does not exist." This means that if a result such as an eye awareness already exists at the time of its causes, there is no purpose to it being produced again.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case, out of the wish to totally reject the non-existence of production, that [effect at the time of the cause][23] is not accepted as an existent state, "at that time too, the eye [faculty] and so forth are not other than the awareness that is not [yet] existing," is the very fault that was explained.

That "very fault" is probably that set out before, regarding the refutation of production from other. Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, if production from others is asserted like that, even if otherness were possible, production would be impossible. Because that is impossible, both are impossible. And, even if production were possible, otherness would be impossible. Because that is impossible, both are impossible. Hence, because external objects do not exist in any way, since emptied by external objects, the gone having gone, only the mere term will remain.
>
> Therefore, this conception [of production from others] is unsuitable.

In short, production from other is not acceptable. In the context of production from other, 'other' is an established-by-way-of-its-own-character other. Although cause and result are possible, production from other is not possible. Having refuted production from other, only the mere term 'production from other' remains.

Tuesday morning, 23 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 162) says:

> OBJECTION: Here we say that since seed and sprout do not exist simultaneously, production from other is unsuitable because there is no otherness by way of its own entity. However, since cause and result do exist simultaneously, otherness exists there, therefore, there is production from other; for example, the eye consciousness and the feeling and so forth which are simultaneous with it. The eye, form and so forth, and the feeling and so forth that simultaneously arise produce an eye consciousness at only the same time. Likewise, the eye and so forth and the mind are also conditions for [the arisal of] feeling and so forth at only the same time.

Here the lower school, the Vaibhashika, gives reasons to prove production from other in terms of cause and result existing simultaneously. To this, the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond as follows. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 162) says:

> RESPONSE: Chandrakirti says:
>
> *If an eye awareness exists as other than its producers – the simultaneous*

[23] LTK, p. 170.

> *Eye and so forth – and the discrimination and so forth that arise simultaneously,*
> *Since it exists what sense would there be for it to arise?*
> *If someone says "That does not exist," the faults were already explained concerning that.*
> [6.20]

> *If its producers – the eye and so forth simultaneous* with it *– and the discrimination and so forth that arise simultaneous* with them are conceived to be conditions for *an eye awareness*, i.e., an eye consciousness, then, in dependence on discrimination and so forth, *existence as otherness* would be permissible. However, *since it exists* from the time of the cause, *what sense would there be for it to arise* again? Since there would not even be the slightest [sense], there is no [such] production.

In short, if a result exists at the time of its cause there would be no sense in it being produced again. Because there is not the slightest sense in this, there is no production from other.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 163) says:

> Desiring to dispel the faults of non-production, *if someone says* "*That* result *does not exist* at the time of the cause," then [we say that] *concerning that*, former and later [cause and result], *the faults* of their not existing as other established by way of their own entity *were already explained* previously.

In order to dispel the faults, the lower school then says "That result does not exist at the time of the cause." To this the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond: "concerning that, former and later [cause and result], the faults of their not existing as other established by way of their own entity were already explained previously." In short, if the lower school now says that cause and result are sequential, the faults explained previously would apply.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 163) says:

> Therefore, although this reasoning asserts that in regard to cause and result otherness does exist, inherently existent production is not feasible. Because of that, production from other is indicated to not be feasible and, although production in regard to causes and results is feasible by the former reasoning, their being inherently existent other is not feasible. Thus, production from other is indicated to not be feasible. Then, "production from other," having become empty of the meaning expressed, only the term expressing it remains.

In general, there is production from other but there is no production from an established-by-way-of-its-own-character other. Since there is no production from other, a cause, established by way of its own character, it is said that there is no production from other. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Then, 'production from other,' having become empty of the meaning expressed, only the term expressing it remains." In other words, production from other having been refuted, only the mere words "production from other" remain. This is similar to what Chandrakirti's *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'* says. Thus, production from other is refuted both in the context of sequential cause and effect and simultaneous cause and result.

Student: In the case of cause and result that are simultaneous, for example, the eye consciousness that is produced simultaneously with form and so forth, its conditions, in what sense would there be production of the eye consciousness again?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In general the conditions from which an eye consciousness arise are (1) the observed object condition, a form, (2) the empowering condition, the eye sense power, and (3) the immediate condition. These three conditions are said to precede the production of eye consciousness. However, the lower school says that the eye consciousness exists simultaneously with its conditions;

this is not acceptable. The lower school says that feeling and so forth are the conditions for eye consciousness. They are therefore causes of eye consciousness, specifically they are simultaneously occurring causes. In regard to this assertion the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask: "If eye consciousness arises at the time of its conditions what sense would there be for the eye consciousness to arise again later on? Since the eye consciousness exists at the time of its causes why would it then be produced?" The Prasangika Madhyamikas use this reasoning to refute inherently existent production.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 163) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1A-3 Through analyzing the four possibilities regarding results, production from other is refuted

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (page 65) says:

> Now, in order to indicate that there is no time when the cause, from the two, cause and effect, relies on an effect, it is explained:
>
> *If a producer is a cause producing other objects to be produced, calculate*
> *Whether it produces an existent, non-existent, both, or what is free of both.*
> *If existent, what purpose is a producer and what could it do for the non-existent?*
> *What could it do for both and what could it do for what is free of both?* [6.21]
>
> First of all, a cause that acts to produce is not the producer of an existent object to be produced because of the faults that were already explained by statements such as [6.8d]: *and there is just no reason for the produced to be produced again.* Therefore, there is no purpose at all of conditions for that.
>
> Also, what could those producers do for an object to be produced that is not existent, because of being non-existent, like the horns of an ass?

Here cause is called a 'producer' and result, the 'objects to be produced.' Chandrakirti says: "calculate whether it produces an existent, non-existent, both, or what is free of both." In short, there are four possibilities regarding the produced. One should investigate whether the producer produces an existent, a non-existent, both, or what is free of both. If the produced, the result, already exists at the time of its cause, the producer, there would be no need for it to be produced. For this reason, Chandrakirti asks: "If existent, what purpose is a producer?"

Chandrakirti then says: "What could it do for the non-existent?" This means: "What can a cause do for a result that is non-existent at the time of its cause given that a result is inherently existent?"

Chandrakirti then says: "What could it do for both and what could it do for what is free of both?" 'Both' and 'free of both' are respectively an inherently existent result that is both existent and non-existent and an inherently existent result that is free from being both existent and non-existent.

In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas raise four questions, the conclusion of which is that there is no production from other. If a result exists at the time of its cause there is no purpose to it being produced again, the faults of production again having been explained previously. On the other hand, if a result does not exist at the time of its cause then a producer, a cause, could not do anything for it because the result would be non-existent, like a donkey's horn. In other words, if a result is non-existent at the time of its cause then that result is like a donkey's horn in terms of being non-existent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was explained [in the *Four Hundred Verses*, 11.15]:

> For whoever asserts effects to exist and whoever asserts effects to be non-existent,
> it would also be meaningless to decorate the pillars and so forth of a house.

If the pillars of a house are inherently existent, then decorating them is meaningless. In other words, Aryadeva says that for whoever asserts a result to exist at the time of its cause and whoever asserts a result to be non-existent at the time of its cause it becomes meaningless to decorate the pillars of a house. This means that both an inherently existent result that exists at the time of its cause and an inherently existent result that is non-existent at the time of its cause are not feasible. However, the lower schools maintain that there are inherently existent results, whereas for the Prasangika Madhyamikas if there are inherently existent results then all is possible. Thus, they say to the lower schools that if you say that an inherently existent result is non-existent at the time of its cause that would be wrong because, if a result exists inherently, then it exists at all times.

Student: Could the four possibilities regarding result be discussed without qualifying the result by "existing at the time of its cause"?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Yes, they could.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also from [the *Treatise on*] *the Middle Way* [20.21-22]:
>
> If entitiness of an effect exists, what does a cause produce?
> If entitiness of an effect does not exist, what does a cause produce?
>
> If production does not exist, a cause itself would not be feasible.
> If feasible causes do not exist, of what would there be an effect?

These verses are to be understood in terms of inherently existent results in that, for example, if results exist inherently one can ask: "What does a cause produce?" Nagarjuna then says: "If entitiness of an effect does not exist, what does a cause produce?" For the Svatantrika Madhyamikas if a result does not exist inherently it does not exist. Therefore, also in this case, one can ask: "What does a cause produce?" Nagarjuna then says: "If production does not exist, a cause itself would not be feasible." In other words, if production does not exist there would be no need for a cause. Nagarjuna then says: "If feasible causes do not exist, of what would there be an effect?" In short, without a cause there is no result. These verses refute the first two possibilities: existent and non-existent results. Chandrakirti then refutes the third, results that are both, saying:

> Even if it is the state of being two, what could conditions do for that because the faults that were explained would follow. A thing that is two is the state of being two and existing as the very two is the state of being two. Possession of the entities of existence and non-existence does not exist in the same thing of the same time. Hence, a thing that has such a character does not exist. Because it is just not existent, what could conditions that act to produce do for that?

If there is a result that is both existent and non-existent what could conditions do for it in that if it is both existent and non-existent conditions cannot do anything for it. Here such a state of both existent and non-existent refers to an inherently existent state of being both existent and non-existent. Something that is both existent and non-existent in terms of the time of the cause would mean that it both exists at the time of the cause and does not exist at the time of the cause. However, this is not feasible, therefore conditions cannot do anything for it. Regarding this, Chandrakirti says: "because

the faults that were explained would follow." In short, if something does not exist, conditions cannot do anything for it!

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was said in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, 25-14]:
>
> How could nirvana be both a thing and a non-thing?
> The two do not exist in one, like illumination and darkness.

One object being existent and non-existent is like nirvana being both thing and non-thing, which is impossible in that it would be like illumination and darkness being one. The Prasangika Madhyamikas fling this consequence at the lower schools.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 8.7]:
>
> Being and not being an agent does not create that which is and is not.
> How could one have being and not being, since mutually contradictory?

[This verse (8.7) is translated in *Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way* as:

> An existent and non-existent agent
> Does not perform an existent and non-existent action.
> Existence and non-existence cannot pertain to the same thing.
> For how could they exist together?]

That which is an agent and that which is not an agent being one is not possible. Likewise, a result that is both existent and non-existent is not possible. Nagarjuna says: "How could one have being and not being, since mutually contradictory?" For example, one object such as a sprout being impermanent and not being impermanent is not possible. Being permanent and being impermanent are mutually contradictory, therefore they cannot exist simultaneously.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary then sets out the fourth possibility, results that are free from being both:

> Also, what could those conditions do for that which is separated from both – an effect that is separated from being both, that is, neither existent nor non-existent – because an effect that has abandoned the entities of existence and non-existence does not exist.

What could conditions do for a result that is separated from both being existent and being non-existent "because an effect that has abandoned the entities of existence and non-existence does not exist"? This implies that a result must have an existing entity.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If a state of existence and non-existence is impossible, "that which is *not* existent and *not* non-existent," the negative of that, would not be even slightly different.

A result that is neither not existent nor not non-existent is also impossible. If a result is not existent it is non-existent and if a result is not non-existent it is existent. Existent and non-existent are direct contradictions. Therefore, if a sprout is not existent it is non-existent and if a sprout is not non-existent it is existent. There cannot be a result which is both existent and non-existent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When the two are not established, then that which is neither existent nor non-existent is just impossible.
>
> As was taught [in the *Treatise*, 25.15]:
>
> > Whatever teaches nirvana as not a thing and not a non-thing –
> > that would be established if non-things and things were established.

[This verse (8.7) is translated in *Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way* as:

> Nirvana is said to be
> Neither existent or non-existent.
> If the existent and the non-existent were established
> This would be established.]

The main point of this discussion is to refute production from other. Production from other is production from an inherently existent other. If production is inherently existent, there is production from other. However, the mere production of a sprout from a seed is not production from other. Seed and sprout are otherness, but mere otherness does not imply production from other as production from other means production from an inherently existent other. In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that there is no production from other, whereas the lower school asserts production from other.

Tuesday afternoon, 23 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 163) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *If the producer is a cause that produces other, the produced,*
> > *Calculate, whether that produced is existent, non-existent, both, or free from both.*
> > *If it is existent what need would there be for that which produces it? Also in regard to the non-existent, why would it be by those?*
> > *In regard to it being both, why would it be by those? Also in regard to it being free from both, why would it be by those?* [6.21]
>
> *If the producer is a cause that produces other* than itself – *the produced* – *calculate*, i.e., investigate, *whether* the result *produced* by that cause is:
>
> 1. inherently *existent*,
> 2. *non-existent*,
> 3. *both* existent and non-existent, *or*
> 4. *free from* being *both* existent and non-existent.
>
> For instance, in regard to that *if* a result *is* inherently *existent what need would there be* for conditions *that produce it?* They would not be necessary because if production exists inherently that already produced would be produced again; however, this has already been indicated to be unsuitable. *Also in regard to a non-existent* result, *why would it be* created *by those* conditions in that it would be non-existent like the horns of a donkey? *In regard to it being* a collection of *both*

> existent and non-existent, *why would it be* created *by those* conditions in that a collection of both of these is not possible? *Also in regard to* it *being free from* being *both* existent and non-existent, *why would it be* created *by those* conditions in that not being either of those two is not feasible?

Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary is a synthesis of Chandrakirti's. The main point is that if a cause produces a result one should investigate whether that result is inherently existent, non-existent, both, or neither. If it is inherently existent, what need would there be for it to depend on conditions for its production? Therefore, if an inherently existent result exists it follows that it is produced again, whereas that which is already produced does not need to be produced again. That this is unsuitable was already explained.

On the other hand, if the result that is produced is non-existent, then what need would there be for conditions to produce it since it would be non-existent, like the horns of a donkey? In addition, since there is no result that is a collection of being both existent and non-existent, such being impossible, what need would there be for conditions to produce it? Also in regard to a result that is free from being either existent or non-existent, what need would there be for conditions to produce it?

This discussion analyzes the four possibilities in regard to results in order to negate production from other. For this reason the section is called "Through analyzing the four possibilities regarding results, production from other is refuted."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 163) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B Dispelling harm from the world regarding the refutation

1. Dispelling harm from the world through asserting production from other due to it being renowned in the world
2. Dispelling harm from the world by means of production from other not existing even for the conventions of the world

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1 Dispelling harm from the world through asserting production from other due to it being renowned in the world

A. The disputes [as set forth by the Prasangika Madhyamikas] are harmed by the world
B. Indicating the response which is not harmed by the world

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1A The disputes [as set forth by the Prasangika Madhyamikas] are harmed by the world

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to thoroughly prove production [from others], this and that reasoning (such as perceiving certainty and the balance scale analogy) which were mentioned were like dry firewood saturated with butter since the fire of your [Madhyamika] intelligence burned [everything] without exception. Requesting the firewood of reasoning to intensely kindle your wisdom fire was enough [– now, it is no longer necessary]!

All the assertions of the lower schools regarding production from other are like dry firewood saturated with butter, which are burned by the reasonings of the Madhyamikas. In other words, just as dry firewood saturated with butter is easily burned, likewise the reasonings of the Madhyamikas easily refute the lower schools' proofs regarding production from other.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If [the Madhyamika] asks: Is it not that the meaning desired to be expressed (i.e., production from others) wou1d not be proved without a fine indication through reasoning?

That is not so. There is nothing at all to be accomplished by reasoning about that meaning which is proved through the world itself. Because the perception of the world possesses extreme strength, it is mentioned:

Since it is asserted as valid by those worldly ones abiding in their own view,
What can be done here through just mentioning reasoning?
Other arising from other is also realized by the world, hence,
Production from other exists here. What is the need for reasoning? [6.22]

If it is said: if the entire world abides in only its own view, it has extreme strength and it also views [things] as being produced only from others. But to finely set forth reasoning is worthy for only non-manifest things – not for the manifest. Therefore, even without [further] admissible [reasoning], things being produced from others only exists.

The lower schools say that if an object exists conventionally it cannot be refuted by the world because the perceptions of worldly beings possess great strength. Therefore, the lower schools say that production from other exists and there is no need to establish it by reasonings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 164) says:

Whatever reasonings were propounded in order to establish production from other, like dry firewood sprinkled with butter, you burnt all of them without exception with the fire of intelligence. Therefore, exhorting the firewood of reasoning which kindled the fire of your wisdom was sufficient, but now it is no longer necessary.
QUESTION: Is it not that the meaning of asserting production from other is not established without presenting reasonings?
RESPONSE: It is not so, [that is, it is established without presenting reasonings]. Since it is established for the world, there is nothing whatsoever [to be established] by other reasonings. The statement [in the autocommentary] "because the perception of the world possesses great force" is explained [as follows].
Chandrakirti says:

Anyone abiding in his own view asserts the world as valid,
Therefore, in regard to that what is to be done by propounding reasonings?
Also, that other arises from other is realized by worldly beings.
Therefore, in regard to the existence of production from other, what need is there for reasonings? [6.22]

The lower schools say that since production from other is directly perceived by worldly beings, there is no need to present other reasonings in order to establish it since such perception of worldly beings possesses great force. In brief, production from other is directly perceived and therefore does not need to be proven by reasoning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 164) says:

Anyone, all worldly beings, through *abiding in his own view* alone, *asserts* the perception of *the world as valid*, *therefore*, this possesses great force. *Also that other* results *arise from other* causes established by way of their own entity *is* directly *realized by worldly beings*. Therefore, when the logic of reasoning is set forth, it is set forth with respect to the second from among the two, (1) the directly perceivable and (2) the not directly perceivable.

> In regard to the first, [the directly perceivable,] someone says: Because [the directly perceivable] are established by a direct valid cognizer, logic is not set forth regarding them. Therefore, *in regard to that* existence of production from other, *what it to be done by propounding* other *reasonings* which establish it to exist*? Therefore*, although there is no other logic that establishes production from others, things are established to be produced from other. Therefore, *in regard to the existence of production from other, what need is there* to present other *reasonings?* There is none because it is established by a direct perceiver.

The lower schools say that since production from other is directly perceivable, no reasonings are needed to prove it.

In short, in this section the lowers schools say that "The disputes [as set forth by the Prasangika Madhyamikas] are harmed by the world." Therefore, since production from other is directly perceivable by worldly beings no reasoning is needed to prove it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 164) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B Indicating the [Prasangika Madhyamikas'] response which is not harmed by the world

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [The Madhyamika responds:] Whoever has not unmistakenly realized the meaning of the treatise and who, due to the maturation of the imprints of [true-grasping toward] things is unable to bear to listen to separating from the dear friend of strong settling upon things, depends on the opinion of damage by the world – he is unable to reverse from the opinion of damage of the world without explaining the very many and extensive events of the world. Hence, in order to indicate the qualification of the object of damage of the world:

Those who do not realize the meaning of the treatises and have strong adherence to the true existence of things require an extensive explanation of the events of the world in order "to reverse from the opinion of damage of the world."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 164) says:

> [To this the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond]: Whoever does not unmistakenly realize the meaning of the scriptures and whoever is unable to bear listening again and again to the mode of non-inherent existence – the freedom, i.e., the method for becoming free, from the company of associating over a long time with the strong settling on things as truly existent which arises from the ripening of the latencies of conceiving things to be truly existent deposited since beginningless cyclic existence – depends on chatter, i.e., frivolous talk, which is the harmer of the world. Since they cannot be turned away from the frivolous talk which is the harmer of the world without explaining the many events of the world, it is necessary to present particular objects that are harmed, saying "harmed by the world" with respect to such objects, and particular objects that are not harmed, saying "not harmed by the world" with respect to such objects. With respect to this, it is necessary to begin by presenting the divisions of the two truths.

We do not correctly realize the meaning of the scriptures and have been strongly settling on things as truly existent since beginningless time. Due to not being familiar with the fact that phenomena lack inherent existence but also being unable to bear listening to this again and again, we depend on the talk of the worldly. Since worldly beings say that they directly perceive production from other, we have to agree with them in that they do not rely on reasoning and therefore cannot be refuted by reasoning. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "It is necessary to present particular objects that are harmed,

saying 'harmed by the world' with respect to such objects, and particular objects that are not harmed, saying 'not harmed by the world' with respect to such objects." What are the particular objects that are harmed by the world and the particular objects that are not harmed by the world? In order to answer this one has to understand the two truths; for this reason Lama Tsongkhapa presents the two truths next.

The worldly who are not trained in reasoning engage in chatter or frivolous talk. For example, in India there is a language used by business people which differs from that of the scriptures; this is called "chatter," "frivolous talk," or "jargon." This also includes dialects, for example, the Tibetan nomads have their own way of talking which cannot be understood by other people.

In conclusion, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas there is no production from other. The refutation of production from other is discussed under two main outlines:

- Refuting production from other in general
- Refuting production from other in relation to the Chittamatra school

In this section, the lower schools say to the Prasangika Madhyamikas that they should not refute production from other because it is perceived by the world. The lower schools say that since production from other is perceived by the world, its refutation would be harmed by the worldly beings. However, one has to identify the particular objects that are harmed by the world and those that are not harmed by the world. A particular object harmed by the world is, for example, the horns of a rabbit. The tail of a human being is also a particular object harmed by the world because it is commonly known to the world that a human being does not have a tail. Thus, the refutation of something commonly known to the world is said to be harmed by the world.

Wednesday morning, 24 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 165) says:

> This has five [outlines]:
>
> 1 General presentation of the two truths
> 2 Applying that to the meaning of this context
> 3 Explanation of the individual entities of the two truths
> 4 Indicating that which harms that harmed by the world in regard to refutation
> 5 Indicating the way of harming that which is harmed by the world
>
> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B1 General presentation of the two truths
>
> A Stating that phenomena have two entities each by means of the division into the two truths
> B Indicating other presentations of the two truths
> C Explaining the divisions of conventionalities relative to the world
> D Indicating that the referent object of that mistaken with respect to the referent object does not exist even conventionally
>
> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B1A Stating that phenomena have two entities each by means of the division into the two truths

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 67) says:

> Initially from the viewpoint of the presentation of the two truths, it is explained:
>
> *All things uphold two entities,*
> *The existents found by perfect and false perception.*
> *Whatever is the object of correct perception is thusness –*
> *Of false perception, [that] is taught as the deceptive truth.* [6.23]

All objects of knowledge possess two entities:
(1) that found by a correct perception, reality or ultimate truths, and
(2) that found by a false perception, conventional truths.
Chandrakirti says: "Whatever is the object of correct perception is thusness." This statement indicates the entity of the ultimate. Chandrakirti says: "Of false perception, [that] is taught as the deceptive truth." In brief, all objects of knowledge are suitable as having two entities: the ultimate truth and conventional truth (deceptive truth). The word "things" in this context refers to all existents in that both the Tibetan words *dngos po*, things, and *yod pa*, existent, are translations of the Sanskrit term *bhava*. Therefore, it includes objects seen by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise as well as those seen by a valid cognizer of conventionalities.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Here, the buddha bhagavans, unmistakenly knowing the self-entities of the two truths, thoroughly indicated the two types of self-entity of all inner and outer functional things such as the compositional factors and sprouts and so forth. Like this: the deceptive (or, conventional) and the ultimate.

All inner phenomena, compositional factors and so forth, and all external phenomena, sprouts and so forth, have two entities. Thus, phenomena are presented as possessing or holding two entities.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, the ultimate finds its entity as the very object of a special type of exalted wisdom of those [aryas] correctly perceiving [reality]; it is not established by its own essential nature. This is one entity.

Ultimate truth is that perceived by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. It is not established by its own entity or nature, nor is it inherently existent. Ultimate truth is the first of the two entities.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The other, [the deceptive,] finds its existence through the strength of false perception of ordinary beings, those whose wisdom-eyes[24] are completely covered by the thick film of the cataract of ignorance. It is not established by its own entity like that kind of self that is the object of perception by the childish.

A conventional truth is that which is seen by childish beings or that which found by a valid cognizer analyzing a conventionality. It too is not established by its own entity.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, all things uphold two natures.

[24] Literally: eyes of awareness.

The two natures that all things uphold are the ultimate and conventional natures.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, from the two natures, that which is the object of correct perception is thusness, meaning, "that is the ultimate truth." The self-entity of that will be explained. That which is the object of false perception is the deceptive truth.

In short, if it is an established base or an object of knowledge it is pervaded by having two entities:
1. the entity of the ultimate truth and
2. the entity of the conventional truth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 165) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *All things – things found by correct*
> *And false perception – possess two entities.*
> *Any object of correct perception is thusness,*
> *That of false perception is said to be conventional truth.* [6.23]
>
> The bhagavans, who unmistakenly know the respective entities of the two truths, thoroughly presented *all things*, i.e., everything, – the internal, compositional factors, intention, and so forth, and the external, sprouts and so forth – as *possessing two* types of own *entities*. What are they? They are the entity of conventional truth and the entity of ultimate truth. Therefore, when the entity of one, for example, a sprout, is divided it is presented as having two, the entity of being conventional and the entity of the ultimate. A single entity of a sprout is not at all presented as the two truths in dependence on ordinary beings and superiors.

A single object is not distinguished as being the entity of the conventional and the entity of the ultimate in dependence on ordinary beings and superiors. In other words, all existents have two entities; it is not the case that a single object has two entities in dependence on the two types of beings. All objects of knowledge have two entities: that found by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise and that found by a valid cognizer of conventionalities.

The definitions of the two truths are the same for the two Madhyamika schools.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 282-3) says:

> The <u>definition of that being an ultimate truth</u> is: an object found by a consciousness of [an ultimate] type (*rigs shes*) analyzing the final [nature of phenomena] and with regard to which that consciousness of [an ultimate] type analyzing the final [nature of phenomena] becomes a consciousness of [an ultimate] type analyzing the final [nature of phenomena]. When [ultimate truth] is divided by way of the base of emptiness, there are sixteen and so forth.
> The <u>definition of that being a conventional truth</u> (truth for a concealer, *kun rdzob den pa*) is: an object found by a valid cognizer of conventionalities and with regard to which that valid cognizer of conventionalities becomes a valid cognizer of conventionalities. When [conventional truth] is divided relative to the perspective of a worldly consciousness, there are two: real (*yang dag pa)* and unreal (*log pa*) [conventionalities].

In the *Presentation of Tenets,* the definitions given by Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen are slightly different:

> The definition of an ultimate truth is: an object found by a valid cognizer distinguishing the final [nature of phenomenon] and with respect to which a valid cognizer distinguishing the final [nature of phenomenon] becomes a valid cognizer distinguishing the final [nature of phenomenon].
> The definition of a conventional truth is: an object found by a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality and with respect to which a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality becomes a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 166) says:

> If it were taken to be like that, since entitless phenomenon are not possible, if it is an established base it does not pass beyond being one or different entities. Although [phenomena] are asserted to have an entity, this does not contradict them not having an inherently existent entity.

In his *Collected Topics,* Purbujok Jamba Gyatso defines a phenomenon (*dharma*) as that which is able to hold (*dhara*) its own entity. For this reason, phenomena that are entitiless are not feasible. If it is an established base or an existent, it has to be either one or different entities. There is no phenomenon that is not one or different entities (one or many, singular or plural). However, if something has an entity it does not have to have an inherently existent entity. In other words, although all phenomena hold their own entity, it is not an inherently existent or independent entity.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 166) says:

> In regard to that, the ultimate entity of things, such as sprouts and so forth, is the very object of a special exalted wisdom of those directly seeing the perfect object (*yang dag pa'i don*), whereby its own entity of a self is found; however, it is not established by way of its own essence. This is one of the explanations of the two entities.
> "A special exalted wisdom" means that [the ultimate entity] is not found by just any superior's exalted wisdom; it is a special, i.e., particular, exalted wisdom. Moreover, [the ultimate entity] is found by an exalted wisdom comprehending modes. When the [ultimate entity] is indicated to be found or established by that exalted wisdom, in order to refute the conception thinking "if there is something that can be established by that [exalted wisdom], it is truly existent," [the autocommentary] says that it is not established by way of its own essence. There are those who propound the system of the master [Chandrakirti] to be that if a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise comprehends ultimate truth, it is truly existent, whereby it is not an object of knowledge. Because they do not realize the meaning explained by this system – that although it is found by meditative equipoise it is not truly existent – they corrupt the system of the scholars.

From among the two, an exalted wisdom analyzing a conventionality and an exalted wisdom analyzing the ultimate, "a special exalted wisdom" is an exalted wisdom analyzing the ultimate. In general, the object perceived by an exalted wisdom comprehending modes is the ultimate. If it is an object established, found, or realized by a superior's exalted wisdom it is not pervaded by being truly existent. However, some think that if it is found by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise it must be established by way of its own character. In order to refute this, Chandrakirti says that it is not established by way of its own essence. Some people incorrectly think that an ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge because it is not found by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment* recounts that (see Newland, *Two Truths*, page 89) Loden Sherab asserts that ultimate truth is *not* an object of knowledge because it is *not* found by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. On the other hand, Charpa Chogyi Sengge says that ultimate truth *is* ultimately existent because it *is*

found by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. However, saying that this is the system of the master, whether Chandrakirti or Nagarjuna, is a corruption of their system.

In short, Loden Sherab says that ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge and Charpa Chogyi Sengge says that ultimate truth is truly existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 166) says:

> That which is other than the ultimate, the entity of the conventional, is: that existing as the entity of a self found through the force of false perception by those ordinary beings who eyes of awareness are completely covered by the film of the cataract of ignorance. Objects which are seen by the childish appear to be established by way of their own character, and, likewise, to exist as their own entity, whereas they do not in that they are one of the two entities.

An object seen by the valid cognizer of an ordinary being is a conventional truth. All four Buddhist schools, Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Madhyamika, are similar in having a presentation of the two truths, but their definitions differ. All schools have a presentation of the two truths, four truths, and basis, path, and result. The following definitions are found in Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *Presentation of Tenets*. The Vaibhashikas distinguish conventional truth and ultimate truth in the following way:

> The definition of a conventional truth is: a phenomenon which is such that, if it were broken or mentally separated into parts, the mind apprehending that object would cease.
>
> The definition of an ultimate truth is: a phenomenon which is such that, if it were broken or mentally separated into parts, the mind apprehending that object would not cease.

According to the Sautrantikas they are:

> The definition of an ultimate truth is: a phenomenon that is able to perform a function ultimately.
>
> The definition of a conventional truth is: a phenomenon that is not able to perform a function ultimately.

Therefore, for the Sautrantikas all things are ultimate truths and all permanent phenomena are conventional truths.

The definitions for the Chittamatrins are:

> The definition of an ultimate truth is: that which is realized by means of a valid direct perceiver realizing it clearly without dualistic appearance.
>
> The definition of a conventional truth is: that which is realized by means of a valid direct perceiver realizing it clearly with dualistic appearance.

The definitions for the Madhyamikas are as was mentioned before:

> The definition of a conventional truth is: an object found by a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality and with respect to which a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality becomes a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality.
>
> The definition of an ultimate truth is: an object found by a valid cognizer distinguishing a final phenomenon and with respect to which a valid cognizer distinguishing a final phenomenon becomes a valid cognizer distinguishing a final phenomenon.

In short, the two truths are the basis; method and wisdom are the paths; and the two bodies are the results.

Wednesday afternoon, 24 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 166) says:

> Therefore, in regard to finding the ultimate truth, the finder is said to be a superior. With the thought that [superiors] are the main [finders], it is not asserted that it is not found by ordinary beings who possess the view of the Middle Way in their continua.

All superiors directly realize the ultimate truth, therefore their exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is posited as the finder of ultimate truth. "It is not asserted that it is not found by ordinary beings who possess the view of the Middle Way in their continua" means that also ordinary beings who have the Middle Way view in their continua can realize the ultimate truth. Therefore, even ordinary beings such as ordinary bodhisattvas on the paths of accumulation and preparation realize the ultimate truth.

The finder of conventional truth is also posited as an ordinary being. Because the majority of ordinary beings do not realize the ultimate truth but only realize conventional truths, they are posited as the finders of conventional truth. However, superiors also realize conventional truths in that superiors have a valid cognizer of conventionalities realizing conventional truths. Among ordinary beings it is necessary to make distinctions in that there are those who are normal ordinary beings and those who are higher ordinary beings, in that normal ordinary beings have not realized emptiness while higher ordinary beings have realized it.

"Finder" is to be understood in the sense of realize.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 167) says:

> In regard to finding the conventional, the finder is also said to be a normal ordinary being.

An illustration of a conventional truth is pot and so forth. In order to realize pot and so forth one does not need to have found the view of the Middle Way.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 167) says:

> Illustrations of the conventional are external and internal things perceived under the influence of ignorance. This being the main thought, it is not asserted that these things are not found by valid cognizers of conventions in the continua of superiors. Illustrations of conventional truths are finding pot and so forth; they exist even for those who have not found the view of the Middle Way. However, when these bases are found by a valid cognizer *to be* conventional truths, it definitely must be by one who has previously found the view of the Middle Way because when these bases are established as conventional truths they are necessarily established as falsities, and in order to directly establish them as falsities one must have previously refuted true existence in regard to these bases by means of a valid cognizer.

In order to realize pot, pillar, and so forth there is no need to have found the view of the Middle Way; however, in order to ascertain pot, pillar, and so forth to be conventional truths one must have previously found the view of the Middle Way.

The Tibetan word *kun rdzob* is translated as 'conventional' or 'concealer' in dependence on the context. How is pot realized to be a conventional truth (*kun rdzob den pa*)? In order to realize pot to be a conventional truth, one must have realized that pot is a truth only in the perspective of a concealer (*kun rdzob*), this being the ignorance that is the conception of true existence. The conception of true existence is called a 'concealer' because it obstructs or conceals the reality of the pot. In order to realize the pot to be a conventional truth, one must first realize that the pot is a falsity. In order to do so, one must first find the view of the Middle Way. Therefore, prior to realizing the pot to be a conventional truth one must first realize that the pot is empty of true existence. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "in order to

directly establish them as falsities one must have previously refuted true existence in regard to these bases by means of a valid cognizer." 'These bases' refers to pot and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 167) says:

> Therefore, "through the force of false perception" is [as follows]. Although normal persons perceive falsities, they do not necessarily establish them *to be* falsities. For example, when spectators of an illusion see illusory horses and elephants, although they see falsities, that appearance is not necessarily established to be false by them.

A magician has the appearance of horse or elephant but is mindful that although there is such an appearance it is not true. For the spectators it is not necessarily established that the appearance of horse and elephant is false. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "although they see falsities, that appearance is not necessarily established to be false." When ordinary beings see falsities, there is no need for them to have established them as false.

This is explained by means of an analogy and the meaning that it exemplifies. The analogy is the three types of persons in relation to a magic show:

1. a person who has the appearance but no adherence it,
2. a person who has the appearance and adheres to it,
3. a person who does not have the appearance and does not adhere to it.

The meaning of this analogy in relation to a conventional truth, such as pot, is:

1. a person who has the appearance of truly existent pot and adheres to it as truly existent,
2. a person who has the appearance of truly existent pot but does not adhere to it,
3. a person who does not have the appearance of truly existent pot and does not adhere to it.

These are respectively:

1. a normal ordinary being who has the appearance of truly existent pot and adheres to it,
2. a higher ordinary being who has realized emptiness by way of a meaning generality who has the appearance of truly existent pot but does not adhere to it,
3. a superior in meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness who does not have the appearance of truly existent pot and does not adhere to it.

The relation between the analogy and the meaning is:

1. The spectators of the magic show are analogous to ordinary beings who have not realized emptiness in that they have the appearance of horse and elephant and adhere to it as true.
2. The magician is analogous to higher ordinary beings in that he has the appearance of horse and elephant but does not adhere to it as true.
3. Latecomers are analogous to superiors in that they do not have the appearance of horse and elephant and do not adhere to it as true.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 167) says:

> Therefore, the meaning of finding that posited as conventional truths by perceiving them to be falsities is to find them by means of a valid cognizer of conventions comprehending the meaning of false or deceptive objects of knowledge.

This is the meaning of the verse in the *Supplement* (v. 6.23) which says:

> *All things – things found by correct*
> *And false perception – possess two entities.*
> *Any object of correct perception is thusness,*
> *That of false perception is said to be conventional truth.* [6.23]

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 167) says:

> From the two natures, or entities, that were explained before, any object found by a consciousness of [an ultimate] type perceiving, i.e., comprehending, the perfect object is itself an ultimate truth, that which was explained in the context of "by the strength of cataracts."

The definition of ultimate truth is given here as: "any object found by a consciousness of [an ultimate] type perceiving, i.e., comprehending, the perfect object is itself an ultimate truth." This implies that the definition of conventional truth is an object found by a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality. However, in order for this definition to be complete, it is necessary to add the words: "and with respect to which a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality becomes a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 167) says:

> That found by a valid cognizer of conventions perceiving a false object of knowledge is taught by indicating it to be a conventional truth. The two bases of finding the ultimate and conventional are taught individually; it is not that in regard to one there occur two ways of finding it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 167) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B1B Indicating other presentations of the two truths
>
> Although there are indeed many different ways of asserting the divisions of the two truths, here what is to be understood is as taught in the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra* which is quoted in [Shantideva's] *Compendium of Trainings* saying:
>
> > Therefore, the Tathagata through comprehending the two, the conventional and ultimate, also [comprehended] that which is to be known as being limited to them, the conventional and ultimate truths. Furthermore, the Bhagavan, thoroughly seeing and thoroughly knowing emptiness, excellently actualized it, thereby becoming omniscient.
>
> "Also [comprehended] that which is to be known" refers to the divisions of objects of knowledge and "limited to them" means that the truths are definitely two in number.

An object of knowledge is either a conventional truth or an ultimate truth because if it is an object of an awareness, it is limited to being either a conventional truth or an ultimate truth because there does not exist a third possibility. It can be said: if it is an object of knowledge it is pervaded by being either a conventional truth or an ultimate truth. However, someone can say in debate: "What about the subject 'pot-and-emptiness-of-pot'? Is it a conventional truth or an ultimate truth? It is an object of knowledge because it is an existent." If someone says "Pot-and-emptiness-of-pot are a conventional truth," then one asks: "Is the emptiness of the pot a conventional truth?" If the other responds that it is not, one says: "It is a conventional truth because 'pot-and-emptiness-of-pot' are a conventional truth." To this the other person says: "There is no pervasion."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 168) says:

> Because the Tathagata comprehended both truths, he is said to be omniscient. Therefore, explaining that ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge and is not realized by any awareness as being the thought of [Shantideva's] *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* is to explain it wrongly.

'Omniscient," literally "all-knower," is one who knows the two truths simultaneously. 'All' means that all aspects of the two truths are realized simultaneously without anything left out. Because of knowing this, one is an all-knower or omniscient one.

Someone says that the thought of Shantideva is that ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge and is not realized by any awareness because the ninth chapter of his *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:

> The conventional and ultimate,
> They are asserted to be the two truths.
> The ultimate is not an object of an awareness,
> Awareness is said to be conventional.

Guy Newland in *Two Truths* (page 105) translates this verse as:

> Conventionalities and ultimates,
> These are asserted as the two truths,
> The ultimate is not the province of awareness.
> Awareness is asserted to be a conventionality.

Taking this verse literally, this person asserts that according to Shantideva ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge and is not realized by any awareness. However, Shantideva means that ultimate truth is not an object of ignorance, the conception of true existence, which is a concealer that obstructs seeing reality.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 168) says:

> The division into two, conventional truths and ultimate truths, is the entity of the divisions. There are also many differences in regard to the meaning of the divisions. Here, both [conventional truths and ultimate truths] have an entity because it is not feasible for them to not be either the same or different entities and because if the substrata were different entities from the emptiness of true existence they would be truly existent. [Conventional truths and ultimate truths] are the same entity but different isolates, like product and impermanence. [Nagarjuna's] *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* says:
>
> > Suchness is not observed
> > To be different from the conventional.
> > Conventionalities are explained to be just empty.
> > Because it is definite that if they were not only empty
> > Conventionalities would not arise,
> > They are like product and impermanence.
>
> The meaning of the first four lines is that suchness is not a different entity from the conventional:
> 1. because conventionalities are empty of true existence and
> 2. because even the emptiness of true existence is posited on a conventional basis.

All phenomena have two entities: the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. These two truths are the same entity but different isolates. For example, in regard to the statement "form is empty" which occurs in the *Heart Sutra*, the basis of qualification is form whereas its quality or attribute is its being empty; thus, form and its emptiness are one entity but different isolates.

All objects of knowledge have two entities: the entity of conventional truth and the entity of ultimate truth. Since all phenomena have two entities it can be asked: "In terms of a single base, such as a table, what is its entity of ultimate truth and what is its entity of conventional truth?" In terms of a single base, a table, its entity of ultimate truth is the table's emptiness of true existence, while its

entity of conventional truth is the conventionally existent table. These two truths are one entity but different isolates. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Essence of Eloquence* says that if the two truths were one, there would be four errors and if they were different entities there would be four errors. In regard to these errors, the conclusion is that the two truths are one entity but different isolates.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "because if the substrata were different entities from the emptiness of true existence they would be truly existent." In terms of a single base such as a pot, if the pot were a different entity from its emptiness of true existence it would be truly existent. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "[Conventional truths and ultimate truths] are the same entity but different isolates, like product and impermanence." A pen, for example, has many attributes such as being a product, being impermanent, and so forth. Such attributes appear to a non-mistaken awareness but do not appear separately. The definition of one substance is: that which appears to a non-mistaken awareness but does not appear separately. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Clearing Away the Darkness of the Mind* gives the definition of one substance as: that which appears to a direct perceiver and does not appear separately. In addition, it gives the definition of one entity as: that which appears to a direct perceiver but does not appear as separate substances.

The attributes of product, impermanence, and so forth in terms of a single base, such as a pen, are one entity in that they appear to an eye consciousness but do not appear separately. A pen, for example, is composed of many substances that are not matter such as the substance of being impermanent, the substance of being a product, the substance of being a thing, the substance of being a compounded phenomenon, and so forth. All of these appear to an eye consciousness but do not appear to it separately. One entity and one substance mean the same in relation a functioning thing. However, they are different in relation to uncompounded phenomena. For example, uncompounded space is not the substance of being product, the substance of being impermanent, the substance of being able to perform a function and so forth, which means that it is not a product, it is not impermanent, it is not able to perform a function, and so forth. Therefore, being one substance cannot be posited in relation to a base that is an uncompounded phenomenon, whereas one can posit its being one entity, for example, the entity of permanence, the entity of non-functioning thing, the entity of non-product, and the entity of being empty of the ability to perform a function. These entities exist upon a base which is an uncompounded phenomenon. They are one entity but different isolates. However, keep in mind that the presentation of this varies according to the different schools.

Does uncompounded space appear to an eye consciousness? It does appear. Is the eye consciousness able to apprehend uncompounded space? Think about it.

Thursday morning, 25 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 168) says:

> Following that, the [last] two [lines] indicate being such, it is a definite relation, if one were not to exist, the other would not occur. Furthermore, this is a relationship of same nature (*bdag gcig pa'i 'brel ba*), therefore, they are indicated as being the same entity, like product and impermanence.

A conventional basis and its attribute of being empty of true existence are one entity. The definition of a relationship of same nature is given here as: 'if one were not to exist, the other would not occur.' A relationship of same nature involves two phenomena such that if one is ruled out the other is also ruled out; for example, product and impermanence. If being a product is ruled out, then being impermanent is also ruled out. In other words, if a pot is ruled out as being a product it is also ruled out as being impermanent.

Another type of relationship is a causal relationship, for example, the relationship between fire and smoke. When fire is eliminated, then smoke is also eliminated. This is a causal relationship of different entities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 169) says:

> The identification of the individual divisions is as was explained previously in regard to the individual definitions as found by the two valid cognizers.
> QUESTION: "When explained according to the two, [the *Sutra of the Meeting of Father and Son* as quoted in the *Compendium of Training*] and *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* in which it says:
>
> > The conventional and ultimate,
> > They are asserted to be the two truths.
> > The ultimate is not an object of an awareness,
> > Awareness is said to be a conventionality.
>
> How are they explained?"
> RESPONSE: The first two lines present the division of the two truths. When the entities of the individual divisions are identified, the identification of ultimate truth is presented by the single [word] "ultimate" and the identification of the conventional truth by the single [word] "conventional." The first of the [last two] lines is the thesis 'ultimate truth is not an object of an awareness'; the last line is asserted to be the proof. The meaning of these phrases is not at all as they appear.

Someone says that since the explanation of the two truths in the *Sutra of the Meeting of Father and Son* as quoted in the *Compendium of Training* and in *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* are different, how does Chandrakirti explain this. The response is that "The first two lines present the division of the two truths" and so forth. In other words, the two lines from *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds,* "The conventional and ultimate, they are asserted to be the two truths," present the divisions of the two truths. "The ultimate is not an object of an awareness" means that ultimate truth is only the object of an awareness that is a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Ultimate truth is not at all the object of a valid cognizer analyzing conventionalities; it is not an object of a concealer, the conception of true existence, which obscures the mind. The etymology of "ultimate truth" (*don dam den pa*) is that the 'ultimate' (*don dam*), literally holy or sublime object, is a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise while that which is a 'truth' (*den pa*) for a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is an ultimate truth.

In the term conventional truth, or truth for a concealer, or concealer-truth (*kun rdzob den pa*), *kun rdzob* refers to an awareness which is a concealer. That which is a truth for this concealer is a phenomenon that is true in the perspective of that concealer but is actually false. The Tibetan word *kun rdzob* literally means all-concealer or thoroughly obscuring. What is a concealer (*kun rdzob*)? It is the ignorance that is the conception of true existence which obscures the seeing of reality. Forms and so forth are falsities but are truths for a concealer, or conventional truths.

Saying that the meaning of the statement "The ultimate is not an object of an awareness" is that ultimate truth is not an object of *any* awareness is incorrect. Rather, it means that the ultimate is not an object of a concealing awareness (*blo kun rdzob*). The ultimate is not an object of a false concealing awareness because a false concealing awareness obscures the seeing of reality. That concealing awareness, or awareness that is a concealer, is what conceals or obscures the reality of phenomena. Ultimate truth is not an object of a concealer. As was mentioned earlier, Lama Tsongkhapa's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment* says that Loden Sherab asserts that ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge because it *is not* found by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Charpa Chogyi Sengge, on the other hand, asserts that ultimate truth is ultimately existent because it *is* found by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 169) says:

> Therefore, the identification of the two truths is as taught in the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra* which is quoted in the *Compendium of Trainings* as saying:
>
> > In regard to that, conventionalities are seen by the Tathagata to be objects of the world. Whatever is ultimate is inexpressible; it is not that which is to be known, it is not that which is to be completely known, it is not that which is to be fully known, it is not indicated.
>
> The meaning of this passage is set forth in *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*.

In the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra* it says "conventionalities are seen by the Tathagata to be objects of the world." Here the word 'world' ('*jig rten*) can be understood in different ways. In general, the 'world' includes both the inhabitants of the world and the environment of the world, but here it specifically refers to the inhabitants, sentient beings. Therefore, conventionalities are objects of ordinary beings, the world. The Tibetan word '*jig rten* (pronounced *jig ten*) literally means the basis or support (*rten*) of the transitory or perishing ('*jig*). The basis of the transitory are the five aggregates. The Tathagata knows that the conventional are objects of the basis of the transitory, i.e., sentient beings.

The sutra then says "Whatever is ultimate is inexpressible." This attribute of inexpressibility is mentioned in a preliminary verse to the *Heart Sutra*:

> To the perfection of wisdom, inexpressible in words and thought,
> The entity of the unproduced and unceasing,
> An object of the mind individually cognizing it,
> Mother of the conquerors of the three times, I prostrate.

With this verse one prostrates to the mother, the perfection of wisdom, which is ultimate truth.

The sutra continues: "it is not that which is to be known, it is not that which is to be completely known, it is not that which is to be fully known, it is not indicated." Lama Tsongkhapa then says that the meaning of this verse from the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra* is as explained in *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*. There is debate about whether or not ultimate truth is actually inexpressible. The conclusion is that it is not completely inexpressible, but it is inexpressible in the sense that a term cannot express it just as it is. There is also debate about the statement "it is not indicated" in that someone can assert that ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge because it cannot be indicated. The difference between "it is not that which is to be known, it is not that which is to be completely known, it is not that which is to be fully known, it is not indicated" can perhaps be explained in relation to different types of persons.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 169) says:

> With respect to that, the meaning of saying that ultimate truth is not that which is to be know is that it is not an object of an awareness [of conventionalities], which accords with the meaning of the cited sutra setting out the two truths explained below. If it were not posited in that way, i.e., [ultimate truth] not being the object of any awareness, it would contradict the explanation that the Conqueror, through all conventionalities and the ultimate possessing an aspect of emptiness having become evident [to him], is posited as omniscient. Further on this will also be explained many times.

In the context of ultimate truth not being an object of an awareness, it refers specifically to it not being an object of a false concealing awareness.

Student: What is the difference between the *kun rdzob* that occurs in the context of *kun rdzob den pa* (conventional truth or truth for a concealer) and *blo kun rdzob* (concealing awareness)?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it is an awareness it is necessarily a conventional truth. Is a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise a conventional truth? It is. Why? Because it is that which is able to perform a function. Is a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise a concealing awareness? It is not a concealing awareness, however, it is a conventional truth. Why is it not a concealing awareness? Because it is an awareness of the ultimate. It is an awareness of the ultimate because ultimate truth is posited with respect to it. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas, a concealing awareness in the context of the two truths is always a false awareness which is a conception of true existence. However, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas eye consciousness, nose consciousness, and so forth are also concealing awarenesses because they also conceal reality.
Student: Then for the Prasangika Madhyamikas an eye consciousness is not a concealing awareness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: An eye consciousness is also a concealing awareness for the Prasangika Madhyamikas, but it is not the concealer which is discussed in the stanza from *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*. An eye consciousness is not a concealer in the context of a truth for a concealer (conventional truth).
Student: Since there is a false concealing awareness (*blo kun rdzob rdzun pa*) is there a true concealing awareness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It depends. If one understands 'true' to mean non-mistaken then there is, but if one understands 'true' in the sense of the mode of abidance being concordant with the mode of appearing, then there is no true concealing awareness. In general, true (*den pa*) refers to the ultimate truth, emptiness, and false *(rdzun pa*) to the conventional truth. The mode of abidance and the mode of appearing of all conventional truths is not concordant.

In short, there is a lot to debate about the meaning of the statement "Whatever is ultimate is inexpressible; it is not that which is to be known, it is not that which is to be completely known, it is not that which is to be fully known, it is not indicated," in that one can ask whether it means that a buddha does not know ultimate truth and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 169-170) says:

> The identification of conventional truth does not mean to be posited to an awareness alone; rather it is an object of an awareness. Furthermore, "object of the world" means that it is found to be an object, i.e., an object of use, which is comprehended by the world, that is, a false knower of conventions, whereby this is likewise the meaning of asserting an object of awareness to be a conventionality.
>
> **The division of objects of knowledge into two truths**
>
> Objects of knowledge are presented [in the scriptures and by reasonings] to definitely be those two in number.
> (1) In the scriptures
> The *Meeting of Father and Son* which was quoted before and also the *Exalted Meditative Stabilization Definitely Indicating Suchness* clearly teach:
>
> > Everything is conventional or ultimate,
> > Nothing exists as a third truth.
>
> Also the autocommentary says:
>
> > Likewise, any other truth, even the slightest whatsoever, is to be ascertained as only subsumed in the two truths

The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says:

> All the teachings on the many [things] with the name 'truth' are said to be condensed into the two truths. The divisions that are explained here, the truths that are realized, are also asserted by this master to definitely be two truths in number in order to explain the presentations of the aggregates, constituents, and spheres.

'The world' is a knower of conventionalities (*tha snyad pa'i shes pa*). A falsity found by a knower of conventionalities is a conventional truth. Objects of knowledge are definitely two in number: conventional truths and ultimate truths. There is no truth that is other than the two truths. All phenomena are included in the two truths in that they must be one or the other. In short, there is no third truth.

An object found by a knower of conventionalities or a valid cognizer analyzing a conventionality is a conventional truth. An object found by an ultimate awareness or a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is an ultimate truth. These are the definitions of the two truths according to the Madhyamikas. The definitions according to the Chittamatrins are also similar, whereas they are different in the two lower schools. The two truths are asserted by all four schools but when they are defined and examples of them are posited, they are different. The two truths are said to be like layers of an onion in that just as an onion has many layers that can be peeled away, the two truths can be explained on many different levels. The explanation of the Prasangika Madhyamikas is the most profound and the most difficult to understand. We should try to understand the two truths by, for example, asking ourselves: Is this cup a conventional truth? It is. Why? Is there an ultimate truth in terms of this cup? There is. How is it established? The ultimate truth existing in terms of the cup is the cup's emptiness of inherent existence, its emptiness of establishment by way of its own character, and so forth. The cup itself is a conventional truth, but on top of it, there is also an ultimate truth. The conventional truth that is the cup has different levels of subtlety. The cup itself is a coarse conventional truth. The subtle conventional truth of the cup is its being imputed over there by conception on its ability to perform a function.

Thursday afternoon, 25 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 170) says:

> (2) By reasonings
> If a basis is affirmed to be an object that is false and deceptive, it is necessarily eliminated as being non-deceptive suchness; therefore, deceptive and non-deceptive are a direct contradiction in the sense of abiding in mutual abandonment. If [it is a direct contradiction abiding in mutual abandonment], since that pervades all objects of knowledge, a third possibility of being both or neither is eliminated. [Kamalashila's] *Illumination of the Middle Way* says:
>
> > A pair of phenomena fulfilling the definition of abiding in mutual abandonment is that if something's being one is refuted while its being the other is not established it does not exist; therefore, conceiving a position that is neither is unfeasible.
>
> [This text] also says:
>
> > The definition of abiding in mutual abandonment is: a pair, such that if something's being one is eliminated while its being the other is not affirmed, it does not exist. Any two that are the definition of abiding in mutual abandonment are a pair that pervade in all ways. Any two that pervade in all ways are a pair that eliminate other possibilities; for example, instances of the embodied and unembodied, and so forth.

The deceptive, i.e., the false, and the non-deceptive, i.e., the truth, are 'a direct contradiction in the sense of abiding in mutual abandonment.' This means that if it is an object of knowledge it has to be either deceptive or non-deceptive, that is, there is nothing that is both and nothing that is neither. A direct contradiction abiding in mutual abandonment is a pair of phenomena such that if something is established to be one, it is refuted as being the other. If it is a contradiction, is it necessarily a direct contradiction abiding in mutual abandonment? No. Posit! White and red colors are contradictions because there is nothing that is a common locus of the two, yet they are not a direct contradiction abiding in mutual abandonment. They are not a direct contradiction abiding in mutual abandonment because there are many colors that are neither white nor red, for example, blue, yellow, etc. Is there a difference between a direct contradiction and a direct contradiction abiding in mutual abandonment? Posit!
Student: A person who is eating and a person who is not eating.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It follows that a pillar and pot and a right arm and a left arm are direct contradictions!
Student: A crow and an owl.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are a direct contradiction in the sense of not abiding simultaneously without harming each other. During the day the crow harms the owl, whereas at night the owl harms the crow. This discussion comes in the text *Signs and Reasonings*.
Student 2: Permanence and impermanence.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Are you saying that they are direct contradictions because there is nothing that is a third possibility?
Student 2: Yes.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Are product and permanence a direct contradiction?
Student 3: Perhaps an example of a pair that are a direct contradiction is wisdom and ignorance.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are indirect contradictions.
Student 4: An example of a direct contradiction is day and night.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It follows that if it is a contradiction it is pervaded by being a direct contradiction!
Student 5: An example of a direct contradiction is wet and dry.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It follows that if it is not wet it is dry!

Permanent and impermanent are a direct contradiction. Permanent and functioning thing are a contradiction but are not a direct contradiction because when a cup is realized to be a functioning thing, one does not need to have refuted the object of negation that is permanence. The opposite of functioning thing is non-functioning thing. When a cup is realized to be a functioning thing, one necessarily realizes that the cup is not a non-functioning thing. A direct contradiction is such that when something is established to be one of the pair, it is refuted as being the other.

Functioning thing and permanent are a contradiction but are not a direct contradiction because when a particular basis, such as pot, is established to be a functioning thing by a valid cognizer, there is no pervasion that it is refuted as being permanent.

Wisdom and ignorance are a contradiction abiding in mutual abandonment, but are not a direct contradiction abiding in mutual abandonment. When debating this, one can say: The view of the transitory collection, as the subject, is wisdom. It follows that the view of the transitory collection and wisdom abide simultaneously without harming each other although [ignorance] is the contradictory partner, the discordant class of knowledge, exalted wisdom. The definition of ignorance is posited in this way. The wisdom realizing emptiness by means of a meaning generality, as the subject, does not abide simultaneously with ignorance without harm because it is a wisdom directly realizing selflessness.

In short, is there a difference between a direct contradiction and a direct contradiction abiding in mutual abandonment? Think about it. There exist both direct contradictions and indirect contradictions. Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way* says: "The definition of abiding in mutual abandonment is: a pair, such that if something's being one is affirmed while its being the other is not eliminated, it does not exist." This definition also fits a direct contradiction. The text continues: "Any two that are the definition of abiding in mutual abandonment are a pair that pervade in all ways. Any two that pervade in all ways are a pair that eliminate other possibilities; for example, instances of the embodied and unembodied, and so forth." The embodied and unembodied are a direct contradiction abiding in mutual abandonment in that they eliminate a third possibility, i.e., there is nothing that is both embodied and unembodied and nothing that is neither embodied nor unembodied.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 171) says:

> This is also to be understood in regard to all other direct contradictions.

The definition of a direct contradiction (*Collected Topics*) is: mutually and directly abiding inharmoniously. Are a crow and owl a direct contradiction? They are not. Phenomena that are a direct contradiction are opposites, for example, functioning thing and non-functioning thing, permanent and impermanent, and so forth. Permanent and functioning thing are not a direct contradiction since they are not opposites.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 171) says:

> If there is nothing to indicate as a direct contradiction eliminating a third possibility, there would be nothing to refute through investigation that determines the two possibilities saying "What is asserted to be existent or non-existent, one or many, and so forth?" If there is something to indicate [as a direct contradiction eliminating a third possibility,] since it is a direct contradiction such that if something's being one is refuted while its being the other is not established it does not exist, saying that there are no direct contractions for the Prasangika Madhyamikas is to not understand the presentation of the refutation [of the other's system] and the establishment [of one's own system].
>
> (1) A direct contradiction such that if one is eliminated the other is affirmed and (2) such that if one is refuted the other is necessarily established are not different for the Svatantrika and Prasangika Madhyamikas.

A direct contradiction abiding in mutual abandonment is a direct contradiction eliminating a third possibility. Those who say that a direct contradiction does not exist for the Prasangika Madhyamika system do not understand the presentation of the refutation of the others' system and the establishment of one's own system. The definition of a negative phenomenon is posited as: an object that is realized by the conception apprehending it in the manner of directly eliminating an object of negation. The definition of an affirmative phenomenon is: an object that is realized by the conception apprehending it in the manner of not directly negating an object of negation.

"A direct contradiction such that if one is eliminated the other is affirmed" is, for example, the impermanence and permanence of a pot in that when a pot is affirmed to be impermanent, it is eliminated as being permanent.

The Svatantrika Madhyamikas and Prasangika Madhyamikas define a direct contradiction in the same way. This is probably true for all the Buddhist schools. In brief, a direct contradiction is such that when a basis is established to be one of the pair, it is refuted as being the other.

There are different types of contradictions. A pillar and pot are contradictions but are not direct contractions.

Friday morning, 26 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 171) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B1C Explaining the divisions of conventionalities relative to the world

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, having thus presented the two truths, since, among correct and false perceptions themselves, false perceptions also have the very two, in order to indicate the very two, the object to be apprehended by that and the consciousness, it is explained:
>
> *Also false perception is asserted [as] two types,*
> *With clear senses and faulty senses.*
> *The consciousnesses of those having faulty senses are*
> *Asserted as wrong compared with consciousnesses with sound senses.* [6.24]
>
> There, possessors of clear senses, those free of cataracts and not impaired by jaundice and so forth and that unmistakenly apprehend external objects of that type. Possessors of faulty senses are the opposite of those.
>
> There, in relation to consciousnesses with sound senses, whatever is a consciousness possessing faulty senses is asserted as a wrong consciousness.
>
> Just as these consciousnesses are twofold by way of mistaken-ness and unmistaken-ness, similarly, in order to indicate that "objects are also," it is explained:
>
> *Anything apprehended by the unimpaired six senses*
> *[And] realized by the world, that*
> *Is truth within the world itself. The remainder*
> *Is presented as wrong within the world itself.* [6.25]

Chandrakirti has presented the two truths in general and will now present conventional truths, which are falsities. Relative to the perspective of the world, conventional truth is divided into (1) real conventional truths and (2) unreal conventional truths. Real and unreal conventional truths are further divided in relation to objects and subject (object-possessors). From the point of view of subjects, there are real and unreal subjects, whereas from the point of view of objects, there are real and unreal objects. On the side of subjects, a real subject is a non-defective consciousness whereas an unreal subject is a defective consciousness. A non-defective consciousness is based on a sound, or unimpaired, sense power while a defective consciousness is based on an impaired sense power.

A correct sense power is one that is not polluted by a superficial cause of error. A faulty sense power is one that is polluted by a superficial cause of error. A faulty sense power is, for example, an eye sense power impaired by cataracts due to which there is the appearance of falling hairs. Another example is jaundice, due to which a white conch appears as yellow. Another example is the eye sense power of someone in a moving vehicle who has the appearance of other objects moving past, although they are in fact stationary. Such sense powers are impaired or polluted by a superficial cause of error.

A correct sense power is one that is not impaired by cataracts, jaundice, a moving vehicle, and so forth. Purbujok's *Awarenesses and Knowers* describes four types of superficial causes of errors:

1. a cause of error existing in the basis,
2. a cause of error existing in the abode,
3. a cause of error existing in the object, and
4. a cause of error existing in the immediately preceding condition.

This text (translation by E. Napper) says:

> [Facsimile of a direct perceiver] and mistaken consciousness are synonyms. Second, when [facsimiles of a direct perceiver] are divided, there are seven. This is because there are six conceptual facsimiles and one non-conceptual facsimile of a direct perceiver.
>
> The first six [conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver] exist because there are (1) mistaken conceptions, (2) conventional conceptions, (3) inferential conceptions, (4) conceptions arisen from inference, (5) memory conceptions, and (6) wishing conceptions.
>
> Illustrations are respectively of the first, a thought apprehending sound as permanent; of the second, an inferential cognizer which realizes sound to be impermanent; of the third, a thought which is a mind apprehending a sign; of the fourth, a thought which arises after an inferential cognizer; of the fifth, a thought which today remembers an object of the past, and, of the sixth, a thought which today wishes for an object of the future.
>
> There are many non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver. From among the two, [non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver] which are mental consciousnesses and which are sense consciousnesses, an illustration of the first was explained above. With regard to the second, [non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver which are sense consciousnesses], there are four: the cause of error existing in the basis, in the abode, in the object, and in the immediately preceding condition. The first, [the cause of error existing in the basis], is, for example, an eye impaired by obscuring disease, for a sense consciousness which sees one moon as two is produced in dependence upon that. The second, [the cause of error existing in the abode], is, for example, sitting in a boat, for a sense consciousness which sees trees as moving is produced in dependence upon that. The third, [the cause of error existing in the object], is, for example, a quickly whirling firebrand, for a sense consciousness which sees a firebrand as a wheel is produced in dependence upon that. The fourth, [the cause of error existing in the immediately preceding condition], is, for example, a mind disturbed by hatred, for a sense consciousness which sees the earth as red is produced in dependence upon that.

On the side of the object there are real and unreal objects. An example of an unreal object is the reflection of a face in a mirror that appears to be a real face but is not. It is said to be an unreal conventional truth because it is realized to be false even by ordinary beings who have not realized emptiness. On the other hand, a face or a pot are real conventional truths in the perspective of the world because ordinary beings do not realize that a face or a pot does not exist as it appears.

Therefore, with respect to a worldly consciousness, both objects and subjects have two divisions: real and unreal. In the perspective of a worldly consciousness, consciousnesses are real and unreal; an example of an unreal sense consciousness is the eye consciousness of someone with jaundice to whom a white conch appears as yellow. Therefore, in regard to subjects, the unreal is due to a faulty sense power caused by jaundice and so forth whereby a white conch appears as yellow. The eye consciousness has the appearance of yellow conch, i.e., the unreal appears to it, due to a fault in its support, the eye sense power. In other words, the appearance of a yellow conch instead of white conch is due to impairment of the eye sense power by jaundice. Chandrakirti says: "The consciousnesses of those having faulty senses are asserted as wrong."

An example of a real subject is an eye consciousness that has the appearance of a white conch as white in that it is unmistaken. It is unmistaken because the eye consciousness is based on an eye sense power that is free from impairment. On the other hand, an eye consciousness that has the appearance of a yellow conch is unreal. Thus, the eye consciousness can be real or unreal, in that an eye consciousness perceiving a white conch is real and an eye consciousness perceiving a yellow conch is unreal. Real and unreal are posited only in the perspective of the world. Ordinary beings do not realize that a white conch does not exist as it appears (that is, as truly existent). However, ordinary

beings do realize that a white conch appearing as yellow does not exist as it appears (that is, as yellow).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 171) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *Also those seeing falsities are asserted to be two types:*
> > *Those having clear sense powers and faulty sense powers.*
> > *A consciousness of those having a faulty sense power,*
> > *Compared to a consciousness of those having a sound sense power, is asserted to be unreal.* [6.24]
>
> With respect to conventionalities from among the two, objects and subjects, initially relative to a consciousness of a worldly being subjects are presented as two, real and unreal. Not only are objects of knowledge divided into two truths, *also* subjects which *see falsities are asserted to be two*, real and unreal. [Respectively they are]:
>
> 1. *clear sense powers*, that is, sense powers that are not polluted by a superficial cause of error, and the consciousnesses that are supported on them, and
> 2. *those having faulty sense powers*, that is, subjects that are polluted by a superficial cause of error.
>
> *A consciousness* that is polluted due to *having a faulty sense power*, *compared to a consciousness* that is not polluted by a superficial cause of error, that is, [a consciousness having] *a sound sense power*, is *asserted to be* an *unreal* consciousness. The former, [a real consciousness], is asserted to apprehend objects unmistakenly. These two particularities are not the Middle Way system, but are related to the consciousnesses of worldly beings.

Conventionalities are divided into two, real and unreal, only relative to the consciousnesses of worldly beings. This is because for the Prasangika Madhyamikas, conventionalities are necessarily unreal, that is, there are no real conventionalities. Thus, there are real and unreal conventionalities only relative to the consciousnesses of worldly beings. In general the term 'worldly being' refers to those who are unlearned, but here it specifically means those who have not realized emptiness or who do not understand the meaning of emptiness. Real and unreal conventionalities are posited in the perspective of a consciousness of such worldly beings.

A cause of error can be either superficial or deep. The appearance of objects as existing from their own side or existing inherently is a deep cause of error. What is a deep cause of error? It is the innate conception of true existence. Due to it, one has the appearance of phenomena as though existing from their own side. This is different from a superficial cause of error, which is due to temporary circumstances, for example, being in a moving vehicle. Another example of a superficial cause of error is to put pressure on the eyeball, whereby one moon appears as two. The appearance of a white conch as yellow due to jaundice is also due to a superficial cause of error. It is also said that a white snow mountain appears as blue due to a particular illness and that when someone becomes very angry, everything appears to be red. Thus, there are many superficial causes of error.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Production from Other

Student: According to the Prasangikas, what is meant by the 'mere action of the production of the sprout'? Is it equivalent to the 'mere action approaching the production of the sprout'?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: I think that there is a difference in that if it is a 'mere action of the production of the sprout' it is not necessarily a 'mere action approaching the production of the sprout'; for example, a sprout that is being produced. This is a 'mere action of the production of a sprout' but is not a 'mere

action approaching the production of a sprout.' Approaching the production of a sprout means that the sprout is ready to be produced but is not yet being produced. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 162) says " The action of producing the sprout, which is simultaneous with the seed, is the action approaching the production of the sprout." At this time, the sprout is not yet produced; it will be produced in the future. The mere production of the sprout is of two types in relation to the sprout: (1) approaching the production of the sprout, which exists at the time of the seed and (2) the production of the sprout, at which time the sprout is being produced. In relation to the sprout, approaching production of the sprout is past, whereas the production of the sprout is present.

Student: Is it that approaching production of the sprout is simultaneous with the cessation of the seed whereas production of the sprout is not simultaneous with the cessation of the seed?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The sprout and the action of the production of the sprout are support and supported. This is clear in the *Illumination* in which Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The action of producing the sprout, which is simultaneous with the seed, is the action approaching the production of the sprout. The two, that [action of the production of the sprout] and the sprout, are in general support and supported."

Student: How do the Svatantrikas explain that the agent of the action of production of the sprout is the sprout itself?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: I think that for the Svatantrikas the agent of the action of the production of the sprout is the seed, its cause. But, what is produced? The sprout is produced. By what is it produced? It is produced by its cause and the collection of conditions. Are the sprout and the action of the sprout simultaneous? Are the sprout and the action of the production of the sprout simultaneous? When the Prasangika Madhyamikas and Svatantrika Madhyamikas debate, the Prasangikas say to the Svatantrikas that the sprout and the action of production of the sprout are simultaneous because you Svatantrikas assert that they both exist inherently whereby they do not need to arise sequentially. In short, the Prasangikas say that the Svatantrikas should accept that the sprout and the action of production of the sprout exist simultaneously because they exist inherently.

Student: Is there a difference between 'inherently other' and 'other that is inherently existent'?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: For the Prasangika Madhyamikas neither exist. There is no difference in this sense. Also for the Svatantrikas they are the same. For the Prasangikas both are objects of negation that are to be refuted in the context of emptiness. In short, there is no difference between them.

Meditation Advice

Student: Will Geshe-la please give some general meditation advice with regard to:

- keeping mindfulness on emptiness throughout the day,
- identifying the object of negation of the inherently existent person, and
- our current topic, refuting production from other?

One should be mindful of emptiness during the four types of activities – sitting, walking, lying, and standing. This itself is a practice of emptiness. One can reflect "I do not exist inherently," "If I search for myself I do not find myself," and so forth.

There is no production from other, but if there were it would follow that there is inherently existent production. If we ask "Is there production from mere other?" there is because a seed and sprout are mere otherness. In relation to ourselves, we can think that the subject matter learned and the learner are mere otherness. In the context of refuting production from other, the distinction needs to be made that production from mere other is not what is being refuted.

The best meditation is meditation on emptiness. In addition, one can reflect that whatever one does is for the benefit of others. This makes the four kinds of activities beneficial. For example, we can

visualize that while we eat breakfast, we are nourishing the 84,000 microorganisms in our body and pray that all of them will be reborn as humans and have the opportunity to practice Dharma. In other words, we can practice giving material things to them now and pray that in the future we will be able to offer them the generosity of Dharma. This kind of thought can be cultivated whenever we eat. In addition, when showering we can also think, "I am washing myself in order to have a healthy body so that all the microorganisms in my body will also remain healthy." In a similar way, we can think of benefiting others when we are drinking, eating, dressing, and so forth.

Six Causes and Four Conditions

Student: What are the immediate condition and congruent cause of the first moment of eye consciousness apprehending blue? Could they be ear consciousnesses?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The congruent cause of the first moment of eye consciousness apprehending blue is its immediate condition. This is because a congruent cause is of similar type. The observed object condition and empowering condition are not congruent causes, although they are also necessary for the production of eye consciousness. The ear consciousness can be the immediate condition of the first moment of eye consciousness. For example, if someone says, "Look, there is blue behind you," an ear consciousness is produced, one then looks at the blue whereby an eye consciousness apprehending blue is produced. However, this is in relation to this specific situation in which the ear consciousness is the cause of an eye consciousness apprehending blue. In general, an ear consciousness is not an immediate condition for eye consciousness. Also, if someone says "Help, snake!" an ear consciousness hearing this is produced and then one looks at the snake, whereby an eye consciousness apprehending snake is produced. In this way, in particular situations an ear consciousness can be an immediate condition for an eye consciousness.

Student: In the case of an eye consciousness apprehending blue that does not arise from an ear consciousness, what is the immediate condition of an eye consciousness?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is the mental consciousness.

END

Monday afternoon, 29 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 172) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *Anything apprehended by the six sense powers*
> > *Free from impairment and realized by the world*
> > *Is a truth for the very world. The remaining*
> > *Are presented as unreal for the very world.* [6.25]
>
> Just as subjects are divided into the two, mistaken and unmistaken, so too are objects. They are presented [as follows]. *Any object apprehended by* the consciousnesses of *the six sense powers free from* the *impairment* of a superficial cause of error *and realized by the world* is *a truth*, i.e., is real, *for the very world*, that is, the world itself. These objects are not posited as truths and real relative to superiors. "Superiors" and "the Middle Way system" mean the same here.

Just as subjects are divided into two, mistaken and unmistaken, so too are objects divided into two, real and unreal, *in the perspective of worldly consciousnesses*. Thus, real and unreal objects are posited *only* in the perspective of worldly consciousnesses. In the perspective of a worldly consciousness, real objects are those apprehended by any of the six consciousnesses based on its respective unimpaired sense power. 'Unimpaired' means that it is free from a superficial cause of error. The six objects of the six consciousnesses are: forms of an eye consciousness, sounds of an ear consciousness, odors of a nose consciousness, tastes of a tongue consciousness, tangible objects of a body consciousness, and phenomena of the mental consciousness.

In this way, objects are not posited as real relative to superiors. For this reason, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "These objects are not posited as truths and real relative to superiors. 'Superiors' and 'the Middle Way system' mean the same here." In this context saying 'superiors' is equivalent to saying 'the Middle Way system.' The reason that forms, sounds, and so forth are not posited as truths and real relative to superiors is because they do not exist as they appear. In other words, forms and so forth are truths and real in the perspective of worldly beings but are not truths and real in the perspective of superiors. Here, 'superiors' means those trained in the Middle Way (Madhyamika) system.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 172) says:

> *The remaining*, reflections and so forth, appear as objects when there is impairment to the sense powers. They *are presented as unreal* relative to *the very world* (*'jig rten nyid*). The term 'very' (*nyid*) indicates that in order to posit these consciousnesses as mistaken it is enough to do so by means of a valid cognizer of conventions without basing it on a consciousness of [an ultimate] type.

This is Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary on the line from Chandrakirti's *Supplement* (v. 6.25cd): "The remaining are presented as unreal for the very world." 'The remaining' include both:

1. the reflections of a face in a mirror and so forth, which can be realized by ordinary beings to not exist as they appear and
2. the eye consciousness apprehending the reflection of a face to be a face and so forth, which can be realized by ordinary beings to be wrong consciousnesses.

These are posited as unreal conventionalities in the perspective of worldly consciousness.

A valid cognizer of conventions can realize a consciousness to be mistaken; for example, the consciousness to which a reflection of a face appears to be a face, the consciousness to which a mirage appears as water, and so forth. Likewise, a valid cognizer of conventions can realize that an echo is

not the original sound. All consciousnesses have their respective false objects; for example, a nose consciousness smelling food when there is no food present.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 172) says:

> Internal conditions that impair the sense powers are cataracts, jaundice, and so forth, as well as eating *datura* and so forth. 'Datura' is thorn apple; when its fruit is eaten everything appears as gold. [The words] 'and so forth' include infectious diseases and others. External conditions that impair the sense powers are mirrors, speaking in caves and so forth, and sun rays in springtime striking a place of light sand. Although these are not internal conditions that impair the sense powers, they are the causes of apprehending respectively reflections, echoes, mirage water, and so forth. Mantras, medicines, and so forth prepared by magicians and others are also to be understood similarly.

Internal and external conditions can cause impairment of the sense powers. Internal conditions that do so are cataracts, jaundice, eating datura, and so forth. Cataracts cause one to see a single moon as two moons and so forth. Jaundice causes one to see white objects, such as a conch, as yellow. Eating datura causes one to see things as gold-colored. Datura is a plant that has a yellow flower and a root like a potato. People cook and eat the roots thinking that it is good for strengthening the body. However, if it is not prepared well, it can actually poison the body. Infectious diseases and so forth also impair the sense powers.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "External conditions that impair the sense powers are mirrors, speaking in caves and so forth, and sun rays in springtime striking a place of light sand. Although these are not internal conditions that impair the sense powers, they are the causes of apprehending respectively reflections, echoes, mirage water, and so forth." Mantras, medicines, and so forth are also external conditions that impair the sense powers.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> [The things] that impair the mental sense power are those mantras, medicines, and so forth, as well as harm from wrong tenets, facsimiles of reasons, sleep, and so forth.

Mantras and medicines can cause one to have an unclear memory and can disturb the mind, whereby they impair the mental sense power. For example, an overdose of certain medicines can cause one to hallucinate. Harm to the mental sense power can also come from learning wrong tenets, such as upholding the Samkhyas' assertion of a general principal, an I composed of three activities, and so forth. The mental sense power is also harmed by facsimiles of reasons such as "Sound is permanent because it is a product." The mental sense power can also be harmed by sleep such as when one has nightmares.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 172-3) says:

> From among the six sense powers, sleep is said to impair the mental [sense power], therefore, saying that "Acharya [Chandrakirti] asserts that sense consciousnesses exist in dreams" is a completely wrong explanation.

Sleep impairs the mental sense power. For example, a dream in which many events happen can disturb the mind, whether the events are enjoyable or suffering. During sleep there are no sense consciousnesses, only mental consciousness. That there is 'no sense consciousnesses' means that they are not manifest.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 173) says:

> Therefore, the impairment which is pollution by the ignorance that is the two conceptions of a self, which has been operating since beginningless time and so forth, is not taken to be a cause of impairment here. Rather, the superficial causes of error which impair the sense powers as was explained before are taken [to be the cause of impairment].

The two conceptions of a self are not superficial causes of error, in that they are deep causes of error. Thus, there are two causes of error, one superficial and one deep. Due to the two conceptions of a self, there is the appearance of things as existing inherently or existing from their own side. Due to ignorance, forms appear to the eye consciousness as being established by way of their own character, sounds appear to the ear consciousness as being established by way of their own character, and so forth.

In the perspective of a worldly consciousness, the two conceptions of a self are not unreal conventionalities, but are real conventionalities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 173) says:

> Conventional objects which are apprehended by the six consciousnesses free from such impairment and the objects opposite to them – those posited [respectively] as real and unreal [conventionalities] – are [posited as such] only relative to the consciousnesses of worldly beings because [respectively] they are not harmed and they are harmed by the consciousnesses of worldly beings with respect to their existing as objects in accordance with how they appear. The two, real and unreal, are not [posited] relative to superiors because, like objects that do not exist in accordance with how they appear, such as reflections and so forth, likewise, blue and so forth appear to those who have ignorance to be established by way of their own character, but do not exist as objects in accordance with their appearance. Therefore, mistaken and unmistaken are also indistinguishable with respect to those two consciousnesses.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 68) says:

> There, cataracts, jaundice, and so forth, and ingesting white thorn apple[25] and so forth are internal conditions of impairment for the senses. Sesame oil, water, and mirrors, expressing sounds within caves and so forth, and sunlight and the particulars of place and time being in proximity and so forth, are external conditions of impairment for the senses, for, while not being internal conditions of impairment for the senses, they are causes of apprehending reflections, echoes, mirages, water-moons and so forth. Mantras, medicines, and so forth thoroughly prepared by magicians and so forth should also be known similarly.
>
> That which impairs the mental [consciousness] are those [mantras and medicines], tenets that are incorrectly made and so forth, and facsimiles of inference. The presentation of dreams and so forth will be explained.
>
> Therefore, an object apprehended by any of the six senses without such conditions of impairment for the senses that is realized by the world is a truth within the world; it is not [a truth] in relation to an arya.
>
> Anything, such as a reflection, that when there is impairment to the sense powers appears as the very entity of an object, is wrong in relation to the world.

[25] Sanskrit: Dhattura.

Like Chandrakirti's *Supplement*, Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* also sets out mantras, medicines, wrong tenets, and facsimiles of inference or facsimiles of reasons as those which impair the mental consciousness. While Chandrakirti mentions dreams, Lama Tsongkhapa mentions sleep. However, the meaning is the same.

The six objects, six unimpaired sense powers, and six unimpaired consciousnesses are real conventionalities in the perspective of a worldly consciousness, but are not real conventionalities in the perspective of superiors.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 173) says:

> QUESTION: Due to superficial impairment to a physical sense power an object appears wrongly, whereas due to impairment to the mental consciousness from sleep and so forth the appearances of human beings in a dream are apprehended as human beings and so forth, when awake the appearances of illusory horses and elephants are apprehended as horses and elephants, and the appearance of mirage water is apprehended as water. That these [appearances] are mistaken is realized even by the normal awarenesses of worldly beings. However, objects that are apprehended wrongly due to impairment to the mental [sense power] from bad tenets are not realized to be mistaken by the normal awarenesses of worldly beings. Therefore, how are they posited as unreal for the very world?

Worldly beings realize that the appearances to a sense consciousness caused by a superficial cause of error and appearances to a mental consciousness caused by the impairment of sleep and so forth are mistaken. However, they do not realize that objects that are apprehended wrongly due to the impairment caused by wrong tenets, such as the Samkhyas' tenet of a general principal, the Vaisheshikas' tenet of a generality that is a different entity, and so forth, are mistaken.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 173-4) says:

> REPLY: Here impairment [is taken to be] the harm from analyzing existence and non-existence; it is not taken to be the harm from innate mistaken conceptions. Therefore, imputations due to bad tenets are mainly those that are imputed wrongly through the awareness being affected by tenets. Although they are not realized to be mistaken by the normal awarenesses of worldly beings, when they are realized to be wrong by a valid cognizer of conventions not approaching suchness, they are realized to be wrong by a consciousness of a worldly being.

In short, impairment in this context is not harm from the innate conception of true existence; rather it is harm from a superficial cause of error, which includes wrong tenets. Appearances caused by this are realized to be mistaken, even by those who have not realized emptiness. For example, although a normal ordinary being, one who has not studied tenets, is not able to realize that the general principal does not exist, an ordinary being who has not realized emptiness but has studied tenets can realize that it does not exist.

Tuesday morning, 30 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 174) says:

> For example, objects apprehended by the two innate conceptions of a self are said to be apprehended by unimpaired sense powers. Although [the two selves] are indeed real, or true, relative to the normal thoughts of worldly beings, they do not exist even conventionally.

The objects apprehended by the two innate conceptions of a self are a self of persons and self of phenomena. A self of persons and a self of phenomena appear to those who have an innate conception of self.

Objects appear to unimpaired consciousnesses to be established by way of their own character; therefore, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas the object of negation, true existence, *does* appear to unimpaired consciousnesses. An unimpaired consciousness is one that is free from a superficial cause of error. Although the two selves appear to be real or true relative to worldly consciousness, in fact they do not exist at all.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 174) says:

> QUESTION: Due to your not asserting real conventionalities, they are not considered to be two [types], the real and unreal. But, why are objects and subjects polluted by ignorance not posited as unreal conventionalities?
> REPLY: Because conventionalities are necessarily posited by a valid cognizer of conventions (*tha snyad pa'i tshad ma*), when positing unreal conventionalities they would also necessarily be posited relative to [a valid cognizer of conventions]; however, [objects and subjects] polluted by the latencies of ignorance are not established by a valid cognizer of conventions to be mistaken.

The two conceptions of a self are not posited as unreal conventionalities because they are not established to be mistaken by a valid cognizer of conventions. This is because ordinary beings do not realize that the referent object of the two conceptions of a self does not exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 174) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B1D Indicating that the referent object of that mistaken with respect to the referent object does not exist even conventionally

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 69) says:

> Now, in order to indicate in detail the very meaning that was already expressed through the mode of expressing examples, it is explained:
>
> *The fundamental nature as it is imagined by the Forders,*
> *Strongly agitated by the sleep of unknowing, and*
> *Whatever is imputed as illusions, mirages, and so forth –*
> *They are just not existent, even within the world.* [6.26]
>
> The Forders, since they wish to enter into thusness, desire to progress to perfection [while] definitely apprehending as reality[26] the unmistaken production, disintegration, and so forth of things renowned even to untrained beings such as shepherds, women, and so forth. Hence, like a tree climber having let go of the former branches [but] not holding on to the latter branches, they fall into the ravine of bad views due to the great downfall and do not attain [their] result due to being separated from the two truths. Therefore, the three qualities and so forth that are imagined by them just do not exist in the conventions of the world.

Up to now, the division of conventionalities into real and unreal relative to worldly consciousness in general has been discussed. Now Chandrakirti explains [unreal conventionalities] in particular in relation to the Forders' awarenesses, which are disturbed by the sleep of unknowing. Chandrakirti says that the Forders do not understand even that which is known to the untrained or unlearned, for

[26] LTK, p. 183, has instead: 'not holding/apprehending the unmistaken production, disintegration and so forth...'

example, shepherds, women, and so forth. Women are mentioned here because in the past in India, they worked in the home and were not educated. The Forders have facsimiles of reasons, yet think that their views are supreme in the world. Chandrakirti likens a Forder to a tree-climber who climbs a tree by letting go of one branch before taking hold of the next, whereby he falls, in that because the Forders do not know the correct meaning of the two truths, "they fall into the ravine of bad views." Chandrakirti says: "[they] will not attain [their] result due to being separated from the two truths." 'Separated from the two truths' means that they do not understand the two truths properly.

Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, these three qualities and so forth that are imagined by them just do not exist in the conventions of the world." These three qualities or activities are the darkness, lightness, and movement asserted by the Samkhyas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 174) says:

> Due to the impairment of a mental [sense power], which was already explained, [the mental consciousness] is mistaken with respect to its referent object. In order to present this very meaning, which was indicated in general, there is the [following] explanation by means of setting forth analogies in regard to particular illustrations.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *The exact nature and*
> *The illusions, mirages, and so forth*
> *Imputed by the Forders, who are disturbed by the sleep of unknowing,*
> *Just do not exist even within the world.* [6.26]
>
> *The Forders*, whose minds *are disturbed by the sleep of unknowing*, have a mental [sense power] impaired by mistaken bad tenets and facsimiles of reasons. Desiring to engage thusness, they do not unmistakenly apprehend the production, destruction, and so forth which are renowned even to untrained beings – herdsmen, women, and so forth. Desiring to become supreme among worldly beings, like a tree climber who, without holding on to the next branch, lets go of the former, they (1) fall into the ravine of bad views due to the great downfall, and (2) do not attain the final result due to being separated from excellently perceiving the two truths.

Due to holding bad views, the Forders (Skt. *Tirthikas*) cannot attain liberation. There are five or eleven types of Forders, which are discussed extensively in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Exposition of Tenets*. The five types are:

1. the Samkhyas
2. the Vaisheshikas,
3. the Nirgranthas,
4. the Naiyayikas,
5. the Charvakas.

Each of these schools holds particular views. The Samkhyas say that in order to attain liberation one must know the twenty-five categories, which include all objects of knowledge. The Vaisheshikas say that all objects of knowledge are included in six categories. The Nirgranthas set forth nine categories, which include all objects of knowledge. According to some the three activities, darkness, lightness, and movement, are the three mental poisons, attachment, hatred, and ignorance. The Samkhyas set out these three qualities, whereas the Vaisheshikas set out twenty-four. Here the three qualities are emphasized because the Samkhya school is the highest of the various non-Buddhist schools. In fact, it is said that someone who leaves behind the Samkhya view becomes a Prasangika Madhyamika.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 175) says:

> Therefore, whatever is *imputed by* the Forders, such as the three qualities and so forth with respect to the *exact nature* which appear in their respective texts, does not exist even within the

> conventionalities of the world. Therefore, saying that [Chandrakirti's] system posits that which is conventionally existent as an existent in the perspective of a mistaken awareness is well refuted.

The three qualities do not exist but are merely imputed or imagined by the Forders. Therefore, the being, which is composed of consciousness, knower, and self, as well as the principal generality and so forth exist only in the perspective of the Forders themselves; they do not actually exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 175) says:

> Likewise, although *those illusions*, *mirages*, reflections, *and so forth are imputed* as [respectively] a horse and elephant, water, a face, and so forth, they *just do not exist even within* the conventionalities of *the world*.

"Do not exist even within the conventionalities of the world" means that even ordinary beings know that mirage water is not actual water, that a horse and elephant created by a magician are not an actual horse and elephant, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 175) says:

> Therefore, that which exists as a convention (*tha snyad du yod pa*) is necessarily established by a valid cognizer.

That which exists as a convention must be established by a valid cognizer because the definition of an existent is: that which can be observed by a valid cognition.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 175) says:

> Although such referent objects do not exist even conventionally, appearing objects are not asserted to be like that. Excluding mere degrees of subtlety, there is no difference in terms of being mistaken or unmistaken with regard to appearing objects whether they are:
> (1) appearances, the five present [objects], forms, sounds, and so forth, to sense consciousnesses as established by way of their own character due to being polluted by ignorance or
> (2) the appearance of reflections, echoes, and so forth to sense consciousnesses.
> Blue and so forth established by way of their own character and reflections existing as faces are not feasible. However, just as there exist reflections that are not faces, likewise, although not established by way of their own character, blue and so forth necessarily exist. Furthermore, just as [blue and so forth] exist among external objects, reflections are also asserted to be form spheres. Further on [in the text] it also says that a reflection produces a sense consciousness having its appearance. That these modes are also to be understood with respect to illusions appearing to the eye as horses and elephants, as well as with respect to echoes, and so forth is the uncommon presentation of this supreme system.

Although the referent objects of the two conceptions of a self do not exist even conventionally, their appearing objects do exist. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Excluding mere degrees of subtlety, there is no difference in terms of being mistaken or unmistaken with regard to appearing objects." This means that there are different levels of mistaken consciousnesses; for example, an eye consciousness to which forms and so forth appear to be established by way of their own character is a *subtle* mistaken consciousness. On the other hand, an eye consciousness to which the reflection of a face appears as a face is a *coarse* mistaken consciousness. Blue and so forth are not established by way of their own character, yet they appear to be established by way of their own character due to the sense consciousnesses being polluted by ignorance. For this reason, ordinary beings do not realize that they are not established by way of their own character. On the other hand, even ordinary beings realize

that the reflection of a face appearing to be a real face is not true. The reflection of a face is said to be a form sphere because it produces eye consciousness.

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "That these modes are also to be understood with respect to illusions appearing to the eye as horses and elephants, as well as with respect to echoes, and so forth is the uncommon presentation of this supreme system." Because the appearance of a magical horse and elephant produces an eye consciousness, those appearances are form spheres. Do illusory horse and elephant exist? They do. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas, because the illusory horse and elephant appear to the eye consciousness they are forms; therefore they are included in the form sphere. There are two types of form: form that is a form sphere and form that is a phenomenon sphere:

1. Form that is a form sphere is: an appearing form that appears to an eye consciousness.
2. Form that is a phenomenon source is: an appearing form that appears to a mental consciousness.

The remaining types of form are: form that is a vow, form that is a non-vow, and form that is occasionally manifest.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 175) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B2 Applying that to the meaning of this context

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 69-70) says:

> Therefore, here:
>
> *As the observation of an eye with cataracts*
> *Does not harm the knowledge [of] one without cataracts,*
> *Similarly, there is no damage to a stainless wisdom*
> *By an awareness that has abandoned stainless wisdom.* [6.27]
>
> The refutation of production from others that was explained was not [made] through abiding in only the view of the world.
>
> If asked: What then?
>
> It is through accepting the perceptions of the aryas. When this refutation of production is distinguished, then, just as observing the entities of hairs and so forth of those with cataracts does not damage the knowledge of those without cataracts, similarly, since there is no damage to uncontaminated perceptions by the knowledge of ordinary beings separated from uncontaminated exalted wisdom, there is also no damage by the world to objects of such type. Therefore, such outsiders are just worthy as objects of laughter by the excellent ones.

Those with cataracts see falling hairs, but this does not harm the knowledge of those without cataracts. Likewise, the consciousnesses of ordinary beings, which are separated from uncontaminated exalted wisdom and polluted by ignorance, do not harm a superior's uncontaminated exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 175) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *The observing by one whose eyes have cataracts*
> *Does not harm a knower without cataracts;*
> *Likewise, an awareness that has abandoned the stainless exalted wisdom*
> *Does not harm a stainless awareness.* [6.27]

> The object thusness is not posited by a knower of conventions (*tha snyad pa'i shes pa*). Therefore, the refutation of production from other is not made only through abiding in the view of worldly beings; it is refuted with respect to the ultimate through asserting a superior's perception of thusness. When the refutation of production from other is applied to the instance of the ultimate [it is as follows].
>
> Just as a knower of *one whose eyes have cataracts observing* falling hairs and so forth *does not harm* the non-appearance of falling hairs and so forth to *a knower without* the pollution of *cataracts*; *likewise*, *the awareness*, polluted by ignorance, of an ordinary being who *has abandoned*, i.e., is free from, *the stainless*, that is, uncontaminated, *exalted wisdom does not harm a stainless*, that is, uncontaminated, *awareness* not polluted by ignorance.

Here, it would seem that in refuting production from other there is the need to qualify it by saying 'production from other ultimately.' However, in general according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas there is no need for this qualification. From the point of view of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, however, there is the need to qualify production from other by the word 'ultimately,' because they assert that there is production from other. This is because they assert that a cause established by way of its own character produces a result established by way of its own character. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not make a distinction between existing ultimately, establishment by way of its own character, existing truly and so forth, whereas the Svatantrika Madhyamikas do.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 176) says:

> The refutation of production from other with respect to the ultimate is not harmed even though it is permissible to establish production from other in the perspective of worldly beings. Therefore, the opponents are objects of the laughter of holy beings and scholars.

One can ask: "Is the refutation of production from other actually harmed by worldly beings?" The answer to this question varies according to the school. For example, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that the refutation of production from other is harmed by worldly beings, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it is not.

Those with cataracts have the appearance of falling hairs due to a faulty eye sense power, this being the condition for the appearance of falling hairs. An awareness based on a faulty sense power does not harm an awareness of one who does not have a faulty sense power, for example, someone without cataracts. For example, one who becomes intensely angry has the appearance of things as red; however, his eye consciousness does not affect one who is not angry who does not have the appearance of red. Likewise, the awareness of an ordinary being polluted by ignorance does not harm, or affect, the awareness of a superior that is not polluted by ignorance.

In conclusion, if it is real in the perspective of worldly consciousness it is not necessarily real; for example, the two selves – the self of persons and the self of phenomena. On the other hand, the reflection of a face is unreal in the perspective of a worldly consciousness, because even ordinary beings realize that it does not exist as it appears.

Tuesday afternoon, 30 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 176) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B3 Explanation of the individual entities of the two truths

- A Explanation of the conventional truth
- B Explanation of the ultimate truth

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B3A Explanation of the conventional truth

1 Truths and non-truths in the perspective of a concealer
2 The way in which mere conventionalities appear and do not appear to the three persons
3 The way in which [things] are ultimate and conventional relative to ordinary beings and superiors

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B3A-1 Truths and non-truths in the perspective of a concealer

A Actual meaning
B Explanation of the uncommon presentation of the afflictions

IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONVENTIONAL TRUTH

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B3A-1A Actual meaning

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, due to this, the truths are two and through the divisions of deceptive and ultimate, the entities of all things are expressed as two. There, because the deceptive truth of the world is to be indicated, it is explained:
>
> *Because confusion obscures self-nature, it is all-concealing (deceptive),*
> *Whatever fabrication appears as true due to that,*
> *The Muni taught as "truth for an all-concealer" (deceptive truth).*
> *Fabricated things are all-concealing (deceptive).* [6.28]
>
> There, since it acts as darkness with regard to sentient beings viewing how things abide, it is confusion. Ignorance acting to superimpose a self-entity of things that does not exist, having the character of obscuring the perception of the nature [of reality], is the all-concealer (i.e., the deceiver).[27]
>
> For something to appear as true due to that concealing (deception) while without self-nature, to appear individually as a self-nature – that is truth for a concealer (deceptive truth) of the mistaken world. That is the fabricated dependent arising.
>
> Some dependent arisings such as reflections, echoes, and so forth, also appear false to those possessing ignorance; some visible forms such as blue and so forth, mind and feeling and so forth, appear as true. The self-nature [of the mode of existence of phenomena] does not appear in all ways to those possessing ignorance. Therefore, that [self-nature] and also whatever is deceptively false, are not the deceptive truth.

Chandrakirti now explains the entities of the two truths individually, beginning with the conventional truth. Chandrakirti says: "Because confusion obscures self-nature, it is all-concealing." Confusion is a concealer because it obstructs one from seeing the [final] nature.

Chandrakirti then says: "Whatever fabrication appears as true due to that, the Muni taught as "truth for an all-concealer." For example, a cup is a truth for a concealer because it is a truth in the perspective of the conception of true existence. Chandrakirti says: "Fabricated things are all-concealing." Fabricated things are mere conventionalities; they are not pervaded by being conventional truths. This is because in the perspective of three types of persons – hearer foe destroyers, solitary realizer foe destroyers, and bodhisattvas abiding on the three pure grounds – a cup, for example, is a conventionality but not a truth. It is not a truth for them because they do not have the ignorance that is the conception of true existence that obscures seeing the reality of phenomena, [whereby, it cannot be a truth for their concealers, the conception of true existence].

[27] According to the reading of LTK, p. 185.

Phenomena can be divided into:
1. phenomena such as reflections, echoes, and so forth, which are realized by ordinary beings to not be real and true and
2. phenomena, such as blue and so forth, which are not realized by ordinary beings to not exist as they appear.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 176) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *Because confusion obstructs the nature it is a concealer.*
> > *By that, fabrications appear as truths.*
> > *The Subduer taught them as "truths for a concealer."*
> > *Things which are fabrications are conventionalities.* [6.28]
>
> Therefore, *because confusion*, i.e., ignorance, acts to *obstruct*, that is, obscure, sentient beings from viewing *the nature* of how things abide, although the entity of things is not inherent existence, it superimposes inherent existence on them.

A concealer is an obstructor because it obstructs one from seeing the nature or reality of phenomena. This means that it obstructs one from seeing that phenomena are empty of inherent existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 176-7) says:

> That having the nature of obstructing the perception of the nature of the mode of being (*yin lugs*) is a *concealer*. The truth called "a truth for a concealer" (*or* "a conventional truth") is identified to be a conventionality posited in the perspective of a concealer; it is not identified to be a conventionality in general.

This is the explanation of the first line of Chandrakirti's root verse (v. 6.28a): "Because confusion obstructs the nature it is a concealer."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 177) says:

> This identification, moreover, is mentioned in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* saying:
>
> > The production of things is a conventionality.
> > Ultimately it is without nature.
> > Whatever is mistaken regarding non-inherent existence
> > Is asserted to be a concealer of the perfect.
>
> The meaning of this is [as follows]. An awareness which mistakes what is ultimately without inherent existence to have inherent existence is a concealer. That concealer – obstructor being an equivalent term for concealer – is an obstructor by engagement. What does it obstruct? Saying "[it] is asserted to be a concealer of the perfect (*yang dag kun rdzob*)" is to say "Since obstructing the perfect object, it is asserted to be a concealer or an obstructor." It does not indicate a real conventionality (*yang dag kun rdzob*) from among the two, real and unreal.

Lama Tsongkhapa identifies a concealer, saying: "An awareness which mistakes what is ultimately without inherent existence to have inherent existence is a concealer." Concealer is equivalent to obstructor; the conception of true existence is an obstructor because it obstructs from seeing the reality of phenomena. In other words, a concealer is so-called because it obstructs from seeing the perfect object, emptiness. This stanza does not present real conventionality (in Tibetan this is *yang dag kun*

rdzob), but presents the concealer of the perfect (this also being *yang dag kun rdzob*). The "perfect" (*yang dag*) is the mode of abidance of phenomena, whereas the "concealer" (*kun rdzob*) is that which obstructs from seeing it. Thus, in this context *yang dag* is not the real (*yang dag*) that occurs in the context of that which is a real conventionality (*yang dag kun rdzob*) in the perspective of a worldly consciousness. Any consciousness that obstructs from seeing the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena is a concealer of the perfect (*yang dag kun rdzob*).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> The two, the conventional (*kun rdzob*) presented by the first line and the concealer (also *kun rdzob*) presented by the last two lines, are not the same because in the first case *kun rdzob* is a conventionality which is asserted to be the production of things and so forth anywhere, whereas in the latter case *kun rdzob* is a concealer which is the conception of true existence, in the perspective of which things are true.

When the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* says "The production of things is a conventionality (*kun rdzob*)" it presents conventionalities, whereas when it says "Whatever is mistaken regarding non-inherent existence is asserted to be a concealer (*kun rdzob*) of the perfect" it presents the concealer that obstructs from seeing the perfect, emptiness. The point here is that the Tibetan for both conventionality and concealer is *kun rdzob,* but the meaning is very different.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 177) says:

> *By* the force of *that* concealer, the conception of true existence, *the fabrications* fabricated as appearing to it, blue and so forth, although not inherently existent, *appear as truths* to sentient beings. Due to being truths in the perspective of the mistaken concealer of the world which was explained previously, *the Subduer taught them as* "*truths for a concealer* of the world." This way of teaching is taught in that sutra [cited] above. *Things which are fabrications* due to being fabricated by a conception of non-true existence in the perspective of any of the three persons are said to be mere *conventionalities* due to their not being true in the perspective of their concealers.

Here, Lama Tsongkhapa does not specify who the "three persons" are. However, they are later presented to be hearer foe destroyers, solitary realizer foe destroyers, and bodhisattvas of the three pure grounds. In the perspective of these three persons, a pot is a mere conventionality but not a truth, because they have abandoned the conception of true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 177) says:

> [Chandrakirti's autocommentary] says:
>
> > A few dependent-arisings, such as reflections, echoes, and so forth, although false, appear to those who have ignorance. A few such as forms, blue and so forth, and minds, feelings, and so forth appear to be true, that is, the nature of the mode of being of all phenomena does not appear in all ways to those who have ignorance. Therefore, that nature, as well as whatever is a falsity even for a concealer, are not truths for a concealer (conventional truths).

Lama Tsongkhapa quotes Chandrakirti's autocommentary, which says that although reflections, echoes, and so forth appear to those who have ignorance, they are realized to not be true (i.e., they are realized to not exist as they appear). On the other hand, forms and so forth appear to be true to those who have ignorance but are not realized to not exist as they appear.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In that case, briefly, the all-concealing (or, deceptive) truth is presented by the power of deluded ignorance fully included in the [twelve] links of [cyclic] existence.
>
> Furthermore, for hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas who have abandoned deluded ignorance and who see the compounded as like the existence of reflections and so forth, [those phenomena] are of a fabricated nature and not true because [the three individuals are] without strong adherence [to phenomena] as true.

Conventional truths are true only in the perspective of the ignorance included in the first link of the twelve links of dependent-arising. This ignorance is the cause for wandering in cyclic existence. For the hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas who have abandoned afflicted ignorance, phenomena are not conventional truths but are mere conventionalities. They see only mere conventionalities because they are without the strong fancying of, or adherence to, true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 178) says:

> When the meaning of this passage is explained, it is [as follows]. "A few" in the translation of Nagtso is translated as "some;" this is convenient. "Reflections, [echoes,] and so forth, although false, appear" means that they appear as false. [A reflection] is a falsity that is a collection of the two: appearing to be a face and empty of [being a face]. Therefore, its emptiness of truth is its emptiness of truth as a face. It does not mean that a reflection is empty of the truth that is establishment by way of its own character. Therefore, although a reflection is established as empty of being a face, a reflection is a truth for a concealer (conventional truth) in the sense of it being a thing that is not at all contradictory to it being a truth in the perspective of a concealer that conceives it to be established by way of its own character.

The translation of Chandrakirti's autocommentary says 'a few' whereas Nagtso translates the same Sanskrit word as 'some.' Lama Tsongkhapa says that this is a convenient way of translating it.

A reflection of a face appears to be a face but is realized to not be a real face. However, it is not realized by ordinary beings to be empty of being established by way of its own character. The realization of that would be the realization of emptiness. Reflections, echoes, and so forth are truths for a concealer, or conventional truths, because they are truths in the perspective of the conception of true existence, which is the subject (the consciousness) in the perspective of which they appear.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 178) says:

> Therefore, the intention in saying that a reflection is not a truth for a concealer, for example, the reflection of a face in the perspective of concealer of the worldly trained in terminology, is that since its being a face is a falsity, relative to that it is not a truth for a concealer. It is not at all posited to be the conventional truth that is explained (v. 6.23d) saying: "That of false perception is said to be conventional truth."

The reason that reflections and so forth are not truths for a concealer is that they are not real conventionalities in the perspective of a worldly consciousness because they do not exist as a face as they appear.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 178) says:

> Not being such, if not existing as a truth for a concealer were contradictory to its being a conventional truth, saying that establishment by way of its own character does not exist even nominally would contradict all the refutations of true existence, proofs of non-true existence, and the presentations of nominal activities. Therefore, saying that objects that are known to be mistaken even by the normal consciousnesses of worldly beings, such as reflections and so forth, are not conventional truths but are mere conventionalities seems to be the talk of those who have not understood (1) the two truths which are definite in number, (2) truths and falsities with respect to worldly beings, and (3) the truths and falsities posited by the Middle Wayers.

In the context of "truths and falsities posited by the Middle Wayers," 'truths' are those phenomena whose mode of appearing accords with their mode of abidance, whereas 'falsities' are those phenomena whose mode of appearing does not accord with their mode of abidance. In the context of "truths and falsities with respect to worldly beings," 'worldly beings' are those who have not realized emptiness in whose perspective there do exist truths and falsities. "The two truths which are definite in number" means that all phenomena of cyclic existence and nirvana are definitely included in the two truths, there not being a third truth.

It is incorrect to assert that reflections, echoes, and so forth are not conventional truths. They are conventional truths because otherwise they would be ultimate truths, since there is no third possibility. Therefore, saying that they are not conventional truths is the talk of those who have not understood the above three points.

The two truths are presented in all four Buddhist schools, but the presentation differs. Because of this, the concealer is presented in different ways. For example, for the Madhyamikas the concealer is the conception of true existence. On the other hand, for the Chittamatrins the concealer is not the conception of true existence because they assert true existence. For them, the concealer is the conception apprehending forms to be an established by way of their own character as a basis for affixing the term 'form' or the conception apprehending form and the valid cognizer apprehending form to be different substances.

The two truths are important for Buddhists because they are the basis on which one generates the two paths of method and wisdom, the cultivation of which enables one to actualize the result, the two bodies, the form body and truth body.

Wednesday morning, 31 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 179) says:

> Although [the autocommentary] says that "The nature does not appear to all those who have ignorance," since superiors who have not abandoned ignorance are asserted to directly realize suchness, the intention [of this statement] is consciousnesses polluted by ignorance. Since the exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment of learner superiors and the view of suchness of ordinary beings are polluted by ignorance and its latencies, in general ultimate truth is necessarily asserted to appear [to them] although it does not appear directly.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says: "The nature does not appear to all those who have ignorance." The nature is the final mode of abidance; it does not appear to learner superiors in subsequent attainment and to ordinary beings who have not *directly* realized emptiness because they are polluted by ignorance and its latencies. However, in general the nature, the final mode of abidance, ultimate truth, is asserted to appear to them although it does not appear directly. This is because ordinary beings do realize emptiness, even though it is by way of a meaning generality and not directly. Therefore, the final mode of abidance of phenomena appears to them by way of a meaning generality but not directly. Similarly, the exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment of superiors sees the nature

as an illusion; the nature does not appear directly to the exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, all consciousness except an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness are polluted by ignorance and its latencies.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 179) says:

> [The autocommentary] says, "In that case, briefly, the presentation of truth for a concealer is from the point of view of the afflicted ignorance included in the links of existence." Therefore, the ignorance which conceives phenomena to be truly existent – renowned as the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena – is asserted to be the ignorance of the twelve links, due to which it is not asserted to be a knowledge obstruction.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that the ignorance that is the first of the twelve links of dependent-arising is both the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena; this is the view of the Prasangika Madhyamikas. For the lower schools, only the conception of a self of persons is posited as the ignorance that is the first of the twelve links. This is because they assert that the conception of a self of persons is an afflictive obstruction, whereas the conception of a self of phenomena is a knowledge obstruction. The lower schools say that it is possible to become free from cyclic existence by abandoning the conception of a self of persons alone, without abandoning the conception of a self of phenomena. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas both the conception of a self of persons and the conception of self of phenomena are afflictive obstructions and the ignorance that is the first link.

Ignorance, not knowing (*ma rig pa*), is not just the opposite of knowledge (*rig pa*); it is a mental factor that is the opposite, the discordant class, of the knowledge that is exalted wisdom.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 179) says:

> The statement "truths for a concealer are posited *from the point of view of* that ignorance, the conception of true existence" indicates a manner of positing which posits truths in the perspective of a concealer. On the other hand, the statement "pots, blankets, and so forth, which are conventional truths, are posited *by* that conception of true existence" is not because we assert that 'posited by the conception of true existence' is not feasible even nominally.

Truths for a concealer, or conventional truths, are only truths *in the perspective of* a concealer, the conception of true existence. It is not the case that conventional truths, such as pots, blankets, and so forth, are posited *by* that conception of true existence, because there is nothing that is posited by the conception of true existence, even nominally or conventionally.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 179) says:

> Therefore, since concealers (*kun rdzob*), in the perspective of which truths that are a facet of "truths for a concealer" are posited, and conventionalities (*kun rdzob*), which are posited as existing conventionally, pots and so forth, are similar in name [in Tibetan], the meaning also appears to many mistaken [persons] to be the same; however, they should be well distinguished.

The word *kun rdzob* occurs in the context of a truth posited in the perspective of a concealer (*kun rdzob*) and in the context of conventionalities (*kun rdzob*), such as pots, blankets, and so forth, which exist conventionally. Although they are the same term in Tibetan, the meaning differs in relation to the context. The *kun rdzob* of the first case is an obstructor, whereas the *kun rdzob* of the second case is not an obstructor but refers to existing nominally (*tha snyad pa'i yod pa*).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 179) says:

> QUESTION: Are pots and so forth truths in the perspective of the concealers of all persons who are not buddhas or do they also exist as non-truths in the perspective of the concealers of some persons?
> REPLY: Those forms, sounds, and so forth that are posited as truths for a concealer, moreover, are [as it says in the autocommentary:]
>
> > For those hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas who have abandoned afflicted ignorance and perceive compounded phenomena to be like reflections, and so forth, they are the nature of fabrications and are not truths because [such persons] are free from strongly fancying them as truly existent.

The reply to the question is that falsities, forms and so forth, are not truths in the perspective of the three types of persons who have abandoned afflicted ignorance. However, excluding them, that is, in the perspective of all other persons, they are truths. This is because other persons have the conception of true existence. For the three persons, hearer foe destroyers, solitary realizer foe destroyers, and bodhisattvas on the three pure grounds, forms and so forth are mere conventionalities because these persons have abandoned the ignorance that is the conception of true existence.

Is there the appearance of true existence to these three persons?

Student: Since they still have knowledge obstructions they still have the appearance of true existence.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why?

Student: Because a knowledge obstruction is the appearance of true existence itself.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: You are saying that the three persons have the appearance of true existence because they still have knowledge obstructions. For them forms, sounds, and so forth are not true. Why are they not true for them? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 180) says:

> When the meaning of this statement is explained it is [as follows]. The three persons for whom [forms, sounds, and so forth] are not true in their perspective are the hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas. Moreover, since they are not taken to be just any hearer, solitary realizer, or bodhisattva, they are in fact special because the direct realization that all compounded phenomena are empty of inherent existence, yet appear as [inherently existent], like reflections, is special. Since even seventh ground bodhisattvas and below, as well as hearer and solitary realizer learner superiors, have that [realization], in order to eliminate them, [the autocommentary] says "who have abandoned ignorance" in regard to these three persons. Therefore, they are to be taken as the bodhisattvas on the pure grounds and the two, hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers. Thus, [forms, sounds, and so forth] are not truths in the perspective of these three [persons].

Forms and so forth are not truths in the perspective of these three persons because these persons have abandoned the ignorance that is the conception of true existence and see all phenomena as like reflections. In short, they have abandoned adherence to the true existence of phenomena, whereby in their perspective phenomena are not true.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 180) says:

> "Whatever is not a truth, moreover" is all external and internal phenomena. There is a reason that they are not truths [for the three persons]; it is because they do not fancy, that is, do not adhere to, them as truly existent because they have extinguished the ignorance that is the conception of true existence.

The reason that external and internal phenomena, forms and so forth, are not truths for these three persons is because they have abandoned the conception of true existence. Forms and so forth are mere conventionalities in their perspective.

Lama Tsongkhapa paraphrases Chandrakirti's statement, "Therefore, that [nature] and whatever is false even conventionally are not conventional truths," saying "Whatever is not a truth, moreover." External and internal phenomena are not truths for the three persons because they have abandoned the conception of true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 180) says:

> Therefore, all external and internal phenomena are proven to not be truly existent in the perspective of *the concealers of* these three persons. Commenting in this way does not at all prove that [external and internal phenomena] are not conventional truths in their perspective, rather they are proven to "not be truths." In regard to that, conceiving them to be proven to not be conventional truths is a bad system of explanation [caused by] polluting the master's thought with one's own mental stains through the extremely rough operation of one's mind.

External and internal phenomena are not truths for the three persons, but are mere conventionalities for them.

Although the Tibetan text actually says "Therefore, all external and internal phenomena are proven to not be truly established in the perspective *of the concealers* of these three persons," it should probably just say 'in the perspective of these three persons,' that is, the words 'of the concealers' should be omitted.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "conceiving them to be proven to not be conventional truths is a bad system of explanation." This is because forms, sounds, and so forth are simply proven to not be *truths* in the perspective of the three persons; they are not proven to not be *conventional truths* in their perspective.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 180) says:

> Although such is to be proven, it is not [to be proven] for these three persons. That which is not a truth in the perspective of these three is to be proven for other persons, such as ourselves. Lower beings who are not these three persons have the innate conception of true existence, whereby nothing can be proven to be non-truly existent in the perspective of any of their concealers.

Forms and so forth are not established to be truths in the perspective of these three, but are established to be truths in the perspective of others, such as ourselves. For us, phenomena, forms and so forth, need to be proven to not be a truth, that is, not truly existent, because we have the conception of true existence and adhere to these phenomena as true.

Lama Tsongkhapa's statement would seem to mean that in the perspective of some concealers, forms and so forth can be proven to be non-truly existent, whereas in the perspective of others they cannot. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "nothing can be established as non-truly existent in the perspective of any of their concealers." If it is a concealer that is a conception of true existence, although phenomena cannot be established as non-truly existent in its perspective, can they be established as such in the perspective of another concealer? What could that concealer be? Does it mean that in the perspective of the concealer that exists in us, forms and so forth cannot be established as non-truly existent, but in the perspective of the concealers of the three persons they can be established as non-truly existent? Those who are not the three persons are the bodhisattvas on the seventh ground and below and so forth. The word 'nothing' is a subject of much debate. 'Their concealers' perhaps includes those who have the conception of true existence to which phenomena cannot be established as non-truly existent

and those such as bodhisattvas on the seventh ground and below, to which they can be established to not be truly existent. Perhaps the meaning of this is clearer in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's commentary.

The main point here is that external and internal phenomena are mere conventionalities in the perspective of the three persons but are not truths. They are not truths in their perspective:

1. because they have realized compounded phenomena, external and internal phenomena, to be like reflections and
2. because they have abandoned the conception of true existence, whereby there is no adherence to phenomena as true.

For those other than the three persons, external and internal phenomena are conventional truths and true. This is because they have the conception of true existence. External and internal phenomena are truths for a concealer, which is the conception of true existence. In brief, all conventionalities are not truths but are falsities. This is why the Madhyamikas say that ultimate truth is posited as truth, whereas conventional truths are posited as false.

If it is an established base it is pervaded by having two entities: the entity of conventional truth and the entity of ultimate truth. These two truths are the same entity but different isolates.

Wednesday afternoon, 31 May 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 181) says:

> If [phenomena] were proven to not be conventional truths in their perspective, which is not as explained above, it would become a proof that is thoroughly unrelated. Upon establishing such-and-such a basis in the perspective of such-and-such an awareness to be a conventional truth, that basis is necessarily established to be a falsity, therefore, setting forth as the reason [for this] that it is not adhered to as truly existent is a source of laughter.

Forms, sounds, and so forth are proven to not be truths in the perspective of the three persons, but are not proven to not be conventional truths in their perspective. If forms and so forth were proven to not be conventional truths in their perspective, that proof would be thoroughly unrelated. When a particular basis is established to be a conventional truth in the perspective of a particular awareness, that basis is also established to be a falsity in the perspective of that very awareness. When this point is proved, if the reason given is that it is "because they do not have a conception of true existence," this would be a source of laughter. This is because by means of the reason that there is no adherence to the true existence of the basis, a base is not necessarily established to be false, for example, ultimate truth. Thus, although hearer foe destroyers, solitary realizer foe destroyers, and bodhisattvas of the pure grounds do not have the conception of true existence of ultimate truth, there is no pervasion that they establish ultimate truth to be a falsity.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 181) says:

> Although such-and-such a basis is established to be a conventional truth in the perspective of such-and-such an awareness, there is a reason that that basis is necessarily established to be a falsity. When positing truth in the term "conventional truth" in regard to pots and so forth, among the two, awarenesses and objects, they are not posited as truths in terms of objects, but are necessarily posited as truths in the perspective of a concealer, the conception of true existence. When that is seen, if that difference is not applied, since the main point is that it is necessary to see that they are not established as truths and are falsities, it is so.

When pots and so forth are posited as conventional truths, they are posited as such relative to a concealer that is the conception of true existence. Thus, pots and so forth are only posited as truths relative to that conception of true existence.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 285) says:

> Regarding the third, etymologies of ultimate truth (*don dam bden pa*) and conventional truth (*kun rdzob bden pa),* the first is as follows. The reality (*chos nyid*) of a pot as the subject, there is a reason for calling it "ultimate truth" (literally, supreme object truth); it is because it is referred to as such since it is an object (*don*), supreme (*dam pa*), and a truth (*bden pa*). It is an *object* because it is the object found by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. It is *supreme* because it is the supreme mode of abiding (*gnas lugs*). It is a *truth* because it is non-deceptive in that its mode of abidance and its mode of appearance are concordant. [Chandrakirti's] *Clear Words* says:
>
> > Since it is an object and supreme, it is the supreme object. Since just that is a truth, it is the supreme object truth, [that is, the ultimate truth].
>
> Regarding the second, [the etymology of concealer-truth (conventional truth) (*kun rdzob bden pa*)], there are two, the etymology from the perspective of the object and from the perspective of the subject. The first is as follows: pot as the subject, there is a reason for calling it a "concealer-truth;" it is because it is referred to as such since it is a *truth* in the perspective of the confusion which is the conception of true existence, a *concealing* awareness. The second is as follows: the conception of true existence as the subject, there is a reason for calling it a "concealer-truth;" it is because it is referred to as such for the reason that it is an obstructer to directly seeing the meaning of mode of abiding. [Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* says:]
>
> > Since confusion obstructs the nature, it is a concealer.
>
> With respect to the second [etymology]: "all" (*kun*) is variety, "conceal" (*rdzob*) means falsity, and "truth" (*bden pa*) is a truth in the perspective of the conception of true existence. The meaning of [this section of the] text is as follows: inner and outer things as the subject, there exist two entities in terms of them, because there exist in terms of those two: (1) an object found by a consciousness of [an ultimate] type analyzing the final [nature of phenomena] and (2) an object found by a valid cognizer of conventions.

A conventional truth is a truth only in the perspective of a concealer; otherwise it is a falsity. When one ascertains that a particular basis, such as a pot, is a conventional truth, a truth for a concealer, does one necessarily establish it to be a falsity?
Student: Yes.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If Chandrakirti were to ask Bhavaviveka "Would you say that the table is a conventional truth or an ultimate truth?" what would he say? Does Bhavaviveka realize the table to be a falsity because he establishes the table to be a conventional truth? Think about it.

In conclusion, when a particular basis is realized to be a conventional truth, it is realized to be a falsity and when it is realized to be a falsity, it is refuted as being a truth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 181) says:

THIS SYSTEM'S PRESENTATION OF THE AFFLICTIONS

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B3A-1B Explanation of the uncommon presentation of the afflictions

> In this system there is an uncommon identification of the afflictions that does not accord with the explanations in the upper and lower *Knowledges* (*Abhidharmas*). Since it seems to be important to understand it, when explained [it is as follows].
> The conception of true existence of things is of two [types]:
> 1. the conception of true existence in regard to persons and
> 2. the conception of true existence in regard to phenomena.
>
> That those very [two] are also asserted to be the two conceptions of a self has already been explained before. In both the commentary on the *Supplement* and the commentary on the *Four Hundred Stanzas*, the conception of true existence is explained to be afflicted ignorance. That ignorance is abandoned by hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers. In the commentary on the *Four Hundred Stanzas*, it is explained that it is [also] abandoned by bodhisattvas who have attained forbearance with respect to the unproduced phenomenon.

The upper *Knowledge* is Asanga's *Compendium of Knowledge,* whereas the lower is Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena are afflictive obstructions. Thus, the conception of true existence is a conception of either persons or phenomena as existing truly or inherently.

The two conceptions of a self are differentiated by the Prasangika Madhyamika system in terms of their observed objects, not in terms of their modes of apprehension. On the other hand, in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system they are differentiated in terms of their modes of apprehension, not in terms of their observed objects. In the Prasangika Madhyamika system:

- the conception of a self of persons is the conception of the person as existing inherently and
- the conception of a self of phenomena is the conception of phenomena other than the person as existing inherently.

In this way, they are said to be differentiated in terms of their observed objects and not in terms of their modes of apprehension. On the other hand, in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system they are differentiated in terms of their modes of apprehension. This is because for them:

- the conception of a self of phenomena is the conception that conceives either the person or a phenomenon other than the person to exist truly, whereas
- the conception of a self of persons is either (1) the conception that conceives the person to be self-sufficient substantially existent or (2) the conception that conceives a phenomenon other than the person to be an object of use of a self-sufficient substantially existent person.

In this way, the two conceptions are differentiated in terms of their modes of apprehension. These two conceptions are posited similarly in the Chittamatra system in that they do not posit the two conceptions in terms of their observed objects, but in terms of their modes of apprehension. On the other hand, the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas only posit a conception of a self of persons, that is, they do not posit a conception of a self of phenomena. They say that because phenomena are established as a self, there is no selflessness of phenomena.

There is debate about these assertions. For example, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas both the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena are ignorance. Therefore, when they posit a conception of a self of persons they posit it as ignorance. Such a conception of a self could be both a mind and a mental factor. Do you agree? For example, there is a main mental consciousness that conceives inherently existent phenomena along with the mental factors in its retinue. But when this is posited as ignorance, it is neither a mind nor a mental factor. Ignorance, the conception of true existence, cannot be either a mind or a mental factor because it has both parts. Someone can therefore say: "Ignorance as the subject, it follows that it is not a mental factor." If the defendant accepts that it is not, the other says: "Is it not one of the six root afflictions that are included in the fifty-one mental factors?" If the defendant answers that it is not, then one insists that it is because it is one of the six and tells that person to list them so as to see that it is there!

In short, with respect to ignorance is there both a mind and a mental factor? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "In both the commentary on the *Supplement* and the commentary on the *Four Hundred Stanzas,* the conception of true existence is explained to be afflicted ignorance. That ignorance is abandoned by hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers." The reason for this is that they have destroyed the foe that is the ignorance which is an afflictive obstruction; in fact, this is why they are called 'foe destroyers.'

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "In the commentary on the *Four Hundred Stanzas* it is explained that it is [also] abandoned by bodhisattvas who have attained forbearance with respect to the unproduced phenomenon." These bodhisattvas are those on the eighth ground and above. What is 'the unproduced phenomenon'?

Student: Perhaps it is emptiness.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Then this passage would mean that a bodhisattva who has attained forbearance with respect to emptiness has abandoned ignorance. Can this forbearance be divided into small, middling, and great with respect to emptiness? Is this forbearance with respect to the unproduced phenomenon similar to that mentioned in the *Ornament,* saying that a sharp-facultied bodhisattva attains forbearance regarding the unproduced on the path of preparation, a middling-facultied bodhisattva attains it on the path of seeing, and dull-facultied bodhisattva attains it on the eighth ground? Think about it.

Having debated about this passage, one can ask does 'forbearance with respect to the unproduced phenomenon' not mean forbearance with respect to the afflictions not being produced again? Forbearance with respect to the afflictions not being produced again would mean that for this bodhisattva, the afflictions are definite to not be produced again.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 181) says:

> Therefore, afflicted ignorance is the discordant class of the knowledge of the suchness which is selflessness. Moreover, [that afflicted ignorance] is not just an absence of that knowledge and not just other than that [knowledge]. Rather it is the discordant class, the opposite, [of that] which superimposes inherent existence on persons and phenomena.

The objects of the mode of apprehension of the exalted wisdom realizing emptiness and ignorance are direct contradictions, given that non-inherent existence and inherent existence are direct contradictions. Thus, when a pot is realized to be non-inherently existent it is refuted as being inherently existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Moreover, [that afflicted ignorance] is not just an absence of that knowledge and not just other than that [knowledge]." Likewise, Gedun Drup's commentary (chapter 3) on Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* says:

> If one asks, what is the nature of ignorance? Ignorance is not merely not knowing, nor merely what is other than knowledge; rather it is another phenomenon that is the discordant class of and contradictory to knowing-wisdom. For example, an adversary is not merely someone who is not a friend, or merely someone who is other than a friend; rather it is defined as the opposite of a friend. Similarly, lying words are defined as the opposite of true words. So it is like these examples and others.

In *Awareness and Knowers,* ignorance is said to be a mental factor that obscures its object, or a mental factor that engages its object with an aspect of obscuring it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 182) says:

> When taken in this way, positing the superimposition of a self of phenomena as afflicted ignorance and positing the two conceptions of an I and mine established by way of their own character as the view of the transitory collection does not accord with the Abhidharmists.

The view of the transitory collection must be a conception of a self of persons. However, Lama Tsongkhapa posits four possibilities regarding the view of the transitory collection and the conception of a self of persons.

In short, the conception conceiving I and mine to be established by way of their own character is ignorance. If someone says that the view of the transitory collection is ignorance, then one asks: "Is the view of the transitory collection one of the six root afflictions because it is ignorance?" Another point of debate is: "Among the fifty-one mental factors which is the view of the transitory collection?" Think about it. The view of the transitory collection is defined as wisdom. In relation to this, one can ask: "If it is wisdom is it one of the five object-determining mental factors? Does the view of the transitory collection ascertain its object?" The five object-determining mental factors are aspiration, belief, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom.

Thursday morning, 1 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 182) says:

> The system of the Abhidharmists is as explained in the ninth chapter of the commentary on the *Treasury of Knowledge*, that is:
>
> - the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person is posited as the view of the transitory collection conceiving I and
> - the conception of the mine as under the control of such a substantially existent person is posited as the view of the transitory collection conceiving mine.
>
> This is very different [from the system of the Prasangika Madhyamikas].
>
> Although the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person does in fact exist in those whose minds have not been affected by tenets, the conception of the person and aggregates as having different, dissimilar natures does not exist in those whose minds have not been affected by tenets. Therefore, the view holding to an extreme is also of two [types].

In the lower schools, from the Svatantrika Madhyamikas down, the view of the transitory collection is posited as the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person. That view of the transitory collection is of two types: a view of the transitory collection conceiving I and a view of the transitory collection conceiving mine. Regarding the first, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person is posited as the view of the transitory collection conceiving I." Regarding the second, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the conception of the mine as under the control of such a substantially existent person is posited as the view of the transitory collection conceiving mine." This way of positing the two conceptions is very different from how they are posited by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. This is because the Prasangika Madhyamika system defines a view of the transitory collection as: an afflicted ignorance that, observing the I or mine in one's own continuum, conceives it to be established by way of its own character.

The conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person exists in those whose minds have not been affected by tenets, such as farmers, animals, etc. Therefore, there is an innate conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person. On the other hand, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the conception of the person and aggregates as having different, dissimilar natures does not exist in those whose minds have not been affected by tenets." That is, it only exists in those whose minds have been affected by tenets. The conception of the person and aggregates to be different entities is to conceive the I to be the utilizer and the aggregates to be the object of its use, or to conceive the I to be the carrier

and the aggregates to be the load. Such conceptions do not exist in those whose minds have not been affected by tenets. In fact, in sutra it says that the five aggregates are the load, there is a person who carries them, and that it cannot be expressed to be either permanent or impermanent. Thus, this sutra presents a self of persons. Buddha taught this sutra with the intention to lead non-Buddhists who assert a self of persons into the Buddhist path.

The view holding to an extreme is also of two types: the acquired and the innate, or the view holding to the extreme of an inherently existent I and the view holding to the extreme of an inherently existent mine. Among the five types of view, two of them, the view of the transitory collection and the view holding to an extreme, are of two types, the acquired and innate, whereas the other three, the view holding bad conduct and bad morality as supreme, the view holding a bad view as supreme, and wrong view, are only acquired. These views cannot be innate because they arise from reasons and tenets.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 182) says:

> QUESTION: In regard to the position that asserts persons and phenomena to be established by way of their own character, how are such conceptions proven to be afflicted ignorance and the two conceptions of a self?
> REPLY: Inherently existent persons and phenomena are negated by the reasonings that refute them. At that time, such conceptions are established to be conceptions of true existence which are mistaken with respect to their referent objects (*zhen yul*). When that is established, the conceptions of the two, persons and phenomena, as truly existent are established to be the two conceptions of a self.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas adopt this position in an attempt to force the Svatantrika Madhyamika system to accept their assertions. Thus, they say that the conception of persons and the conception of phenomena as inherently existent are the two conceptions of a self, and so forth. When the Prasangika Madhyamikas say the conception of the person as inherently existent is a conception of a self of persons, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas would respond that the reason is not established. The Prasangika Madhyamikas would respond that it is so because the person is not found when thoroughly sought. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas would again respond that the reason is not established because the person *is* found when thoroughly sought. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that this is because when the person is sought among the five aggregates it is found; that which is found being the mental consciousness, the illustration of the persons.

The Svatantrika Madhyamikas, such as Bhavaviveka, would ask the Prasangika Madhyamikas: "Do you find the person or not? If not, then you, Chandrakirti, do not find yourself! If you do not find yourself, then it follows that even your parents do not find you when you are sought? However, this would contradict the conventions of the world because everyone would say that you are found by your parents." The Prasangika Madhyamikas would say that there is a difference in the way of searching.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 182) says:

> When they are established, the conception of true existence is established to be the discordant class opposing a knower of the meaning of suchness, whereby it is established to be ignorance. As long as that is not extinguished, the view of the transitory collection can also be proven to not be extinguished, whereby it is established as *afflicted* ignorance. Therefore, it is very important to understand that this is posited as the uncommon presentation of the afflictions.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the conception of true existence is established to be the discordant class opposing a knower of the meaning of suchness." This is because relative to the object, a self, there is

both exalted wisdom and ignorance, in that the conception of true existence opposes the exalted wisdom realizing emptiness. When the conception of true existence is established to be the discordant class of the exalted wisdom realizing emptiness, it is also established to be ignorance. As long as that ignorance is not extinguished, the view of the transitory collection is not extinguished because the view of the transitory collection itself is a kind of ignorance. Therefore, it is established to be *afflicted* ignorance. Such a way of positing the afflictions is not common to, or shared by, the lower schools.

In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that both the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena are ignorance. The lower schools do not say that the conception of a self of phenomena is ignorance because they say that ignorance is a root affliction, whereas the conception of a self of phenomena is not an affliction, but is a knowledge obstruction.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 182-3) says:

> The way the other afflictions, attachment and so forth, also operate through the confusion which is a conception of true existence [is as follows]. [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas* (6.10ab) says:
>
> > Like the body sense power [abides in] the body,
> > Confusion abides in all.
>
> The commentary on this says:
>
> > Confusion, because of obscuring to realize them as truths just as they are, thoroughly operates to exaggeratedly superimpose true existence on things as their own entity. Because attachment and so forth also operate to superimpose the distinctions of attractiveness, unattractiveness, and so forth on only the nature of things which are imputed by confusion, they operate not differently from confusion. They are also based on confusion because confusion is the main [affliction].

Attachment and hatred operate on the basis of ignorance. This is because on the basis of the ignorance that conceives an object to exist from its own side, attachment superimposes attractiveness on an object. On the other hand, on the basis of the ignorance conceiving the object to exist from its own side, hatred superimposes unattractiveness on an object. Ignorance in this case is the conception apprehending persons or phenomena to be inherently existent, to exist from their own side, and to be established by way of their own character. This conception arises naturally in our continua without relying on reasons. On this basis, we superimpose attractiveness and unattractiveness on objects. When several people see a single object, does it appear in the same way to all of them? It does not, because to some it may appear as attractive and to others it may appear as unattractive. Why does this difference arise? With the innate conception of true existence as a condition, we superimpose attractiveness or unattractiveness on an object. Due to seeing the object as attractive, attachment arises, whereas due to seeing it as unattractive, hatred arises.

Ignorance and attachment engage their object in a similar way. For example, the body is the abode of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body sense powers. Since the body sense power is the main one, if it is destroyed all the remaining sense powers are destroyed since they rely on it. On the other hand, if the eye sense power is destroyed the other sense powers are not destroyed. Similarly, if a single affliction such as hatred is destroyed the other afflictions, such as attachment and so forth, are not destroyed, whereas if ignorance – the support – is destroyed, all the remaining afflictions – the supported – are also destroyed. This is the way in which they are support and supported, whereby they assist each other.

Aryadeva says: "Confusion abides in all." This means that the conception of true existence abides in all the afflictions or that the conception of true existence is the abode of all the afflictions. The commentary says: "Because attachment and so forth also operate to superimpose the distinctions

of attractiveness, unattractiveness, and so forth on only the nature of things which are imputed by confusion, they operate not differently from confusion." Therefore, it can be said that the conception of true existence operates in regard to the observed objects of all the afflictions. First of all, phenomena are conceived to be truly existent; then, on this basis the other afflictions, attachment and so forth, superimpose attractiveness and so forth. In other words, on the basis of phenomena being conceived by ignorance to be truly existent, the other afflictions superimpose attractiveness, unattractiveness, and so forth on objects, forms, sounds, and so forth. Thus, we conceive attractive and unattractive forms, attractive and unattractive sounds, attractive and unattractive odors, attractive and unattractive tastes, and attractive and unattractive tangible objects, on the basis of which we generate respectively attachment or hatred.

The verse from Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas* continues: "Therefore, when ignorance is destroyed, all the afflictions are destroyed."

Student: On the basis of conceiving an object to exist from its own side, does merely conceiving an object to be attractive generate attachment or do we have to exaggerate its attractiveness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: An object itself has some kind of attractiveness, but due to improper mental attention, we exaggerate its attractiveness. There is a story about a couple in the past in India. One day the man said to the woman, "You are becoming more beautiful." The woman asked, "How is it possible, in that I am not changing?" The man replied, "I see you as becoming more and more beautiful every day." This is due to projecting beauty on the object, in that although the object does not change, the perception of it changes. The person who was perceived to be beautiful in this case was actually missing an eye!

In short, ignorance and attachment are concomitant and are support and supported.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 183) says:

> When this is explained [it is as follows]. The statement "confusion, because of obscuring to realize them as truths just as they are, thoroughly operates to exaggeratedly superimpose on things their own entity of truth" indicates that confusion is the conception of true existence. "Attachment and so forth... operate not differently from confusion" [means that] they operate concomitant with confusion and do not operate free from it. The reason for that is as said: "Because attachment and so forth, also operate to superimpose the distinctions of attractiveness, unattractiveness, and so forth on only the nature of things which are imputed by confusion." Regarding this, that which superimposes the distinctions of pleasantness and unpleasantness on objects is improper mental attention – the cause that produces the two, attachment and hatred. Therefore, it does not indicate the way in which the two, attachment and hatred, conceive [their objects].

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What are the objects of the mode of apprehension of ignorance, attachment, and hatred?
Student: A hypothetically truly existent object, a hypothetically truly existent attractive object, and a hypothetically truly existent unattractive object.

Student: Is the object of the mode of apprehension of ignorance the referent object of ignorance?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In this case, they are the same. In *Awareness and Knowers* it says that in the case of a conceptual consciousness, the object of the mode of apprehension, the referent object, and the object of engagement are mutually inclusive.

Thursday afternoon, 1 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 183) says:

> Therefore, "on only [the nature of things which is] imputed by confusion" and so forth means "because the two, attachment and hatred, operate in dependence on superimposing pleasantness and unpleasantness which are only inherently existent." From_among the two types of observed objects of attachment and so forth, the true existence alone which is imputed by confusion is not indicated to be an observed object because the observed objects that are the two types of observed objects of both innate conceptions of a self are established bases. Attachment and so forth, due to being concomitant with confusion, also have similar observed objects.

While ignorance – the conception of true existence – does have an observed object, its object of the mode of apprehension does not exist. What is the observed object of the conception of a self of persons? It is the I. What is the observed object of the conception of a self of phenomena? It is the five aggregates and so forth. From the point of view of their production, first the conception of a self of phenomena is produced, then on this basis the conception of a self of persons is produced. But from the point of view of the realizations of the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena, first one realizes the selflessness of persons and then the selflessness of phenomena. This is mentioned by Lama Tsongkhapa in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*. In short, first there is the production of the conception of a self of phenomena followed by the production of the conception of a self of persons because first, in dependence on seeing the aggregates of a person, the conception of a self of phenomena is produced, then upon being introduced to the person, the conception of a self of persons is produced. The reason that first there is the realization of the selflessness of persons followed by the realization of the selflessness of phenomena is because one first realizes that the person is imputed upon the aggregates, whereby the existence of a self of persons is refuted.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "From among the two types of observed objects of attachment and so forth, the true existence alone which is imputed by confusion is not indicated to be an observed object because the observed objects that are the two types of observed objects of both innate conceptions of a self are established bases." The true existence imputed by ignorance is not the observed object of attachment, hatred, and so forth because the two conceptions of a self have their respective observed objects, [which are existents]. On the other hand, the object of the mode of apprehension of the two conceptions of a self is non-existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Attachment and so forth, due to being concomitant with confusion, also have similar observed objects." This would seem to mean that ignorance and attachment, as well as ignorance and hatred, have five concomitances. One should analyze whether it is enough to have an observed object in common to be concomitant or whether all five concomitances are necessary. Ignorance and attachment, or ignorance and hatred, have the same support, but do they have a common substance and common time? In general, from the point of view of the lower schools, two things being concomitant means that they have five points in common. The observed object of both ignorance and attachment is the same. However, is their aspect the same? If the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask, what is the object of the mode of apprehension of the ignorance that is the conception of true existence, the answer is true existence, inherent existence, establishment by way of its own character, and existence from its own side. This is the aspect of ignorance. On the other hand, the aspect or object of the mode of apprehension of attachment is that having an aspect of pleasantness, whereas the aspect of hatred is that having the aspect of unpleasantness. It cannot be said that there is no object of the mode of apprehension of attachment, since attractiveness or pleasantness is the object of the mode of apprehension.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 183) says:

> That having the aspect of desiring an object and that having the aspect of not desiring but turning away from an object, which are induced by the two [types of] improper mental attentions, are [respectively] attachment and hatred.

The aspect of desire is the aspect of pleasantness, whereas the aspect of hatred is the aspect of unpleasantness. The object-aspect or object of the mode of apprehension of attachment is exaggerated attractiveness on a basis that is attractive. The object-aspect or object of the mode of apprehension of hatred is exaggerated unattractiveness on a basis that is unattractive.

The object-aspect of attachment is the object of the mode of apprehension of attachment, whereas the subject-aspect of attachment is the attachment itself. An object of the mode of apprehension is only posited from the side of the object; it is not posited from the side of the subject. On the other hand, aspects are of two types: object-aspects and subject-aspects.

If we say attachment and hatred are not wrong consciousnesses but are mistaken consciousnesses, what is the consequence? Or if we say that the conception of true existence is a wrong consciousness but that attachment and hatred are not, what is the consequence? The object of the mode of apprehension of ignorance does not exist, but the object of the mode of apprehension of attachment and hatred does exist. Are they not wrong consciousnesses? They are not. Are they mistaken consciousnesses? They are. Therefore, the object of the mode of apprehension of attachment and hatred exists.

There are two ways of talking about the object, because the exaggeratedly attractive object does not exist, whereas the attractive object does exist. In general, attachment is defined as that which has the aspect of attractiveness of a contaminated object. Hatred is defined as that which has the aspect of unattractiveness of a contaminated object.

Student: How is mere attractiveness exaggerated if attractiveness is imputed?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Do you not accept attractiveness?
Student: Yes.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What is it?
Student: It is a ripening of karmic latencies in my continuum.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In general, attractiveness and unattractiveness exist; however, they are imputed by the subject. This is what depends on the ripening of karmic latencies.
Student: It seems that when an object appears, it appears as attractive due to karmic latencies and then the mind starts to embellish its beauty. Is that what happens?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Yes; first the attractive object appears and then we begin to think, "It is beautiful. It is really beautiful," and so forth." However, some time later we might even start to think about that same object, "It is ugly. It is really ugly," and so forth!

In short, the observed objects of ignorance and attachment are the same. However, their objects of the mode of apprehension are different.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> Therefore, because those [minds] that have the mere aspect of desire or non-desire induced by the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person are not posited as attachment and hatred, the way of positing attachment and hatred is also not the same [in the lower schools and the Prasangika Madhyamika].

The lower schools posit the aspect of attractiveness and the aspect of unattractiveness induced by the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person as the aspect of attachment and hatred. However, Lama Tsongkhapa says that this is not sufficient in the Prasangika Madhyamika system to posit the aspects of attachment and hatred. When Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the way of positing

attachment and hatred is also not the same," it means that the way they are posited in the lower schools and the Prasangika Madhyamika system are not the same.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 184) says:

> The phrase "they are also based on confusion" means that attachment and so forth are induced through being preceded by the confusion which is the conception of establishment by way of its own character.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that this phrase cited from the commentary on the *Four Hundred Stanzas* "means that attachment and so forth are induced through being preceded by the confusion which is the conception of establishment by way of its own character." This means that in dependence on ignorance – the conception of true existence – attachment and hatred arise. In this way, the conception of true existence is a cause for the result that is attachment or hatred. If this is the case, then ignorance and attachment, or ignorance and hatred, cannot be concomitant in that they arise serially.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 184) says:

> The analogy [in Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas*] of "[like] the body sense power [abides in] the body" means that just as the other four sense powers do not have a basis which is a separate location from the body sense power, likewise, also all other afflictions operate in dependence on confusion and operate without being separated from it.

All afflictions engage their object without being separated from ignorance, that is, they engage their object together with ignorance. Here Lama Tsongkhapa only explicitly mentions attachment and hatred but the other afflictions such as pride, doubt, and afflicted view also operate in dependence on ignorance. In short, all five root afflictions engage their respective objects without being separated from the sixth, ignorance.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 184) says:

> Therefore, since by destroying ignorance itself all afflictions are destroyed, it is said that one should respect the advice concerning its antidote, dependent-arising, the emptiness of inherent existence.

Just as the body sense power is the support of all the other remaining sense powers, ignorance is the support of all other afflictions. Likewise, just as when the body sense power is destroyed all the remaining afflictions are destroyed, similarly, when ignorance is destroyed all the other afflictions are destroyed. Therefore, in order to destroy ignorance, one should listen to teachings on dependent-arising, the emptiness of inherent existence. By means of the antidote, the understanding of dependent-arising, ignorance can be destroyed, in that by developing this wisdom, ignorance is abandoned. In many texts, in the context of calm-abiding and special insight, it is said that the meditation on dependent-arising is the antidote to the conception of a self. In answer to the question as to what meditation is the antidote to strong attachment, Lama Tsongkhapa's texts on the stages of the path and others say that the antidote to intense attachment is meditation on repulsiveness. Likewise, they say that when one has strong hatred due to tendencies developed in the past, one should meditate on love; when ignorance is strong, one should meditate on dependent-arising; when pride is strong, one should meditate on the detailed divisions of the constituents; and when one has a lot of conceptions, one should meditate on the breath. Lama Tsongkhapa bases this advice on texts such as Asanga's *Bodhisattva Grounds*.

In short, the meditation on dependent-arising is of great benefit.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 184) says:

> Although the conception of the true existence of things is the ignorance which is the root of cyclic existence, [Nagarjuna's] *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness* and his *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* say:
>
> > When any abode is found
> > The afflictions with the deceitfulness of a poisonous snake
> > Seize hold of it. Whoever's mind
> > Lacks that abode will not be seized.
>
> It is said that when any abode – a referent point for the conception of true existence – is found, it is seized by the snake of the afflictions.

When a referent point (target) for the conception of true existence is found, the snake of the afflictions arises. On the other hand, when the referent point of the conception of true existence is destroyed, the other snake-like afflictions are also destroyed. In short, the conception of true existence, ignorance, is the basis upon which other afflictions arise. A poisonous snake is dangerous in that it can cause one to die quickly, likewise when one has ignorance, the support, and the other afflictions, the supported, one risks losing the life-force of the path to liberation, i.e., one will not attain liberation. The analogy is a poisonous snake, which endangers one's life; the meaning it exemplifies is the ignorance and other afflictions, which endanger one's attainment of liberation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> Afterward this same text says:
>
> > In those whose minds have that abode,
> > Why would the afflictions, the great poisons, not arise?
>
> This is the sublime assertion of Arya [Nagarjuna].

Here the question is raised: "In those who have the abode of ignorance, why would there not be the arisal of the poisonous snakes of the afflictions?" While conceiving persons and phenomena to be truly existent and yet wishing to attain liberation, to not do anything would be absurd. This is because it is impossible for someone to abandon the afflictions while conceiving of a self, aggregates, and so forth that are inherently existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 184) says:

> To make a connection with the last two lines [is as follows]. That, even though observing the nature of forms and so forth, the afflictions are asserted to be abandoned is said to be taught based on the statement "It is not possible to abandon the afflictions." Also the later commentary says:
>
> > If it is observed to be a thing, the infinite afflictions, such as attachment and so forth, definitely arise without being counteracted. Why? When that thing accords with the mind, at that time it is difficult to counteract the attachment which follows that, whereas if it does not accord [with the mind], at that time it is difficult to avert anger and spite.

The later commentary says that if something is observed to be an inherently existent thing, infinite afflictions will definitely arise without being counteracted in that they are a result of the conception of true existence. This text then says: "When that thing accords with the mind, at that time it is difficult to counteract the attachment which follows that, whereas if it does not accord [with the mind], at that time it is difficult to avert anger and spite." Due to the conception of a self, attachment and hatred arise. How do attachment and hatred arise due to ignorance? Attachment is produced in relation to an object that accords with one's mind, whereas hatred is produced in relation to an object that does not accord with one's mind. The text actually says 'anger and spite.' Which is worse, anger or spite? Anger is stronger. Spite arises from anger. What is spite? Think about it.

Friday morning, 2 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 185) says:

> It is said in the commentary that even if an object is neither attractive nor unattractive, ignorance is produced. If the conception that the object is established by way of its own character operates in the continuum, even if neither of the two, attachment or hatred, are produced, it is asserted to operate like a type of confusion. [Shantideva's] *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* (v. 9.50-1) says:
>
> > A mind that has an observed object
> > Is an abode in some.
> >
> > In a mind separated from emptiness,
> > Ceased, they are produced again,
> > Like the absorption without discrimination.
>
> In regard to this position, the commentaries on the thought of Arya Nagarjuna by these two masters, [Chandrakirti and Shantideva], and a third, Buddhapalita, are not different.

Objects that are attractive, unattractive, and neutral produce respectively attachment, hatred, and ignorance. This concept is similar to the meditation on equanimity described in the teachings on the stages of the path, in which one visualizes a friend, enemy, and stranger and then examines which mental factors arise in relation to them. Doing so, one will find that in relation to a friend attachment arises, in relation to an enemy hatred arises, and in relation to a stranger ignorance arises.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that as long as the conception that an object is established by way of its own character operates in one's continuum, attachment, hatred, or confusion will arise in relation to that object.

The verse from *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* means that whenever the mind has a referent point (target) for the conception of true existence, even though the afflictions may cease for a while, they will be produced once again. This is because without the realization of emptiness, the cessation of afflictions is only temporary, like the temporary cessation of minds and mental factors when absorbed in the absorption without discrimination.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 127) says:

> The meaning of "A mind that has an observed object is an abode in some" [is as follows]. A path that is separated from the view that is the realization of subtle emptiness cannot abandon craving because in the continuum of a person whose mind has the observed object that is the conception of true existence, craving induced by that conception of true existence manifestly arises.
>
> [Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* then says:]
>
> > In a mind separated from emptiness,
> > Ceased, they are produced again,
> > Like the absorption without discrimination.
> > Therefore, meditate on emptiness.
>
> Those who are intent upon liberation and omniscience should meditate on the emptiness which is the person's and aggregates emptiness of establishment by way of their own character. This is because persons who are separated from the realization of the emptiness, which refutes persons and aggregates established by way of their own character, stop other manifest afflictions for a while by means of cultivating other paths, but they will manifestly arise once again; for example, like persons abiding in the absorption without discrimination.

Someone who lacks the realization of emptiness but cultivates an antidote separated from emptiness can achieve a temporary cessation of the afflictions but, due to lacking a realization of emptiness, the afflictions will return again. For this reason, Shantideva says that one should meditate on emptiness. This is similar in the case of someone who meditates on repulsiveness in that this person achieves a temporary cessation of attachment but, due to not having realized emptiness, the attachment will arise again later on. We can verify the return of attachment based on our own experience in the desire realm. While we may be able to avert attachment to some people, we are not able to do so in regard to all people. Likewise, as long as one remains absorbed in the absorption without discrimination, one will have a temporary cessation of coarse minds and mental factors, but when one arises from that absorption they will return again.

When Lama Tsongkhapa says "these two masters" he is referring to Chandrakirti and Shantideva.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> Since the main point [of the two *Knowledges*] is the intention to explain passing beyond sorrow by the mere path of the sixteen [attributes], impermanence and so forth, the identification of the afflictions from the point of view of that path is also incomplete. In dependence on these [explanations], pride and so forth can also be understood. The uncommon ignorance, the view of the transitory collection, and the view of an extreme are to be understood as being both acquired and innate; however, fearing too many words I have not written about that.

The explanation in the upper and lower *Knowledges* regarding the attainment of nirvana by the mere path of the four noble truths requires interpretation. This is because one cannot attain nirvana by means of the four noble truths explained in these two texts. In these texts, the identification of the afflictions from the point of view of the path is not complete in that there is more to be said. This is because the presentation of the afflictions in these texts lacks certain information, such as the Prasangika Madhyamikas' assertion that the two conceptions of a self are afflictive obstructions and that in dependence on the ignorance that is the conception of true existence, attachment, hatred, and so forth arise.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: Would Geshe-la please discuss the differences between 1) a relationship of support and supported and 2) a relationship of cause and effect?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The aggregates are the support and the person is the supported. The person is posited on the support, which is the five aggregates. For example, in the case of a cup filled with tea, the cup is the support and the tea is the supported. The cup is the support because it functions to prevent the tea from pouring down.
Student: But what is the difference between the two types of support and supported, those that are simultaneous and those that are serial?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Do you mean support and supported that are different entities and those that are the same entity?
Student: Yes.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The supported, the aggregates, and the support, the person, are support and supported which are one entity and simultaneous. On the other hand, serial support and supported are cause and effect which are not simultaneous; for example, seed and sprout. For this reason, there is a discussion of support and supported in the context of cause and effect. However, in the case of a cup of tea, are they support and supported that are one or different entities? In one way they would seem

to be two different entities. However, in the first chapter of Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition,* an example is given of juniper leaves which are put in a pot made of juniper and a question is raised as to whether such a support and supported are one or different entities? Since the pot made of juniper functions to prevent the juniper leaves falling down, they are support and supported. But are they support and supported that are one entity or different entities? If we take the example of this flower in this bowl we can ask a similar question.
Student: If they are simultaneous support and supported they should be one entity even though they do not appear as such.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: How are they simultaneous? How are the flower in the bowl and the supporting bowl established to be simultaneous? The bowl functions to prevent the flower from falling down. Because the bowl assists the flower it can be considered a cause. The flower and the bowl are different entities because when they appear to our eye consciousness they appear separately or individually. On the other hand, in the case of Chogyal's aggregates and the person Chogyal, they appear together and not separately. Therefore the way in which the person Chogyal and the aggregates of Chogyal appear is as one entity and not separate. Therefore, support and supported in terms of the person and the aggregates are simultaneous and one entity.
Student: Therefore, the bowl and the flowers do not exist at the same time?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If this is debated, one can also ask: "Do mother and son not exist simultaneously even though they are cause and effect? It follows that they do exist at the same time.
Student: Do two books leaning on and supporting each other not exist simultaneously?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are not simultaneous but exist simultaneously, like the flower and the bowl. Two books leaning on each other assist each other, therefore they are support and supported which exist simultaneously. Are the two books one entity? They are not one entity. Are they cause and effect? They are not. Therefore, there is a third possibility for support and supported: (1) a relationship of cause and effect, (2) a relationship of same essence, and (3) a relationship that is neither.

There are many types of support and supported. For example, students who receive financial support in order to be able to continue their studies.

Student: Is it correct to say that 'horns of a rabbit exist' for the consciousness apprehending horns of a rabbit?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Yes, it is correct to say that horns of a rabbit exist for the consciousness apprehending horns of a rabbit. But if we then ask, does that mean that horns of a rabbit exist, they do not. In *Awareness and Knowers,* it says that if it exists in the perspective of a conception apprehending it, there is no pervasion that it exists. In conclusion, the horns of a rabbit exist for a consciousness apprehending horns of a rabbit, but horns of a rabbit do not exist.

Student: According to the Prasangikas, what is the difference between 'confusion' (*gti mug*) and 'ignorance' (*ma rig pa*)?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are the same. Ignorance (*ma rig pa*) means obscuration and not knowing. In the texts, it gives the definition of ignorance as a mental factor that engages its respective object with the aspect of being obscured. Confusion (*gti mug*) and ignorance (*ma rig pa*) are synonyms.

Student: One of the meanings of *kun rdzob* (conventional, conventionality, or concealer) is *tha snyad* (nominal or convention). Please explain the meaning of *tha snyad* in this context.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: *Tha snyad* is of two types, expressive sound and motivating conception. For example, first there is a motivation, a motivating conception, to say something which is followed by the actual words expressed, expressive sound. *Kun rdzob* is an obstructor and that which exists for a knower of conventions. Usually *tha snyad* is related to designating a name (i.e., to conventions).

Student: What is the pervasion between congruent cause and substantial cause?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it is a substantial cause it is not pervaded by being a congruent cause. For example, the last moment of the supreme mundane quality level of the path of preparation realizing emptiness by way of a meaning generality, as the subject; it is a *substantial* cause for the first moment of the uncontaminated path of seeing directly realizing emptiness but is not a *congruent* cause of that. The last moment of the supreme mundane quality level of the path of preparation realizing emptiness by way of a meaning generality and the first moment of the uncontaminated path of seeing directly realizing emptiness are not congruent (literally, of equal fortune) because the first is contaminated and the latter uncontaminated. Yet the last moment of the supreme mundane quality level of the path of preparation realizing emptiness by way of a meaning generality is a substantial cause for the first moment of the uncontaminated path of seeing directly realizing emptiness because it is that which transforms into that.

Student: Is it possible for two different sense consciousnesses – e.g., an eye consciousness and a body consciousness – to operate simultaneously for an ordinary being and for a learner superior?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Yes, they can operate simultaneously. For example, an ordinary being can look at the body and simultaneously experience the sensation of touching it. On the other hand, one can also touch something without the need to look at it. Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* says: "A form, a pot, exists in the darkness." Although it cannot be seen, it can be touched and identified. In conclusion, even for an ordinary being or a learner superior, two sense consciousnesses can function simultaneously. Perhaps there is a difference for the mental consciousness, but think about it. In my opinion, the experience of an eye consciousness and that of a body consciousness can occur simultaneously. The body consciousness experiences tangible objects, the eye consciousness experiences forms, colors and shapes. Although in one text it says that two conceptions cannot exist simultaneously, it actually means that, for example, the conception "beautiful" and the conception "soft" do not exist simultaneously. Think about this.

Student: What is the immediate condition of a form such as a pot? Is the immediate condition the immediately preceding moment of the pot? What is the relationship between this and the substantial cause?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In my opinion, there is no immediate condition for a form such as a pot. However, earlier in the *Illumination* it was said that even form has an immediate condition. Generally speaking, for the lower schools a form does not have an immediate condition because an immediate condition is a condition for the arisal of a consciousness. Therefore, an immediate condition is necessarily the factor of clarity and knowing that immediately precedes a consciousness. However, there are some who differentiate between a concordant immediate condition and a mere immediate condition. If a cup had an immediate condition what would it be? The clay is not the immediately preceding condition because it is the cup's substantial cause. However, I will think about the relationship between an immediate condition and a substantial cause in terms of an eye consciousness.

Student: According to the *Illumination*, an empowering condition is defined as an acting cause, which is anything that does not interfere with the production of a phenomenon. However, in general, we say that the empowering condition of the nose consciousness apprehending a smell is the nose sense power. According to the definition from the *Illumination*, a pot could also be the empowering condition of a nose consciousness. Would it be correct to say this?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: An empowering condition being defined as an acting cause is mentioned in the *Treasury of Knowledge,* which sets out the point of view of the Vaibhashikas. A pot is not the empowering condition of a nose consciousness apprehending a smell because a pot is not an

empowering condition for nose consciousness. Even if there is no pot present, a nose consciousness can still arise when there is the presence of a smell. In conclusion, the empowering condition of a sense consciousness must be clear physical matter (i.e., a sense power).

On the other hand, according to what Vasubandhu says in the *Treasury of Knowledge,* it follows that even a smell is an empowering condition for nose consciousness because it does not interfere with the production of nose consciousness but instead assists the production of nose consciousness. For example, in regard to an eye consciousness the empowering condition is a clear sense power, the observed object condition is a form, color and shape, and the immediate condition is the immediately preceding consciousness. The immediate condition is usually an antecedent mental consciousness, but sometimes it can even be an ear consciousness. For example, if someone says "There is someone behind you," you generate an ear consciousness hearing this and then look at that person, whereby you generate an eye consciousness apprehending that person. In fact, Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* says that the immediate condition is any of the six consciousnesses.

END

Wednesday morning, 21 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 185) says:

> Similarly, dividing the conceptions that apprehend phenomena to be truly existent into nine – the great, middling, and [small], objects of abandonment of the path of meditation – and connecting them with their antidotes, the nine paths of meditation, in the same way that the conceptions that apprehend apprehendeds and apprehenders to be different substances are divided into nine – the great, middling, and [small], objects of abandonment of the path of meditation – and explained in connection with the objects of abandonment and their antidotes, the nine paths of meditation, is to be understood as the interpretive meaning that was taught for some trainees who for the moment are not able to completely realize both the coarse and subtle selflessnesses of phenomena.

Buddha divided the conceptions of true existence into nine – the three great, three middling, and three small – just as he did the conceptions apprehending apprehendeds and apprehenders to be different substances for those who are temporarily unable to realize the subtle selflessness of phenomena. The division of the innate conceptions that apprehend phenomena to be truly existent into nine and the division of the conceptions that apprehend apprehendeds and apprehenders to be different substances into nine are both from the point of view of the hinayana *path*. This differs from the presentation of the Prasangika Madhyamikas, who assert that the conception of true existence, or the conception of inherent existence, is an afflictive obstruction and not a knowledge obstruction. For this reason, the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that when one attains the state of a hinayana foe destroyer, one abandons the conception of inherent existence. Thus, from the point of view of the mahayana *path*, the conception of true existence is not divided into nine. However, for the Prasangika Madhyamika system, if the conception of true existence were divided into nine, the way in which these nine levels are abandoned would differ from how they are abandoned according to the lower schools. They would say that the first six levels are abandoned by a bodhisattva on the first six grounds, that the three great levels are abandoned on the seventh ground, and that on the eighth ground all nine levels have been abandoned. Thus, Lama Tsongkhapa says that the divisions of the conception of true existence into nine is an interpretive teaching "that was taught for some trainees who for the moment are not able to completely realize both the coarse and subtle selflessnesses of phenomena."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 186) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B3A-2 The way in which mere conventionalities appear and do not appear to the three persons

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 71) says:

> For the childish, [even those things] will act to deceive.
>
> For those other than them, since merely arising dependently like illusions and so forth, they are the mere deceptive. Furthermore, because of perpetually using mere ignorance possessing the characteristic of the obscuration of knowing, it appears to the aryas who have a sphere together with appearance – it does not to those possessing a sphere without appearance.
>
> Because buddhas are manifestly, completely enlightened about all aspects of all phenomena, they are asserted as reversing forever the flow of mind and mental factors.
>
> Hence, at first, the Bhagavan taught the deceptive truth and the mere deceptive.

Ordinary beings are deceived by the fact that things have the appearance of true existence. On the other hand, for the three persons, hearer foe destroyers, solitary realizer foe destroyers, and bodhisattvas on the three pure grounds, although phenomena appear to them as truly existent, they do not adhere to them as truly existent because they have abandoned the conception of true existence. Therefore, phenomena appear to them as dependent-arisings and mere conventionalities. In other words, they perceive phenomena as like illusions in that they appear to be truly existent but are not. For whom is there no appearance of true existence? The answer is only for a buddha. For the minds of sentient beings, excluding that of non-conceptual meditative equipoise, there is the appearance of true existence.

According to what it says in Chandrakirti's commentary, it would appear that the three persons still have the ignorance that has the characteristic of a knowledge obstruction. It can be asked: "Is ignorance a knowledge obstruction? Is there a knowledge obstruction that is ignorance? Are there two types of ignorance, one that is afflicted and one that is not afflicted? Is the mere ignorance that has the characteristic of a knowledge obstruction the ignorance that is a conception of true existence or is it another type of ignorance?" Think about these questions.

Chandrakirti says: "it appears to the aryas who have a sphere together with appearance – it does not to those possessing a sphere without appearance." 'The aryas who have a sphere together with appearance' means that for those superiors who have the appearance of conventionalities, there is the appearance of true existence, whereas for those superiors who do not have the appearance of conventionalities, there is no appearance of true existence. In short, for superiors in subsequent attainment, because there is the appearance of conventionalities there is the appearance of true existence, whereas for superiors in meditative equipoise, because there is no appearance of conventionalities there is no appearance of true existence.

Chandrakirti then says: "Because buddhas are manifestly, completely enlightened about all aspects of all phenomena, they are asserted as reversing forever the flow of mind and mental factors." This would seem to imply that a buddha is without the flow of mind and mental factors but, if this were the case, it would have to be said that a buddha does not have a mind. Later on, the *Supplement* says:

> *The pacification due to burning the entirety of dry firewood*
> *Of objects to be known is the dharmakaya of the conquerors.*
> *Then, non-produced and non-ceasing,*
> *By stopping the mind, it is manifested by the body.* [12.8]

Thus, it would seem that a buddha is without mind! However, it refers to the fact that the flow of mind and mental factors occurs in subsequent attainment and not in meditative equipoise. This distinction is made only at the level of sentient beings, whereas for complete buddhas there is no distinction between meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment, in that they are one entity for a buddha. It can also be said that for a buddha, the flow of mind and mental factors that is conceptuality has ceased.

Chandrakirti says: "the Bhagavan taught the deceptive truth and the mere deceptive." (Note that this could also be translated as "the Bhagavan taught the conventional truth and mere conventionalities.") One can ask: "Is ultimate truth a mere conventionality? Can it be said that ultimate truth is a mere conventionality but not a conventional truth?" In short, ultimate truth exists as a mere conventionality but it is not a conventional truth.

Student: Why is *mere* conventionality specified?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The word 'mere' eliminates it being truly existent. The *Illumination of the Middle Way* says: "The opposite to existing conventionally is existing truly." Thus, ultimate truth is not a conventional truth but it is a mere conventionality.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 186) says:

> These things, moreover, while not inherently existent, deceive the childish by appearing to be [inherently existent]. Whereas, for the three persons other than them, who were explained before, because of being dependent-arisings, fabricated things, they are not truly existent but mere conventionalities.

"Things" can refer to functioning things or to phenomena in general. To the childish they appear to be truly existent, whereas to these three persons they appear to be truly existent but they do not adhere to them as truly existent because their real nature appears to them. "Fabricated things" refers to dependent-arisings, which are real conventional natures; for the three persons, they are not truly existent but are mere conventionalities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 186) says:

> Furthermore, because they always employ mere unafflicted ignorance which has the characteristic of a knowledge obstruction, [things] appear to superiors abiding in subsequent attainment who have objects that are together with appearances that are polluted by ignorance and its latencies; they do not appear to superiors abiding in meditative equipoise possessing an object that is without appearances.

As in Chandrakirti's autocommentary, also here in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination,* it appears that the three persons possess a mere unafflicted ignorance, which has the characteristic of a knowledge obstruction. What is this unafflicted ignorance? For the Vaibhashikas, there are two types of ignorance, the afflicted and unafflicted. According to the Vaibhashikas, there are four types of unafflicted ignorance (from Gedun Drup's *Clarification of the Path to Liberation*, translated by G. Churinoff):

> If it is asked: well then, what are the four causes of unknowing?
> 1. Unknowing due to the profound and subtle qualities of the Buddha is, for instance, as was said [in a sutra]:
>
> > The Teacher said to Shariputra, "Shariputra, do you know the Tathagata's aggregate of morality, etc.?" Shariputra answered, "It is not known [by me]."
>
> 2. Unknowing due to very remote location is, for instance, Maudgalyayana not knowing his mother had been reborn in the northern direction in the world [called] Having Light Rays.
> 3. Unknowing due to very remote time is, for instance, when Shariputra did not know that the householder [called] Glorious Rebirth possessed the roots of virtue of the similitude of liberation and hence did not ordain him, the Teacher said, "I see the very subtle seeds of your liberation like gold hidden amidst colored powder or stone," and granted ordination.
> 4. Unknowing due to the infinite divisions of aspects is not knowing the particularities of the constituents, migrations, places of rebirth, rebirths, etc. which are difficult to realize, like, for example, not knowing the causes of the various colors of the center of the peacock's feathers, etc., as was taught by the Elder Rahula: "The various divisions of causes of a single eye of the peacock's feather are not objects of knowledge of the not-

omniscient since knowing that is the strength of omniscience."

These three persons have such unafflicted ignorance. In short, phenomena only appear to the three persons abiding in subsequent attainment and not to those abiding in meditative equipoise.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 186) says:

> QUESTION: Well then, what does this system consider to be knowledge obstructions?
> RESPONSE: In the *Explanation of the* '*Supplement to the "Middle Way"*' (commentary on v. 12.31) it says:
>
> > In [foe destroyers] the latencies of ignorance prevent the full distinguishment of objects of knowledge. The presence of latencies of attachment and so forth are also causes of such kinds of engagements of body and speech. Furthermore, the latencies of ignorance, attachment, and so forth are overcome only in the omniscient and buddhas; they are not in others.

In brief, knowledge obstructions are the latencies of ignorance; they prevent seeing the two truths simultaneously. A knowledge obstruction is that which obstructs the simultaneous and direct knowledge of the entities of the two truths. The latencies of attachment and so forth are also included in knowledge obstructions. Due to the existence of latencies of attachment in his continuum, a foe destroyer has negative tendencies of body and speech such as engaging in activities like swinging from tree to tree, using vulgar language, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 186) says:

> Although the Teacher prohibited the negative tendencies of body and speech of jumping like monkeys and calling others "female servants," the engagements of body and speech that exist in foe destroyers, they are not overcome. Stating "furthermore" indicates that the latencies of attachment and so forth also prevent the distinguishment of objects of knowledge. The latencies of the afflictions are knowledge obstructions. Their results, all factors of mistaken dualistic appearance, are also included in [knowledge obstructions].

In short, the latencies of the afflictions are knowledge obstructions as are their results, all factors of mistaken dualistic appearance.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 186-7) says:

> From among the two,
> 1. the seeds of the afflictions deposited as latencies and
> 2. the latencies that are not seeds of the afflictions,
>
> the latter are posited as knowledge obstructions.

There are two types of latencies: a latency that is a seed of an affliction and a latency that is not a seed of an affliction. A <u>latency that is a seed of an affliction</u> is: a latency of a former affliction that has the capacity to bring about a future affliction. A <u>latency that is not a seed of an affliction</u> is: a latency of an affliction that does not have the capacity to produce a future affliction.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 187) says:

> This is because, due to having extinguished all the seeds of the afflictions, the conception of true existence is not produced whereas, due to the pollution of latencies, an awareness that is mistaken with respect to its appearing object is produced.

Although the conception of true existence is no longer produced, an awareness that is mistaken with respect to its appearing object, meaning one with the appearance of true existence, is produced due to the pollution of latencies.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 187) says:

> Since superiors who are not buddhas have not abandoned the ignorance that is a knowledge obstruction, they alternately have conceptions together with appearances in subsequent attainment and are without appearances in meditative equipoise. On the other hand, because buddhas are "manifestly" (that is, evidently), "completely" (that is, without exception) "enlightened" (that is, realized) regarding the ultimate and conventional aspects of all phenomena, all the conceptual flow of minds and mental factors is forever stopped, whereby they do not alternately have and not have conceptions of appearances in subsequent attainment and in meditative equipoise. The word 'forever' indicates that in other superiors the stopping [of the conceptions of appearances] in meditative equipoise is occasional; therefore, they alternately exist [and do not exist] in subsequent attainment and meditative equipoise.

For superiors who are not buddhas, the stopping of the conceptions having the appearance [of true existence] is occasional because, although in meditative equipoise they do not have the appearance of true existence, in subsequent attainment they do have the appearance of true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 187) says:

> Therefore, the statement [in the autocommentary] "because of employing the ignorance that is a knowledge obstruction" is not the reason for the existence of appearances; rather it is proof that appearances occur alternately – existing and not existing – in subsequent attainment and meditative equipoise.
>
> "The flow of minds and mental factors" [mentioned in the autocommentary] is asserted to be conceptuality. *Clear Words* says:
>
> > Conceptuality is the flow of mind. Because of being free from that, suchness is without conceptuality.
>
> It is as explained in sutra saying:
>
> > What is ultimate truth? If it is even without the flow of mind, what need is there to also mention [that it is without] letters?

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the statement [in the autocommentary] 'because of employing the ignorance that is a knowledge obstruction' is not the reason for the existence of appearances; rather it is proof that appearances occur alternately." In other words, this is not a reason for saying that there are appearances but rather, it is proof that during meditative equipoise, because there is no appearance of conventionalities, there is no appearance of true existence whereas because there is the appearance of conventionalities in subsequent attainment, there is also the appearance of true existence.

Clear Words says: "Conceptuality is the flow of mind." Thus, the flow of mind and mental factors refers to conceptuality. A buddha does not have such a flow of mind and mental factors.

Wednesday afternoon, 21 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 187) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B3A-3 The way in which [things] are ultimate and conventional relative to ordinary beings and superiors

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 71) says:

> There, that itself that is the ultimate of ordinary beings is the mere deceptive of the aryas having a sphere together with appearance. That which is the self-nature of that, emptiness, is their ultimate.

That which is ultimate for ordinary beings is a mere conventionality for the superiors who have objects together with appearance. This means that in the perspective of ordinary beings things, such as a pot, are ultimately or truly existent. On the other hand, for superiors in subsequent attainment who have the appearance of conventionalities, although phenomena appear to them as truly existent, they do not adhere to phenomena as truly existent. Instead, due to their having directly realized emptiness, phenomena are mere conventionalities, whereas the nature of these conventionalities is ultimate for them. For this reason, Chandrakirti says: "That which is the nature of that, emptiness, is their ultimate."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The ultimate of the buddhas is self-nature itself, and further, as it is just incontrovertible (non-deceptive), it is the ultimate truth; it is an object to be cognized by themselves individually. The deceptive truth, because of just deceiving, is not the ultimate truth.

The ultimate, emptiness, is undeceptive and individually realized by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Thus, because the conventional truth is deceptive, it is not an ultimate truth. Therefore, the two truths can be distinguished simply by the fact that a conventional truth is a deceptive substratum, whereas an ultimate truth is an undeceptive substratum. In terms of truths and falsities, a truth is that which has a mode of appearing that is concordant with its mode of abiding, whereas a falsity is that which has a mode of appearing that is not concordant with its mode of abiding. If conventional truth and ultimate truth are defined in this way, that which is deceptive and conventional truth can be considered to be synonymous, and that which is undeceptive and ultimate truth can be considered to be synonymous. However, if this is debated one can say: "The son of a barren woman, as the subject, it follows that it is an ultimate truth because its mode of appearing and its mode of abiding are concordant." If someone objects to this, one insists asking: "Is this not the case?" The point here is that the son of a barren woman is non-existent, as are the horns of a rabbit and the tail of a human being. When debating, it is permissible to take as a subject that which is without potential, such as the son of a barren woman, a sky-flower, the horns of a rabbit, and other non-existents.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 187-8) says:

> [The autocommentary] says:
>
> > In regard to that, whatever is ultimate for ordinary beings is itself a mere conventionality for superiors who have objects that are together with appearances. Their nature is emptiness; that is ultimate for them.
>
> The meaning of the first [phrase is as follows]. Pot and so forth, which are apprehended by ordinary beings to be ultimately existent, are indicated to be mere conventionalities for those three superiors explained before who have appearances in subsequent attainment upon arising from meditative equipoise. Therefore, in their perspective [pot and so forth] are negated to be mere truths but are

> not negated to be conventional truths. The referent objects conceived by ordinary beings to be ultimately existent, pot and so forth, are not indicated to be conventionalities for superiors because that is not possible.

Conventionalities that are apprehended to be ultimately existent by ordinary beings are, for the three superiors – hearer foe destroyers, solitary realizer foe destroyers, and bodhisattvas of the three pure grounds in subsequent attainment – mere conventionalities because, although they appear to be truly existent, these three do not adhere to them as truly existent due to having abandoned the conception of true existence. Things, such as pots and so forth, are mere conventionalities for superiors in subsequent attainment but are ultimately or truly existent for ordinary beings. Why do pot and so forth not exist truly for these three persons in subsequent attainment? It is because they have already abandoned the conception of true existence. To ordinary beings conventionalities, such as pot and so forth, appear to be truly existent and they adhere to them as truly existent. Do pot and so forth exist truly in the perspective of the childish? Perhaps it can be said that if it is truly existent in the perspective of the childish it is not pervaded by being truly existent. In other words, if something is truly existent in the perspective of a particular person, it is not pervaded by being truly existent. Think about this.

Childish ordinary beings have the appearance of conventionalities as truly existent and adhere to them as truly existent. Therefore, it said that conventionalities, pot and so forth, are conventional truths in the perspective of childish beings because they appear as truly existent to the conception of true existence but in reality are not truly existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, in their perspective [pot and so forth] are negated to be mere truths and are not negated to be conventional truths. The referent objects conceived by ordinary beings to be ultimately existent, pot and so forth, are not indicated to be conventionalities for superiors because that is not possible." This is not possible because if it is a referent object of the conception of true existence of ordinary beings, it is pervaded by being non-existent. Because it is non-existent, it cannot be a conventionality for superiors.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 188) says:

> The meaning of the second phrase is [as follows]. Reality, the nature of conventional dependent-arisings, is indicated to be ultimate for superiors. Therefore, mistakenly propounding the opposite to that phrase, saying, "A single basis, such as a pot and so forth, is a conventionality relative to ordinary beings and ultimate relative to superiors" is the talk of those who have not understood that, having become a conventional truth in the perspective of an awareness, it is necessarily prevented from being a truth in the perspective of that [awareness].

In short, it is incorrect to say: "A single basis, such as a pot and so forth, is a conventionality relative to ordinary beings and ultimate relative to superiors."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 188) says:

> [The autocommentary] says:
>
> > The ultimate for the buddhas is the very nature. Moreover, due to being undeceptive, it is ultimate truth. It is known by them individually.

"It is known by them individually" means that the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise knows its respective object, an emptiness, individually.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 188) says:

> The word 'very' of "is the very nature" is to be taken as unvarying. That distinguished by [the buddhas], the ultimate truth of other superiors, is not alternately posited as the nature which is without appearances in meditative equipoise and the nature which is together with appearances in subsequent attainment; rather, the nature at all times is the reality of meditative equipoise. The meaning of "Moreover..." and so forth is that, having asserted that the 'truth' of ultimate truth is presented as not being true existence, it is explained to mean that it is the truth that abides undeceptively in the perspective of a seer of suchness.

Here, Lama Tsongkhapa explains Chandrakirti's statement, "The ultimate for the buddhas is the very nature." The word 'very' of "is the very nature" eliminates the nature being at times an object with appearance and at other times an object without appearance, in that ultimate truth is not like that. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "rather, the nature at all times is the reality of meditative equipoise." The word 'truth' in the context of 'ultimate truth' is indicated to not mean true existence; rather it is the truth that abides undeceptively in the perspective of a seer of suchness. It is a truth in that its mode of appearing concords with its mode of abiding. The etymology of ultimate truth (literally, highest meaning truth) is that 'ultimate' (literally, highest meaning) is the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, whereas ultimate truth is that which is true for that highest meaning or ultimate – the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. The way in which emptiness appears to the subject, which is the highest meaning or ultimate, the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, concords with the way in which it abides; for this reason emptiness is ultimate truth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 189) says:

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ULTIMATE TRUTH AND
HOW AN EXALTED KNOWER OF ALL ASPECTS KNOWS THE TWO TRUTHS

(Note that these titles that occur in this version of the Tibetan text are not by Lama Tsongkhapa but were added by the publisher.)

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B3B Explanation of the ultimate truth

1 Explanation of the meaning of the words of the root verse
2 Dispelling disputes about [the meaning of the words of the root verse]

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B3B-1 Explanation of the meaning of the words of the root verse

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 71) says:

> Therefore, having indicated the deceptive truth like that, since I desire to indicate the ultimate truth, because it is inexpressible and because it is just not the object of knowledge [resulting from such expression], since it cannot be indicated explicitly – in order to clarify its nature to those desiring to hear, an example of one's own experience is explained:
>
> *[If] some wrong entity due to the strength of cataracts,*
> *Such as falling hair and so forth, is investigated,*
> *That perceived by pure eyes where the essence of that itself*
> *[Is supposed to be], is reality. Like that, it should be known here.* [6.29]
>
> Due to the strength of cataracts [of the eyes], those with cataracts see a continuously transforming assembly of falling hair and so forth within vessels of rhinoceros [horn] and so forth that are held in their hand. Hence, wishing to dispel that, they repeatedly overturn the vessel. Knowing they are finding difficulty, those without cataracts wonder, "What are they doing?" and

> having come nearby that, although they direct their eyes to the area of the falling hair, they do not observe the aspect of falling hair and do not even think (investigate) about the distinctions having the support of the falling hair – such as thing, non-thing, falling, hair not falling, azure (sky-blue), and so forth.

Having presented conventional truth, Chandrakirti now wishes to present the ultimate truth. It is said that since ultimate truth cannot be expressed by terms and is not an object of knowledge, it cannot be indicated explicitly. However, that it is "not an object of knowledge" means that it is not an object of knowledge of a consciousness of conventionalities. Chandrakirti says: "in order to clarify its nature to those desiring to hear, an example of one's own experience is explained." Because emptiness cannot be easily expressed, an analogy is needed to explain it. It is like, for example, the taste of molasses which, when asked how it is, one can only respond that it is sweet. If the questioner then asks "what does sweet mean,?" the taster can only continue to say, "It is sweet."

The analogy given here involves those who have cataracts who see falling strands of hair. A person with cataracts who is holding a vessel of rhinoceros horn or a golden vessel sees falling hair in it and continuously strives to clean it. Meanwhile, if someone without cataracts asks him what he is doing, he would answer that he is trying to clean away the falling hair in the vessel. Although there is no such falling hair, there is the appearance of falling hair due to the cataracts. This is analogous to that fact that although phenomena do not exist truly, ordinary beings have the appearance of true existence. Likewise, although there is no falling hair, there is the appearance of falling hair to those with cataracts. On the other hand, for those without cataracts there is no appearance of falling hair. The meaning of this analogy is that for ordinary beings, phenomena appear to be truly existent and just as they appear they adhere to them as truly existent, whereas in the perspective of superiors in meditative equipoise there is no appearance of true existence. For such superiors, what appears (that is, the absence of true existence) actually exists.

In short, emptiness cannot be expressed just as it is by terms and it cannot be conceptualized just as it is by the conception that follows upon these terms. However, this does not mean that emptiness is not an object of a consciousness. If someone says that it is not an object of a consciousness, one would ask: "Is it not an object of a valid inferential cognizer? Is it not an object of a valid direct perceiver?" If someone says that it is not, one then asks: "Is it not an object of knowledge?" If someone says that it is not an object of knowledge, one asks: "Is it not established by a valid cognizer?" If someone says that it is not, we say that then it follows that ultimate truth is non-existent. Some people, such as Loden Sherap, actually arrive at the conclusion that ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge. Loden Sherap, a famous lama, was a previous incarnation of Dagyab Rinpoche who now lives in Bonn, Germany.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, when those with cataracts indicate their thoughts to those without cataracts saying, "I see falling hair," then, desiring to dispel their fantasies, having taken the side of the observation of those with cataracts, they indeed mention encouraging words of pacification saying, "There is no falling hair existing here." Yet, in this comment there is no underestimation of the hair.
>
> The reality of the falling hair is that which is seen by those without cataracts; [what is seen] by others is not.
>
> Similarly, due to not seeing suchness since harmed by the cataract of ignorance, that which is the referent – the self-entity of the aggregates, elements, and sources – is their deceptive entity.

> That [object] seen in whatever self-nature by the buddha bhagavans [who are] separated from the ignorance of those very aggregates and so forth, in the manner that those not possessing cataracts do not see falling hair, is their ultimate truth.

Those with cataracts see falling hair, whereas those without cataracts do not. The meaning of this analogy is that for the bodhisattvas of the pure grounds who have abandoned the conception of true existence conventionalities, such as pot and so forth, are mere conventionalities and not ultimately existent. On the other hand, childish ordinary beings see only the conventional entities of the aggregates, constituents, and spheres; they do not see their ultimate entity. In other words, ordinary beings do not see the ultimate truth or reality of the aggregates, constituents, and spheres, whereas the buddha bhagavans see the nature or reality of the aggregates, constituents, and spheres just as it is.

To summarize, it is important to understand the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth and to know how to posit each of them. The two truths are described in Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning*, in his *Tenets*, and in many other texts.

> The definition of a conventional truth in *Tenets* is: an object which is found by a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality and with respect to which a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality becomes a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality.
>
> The definition of an ultimate truth is: an object which is found by a valid cognizer analyzing for the final mode of existence and with respect to which a valid cognizer analyzing for the final mode of existence becomes a valid cognizer analyzing for the final mode of existence.

One should memorize the various definitions of the two truths according to the different schools. Then, on the basis of the two truths, one should know how to posit the four noble truths, and on this basis one should know how to posit the basis, paths, and results. The two truths are one entity but different isolates.

Thursday morning, 22 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 189) says:

> [Chandrakirti's autocommentary] says:
>
> > Because ultimate truth is inexpressible by means of words and because it is not an object of a knower that follows upon those words, it cannot be explicitly indicated. However, since I wish to present the ultimate truth, in order to clarify its nature to those desiring to listen, I will explain an analogy experienced by ordinary beings themselves.

Ultimate truth is not expressible by words *just as it is* and it cannot be realized by a conception that follows from these words *just as it is*. However, if it is not specified that it is not expressible *just as it is,* it would follow that there are no words that express emptiness and therefore it would be non-existent. Likewise, a conception that follows from these words cannot realize emptiness *just as it is,* but in general a conception can realize emptiness upon hearing words describing it. There can be debate about this subject, such as: "Ultimate truth, as the subject; if follows that it is not an object of comprehension of a valid inferential cognizer because the conception that follows upon words cannot realize it. "

Chandrakirti says: "it cannot be explicitly indicated." This too can be debated, asking: "Is emptiness not explicitly indicated in sutra? Is there no sutra that explicitly explains emptiness? Is

there no sutra that takes emptiness as its main subject matter? Is there no second Dharma wheel? Does the second Dharma wheel not take emptiness as its main subject?"

Chandrakirti then says: "However, since I wish to present the ultimate truth, in order to clarify its nature to those desiring to listen, I will explain an analogy experienced by ordinary beings themselves."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 189) says:

> The meaning of [ultimate truth] not being an object of knowledge and an object of expression is as stated: "it cannot be explicitly indicated." In addition, Nagtso's translation says "it cannot be *directly* indicated."

As before, this statement can be debated, asking: "Do the sutras not explain emptiness explicitly and can trainees intent upon it not realize emptiness?" If emptiness cannot be explained explicitly, then also those who listen to teachings on it could not realize it explicitly. In short, ultimate truth cannot be indicated nakedly just as it is, but if this is not specified, then there follow many absurd consequences. Terms can expresses emptiness but not exactly or nakedly *just as it is*. This is because they express emptiness by means of a term generality. Likewise, when a conception realizes emptiness, it does so by means of a meaning generality and not directly or nakedly.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 189) says:

> The meaning of this is [as follows]. The commentary that says that the meaning of suchness is not to be known as other, *Clear Words*, says:
>
> > When those with cataracts mistakenly see the entity of falling hair and so forth, even though those without cataracts have already indicated [their absence], they cannot realize, as it exists, that which is to be realized in the way in which those without cataracts do not see the respective entities of falling hair and so forth.
>
> Although one without cataracts says to one with cataracts "There is no falling hair," [the one with cataracts] is said to not realize the absence of falling hair like it is seen by one without cataracts. Therefore, although the listener does not realize [the absence of falling hair like it is seen by those without cataracts,] it is not that the absence of falling hair is not realized.

When the text says, "the meaning of suchness is not to be known as other," it is not clear whether this means that the meaning of suchness is not to be known *in another way* or if it means that it is not to be known *through others*.

Those with cataracts see falling hair, whereas those without cataracts do not see falling hair. Yet, if one without cataracts says to one with cataracts that there is no falling hair, the one with cataracts does not realize the absence of falling hair just like the one without cataracts realizes it. This is because the one with cataracts still continues to see falling hair, even though one without cataracts says that there is no falling hair. Those with cataracts do not see the absence of falling hair in the same way that those without cataracts see its absence.

The meaning of this analogy is that an ordinary being does not see emptiness in the same way that a superior sees emptiness. Superiors realize emptiness directly, whereas ordinary beings who realize emptiness only do so by means of a meaning generality and, therefore, do not realize it directly. Similarly, those with cataracts see falling hair, whereas those without cataracts see the absence of falling hair.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 189) says:

> Taking that as an analogy, when presenting suchness it is asserted that although it is not realized like it is seen by those free from the pollution of the cataracts of ignorance, in general it is not that suchness is not realized.

Although ordinary beings realize emptiness, they do not realize it in the same way that superiors realize it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 189-90) says:

> Therefore, it is not the case that ultimate truth
> - cannot be expressed by scriptures of definitive meaning that possess the profound meaning and by speech presenting [the profound meaning] and
> - cannot be realized even by the awareness that follows upon them.
>
> All [such] statements that the meaning of suchness is not an object of knowledge and an object of expression are also to be understood similarly.

It is not that suchness is not realized by the awareness that follows upon speech presenting the profound meaning; rather, it is not realized *just as it is*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 190) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Due to the force of cataracts, those unreal entities*
> *Of falling hair and so forth are imagined.*
> *Their nature is seen by the eyes on anything.*
> *Likewise, understand suchness here.* [6.29]
>
> Those with cataracts, *due to the force of* being polluted by *cataracts* of the eyes, upon seeing falling hair and so forth, that is, bees and so forth, in a vessel for food and drink made of rhinoceros [horn] and other [materials] in their hands, *imagine those unreal entities to be falling hair*, bees, *and so forth*. Then, wishing to get rid of them, they overturn that vessel again and again. Knowing that they are having difficulty, those without cataracts of the eyes come nearby but, although they direct their *eyes* to *the nature of* the falling hair and so forth *seen on any* basis, they do not observe the aspect of falling hair and do not conceive any attributes, that is, that having the support, of falling hair.

One with cataracts, while eating food from a vessel, sees falling hair, bees, and so forth there and tries to remove them. Even if someone without cataracts tells him that there is no falling hair or bees, he still continues to see them. This is the case even though a person without cataracts explains to him that because his eyes are mistaken he has such appearances.

The meaning of this analogy is that ordinary beings are likened to those with cataracts and superiors to those without cataracts. Ordinary beings have the appearance of phenomena as truly existent and adhere to them as truly existent. Although superiors tell ordinary beings that phenomena are not truly existent, they still continue to appear to ordinary beings to be truly existent and they continue to adhere to them as truly existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 190) says:

> Furthermore, when one with cataracts reveals his thoughts to one without cataracts saying "I see falling hair," although [the one without cataracts,] wishing to dispel the conceptions of the one with cataracts, takes his side and says words that earnestly refute that, saying, "There is no falling hair," that speaker does not deprecate the falling hair.

When one who has realized emptiness explains emptiness to those without this realization, it is difficult for them to understand.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 190) says:

> The *suchness* of the falling hair seen by those with cataracts is what is seen by those without cataracts; it is not what is seen by those with cataracts. *Likewise*, *understand* the two analogies *here* in the context of their meanings.

The two analogies are those with cataracts and those without cataracts, whereas the two meanings are ordinary beings and superiors.

There was a geshe in Sera Monastery who one time when the *Heart Sutra* was being recited very slowly was sitting in meditation. When another monk asked him what he was doing, he replied that he was meditating on emptiness. When the other asked him what it was like, he replied that it was like the appearance of blue. When asked to describe it further, he said that it was as difficult for him to describe as for a mute person to describe a deity's body. In short, although emptiness is realized, it is difficult to explain it to others.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 190-1) says:

> The way they are to be understood is:
> 1. Those who do not see suchness due to a polluted awareness – the impairing cataracts of ignorance – observe the own entities of the aggregates, constituents, and spheres, the conventional entities of those aggregates and so forth, like those with cataracts observe falling hair.
> 2. Those observed by means of not seeing the aggregates and so forth – the objects seen by the buddhas who are free from knowledge obstructions, the latencies of ignorance, as what is the nature of the aggregates and so forth in the way in which falling hair is not seen by the eyes of those without cataracts – are ultimate truths for those buddhas.

The buddhas have directly realized the nature of the aggregates, constituents, and spheres, whereas ordinary beings have not. Those without the cataracts of ignorance realize emptiness just as it is, whereas when ordinary beings realize emptiness, they do so obstructed by the cataracts of ignorance.

Another example is the situation in which one person is eating molasses and another person who has never tasted molasses asks him what he is eating. The person asking the question is like someone who does not know what emptiness is, whereas the person eating the molasses is like someone who has realized emptiness. When the person who has never eaten molasses asks what it tastes like, the person who is eating answers that it is sweet, but when the other person then asks "What is 'sweet'?" the other person has difficulty explaining sweetness just like a person who has realized emptiness has difficulty explaining what emptiness is.

Student: Please explain the meaning of the sentence "The *suchness* of the falling hair seen by those with cataracts is what is seen by those without cataracts; it is not what is seen by those with cataracts."
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Those with cataracts see falling hair, but do they see the suchness or reality of the falling hair? They do not, because they have mistaken appearance. On the other hand, those without cataracts see the suchness of the falling hair. The absence of falling hair is what is actually real.

In short, when those with the realization of emptiness talk about it to those without the realization of emptiness, they will not understand what it is. Ordinary beings have the appearance of inherent existence and adhere to it, whereas superiors who have realized emptiness have the appearance of phenomena as inherently existent but do not adhere to them as inherently existent. Previously, Chandrakirti's autocommentary said:

> Whatever nature of the aggregates and so forth, seen by the buddha bhagavans free from the latencies of ignorance in the manner in which those without cataracts do not see falling hair, is ultimate truth for them.

The buddhas see the nature of the aggregates and so forth like those without cataracts see the absence of falling hair.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 191) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B3B-2 Dispelling disputes about [the meaning of the words of the root verse]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 72) says:

> If asked, is not the self-nature that is like that aspect, just without seeing? Therefore, how do they see?
>
> That is indeed true, nevertheless, through the manner of not seeing, "they see" is expressed.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 191) says:

> OBJECTION: If just as the eyes of those without cataracts do not see even mere appearance in regard to falling hair, the buddhas do not see conventionalities – the aggregates and so forth – which appear to an awareness polluted by ignorance, then [those conventionalities] would not exist because if they did exist the buddhas would necessarily see them. If conventionalities, the aggregates and so forth, do not exist, even the attainment of buddhahood would not exist because a person who initially generates the mind [of enlightenment] has the pollution of ignorance.

Those without cataracts do not have the appearance of falling hair. In regard to this, someone asks: Do the buddhas who are free from the cataracts of ignorance not see conventionalities, the aggregates and so forth? Does a buddha see phenomena, such as the aggregates and so forth, that appear to ordinary beings? They must see them, as otherwise they would be non-existent. Do phenomena, such as the aggregates and so forth, which appear to ordinary beings who have the cataracts of ignorance, appear to buddhas? They do appear to them. If the buddhas see them, do they see them due to the cataracts of ignorance? They do not. Phenomena, such as the aggregates and so forth, do not appear to buddhas as they appear to ordinary beings, yet they do appear to them. This is because since phenomena, the aggregates and so forth, exist, they must be seen by the buddhas. Similarly it is said in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* that bad-tasting food appears to a buddha as delicious. This means that bad-tasting food for an ordinary being appears as delicious to a buddha. There is a story about this in relation to Shakyamuni Buddha. One day when the Buddha was out begging for alms, a woman offered him the rotten dregs of alcohol, yet the Buddha accepted them and ate some. Although Ananda had warned the Buddha not to eat them, the Buddha said that they were very good and in order to prove this, took some from his mouth and gave it to Ananda to eat. Ananda found that it was in fact delicious! Bad-tasting food appears to a buddha as delicious due to his vast collection of merit. In fact, whatever appears to a buddha is pure and good.

Thursday afternoon, 21 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 191) says:

> RESPONSE: The explanation of the way in which there is no such fault [is as follows]. There are two ways in which a buddha's exalted wisdom knows objects of knowledge:
> 1. the way in which it knows all objects of knowledge that are ultimate truths and
> 2. the way in which it knows all objects of knowledge that are conventional truths.

It is important to understand these two way in which a buddha's exalted wisdom knows object of knowledge.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 191) says:

> The first, [the way in which a buddha's exalted wisdom knows all objects of knowledge that are ultimate truths,] is: in a manner of not seeing the appearance of conventionalities, the aggregates and so forth, [a buddha's exalted wisdom] knows their suchness.
> The second, [the way in which a buddha's exalted wisdom knows all objects of knowledge that are conventional truths,] is: because with respect to buddhas it is not suitable to posit an implicit realization realizing [conventionalities] even though they do not appear, [a buddha's exalted wisdom] necessarily knows them through their appearing; therefore, in the perspective of that exalted wisdom knowing varieties, it knows [conventionalities] in a manner of the dualistic appearance of object and subject.

The way in which a buddha's exalted wisdom knows all objects of knowledge that are ultimate truths is that although when a buddha sees the reality of conventionalities he does so without the appearance of conventionalities, he still realizes their suchness. In other words, in the perspective of a buddha's seer of suchness, there are no conventionalities. Thus, a buddha's exalted wisdom seeing suchness is an exalted wisdom seeing modes; it sees the suchness of conventionalities without seeing conventionalities.

The way in which a buddha's exalted wisdom knows all objects of knowledge that are conventionalities is that a buddha's exalted wisdom realizing varieties sees them in a manner of the dualistic appearance of object and subject. In other words, in the perspective of a buddha's exalted wisdom seeing varieties, there is the dualistic appearance of object and subject in that they are seen as different. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Because with respect to buddhas it is not suitable to posit an implicit realization realizing [conventionalities] even though they do not appear, [a buddha's exalted wisdom] necessarily knows them through their appearing."

In short, in the perspective of a buddha's exalted wisdom seeing modes or suchness there are no conventionalities, such as the aggregates and so forth. On the other hand, in the perspective of a buddha's exalted wisdom seeing varieties there are conventionalities. That there are no conventionalities, the aggregates and so forth, in the perspective of a buddha's exalted wisdom seeing modes is the final reality. For this reason, such an exalted wisdom is said to realize suchness in a manner of not seeing.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 191) says:

> Although the aggregates and so forth do not appear to a buddha's exalted knower of varieties through it being polluted by the latencies of ignorance, since they do appear to other persons' knowers, which are polluted by ignorance, they must appear to buddhas because their non-appearance to them is not feasible in that if conventionalities exist they must be observed by an exalted knower of varieties.

Buddhas do not have the appearance of conventionalities, such as the aggregates and so forth, due to being polluted by ignorance. However, the appearance of conventionalities to sentient beings due to their being polluted by ignorance appears to buddhas. This is because the appearance of conventionalities to those sentient beings is an existent. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "since they do appear to other persons' knowers which are polluted by ignorance, they must appear to buddhas because their non-appearance to them is not feasible in that if conventionalities exist they must be observed by an exalted knower of varieties."

Do conventionalities, the aggregates and so forth, appear to buddhas due to their being polluted by ignorance? They do not. How do conventionalities, the aggregates and so forth, appear to sentient beings? They appear to sentient beings as if truly existent. That way of appearing does not appear to buddhas. However, does the appearance of true existence to sentient beings appear to buddhas?

Student: It does not.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Yet to sentient beings conventionalities, the aggregates and so forth, appear to be truly existent. Is there the appearance of truly existent aggregates to sentient beings? There is. Does the appearance of true existence to sentient beings also appear to a buddha's exalted knower of varieties?

Student: It does appear because the appearance of true existence is an object of knowledge.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If something exists, does it necessarily appear to a buddha?

Student: Yes.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is right.

In conclusion, the appearance of the aggregates as truly existent in the perspective of sentient beings appears to buddhas, but the aggregates and so forth do not appear to be truly existent to buddhas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 191) says:

> Although an eye consciousness free from cataracts does not have the appearance of the falling hair that appears to those with cataracts, since that appearance is not necessarily non-existent it is not like the case of a buddha.

To those without cataracts, there is no appearance of falling hair. Is the appearance of falling hair necessarily non-existent? It is not; the appearance of falling hair exists. For whom does it exist? It exists for those with cataracts, in that for those with cataracts there is the appearance of falling hair. Does the falling hair exist? No, it does not. If someone says "It follows that it does exist because there is the appearance of falling hair," we reply that there is no pervasion. Likewise, does true existence exist? If someone says that it does exist because the appearance of true existence exists, we reply that there is no pervasion.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 191-2) says:

> As long as the latencies of mistaken dualistic appearance are not extinguished, the two direct comprehensions of modes and varieties cannot be generated in the same entity. Since they must be comprehended alternately in meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment, those two, [the modes and varieties,] do not come to be comprehended by means of a single moment of exalted wisdom. On the other hand, when all the latencies of mistaken [dualistic appearance] without exception are abandoned, even in each moment of exalted wisdom the two exalted wisdoms are uninterruptedly generated in the same entity. Thereby, simultaneously the alternating of direct comprehension with non-comprehension of the two objects of knowledge is no longer necessary.

As long as the latencies of mistaken dualistic appearance are not abandoned, a single awareness cannot realize the two truths directly and simultaneously. This is why for non-buddhas there is alternately the comprehension of varieties in subsequent attainment and the comprehension of modes in meditative equipoise. On the other hand, a buddha is completely free of the latencies of ignorance and is therefore able to see the two truths directly and simultaneously. Therefore, at this point the two truths are no longer seen alternately in meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment in that on the buddha ground, meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment become one entity. Therefore, it is said that a buddha is constantly absorbed in meditative equipoise on the two truths or that a buddha is absorbed in meditative equipoise on reality in a manner of non-arising. Such a quality is unique to only buddhas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 192) says:

> Therefore, this also does not contradict [the autocommentary on the *Two Truths*] that says:
>
> > Even a single moment of an exalted knower
> > Pervades all the mandalas of objects of knowledge.
>
> Although the two exalted wisdoms are the same entity, there is not even the slightest contradiction in there occurring two different modes of knowing in relation to the two objects; this is a distinctive quality of the buddha bhagavans alone. Taking the way of knowing suchness alone as a buddha's way of knowing and then saying that a knower of varieties does not exist in the mental continuum of a buddha, but is included in the continuum of trainees, is to deprecate a buddha's knower of varieties. Someone who also says that an exalted knower of modes does not exist in the mental continuum of a buddha appears to deprecate both exalted wisdoms. Some remaining [information] about this will be explained in the chapter on the result.

The *Two Truths on the Middle Way* is by Acharya Jnanagarbha, as is its autocommentary. "All the mandalas of objects of knowledge" refers to the two truths. A single moment of a buddha's exalted knower knows the two truths simultaneously; this is a distinctive quality of a buddha that is not shared by anyone else.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "there is not even the slightest contradiction in there occurring two different modes of knowing in relation to the two objects." This means that the exalted knower of a buddha is only one entity but, relative to the two types of objects, it has two modes of knowing. Thus, although a buddha's exalted knower of ultimate truths and a buddha's exalted knower of conventional truths are one entity, they are posited as two relative to their modes of knowing.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 192) says:

> QUESTION: Is the nature that is such an aspect, the vanishing of all dualistic appearances, not without seeing? Therefore, how do buddhas see ultimate truth?
> RESPONSE: That [the nature] is not seen in a dualistic manner due to the vanishing of dualistic appearances in the perspective of a seer of suchness [is as said in the autocommentary]:
>
> > Although indeed true, nevertheless, it is said "In a manner of non-seeing they see."
>
> The way of proceeding in the response to this debate [is as follows]. The exalted wisdom knowing modes,
> - because of directly seeing the suchness of the aggregates and so forth,
> - because that which is not established in the perspective of a seer of the aggregates and so forth is their suchness, and
> - because their suchness must be seen in a manner of not seeing the aggregates,
>
> the autocommentary (commentary to verse 6.97) says:

> Without contacting a functioning thing that has production, he directly enacts the nature alone. Therefore, because of comprehending suchness, he is called "buddha."

> Saying 'a buddha's exalted wisdom knowing the ultimate comprehends reality alone without contacting the substratum' means the same as saying 'their suchness is seen in a manner of not seeing the aggregates.' Although 'not seeing' means "highest seeing," to not see anything is not asserted to be seeing.

A buddha's exalted wisdom seeing modes realizes the reality of conventionalities without seeing the appearance of conventionalities. The very non-establishment of phenomena, the aggregates and so forth, in the perspective of a buddha's exalted wisdom seeing modes, is their final mode of abidance. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "that which is not established in the perspective of a seer of the aggregates and so forth is their suchness." The non-existence of the aggregates in the perspective of a buddha's exalted wisdom knowing modes is suchness.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "because their suchness must be seen in a manner of not seeing the aggregates." This was discussed previously.

Lama Tsongkhapa then quotes Chandrakirti's autocommentary. A buddha's exalted wisdom knowing modes does not contact functioning things that have production, yet it sees their nature. This means that a buddha directly realizes their emptiness. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Saying 'a buddha's exalted wisdom knowing the ultimate comprehends reality alone without contacting the substratum' means the same as saying 'their suchness is seen in a manner of not seeing the aggregates.'"

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "'not seeing' means 'highest seeing.'" In the perspective of a buddha's exalted wisdom realizing modes there are no conventionalities. This non-seeing of conventionalities is highest seeing, that is, seeing the highest, the ultimate. In other words, the non-seeing of varieties by a buddha's exalted wisdom realizing modes is highest seeing or the seeing of the ultimate. On the other hand, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "to not see anything is not asserted to be seeing."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 193) says:

> Since, as was explained before, not seeing elaborations is posited as 'seeing free from elaborations,' seeing and non-seeing are not posited in regard to a single basis.

"Seeing and non-seeing are not posited in regard to a single basis" means that seeing is posited in regard to modes and non-seeing is posited in regard to varieties or conventionalities. In other words, the non-seeing of conventionalities is the seeing of the ultimate.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 193) says:

> Moreover, the *Compendium on the Mahayana* says:
>
> > "Not seeing forms, as well as not seeing feelings,
> > Not seeing discriminations, not seeing intentions,
> > Not seeing consciousnesses, minds, and mentality anywhere,
> > Is seeing phenomena;" this is taught by the Tathagata.
> >
> > Sentient beings express in words "I see space."
> > How is space seen? They should investigate it.
> > Also seeing phenomena like that is taught by the Tathagata.
> > Such seeing cannot be described by other analogies.
>
> "Not seeing the five aggregates and seeing phenomena" is the meaning of suchness. As is taught: "Whoever sees dependent-arising, sees phenomena."

The exalted wisdom seeing the reality of the five aggregates does not see the substratum, the five aggregates. In other words, the reality of the five aggregates is seen by this exalted wisdom in a manner of not seeing the five aggregates. This is called "seeing phenomena." 'Phenomena' in this context refers to suchness or ultimate truth.

That the exalted wisdom realizing the reality of the five aggregates realizes their reality in a manner of not seeing the substratum, the five aggregates, means that the five aggregates do not appear to or do not exist in the perspective of that exalted wisdom.

The Buddha said that one who sees dependent-arising sees phenomena. In this context 'phenomena' is the ultimate truth. When dependent-arising is realized, one realizes ultimate truth. Thus, the realization of ultimate truth arises from the realization of dependent-arising.

It is said that in order to realize ultimate truth for the first time, one must do so in dependence on a correct reason. Is there pervasion that it is based on a correct reason? According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system, there is no pervasion because it is possible to generate an inferential valid cognizer in dependence on a mere consequence. Is an inferential valid cognizer necessarily produced in dependence on a correct reason? In general, the definition of an inferential cognizer is: a new, incontrovertible determinative knower that is directly produced in dependence on a correct reason that is its basis. What is the definition of an inferential cognizer in the Prasangika Madhyamika system?

Student 1: Perhaps for the Prasangika Madhyamika system it is necessary to add "or a consequence" to this definition.

Student 2: I think that for the Prasangika Madhyamika system one does not need to say that it is a *new* incontrovertible determinative knower.

Student 3: Thus, the definition could be: an incontrovertible determinative knower that is directly produced in dependence on a correct reason or consequence that is its basis.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Then, is the conclusion that it is "an incontrovertible determinative knower that is directly produced in dependence on a consequence that is its basis"? The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it is possible to generate an inferential cognizer realizing the probandum in dependence on a mere consequence. The etymology of the word 'Prasangika,' translated as Consequentialist, is that it is one who propounds that an inferential cognizer realizing the probandum is generated in dependence on a mere consequence. According to other schools, it is necessary to do so in dependence on an autonomous sign.

Friday morning, 23 June 2000

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 331) says:

> The presentation of our system
> The definition of a valid cognizer is: an incontrovertible knower.
> The definition of a direct valid cognizer is: a valid cognizer that is an incontrovertible knower with regard to its object of comprehension, its object of the mode of apprehension, without directly depending on a reason.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (page 333) says:

> The definition of an inferential cognizer is: an incontrovertible knower with regard to its object of comprehension, which is hidden to itself, and that is directly produced in dependence on its basis, a correct reason.

This can be debated, saying: "If it is an inferential valid cognizer it is pervaded by being produced in dependence on its basis, a correct reason, but there is no pervasion that an inferential valid cognizer is produced in dependence on a correct reason." An inferential valid cognizer produced in dependence on a consequence is produced in dependence on its basis, a correct reason. However, is that a correct reason? It is not. For example, sound, as the subject, it follows that it is a non-product because it is

permanent. When such a consequence is set forth, an inferential valid cognizer can be produced in dependence on it. However, although it is not a correct reason, it involves an implicit correct reason. Thus, when this consequence is set forth, an inferential valid cognizer can be produced in dependence on it, whereby it is produced in dependence on the implicit correct reason, "because it is impermanent."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 193) says:

> In addition, space, for example, is the mere elimination of obstructive contact; seeing or realizing that is likened to the function of not seeing, in that if the object of negation, an obstructive phenomenon, existed, it would be visible. Also with respect to that, obstructive phenomena are the unseen while the space is the seen.

The entity of space is the mere elimination of obstructive contact. The definition of uncompounded space given in *Collected Topics* is: a non-affirming negative that is the mere negation of an obstructive phenomenon. "Obstructive contact" implies form.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "seeing or realizing that is likened to the action of not seeing in that if the object of negation, an obstructive phenomenon, existed, it would be visible." This seems to mean that if obstructive contact existed, it could be seen, whereas it is not. However, although obstructive phenomena are seen in general, when looking at space one does not see obstructive phenomena; one sees only space. According to the Vaibhashika school uncompounded space is a phenomenon that is able to perform a function because it functions to permit movement, construction, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Also with respect to that, obstructive phenomena are the unseen while the space is the seen." This means that the non-seeing of obstructive phenomena is the seeing of space.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 193-4) says:

> The last line [of the above stanza] refutes the seeing of blue, which is not like the seeing in the analogy, for example, as being like seeing suchness.

Seeing blue is not like seeing the reality of space. In other words, someone says that the reality of space is seen in the same way as blue is seen; this is what is refuted here. The last line of the stanza is: "Such seeing cannot be described by other analogies."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As extensively taught in the *Exalted Engaging in the Two Truths:*
>
> > Devaputra, ultimately, if ultimate truth were the nature of the objects of body, speech and mind, that would not proceed to be counted "ultimate truth," since it would be just deceptive truth.
> >
> > Nonetheless Devaputra, ultimately, ultimate truth is passed beyond all conventions, is without particulars, is unproduced and does not cease, is separated from being an object to be mentioned or mentioning, object to be known or knowing.
> >
> > Devaputra, ultimate truth is passed beyond until the object of the exalted wisdom of omniscience, possessing supremacy of all aspects. Hence, it is not like the expression, "ultimate truth." All phenomena are false since [they are] controvertible (deceptive) phenomena.

> Devaputra, ultimate truth is not able to be indicated. If asked, why is that? Whoever indicates, whatever is indicated, and whoever is indicated to – all these phenomena are ultimately not strongly produced. Not strongly produced phenomena are not able to explain strongly produced phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 194) says:

> In regard to the knowing that is seeing in a manner of non-seeing, the autocommentary [cites the *Exalted Engaging in the Two Truths Sutra*] with respect to the two truths:
>
> > "Devaputra, if, for the ultimate, ultimate truth were the nature of objects of body, speech, and mind, it would not be counted as that called 'ultimate truth' in that it would be conventional truth."
> >
> > "Furthermore, Devaputra, for the ultimate, ultimate truth is passed beyond all conventions, without instances, unproduced, unceasing, free from being an object of speech and a speaker, and free from being an object of knowledge and a knower."

This is a description of ultimate truth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 194) says:

> The meaning of the first sutra [passage] that is to be interpreted [is as follows]. In the perspective of a seer of the ultimate, ultimate truth is not seen in the manner in which conventionalities, such as the aggregates and so forth, are not seen. If [ultimate truth] were an object – like the aggregates and so forth are objects of body and speech and like they are objects of mind – since it would not be free from elaboration in the perspective of a direct seer of suchness, [the Buddha] says it would not be ultimate truth but would be an elaboration that is a conventionality. When taken to be like this, [a seer of the ultimate] becomes a knower that sees in a manner of non-seeing.

What is ultimate truth like? The sutra says: "ultimate truth is passed beyond all conventions, without instances, unproduced, unceasing, free from being an object of speech and a speaker, and free from being an object of knowledge and a knower." This is mentioned in the praise to the perfection of wisdom:

> To the perfection of wisdom, inexpressible in words and thought,
> The entity of the unproduced and unceasing,
> An object of the mind individually cognizing it,
> Mother of the conquerors of the three times, I prostrate.

In short, when the exalted wisdom knowing modes sees the ultimate truth of the varieties, it does so without seeing the varieties, that is, conventionalities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 194) says:

> The meaning of the second sutra [passage is as follows]. In the perspective of a direct seer of the ultimate, there are no instances of ultimate truth, that is, there are not many dissimilar particulars of it. The other three [qualities, being unproduced, unceasing, and free from being an object of speech and a speaker,] are easy [to understand]. That [ultimate truth] is free from being an agent and an object of speech in the perspective of that seer is easy [to understand].
> Although the exalted wisdom directly seeing suchness can be posited as a knower of the ultimate and ultimate truth as its object known, this does not contradict [ultimate truth] being free from being

> the two, agent and object, in the perspective of that exalted wisdom. [That lack of contradiction] is because the two, agent and object, are posited only in the perspective of an awareness of conventions. For example, although an inferential consciousness of [an ultimate] type can be posited as the subject and ultimate truth as the object, the two, the agent and object which are subject and object, are not posited in the perspective of a consciousness of [an ultimate] type.

In the perspective of the exalted wisdom seeing modes there is no agent and object, that is, speaker and object of speech. Likewise, an object of knowledge and a knower do not exist in the perspective of a consciousness of an ultimate type.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: That the state of the mind absorbed in the direct realization of emptiness is like water poured into water seems to be the same as the state of the mind of a Samkhya who has attained liberation and has a vision of totality. Is this correct? If it is like this, could it be said that to attain the same mental state, it is possible to take very different paths?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is true that when absorbed in the direct realization of emptiness it is like water poured into water in that subject and object are one. However, this is not the same as the state of the mind of a Samkhya who has a vision of totality. What is a vision of totality? Does it mean that everything vanishes like a rainbow vanishes in the sky?
Student: It seems to mean that the consciousness expands and is able to enter into a state of union or totality with the entire universe.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to the Samkhyas, when liberation is attained, twenty-four of the twenty-five categories of objects of knowledge asserted by them vanish like a rainbow in the sky and all that remains is the being that is self, consciousness, and knower. Thus, all objects of knowledge – causes and results – vanish, leaving only the being. This liberation is not a realization of emptiness. When our system says that the mind realizing emptiness is like water poured into water, it means that just as the water present before cannot be distinguished from water that is added to it later on, similarly, the mind realizing emptiness and the object emptiness become one entity.

Student: In the context of discussing attachment, it was said that due to improper mental application, we exaggerate the attractiveness of the object; however, the object itself has some kind of attractiveness. Does this mean that the object has attractiveness from its own side? How is it possible for the object itself to have attractiveness according to Prasangika?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In the Prasangika Madhyamika system the beauty of a woman does not exist from its own side. However, the object does possess a factor of beauty. We then exaggerate this beauty, thinking, "It is beautiful. It is really beautiful," and so forth. In short, there is the beauty of the object in regard to which we think, "It is beautiful. It is more beautiful. It is the most beautiful," and then generate the wish to obtain it, whereby attachment is produced.

The object has a nature of attractiveness but that beauty does not exist from its own side. That attractive object is imputed by the conception thinking, "It is beautiful." In the Prasangika Madhyamika system, beauty is imputed by conception. An object can have one of two factors, attractiveness or unattractiveness; upon this basis, we exaggerate these qualities.
Student: Before the mind imputes attractiveness, is there already attractiveness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is not, because there is nothing that is not imputed by the mind. It can be debated as to which comes first, like in the case of the chicken and the egg. When attachment is produced, it is due to apprehending the object to be an inherently existent attractive object. In other words, due to the conception of true existence, one generates attachment. Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas* says:

> Like the body sense power [abides in] the body,
> Confusion abides in all.
> Therefore, when confusion is destroyed,
> All the afflictions are destroyed

Also, in regard to the concomitance between attachment and ignorance, it was said that attachment engages an object together with ignorance, this ignorance being the conception of true existence. Due to the conception of true existence, we conceive objects to be inherently attractive or inherently unattractive and then exaggerate these qualities, whereby attachment or anger are produced.

Student: In general, it is said that when two mental factors exist simultaneously in the retinue of the same main mind, they share five similarities. However, when ignorance and attachment exist simultaneously in the retinue of the same main mind, they do not have the similarity of aspect. Could Geshe-la please explain this seeming contradiction?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: This question arises because the *Illumination* says that the ignorance that is the conception of true existence and attachment are concomitant. However, you are saying that is not clear how they are concomitant, in that ignorance and attachment do not have a similarity of aspect. But perhaps they do have a similar aspect. What is the aspect of attachment? Attachment has the aspect of attractiveness. Ignorance could also perhaps be said to have the aspect of attractiveness, although in general it is said that ignorance engages its object with an aspect of ignorance. There is an ignorance together with attachment that apprehends inherently existent beauty. This can be said to be the aspect of that ignorance. The object has no such aspect, but ignorance conceives it to exist in this way. The aspect of the conception of true existence is the object of negation, inherently existent beauty. Aspects can be understood in terms of objects and in terms of subjects. The conception of true existence is the subject-aspect, not the object-aspect. However, if it is insistently asked what is the object-aspect and what is the object of the mode of apprehension, they can be posited as the truly existent beauty.

Student: Foe destroyers in subsequent attainment have only the appearance of true existence; superiors have the appearance of true existence and occasions of adhering to true existence but disbelieve that phenomena truly exist; and ordinary beings have the appearance of true existence, adherence to true existence, and they believe in true existence. With regard to foe destroyers, is there the appearance of true existence without apprehending it?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it is said that foe destroyers in subsequent attainment have the appearance of true existence, they must be specified to be sentient beings and hearer foe destroyers since buddhas are considered to be mahayana foe destroyers. For a buddha superior, meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment are one entity, therefore for a mahayana foe destroyer there is no appearance of true existence. However, for a hinayana foe destroyer in subsequent attainment there is the appearance of true existence. If it is asked whether they adhere to true existence, the answer is that they do not. If it is said that they must adhere to true existence because true existence appears to them, then the answer to that is there is no pervasion.

Do foe destroyers apprehend the appearance of true existence? There would be no fault in saying that they do. If the appearance of true existence is apprehended, there is no pervasion that a foe destroyer apprehends true existence. In short, a foe destroyer apprehends *the appearance of* true existence but does not apprehend true existence.

Some superiors have the conception of true existence in their continua but do not adhere to true existence. Thus, if a superior has a conception of true existence in his continuum, there is no pervasion that he adheres to true existence.

There is a difference between the way in which a person apprehends true existence and the way in which an awareness apprehends true existence. When it is said that a person adheres to the

true existence of a table, is it due to having the conception of true existence of table in his continuum? It is not. The way a person conceives of true existence is by way of asserting or accepting true existence. Therefore, a person can have realized non-true existence but still have the conception of true existence in his continuum up through the seventh ground. However, on the eighth ground and upward there is no conception of true existence.

According to the hinayana, the conception of true existence exists through the end of the continuum of a non-foe destroyer; therefore, only when the person becomes a foe destroyer is the conception of true existence abandoned. If a person has the conception of true existence in his continuum, there is no pervasion that he accepts true existence.

Although a person on the first ground disbelieves in true existence, there is a conception of true existence in his continuum. If one questions even an ordinary bodhisattva on the path of preparation as to whether things exist truly, he would answer that they do not, yet there is a conception of true existence in his continuum. The acceptance of true existence is the conception of the acceptability of true existence.

Student: In terms of experience what is the difference between an eye consciousness to which the impermanence of pot appears but is not apprehended and not appearing at all?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Usually it is said that only a buddha's eye consciousness apprehends both the pot and the impermanence of the pot because a buddha's eye consciousness is omniscient and therefore apprehends everything. With respect to an eye consciousness, appearing and not apprehending compared to not appearing at all are the same. When pot appears to an ordinary being, the eye consciousness does not apprehend the pot to be impermanent, but the person can apprehend it to be impermanent. When pot appears to a person and is apprehended, there is no pervasion that the person apprehends the pot to be impermanent. For example, a cat, which is a person [in Buddhist terminology], has the appearance of pot but does not apprehend the pot to be impermanent. On the other hand, Chogyal's eye consciousness apprehends pot, but Chogyal apprehends pot as impermanent. Thus, the eye consciousness does not apprehend the impermanence of the pot, only the person apprehends this.

END

Monday afternoon, 26 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 195-6) says:

> Then, [the sutra] says:
>
> > "Devaputra, the ultimate truth that has passed beyond ranging through to being an object of the exalted wisdom of an omniscient being possessing the supreme of all aspects is not like that expressed saying 'ultimate truth.' All phenomena are false, that is, deceptive, phenomena."
>
> The meaning of this [sutra] citation [is as follows]. "Devaputra, the ultimate truth that has passed beyond ranging through to being an object of the exalted wisdom of an omniscient being possessing the supreme of all aspects" indicates that ultimate truth has passed beyond being an object of the exalted wisdom of an omniscient being. The way in which it has passed beyond being its object is indicated by the statement, "[it] is not like that expressed saying 'ultimate truth,'" in that when "ultimate truth" is expressed, to the conception that follows upon those words object and subject appear as two separate, individual [things]. Likewise, for that exalted knower of modes of an omniscient being, [ultimate truth] has passed beyond being its object in the sense of appearing in this way. Since all phenomena that appear dualistically are false, deceptive phenomena, it is said that they do not exist in the perspective of a seer of the undeceptive which is suchness alone.

The sutra citation explained here by Lama Tsongkhapa also occurs in Chandrakirti's autocommentary. Here, it says that the ultimate truth has passed beyond all 108 phenomena, ranging from form through omniscience. The sutra says: "[it] is not like that expressed saying 'ultimate truth.'" To a conception that follows upon the words "ultimate truth," subject and object appear as two separate, individual things.

There is debate about the statement in sutra: "If ultimate truth has passed beyond through to being an object of the exalted wisdom of an omniscient being, is ultimate truth not an object?" If someone says that it is not that, we say: "Is it not an object of knowledge? If it is not, it is not an existent because it is not that suitable to be an object of an awareness." On the other hand, if someone says that ultimate truth has not passed beyond being an object of an omniscient mind, then we say that this would contradict this sutra.

Following upon the words "ultimate truth" a conception arises. Conception is a subject (an object-possessor), while ultimate truth is its object. How do they appear? These two appear dualistically as if separate, individual things. On the other hand, the subject, the exalted wisdom seeing modes, and the object, ultimate truth, are one entity like water poured into water due to the vanishing of dualistic appearance for the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. In other words, in the perspective of the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, there is the vanishing of dualistic appearance of subject and object. When ultimate truth appears to an exalted knower realizing modes, it appears in a manner of the vanishing of dualistic appearance. Thus, ultimate truth has passed beyond dualistic appearance. Thus, when the sutra says that ultimate truth has passed beyond being an object of an omniscient being it means that it has passed beyond appearing in a manner that is dualistic.

One can argue: "If an omniscient mind has the appearance of conventionalities it follows that it is not without dualistic appearances because it has the appearance of conventionalities." There are three levels of dualistic appearance: (1) the appearance of conventionalities, (2) the appearance of the object of negation, true existence, and (3) the appearance of subject and object as separate. There is no appearance of conventionalities to a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Based on this, it can be asked: "If there is the appearance of conventionalities is there necessarily dualistic appearance? Is there dualistic appearance for the omniscient mind knowing modes? Because, to that omniscient mind knowing modes, there is the appearance of conventionalities in that all phenomena

appear to that mind. This is because it realizes all phenomena directly due to being an omniscient mind." If someone says that the omniscient mind has dualistic appearance, we answer that it does not because it is an awareness for which dualistic appearance has vanished.

Sutra says: "All phenomena are false, that is, deceptive, phenomena." What are 'all phenomena'? They are conventional truths. But if it is asked "Does 'all phenomena' not include ultimate truth?," one can say that it does. All phenomena are one of the two truths because they are objects of knowledge and objects of knowledge are definitely two in number. There are many ways of being definite in number but here it refers to being definite in number by way of pervasion. Being definitely two in number by way of pervasion means that if it is an object of knowledge it is pervaded by being one of the two, either conventional or ultimate truth. Therefore, with respect to the sutra saying 'all phenomena,' if one says it refers to conventional truth, one can say "Kor sum!" in that if it is asked "Is not ultimate truth included in 'all phenomena?'" it has to be said that it is. Although ultimate truth is included in all phenomena, there is no pervasion that phenomena have to be ultimate truths. This is similar to a debate that occurs in *Collected Topics,* saying: Is object of knowledge a permanent phenomenon or functioning thing? The answer given is that it is a permanent phenomenon. Then it is asked: Are functioning things not included in objects of knowledge? However, there is no pervasion that because functioning things are included in objects of knowledge, object of knowledge is a functioning thing. If it is an existent it must be either a conventional truth or an ultimate truth; thus if it is not an ultimate truth it must be a conventional truth.

In short, in the perspective of the exalted wisdom knowing modes, ultimate truth, or suchness, there are no conventionalities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 195) says:

> All these [sutra citations] are sources for [saying] that conventionalities, the aggregates and so forth, do not appear in the perspective of a direct seer of suchness. Therefore, in the perspective of a direct seer of suchness, all elaborations of phenomena – the two, things and non-things – are not possible because it does not observe the respective entities of those elaborations.

In short, conventionalities do not exist for an exalted knower seeing suchness. Ultimate truth is free from elaboration.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, in suchness, the distinctions of thing and non-thing, one's own thing and another's thing, truth and not truth, eternalism and nihilism, permanent and impermanent, happiness and suffering, clean and unclean, self and selfless, empty and not empty, definition and illustration, oneness and otherness, production and cessation, and so forth are not possible because of not observing their self-entities.

Phenomena, thing and non-thing, one's own thing and another's thing, truth and non-truth, and so forth, do not appear dualistically to an exalted knower of modes. 'Thing' is usually that which is able to perform a function and 'non-thing' that which is unable to perform a function, but here it seems that thing refers to the subject and non-thing to the object. 'One's own thing and another's thing' refers to an object belonging to oneself and that belonging to someone else. A 'truth' is that which has a concordant mode of appearing and mode of abidance, whereas a non-truth is that which does not have a concordant mode of appearing and mode of abidance. Eternalism (the permanent) is inherent and true existence or permanent existence, whereas nihilism is the non-existence of phenomena if they do not exist inherently or truly. A permanent phenomenon is that which is a common locus of being a

phenomenon and not being momentary, and an impermanent phenomenon is that which is momentary.

Happiness is an experience of pleasure or contentment, suffering is an experience of pain. The clean is an aggregate that is not projected by the force of karma and afflictions, whereas the unclean is an aggregate projected by the force of karma and afflictions. Clean and unclean can also be discussed from the point of view of worldly conventions.

Self is discussed in two contexts: a self that is permanent, unitary, and independent and a self that is self-sufficient substantially existent. There is also an inherently existent self. Selfless is the lack of an inherently existent self. Empty is empty of inherent existence and true existence, whereas not empty is not empty of inherent existence and true existence. Empty and non-empty can also be discussed in terms of empty of a self that is permanent, unitary, and independent and not empty of a self that is permanent, unitary, and independent.

A definition is that which fulfills the three qualities of substantial existence (this is not according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system). Illustration is that which is a basis for ascertaining a definition prior to ascertaining a definiendum. Thus, before ascertaining a definiendum, one must first ascertain the definition. This is done by way of the illustration. The definition of definition can also be posited as: that which fulfills the three qualities of a positer of an aspect. What are these three qualities? The three qualities are: (1) in general, it is a definition, (2) it is established in terms of its own basis of illustration, and (3) it is the definition of that which is its own definiendum and not of any other.

Oneness is defined as that which is not diverse. Otherness is defined as that which is diverse. On the other hand, one substance is defined as that which is not diverse and does not appear separately, whereas other substance is defined as that which is diverse and appears separately.

"Cessation" should perhaps be translated as "ceasing." Texts say that if it is a compounded phenomenon, it is produced and ceases. Ceasing, or cessation, should *not* be understood in terms of the attributes of compounded phenomena of production, abiding, and cessation.

"Are not possible" means that these pairs cannot exist inherently. Chandrakirti says that this is because their own entities are not observed.

With respect to this passage in the autocommentary, Lama Tsongkhapa merely says: "Therefore, in the perspective of a direct seer of suchness, all elaborations of phenomena – the two, things and non-things – are not possible because it does not observe the respective entities of those elaborations."

Chandrakirti says:

> Therefore, like that, to contemplate suchness, only the aryas are valid; those who are not aryas, are not.

Ordinary beings are not valid with respect to suchness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 195) says:

> Therefore, with respect to the thought of suchness, explicitly superiors alone are valid; non-superiors are explicitly not valid. Therefore, the refutation of production from other in the perspective of a superior's seer of the ultimate is not harmed by the world.

The world cannot harm the refutation of production from other in the perspective of a superior's seer of suchness.

Tuesday morning, 27 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 195) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B4 Indicating that which invalidates the harm by the world to the refutation [of production from other]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 73) says:

> In case the perceptions of the world about analyzing thusness were also accepted as valid states due to a desire to express the damage of the world, [let it] be like that and:
>
> *If the world were valid, since the world [would] see thusness,*
> *What would be the need for the other aryas?*
> *What could be done by the arya path?*
> *The foolish as valid is also unreasonable.* [6.30]
>
> Because the world is accepted as just valid and just it perceives thusness, if it is necessary that ignorance is accepted as being abandoned, why are the foolish not also reasonable as valid? Whoever has unknowing that is the subject of something, they are seen as not being valid regarding that. For example, with regard to investigating precious jewels and so forth, like those not knowing that.
>
> Because only those with pure eyes and so forth ascertain thusness, since the endeavor in morality, hearing, contemplation, meditation, and so forth in order to bear the arya path in mind also would not bear result – it is not like that. Therefore:
>
> *The world is not valid in all aspects, therefore,*
> *In the context of thusness there is no damage of the world.* [6.31ab]
>
> In the aforementioned fashion, in the context of suchness, the world is not valid in every aspect and in the context of suchness, there is no damage of the world.

There is no harm from the world to the refutation of production from other, although the world maintains that there is production from other. This is because in the context of analyzing suchness, worldly beings are not valid. If worldly beings were valid with respect to analyzing suchness, what purpose would there be for superiors? What would be the purpose of cultivating a path and striving in it since the worldly would see suchness?

Chandrakirti says: "The foolish as valid is also unreasonable." Although the Prasangika Madhyamikas accept the world as valid in general, they say that it is not valid in the context of analyzing suchness. Thus, they say that whereas the seeing of the world is valid, worldly beings are not valid with respect to suchness because, if they were valid in the context of analyzing suchness, there would be no purpose to cultivating and striving in a superior's path.

Chandrakirti says: "Because only those with pure eyes and so forth ascertain thusness, since the endeavor in morality, hearing, contemplation, meditation, and so forth in order to bear the arya path in mind also would not bear result – it is not like that." In order to cultivate a superior's path one must safeguard morality, listen to teachings, contemplate and meditate on them, and so forth. Morality is the foundation or basis on which qualities can be generated, just as the earth is the basis for the growth of all vegetation. Similar to the fact that the better quality the earth, the better quality the harvest, likewise the better the morality, the better the qualities produced. There are different types of morality or ethics such as the vows of individual liberation, bodhisattva vows, and tantra vows, as well as formulated codes of ethics and natural codes of ethics. Observing natural codes of

ethics is refraining from non-virtuous actions that bring the result of suffering in the future and engaging in virtuous actions that bring the result of happiness in the future. The Tibetans say: "If you live in the village of Yalung, you should propitiate the local god," which means that when you live in a certain place you should keep the rules of that place. We should not be like politicians who talk a lot about morality but often behave in the opposite way!

On the basis of morality one should accumulate the hearing of many teachings, reflect on them, and then meditate on them.

In short, there is no harm from the world to the refutation of production from other. This is because the refutation of the production from other is only in the context of analyzing suchness and in the context of analyzing suchness, worldly beings are not valid. For this reason, worldly beings do not harm the refutation of production from other. In other words, worldly beings are not valid with respect to production from other.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 195-6) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *If the world were valid,*
> > *Since worldly beings would see suchness, what need would there be*
> > *[For it to be seen] by others, the superiors? What could be done by a superior's path?*
> > *The foolish as valid is not even feasible.* [6.30]
> >
> > *Therefore, in all aspects the world is not valid. Because of that,*
> > *In the context of suchness there is no harm from the world.* [6.31ab]
>
> Wishing to express the harm from the world in regard to refuting production from other as ultimate, [there is the following explanation]. In the context of analyzing suchness, if even a seer of the world were asserted to be valid with respect to suchness, it would be as [follows]. *If* a seer of *the world were valid* with respect to suchness, *since* normal *worldly beings would* directly *see*, that is, realize, *suchness* and, in addition, they would have [directly realized it] from beginningless cyclic existence whereby ignorance would have to be asserted to have been abandoned, *what need would there be* for suchness to be directly realized *by others, the superiors?* There would be no purpose. Also *what could be done by* seeking *a superior's path?* There would be no purpose.

With respect to the refutation of production from other, there is no harm from the world. If it were the case that worldly beings realize suchness, there would be no purpose to cultivating a superior's path. This is because if worldly beings were valid with respect to suchness they would have realized suchness, and if this were the case they would have realized it from beginningless time in cyclic existence whereby it would be necessary to say that they have abandoned ignorance. If this were the case, there would be no need for them to cultivate a superior's path as they would have already abandoned the conception of true existence due to having directly realized emptiness. In that case, what need would there be to cultivate a superior's path? In short, a seer of the world is not valid with respect to suchness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 196) says:

> *The foolish*, who are normal worldly beings, *as valid* with respect to suchness *is not even feasible*. *Therefore*, in the context of analyzing suchness, *in all aspects*, that is, in every way, a seer of *the world is not valid* with respect to suchness. *Because of that, in the context of suchness there is no harm from the world*.

The foolish, who are normal worldly beings, are not valid with respect to suchness. Since they are never valid with respect to the analysis of suchness, how could there be harm from the world to the

refutation of production from other? Who is it that says that there is harm from the world to the refutation of production from other?
Student: Perhaps it is the lower Buddhist schools.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why would they say that?
Student: The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that there is production from other and that production from other exists because other inherently exists.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If the Svatantrika Madhyamikas say there is harm from the world to the refutation of production from other, how is there harm?
Student: The Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that there is no production from other, whereas because the Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that there is production from other in the context of the world they say that the Prasangika Madhyamikas' assertion is harmed by the world.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Who is the world?
Student: The world includes everyone from uneducated farmers to those who study the Svatantrika Madhyamika tenets.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is correct to say that those who have not trained in terminology are "the world," or worldly beings. They see that, having planted a seed in a field, there is the production of a plant; therefore, there is production from other. The lower schools say that the Prasangika Madhyamikas' assertion is harmed both by reasoning and by the world.

By mentioning the specification 'as ultimate' in the statement, "Wishing to express the harm from the world in regard to refuting production from other as ultimate," the Svatantrika Madhyamikas are included. In the Svatantrika Madhyamika system, production from other is not refuted, whereas production from other *as ultimate* is refuted. Therefore, those who say that the refutation of production from other as ultimate is harmed by the world are the lower schools from the Chittamatra downward. This is because they say that there is production from other as ultimate. They say that if there were no production from other ultimately, there would be no production from other at all. Thus, this outline can be understood in terms of there being harm to both Madhyamika schools from the world. The proponents of true existence say that the two Madhyamika schools are harmed by the world because production from other is seen by the world and established for the world. The proponents of true existence dispute the two Madhyamika schools saying: "Is son not other than mother? If they are not other, are they one?"

When this harm from the world to the Madhyamika schools' refutation of production from other is pointed out by the lower schools, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas respond that they accept that there is production from other but that there is no production from other ultimately. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond that although there is production of a son from a mother, there is no production from other because the production of a son from a mother is not production from other. The production of a son from a mother is not production from other because an inherently existent mother cannot give birth to an inherently existent son. Thus, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say there is no production from other.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 196) says:

> Although there are both those who say "Stating 'in all aspects the world is not valid' (v. 6.31a) demonstrates that this system does not assert [a seer of the world] as valid at all, therefore, that system, moreover, is not pure" and others who say "[Therefore,] that system is excellent," they are similarly said to not realize the assertions of this master, [Chandrakirti]. Therefore, because their respective presentations are limited, with regard to presenting a seer of the world as not valid in all aspects with respect to suchness they understand [Chandrakirti] as not asserting [a seer of the world] as valid in general. A valid cognizer and an object of comprehension, moreover, as is said in *Clear Words*, having been refuted to be established by way of their own entity should be taken, as is

explained, to be posited as valid cognizer and object of comprehension that are posited interdependently. This will be explained later on.

The first opinion, "Stating 'in all aspects the world is not valid' (v. 6.31a), demonstrates that this system does not assert [a seer of the world] as valid at all, therefore, that system, moreover, is not pure," is not correct. When Chandrakirti says that "in all aspects the world is not valid," it means that the world is not valid with respect to suchness in all aspects, not that it is not valid at all.

Likewise, the second opinion, "Stating 'in all aspects the world is not valid' demonstrates that this system does not assert [a seer of the world] as valid at all, therefore, that system is excellent," is also incorrect. Lama Tsongkhapa says that both these people have not understood Chandrakirti's assertions correctly. The line from the root text, 'in all aspects the world is not valid,' means that worldly beings are not valid with respect to suchness; it does not mean that worldly beings are not valid at all. Lama Tsongkhapa says that those who hold such opinions have understood Chandrakirti to mean that he does not accept valid cognition. However, Chandrakirti does accept valid cognition since *Clear Words* says: "A valid cognizer and an object of comprehension, having been refuted to be established by way of their own entity, should be taken, as is explained, to be posited as valid cognizer and object of comprehension that are posited interdependently." A valid cognizer is posited in dependence on its object of comprehension and an object of comprehension is posited in dependence on a valid cognizer. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas, everything is posited interdependently. Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* says: "Because there are two types of objects of comprehension, there are two types of valid cognizers." It can also be said that because there are two valid cognizers, there are two objects of comprehension. The two types of valid cognizer are valid direct perceivers and inferential valid cognizers. The first is produced without depending on a reason, whereas the latter is produced in dependence on a reason. The objects of a valid direct perceiver are manifest phenomena, whereas the objects of a valid inferential cognizer are hidden phenomena. Although in general there are two types of valid cognizers, in *Clear Words* there is a presentation of four types.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "This will be explained later on." 'Later on' refers to a coming passage in the *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 280).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 196) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-1B5 Indicating the way of harming that is harm by the world

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 74) says:

If asked: Well then, how is there damage by the world?
It is explained:

Since the objects of the world are renowned to the world,
If denied, the world will damage. [6.31cd]

For example, someone mentions, "A substance of mine was stolen," and another disputes and interrogates him: "What is the substance?" Upon his comment, "A vase is the substance," he is refuted by him saying, "A vase is not a substance because of being an object of comprehension, like a dream vase." With regard to such objects and so forth, since the objects of the world are just renowned to the world, to make a denial will be harmed by the world.

When abiding in an arya's perception, learned beings take it as valid, then there will not exist the harm of the world. The learned should also analyze others by this position.

In this example, one person says "A substance of mine has been stolen," to which a second person asks, "What substance?" To this, the first person responds "A pot is the substance," with respect to which the second person says: "A pot is not a substance because it is an object of comprehension, like a dream pot." In other words, the second person says that the first person's pot has not been stolen because it is like a dream pot. However, such a response is incorrect in that it is harmed by the world. In other words, if someone says something that goes beyond what is renowned to the world then the world harms his statement. What is renowned to the world? It is that which is well known to worldly beings. That which is known to them cannot be harmed by the world itself. In addition, the valid cognizer of a superior realizing that there is no production from other cannot be harmed by the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 195) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *When an object of the world is denied*
> > *By means of renown itself, there is harm by the world.* [6.31cd]
>
> QUESTION: Well then, how is there harm by the world?
> RESPONSE: *When an object* that is renowned to and established for *the world* itself *is denied by means of the renown* of the world *itself*, *there is harm by the world* to that person. For example, someone says, "A substance of mine has been taken," and another person questions him asking, "What substance?" Then, in regard to his saying, "A pot," the other refutes this saying, "A pot is not a substance because it is an object of comprehension, like the pot of a dream." Objects such as this refutation and so forth are harmed by the world.
>
> When a being skilled in the ultimate is taken to be valid and suchness is settled in dependence on a superior's seer of the ultimate, there is no harm from the world.

If someone says, "A substance of mine has been taken" and another person questions him, asking, "What substance?," if he answers, "A pen," the other refutes this saying, "A pen is not a substance because it is an object of comprehension, like the pen of a dream." When the second person refutes the first person, does he not set forth a correct proof? Stating "If it is an object of comprehension it is pervaded by not being a substance" is a case of counter-pervasion.

Another example is someone goes to the village of Pomaia and says, "A substance of mine was stolen," and upon being asked what was stolen he answers "My T-shirt." If the second person says, "Your T-shirt is not a substance because it is an object of comprehension, like the T-shirt of dream," this person is not correct. In other words, it is incorrect to say that he has lost the T-shirt of a dream and not an actual T-shirt.

Lama Tsongkhapa also says that that which is established by a superior, for example, the refutation of production from other, cannot be harmed by the world.

Tuesday afternoon, 27 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 197) says:

> [The passage from Chandrakirti's autocommentary] "The learned should also analyze others by means of this position" [means as follows]: When [someone] says, "I am not the owner of the pot and Devadatta is not the robber..." and when [someone else] says, "It is produced in my field," and in response to the question, "What is produced?", says, "A sprout," those who assert statements [such as] "A sprout is not produced because it is an object of comprehension" and "Like a person and a sprout in a dream" to be the great reasonings of the Middle Way are shown to be harmed by the world.

The statement "I am not the owner of the pot and Devadatta is not the robber..." is related to the previous dialogue regarding a stolen pot. Lama Tsongkhapa says that the learned should analyze other situations using this same logic.

In the second example, the object under analysis is the production of a sprout in a field. As in the first example, someone says, "It is produced in my field," to which a second person asks "What is produced?" Upon the first person responding, "A sprout," the second person says "A sprout is not produced because it is an object of comprehension, like the sprout of a dream." "If it is an object of comprehension it is not produced" is the counter-pervasion. The example "like a sprout in a dream," is a correct example since it is true that a sprout in a dream is not produced. The argument can be set out as a syllogism: A sprout, as a subject, is not produced because it is an object of comprehension, like a sprout in a dream. This means that if it is an object of comprehension the non-production of a sprout is established upon the basis, a sprout in a dream. Is a sprout in a dream an object of comprehension?
Student: No, it is not an object of comprehension.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It follows that a sprout in a dream is non-existent. From this, it follows that there is no person in a dream, etc. Does a sprout in a dream exist?
Student: It does.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does a dream son exist? If so, what is he like? Is the sprout of a dream an appearance that arises for a dream consciousness or for sleep consciousness? Is there a difference between a dream consciousness and a sleep consciousness? Does a sprout of a dream appear to a sleep consciousness or to some other consciousness?
Student: It appears to a sleep consciousness.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Can that appearing to a sleep consciousness in a similar aspect be defined as a dream?
Student: A sprout appears to a dream consciousness, but since a dream consciousness is not a valid cognizer, the sprout does not exist because it is not cognized by a valid cognizer.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Then what is the sprout of a dream? The son of a dream? The elephant of a dream? The deity of a dream?
Student: Due to the ripening of past karma, images appear to a dream consciousness and are observed by a sleep consciousness.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is the sprout of a dream a consciousness, a form, a non-associated compositional factor, or a permanent phenomenon?
Student: It is the object of a dream consciousness that is dreaming, therefore, it is a form sphere for that consciousness.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it is a form sphere, is it color or shape? The sprout of a dream is not a sprout. But the sprout of a dream has a similar appearance to sprout. Is it like a reflection of a face in a mirror? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "those who assert such statements to be the great reasonings of the Middle Way are shown to be harmed by the world." If someone says that the statement "A sprout is not produced because it is an object of comprehension, like a sprout in a dream" is the great reasoning of the Middle Way this would be harmed by the world. In other words, such reasoning is not the reasoning of the Middle Way.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 197) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1B-2 Dispelling harm from the world through production from other not existing even in the conventions of the world

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 75) says:

Although, having accepted production from others through the renown of the world, the damage of the world was completely abandoned, now, since even in the world, production from others does not exist, in order to indicate that, "damage of the world does not exist," with regard to accepting production from others as refuted even by abiding in that view, it is explained:

Because, having cast mere seed, the world
Announces, "I produced this boy," and also
Considers that the tree was planted. Due to these conceptions,
Production from others does not exist even in the world. [6.32]

When finely indicating someone made conspicuous due to [having] the male faculty, the comment, "I produced this boy," is made. This [man] did not insert a [boy] of such an aspect within the mother of the [boy] having ejected it from his body.

If asked: Then what [was inserted into the mother]?

A mere impurity that was the seed of that [boy]. Because this [father] brought forth his son having emitted the cause of the [son], therefore, the two, the seed and the boy, are not mere others. [Such] statements are clearly ascertained in the world.

If there were otherness, like another person, that [boy] would also not be finely indicated [saying, "I produced him."]. It should also be applied similarly for a seed and a tree.

Simply said, there is no harm from the world to the refutation of production from other because worldly beings do not accept causes and results as other. In the world, people say "I produced that boy" and when they plant a seed in a field, in regard to the tree that is produced, they say "I planted that tree" and not "I planted that seed." Likewise, when a man puts an impurity in a woman's womb and a son is produced, he says "I produced that boy" and does not say "I put that impurity." Thus, production from other is not accepted even in the world, whereby the refutation of production from other is not harmed by the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 197) says:

Therefore, even though by asserting production from other in the perspective of what is renowned to the world, harm from the world was abandoned, now, since production from other does not exist even for a seer of the world, in order to indicate "There is no harm from the world" – even from the point of view of those abiding in the views of the world – to the assertion that production from other is refuted there is [the following] explanation.
Chandrakirti says:

Because of that, since worldly beings, having planted a mere seed,
Say "I produced that boy" and
Conceive "I also planted that tree,"
Production from other does not exist even for the world. [6.32]

Because of that reason, when *worldly beings* point out someone with a male faculty they *say "I produced that boy."* Even though they say so, it is not the case that that father ejected someone with a male faculty from his own body and inserted it into the mother of that boy. Then, what [is the case]? He *planted*, that is, put, *a mere* impurity which is the *seed* of that boy's body into the womb of his mother.

The assertion of production from other is not harmed by the world because worldly beings do not understand the meaning of production from other. However, Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "'There is

no harm from the world' – even from the point of view of those abiding in the views of the world – to the assertion that production from other is refuted."

Chandrakirti says: "Production from other does not exist even for the world." Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Because of that reason, when worldly beings point out someone with a male faculty, they say "I produced that boy." Although they say this, it does not mean that this man ejected a boy from his body and inserted it into the mother's womb. Rather, he inserted an impurity that is a seed into the mother's womb, whereby a son was produced. The impurity inserted by him into the mother's womb joined with an egg, into which a consciousness entered, whereby it developed into a child. Due to this, people say "I produced that boy" or "I produced that girl."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 197) says:

> Because of that, that father, having expelled the cause of that boy's body, points him out as his son.

The father does not think of the cause, the impurity, and the result, the son, as other. Therefore, production from other is not even mentioned in the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 197) says:

> Therefore, the statement "The two, the seed and the boy, are not conceived to be an established by way of their own character other" is clearly ascertained in the world.

The seed and the boy are not conceived by the world to be an established by way of its own character other.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 197) says:

> Due to that, the conception that the two, the impurity which is the seed and the boy, and the two, a barley seed and sprout, and so forth are *produced from other does not exist even for the world*.

The world does not say that the two – the impurity that is the seed and the boy – are produced from other. For worldly beings they are one, but if asked whether they are one, the answer is that they are not. Worldly beings think "I produced that boy" and do not think that it was produced from other. If a farmer, for example, is asked "Are a barley seed and sprout one?", he would answer that they are not. But if he is asked "Is there production from other?", he would not know how to respond.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 198) says:

> If they were conceived to be an established by way of their own entity other, based on that boy, who is like another person, one would not point to him saying "I produced him." Similarly, if having planted the mere seed of a tree, a tree is produced from it, *since* one *conceives* "*I planted that tree*," that there is no production from other and so forth in the perspective of the world is to be applied as before.

If the impurity that is the seed and the boy are conceived to be an established by way of their own entity other, it would be like someone pointing to the son of another family and saying "I produced that son." For example, Maurizio would not point to Gianni's child saying "I produced that son." Also if Nobil plants a seed, no one else would say "I planted that tree;" Nobil alone would say that. Thus, there is no production from other even in the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 198) says:

> The two seeds that were planted are not a tree and not a boy. However, if, in dependence on planting those two [seeds], a tree and a boy are produced, based on those two, one can posit "I produced them." For example, although a hand that is ailing and a hand that is healed are not the person, that person can be posited as ailing or healed due to an ailing or healed hand.

For example, if one has an ailing hand one says "I am sick," and when the hand is healed one says "I am better." This is in spite of the fact that the hand is not "I," but a limb of the body. Why does one say "I hurt" when the hand is painful? Or why does one say "I am sick" when one has a headache?
Student: Because there is a feeling related to the hand, one says "I am sick."
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: When the hand is burnt, why does someone say "I am burnt"? Is it related to an innate awareness that automatically arises without reasoning? Our hand is part of our body and our body is one entity with the self; therefore, there is an innate awareness thinking, "I am sick." There is a relation of one entity between body and self. What do you think about this?
Student: The hands and so forth are the basis of imputing the self.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The aggregates and so forth are one entity with the I. Is the basis of imputation one entity with the imputed phenomenon?
Student: It is.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In general it is said that the basis of imputation and the imputed phenomenon are one entity. I once debated this, saying that they are not one entity, and gave the example of a rikshaw driver. My point was that the name 'rikshaw driver' is given on the basis of the rikshaw. Likewise, when we say 'car driver' the basis of imputation is the car itself. These two, the car and car driver, are not one entity. The defendant had a hard time refuting me!

Wednesday morning, 28 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 198) says:

> Thus, even though in the conventions of the world there is no production from other, the existence of production from other cannot be refuted by a seer of the world because the refutation of cause and result as inherently different entities is definitely based on the reasoning analyzing suchness.
>
> Therefore, the meaning of production from other asserted by other proponents of tenets is production from an other that is established by way of its own character; it is not [production from an other] that is merely established as another entity since merely that is not even not established in the perspective of the world.

For ordinary worldly beings who are not learned in tenets, there is no convention of production from other. However, a seer of the world cannot refute production from other because in order to refute this one must apply the reasoning analyzing suchness. In other words, in order to refute that cause and result are inherently other, one must use the reasoning analyzing suchness. Analyzing production from other is analyzing suchness. Therefore, in order to refute production from other, one must apply the reasoning analyzing suchness. A reasoning analyzing conventionalities cannot refute production from other. Production from other, for those who assert it, is production of a result established by way of its own character from a cause established by way of its own character, or the production of an inherently existent result from an inherently existent cause. Production from other that is production from an other that is merely established as another entity is not the criteria for establishing production from other because phenomena are accepted by the world to be produced from other. Seed and sprout, according to the world, are established as other entities. Although the sprout being an other entity from the seed is acceptable to the world, this does not mean that the world asserts production from other. This is because production from other means an inherently existent result is produced

from an inherently existent cause. Likewise, the Prasangika Madhyamika system does not assert that seed and sprout are one entity, but that they are different or other entities. However, if someone disputes them, saying "Sprout, as the subject, it follows that it is produced from other because it is produced from a seed which is a different entity," the Prasangika Madhyamikas would say that there is no pervasion.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 198) says:

> The meaning of "Production from other does not exist even for the world" (v. 6.32d) is not merely "A normal worldly being does not conceive substantial cause and result, such as seed and sprout and so forth, to be an established by way of their own character other"; it is to be understood also as indicating that production from other does not exist even in conventional terms.

Normal worldly beings do not conceive a substantial cause, the seed, and a substantial result, the sprout, to be an established by way of their own character other. In addition to this, "Production from other does not exist even for the world" is also to be understood as meaning that production from other does not exist even in conventional terms.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 198) says:

> Also, the commentary that refutes production from both [in Chandrakirti's text in the context of explaining v. 6.98] clearly states that there is no production from other even in conventional terms, saying:
>
> > Just as indicated above "production from self and other are not feasible either as a worldly conventionality or ultimately," likewise, also propounding two important phrases is not possible due to the reasonings that were explained.

The autocommentary (Tibetan text page 127) says:

> *Production from two is also not a reasonable entity,*
> *Because those faults that were already explained will accrue.* [6.98ab]
>
> There, those [Nirgranthas or Jainas], who propound phrases in two possibilities,[28] consider production from both since production occurs from self and also occurs from other.

"Phrases in two possibilities" (better translated as "two important phrases") refers to production from self and production from other.

In short, production from other is not mentioned in the world even in conventional terms. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that just as there is no production from other for the world, there is no production from other.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 198-9) says:

> *Clear Words* says:
>
> > QUESTION: If there is no production of things from self, other, both, and causelessly, why is it that the Bhagavan said "Karmic formations [are produced] by the condition of ignorance"?

[28] Skt: *syadvada*; Tib: *gal nyi.su smra.ba* – 'those who propound two possibilities.' The phrase 'it might be,' or 'in the case that,' is especially used in Jaina works.

> RESPONSE: I will explain this. They are conventionalities, not suchnesses.
>
> This means that the karmic formations and so forth produced by ignorance are conventionalities; they are not ultimates.

Since there is no production from self, other, both, and causelessly, someone asks why the Buddha said that karmic formations are produced from the condition of ignorance. The answer is that production from other is discussed in the context of the reasoning analyzing the ultimate, whereas the fact that karmic formations are produced from the condition of ignorance is discussed in the context of conventionalities. Conventionally from ignorance there is production of karmic formations, from karmic formations there is the production of consciousness, from consciousness there is the production of name and form, and so forth. Thus, serial production exists conventionally. When the twelve links are discussed in terms of a previous link producing a later link, is this presentation in terms of completing one round of the twelve links or more than one?
Student: It involves more than one.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: One round of twelve links means that all twelve links occur in a single rebirth. First, there is ignorance. From it, arise karmic formations, which are deposited on the consciousness. These are then nourished by craving and grasping and then intensified by becoming. In the second moment following that, there is birth and simultaneously name and form. In the second moment following that, there can be either aging or death, as well as the link of the six spheres (the formation of the senses). This is followed by contact (the meeting of object, sense power, and consciousness), which in the second moment is followed by feeling. This is the way in which one cycle of the twelve links occurs in a single rebirth. There is another way of explaining the twelve links in terms of their being completed in more than one rebirth.

When the condition, ignorance, produces karmic formations, this is in terms of conventionalities and not in terms of the ultimate. The Prasangika Madhyamika system's presentation of the twelve links is explained in the 26th chapter of *Fundamental Wisdom*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 199) says:

> QUESTION: "What is it that is explained in the presentation of conventionalities?"
> RESPONSE: "Conventionalities are asserted to be established merely by this conditionality; they are not [established] by means of asserting the four positions."
>
> This clearly says that production from the four positions is also not asserted in regard to asserting the production which is the arising of *this* in dependence on *that* condition conventionally.

> Therefore, saying "In this system production from other is not refuted conventionally" is the explanation of those who do not realize this system well.

The question "Why is the presentation of conventionalities explained?" arises from the fact that in terms of conventionalities, karmic formations are produced from the condition of ignorance. The four positions mentioned here are: (1) production from self, (2) production from other, (3) production from both, and (4) causeless production. Conventionalities are not asserted in terms of these four positions.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, saying "In this system production from other is not refuted conventionally" is the explanation of those who do not realize this system well." Someone who says that the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that production from other exists conventionally but not ultimately has a wrong understanding of the Prasangika Madhyamika system because this system says that production from other does not exist either conventionally or ultimately. On the

other hand, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that although there is production from other conventionally, there is no production from other ultimately.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 199) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1C Indicating the excellent qualities of such a refutation

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 75) says:

Therefore, in order to indicate the quality in the manner of so explaining [things as without inherent existence][29] by way of establishing dependent arising without eternalism or nihilism, it is explained:

Because the sprout is not other than the seed, therefore,
At the time of the sprout, the disintegrated seed does not exist.
Because oneness is non-existent, therefore, also
At the time of the sprout, one does not express, "The seed exists." [6.33]

If the sprout were just other than the seed, the continuity of the seed would doubtlessly also be cut off while the sprout is existing, because, although cows were to die, it is not that the continuity [of their species] would not be cut due to the existence of wild cattle and although aryas were to pass beyond sorrow, it is not [that their continuity would not be cut off] due to the existence of ordinary beings.

Because otherness does not exist, like the self-essence of the sprout, the seed is not cut off. Thus, nihilism is abandoned. Since oneness does not exist, that itself which is the seed is not the sprout. Hence, because of refuting the non-disintegration of the seed, eternalism is also refuted.

As was taught [in the *Extensive Sport Sutra*]:

If the seed exists, so does the sprout;
Whatever is the seed, that itself is not the sprout.
It is not other than that, it is not that either.
Thus, the *dharmata* is not eternalistic, not nihilistic.

"If the seed exists," means "if the seed were to exist."

If it is said: If the sprout bearing the cause of the seed also arises, it is unsuitable as just other than the seed.

It was taught [in the above citation]: *whatever is the seed, that itself <u>is</u> not the sprout*.

Again, if asked: Why would that very seed not be in the sprout?

Therefore it was taught [above]: *it is not other than that, it is not that*.

Because the position of both thatness and otherness is impossible, therefore, other than that and just not other are unreasonable. Thus, if both positions were refuted, it will become fully clarified as *dharmata* without eternalism or nihilism.

The thusness that is the meaning here should be understood as being, "if there were to exist some self-nature in the two, seed and sprout, the two would be just one or other. Hence, if the self-nature of those is non-existent, then like seeds and sprouts observed also in a dream, how would they become just one or just other?"

This very meaning was explained [*in the Extensive Sport Sutra*]:

[29] LTK, p. 209.

> All [karmic] formations possess the condition of ignorance.
> Those compoundeds are not existent in thusness.
> These two, formation and ignorance, are empty,
> Separated from movement by self-nature.

It was also taught in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, 18.10]:

> Whatever arises dependent on something, it is not that itself to a small extent,
> nor is it other than that; therefore, there is no eternalism or nihilism.

If one negates production from other in this way, there is the excellent quality of becoming free from the two extremes of permanence and annihilation. The term "dependent-relation" eliminates these two extremes simultaneously because "dependent" means that something depends on an other and therefore it eliminates the extreme of permanence, and "relation" means that something is not non-existent since it exists in relation to an other and therefore it eliminates the extreme of annihilation. For the reason that the reasoning of dependent-relation, or dependent-arising, is able to eliminate the two extremes at once it is said to be the "king of reasonings." Other reasonings are not able to eliminate the two extremes simultaneously. There is a passage in a text that says: "Having examined other reasonings, it comes down to dependent-arising." It is like the fact that no matter how much the ministers discuss a particular matter, the president alone has the final word meaning that if the president does not give his approval all the previous discussion by the ministers becomes useless. In this sense dependent-arising is called "the king of reasonings."

Seed and sprout are different in conventional terms. Thus, at the time of the seed, the sprout does not exist. Likewise, at the time that the sprout is produced the seed has disintegrated. This is what is known and seen in the world. Thus, if we were to plant a wheat seed in a pot of earth and water it, a sprout would be produced, but if we were to look for the seed we would only find its husk. If seed and sprout were an inherently existent other, such transformation could not occur.

At the time of the sprout has the continuity of the seed been interrupted? It has not, yet the seed itself no longer exists. The potency of the seed has transferred to the sprout. Likewise, due to the birth of a son the continuity of the lineage of a king is not uninterrupted, whereas if he does not have a son the continuity of his lineage will be interrupted. This process is similar in terms of both inner and outer causes and results.

Wednesday afternoon, 28 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 199) says:

> Therefore, with regard to the way it is explained above that things do not inherently exist like that, in order to indicate the quality of not falling into the extremes of permanence and annihilation by means of establishing dependent-arising as without permanence and annihilation there is [the following] explanation.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *Because of that, a sprout is not other than the seed.*
> > *Therefore, at the time of the sprout there is no disintegration of the seed.*
> > *Because of that, they do not exist as just one. Also because of that,*
> > *At the time of the sprout it is not said "The seed exists."* [6.33]
>
> If a sprout were an inherently existent other than the seed, because the two, seed and sprout, would be unsuitable as cause and result, the sprout being existent without doubt the continuity of the seed would be interrupted. This is because through seed and sprout having become unrelated, although

> the sprout exists, it does not contribute to the non-interruption of the continuity of type of the seed. For example, it is like:
> - oxen having died, the existence of *bamen* [cattle] not contributing to the non-interruption of the continuity of type [of oxen] and
> - the existence of ordinary beings not contributing to the non-interruption of the continuity of superiors circling in their own existence.

Seed and sprout are not an inherently existent other. This is because if they were an inherently existent other, they would not be suitable to be cause and result. If they were inherently existent, it would follow that when the sprout is produced the continuity of the seed would be interrupted because they are unrelated. This is likened to the situation in which, oxen having died, the existence of *bamen* cattle does not contribute to the non-interruption of the continuity of type of oxen because oxen and *bamen* cattle are unrelated. What is a *bamen*? It is another species similar to oxen, perhaps a type of wild cow. An ox is defined in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* as: a composite of a hump and dewlap. A *bamen* is similar to an ox but not exactly the same. Another example is: the existence of yaks not contributing to the non-interruption of the continuity of type of cows or dogs and so forth. Lama Tsongkhapa also gives the example of "the existence of ordinary beings not contributing to the non-interruption of the continuity of superiors circling in their own existence."

In short, if seed and sprout were an inherently existent other they would be unrelated, whereby when a sprout is produced it would not contribute to the non-interruption of the continuity of type of the seed, just as in the two examples.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 199-200) says:

> This being the case, *for that* reason with respect to the position that *a sprout is not* an inherently existent *other than the seed* it does not contradict the two, [seed and sprout,] being cause and result. *Therefore*, *at the time of the* existence of the *sprout*, the continuity of its type, that is, *the state of disintegration of the seed*, has [not] been interrupted; thereby annihilation is avoided.

When the seed disintegrates and transforms into the sprout, what happens to its continuity? The continuity of type of the seed transfers to the entity of the sprout; therefore, the continuity of the seed is not interrupted at the time of the sprout. Because of this, one would not say that the continuity of the seed *has been* interrupted, whereby annihilation is abandoned (this discussion refers to the fact that the Tibetan version of the text is missing the negative particle and says "the continuity of its type *has* been interrupted"). In short, the continuity of the seed is *not* interrupted; thus, annihilation is abandoned. If the continuity of its type were interrupted, annihilation could not be abandoned. When a sprout is produced if it is asked "Has the seed disintegrated?", the answer is that it has, whereas its continuity still exists. The seed is the congruent cause of the sprout.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 200) says:

> Since it has been explained many times that at the time of the sprout the seed has ceased, the commentary explains the meaning of the state of disintegration of the seed to be that the continuity of the seed has been interrupted and says that the non-disintegration of the seed is refuted. Therefore, saying "the continuity of the seed has been interrupted" is asserted to [mean that] the continuity of *its type* has been interrupted.

This is Lama Tsongkhapa's explanation of Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 75), which says: "Because otherness does not exist, like the nature of the sprout, the seed is not interrupted. Thus, it being annihilated is abandoned."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 200) says:

> *Because of that*, the two, seed and sprout, *do not exist as just one*, therefore, the seed itself does not transfer into the sprout. At the time of the sprout, that the seed is not destroyed is refuted. *Also because of that*, *at the time of the sprout it is not said "The seed exists,"* whereby it is also refuted as being permanent.

This is Lama Tsongkhapa's explanation of Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 75) which says: "Since oneness does not exist, that itself which is the seed is not the sprout. Therefore, because of refuting the non-destruction of the seed, it being permanent is also refuted."

Does the continuity of the seed become the entity of the sprout? It does. Does this mean that the seed transfers itself into the entity of the sprout? Although Jonathan transfers from Italy to France, he still remains Jonathan. The word "transfer" usually means to change place. Does the seed itself transfers from the place of the seed to the place of the sprout? It is not like that. I think it is better to say that the continuity of the seed goes on to become the entity of the sprout.

Has the seed disintegrated at the time of the sprout? It has, therefore, one should not say that the seed exists at the time of the sprout. In this way the extreme of permanence is refuted. I think that if it is asked "Does the seed exist at the time of the sprout?" the answer is that it does not, whereas if it is asked "Does the *continuity* of the seed exist at the time of the sprout?" the answer is that it does.

When the seed has disintegrated, has the seed become non-existent? It has; however, the continuity of the seed has not become non-existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 200) says:

> Such an explanation is set forth in the *Extensive Sport Sutra* saying:
>
> > If the seed exists, how could the sprout?
> > Whatever is the seed, that itself is not the sprout,
> > It is not other than it, it is also not that.
> > Therefore, reality is not permanence and is not annihilation.

This sutra is also quoted in Chandrakirti's autocommentary.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 200) says:

> The meaning of that is [as follows]. The meaning of these [lines] is that when the seed becomes existent, also the sprout – that having the cause which is the seed – arises accordingly. When [the sprout] arises, it is not suitable to arise from, that is, through, the seed. Therefore, if one thinks "The two, the seed and the sprout, are one entity," although it is not [the case] that the sprout arises from other than the seed, it is not that the seed itself transfers to the sprout.

The seed and sprout are not one entity. If they were one, it would not be feasible to say that a result arises from a cause or, for example, that a sprout arises from a seed. Therefore, seed and sprout are different entities. Because they are different entities, a sprout can be produced from a seed. The sprout is produced only upon the transformation of the seed into a dreg.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "although it is not [the case] that the sprout arises from other than the seed, it is not that the seed itself transfers into the sprout." The seed itself transferring into the sprout

does not mean that the seed becomes the sprout, it means that the continuity of the seed transfers to the sprout.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 200) says:

> What is the reason for that? It is because that sprout is not an inherently existent other than the seed and it is also not one nature with it. Also, whenever such two positions are refuted, the nature of the sprout is clarified to be reality which is free from permanence and annihilation.

In conclusion, a seed is free from the extreme of permanence and free from the extreme of annihilation. It is free from the extreme of permanence because it is free from true existence, and it is free from the extreme of annihilation because its continuity remains.

"Such two positions" refers to:
1. the sprout is an inherently existent other than the seed and
2. the sprout is one nature with the seed.

In brief, through refuting that a sprout is inherently existent it is established to be a dependent-arising, whereby the extreme of permanence is refuted.

Thursday morning, 29 June 2000

Student: What is the difference between the Tibetan words *brgyud* and *brgyun* which have both been translated as continuity?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In general the Tibetan words *brgyud* and *brgyun* are similar but in certain contexts there is a slight difference. The first moment of the uninterrupted path of the mahayana path of seeing is a continuity (*brgyun*) of the last moment of the supreme mundane quality level of mahayana path of preparation, but it is not a continuity of type (*rigs brgyud*) because the first moment of the uninterrupted path of mahayana path of seeing is uncontaminated, while the previous moment of the supreme mundane quality level of the mahayana path of preparation is contaminated. Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* says that excluding the first moment of the uncontaminated, everything else has a congruent cause. The first moment of the uninterrupted path of mahayana path of seeing does not have a congruent cause because uncontaminated and contaminated are not congruent (literally, not of equal fortune).

Another example is a mule, the offspring of a male donkey and a female horse, which is a continuity of the father but is not a continuity of type. Thus, if it is a continuity it is not necessarily a continuity of type, whereas if it is a continuity of type (*rigs brgyud*) it is necessarily a continuity (*rgyun*).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 200) says:

> That very meaning is explained in the *[Extensive Sport] Sutra* saying:
>
> > Karmic formations have the condition of ignorance.
> > Those karmic formations do not exist in suchness.
> > The two, karmic formations and ignorance, are empty,
> > That is, they are free from inherently existent movement.
>
> The first line indicates the reason, this being that karmic formations arise in dependence on ignorance. The second line indicates the thesis: "karmic formations do not exist in suchness." The third line indicates that both cause and result are empty. The fourth line indicates the way in which they are empty, that is, movement is strong formation while the freedom from that is a formation's

> emptiness of formation. Furthermore, "free from inherent existence" indicates the qualification of the object of negation, this being similar in meaning to not existing in suchness.

"Karmic formations have the condition of ignorance" means that from the first link of the twelve links of dependent-arising, which is ignorance, arises the second link, karmic formations. The second link, karmic formations, as the subject, does not exist in suchness or does not exist inherently because it arises in dependence upon the condition that is ignorance. Both the cause, ignorance, and the result, karmic formations, are empty of inherent existence. The sutra says: "The two, karmic formations and ignorance, are empty." This is explained, saying: "That is, they are free from inherently existent movement." Lama Tsongkhapa says: "movement is strong formation while the freedom from that is a formation's emptiness of formation." The word 'movement' implies movement due to causes and conditions, which means that due to causes and conditions there is the strong formation of things. On the other hand, if something existed inherently, it would be without movement in the sense that it would remain the same without changing. In short, things are free from inherently existent movement, but if things were inherently existent they would not move, that is they would not change.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "'free from inherent existence' indicates the qualification of the object of negation, this being similar in meaning to not existing in suchness." Karmic formations, as the subject, do not exist in suchness because they arise in dependence on the condition of ignorance.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 201) says:

> The meaning of this sutra is also taught in the *Treatise [on the Middle Way]*, *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 18.10) saying:
>
> > Whatever arises in dependence on something,
> > It is not at all that itself,
> > It is also not other than that,
> > Therefore, it is not permanent and not annihilated.

What does "It is not at all that itself, it is also not other than that" mean? If something arises in dependence on causes and conditions, it itself cannot be inherently existent. It also cannot be an inherently existent other. *Fundamental Wisdom* says: "Therefore, it is not permanent and not annihilated." This means that because it is a dependent-arising, it is free from permanence and annihilation. For example, a sprout, as the subject, is not inherently existent because it is a dependent-arising. Hence, a sprout is free from the extreme of permanence and free from the extreme of annihilation. A sprout is not permanent because it does not exist inherently and it is not annihilated because it is not completely non-existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 201) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1D Indicating that there is never inherent production
>
> 1 Refuting the assertion of establishment by way of its own character
> 2 Dispelling argument regarding the refutation [of the assertion of establishment by way of its own character]
>
> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1D-1 Refuting the assertion of establishment by way of its own character
>
> A Refuting [the assertion of establishment by way of its own character] due to it following that a superior's meditative equipoise would be the cause for the destruction of things
> B Refuting [the assertion of establishment by way of its own character] due to it following that truth in conventional terms would withstand analysis by reasoning
> C Refuting [the assertion of establishment by way of its own character] due to it following that ultimate production would not be refuted

These three consequences are mainly flung by the Prasangika Madhyamikas to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas.

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1D-1A Refuting [the assertion of establishment by way of its own character] due to it following that a superior's meditative equipoise would be the cause for the destruction of things

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 76) says:

Just as the statement, "there is no inherent production of anything whatsoever," must be accepted without hesitation; unlike that:

If a self character were dependent,
Because denying that would destroy things,
If emptiness would be the cause of destroying things,
That is unreasonable. Therefore, there is existence of things. [6.34]

If a self-characteristic of things such as form, feeling, and so forth – a self-entity and self-nature were produced by causes and conditions, when this yogi sees things as emptied by self-nature and realizes a phenomenon as without self-nature, at that time he would realize emptiness through denying the self-nature, which is how they were definitely produced.

Therefore, just as hammers and so forth are the causes of the destruction of vases and so forth, if similarly also emptiness were the cause of denying the self-nature of things, that is also not suitable. Therefore, the self-characteristic of things is not to be accepted as produced at any time.

As extensively taught in the *Exalted Pile of Jewels Sutra*:

> Kashyapa, furthermore, the middle path to correctly reflect upon phenomena is: phenomena are not made empty by some emptiness, phenomena themselves are empty; phenomena are not made signless by some lack of signs, phenomena themselves are signless; phenomena are not made wishless by some lack of wishes, phenomena themselves are wishless; phenomena are not made without strong composition by some lack of strong composition, phenomena themselves are without strong composition; phenomena are not made in an unborn state by some non-growing, phenomena themselves are unborn; phenomena are not made to not arise by some non-arisal, phenomena themselves do not arise.

Some, [the Chittamatrins], accept a dependent entity and think that the emptiness that depends on it (i.e., on the dependent entity), having the characteristic of lacking a difference in substance of apprehended and apprehender, is not an object to be expressed as thusness or otherness, like impermanence itself and so forth. If so, [the *Sutra*] would have said, "all phenomena are empty due only to emptiness, they are not [empty] by mere nature."

It is explained in the *Four Hundred* [*Verses*, 8.7]:

> One does not see what is not empty as empty and say, "may nirvana be mine."
> That that wrong view does not pass beyond sorrow was taught by the tathagatas.

It is also taught in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, 13.8]:

> All views of emptiness are taught by the Conqueror as definite removal.
> Those who view emptiness are taught as lacking proof (achievement).

Inherently existent production does not exist at all; this is what should be asserted. However, in response to someone who says it is not to be accepted, Chandrakirti's root text says:

If a self character were dependent,
Because denying that would destroy things,
If emptiness would be the cause of destroying things,
That is unreasonable. Therefore, there is existence of things. [6.34]

Why does it follow that [if there is inherently existent production] the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise becomes a cause for the destruction of things? The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond that the non-existence of establishment by way of its character, the object of negation, is realized by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, whereby the object of negation, establishment by way of its character, is negated. Because the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise negates establishment by way of its character, if things existed by way of their own character they would also be negated by it.

These three consequences are mainly flung by the Prasangika Madhyamikas to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas. When the first consequence, it follows that a superior's meditative equipoise would be the cause for the destruction of things, is thrown to them, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas respond that establishment by way of its own character does exist. To this assertion the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond that it follows that a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is a cause for the destruction of things. This is because if things are established by way of their own character they should be seen by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, whereas they are not seen. Because a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise does not see conventionalities, such as forms and so forth, it follows that they are non-existent.

Gyelwa Gendun Drup's commentary, *The Mirror of the Clarification of Thought* (translated by Martin Willson), says:

If it depended on [existing by] its own nature,
Then negating this would destroy the functional thing,
So voidness would be a cause destroying the thing.
This cannot be so, therefore [such] things do not exist. [6.34]

> It follows that the wisdom-knowledge of the contemplation of the aryas, perceiving voidness, (:) perceives voidness in the manner of negating the nature of a functional thing, and is a cause that destroys the thing. For previously, by hypothesis, the functional thing was dependent on existence by way of its own nature, but it perceives that there is no functional thing existing by way of its own nature. It should be understood that (:) the functional thing does not exist inherently, for if the thing existed inherently, the contemplation perceiving voidness would be the cause destroying the thing, which is impossible.

In summary, [in response to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas assertion that there exists production established by way of its own character] the Prasangika Madhyamikas fling the following consequence to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas: "It follows that a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is a cause for the destruction of things." A yogi single-pointedly absorbed in meditative equipoise on the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena realizes that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence. In the perspective of that meditative equipoise realizing the non-inherent existence of all phenomena there is no inherently existent production. This means that the nature of production is not seen, due to which it is as if this exalted wisdom has destroyed it. Just as upon destroying a cup with a hammer, the cup becomes non-existent, likewise, when a yogi meditates on the emptiness of conventionalities or compounded phenomena of inherent production, they are as if destroyed by his exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Just as a hammer destroys a

cup, a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise destroys phenomena that are inherently produced. Reasoning in this way, it appears that emptiness becomes the cause for the destruction of things; however, it does not. Is emptiness a cause for deprecating the nature of things? It is not. However, the realization of emptiness becomes a condition destroying inherent production. According to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas if something is refuted to be established by way of its own character it becomes non-existent, due to which compounded phenomena would become non-existent. Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that because a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise realizes the emptiness of inherent existence, it becomes a condition for the destruction of all functioning things, compounded phenomena. This is because for the Svatantrika Madhyamikas if something is not established by way of its own character it is non-existent. Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say to them, "You must accept that a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise destroys functioning things." Why is this? Because the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise realizes the non-inherent existence of phenomena. Note that the assertion that the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise realizes the non-inherent existence of phenomena is according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, not according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 201) says:

> As [Chandrakirti's autocommentary] says:
>
> > The statement "There is no production of any phenomenon inherently whatsoever" must be accepted inevitably.
>
> This means that it is appropriate to say "It must definitely be accepted," whereas one should avoid saying, that is, one should not say, "It is unsuitable to posit assertions regarding that." Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *If own character were dependent,*
> > *By deprecating it, things would be destroyed. Therefore,*
> > *If emptiness were to become a cause for the destruction of things,*
> > *That would not be suitable. Therefore, things do not exist.* [6.34]
>
> If that were not the case – that is, *if* a nature that is establishment *by way of its own character*, that is, by way of its own entity, of forms, feelings, and so forth *were* produced *in dependence* on causes and conditions – when a yogi directly realizes phenomena as empty of inherent existence, he would realize emptiness by means of *deprecating that*, the nature of things. This is because, while meditative equipoise necessarily does not observe forms and so forth, if they were established by way of their own character they should be observed by meditative equipoise, whereas they are not. At that time [of not being observed] those things would not exist. If they do not exist, *things* that exist prior to meditative equipoise would later become non-existent, that is, they *would be destroyed*, or would disintegrate. Because of that, meditative equipoise itself would necessarily come to be the cause for such destruction, whereby, just as hammers and so forth are causes for the destruction of pots and so forth, likewise, if seeing *emptiness were* also *to become a cause for the destruction of* the nature of *things* and for its deprecation *that would* also *not be suitable*. *Therefore*, since *things* established by way of their own character *do not exist*, one should never assert inherent production.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "When a yogi directly realizes phenomena as empty of inherent existence, he would realize emptiness by means of deprecating that, the nature of things." This is because a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise does not observe forms and so forth. It also does not observe the nature of the aggregates and so forth. It follows that when an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise realizes emptiness, phenomena would become non-existent because they would become non-existent for that exalted wisdom. Forms and so forth previously existed, but they would become non-existent when a yogi meditates on them, whereby, the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of that yogi would become a cause for their destruction. For this reason, it follows that a

superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise would become a cause for the destruction of things, just as being hit with a hammer is a cause for the destruction of a pot. The exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise would be analogous to a hammer because just as a hammer destroys a pot, the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise would destroy things. However, it is not like this. Why? Because establishment by way of its own character does not exist. Due to this, the Prasangika Madhyamikas tell the Svatantrika Madhyamikas that establishment by way of its own character is not to be asserted ever.

Thursday afternoon, 29 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "likewise, if seeing emptiness were also to become a cause for the destruction of the nature of things and for its deprecation, that would also not be suitable. Therefore, since things established by way of their own character do not exist, one should never assert inherent production." If it is a Madhyamika, he is pervaded by not being suitable to assert establishment by way of its own character, yet there are Madhyamikas who assert establishment by way of its own character. This is likened to the case of fully ordained monks in that, although they are not suitable to break their vows, there are fully ordained monks who have broken their vows. In short, the Svatantrika Madhyamika system asserts that things are established by way of their own character but are not truly existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 202) says:

> It is in fact said: "In regard to this, those Madhyamikas who assert production established by way of its own character assert that, although established by way of its own character, it is not truly existent. For this reason, even if forms and so forth are established by way of their own character, they are not necessarily observed by a direct seer of suchness." However, it was also explained before that, through merely that, they are truly existent and that one cannot abandon the faults [that accrue] by means of the reasoning which will be explained again.

"Those Madhyamikas who assert production established by way of its own character" are the Svatantrika Madhyamikas. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that the form aggregate and so forth are established by way of their own character but are not truly existent. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if it is established by way of its own character it is truly existent. It has been explained before and will be explained again later on that for the Prasangika Madhyamika system the following are synonymous:

1. the measure of establishment by way of its own character,
2. the measure of existing by way of its own entity,
3. the measure of inherent existence,
4. the measure of true existence,
5. the measure of existing ultimately, and
6. the measure of establishment by its own reality.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 202) says:

> Here the [auto]commentary says:
>
> > The *Pile of Jewels Sutra* says:
> >
> > Kashyapa, furthermore, the middle way correctly and individually investigating phenomena is: phenomena are not made empty by emptiness, phenomena themselves are empty...

> And likewise [that sutra] is also cited as saying that [phenomena] are signless, wishless, without strong application, unproduced, and non-arising. Thus, if phenomena have a nature that is establishment by way of its own character, since those phenomena would not come to be empty from their own side it would be incorrect [for the sutra to] say "Phenomenon themselves are empty..." Without refuting that they exist by way of their own entity from their own side, they must be presented to be empty in terms of being empty of something else, thereby contradicting the statement "Phenomena are not made empty by emptiness." Therefore, the middle way says that when the nature of phenomena is individually investigated, phenomena are shown to be empty of inherent existence from their own side.

This sutra was also cited in the autocommentary. It says that phenomena are (1) empty, (2) signless, (3) wishless, (4) without strong application, (5) unproduced, and (6) non-arising. In general, there are said to be three doors of liberation, but in tantra there are said to be four: (1) emptiness, (2) signlessness, (3) wishlessness, and (4) without strong application, which are the first four of the six listed in the sutra. The three doors of liberation are:

1. emptiness, which is the entity itself being empty of true existence,
2. signlessness, which is that causes have been pacified of the sign of true existence, and
3. wishlessness, which is not wishing for truly existent results.

Buddha said that due to not knowing these three doors of liberation, sentient beings wander in cyclic existence. The fourth door of liberation, according to tantra, is the door without strong application, which means that there is no truly existent strong application.

These are called "doors of liberation" because without these realizations liberation cannot be attained. When one has these realizations and cultivates them, one enters through the door of liberation. The three or four doors of liberation are explained differently by the three schools.

Phenomena being unproduced and non-arising are similar. The point of the sutra is that one should cultivate the realization of emptiness. Is pot empty of itself? Is pot empty of pot? Pot is empty of true existence. Is this emptiness self-emptiness or other-emptiness? The self-emptiness of the pot is the entity of the pot itself being empty of true existence. Other-emptiness is illustrated by a monastery empty of monks, from which one understand that there are no monks in the monastery. What is the difference between a monastery empty of monks and a pot empty of pillar? One would not say either that a pot is empty of pot or that a pillar is empty of pillar. Other-emptiness is accepted by the Nyingma tradition who say that this view is superior to that of the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

"Phenomena are shown to be empty of inherent existence from their own side" means that the entity of all phenomena is the emptiness of inherent existence.

The statement in sutra "phenomena are not made empty by emptiness, phenomena themselves are empty" and so forth indicate self-emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 203) says:

> This sutra also refutes the statement by the Aspect Cognizers (Chittamatrins): "Other-powered phenomena are not empty of establishment by way of their own character, and apprehenders and apprehendeds are not different substances, therefore, they are empty [of being different substances]."

This sutra refutes the Chittamatrin's assertions that "other-powered phenomena are not empty of establishment by way of their own character" and that since apprehenders and apprehendeds are not different substances, they are empty of being different substances. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas, phenomena are not empty of being different substances because they assert the existence of external object.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 203) says:

> The meaning of the above sutra is also explained in [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred [Verses]* (v.8.7) saying:
>
> > Not seeing what is empty as not empty
> > One says, "May nirvana be mine."
> > Not passing beyond sorrow due to this wrong view
> > Is taught by the tathagatas.
>
> [It is also explained in Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 13.8) saying:
>
> > All views of emptiness
> > Are taught by the Conqueror as definite deliverance.
> > Whoever views emptiness,
> > They are taught as lacking achievement.

The first line of the verse from Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas*, translated here as "Not seeing what is empty as not empty," is difficult to understand. Literally it reads: "Not empty / what possesses empty / is not seen." Due to this one can ask: "Not empty of what? What is it that is empty?"

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 203) says:

> The thought "Phenomena are empty of their own entity" is also the meaning itself. However, it is not at all suitable to say: "Pot not being empty of pot but being empty of true existence is the emptiness of other. Therefore, pot being empty of pot is the emptiness of self." If pot were empty of pot, pot would necessarily not exist as pot. If that were the case, since it does not exist as itself it also would not exist as other, whereby pot would be utterly non-existent.

"Phenomena are empty of their own entity" means that phenomena are empty of establishment by way of their own character and empty of establishment by way of their own entity. It is incorrect to say: "Pot not being empty of pot but being empty of true existence is the emptiness of other." This would mean that pot being empty of true existence is other-emptiness and pot being empty of pot is self-emptiness, but this is not correct. A pot being empty of itself can only be understood to mean either (1) that pot does not exist with respect to pot or (2) that pot is not pot. If pot does not exist with respect to itself it would not exist with respect to other, therefore, pot would be utterly non-existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 203) says:

> Then, since every other thing would also be like that, even those who say this would be non-existent and any presentation of "empty of this and not empty of that" would not be possible.

If it were the case that phenomena are empty of themselves, like pot being empty of pot, then even those who say this would be non-existent. This is because if the speaker is empty of himself, he would not exist with respect to himself, whereby he would be non-existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "any presentation of 'empty of this and not empty of that' would not be possible." If phenomena were empty of themselves, like pot being empty of pot, then it could not be said that pot is empty of true existence but is not empty of existing conventionally. If things were empty of themselves, such statements could not be made.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 203) says:

> Also both those who say that such emptiness is correct and others who assert it to be nihilistic emptiness are ostracized from the fact that the conquerors and the conquerors' children proved it more than once to be dependent-arising free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that there are both those who say 'such emptiness' is correct and others who assert it to be a nihilistic emptiness, but what is that emptiness? Previously two types of emptiness were posited: (1) pot being empty of pot is self-emptiness and (2) pot being empty of true existence is other-emptiness. There are those who say that such emptinesses are correct and those who say that they are nihilistic emptinesses but both of them are incorrect and are distant from the Buddha's presentation of dependent-arising which is free from permanence and annihilation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 203-4) says:

> In particular, asserting a nihilistic emptiness through saying "All conventional truths are necessarily settled to be empty of themselves" is just not suitable because none of the four [proponents of] tenets, through having understood that view to be the view of annihilation, generate it in their continua.

When any of the four proponents of tenets understand this to be the view of annihilation, they do not generate it in their continua. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "asserting a nihilistic emptiness through saying 'All conventional truths are necessarily settled to be empty of themselves' is just not suitable." This would be asserting self-emptiness, that is, emptiness of itself.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 204) says:

> Thus, while the basis of negation not existing in the entity of the object of negation and that basis being empty also of the way of being empty of the object of negation are similar, phenomena being empty of establishment by way of their own character is the meaning of being empty by way of their own entity. The reason that modes of emptiness other than that are not an emptiness of own entity is:
>
> - as long as the former mode of emptiness, which has already been established by a valid cognizer, has not degenerated, it is not possible for a [proponent of] tenets to generate a superimposition that conceives that base as either truly existent or as existing as the meaning of [truly existent],
> - whereas even though the meaning of the latter [mode of emptiness] has been established by a valid cognizer and not degenerated, it is not contradictory that a [proponent of] tenets superimposes true existence or the meaning of true existence.

There are two modes of being empty. The former mode of being empty is pot being empty of true existence. As long as one has the realization of pot being empty of true existence and this realization has not degenerated, one will not generate the superimposition that is the conception of pot as truly existent. In other words, while realizing, by means of a valid cognizer, that pot is empty of true existence one does not conceive pot to be truly existent.

The latter mode of being empty is pot being empty of pot. Although this cannot be established by a valid cognizer, if it were established by a valid cognizer even while one has the realization of pot being empty of pot, one could still generate the conception of truly existent pot. Keep in mind that actually there is no realization of pot being empty of pot, but if it did exist it would not at all harm the conception of pot as truly existent.

Friday morning, 30 June 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 204) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1D-1B Refuting [the assertion of establishment by way of its own character] due to it following that truth in conventional terms would withstand analysis by reasoning

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 78) says:

> It is mentioned here: Production does not exist ultimately; hence, it indeed depends on refuting production from self and other. Yet, the self-nature of those observed by direct perception and inference – forms, feelings, and so forth, whatever – are doubtlessly produced from other. If such were not accepted, why express two truths? There would be only one truth, due to which production from other just would not exist.

Someone says that it is acceptable that since there is no production ultimately there is no production from self and others. However, this person says that it follows that some phenomena, forms, feelings, and so forth, are produced from others because they are observed by direct perceivers and inferential cognizers and that if this is not accepted, why would two truths have been taught? In other words, if this is not accepted it follows that there is only one truth. This means that if there is no production from other, it would follow that there is only one truth because there would only be ultimate truth and not conventional truth. Chandrakirti says: "There would be only one truth, due to which production from other just would not exist." In short, this person says that if there is only one truth, the ultimate, production from other would be non-existent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [Response:] I shall explain about this. It is indeed true that the two truths are not ultimately existent because it is set forth [in the scriptures:]:[30]
>
> > Bhikshus, this highest [meaning] truth is one. It is like this: that having non-deceiving features, nirvana. All formations have false, deceiving features.
>
> Therefore, that which is deceptive truth, because of being the method of engaging the ultimate truth, is taken as it is accepted by the system of the world without analyzing production from self and others.

The two truths do not exist ultimately. In order to prove this, Chandrakirti quotes a sutra that says: "Bhikshus, this highest [meaning] truth is one." Here the word 'truth' does not refer to the object of negation, true existence, but refers to truth in the context of truth and falsity. Conventional truth is a means for engaging the ultimate truth. Later on, Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:

> *Conventional truth is the means and*
> *Ultimate truth arises from the means.*
> *Those who do not know the distinction of the two*
> *Have entered a bad path due to wrong conceptions.* [6.80]

Conventional truths, such as forms, feelings, and so forth, are the means for gaining the realization of ultimate truth. This is because first one generates the wisdom realizing conventional truths in dependence on seeing the basis of imputation. Having realized this, one then comes to realize the nature of the basis of imputation, ultimate truth. On the other hand, in another text it says that

[30] Poisson notes that the *Madhyamakavritti* cites this quotation without attribution.

ultimate truth is the means and conventional truth arises from that means. This is to be understood as meaning that in order to realize subtle conventionalities, one must first realize ultimate truth. In other words, the realization of subtle conventional truths comes after the realization of ultimate truth. This is because one first realizes that phenomena do not exist truly and then that they are therefore feasible as agents and actions. In this case, conventional truths are divided into the coarse and subtle. The mind realizing coarse conventional truths is the means for realizing ultimate truth, whereas the mind realizing subtle conventional truths arises from the realization of ultimate truth.

The sutra says: "that having non-deceiving features, nirvana." This passage can be debated as follows: does this mean that only nirvana is truth while all other phenomena are deceptive? What about emptiness? One can say that emptiness is nirvana. Is the naturally abiding lineage, the emptiness of true existence of the mind, not a truth? Is it a nirvana? One can say that it is a nirvana in terms of the four terminological divisions of nirvana – (1) nirvana with remainder, (2) nirvana without remainder, (3) natural nirvana, and (4) non-abiding nirvana – in that a natural nirvana is emptiness. It can also be asked: "If it is a deceptive substratum is it pervaded by being deceptive?" If someone says that it is, one asks: "Are valid direct perceivers and inferential valid cognizers deceptive?" If someone says that they are, one says: "They are not because the definition of a valid cognizer says that it is undeceptive (incontrovertible)." However, in this context, deceptive has a particular meaning, whereas in the context of the definition of a valid cognizer it has another meaning. What is the difference?
Student: The non-deceptiveness of a valid direct perceiver and an inferential valid cognizer is what makes it possible to discriminate conventional truth and understand conventional phenomena, whereas the non-deceptiveness that is ultimate truth is what is found by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Kor sum! If the ultimate truth is only seen by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, many absurd consequences follow. For example, is there no ordinary being who realizes ultimate truth? Is there no inferential valid cognizer that realizes ultimate truth? Is such an inferential valid cognizer an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise? So what is the difference?
Student 2: The non-deceptive in relation to a valid cognizer refers to a consciousness which realizes its object in a non-deceptive manner, whereas ultimate truth being non-deceptive is in terms of the way the object appears to a perceiver.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is correct.

Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, that which is deceptive truth, because of being the method of engaging the ultimate truth, is taken as it is accepted by the system of the world without analyzing production from self and others." Thus, it would appear that one should accept what is accepted by the world.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary then says:

> Like this:
>
> *Because, if these things are thoroughly analyzed,*
> *Apart from things having the essence of thusness,*
> *A state is not found; therefore, the world's*
> *Conventional truth should not be thoroughly analyzed.* [6.35]

Chandrakirti says that conventional truths, or truths in conventional terms, should not be analyzed by reasoning because when they are analyzed by reasoning, they are not found. This discussion comes under the outline "Refuting [the assertion of establishment by way of its own character] due to it

following that truth in conventional terms would withstand analysis by reasoning." The argument here is that the Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas that it follows that conventional truths are able to withstand analysis by reasoning because, according to you, they are established by way of their own character and are inherently existent. However, when conventional truths are analyzed by the reasoning analyzing ultimate truth, they are not found. For example, when one analyzes whether conventional truths are produced from self, produced from other, produced from both, or produced causelessly, such conventional truths are not found. For this reason, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas that, according to their assertions, conventional phenomena should be found because they are established by way of their own character.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Like this: If these forms, feelings and so forth are thoroughly analyzed concerning such statements as "What is produced from self" or "What is produced from others?" and so forth with regard to production and so forth, a portion apart from, i.e., other than, having a self-nature ultimately unproduced and unceased, is not a state. Therefore, without engaging in thorough analyses of such statements as "from self and others" and so forth, that universally perceived by the world "If this exists, this arises," merely this much should be accepted by way of engagement that depends on others (i.e., the world).

Conventional truths should be accepted without thorough analysis but just as they are accepted by worldly beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 204) says:

> OBJECTION: That there is no production ultimately indeed depends on refuting production from self and other. However, the nature of those forms, feelings, and so forth observed by the two valid cognizers is unquestionably produced from other. If that is not asserted, why are two truths mentioned? There would only be one truth, due to which production from other would be non-existent.
> Such a challenger, since seeming to assert that there is no production ultimately whereas there is production from other in conventional terms, is only a Svatantrika Madhyamika. His saying "If inherently produced production from other is not asserted conventionally there would be only one truth" means "If there is no production by way of its own character conventionally, real conventionalities would not exist. Then, since conventional truths would not occur, there would only be ultimate truth."
> In response to this [objection, the autocommentary] says:
>
> > Indeed it is true, for the ultimate there do not exist two truths because [the Buddha] said:
> >
> > > Monks, the ultimate truth is one. It is thus: the non-deceptive substratum is nirvana. All composites are false, deceptive substrata.

This is similar to what is said in the autocommentary. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that if there were no establishment by way of its own character, it would follow that there would be no real conventionalities and therefore no conventionalities. Thus, there would only be ultimate truth.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: What does it mean that because the Vaibhashikas accept simultaneous cause and result, they accept an immediate condition?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The Vaibhashikas say that there exist causes and results that are simultaneous but that not all causes and results are simultaneous. Although they accept this, there is no contradiction in their also accepting an immediate condition. For example, together with a compounded phenomenon there exist simultaneously its four characteristics of production, abidance, and so forth. These characteristics are called simultaneously arising causes because they do not hinder production but assist it. A mind and the mental factors in its retinue are simultaneously arising causes because they assist each other, yet they also have an immediate condition.

Student: Are attachment and hatred wrong consciousnesses?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are wrong consciousnesses as well as mistaken consciousnesses. If it is a mistaken consciousness it is not pervaded by being a wrong consciousness because all conceptual consciousnesses are mistaken consciousnesses. It is not said in any text that attachment and hatred are wrong consciousnesses, yet it can be said that they are. Attachment is a mind that perceives its contaminated object to be attractive due to the motivation of improper mental attention. In other words, it exaggerates the beauty of an object. Hatred is a mind that perceives its contaminated object as unattractive due to the motivation of improper mental attention.

Student: In *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 185) it explains that the presentation of the conceptions of true existence in nine levels is to be interpreted. Geshe-la explained that this division into nine was from the point of view of the *hinayana path* for those temporarily unable to realize subtle selfless and that it is not the presentation of the *mahayana path*. Do the Svatantrikas not have a division into nine? Please explain this.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The Svatantrika Madhyamikas set forth a division of the conceptions of true existence into ten, there being both coarse and subtle great of the great conceptions of true existence. This division into ten is in relation to the ten grounds of the path of meditation. What is the respective object of abandonment of the first ground of the path of meditation? It is the coarse great of the great innate conception of true existence. In this way, ten objects of abandonment of the ten grounds are posited. Therefore, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas do divide the conception of true existence into further subdivisions.

In the Prasangika Madhyamika system, the conception of true existence is divided into nine but the difference is that they say that a bodhisattva *simultaneously* abandons the three small levels of the conception of true existence.

The nine divisions are posited in terms of the hinayana path, not in terms of hinayana tenets.

Student: In *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 187) the term "conception of appearance" is used. Please explain this term.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: For a buddha, because meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment are one entity, the conception that is together with appearance in subsequent attainment and the conception without appearance in meditative equipoise do not arise alternately. For sentient beings there is a conception together with appearance while in subsequent attainment, whereas in meditative equipoise there is no conception together with appearance, that is, there is no appearance of conventionalities. Therefore, the conception together with appearance and the conception without appearance are said to occur alternately. To be more precise, in meditative equipoise there is no manifest conception together with appearance.

Student: In *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 186) it says "having an appearance polluted by ignorance and the latencies of that." In what way is the appearance polluted by ignorance?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In regard to "appearance polluted by ignorance and the latencies of that," 'polluted' means to be under the influence of ignorance and the latencies of ignorance. Due to the

mind being polluted by ignorance, one is unable to see reality. In subsequent attainment, there is the appearance of true existence due to the mind being polluted by ignorance. Pollution in this context mainly refers to the presence of the latencies of ignorance. The reason for saying ignorance and the latencies of ignorance is just to emphasize that the latencies themselves exist due to a previous ignorance. To an ordinary bodhisattva in subsequent attainment who has realized emptiness, there is the appearance of true existence due to ignorance. A bodhisattva on the higher grounds has the appearance of true existence due to the latencies of ignorance. Thus, the bodhisattvas on the path of accumulation and path of preparation have the appearance of true existence due to ignorance, whereas bodhisattvas on the eighth ground and above have the appearance of true existence due to the latencies of ignorance.

Student: In *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 172) the definition of a manifest knowledge obstruction includes the word "factor" (*cha*). Why is this word necessary here?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In general, the use of the word "factor" blocks certain pervasions. It is often used by Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa in his texts. This word means a part or portion. Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* says:

> The definition of a manifest knowledge obstruction is: that abiding in a type of obstruction occurring in the continuum of a learner superior who has abandoned all conceptions of true existence without exception that is a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance that is the appearance of one's object, forms and so forth, as truly existent. For example, a factor of mistaken dualistic appearance that is the appearance of the objects of the six engaging consciousnesses, forms and so forth, as truly existent.

If the word "factor" were omitted from the definition of a manifest knowledge obstruction and it were merely said "mistaken dualistic appearance," what would happen? The eye consciousness of a learner superior, as the subject, it follows that it is a knowledge obstruction. Is eye consciousness a knowledge obstruction? In Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's texts the word "factor" is used in the context of "that which abides in a type," but here it merely means a factor of dualistic appearance.

Student: In *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 186) it states that the latencies of attachment are negative tendencies in hinayana foe destroyers, which cause jumping around like a monkey and so forth and are knowledge obstructions. Do the latencies of attachment, which are knowledge obstructions, cause mistaken dualistic appearances?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It can be said that the latencies of attachment cause mistaken dualistic appearances.

Student: What is the earliest point on the path where one would view phenomenon as mere conventionalities?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The three persons see phenomena as mere conventionalities in subsequent attainment. In general, from the first ground upward, phenomena are viewed as mere conventionalities. In terms of viewing phenomena as mere conventionalities together with the conception of true existence, a bodhisattva on the first ground has this view. In terms of viewing phenomena as mere conventionalities but without the conception of true existence, this occurs from the eighth ground upward. Viewing phenomena as mere conventionalities is in terms of not adhering to phenomena as truly existent. If bodhisattvas do not see phenomena as mere conventionalities, what do they see them as? Do they realize conventionalities? Do they not realize both truths? The word "mere" in "mere conventionalities" eliminates them being conceived to be truly existent. Bodhisattva superiors in subsequent attainment view phenomena as mere conventionalities.
Student: Can ordinary beings who have an inferential valid cognizer realizing emptiness view phenomena as mere conventionalities?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They can.
Student: Can someone who has a mere understanding of emptiness view phenomena as mere conventionalities?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They can understand and say that phenomena are mere conventionalities, but this does not mean that they realize it.
Student: Does viewing phenomena as mere conventionalities not imply that one has a realization of calm abiding and special insight?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is no need. If emptiness is realized, it is not necessarily realized by means of one of the two, calm abiding and special insight. If emptiness is realized by means of calm abiding, this person has a wisdom arisen from meditation. Such wisdom arisen from meditation realizing emptiness is developed only on the path of preparation.

END

Monday afternoon, 3 July 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 205) says:

> The meaning of these [statements is as follows]. The meaning of the truth asserted by us is the non-deceptive, therefore, since there would be the non-deceptive truth alone here [Chandrakirti] says: "Indeed it is true."

When Chandrakirti says "Indeed it is true" it is in response to the objection (*Illumination*, Tibetan text page 204): "That there is no production ultimately indeed depends on refuting production from self and other. However, the nature of those forms, feelings, and so forth observed by the two valid cognizers is unquestionably produced from other. If that is not asserted, why are two truths mentioned? There would only be one truth, due to which production from other would be non-existent."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 205) continues:

> Saying "for the ultimate" means "in the perspective of a seer of suchness the two truths, the conventional and ultimate, do not exist because [the Buddha] said that in that perspective there is a single one, the ultimate truth." The highest truth is the ultimate truth (highest meaning truth). That conventional truths do not exist in the perspective of that exalted wisdom is to be understood by [the Buddha's] saying that they are deceptive substrata.

In the perspective of a seer of suchness, an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, there exists ultimate truth but not conventional truths. In the perspective of a seer of suchness conventional truth is an object of negation. There are two types of objects of negation:

(1) establishment by way of its own character and
(2) conventional truth existing in the perspective of an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise or in the perspective of a consciousness of [an ultimate] type.

In this context it refers to the second type of object of negation.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "That conventional truths do not exist in the perspective of that exalted wisdom is to be understood by [the Buddha's] saying that they are deceptive substrata." That which exists in the perspective of an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is the undeceptive, therefore, that which does not exist in its perspective is the deceptive. Therefore, the conventional truths not existing in the perspective of an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise are deceptive substrata.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 205) says:

> In short, if phenomena were established by way of their own character, composites would not be established as false, deceptive substrata. Therefore, because conventional truths would not exist, there would not be two truths. The position that there is no establishment by way of its own character means "Both conventional and ultimate truths exist."

If phenomena were established by way of their own character they would be true, due to which they would not be false and deceptive. Therefore, there would not exist conventional truths, due to which there would not be two truths. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "because conventional truths would not exist, there would not be two truths." For the Prasangika Madhyamikas, because there is no establishment by way of its own character, both conventional and ultimate truths exist.

Here it seems to imply that two truths do not exist in the lower schools, whereas they do exist in the Prasangika Madhyamika system. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that when the lower

schools posit the ultimate, the conventional becomes non-existent, and that when they posit the conventional, the ultimate becomes non-existent. They say that because the lower schools assert establishment by way of its own character one of the truths is lost by their positing the other. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that by not asserting establishment by way of its own character two truths are feasible.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 205) says:

> QUESTION: If, according to the scripture above, nirvana alone is truth, since [the Buddha] said that other composites are false, is it not that nirvana, ultimate truth, is established by way of its own character, although compounded phenomena are not established by way of their own character?

This question is asked in reference to the sutra citation: "Monks, the ultimate truth is one. It is thus: the non-deceptive substratum is nirvana. All composites are false, deceptive substrata." Here someone asks: "Although phenomena are not established by way of their own character, is nirvana not established by way of its own character?" When the sutra says ultimate truth is one it refers to this truth being undeceptive and not to the non-inherent existence of nirvana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 205) says:

> RESPONSE: The truth of that [context] is explained in terms of a non-deceptive object since [that very sutra] says that it is "the non-deceptive substrata," but it is not a truth that exists inherently. Also since [the Buddha] said "All composites are false, deceptive substrata," it is to be understood that the previous truth, [the ultimate truth,] is a non-deceptive object.

Truth and falsity are based on an object being respectively non-deceptive and deceptive. The truth is non-deceptive and the false is deceptive. A truth is that which has a concordant mode of abidance and mode of appearing. These two modes are posited with respect to the subject to which the object appears. This subject (object-possessor) which takes as its object ultimate truth is the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. The subject which takes as its object a conventional truth is of diverse types; for example, form is the object of an eye consciousness apprehending form. The main object taken by an eye consciousness is a form sphere, either color or shape. Do form spheres exist in the way that they appear to an eye consciousness? They do not exist in that way because color and shape appear to the eye consciousness to exist from their own side. Thus, form's mode of appearing does not concord with its mode of abidance. There are also particular subjects that take the sound sphere, odor sphere, taste sphere, and body sphere as their main objects.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 205) says:

> The commentary on [Nagarjuna's] *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* also says:
>
> > Although compounded phenomena act to deceive the childish by appearing wrongly, nirvana, the ultimate, does not deceive through appearing like that. Therefore, nirvana is explained saying 'truth' and the others saying 'non-truth.' Due to this, it is to be unquestionably asserted that the division into the two, truths and non-truths, is the meaning of 'non-deceptive' and 'deceptive.'

Compounded phenomena deceive the childish because their mode of appearing and their mode of abidance are not concordant. On the other hand, nirvana is ultimate truth which appears to the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. It is undeceptive. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas

an ultimate truth is an emptiness. They define a nirvana as: a factor that is the reality of the mind free from the two obstructions. The Prasangika Madhyamikas assert this to be an ultimate truth. On the other hand, the lower schools say that nirvana is a conventional truth, not an ultimate truth. For example, in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system, because all four noble truths are conventional truths, a true cessation is a conventional truth and not an ultimate truth, therefore, a nirvana is also a conventional truth. Why do they assert a true cessation to be a conventional truth? It is because they assert that the object of negation that is negated is a conventionality and therefore the negation of that object of negation is also a conventionality.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 206) says:

> Stating in the commentary on [Nagarjuna's] *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* that nirvana is a truth conventionally [means that] nirvana existing as an ultimate truth is an object posited in the perspective of a concealer, but in conventional terms it is not asserted to be a truth.

"In the perspective of a concealer" refers to a conventional awareness (*blo kun rdzob pa*). Nirvana exists as an ultimate truth; that nirvana exists in the perspective of a concealer. However, nirvana is not asserted to be a truth in conventional terms.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 206) says:

> Thus, because conventional truth is the means of engaging the ultimate truth, just as without analyzing production from self and other the system of worldly beings functions conventionally, similarly do the Madhyamikas also make assertions.

Conventionalities, such as forms and so forth, which are the bases of emptiness are the means for realizing their emptiness. In other words, only by realizing the bases of emptiness can one realize their emptiness. Chandrakirti later (v.6.80ab) says:

> *Conventional truth is the means and*
> *Ultimate truth arises from the means.*

Here Lama Tsongkhapa is commenting on the passage from Chandrakirti's autocommentary that says: "Therefore, that which is deceptive truth, because of being the method of engaging the ultimate truth, is taken as it is accepted by the system of the world without analyzing production from self and others."

The Madhyamikas accept phenomena as they are without analysis as do worldly beings. This is why the Prasangika Madhyamikas are called "the Madhyamikas who take what is renowned in the world."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 206) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Because of that, when those things are analyzed,*
> *What possesses the essence of suchness is not found*
> *To abide on the side of things. Therefore,*
> *Do not analyze the truths that are worldly conventions.* [6.35]
>
> Therefore, *because of that*, *when those things*, forms, feeling, and so forth, *are analyzed* in terms of, for example, "Is it produced from self?," "Is it produced from other?," and so forth, *they are not found to abide* possessing a part that is produced and so forth on *this side of*, i.e., which is other than, the

> non-production and non-cessation ultimately of *what possesses the essence of suchness*. *Therefore*, *without analyzing truths that are worldly conventions* in terms of, for example, [whether they are] "from self or other," merely that seen by the worldly saying "If this exists, that arises" is to be asserted from the point of view of employing the conventions that depend on others, the world.

The Prasangika Madhyamika system says that one should not analyze things in terms of whether they are produced from self or produced from other, but should assert them as they are posited in terms of worldly conventionalities. This is because if one analyzes phenomena using the analysis of the ultimate nothing is found. Therefore, one should accept what the world sees, for example, from a barley seed comes a barley sprout, from a rice seed comes a rice sprout, and so forth. Because nothing is found when things are analyzed using the analysis of the ultimate, it is said that conventional truths do not withstand analysis. Therefore, one should leave such objects as they are without analyzing them.

In this context Chandrakirti's autocommentary says: "Therefore, without engaging in thorough analyses of such statements as "from self and others" and so forth, that universally perceived by the world "If this exists, this arises," merely this much should be accepted by way of engagement that depends on others (i.e., the world)."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 206) says:

> Aryadeva's [*Four Hundred Verses*, (v. 8.19)] says:
>
> Just as barbarians cannot be caught
> In another language,
> Similarly, with the exception of worldly beings,
> The world cannot be caught.

Barbarians are those people who do not have a written language or those who live in a land where there are no Dharma teachings. If something is not included in the world it cannot be caught or apprehended by worldly beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 206) says:

> Also *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 24.10) says:
>
> Without depending on conventions,
> The highest meaning will not be realized.
> Without realizing the highest meaning,
> Nirvana will not be attained.

Conventions (*tha snyad*) are expressive sounds and the conceptions that follow from them. Without depending on them, one cannot realize ultimate truth (the highest meaning). If ultimate truth is not realized, one cannot attain nirvana. In other words, in order to attain nirvana one must realize ultimate truth, selflessness; without this realization one cannot abandon the conception of a self. If this is not abandoned, nirvana cannot be attained.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 206) says:

> [Nagarjuna's] *Refutation of Objections* says:
>
> Without asserting conventions
> We do not make explanations.

Without asserting conventions, Nagarjuna says that he does not make any explanations. Conventions are designations or terms, for example, saying "This is good," "That is bad," and so forth.

In short, the realization of emptiness depends on realizing conventions.

Tuesday morning, 4 July 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 206-7) says:

> Here analyzing and not analyzing refers to analyzing and not analyzing suchness. Furthermore, since it is important to understand the procedure for analyzing suchness by means of however many systems of analysis there are, when this is explained a bit the Prasangika system [is as follows].
> In regard to, for example the statement "The production of a sprout," without being satisfied by imputing terms, to search for the imputed object which is imputed like that asking "Is it produced from self or other?" is posited as analyzing suchness. Therefore, this is to be understood as not at all like the analyses by means of worldly conventions such as "Where does it come from? Where it is going?" and "Where is it, outside or inside?" and so forth.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that analyzing suchness is to analyze whether phenomena are produced from self or produced from other. If one does this analysis phenomena are not found. This non-finding is supreme finding just as non-seeing is supreme seeing; this is the meaning of finding emptiness. For example, when an imputed object, such as a sprout, is sought it is not found; this non-finding is the meaning of finding emptiness. On the other hand, analyzing "Where does it come from? Where it is going?" is not an analysis of suchness, but is merely analysis in terms of worldly conventions. Also analyzing "Where is it? Is it inside? Is it outside?" is not the analysis of the ultimate. This is because such types of analysis do not search for the imputed object.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 207) says:

> The Svatantrikas do not posit the analysis of suchness through merely that but [say] that it becomes an analysis of suchness through analyzing whether
> 1. it is posited as existing by the force of appearing to a consciousness, as was explained before, or
> 2. it is an object that is not posited by the force of [appearing to a consciousness] but is established by way of its mode of subsistence.
>
> Due to the significance of the identification of the object of negation being different, there are also two different demarcations of the analysis of suchness.

On the other hand, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system the analysis as to whether phenomena are produced from self or produced from other is not the analysis of suchness. Rather, in this system the analysis of suchness is to analyze whether an object is posited as existing by the force of appearing to a consciousness or is not posited as existing by the force of appearing to a consciousness but instead is established by way of its own mode of subsistence. For the Svatantrika Madhyamikas this is the measure of the object of negation, true existence. In other words, in this system the measure of true existence is: establishment by way of its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness.

Thus, because in the Prasangika Madhyamika system and Svatantrika Madhyamika system the identification of the object of negation is different, the demarcations of the analysis of suchness are different.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 207) says:

> Without understanding that, through taking into consideration the example of Devadatta – who in reality has not come to this abode but is initially mistaken to have come, and then upon investigating whether he has come or not come is understood to not have come – and then asserting that all non-analyzed presentations have only the wrong meaning, whereas analyzed presentations are not wrong, is not a system of the Madhyamikas and valid cognition because there are many occurrences of non-analyzed presentations by both systems which are established by valid cognition. Since this has already been extensively explained in other [texts], I will not elaborate upon it [here].
> Thus, when analyzed conventionalities are by means of the reasonings analyzing suchness this is to be understood as corrupting all worldly conventions.

For example, although Sonam has not come to Sherab's house, someone, without investigating, mistakenly thinks that he has come. This person then investigates whether or not Sonam has come to Sherab's house and discovers that he has not. On the basis of this example, asserting that all non-analyzed presentations are wrong, whereas all analyzed presentations are not wrong, is not a system of the Madhyamikas. "Valid cognition" can refer either to the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas, or else to the Chittamatrins, but it can also refer to the seven scriptures on valid cognition, such as the Dignaga's *Compendium of Valid Cognition*. Even when there is no analysis done by either of these two systems there remain many objects that are established by valid cognition. For example, the statements "This is black," "This is white," and so forth are non-analyzed presentations of objects that can be established by a valid cognizer to exist just as they are presented. Thus, many things are established by a valid cognizer without any analysis. In the Madhyamika system things are established by a valid cognizer without analyzing the imputed object. Colors and so forth exist in the perspective of an innate conventional awareness that does not investigate or analyze the imputed object. If it exists in the perspective of that awareness, it exists. Thus, there are many objects that are posited by the force of conventions without the need for investigation and analysis.

In conclusion, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Thus, when conventionalities are analyzed by means of the reasonings analyzing suchness this is to be understood as corrupting all worldly conventions."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 78) says:

> As explained by Aryadeva [in the *Four Hundred Verses*, 8.19]:
>
> > Just as barbarians cannot be led by other languages, similarly,
> > without being of the world,[31] the world is not able to be led.
>
> It is also taught in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, 24.10]:[32]
>
> > Not relying on the conventional, ultimate truth will not be realized. Not realizing ultimate truth, nirvana will not be attained.
>
> If a thorough analysis is made, the conventions of the world will fail. As extensively taught in [the *Extensive Sport] Sutra:*
>
> > For example, wood and string relied upon,
> > The hand exerted; if the three are assembled,
> > Instruments such as lutes and flutes
> > Will also give rise to sounds produced from them.
> >
> > Then, some scholars having investigated,
> > "From where has that come, to where has it gone?." –

[31] Literally, 'not belonging of the world.'

[32] Poisson misattributes it to chapter 14.

When investigation is made in each direction and in between,
Coming or going of sound will not be found.

From such causes and conditions,
All that is compositional will arise.
The yogi of perfect perceptions,
Perceives composites empty, unmoving.

The aggregates, entrances, and elements are
Empty even internally, externally empty –
Concerning sentient beings, emptied by self and without abode,
The character of phenomena is the very entity of space.

When wood, string, and the action of the hand come together, instruments, such as lutes, give rise to sound. Likewise, when a mouth blows on a flute sound is produced. If one analyzes where the sound comes from, where it goes, and so forth it is not found. These sounds arise from the assembly of certain causes and conditions. When a yogi who possess perfect realizations looks upon composites he sees that they are empty and unmoving, that is, they are free from inherently existent movement. Likewise, the five aggregates, twelve spheres (entrances), and eighteen constituents (elements) are also empty. The twelve spheres are internally and externally empty in that both the six spheres that are internal and the six that are external are empty. Just as objects are empty, so too are sentient beings empty of a self. They are empty of an inherently existent self and do not abide as an inherently existent self. Just as space is freedom from obstructive contact, likewise, the character of phenomena is freedom from inherent existence.

In short, phenomena should be posited without investigation and analysis just as they are asserted by the world. There is a story about Ashvagosha, initially a Forder, who, while standing in the doorway of a house, asked Aryadeva whether he was inside or outside. Aryadeva answered that it depended on his mind. When such questions are asked this is not the analysis of suchness.

In brief, one should not thoroughly analyze worldly conventions since by doing so they are corrupted because, when they are thoroughly analyzed, they are not found.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 207) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1D-1C Refuting [the assertion of establishment by way of its own character] due to it following that ultimate production would not be refuted

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

In case it is mentioned: [We are] perplexed about what to do[33] if all presence of adherence to such things were also totally cut off. This adherence to conventional truth, being the cause of the fully deluded and the completely pure, necessarily produces some substantial essence.

Also in that case, an excess of mere words will remain concerning what was mentioned. If asked: Why?

In the context of thusness, due to some reason,
Production from self and others were unreasonable –
Since it is also unreasonable conventionally due to that, reason,
By what will your production be [established]? [6.36]

[33] Jayananda explains the Tibetan: *bred.sha thon pa* as *ngas ci zhig bya sNyam.nas bya.ba la rMongs.pao.*

> Just as production from self and others is unsuitable through the reasoning that was explained in the context of [analyzing] the ultimate, similarly, production is unreasonable through that [reasoning] itself even conventionally. So, by what [valid cognizer] will your production of things be established?
>
> Therefore, although not asserting that "production by self-characteristic does not exist in either of the two truths," undoubtedly it is to be accepted.

(Note the Tibetan word translated here as "perplexed" more literally means to be frightened.)

Due to strong adherence to completely pure phenomena and thoroughly afflicted phenomena as inherently existent, there are those who assert that phenomena must be established by way of their own character. This, that is, ultimate production, is what is to be refuted. It is refuted here saying that there is an excess of mere words because when it is analyzed it is not found. Chandrakirti says:

> *In the context of suchness, production from self and other*
> *Is not suitable by any reasonings.*
> *Since, even in conventional terms, it is not suitable by these reasonings,*
> *By what does your production exist?* [6.36]

By what is the production of things from self and others established? Chandrakirti says: "Just as production from self and others is unsuitable through the reasoning that was explained in the context of [analyzing] the ultimate, similarly, production is unreasonable through that [reasoning] itself even conventionally. So, by what [valid cognizer] will your production of things be established?" In other words, by what valid cognizer is the production of inherently existent things established? Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, although not asserting that 'production by self-characteristic does not exist in either of the two truths,' undoubtedly it is to be accepted." This means that even though the Svatantrika Madhyamikas do not wish to do so, they must accept that there is no established by way of its own character production because this is how things actually exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary then says:

> Due to some statements, such as "Not from self, [not from others]" and so forth, from the holy speech of Nagarjuna, [some] masters imagine that "only the entitiness of imaginaries are refuted; other-powered entities are not." Since this assertion of theirs, lacking reason, is also not established, those comments mentioned are only objects to be disputed and investigated.

Such comments are to be investigated and analyzed.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 207-8) says:

> OBJECTION: Furthermore, in that way, when all strong adherence to things as truly existent is eliminated, one is left alarmed. The adherence to truths in conventional terms as truly existent is the cause of bondage to and freedom from the two, the fully afflicted and completely pure. There must be some production that is of a substantial, that is, established by way of its own character, nature.
> RESPONSE: In regard to the aforementioned, there would be an excess of mere words. Why is that? Chandrakirti says:
>
> *In the context of suchness, production from self and other*
> *Is not suitable by any reasonings.*
> *Since, even in conventional terms, it is not suitable by these reasonings,*
> *By what does your production exist?* [6.36]

> Just as the *production* of forms and so forth *from self and other is not suitable by any of the reasonings* explained before *in the context of* analyzing *suchness*, that is, analyzing the ultimate, likewise, *since*, *even in conventional terms*, production *is not suitable by* those very *reasonings*, *by what* valid cognizer *is your* inherent *production* established? It is not [established by any valid cognizer]. [Chandrakirti's autocommentary] says:
>
> > Therefore, even though you do not wish to say "Production by way of its own character does not exist with respect to either of the two truths," this must inevitably be accepted.

In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the Svatantrika Madhyamikas must inevitably accept that established by way of its own character production does not exist with respect to either of the two truths.

This person says: "The adherence to truths in conventional terms as truly existent is the cause of bondage to and freedom from the two, the fully afflicted and completely pure." The part of the statement that says 'the adherence to truths in conventional terms as truly existent is the cause of bondage' is easily accepted, whereas the other part, 'the adherence to truths in conventional terms as truly existent is the cause of freedom,' is not easily explained. How can strong adherence to true existence be the cause of freedom? Think about it.

This person then says: "There must be some production that is of a substantial, that is, established by way of its own character, nature." The autocommentary merely says 'substantial nature,' whereas Lama Tsongkhapa explains this as meaning an established by way of its own character nature. What is establishment by way of its own character? In the Svatantrika Madhyamika system, either:

- substantiality, that is, establishment by way of its own character, is the basis for both the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure, or
- the conception conceiving establishment by way of its own character is the basis for both the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure.

Such substantiality being the basis for both the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure means that if there were no establishment by way of its own character things would not exist. Therefore, on the basis of establishment by way of its own character, one creates the causes of bondage to cyclic existence or the causes of freedom from cyclic existence. Or it can be said that strong adherence to true existence is the cause of bondage to cyclic existence, whereas according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas asserting that conventional phenomena are established by way of their own character is the cause of freedom from cyclic existence.

In short, regarding the cause of bondage to and freedom from cyclic existence, the Svatantrika Madhyamika system asserts that established by way of its own character production is the basis of bondage to and freedom from cyclic existence.

Tuesday afternoon, 4 July 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 208) says:

> Therefore, the production that is refuted even in conventional terms by the reasonings analyzing suchness is explained, in order to make a connection, to be the production which is of a substantial nature. In summary, as explained previously [the production which is of a substantial nature] is only that which is affixed as a qualification to the object of negation, "production by way of its own character"; it is not at all mere production because it is said many times that conventional objects are inappropriate as objects of the analysis of the ultimate.

When the reasoning analyzing suchness is applied even production in conventional terms cannot be found. "Is explained, *in order to make a connection*, to be the production which is of a substantial

nature" refers to the previous passage in the autocommentary that says: "There must be some production that is of a substantial nature." This makes a connection in that the previous meaning, production that is of a substantial nature, is connected with the meaning here, the production that is refuted even in conventional terms by the reasonings analyzing suchness. In other words, production that is of a substantial nature is production established by way of its own character, it is not mere production.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 208) says:

> [We] assert that if production which is established by way of its own character in conventional terms is not negated by the reasonings analyzing suchness, ultimately existent production is also not negated. Since through merely being established by way of its own character it comes to be truly existent, [we] assert that affixing and not affixing "in conventional terms" to that [production established by way of its own character] is the same.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas: "According to you Svatantrika Madhyamikas it follows that production is ultimately existent because you accept that production is established by way of its own character. This is because if production is established by way of its own character it should also exist ultimately. You cannot negate ultimately existent production because you say that production is established by way of its own character."

In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that establishment by way of its own character is true existence, therefore, it makes no difference whether or not the qualification "in conventional terms" is affixed to production established by way of its own character. In other words, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas: "Even if you say that conventionally production by way of its own character exists but ultimately it does not exist there is no difference." This is how the Prasangika Madhyamikas debate the Svatantrika Madhyamikas. However, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas accept that conventionally there is production established by way of its own character whereas ultimately there is no production established by way of its own character. Thus, they make a distinction between these two, whereas for the Prasangika Madhyamikas production established by way of its own character does not exist either conventionally or ultimately.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 208) says:

> Since that is the case, the affixing of the qualifications "by way of its own character," "inherently," "by way of its own entity," and so forth to the object of negation occurs untold times in the sutras and in the texts of the two, the father and son, and this master. However, when refuting that they are the same, some Madhyamikas take the previous position and explain it as before. *Clear Words* also says:
>
> > This should be inevitably accepted as that alone. Otherwise, would conventionalities not be admissible? In that case, they would be suchnesses, not conventionalities.
>
> When, not content with mere imputation in conventional terms, the positing of conventional objects is refuted through performing the analysis that seeks the object of imputation, saying "In that case, [forms and so forth] are ultimately existent and forms and so forth are not conventionalities" flings [the consequence] that forms and so forth are not asserted to be ultimately established and are posited as conventionalities. Moreover, it is very clear that this [consequence] is not [flung] to the proponents of true existence but to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas.

"By way of its own character," "inherently," and "by way of its own entity" mean the same. However, when refuting that they are the same, some Madhyamikas take the former position, that of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas.

The citation from *Clear Words* "This should be inevitably accepted" means that if something is asserted to be established by way of its own character it should also be asserted to be ultimately existent.

In short, when one searches for conventional objects one should not investigate and analyze them. This is because if one searches for the imputed object through thorough analysis one does not find it. In the case that it is found by thorough analysis, the imputed object would exist ultimately and be established by way of its own character.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "saying 'In that case, [forms and so forth] are ultimately existent and forms and so forth are not conventionalities' flings [the consequence] that forms and so forth are not asserted to be ultimately established and are posited as conventionalities." Such a consequence is flung not to the proponents of true existence but to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas. The Prasangika Madhyamikas set forth three reasonings in order to prove that established by way of its own character production does not exist. These reasonings, which are set out in the outlines to *Illumination*, are mainly for the Svatantrika Madhyamikas. Lama Tsongkhapa says that if production established by way of its own character exists:

1. it would follow that a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise would become the cause for the destruction of things,
2. it would follow that truths in conventional terms would be able to withstand the reasoning analyzing suchness, and
3. it would follow that there would be ultimately existent production.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 209) says:

> Here, some masters assert that by means of passages from the holy speech of Arya [Nagarjuna], such as "Not from self, not from other" and so forth, which refute production and so forth, the production of the imputational factor, which is apprehenders and apprehendeds being different substances, is refuted, whereas truly existent other-powered phenomena are not refuted. Furthermore, since the logical reasoning of such commentaries is not established to be non-existent, the aforementioned are only to be tested and investigated. Although those [masters] who proclaim the above position explained by this statement are said to be some past scholars such as Acharya Sthiramati and so forth, they do not appear to explain it like this in their texts.

The assertion that passages such as "Not from self, not from other" and so forth by Nagarjuna refute production of the imputational factor, which is apprehenders and apprehendeds being different substances, is attributed to Acharya Sthiramati but Lama Tsongkhapa say that it does not appear that Acharya Sthiramati actually says this in his texts.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 209) says:

> Since Acharya Dharmapala in his commentary on [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas* explains the view of the *Four Hundred Stanzas* as commenting on the Chittamatra [system], when [this position is] attributed to him it is fitting.

The master who actually asserts the above position is Acharya Dharmapala. He comments on Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* in accordance with the Chittamatra views saying that there is the production of truly existent other-powered phenomena but there is no production of the imputational factor which is apprehenders and apprehendeds being different substances because apprehenders and apprehendeds are one substance. For this reason, Lama Tsongkhapa says that if it is said that the master making the above assertion is Acharya Dharmapala this is fitting.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 209) says:

> QUESTION: Well then, how do those who comment on the meaning of the profound sutra as being Chittamatra comment on the meaning of Arya [Nagarjuna's] texts?
> RESPONSE: In the texts of the great masters, such as Vasubandhu and so forth, although it does not clearly say "The meaning of Nagarjuna's texts are commented in this way," since in [Vasubandhu's] *Suitable Explanations* and so forth the perfection of wisdom sutras seem to be explained to be interpretable meaning [sutras] in dependence on the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought*, it is evident that they explain [Arya Nagarjuna's texts] similarly, [due to which] they cannot refute them. However, if they explain [these texts] literally, it is not that they do not explain the perfection of wisdom sutras literally because when the interpretable meaning [sutras] are explained literally their meaning must be explained as Chittamatra.

Great masters, such as Vasubandhu and so forth, explain Nagarjuna's Six Collections of Reasonings to be interpretable meaning teachings because these masters take the perfection of wisdom sutras to be interpretable meaning sutras and, since Nagarjuna's texts are explanations of them, they say that these texts must also be interpretable meaning. Although these great masters do not say that all sutras are interpretable meaning, they say that the sutras taught during the turning of the middle wheel of Dharma are interpretable meaning sutras. In short, they consider the extensive, middling, and brief mother perfection of wisdom sutras to be interpretable meaning sutras. Then, because these masters comment on the three mother sutras as interpretable meaning sutras they also explain Nagarjuna's texts as being interpretable. Thus, they do not refute Nagarjuna's texts but consider them to be interpretable.

"However, if they explain [these texts] literally, it is not that they do not explain the perfection of wisdom sutras literally" means that if Nagarjuna's various texts are explained literally they also have to explain the perfection of wisdom sutras literally. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "because when the interpretable meaning [sutras] are explained literally their meaning must be explained as Chittamatra." The Madhyamikas take the extensive, middling, and brief mother sutras to be literal and definitive meaning sutras, whereas those who say that the three mother sutras are interpretable are the Chittamatrins. This is because the Chittamatrins assert the middle wheel of Dharma to be interpretable meaning, while the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert it to be definitive meaning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 210) says:

> However, the explanations that all phenomena are not ultimately existent and not established by way of their own character are established by reasonings to be literal. Therefore, because there is no harm to them being literal, [Chandrakirti], thinking that [these masters] cannot comment on [Nagarjuna's texts as] interpretable meaning, says: "[they are] only to be tested and investigated."

Thinking that these masters cannot comment on them as interpretable meaning, Chandrakirti says "they are only to be tested and investigated." Chandrakirti's autocommentary says: "Those comments are only objects to be disputed and investigated."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 210) says:

> Indicating the infinite harm regarding the opposite position of their being literal and the infinite proofs regarding their being straightforward, the meaning of [Nagarjuna's] texts is established to not be suitable to be interpreted in other ways due to which here this is not taught other than briefly.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system when it is said that there is no establishment by way of its own character this is to be taken literally and cannot be harmed. For this reason, the

Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the mother sutras are literally acceptable and are not interpretable meaning sutras. Chandrakirti, thinking this, says: "[they are] only to be tested and investigated."

In short, the three mothers sutras are literally acceptable without the need for interpretation. When they are accepted as literal, there is no harm but only proof as to how they are definitive.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 210) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1D-2 Dispelling arguments regarding the refutation [of establishment by way of its own character]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Well then, if it is said: Self-characterized production does not exist for either of the two truths. Therefore, how will their self-entities be observed in the world?
>
> I shall explain:
>
> *Empty things such as reflections and so forth –*
> *Those relying on collections – are not unknown either.*
> *Just as there, from empty reflections and so forth,*
> *Consciousness will be produced in its aspect.* [6.37]
>
> *Similarly, although all things are empty,*
> *They are strongly produced from emptinesses.* [6.38ab]
>
> All things abide as undifferentiated causes and effects. Although a reflection is posited in the aspect of non-inherent causes and effects, who with intelligence would consciously take [it] as definitely having a self-nature due to observing forms, feelings, and so forth – those abiding undifferentiated from causes and effects – as a mere existent? Therefore, although it is observed to exist, inherent production does not exist. As was taught [in the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra*]:
>
> In a mirror, very clean all over, just as reflections that
> lack self-nature appear; similarly, Druma, should phenomena be known.

The Svatantrika Madhyamikas dispute the Prasangika Madhyamikas saying that if established by way of its own character production does not exist with respect to the two truths it follows that forms, feelings, and so forth would not be observed. They, therefore, ask the Prasangika Madhyamikas: "Do worldly beings not see them? How do worldly beings observe forms and so forth if this is the case?" Chandrakirti, that is, the Prasangika Madhyamikas, then respond to this question as above.

Chandrakirti says: "All things abide as undifferentiated causes and effects." Although things are actually differentiated into causes and results, they are not differentiated into causes and results that are established by way of their own character. A reflection of a face in a mirror produces a result which is an eye consciousness apprehending the reflection of a face. Therefore, causes and results do exist. Likewise, forms, feelings, and so forth that do not inherently abide as causes and results exist, whereas they do not exist as inherently existent causes and results. Thus, although causes and results are not differentiated into established by way of their own character causes and established by way of their own character results, they are differentiated into causes and results.

The sutra says that just as there exists a reflection of a face in a clean mirror that appears to be a face but does not exist as a face, similarly, one should understand phenomena.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why does a pot not exist from its own side?
Student: A pot, as the subject, does not exist from its own side because it does not exist inherently.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That would be like saying: a pot, as the subject, does not exist inherently because it does not exist inherently! Rather one should say: a pot, as the subject, does not exist inherently because of being free from being an inherently existent one and an inherently existent many. Or else: a pot, as the subject, does not exist inherently because of being a dependent-arising. Or: a pot, as the subject, does not exist inherently because it exists. What is a pot? Is this cup a pot?
Student: It is not a pot because it is not a proper basis of imputation for the name 'pot.'
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why is not a proper basis since it is able to perform the function of holding liquid?
Student: It is not a round-bellied, flat-bottomed, water container.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What about your stomach, is it a pot?
Student: It is not because it is not flat-bottomed!

Wednesday morning, 5 July 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 210) says:

> OBJECTION: If production which is established by way of its own character does not exist with respect to both the two truths, forms and so forth would not exist. If that were the case, eye consciousnesses and so forth would not observe the entities of forms and so forth in the world. On the other hand, if that were not the case, even the horns of a rabbit and so forth would appear to eye consciousnesses and so forth for the very same reason.
> THE RESPONSE TO THAT IS EXPLAINED [AS FOLLOWS]: Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Empty things, reflections and so forth, that*
> *Depend upon a collection are not even not renowned.*
> *Just as for that from empty reflections and so forth*
> *Consciousnesses in their aspect are produced,* [6.37]
>
> *Likewise, even if all things are empty*
> *They are strongly produced from those that are empty.* [6.38ab]
>
> *Empty things*, that is, falsities, such as *reflections and so forth*, i.e., echoes and so forth, which are produced in *dependence on*, that is, based on, *a collection* of causes and conditions – a mirror and a face, a cave and an expelled sound, and so forth – *are not even not renowned* in the world, that is, they are renowned.

The objection made by the Svatantrika Madhyamikas is that if established by way of its own character production does not exist with respect to both truths it follows that forms and so forth would not exist. They say: "If that were the case, eye consciousnesses and so forth would not observe the entities of forms and so forth [to exist] in the world." They say that if something, such as a form and so forth, that does not exist is observed, then even the horns of a rabbit and so forth, which do not exist, would appear to eye consciousnesses for the very same reason. This is because if forms and so forth that do not exist are observed by an eye consciousness and so forth then also the horns of a rabbit and so forth which do not exist would appear to an eye consciousness.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond that although things are empty of establishment by way of their own character, in dependence on the conditions of a face and a mirror there is the production of an eye consciousness apprehending the reflection of a face. Likewise, in dependence on the conditions of a cave and an expelled sound an ear consciousness apprehending an echo is produced. These facts are renowned in the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 210) says:

> *Just as for that* renowned in the world, *empty reflections and so forth*, that is, falsities, *produce* eye *consciousness* and so forth having *the aspect of those* reflections and so forth – that is, a consciousness having the aspect of a falsity is produced from a reflection which is a falsity – *likewise*, *even if all things are empty* of establishment by way of their own character, results which are empty of [establishment by way of their own character] *are strongly produced from* causes which *are empty* of [establishment by way of their own character].

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas that a cause which is empty of establishment by way of its own character produces a result which is empty of establishment by way of its own character. Although the Svatantrika Madhyamikas do not accept this, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "just as a consciousness having the aspect of a falsity is produced from a reflection which is a falsity – likewise, even if all things are empty of establishment by way of their own character, results which are empty of [establishment by way of their own character] are strongly produced from causes which are empty of [establishment by way of their own character]."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 211) says:

> Here an eye consciousness apprehending [a reflection] is said to be produced from the reflection. Therefore, since a reflection is a thing and a different entity from consciousness it is an external object. In addition, it is an observed object condition of an eye consciousness, due to which it is asserted to be a form sphere.

The reflection of a face is a functioning thing because it is able to produce the eye consciousness apprehending it. It is also a different entity from the consciousness apprehending it, it is an external object, and it is an observed object condition of an eye consciousness, due to which it is a form sphere. Why is it a form sphere? It is a form sphere because it is the appearance of a form which appears as form to the eye consciousness. There is a difference between form and form sphere because sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects are form but are not form spheres.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 211) says:

> The appearance of two moons and falling hair, mirages and so forth, and echoes and so forth should also be understood similarly. Hence, a face, two moons, falling hair, and so forth which appear to mistaken sense consciousnesses are likened to the establishment by way of its own character which appears to the five consciousnesses that are free from superficial impairment to the sense powers. Even though [the reflection of a face existing as] a face and so forth is not possible, they appear as such, just as even though establishment by way of its own character is not possible, [things] appear as that.

The appearance of one moon as two moons, the appearance of falling hair, and the appearance of the reflection of a face as a face are able to produce eye consciousnesses, are external objects, and are form spheres. The appearance of one moon as two moons is the appearance of a form which appears as form to an eye consciousness. Because it is the appearance of a form which appears as form, it is a form sphere. This can be debated asking: "Is one moon two moons?" If someone says that it is not, one says: "It is because one moon appears to be two moons." In conclusion, one moon appearing to be two moons is mistaken but the appearance of two moons is not mistaken; however, it is a falsity because that appearance is a form sphere.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 211) says:

> Reflections, echoes, and so forth are like forms, sounds, and so forth. Therefore, although the five, forms and so forth, that exist inherently are not posited as external [objects], the forms and so forth

> that *appear* to exist inherently are posited as external objects. Likewise, although reflections and so forth are not posited as external faces and so forth, reflections and so forth are posited as external [objects]. These two, [forms and so forth that appear to be inherently existent and reflections and so forth], are similarly posited and not posited as external [objects].

Just as a reflection of a face appears to be a face but is not, likewise, although things appear to exist inherently they do not exist inherently. What is the reflection of a face that appears to eye consciousness as a face? What is the appearance of one moon as two moons, the appearance of falling hair, and so forth? According to what Lama Tsongkhapa says here it appears that they are form spheres. However, the eye consciousness to which one moon appears to be two is a mistaken consciousness. What is the condition for one moon to appear to be two moons?
Student: The condition of one moon and impairment to the eye sense power.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What causes the impairment to the eye sense power?
Student: Perhaps drinking too much alcohol!
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It could also be that, but it is usually said that it is caused by pressing on a particular part of the eye ball. In short, one moon appears to be two due to an impairment of the eye sense power. Without discussing whether or not that appearance is mistaken, what is that appearance? Is it matter, such as form, sound, odor, and so forth, or is it consciousness or a non-associated compositional factor? Since that appearance is not a permanent phenomenon but a functioning thing, it should be either matter, consciousness, or a non-associated compositional factor. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if it is a consciousness it is pervaded by being a valid cognizer *with respect to its own appearance*. It can be asked: "Is a consciousness pervaded by being a valid cognizer?" If someone says that it is not, one says: "It must be a valid cognizer because it is pervaded by being a valid with respect to its own appearance." To this one answers that there is no pervasion, because if it is a valid cognizer with respect to its own appearance it is not pervaded by being a valid cognizer. Because all consciousnesses are valid cognizers with respect to their own appearance, there is no need to posit a self-cognizer in order to explain memory. However, this can be debated: "The conception of true existence, as the subject, it follows that it is a valid cognizer with respect to its own appearance because it is a consciousness." If someone says that it is, one asks: "It follows that it realizes its own appearance because it is a valid cognizer with respect to it." If the other person says that it realizes its own appearance, one says: "Is it certain that the conception of true existence realizes its object? Is it a realizing awareness?" If someone says that it is not a valid cognizer with respect to its object but it is a valid cognizer with respect to its own appearance, one answers that there is no pervasion because if it is a valid cognizer with respect to its object it is a valid cognizer with respect to its object of the mode of apprehension.

In short, although there are some Prasangika Madhyamikas who say that a consciousness is not pervaded by being a valid cognizer with respect to its own appearance, Lama Tsongkhapa says that if it is a consciousness it is pervaded by being a valid cognizer with respect to its own appearance. Although a consciousness is pervaded by being a valid cognizer with respect to its own appearance, it is not pervaded by being a valid cognizer.

Student: Why is it that if it is a consciousness it is pervaded by being a valid cognizer with respect to its appearance?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is because there exist wrong consciousnesses. The definition of a valid cognizer in the Prasangika Madhyamika system is: an incontrovertible knower. Another definition of a valid cognizer is: an incontrovertible knower with regard to its main object of comprehension.

However, there is debate concerning the definition of valid cognizer and the conception of true existence. One can say: "The conception of true existence, as the subject, it follows that it is an incontrovertible knower." If someone says that it is not, one says: "It is a valid cognizer because it is a

valid cognizer with respect to its appearance." If someone responds saying that there is no pervasion, one says: "It is a valid cognizer with respect to its appearance because it is a consciousness."

If it is asked: Since the conception of true existence is a consciousness (a knower), what does it know? The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond that it knows its appearance. The lower schools posit a common locus between a consciousness and that which does not know its object, this being a wrong consciousness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 211) says:

> That a reflection is a falsity that is merely empty of being a face is established by all the mature of the world who are learned in terminology but have not directed their minds toward any of the scriptures and reasonings that present emptiness. Therefore, it is just not suitable to assert that what realizes [it to be a falsity] is a coarse consciousness of [an ultimate] type.

That a reflection is not a face is established even by the mature of the world who are learned in terminology but have not directed their minds toward any of the scriptures and reasonings that present emptiness. The Tibetan word *rgan po*, translated here as "mature," usually refers to those who are 50 years old and more, whereas adults are from 18-50 years old, youths are from 6-18 years old, and children are less than 6 years old.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 211-2) says:

> QUESTION: In that case, although reflections are renowned, that is, established, to be falsities, they are not established to be the falsities that are posited by the Madhyamikas. Therefore, how is the former an example of the latter?
> RESPONSE: In this context, setting forth reflections and so forth as an analogy is to set forth that already established by the world [to be falsities] as an example; it is not to set forth that already established to be posited by the Madhyamikas to be falsities as an example.

Someone says that although it is renowned that reflections are falsities, they are not the falsities posited by the Madhyamikas, so how are they an example of the latter? The response is as above.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: On the basis of a table, for example, what do the Madhyamikas establish to be a falsity?
Student: They establish its appearance as truly existent to be a falsity.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In order to know that the table as a falsity it is necessary to realize that it is not truly existent? The table appears to be truly existent, but it is not; therefore, its mode of appearance and its mode of abidance are not concordant. What is the measure of the table being a falsity?
Student: The measure of it being a falsity is that its mode of appearing and its mode of abidance are not concordant.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does the measure of the table being established to be a falsity mean that one realizes that its mode of appearing and its mode of abidance are not concordant?
Student: Yes.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is acceptable. Do you realize that?
Student: No, I do not.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Although you do not realize it, do you understand it?
Student: I can say the words!

Student: I did not understand what Geshe-la said about the measure of something being a falsity in the Prasangika Madhyamika system because they do not distinguish real and unreal conventionalities.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The measure of a particular object being a falsity is that its mode of appearance and mode of abidance are not concordant. More precisely, its mode of appearing and mode of abidance are not concordant with respect to its main subject. Simply put, whenever the two modes of an object are not concordant it is established to be a falsity. Do mature worldly beings realize that a reflection does not exist as a face? Since they do realize it, a reflection is renowned to be a falsity. If it is a falsity renowned in the world is it pervaded by being a falsity? One can debate like this.

Wednesday afternoon, 5 July 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 212) says:

> Furthermore, a reflection that appears to be a face, for example, cannot be distinguished in all ways saying "Merely this part appears as a face, merely that does not appear as a face" on the basis of what appears to be a face. Although [a reflection that appears to be a face] is empty of existing as it appears with respect to all the parts of whatever appearance of face there is, this does not contradict it being produced in dependence on its causes. Taking this as an analogy, likewise, even when blue appears to be established by way of its own character, the two parts, the blue that appears as inherently existent and the blue that does not appear as inherently existent, appear inseparably. Although [blue] appears so, it is empty of existing as it appears with respect to all the parts of whatever appearance there is. Even so it is established that there is no contradiction in it being produced by its causes and in its producing results. Although the reflection of a face does not exist as it appears with respect to all the parts of whatever appearance there is, a reflection is understood to be posited as not being non-existent. [Similarly,] although blue does not exist as an object as it appears with respect to all the parts of it appearing to be established by way of its own character, blue can definitely be posited as existing.

When a reflection of a face appears as a face it cannot be said that "this part of the reflection appears as a face but that part of the reflection does not appear as a face," however, this does not imply that the reflection does not exist. Likewise, when blue appears to be established by way of its own character it cannot be said "this part of blue appears to an eye consciousness to be established by way of its own character but that part of blue does not appear to an eye consciousness to be established by way of its own character," however, this does not mean that blue does not exist, it does exist. Thus, despite not being able to make this distinction there is no contradiction in blue being produced by causes and in its producing results. Although blue appears to an eye consciousness to be established by way of its own character, it is not. The fact that blue does not exist in the way that it appears does not mean that blue does not exist. Therefore, it is feasible for it to be produced by its causes and to produce the result of eye consciousness. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Although the reflection of a face does not exist as it appears with respect to all the parts of whatever appearance there is, a reflection is understood to be posited as not being non-existent. [Similarly,] although blue does not exist as an object as it appears with respect to all the parts of it appearing to be established by way of its own character, blue can definitely be posited as existing."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 212) says:

> Since a fine awareness distinguishing, through the analogy of a reflection, the two aspects "This is to be negated" and "This is not to be negated" on the basis of forms and so forth is indispensable for finding the Madhyamika view, do not be easily satisfied.

What do is to be understood with respect to "This is to be negated" and "This is not to be negated"? "This is to be negated" means that the blue appearing to be established by way of its own character is to be negated. "This is not to be negated" means that the blue appearing to be blue is not to be negated because this blue exists. Distinguishing these two is necessary in order to understand the Madhyamika view.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 212) says:

> Then, the [auto]commentary also says:
>
> > Although reflections are presented as causes and results that are not inherently existent, due to observing forms, feelings, and so forth – those [phenomena] abiding undifferentiated from causes and results – as mere existents, what scholar would knowingly ascertain them to have inherent existence? Therefore, they are observed to exist but are not produced inherently.

Reflections do not exist inherently yet they can be posited as causes and results. Likewise, forms, feelings, and so forth are causes and results but not inherently existent causes and results. Thus, although forms, feelings, and so forth are observed to exist, they are not observed to be inherently existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 212) says:

> With respect to mere existence and inherent existence and the production presented before, here it is indicated that there is no inherent production.

A distinction must be made between mere existence and inherent existence, as well as between mere production and inherently existent production. Mere existence and mere production exist, whereas inherent existence and inherently existent production do not exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 213) says:

> Therefore, it is very clearly stated that the two, production and inherent production, should be distinguished separately. If they are not so distinguished, through existent things on upward having become existent by way of their own entity and those [things] not existing by way of their own entity upward having become eternally non-existent, one will not pass beyond the two extremes of superimposition and deprecation. The commentary on [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas* says:
>
> > According to the proponents of true existence as long as there is the very existence of things there is also their own entity, whereas, when free from their own entity those things would not exist in all ways, due to which they would be like the horns of a donkey. Therefore, since one does not pass beyond being a proponent of duality it becomes difficult to make all strong assertions regarding that conform.

It is very important to distinguish between mere existence and inherent existence because, if one does not, one would have to say whatever exists exists inherently whereby one would fall into the extreme of superimposition and one would have to say that if phenomena do not inherently exist they do not exist at all whereby one would fall into the extreme of deprecation. The extremes of permanence and annihilation, or the extremes of superimposition and deprecation, are respectively (i) if it exists it exists inherently and (ii) if it does not exist inherently it does not exist at all. This is clear in the commentary on [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas*. However, the meaning of the statement "it becomes difficult to make all strong assertions regarding that conform" is not clear.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 213) says:

> Thus, the freedom from
> - all extremes of existence due to not existing by way of their own entity and
> - all extremes of non-existence due to being able to posit causes and results that are not inherently existent
>
> appears to be a particular of Acharya Buddhapalita's and Chandrakirti's commentaries on the thought of Arya [Nagarjuna]. Therefore, it is very important to distinguish the two existents and the two non-existents.

It is important to distinguish:
1. the two, existent and existing existent, and
2. the two, non-inherently existent and non-existent in conventional terms.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 213) says:

> That this is settled by the analogy of a reflection [is as follows]. The *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra* says:
>
> > Just as in a very perfectly pure mirror,
> > Reflections which lack
> > Inherent existence appear, likewise,
> > Druma, understand phenomena.
>
> The way of applying the meaning of analogies that are other examples of falsities should also be understood like the previous [analogy of a reflection].

There are many analogies that are other examples of falsities such as one moon appearing as two moons, the appearance of falling hair, an echo in a cave appearing to be the original sound, a magical horse and elephant appearing to be a real horse and elephant, and so forth. Is the sense consciousness to which one moon appears to be two moons a wrong consciousness? Is a sense consciousness to which falling hair appears a wrong consciousness? What is the object of the mode of apprehension of the sense consciousness to which one moon appears to be two moons?
Student: It should be the moon.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does that mean that the sense consciousness apprehends the moon?
Student: No, it apprehends two moons.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Just as two moons appear does the eye consciousness apprehend two moons?
Student: It apprehends two moons.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: How? What is the object of the mode of apprehension of a sense consciousness to which there is the appearance of falling hair?
Student: Hair.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does hair appear to that eye consciousness?
Student: Hair appears to it.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does hair appear to it because there is the appearance of falling hair? Does a snow mountain appear to the sense consciousness to which a snow mountains appears as blue?
Student: It does not appear.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If a snow mountain appears as blue to it does not a snow mountain appear?
Student: A white snow mountain does not appear to it.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Hair appears to the eye consciousness which has the appearance of falling hair; this was accepted by you! In the case of falling hair what is the superficial cause of error?
Student: It is an inner superficial cause of error within the sense power.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What is wrong with the eye sense power?
Student: The clear sense power in the eye is impaired.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is it dirty?! There are superficial causes of error and deep causes of error. When a white conch appears as yellow is it due to a superficial or deep cause of error?
Student: It is due to a superficial cause of error.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What is that?
Student: It is jaundice.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does the eye consciousness to which one moon appears as two have the appearance of one moon?
Student: It has the appearance of two moons.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it has the appearance of two moons, does it not have the appearance of one moon? You cannot have the appearance of two without the appearance of one!

When one moon appears as two moons, does the appearance of two moons exist? It does exist. What kind of phenomenon is the appearance of two moons? Is it a functioning thing or a non-functioning thing? If it is functioning thing it would be impermanent, whereas if it is a non-functioning thing it would be permanent. Does the appearance of falling hair to a sense consciousness exist? It does exist, but what kind of phenomenon is it? If asked: "Does falling hair exist?" If someone says: "It does not," then one says: "There should be because there is the appearance of falling hair." To this one replies: "There is no pervasion."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 213) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E Indicating the excellent qualities of refuting inherent production also with respect to the two truths

1 The excellent quality of easily abandoning the views of permanence and annihilation
2 The excellent quality of the relationship of actions and results being completely appropriate

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-1 The excellent quality of easily abandoning the views of permanence and annihilation

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Therefore:

Because self-nature does not exist in either of the two truths,
They are not eternal nor annihilated. [6.38cd]

Because, thus, things are inherently empty like the aspect of a reflection, therefore, permanence and annihilation just do not exist because a self-nature, an entitiness, does not exist in either of the two, the ultimate and conventional truths.

If one understands the two truths very well, one will easily become free from the extreme of permanence and the extreme of annihilation. A reflection appears to be a real face but is not, likewise phenomena appear to be inherently existent but are not. Therefore, conventional truths and ultimate truths do not have an inherent entity. Because the two truths are not inherently existent they are free from the extreme of permanence; because they are feasible in conventional terms they are free from the extreme of annihilation. Thus, when phenomena are understood to be empty of inherent existence, one becomes free from the two extremes. To abide in the Middle Way means that by realizing that the two truths do not exist inherently one becomes free from abiding in the extreme of permanence. In

addition, when one understands that because the two truths do not exist inherently they are feasible as agents and actions, one becomes free from the extreme of annihilation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As is said in the *Treatise [on the Middle Way*, 15.11]:
>
> > Whatever entitiness exists, it is eternal since not non-existent.
> > "The previously arisen does not exist now;" hence, it follows as annihilated.

(Note this verse is translated by Jay Garfield in *Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way* as:

> "Whatever exists through its essence
> Cannot be non-existent" is eternalism.
> "It existed before but doesn't now"
> Entails the error of nihilism.)

The first two lines of this verse in the *Treatise on the Middle Way* mean that whatever is an inherently existent entity is permanent. "The previously arisen does not exist now;" hence, it follows as annihilated" means that whatever existed before but no longer exists is annihilated.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, like the teaching [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 21.14]:
>
> > If a thing were accepted as existent, viewing it as eternal and annihilated
> > would follow because that thing would become permanent and impermanent.
>
> – and so forth.

(Note this verse is translated by Jay Garfield in *Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way* as:

> If one accepts the existence of entities,
> Permanence and the view of complete non-existence follow.
> For these entities
> Must be both permanent and impermanent.)

The *Treatise on the Middle Way* is difficult to understand without commentary. However, this verse means that by asserting phenomena to be inherently existent one falls into the view of permanence and by asserting that if a phenomenon does not exist inherently it is non-existent one falls into the view of annihilation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 17.31-33]:
>
> > Just as emanations by the Teacher emanate due to perfect magical emanation,
> > and the emanations also emanate others again; like emanation,
> >
> > Similarly, whatever acts are done by the agent are also like a kind of emanation,
> > for example, like that emanated from an emanation making emanations.

> Delusions and actions, and bodies, agents, and results,
> are like the city of gandharvas, a mirage, and a dream.
>
> Thus, the example of emanation indicates the non-inherent as produced from the non-inherent.

Shakyamuni Buddha emanated emanations, which then created other emanations, which then created other emanations and so forth. A buddha is able to emanate billions of emanations in billions of world systems. When an emanation emanates an emanation, the first emanation is the agent and the second emanation is the object. Similarly, due to afflictions and karma one takes a body; afflictions and karma being the agent and the body the object. Agent and action lack inherent existence and are likened to a city of gandharvas, a mirage, a dream, and so forth. What is "a city of gandharvas"? This is discussed in the context of the instructions regarding putting a small amount of water in an offering bowl before placing it on the altar in order to avoid that the gandharvas build their city there and then by pouring water into the bowl one destroys their city and creates heavy negative karma.

Thursday morning, 6 July 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 213) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *Even with respect to the two truths there is no inherent existence.*
> > *Therefore, they are not permanent; they are also not annihilated.* [6.38cd]
>
> Therefore, all things are empty of inherent existence, like reflections, that is, *even with respect to the two truths*, the ultimate and conventional, or with respect to both of them, *there is no inherent existence*. *Therefore*, *they*, forms and so forth, *are not* inherently existent *permanent*. Not only that, *they are also not annihilated*. 'Annihilation' is annihilation as it is explained in the context of [saying that] at the time of the sprout, the disintegrated seed is non-existent. *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 15.11cd) says:
>
> > "The previously arisen, now does not exist,"
> > Hence, it would follow as annihilated.
>
> Due to asserting inherently existent things, if it is asserted either that
> 1. things that existed before, later do not exist, or
> 2. that they are impermanent [phenomena] which have disintegrated,
>
> it is a view of annihilation. This is because, even though when things are asserted to be inherently existent they are asserted to be either permanent or impermanent, they are said to be views that fall into the extremes of permanence and annihilation.

Here the Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas: "If you accept forms and so forth to be inherently existent you fall into the extremes of permanence and annihilation." Forms and so forth are neither inherently existent permanent nor inherently existent impermanent. Asserting that inherently existent forms and so forth that existed previously, later become non-existent is the extreme of annihilation. However, if non-inherently existent phenomena that existed before are asserted to later become non-existent this is not the extreme of annihilation because impermanent phenomena do exist and disintegrate. When one realizes the non-inherent existence of phenomena, one easily becomes free of the extremes of permanence and annihilation.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "This is because, even though when things are asserted to be inherently existent they are asserted to be either permanent or impermanent, they are said to be views that fall into the extremes of permanence and annihilation." If one asserts that inherently existent phenomena are permanent one falls into the extreme of permanence, whereas if one asserts that

inherently existent phenomena are impermanent one falls into the extreme of annihilation. The latter is because if something that exists inherently is impermanent it would be non-existent.

Student: Does there exist an innate view of extremes?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Having an innate view of permanence does not mean that one falls into the extreme of permanence. To fall into the extreme of permanence means that one *asserts* inherently existent phenomena are permanent. Only two views, the view of the transitory collection and view of extremes, are both innate and acquired.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 214) says:

> *Fundamental Wisdom* says that just as emanations by the Teacher emanate and [those emanations] also emanate others, likewise, also agent, action, and that produced by them are similar to those. Due to this, here the [auto]commentary says:
>
> > [The analogy of emanation] indicates that those that are non-inherently existent are produced from the non-inherently existent.
>
> This statement indicates that due to positing all agents and actions as non-inherently existent there is no view of annihilation. Here, if establishment by way of its own character is not negated conventionally, one will not realize the very subtle selflessness, due to which it also becomes difficult to not generate the very subtle views of permanence and annihilation in one's continuum. Therefore, the abandonment of all views of permanence and annihilation without exception is the excellent quality of refuting the object of negation conventionally. If it is refuted to be conventionally existent, not only will one not fall into the views of permanence and annihilation relative to the ultimate, one will [also] not be polluted by the stains of the views of permanence and annihilation relative to the conventional. Hence, [refuting inherent production] has the excellent quality of easily abandoning the views of permanence and annihilation.

Just as in the example of an emanation emanating emanations, it is feasible to posit agents and actions, or causes and results. The meaning of the analogy is that the Teacher, the emanator, is the agent, and the emanation is the object of the action. In terms of cause and result, the Teacher is the agent, the emanation he emanates is the action, and that emanation making an emanation is like an action producing a result.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "This statement indicates that due to positing all agents and actions as non-inherently existent there is no view of annihilation." In short, due to positing phenomena as non-inherently existent agents and actions are feasible.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Here, if establishment by way of its own character is not negated conventionally one will not realize the very subtle selflessness." If someone asserts that, although inherently existent phenomena do not exist ultimately, they do exist conventionally, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is incorrect because they also do not exist conventionally. Thus, if inherently existent phenomena are not refuted also conventionally one will have difficulty in achieving the realization of the very subtle selflessness. Then, if one does not realize the very subtle selflessness "it also becomes difficult to not generate the very subtle views of permanence and annihilation in one's continuum." Therefore, in order to have a view that is free from the two extremes, one also has to refute inherently existent phenomena conventionally. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "If it is refuted to be conventionally existent, not only will one not fall into the views of permanence and annihilation relative to the ultimate, one will [also] not be polluted by the stains of the views of permanence and annihilation relative to the conventional."

In conclusion Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Hence, [refuting inherent production] has the excellent quality of easily abandoning the views of permanence and annihilation." The two extremes of

permanence and annihilation are also respectively called 'the extreme of existence' and 'the extreme of non-existence.'

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Who abides in the extreme of permanence and who abides in the extreme of annihilation?
Student: The followers of the lower schools abide in the extreme of permanence because they assert phenomena to be inherently existent, and those who abide in the extreme of annihilation are some of the non-Buddhist schools.
Student 2: Those who abide in the extreme of permanence are ordinary worldly beings like my mother, whereas those who abide in the extreme of annihilation are the existentialists.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Who are those who abide in both extremes?
Student: They are superiors who abide on the path of seeing who no longer have the acquired afflictions but have the innate ones.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is not possible for superiors to abide in both extremes because they have realized the non-inherent existence of phenomena and have realized that agent, action, and object exist within that. The measure of falling into the extreme of permanence is to assert that compounded phenomena exist truly. The measure of falling into the extreme of annihilation is asserting that if compounded phenomena do not exist truly they are completely non-existent. In conclusion, there are no superiors who fall into the extreme of permanence and the extreme of annihilation.

Student: If a Svatantrika Madhyamika asserts a phenomenon to be permanent and inherently existent he would fall into the extreme of permanence and if he asserts a phenomenon to be impermanent and inherently existent he would fall into the extreme of annihilation.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It can be said that from the point of view of the Prasangika Madhyamikas the Svatantrika Madhyamikas fall into both extremes. However, you can then debate this saying: "It follows that a Svatantrika Madhyamika is not a Madhyamika because he has fallen into the extremes of permanence and annihilation." If rather than saying "inherently existent" you had said "truly existent" then this argument would not apply to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas do not assert that phenomena are truly existent, ultimately existent, and existing as their own reality, but assert that phenomena are inherently existent, established by way of their own character, and existing from their own side.

Student: If someone thinks that nothing exists and therefore it is not necessary to safeguard morality is that a view of annihilation which makes one fall into the extreme of annihilation?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is a wrong view. For example, thinking that there are no future lives or no Three Jewels are wrong views.
Student: Does the view of annihilation follow from a wrong view? Does a wrong view follow from a view of annihilation? What is their relationship?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is no particular order. Wrong views are to hold that the Three Jewels, the law of actions and results, and so forth do not exist, it is not to say "I do not exist" and "You do not exist." The view of annihilation is to analyze with reasonings and come to the conclusion that phenomena do not exist inherently and therefore do not exist whereby one thinks "I do not exist." One thinks that if phenomena do not exist inherently they do not exist at all. Holding the view that phenomena do not exist inherently therefore they do not exist is to fall into the extreme of annihilation. Just to hold the wrong view that the Three Jewels, law of actions and results, and so forth do not exist is not to fall into the extreme of annihilation.

Therefore, who has fallen into the extreme of annihilation and who has fallen into the extreme of permanence? According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas the followers of the lowers schools have

fallen into the extreme of permanence, and only they themselves have not. To fall into the extreme of annihilation, or to generate the view of annihilation, is to analyze emptiness and upon recognizing the object of negation to think that if it is negated then everything becomes non-existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 214-5) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2 The excellent quality of the relationship of actions and results being completely appropriate

- A Indicating that with regard to not asserting establishment by way of its own character, it is not necessary to assert a basis-of-all and so forth
- B Indicating an example of a result arising from a action that has ceased
- C Dispelling arguments with respect to indicating in this way

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2A Indicating that with regard to not asserting establishment by way of its own character, it is not necessary to assert a basis-of-all and so forth

1. Explaining the passage that makes a connection
2. Explaining the meaning of the root verse
3. Explaining the meaning that comes from that

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2A1 Explaining the passage that makes a connection

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 81) says:

> Therefore, since such a self-nature does not exist in either of the two truths, not only is viewing as eternal and annihilated abandoned a long way off, but even if a long time passes after having ceased actions, the relationship with the effect of the actions is admissible even without imagining a consciousness-basis-of-all, a continuum [of mind], not wasting, acquisition, and so forth.

This passage connects: (1) the fact that by the realization of the non-inherent existence of phenomena the views of permanence and annihilation are distanced and (2) the fact that a relationship between cause and result is completely feasible. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the ceasing of actions is a functioning thing due to which, although their results arise a long time later, there is no need to posit a site for the depositing of latencies such as a mind-basis-of-all, a continuity of mind, non-wastage, acquisition, and so forth. On the other hand, the lower schools, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, Chittamatrins, and Sautrantikas, assert that a basis or site is necessary for the depositing of the latencies of actions because without this they could not bring a result. For this reason, they posit a mind-basis-of-all, a mental consciousness, and the continuity of mind as the basis on which these latencies are posited. The Vaibhashikas posit acquisition and non-wastage to explain how actions bring about their results.

The Chittamatrins in general say that a mind-basis-of-all is necessary for the depositing of latencies of actions. However, there are True Aspectarian Chittamatrins and False Aspectarian Chittamatrins, the former of which posit a mind-basis-of-all as the site for the depositing of latencies, whereas the latter posit the mental consciousness. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas also posit the mental consciousness, whereas the Sautrantikas posit the continuity of mental consciousness. Within the Vaibhashikas there are those who posit acquisition and those who posit non-wastage.

What is a mind-basis-of-all? It is an unspecified mind that is other than the collection of seven consciousnesses and is the site for the depositing of the latencies of virtuous and non-virtuous actions. This is discussed in a particular text dedicated to the subject of the mind-basis-of-all, *Ocean of Eloquence, An Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of Mentality and the Basis-of-all*.

The Svatantrika Madhyamikas posit the sixth, the mental consciousness, which is the illustration of the person, as the site for the depositing of the latencies of actions. The entity of this

mental consciousness is unspecified or unobscured unspecified. The latencies of actions are deposited on this basis, an unobscured unspecified mind.

Acquisition is defined as: the substance which brings about the possession of the phenomena to be acquired in the person [who acquires it]. Non-wastage is defined as: a potential that does not allow a property to be wasted. It is like, for example, when we put money in the bank we receive a receipt of the deposit in that this receipt is what prevents the loss of that money.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 215) says:

> [The passage in Chandrakirti's autocommentary that makes a connection] says:
>
> > Thus, since neither of the two truths are inherently existent, not only are the views of permanence and annihilation abandoned to a far distance, but, even a long time after actions have ceased, it is still feasible for them to be related to the result of those actions even without thoroughly conceiving a mind-basis-of-all, a continuity of mind, non-wastage, acquisition, and so forth.
>
> This [passage] indicates that the position of establishment by way of its own character not existing even in conventional terms has not only the excellent quality of casting the views of permanence and annihilation to a far distance, but also has the excellent quality of the relationship between actions and results being completely reasonable even without asserting a mind-basis-of-all and so forth.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that although there is no mind-basis-of-all and so forth the relationship between actions and results is completely reasonable.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 215) says:

> The way to comment on Arya [Nagarjuna's] texts [is as follows]. Even though there does not exist a mere atom of establishment by way of its own character, in dependence on this uncommon system – a way of commenting that is admissible due to positing all agents and actions – there are many pure tenets that are uncommon to other commentators. What are they? For the moment, when the main ones are expressed they are:
>
> 1. not asserting a mind-basis-of-all which is a different entity from the six collections,
> 2. not asserting self-cognizers,
> 3. not asserting that the view of suchness is generated in the continuum of a defendant by an autonomous syllogism,
> 4. in asserting consciousnesses, it is also necessary to assert external objects,
> 5. hearers and solitary realizers have the realization of things as non-inherently existent,
> 6. the conception of a self of phenomena is posited as an affliction,
> 7. disintegratedness is a functioning thing, and
> 8. for that reason, there is an uncommon way of positing the three times.

These are the eight uncommon points or eight difficult points of the Prasangika Madhyamika system. The first is that the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not assert a mind-basis-of-all which is a different entity from the six collections. Then, although the Tibetan text actually says "not asserting an uncommon way of refuting a self-cognizer" this means "not asserting a self-cognizer." If a self-cognizer existed it would be a consciousness that is directed only inward and just an apprehender The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not accept such a consciousness.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas also do not assert that the view of suchness is generated in the continuum of a defendant by means of an autonomous syllogism. In fact, they do not accept autonomous signs. What is an autonomous sign? According to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system a defendant can realize the thesis, or probandum, by means of the challenger setting forth a sign having all three inherently existent modes complete. This is not asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Of the eight difficult points, three of them are what is not asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas and five of them are what is asserted by them. The five are:

1. the existence of external objects,
2. hearers and solitary realizers superiors have the realization of the selflessness of phenomena,
3. the conception of a self of phenomena is an afflictive obstruction,
4. disintegratedness is a functioning thing, and
5. for that reason an uncommon way of positing the three times.

However, in Gyeltshap Dharma Rinchen's *Notes on the Eight Difficult Points, Preventing Forgetfulness of the Foremost One's Speech* it says that, among the eight, four are asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas and four are not asserted by them. In Langdok Lama Rinpoche's commentary *Enumeration of the Names of the Middle Way* there are eleven difficult points. Also in the Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's texts there are more than eight. However, most commentators posit eight difficult points for the reason that there are eight commentaries that are uncommon to the Chittamatra way of commenting and eight commentaries that are uncommon to the Prasangika Madhyamika way of commenting.

Friday morning, 7 July 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 216) says:

> The first, [not asserting a mind-basis-of-all which is a different entity from the six collections,] is presented in this chapter. The way of touching upon the non-assertion of a self-cognizer in terms of not asserting inherent existence will be explained. The way of touching upon the non-assertion of autonomous [syllogisms] in terms of [not asserting inherent existence] has already been extensively explained in other [texts], but it is also briefly explained here. The [way of] touching upon the assertion of external objects in terms of [not asserting inherent existence] will be explained. Also, the way of touching upon the fifth, [the assertion that hearers and solitary realizers have the realization of things as non-inherently existent] in terms of [not asserting inherent existence is as follows]. The non-existent self of the statement "The selflessness of all phenomena within the hearer's basket" by Buddhapalita is establishment by way of its own entity, as was explained previously, and is asserted here as well. Furthermore, this means that it fulfills the definition of selflessness. Therefore, it fulfills the definition of the selflessness of persons and necessarily also that of the person's non-establishment by way of its own entity. In order to realize that properly, it is an essential must to also realize the selflessness of phenomena properly.

The non-assertion of a self-cognizer is touched upon in terms of not asserting inherent existence. In the Prasangika Madhyamika system a self-cognizer is not asserted because they say that a consciousness cannot cognize itself. For example, a knife, no matter who sharp its blade is, cannot cut itself. Likewise, darkness cannot obscure itself and a light cannot illuminate itself. Also a gymnast cannot stand on his own shoulders! In the same way a consciousness cannot cognize itself.

The Prasangika Madhyamika system also does not assert autonomous syllogisms. This means that an inherently existent thesis cannot be realized in dependence on realizing a inherently existent sign that has the three modes complete. This is briefly explained by Lama Tsongkhapa in the *Illumination* but it is extensively explained in his other texts, for example, *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The [way of] touching upon the assertion of external objects will be explained."

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "the assertion that hearers and solitary realizers have the realization of things as non-inherently existent." This is because the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if it is a hearer or solitary realizer superior it is pervaded by realizing the selflessness of phenomena. This was explained extensively in the first chapter of the *Supplement* in relation to:

> *On the Gone Afar he surpasses them with his intelligence.* [1.8d]

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* previously set out three reasonings and seven scriptural authorities proving that hearer and solitary realizer superiors realize the selflessness of phenomena (see *Illumination* Tibetan text page 45).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 216) says:

> The non-existent self of the statement "The selflessness of all phenomena within the hearer's basket" by Buddhapalita is establishment by way of its own entity, as was explained previously, and is asserted here as well. Furthermore, this means that it fulfills the definition of selflessness. Therefore, it fulfills the definition of the selflessness of persons and necessarily also that of the person's non-establishment by way of its own entity. In order to realize that properly, it is an essential must to also realize the selflessness of phenomena properly.

Here Lama Tsongkhapa says that in order to realize a selflessness of persons that fulfills the definition, or a fully qualified selflessness of persons, one must realize a fully qualified selflessness of phenomena. "Fully qualified" means that it fulfills its definition. In both cases, that of realizing the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena, the object of negation is establishment by way of its own character. Is it certain that one must first realize a fully qualified selflessness of phenomena before realizing a fully qualified selflessness of persons? This is not necessary because one first realizes the selflessness of persons and then realizes the selflessness of phenomena in terms of the basis of attributes. This is because one first realizes that the person exists in dependence on his five aggregates, due to which one realizes the person to exist dependently, that is, to be a dependent-arising. This is what it means to understand the person in terms of the basis of attributes. This is explained in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Middling Stages of the Path*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 216) says:

> When that is the case, since one must definitely assert the conception of a self of phenomena to be an affliction, there exist many different features such as:
> 1. with respect to the identification of the afflictions there are two, the coarse and subtle,
> 2. there are two ways of asserting – (i) that there is freedom and (ii) that there is not freedom – by the mere path of the sixteen [attributes], impermanence and so forth, and
> 3. from what point the knowledge obstructions are abandoned.

Because the hearer and solitary realizers realize the non-inherent existence of phenomena the conception of a self of phenomena is an affliction. The afflictions have two levels, the coarse and subtle. The subtle afflictions are those induced by the conception of persons or phenomena as inherently existent, whereas coarse afflictions are those induced by the conception conceiving the person to be self sufficient substantially existent. Or else it can be said that the afflictions explained in

the two *Knowledges* are the coarse afflictions and those explained by the Prasangika Madhyamikas are the subtle.

By relying on the mere path of the sixteen attributes that is explained in the two *Knowledges* one cannot attain liberation, whereas by relying on the path of the sixteen attributes explained here one can attain liberation.

The knowledge obstructions are abandoned from the eighth ground upward. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that a bodhisattva does not begin to abandon the knowledge obstructions until the afflictive obstructions have been abandoned. On the other hand, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert that a bodhisattva begins to abandon the afflictive obstructions together with the knowledge obstructions from the first ground. They say that a bodhisattva definite in lineage attains the two states of foe destroyer simultaneously, that is, a foe destroyer who has abandoned the afflictive obstructions and a foe destroyer who has abandoned the knowledge obstructions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 216) says:

> QUESTION: Well then, that initially it is possible for there to be a common locus of the two – (i) excellently settling the view of suchness that enters the mahayana and (ii) falling into the hearer and solitary realizer [vehicle] – is also necessarily asserted by both Madhyamikas. In that case, it is also necessary to assert that such [a person], through cultivating the selflessness of phenomena, directly perceives it and meditates on that already seen in this way. If that is the case, it is also necessary to assert that, by means of the path, the acquired conceptions of a self of phenomena are abandoned through the path of seeing and the innate conceptions of a self are abandoned through the path of meditation. Therefore, is the conception of a self of phenomena also asserted to be of two [types], afflicted and not afflicted, in the Madhyamika system that conceives things to be established by way of their own character?

Someone says that the two Madhyamikas must accept a common locus of "(i) excellently settling the view of suchness that enters the mahayana and (ii) falling into the hearer and solitary realizer [vehicle]." There are bodhisattvas who have realized emptiness and who have degenerated the mahayana conventional mind of enlightenment due to which they fall to the hearer vehicle. They think that they cannot enact the welfare of sentient beings, who are difficult to subdue, and think to attain their own liberation due to which they fall to the hinayana. There is a story about this. Once Manjushri taught emptiness to a large number of people, however, the listeners were improper vessels for this teaching and generated wrong views and fell into the extreme of annihilation, due to which they created the causes to be reborn in a hell realm. Shariputra told Shakyamuni Buddha what Manjushri had done and what the result would be. Shariputra said that if he himself had taught the hinayana they would not have created the cause to be reborn in the lower realms but would have followed the hearer vehicle and have attained liberation. Shakyamuni Buddha disagreed with Shariputra and said that Manjushri was skilled in means because, although those people would be reborn in hell, upon exhausting their karma they would be reborn and enter the mahayana and attain liberation, whereas if they had heard teachings from Shariputra they would have attained a hinayana liberation and remained in solitary peace for a long time due to which it would have taken them much longer to achieve full enlightenment.

The question continues: "In that case, it is also necessary to assert that such [a person], through cultivating the selflessness of phenomena, directly perceives it and meditates on that already seen in this way. If that is the case, it is also necessary to assert that, by means of the path, the acquired conceptions of a self of phenomena are abandoned through the path of seeing and the innate conceptions of a self are abandoned through the path of meditation." In general the Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that the acquired conceptions of a self are abandoned by the antidote that is the

path of seeing and the innate conceptions of a self are abandoned by the antidote that is the path of meditation.

The actual question is: "Therefore, is the conception of a self of phenomena also asserted to be of two [types], afflicted and not afflicted, in the Madhyamika system that conceives things to be established by way of their own character?" This person expresses a doubt as to whether the conception of a self of phenomena is an affliction in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system. The conception conceiving form to be an external object is an afflictive obstruction which is abandoned by the solitary realizer path. In general according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, the three main objects of abandonment of the three persons are:

1. the main object of abandonment of hearers is the conception of a self of persons,
2. the main object of abandonment of solitary realizers is the conception of forms as external objects, and
3. the main object of abandonment of mahayanists is the conception of true existence.

These three objects of abandonment of the three persons are extensively discussed in Haribhadra's *Commentary Clarifying the Meaning* on *Ornament for Clear Realizations* in the context of the perfect end. Here it says all paths are to be generated and to be known, and that the three persons respectively abandon the conception of a self of persons, the conception of external objects, and the conception of true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 217) says:

> RESPONSE: Although it does not appear to be clearly explained, [according to] the Svatantrikas, hearers and solitary realizers cultivate the path in this way. However, it is necessary to assert "Although they achieve a temporary abandonment of the manifest conceptions of a self of phenomena, without the help of the accumulation of the infinite collections, the seeds of neither of the two conceptions of a self of phenomena will come to be abandoned." Therefore, although hearers and solitary realizers can temporarily abandon the manifest knowledge obstructions, it must be said that they cannot abandon their seeds. According to the assertions of Acharya [Chandrakirti], the conception of a self of phenomena is an affliction, therefore, in order to abandon its seeds the help of the accumulation of the infinite collections is not necessary. However, with respect to purifying the knowledge obstructions that are latencies of mistaken dualistic appearance, it is asserted that they cannot be purified without such help.

The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that hearers and solitary realizers abandon the manifest conceptions of a self of phenomena temporarily, meaning that they are ceased temporarily. However, they do not abandon their seeds because they do not have a sufficient accumulation of the collections. In order to abandon the knowledge obstructions the accumulation of infinite collections is necessary, whereas hearers and solitary realizers lack this. On the other hand, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "According to the assertions of Acharya [Chandrakirti], the conception of a self of phenomena is an affliction, therefore, in order to abandon its seeds the help of the accumulation of the infinite collections is not necessary." The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that since the conception of a self of phenomena is an affliction there is no need to have an accumulation of infinite collections in order to abandon it. Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "However, with respect to purifying the knowledge obstructions that are latencies of mistaken dualistic appearance, it is asserted that they cannot be purified without such help."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 217) concludes:

> This is explained since there seems to be very great value in understanding the above explanations.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: Bodhisattva superiors from the first to the seventh ground have appearances of true existence and adhere to it. How often does this occur?

- at all times?
- every time they have the appearance of true existence they grasp at true existence?
- only sometimes, and less and less as they proceed along the grounds?

Could you explain this also with respect to ordinary beings?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Bodhisattvas have the innate conception of true existence through the seventh ground. Therefore, in subsequent attainment they have the appearance of true existence, although in meditative equipoise there is no such appearance. Therefore, these bodhisattvas do not have the appearance of true existence at all times. Although there is the appearance of true existence, the person, the bodhisattva, does not adhere to it. In conclusion, there is a difference between the person adhering to the true existence and adherence to true existence. The person adhering to true existence means that he *asserts* true existence, whereas adhering to true existence means to have the conception of true existence.

As a bodhisattva progresses along the path the conception of true existence diminishes. On the eighth ground it is abandoned completely.

Ordinary beings absorbed in meditative equipoise on emptiness do not have the appearance of true existence, but in subsequent attainment they have the appearance of true existence.

Student: If an ordinary being realizes emptiness by means of a meaning generality how can there be no appearance of true existence?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: As long as an ordinary being is absorbed in meditative equipoise on emptiness there is no appearance of true existence. Do you think that there is the appearance of conventionalities?

Student: Yes.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If we say that that meditative equipoise is conceptual it would be a mistaken consciousness because a conceptual consciousness is pervaded by being a mistaken consciousness. Therefore, with respect to what is it mistaken?

Student: With respect to its appearing object.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does it not realize its appearance? We can say that the appearance and the appearing object are different. Think about this.

Student: According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, does the emptiness of the table appear to the eye consciousness apprehending the table?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: No, emptiness does not appear to a sense consciousness. If emptiness were to appear to an eye consciousness, it would have to have the appearance of the negation of the object of negation, but it does not. A non-affirming negative cannot appear to a sense consciousness. However, this can be debated asking: "Does empty space, a non-affirming negative that is the lack of obstructive contact, appear to a sense consciousness since there is the appearance of an intermediate pale area?

Student: It is said that buddhas apprehend the appearance of true existence (not because they are polluted by the latencies of the conception of true existence, but because such appearances exist). So what is the difference experientially with regard to the appearance of true existence for a buddha and for a pure ground bodhisattva?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Pure ground bodhisattvas have the appearance of true existence or dualistic appearance. Buddhas do not have this. Buddhas have the appearance of true existence that appears to sentient beings. If it is asked whether a buddha has the appearance of true existence, the answer is that he does not. Does he have the appearance of true existence that appears to sentient beings? He

does. A buddha does not have the appearance of true existence, whereas pure ground bodhisattvas do.

Student: Can the etymology of the word *kun rdzob* be "thoroughly false" since conventionalities are falsities?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The etymology of *kun rdzob den pa* (conventional truth or truth for a concealer) is a truth in the perspective of a concealer which is a conception of true existence. *Kun rdzob* means falsity. All compounded phenomena are deceptive, therefore they are falsities.

Student: Does a consciousness necessarily have an *observed object*, for example, the consciousness appending the tail of a human being?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: A consciousness necessarily has an observed object because a consciousness apprehending the tail of a human being has as its observed object a human being. When someone looks at the defects of a human being, such as a tail, he is looking at the defect and observing that person. In short, even a consciousness observing the tail of a human being has an observed object, this being a human being. Once there was the following debate. The challenger asked: "If it is selfless does it have a conception apprehending it?" A geshe, also named Geshe Jampa Gyatso, answered that it is pervaded by having a conception apprehending it. The challenger responded: "Kor sum! Is there a conception thinking that a huge yak is entering your anus?" The geshe replied that there is. The challenger then asked: "Who has this conception?" The geshe answered: "You do!"

Student: The refutation of production from other by the Prasangika Madhyamikas is also made conventionally and not only in terms of an inherently existent other. Thus, seed and sprout are not other even conventionally, not even non-inherently. Therefore, it seems that even conventionally production from other is a non-affirming negative, therefore we cannot say that things are produced from other conventionally. How is this?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In the Prasangika Madhyamika system a cause that is a mere conventionality producing a result that is a mere conventionality is not called 'production from other.' Only production of an inherently existent result from an inherently existent cause is called 'production from other.' However, one can debate the Prasangika Madhyamikas asking: "Are seed and sprout not other?" The Prasangika Madhyamika system would say that they are other because they are mere other. One then asks: "Does a seed not produce a result?" The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that a seed produces a result. One then concludes: "Therefore, there is production from other." To this the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond that there is not. One then says: "There is production from other because a seed produces a sprout and they are other." The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "There is no pervasion." The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that a seed does produce a sprout and that seed and sprout are other, but they maintain that there is no production from other.

Student: A buddha simultaneously and directly realizes all phenomena. A buddha realizes pure conventionalities, such as the major and minor marks of a buddha, through the appearance of the object itself and realizes impure conventionalities through the object's appearance to sentient beings. Please explain these two ways a buddha realizes conventionalities.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: A buddha realizes everything directly because he has abandoned all obstructions to seeing objects directly. A buddha sees pure phenomena and impure phenomena directly and simultaneously. For example, if we simultaneously observe a clean cup and a dirty cup they both appear to our eye consciousness. There is no contradiction in this. Through seeing both cups we remember one cup is clean and one is dirty. It is similar in the case of a buddha who simultaneously realizes impure and pure conventionalities.

Student: A view holding to an extreme observes the self apprehended by the view of the transitory collection and conceives it to be either permanent or annihilated at death. The self apprehended by the view of the transitory is a truly existent self which does not exist. How can this self be the observed object of a view holding to an extreme?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is generally said that a view holding to an extreme observes the self apprehended by the view of the transitory collection and conceives of it as either permanent or annihilated at death.
Student: But that self does not exist.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The views of permanence and annihilation mean that one views the self that is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection as either permanent or annihilated. The self that is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection is a self. Taking that self as the observed object, a view holding to an extreme either conceives it to be permanent or non-existent. The self that is the object of the mode of apprehension of the view of the transitory collection is not the observed object of a view holding to an extreme. In conclusion, the self that is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection is the observed object of the view holding to an extreme.

END

Wednesday afternoon, 27 September 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 217) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2A2 Explaining the meaning of the root verse

Chandrakirti (Tibetan text page 81-2) says:

If asked: How?

Since that is not inherently ceased, therefore,
Because this [effect] is capable even without a basis of all.
Ceased actions pass a long time in some, yet the action
Should be understood as giving rise to the correct effect. [6.39]

In the case of some [systems], in answer to the dispute stating "The action is ceased; how would an effect arise from that action that has already ceased?" – in order to present the capability of an action that already ceased [they] imagine:

1. a consciousness-basis-of-all (*alayavijÒana*), or
2. another feature like a debt-contract, not wasting, or
3. acquisition, or
4. a continuum of consciousness that is stained by the imprints of actions.

In the case of that [system] in which an action is not produced by its own essential nature (i.e., the Prasangika), neither does ceasing that [action] exist [inherently] nor is it impossible for the effect to arise from the non-disintegrated. Hence, actions not disintegrating, the relationship of actions and effects becomes very extremely admissible.

As was taught in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, 17.21]:

Because action is unproduced, [it is] thus without self-nature because of that.
Because it is not produced, therefore it will not be wasted.

Also in [a mahayana] sutra:[34]

The human life span is a hundred years, so "To live that long" is indeed expressed,
yet years lack accumulation as a heap. The proof is similar to that.

What is called "unexhausted" and what is called "exhausted action" are indicated
as exhausted in the conventional sense, not exhausted in the sense of empty.

Even for the school that, asserting the absence of inherent existence, does not assert a mind-basis-of-all, a relationship between cause and result is still admissible. The lower schools say that when an action has been created, it yields a result even a long time later because the latency of that action is deposited on a particular basis; however, the Prasangika Madhyamika system asserts that there is no need to posit such a basis. The Chittamatra system asserts that the mind-basis-of-all is the basis upon which the latencies of actions are deposited, whereas other lower schools assert that the latencies of actions are deposited on the continuum of consciousness. The Vaibhashikas assert that the result of an action arises due to acquisition, which is equivalent to non-wastage, this being likened to a receipt of a debt contract or the receipt received when money is deposited in a bank. Thus, each of the lower schools posits a particular basis upon which the latency of an action is deposited. They say that when that latency is nourished by particular conditions, it will yield its result.

[34] Poisson could not identify this citation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 217) says:

> QUESTION: With respect to the position that asserts that things do not inherently exist, how does [this school] justify a relationship between actions and results in spite of not asserting a mind-basis-of-all and so forth?
> RESPONSE: That there arise the results of happiness, suffering, and so forth even from virtuous and non-virtuous actions that have a long gap between the action and its result is asserted by all the higher and lower [Buddhist] schools. With respect to this, if an action were to remain through to just prior to yielding a result it would be permanent, but being permanent it would not be able to perform a function, whereby the relationship of a result arising from an action would not be justifiable. [On the other hand], if an action has disintegrated at the second moment of its production then, from that point through to just prior to directly yielding a result, that action would no longer exist, whereas since a disintegrated action is not even a functioning thing how would a result arise from an action? The answer to these arguments [is as follows].

According to the lower schools if, without being deposited on a basis, an action were to remain through to just prior to yielding its result, then that action would be permanent, due to which it would be empty of being able to perform a function. In that case, a relationship between action and result would not be justifiable. On the other hand if an action, having been produced, had disintegrated at the second moment, it would no longer exist. Therefore, there would be nothing to connect an action and its result. This is because for the lower schools a disintegrated action is a non-functioning thing and is therefore unable to yield a result. These schools define a non-functioning thing as that which is empty of being able to perform a function; therefore, it is that which is unable to bring a result. In response to the lower schools' arguments that the Prasangika Madhyamikas' assertions do not permit a relationship between actions and results, the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond as follows.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 218) says:

> In order to posit the potential of an action at the time of approaching the cessation of that action, this being prior to it having already ceased at the second moment of the action's production:
> 1. some conceive a mind-basis-of-all;
> 2. some assert a non-associated compositional factor called 'non-wastage,' an object other than the two actions which is like the receipt of a debt contract;
> 3. some conceive a non-associated factor that is an object other than the two [actions] called 'the acquisition of the two actions'; and
> 4. some, because of conceiving a continuum of consciousness that is stained by the latencies of actions, assert that although an action has ceased, there is no contradiction that that action yields a result a long time afterward.
>
> Since an action deposits a latency on the mind-basis-of-all, that latency is the result of that action. Since, in the end, a continuity of a similar type to [the action] yields the result, the result of the initial action is asserted to arise from a continuity. The other three are also to be understood similarly.
> The first, [those who conceive a mind-basis-of-all], are some Chittamatrins.

The Chittamatrins who assert eight consciousnesses, among which the mind-basis-of-all is the basis upon which the latencies of actions are deposited, are the True Aspectarian Chittamatrins, not the False Aspectarian Chittamatrins. The eight consciousnesses are:
(1-6) the six engaging consciousnesses – the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses;
(7) the mind-basis-of-all, which is an unspecified consciousness; and
(8) the afflicted mentality, which observes the mind-basis-of-all and conceives it to be a self-sufficient substantially existent self.

The Chittamatrins cite scriptural quotations and give reasonings that support the existence of a mind-basis-of-all. What is a mind-basis-of-all? It is the particular consciousness upon which the latencies of all virtuous and non-virtuous actions are deposited. A mind-basis-of-all is said to be unspecified because it is the basis upon which both virtuous and non-virtuous latencies are deposited; if it were virtuous it could not be the basis upon which non-virtuous latencies are deposited and if it were non-virtuous it could not be the basis upon which virtuous latencies are deposited. Therefore, it has to be posited as unspecified. Among the seven types of awarenesses, the mind-basis-of-all is an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained (an inattentive awareness).

'The other three' are the other three positions, which respectively assert non-wastage, acquisition, and a continuum of consciousness [to explain the relationship between actions and their results].

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 218) says:

> The second are explained by Avalokitavrata to be the Vaibhashikas who are other than the Kashmiri Vaibhashikas.

These Vaibhashikas are the Nyeopa Vaibhashikas. They assert non-wastage, which is likened to the receipt of a debt contract.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 218) says:

> The third are also a subdivision of the Vaibhashikas.

These particular Vaibhashikas assert acquisition.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 218) says:

> Although who the fourth are is not clearly specified, according to the ninth chapter of the commentary on the *Treasury of Knowledge*, these seem to be the assertions of the Sautrantikas and also of the Kashmiri Vaibhashikas.

The Kashmiri Vaibhashikas are known to assert acquisition, whereas the Sautrantikas assert that the latencies of actions are deposited on the continuum of the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness. Thus, it is not clear why Lama Tsongkhapa says "also of the Kashmiri Vaibhashikas."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 218) says:

> Although the Kashmiris assert acquisition, they do not assert that acquisition is produced by the two actions, the phenomenon to be acquired. Here 'those who assert such' is the meaning of stating "According to them" [in the autocommentary].

The translation by George Churinoff of 'According to them' in Chandrakirti's autocommentary reads "In the case of that [system]." What is acquisition and what is the phenomenon to be acquired? What is a virtuous acquisition and a virtuous phenomenon to be acquired? According to what Lama Tsongkhapa says here, it would seem that a virtuous acquisition is not produced by a virtuous action and that a non-virtuous acquisition is not produced by a non-virtuous action.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 218) says:

Chandrakirti says:

> *Therefore, they do not inherently cease.*
> *Due to that, even without a mind-basis-of-all, because there is the potential for that*
> *It should be understood that ceased actions in some,*
> *Even after a long time has elapsed, give rise to an appropriate result.* [6.39]

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, actions are not produced by their own nature. This being the case, *therefore*, actions *do not inherently cease*. However, although actions do not inherently cease, it is not contradictory for results to arise [from them].

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the arisal of a result from a non-inherently existent action is admissible without the need to assert a mind-basis-of-all. This is because for this school a disintegrated action is a functioning thing. Thus, this school asserts that there is no need to posit a basis on which the latencies of actions are deposited because a disintegrated action (an action's disintegratedness) is itself able to perform a function, which is to yield a result later on. In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas' main argument is that because a disintegrated action is able to bring a result, there is no need to assert the existence of a mind-basis-of-all and so forth. On the other hand, in the lower schools there is need to assert a basis on which the latencies of actions are deposited since, without such a basis, actions would not yield a result. These schools say that a disintegrated action is permanent and a non-functioning thing, due to which it cannot give rise to a result later on. Since a disintegrated action is a non-functioning thing that is unable to bring a result later on, it is necessary to assert a basis upon which the latencies of actions are deposited.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 219) says:

> *Due to that*, *even without* asserting *a mind-basis-of-all* and so forth, *because there is the potential for that* – a result – to arise from an action, *it should be understood that* although the production of the two *actions* has *ceased* in *some* sentient beings' continua, *an appropriate result arises* from that action. That is, a result unmistakenly arises from that cause, *even after a long time has elapsed*, i.e., after many eons. Hence, for this school the relationship between action and result is well justified.

Here 'this school' refers to the Prasangika Madhyamika school, which says that without asserting a mind-basis-of-all, a disintegrated action will bring a result even after many eons have passed.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 219) says:

> The meaning of [the above assertions] is that all four respondents to the previous debate also assert:
> - production and cessation with regard to actions are established by way of their own character and
> - the cessation subsequent to the production of an action exists inherently.
>
> With respect to this, it not being suitable for the master, [Chandrakirti,] to respond "Although there is such a cessation, due to asserting a mind-basis-of-all and so forth there is no fault," this [assertion] is negated, stating "Because there is no production and cessation of actions in an inherently existent manner." This way of responding is said to be the assertion of Arya [Nagarjuna].

All four positions mentioned above assert actions to be established by way of their own character. The four positions are those that, in order to posit a relationship between actions and results, respectively posit: (1) a mind-basis-of-all, (2) non-wastage, which is like the receipt of a debt contract, (3) acquisition, and (4) a continuum of consciousness. The Prasangika Madhyamikas negate all these positions, saying that a result cannot arise from an inherently existent action. On the other hand, the

four positions say that even a disintegrated action exists inherently. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas, if a disintegrated action were inherently existent, then the arisal of a result from it could not be justified.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 219) says:

> As cited in *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 17.21):
>
> > Actions are not produced,
> > Hence, they are not inherently existent.
> > Therefore, because they are not produced,
> > They do not go to waste.
>
> This means that because actions do not exist inherently they are not produced by their own nature. Because of that, it is not possible for actions to inherently cease. Therefore, considering the cessation subsequent to the production of an action to be inherently existent and then conceiving non-wastage is unsuitable. Although this reasoning is said to negate non-wastage, there is no difference in terms of it also negating the other three [positions] for completely similar reasons.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond to the previous four assertions, saying that a result arises from a non-inherently existent action. In fact, the Prasangikas say that a result arises because an action is non-inherently existent. They say that although an action does not cease inherently, the disintegratedness of that action brings a result. Because a disintegrated action is a functioning thing, it is able to give rise to a result.

Some Vaibhashikas assert that disintegratedness in general is a functioning thing and is therefore able to perform a function. They say that because disintegratedness is an existent, it is a functioning thing. This is because they assert two types of functioning things: (i) permanent functioning things and (ii) impermanent functioning things. The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond to the Vaibhashikas, saying: "Although you assert a disintegrated action to be a functioning thing, you assert it to be inherently existent, whereas if it is an inherently existent phenomenon, it cannot yield a result later on. Therefore, your assertion is wrong, because if a disintegrated action were an inherently existent phenomenon, it would be an independent phenomenon; if it is an independent phenomenon, it cannot bring about a result. For example, if something is independent it cannot bring about a result due to particular conditions. On the other hand, when a cause gives rise to a result, it does so in dependence on certain conditions." In this way, the Prasangikas say that due to a disintegrated action being an independent phenomenon for the Vaibhashikas, it cannot bring about a result. This is how they debate the Vaibhashikas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 219–20) says:

> In addition, in sutra it says:
>
> > The lifespan of human beings being a hundred years,
> > It is indeed said, "They live that long."
> > Yet, the years are not piled up in a heap.
> > The proof is also similar to that.
> >
> > Whatever is said to be "without extinguishment"
> > And whatever is said to be "the extinguishment of an action"
> > Are indicated to not be extinguishment in the sense of empty,
> > But extinguishment in the conventional sense.
>
> This citation is the source for positing that inherently existent extinguishment and cessation do not exist and that these two, [extinguishment and cessation], are posited by the power of convention.

A result cannot be produced from an inherently existent action and an inherently existent action can not cease. If an action were inherently existent, there would be no extinguishment and cessation of an action. However, conventionally, actions are extinguished and do cease. For example, although the lifespan of human beings is said to be a hundred years, it does not remain fixed at a hundred years but is consumed year after year; that is, it diminishes year after year. It is like, for example, when one has a hundred lire, if even one lira is exhausted or consumed, one no longer has a hundred lire; in this way the hundred lire are extinguished. For example, it is recounted that once a certain Namtse Ling went to buy a train ticket in Dharamsala but was missing ten *annas* (one *anna* is one sixteenth of a *paese*, which is one hundredth of an Indian *rupee*). In spite of lacking such a small amount of the fair, the ticket seller refused to give him a ticket, even though Namtse Ling insisted he was not given a ticket! Thus, even if a small fraction is missing, the final sum is not reached. Sometimes a small amount does not make a difference, but other times it does. For example, we have to be careful not to create even a small non-virtue, because even a small action can bring a big result.

There is also a story about an ex-abbot of Gomang College from Mongolia, who has now passed away, who would give his students money to shop for him. When he was given the items that had been bought, he would count the change and insist that he be given even one missing cent of his change, whereas if several dollars were missing, he did not even mention it. This was to show the student that he had not been careful enough and had been cheated out of some money. Likewise, we too should not neglect even small things.

Thursday morning, 28 September 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 220) says:

> Nagtso's translation says:
>
> > Just as years are not piled up in a heap,
> > Likewise, see that
> > They are also perfectly collected.
>
> These [assertions] are explained in addition to affixing the qualification to the object of negation saying "not ceasing inherently."

Although a year exists and is made up of a collection of parts, such as months, weeks, and so forth, it does not exist inherently. Similarly, actions exist but do not exist inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 220) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2A3 Explaining the meaning that comes from that
>
> - A Non-inherent cessation, the way of proceeding in the reasons for not asserting a mind-basis-of-all
> - B Although not asserting a mind-basis-of-all, positing a basis for the latencies
>
> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2A3A Non-inherent cessation, the way of proceeding in the reasons for not asserting a mind-basis-of-all

There is no discussion of this topic in the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way."'*

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 220) says:

> OBJECTION: Although there is no inherently existent cessation, due to the statements "Ceased actions in some" and "...which are ceased and not inherently existent," even in our system the cessation of that action subsequent to the action's production would have to be asserted in accordance with the statement "[They are] indicated... to be extinguished in the conventional sense." In that case, if (1) cessation is not a functioning thing and (2) a mind-basis-of-all and so forth as a basis for the relationship between actions and results are not asserted, due to the argument about the inadmissibility of a result arising from a ceased action after a long time has elapsed, the previous responses are not sufficient.
> RESPONSE: There is no fault. Since the very reason [given in the *Supplement*] that states "Therefore, they do not inherently cease. Due to that..." (v. 6.39ab) establishes that a later result arises from the disintegratedness that is a disintegrated action, additional responses are not mentioned. Moreover, for all systems that assert things to be inherently existent, disintegratedness is not suitable to be a functioning thing, whereas, for the Madhyamika system, which asserts that they do not inherently exist, the essential point is that disintegratedness is established to be a functioning thing.

In short, the Prasangika Madhyamika school says that there is no need to posit a mind-basis-of-all that is a basis on which the latencies of actions are deposited. However, this does not mean that the latencies of actions are not deposited; in fact, they are deposited. But upon what are they deposited? The Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that it is admissible to posit the mere I as the basis upon which the latencies of actions are deposited. This basis is not inherently existent.

In addition to not accepting a mind-basis-of-all that is the basis upon which the latencies of actions are deposited, the Prasangika Madhyamikas refute the assertions of the Chittamatrins and Sautrantikas that an action's disintegratedness is a non-functioning thing. What is the reasoning by which they refute the existence of a mind-basis-of-all? It is that actions do not exist inherently. On the other hand, for the very reason that the Chittamatra system asserts that actions are inherently existent, they need to posit a mind-basis-of-all as the basis upon which the latencies of actions are deposited. Thus, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that because actions are not inherently existent, there is no need to posit a mind-basis-of-all as the basis upon which the latencies of actions are deposited. The Prasangikas set forth an uncommon presentation of the three times, in which an action's disintegratedness is asserted to be a functioning thing and not a non-functioning thing. Due to this, there is no need to posit the latencies of actions, in that the very disintegratedness of an action is able to bring a result. A result arises from an action's disintegratedness even though there elapses a great amount of time after the action is committed. Is an action's disintegratedness permanent? It is not permanent but its continuum is lasting because it remains for a long time. Thus, it is a lasting continuum but is not permanent. The Prasangika Madhyamikas argue with the lower school's assertion that the latencies of actions are deposited on a mind-basis-of-all and remain a long time, asking: "Are the latencies of actions permanent because they remain for a long time?" Because a later continuum arises from a previous continuum, the continuum remains. In short, the latencies of actions are not permanent, they are momentary, but their continuum endures.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 221) says:

> **(1) The first system, [the Chittamatrins and Svatantrika Madhyamikas who assert things to be inherently existent]**
>
> When a thing such as a sprout has disintegrated, all the things that are part of the sprout are obliterated. Since no other thing that is different from the sprout, such as a pot and so forth, is acquired, they assert that disintegratedness is not at all a functioning thing. Because neither the functioning things that are individual spheres, such as blue, nor the collection of things that are its parts, such as a pot, are suitable as illustrations of that disintegratedness, it is not a functioning thing.

The Chittamatrins and Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert that the disintegratedness of a sprout is not a functioning thing. This is because upon the disintegration of the former entity, no new object is created. Taking the color blue and a pot as bases of illustration, they say that upon their disintegration, no new thing is produced that can be pointed to as the result of their disintegration. Thus, upon the disintegration of a sprout or the color blue, all of its parts are obliterated and there is nothing that can be indicated as their result that is a functioning thing. These are the assertions of the lower schools, who say that disintegratedness is not a functioning thing.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 221) says:

> **(2) The latter system, [the Prasangika Madhyamika]**
>
> For example, both (i) Upagupta's individual five aggregates and (ii) the collection of them, and (iii) that which is a different entity from these two cannot be posited as an illustration of Upagupta, and Upagupta is also not suitable as an illustration of these three. However, it is not contradictory for there to be a functioning thing imputed as Upagupta in dependence on his aggregates. Similarly, although disintegratedness is neither an illustration of (i) the functioning thing that has been destroyed nor (ii) a functioning thing that is a similar type to it, it is a functioning thing because it is produced in dependence on the functioning thing that is destroyed.

Taking the person Upagupta as an illustration, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that none of the individual aggregates are Upagupta, nor is the collection of aggregates Upagupta, nor is there an Upagupta who is a different entity from the aggregates, yet Upagupta exists in dependence on his aggregates. We can also take Jonathan as an illustration. Although none of Jonathan's individual aggregates, the collection of his aggregates, or that which is a different entity from his aggregates can be posited as an illustration of Jonathan, Jonathan can be posited on the basis of his aggregates. Even before Jonathan was given a name, his aggregates existed. Then, by means of conception, his parents imputed the name 'Jonathan' on those aggregates. If one searches among Jonathan's five aggregates, none of his individual aggregates are found to be an illustration of Jonathan, nor is the collection of his aggregates found to be an illustration of Jonathan, nor is that which is a different entity from his five aggregates found to be an illustration of Jonathan. In addition, Jonathan's shape is not Jonathan. Thus, if we employ the seven-fold analysis in searching for an illustration of Jonathan, Jonathan will not be found to be the same as his aggregates, nor a different entity from his aggregates, nor the support of his aggregates, nor that supported on his aggregates, nor the shape of his aggregates. Does Jonathan not exist? He does exist, but he exists in a manner of non-investigation and non-analysis; that is, he exists conventionally. Being existent in terms of convention, he is able to perform functions such as meditating, studying, talking, and so forth.

Disintegratedness is then established to be a functioning thing on the basis of both scriptural authority and reasoning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 221-2) says:

> In regard to proving this, (1) scriptural authority and (2) reasoning are mentioned in *Clear Words*.
>
> **(1) Scriptural authority**
>
> The *[Sutra on the] Ten Grounds* says:
>
> > Due to the condition of birth there is aging and death.

> Death is the disintegration of the sentient being who dies; it is produced by the condition of birth. In addition, the [*Sutra on the Ten Grounds*] says:
>
> > Death also subsists in two activities: (1) it functions to destroy compounded phenomena and (2) it also issues forth the cause for the non-severance of the continuum of thorough unknowing.
>
> Death is said to perform two activities in that it is said (i) that death is produced by a cause and (ii) that death produces ignorance. Therefore, disintegratedness has a cause that produces it and disintegratedness is able to produce a result. Although [disintegratedness] is the disintegration of a continuum, it is also similar to the disintegration of a first moment at the second moment. However, it is also indicated to be the cause for the disintegration of a first moment at the second moment. Hence,
> 1. the two, the birth and death of a sentient being,
> 2. not remaining for a second moment, and
> 3. not having remained for a second moment
>
> are similar in being posited and not posited as functioning things and in being produced and not produced by a cause.

The quotation from the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds,* "Due to the condition of birth there is aging and death," is the scriptural authority establishing that disintegratedness is a functioning thing. In terms of sentient beings, disintegration is death; the cause of this disintegration or death is birth. Thus, death is disintegratedness in terms of sentient beings; it has a cause, birth, and it also has a result, that of unknowing. This is set forth by the twelve links of dependent-arising, according to which in dependence on birth, there is aging and death. Death is the disintegration of the life force. The death of a sentient being of this life is the cessation of the life force of this life. However, upon the cessation of this life force, the sentient being does not become non-existent. Rather, this implies that upon the cessation of the life force of this life there arises the life force of the future life. In other words, in dependence on the cessation of the life force of this life, the continuum of a future life force arises. Therefore, cessation or disintegratedness acts as a cause, due to which it is a functioning thing.

Here, the death of a sentient being is a disintegratedness; note that it is not an individual moment but a *continuum* of disintegratedness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 222) says:

> Intending this, *Fundamental Wisdom* says:
>
> > Things and non-things are compounded phenomena.
>
> [Nagarjuna's] *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* also says:
>
> > Pacification, through the very exhaustion of the cause,
> > Is observed to be that called "exhaustion"...
>
> Since [these citations] say (i) that both the thing that is a sprout and so forth and the non-thing that is its disintegratedness are compounded phenomena and (ii) that the exhaustion of a cause, such as oil and so forth, is the cause of the extinguishment of a result, such as a lamp and so forth, these are to be unquestionably asserted to be the assertions of Arya [Nagarjuna].

Fundamental Wisdom says "Things and non-things are compounded phenomena." In this context, a virtuous action is a functioning thing, whereas its disintegratedness is given the name 'non-thing.' Because the disintegratedness of an action is not an action, it is said to be a non-thing. Although the disintegratedness of an action is not an action, it is a functioning thing. Why is the disintegratedness

of an action not an action? The broken cup is the disintegration of a cup; that disintegratedness is not a cup. However, we can say that the broken cup is a functioning thing, because it produces a result.

Another example is Tashi, who has yet to die and is therefore a functioning thing; when he dies he comes to be called a non-thing because he is no longer Tashi. However, upon Tashi's death a result is produced in that death produces the result of a future rebirth.

Then, if we take an oil lamp as an example, upon the exhaustion of the oil, the oil lamp is also exhausted, but does that exhaustion have a result?

Student: It produces obscurity. Before, there was light and when it is exhausted, there is no longer light.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does the last moment of an oil lamp produce a result? You say it produces obscurity, that is, darkness. During the day when the oil lamp is exhausted what does it produce?

Student: The disintegration of the light.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: How does it produce the destruction of the light?

Student: Because there is no more oil, the lack of oil produces the lack of arisal of the light, therefore, there is the destruction of the light.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: During the daytime, when the oil in the oil lamp is exhausted does light become non-existent?

Student: In general, it is not exhausted, but the light of the oil lamp is exhausted.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In extinguishing that light, what result arises?

Student 2: Because the light produced heat, the disintegratedness of that light produces the result of the cooling of the element air in that area.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What do you think?

Student 3: In that case in the summer one should put out a fire to cool a room instead of opening a window!

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What do you think?

Student 4: Maybe the result of the extinguishment of the light is that it can be lit again, because without it being extinguished it cannot be lit.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: When that light is extinguished it no longer exists. What is its result? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 222) says:

> **(2) Reasoning**
>
> The disintegration of the first moment at the second moment is necessarily realized through eliminating the object of negation directly; therefore, it is a negative. Since it is not a non-affirming negative, it is an affirming negative because disintegration is not merely the elimination of that, but rather implies a disintegration, the elimination of that, which is a functioning thing. The remaining proofs are to be understood from the extensive commentary on *Fundamental Wisdom*. The subtle reasonings of this system have great meaning.

The cessation of a first moment is an affirming negative, not a non-affirming negative. The cessation of the first moment propels a second moment. Therefore, the cessation of the first moment is a negative, but because it propels a subsequent phenomenon, it is not a non-affirming negative.

In short, without birth there is no death. Death is disintegratedness in terms of sentient beings. Without death there is no rebirth. Therefore, death, which is a disintegratedness, produces birth. Thus, disintegratedness gives rise to a result.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 222) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2A3B Although not asserting a mind-basis-of-all, positing a basis for the latencies

QUESTION: Although not asserting a mind-basis-of-all, virtuous and non-virtuous latencies are deposited and results are necessarily asserted to arise from the ripening of those latencies because the *Explanation of the* '*Supplement to the "Middle Way"* says:

> In beginningless cyclic existence, the deposited latencies which are functioning things thoroughly ripen, manifesting as things.

Similar statements also occur in many other [texts]. In addition, since it is not suitable for there not to exist a basis for the depositing of latencies, what is that basis?
RESPONSE: According to those who assert a mind-basis-of-all, the mind-basis-of-all – the basis observed by the afflicted mentality thinking "I" – is asserted to be the location of the latencies. Likewise, this system also asserts that that very observed object of the innate awareness which is the mere thought "I' is the basis for the infusion of the latencies.

While circling in cyclic existence since beginningless time, we have accumulated actions; therefore, it is necessary to posit a way in which these actions bring about a result. The lower schools posit a mind-basis-of-all as the site upon which the latencies of actions are deposited, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas posit the mere I as the site upon which disintegrated actions are deposited. Thus, our system posits the mere I as the basis upon which disintegrated actions are deposited.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 223) says:

QUESTION: Well then, why does the *Explanation of the* '*Supplement to the "Middle Way"* say that the continuum of mind is the basis of the latencies?
RESPONSE: Since the mere I itself is a continuum that is imputed in dependence on a mind-consciousness, it is also called a 'a continuum of mind.' In the case that a similar type of mind is called 'a continuum of [mind],' it becomes, moreover, the basis for the infusion of occasional latencies.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas posit the mere I that is the continuum of the being as the site for the depositing of occasional latencies.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 223) says:

The mode of the latencies of ignorance

The *Explanation of the* '*Supplement to the "Middle Way"* (commentary to v. 12.31) says:

> That which subsequently proceeds to cease and infuse the continuum of mind is the latencies. "Extreme of afflictions," "familiarity," "root," and "latency" are synonyms. Even though the uncontaminated path has already abandoned the afflictions, hearers and solitary realizers are unable to abandon [their latencies], like, for example, even though sesame oil, flowers, and so forth have already been removed, their subtle qualities are observed upon encountering them in pots, woolen cloths, and so forth.

Foe destroyers who have completely abandoned the afflictive obstructions still have the latencies of the afflictions. This is like, for example, when sesame oil is put in a pot or on a cloth. Even though the pot or cloth is washed later, the odor of the oil still remains. Likewise, even though a foe destroyer has abandoned the afflictive obstructions, the latencies of the afflictions still remain.

What is the difference between a seed and a latency?

Student: A latency produces the appearance of true existence, whereas a seed produces a later affliction of similar type.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is a seed a latency? A seed is a latency, but if it is a latency it is not necessarily a seed.

In the citation from the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'* Chandrakirti says: "'Extreme of afflictions,' 'familiarity,' 'root,' and 'latency' are synonyms." Synonyms (*rnam grang*) are of two types: synonym by way of name and synonym by way of same meaning. Here Chandrakirti seems to say that familiarity is a latency, but this is difficult to explain. When we meditate and familiarize ourselves with love and compassion is that familiarization a latency? Think about it.

Thursday afternoon, 28 September 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 223) says:

> Other latencies, such as virtuous and non-virtuous latencies, are suitable to be applied to the two bases as well.
> OBJECTION: Well then, although at the time of the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing the objects of abandonment of the path of seeing, that is, the objects of abandonment of that [uninterrupted path of the path of seeing], do indeed not exist, the dormant latencies that are objects of abandonment of the path of meditation must exist. At that time, since the mental consciousness is uncontaminated, in that it is not polluted by the latencies of mistaken dualistic appearance, the dormant latencies would not be suitable to abide in its entity. Since the sense consciousnesses are also not a basis for [the dormant latencies] and form is also not suitable as a basis for [the dormant latencies], by also not asserting a mind-basis-of-all, there would not exist a basis for [the dormant latencies].

This is an objection set forth by the lower school. The objects of abandonment [of the path of seeing] do not exist at the time of the path of seeing because when the antidote is generated, the objects of abandonment no longer exist. However, at that time, the objects of abandonment of the path of meditation *do* exist, although they are dormant. When the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing is generated, the mental consciousness is transformed into an uncontaminated entity. This mind is not polluted by mistaken dualistic appearance. Thus, the lower school says that because the consciousness is an uncontaminated entity, the dormant latencies that are objects of abandonment of the path of meditation cannot abide on it. In addition, the sense consciousnesses cannot be the basis of those dormant latencies, because when the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing is generated, the sense consciousnesses are not manifest. Also, forms cannot be the basis of these dormant latencies. Therefore, because the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not assert a mind-basis-of-all, it follows that there is no basis for the dormant latencies that are the objects of abandonment of the path of meditation. The Prasangika Madhyamikas reply that there is no such fault.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 223) says:

> RESPONSE: There is no fault because, at that time, the mere I is the basis of the dormant latencies that are the objects of abandonment of the path of meditation. The other objects of abandonment and antidotes should also be understood similarly.

In the Prasangika Madhyamika system, it can be said that either the mere I is posited as the basis of the dormant latencies that are the objects of abandonment of the path of meditation, or the mere I is posited as the basis for the infusion of the latencies of actions. This formula can be applied to other objects of abandonment and antidotes.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 224) says:

> [The autocommentary] says:
>
> > When the uncommon way of positing by the people of this system is understood, then when a supramundane, uncontaminated mind becomes manifest in the continua of superiors who have been born in Infinite Space, Infinite Consciousness, and Nothingness, since there are no other mundane minds their being migrating beings will be turned back.
>
> And:
>
> > When an uncontaminated mind included in the level of Nothingness becomes manifest in superiors who have been born in the Peak of Existence, the migrating being included in the level of both the Peak of Existence and Nothingness will be turned back because the abode of an uncontaminated mind is not suitable to be the two migrating beings or a migrating being who has passed beyond sorrow.

The lower schools say that when an uncontaminated mind becomes manifest in the continua of superiors who have been born in Infinite Space, Infinite Consciousness, and Nothingness, then, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, there are no other mundane minds. Due to this, these beings would no longer be migrating beings. The lower schools say that this follows because migrating beings must have a mundane mind, otherwise they would not be migrating beings. This is because the lower schools do not posit a migrating being with an uncontaminated mind. They say that an uncontaminated mind only exists in the levels of Nothingness and below. Because there are no uncontaminated minds in the Peak of Existence, beings born there are turned back from being migrating beings, because they do not have a mundane mind. The abode of an uncontaminated mind also cannot be a migrating being who has passed beyond sorrow, that is, a foe destroyer. In brief, foe destroyers do not take rebirth in the Peak of Existence. In this context, migrating beings are to be understood in this way and not in terms of the six classes of migrating beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page)224 says:

> Even these reasonings do not bring about harm because, although neither a contaminated nor an uncontaminated mind are posited as illustrations of migrating beings, they are admissible by means of positing migrating beings.

What is a migrating being? The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that when each of the individual five aggregates is thoroughly searched, none of them is found to be a migrating being. On the other hand, if one of them were found to be a migrating being, it should be the mental consciousness but, according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system, even this is not found to be a migrating being. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that when an imputed object is searched for, it is not found. What is the way in which a migrating being is posited? An innate, non-investigative, and non-analytic awareness imputes the I upon the five aggregates. Thus, without using reasoning, one naturally thinks "I." In the perspective of this non-investigative and non-analytic awareness, there exists an I that is merely imputed on the five aggregates. Since such an I exists, a migrating being also exists. A migrating being is merely imputed on that which continuously takes rebirth here and there. This is the meaning of Lama Tsongkhapa's statement: "neither a contaminated nor an uncontaminated mind are posited as illustrations of migrating beings."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 224) says:

> The system of the former school is that this is in terms of the unafflicted, unspecified entity of migrating beings who have not entered a path and those who are learners.

Here 'the former school' refers mainly to the Chittamatra system in that the Chittamatrins posit the person to be the mind-basis-of-all, which is an unafflicted, unspecified entity. The Chittamatrins say that the basis upon which the latencies of virtuous and non-virtuous actions are deposited is necessarily unspecified. Likewise, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, if it is a basis for the infusion of latencies it is necessarily unspecified.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 224) says:

> Since these responses are similar to my own, how could I express the great systems by means of my own strength? Rather, they are expressed in dependence on the system of the great charioteers who completely set them out and understood them precisely in accordance with the intention of the protector Nagarjuna. According to them even the remaining reasonings establishing a mind-basis-of-all do not harm this system, thus, they should be examined by those of great intelligence and fine acuteness.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that he bases his explanation on the intention of Nagarjuna. 'The remaining reasonings' refers to the remaining seven of the eight reasonings that are used to establish the existence of a mind-basis-of-all. Therefore, those of great intelligence and fine acuteness should examine these.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 224) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2B Indicating an example of a result arising from an action that has ceased

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 82) says:

> I shall explain, by way of an example, the very meaning that was related:
>
> *Having perceived dream referent objects,*
> *Even awake, longing will be produced in the childish.*
> *Similarly, an effect does exist even from actions*
> *That ceased and are non-inherently existent.* [6.40]
>
> As was taught in the *Sutra of Transference [in] Existence:*
>
> > Great King, it is like this. For example, a man dreamt of enjoying himself together with a lovely townswoman in a sleeping dream. If, having arisen from sleep, he recalls the lovely townswoman, Great King, what do you think about this? He who dreamt of enjoying himself together with a lovely townswoman of a dream, does the man who recalls the lovely townswoman having awakened from sleep have a wise nature?"
> >
> > [The king] replied: "Bhagavan, that is not so. If asked: on account of what? Bhagavan, the lovely dream-woman does not even exist and, since not observed, how could there exist consummation with her? Such a man would have a destitute and wearied fortune."
> >
> > The Bhagavan said: "Great King, similarly, also childish ordinary beings bereft of hearing, having perceived forms with [their] eyes, strongly settle upon forms that make the mind happy. Having strongly settled, it acts to produce longing. Having longed, they strongly compose [actions] with body, speech, and mind that arose from attachment, arose from hatred, and arose from bewilderment. Having strongly composed that action, it ceases. When ceased, it does not abide relative to the southern direction,

from that through:

> … it does not in the intermediate directions.

In this sutra, the Buddha describes a man who enjoys himself with a lovely townswoman in a dream, due to which attachment arises and remains even when he awakes. Buddha then asks the king whether this man is wise or foolish. The king replies that such a man is foolish because the dream woman does not exist and, since she does not exist, how can he enjoy himself with her? Thus, if he thinks that he can, he is foolish. Similarly, when childish ordinary beings see forms as inherently existent , they consider them to be attractive or unattractive and respectively generate attachment and hatred toward them. Due to attachment, hatred, and so forth they then create actions of body and speech. But once the action is accumulated it ceases. Having ceased, if one searches for it in the eastern direction, the southern direction, the intermediate directions and so forth, it cannot be found. This fact of not finding the ceased action indicates that it does not exist inherently because, if a ceased action were inherently existent, it should be found when sought in the various directions.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues:

And:

> At some other time, when abiding near to the time of death, having exhausted actions that are similar fortune to that, when the final instant of consciousness ceases, it is like this: for example, like the lovely townswoman of the man who arose from a long sleep, he approaches that very mental action.
>
> Great King, thus, the final consciousness ceases and the initial consciousness included in the part of rebirth, yet again [will arise] among the gods...

– from that through:

> ... yet again will arise with the hungry ghosts.

And:

> Great King, as soon as the initial consciousness ceases, there arises a continuum of mind of similar fortune to him who manifests full maturation to be experienced. Great King, there, no phenomenon whatsoever transfers from this world to the other world, yet, obvious death-transference and rebirth do exist.
>
> Great King, there, the cessation of any final consciousness is called "death-transference." The arisal of any initial consciousness is called "rebirth." Great King, even when the final consciousness has ceased, it does not go anywhere. Even when the initial consciousness included in the part of rebirth arises, it does not come from anywhere. If asked, why that is? It is because [they] are devoid of inherent existence.
>
> Great King, there, the final consciousness is emptied by the final consciousness. Death-transference is emptied by death-transference. Action is emptied by action. Initial consciousness is emptied by initial consciousness. Rebirth is emptied by rebirth. It is obvious also, that actions are not wasted.

Birth and cessation are empty of inherent existence, yet they do exist conventionally; therefore, actions are created and experienced conventionally. The sutra says that an initial consciousness is empty of an initial consciousness and a final consciousness is empty of a final consciousness; however, this means that an initial consciousness is empty of being an inherently existent initial consciousness and a final consciousness is empty of being an inherently existent final consciousness. It does not mean that a

consciousness is empty of itself; for example, a table is not empty of table but is empty of being an inherently existent table.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 224-5) says:

> The meaning of the explanation that a result arises from a previous action that has ceased is explained by means of an example [as follows].
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *Having seen an observed object in a dream,*
> > *Even upon awakening, the foolish generate longing.*
> > *Likewise, also from actions that have ceased and*
> > *Do not inherently exist, there exist results.* [6.40]
>
> *Having seen an observed object*, a beautiful woman, *in a dream*, then, *even upon awakening*, that is, when awake, *foolish* beings observe that she has now ceased and is non-existent, but still *generate* strong *longing* for her. *Likewise*, *also from ceased actions that do not inherently exist there* arise the *results* of those actions. This indicates that results arise from disintegrated actions.

An action does not exist inherently; once ceased, it still yields a result. In order to indicate this, the Buddha gave the example of a man who enjoys a dream woman and then, in spite of the woman not existing, still generates strong longing for her when he awakes. Similarly, a result arises even from an action that has ceased.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 225) says:

> As proof of that, the *Sutra of Existence and Transference* says:
>
> > [The Bhagavan said:] "Great King, it is like this. For example, in a dream while sleeping a man dreamt that he enjoyed himself together with a lovely townswoman. If he remembers the lovely townswoman upon awakening from sleep, Great King, what do you think about this? Does the man, who having dreamt of thoroughly enjoying himself together with the lovely townswoman of a dream, have a wise nature when remembering the lovely townswoman upon awakening from sleep?"
> >
> > [The king] replied: "Bhagavan, it is not so. On what account? Bhagavan, the lovely woman of a dream does not even exist and, since not observed, how could there be thorough enjoyment with her? Such a man would have a destitute and weary fortune."
>
> This citation presents the example.

Such a man would have a destitute and weary fortune in the sense that, lacking wisdom, he experiences strong suffering through longing for a lovely woman who cannot be attained. This is because no matter how much he remembers and longs for this woman, there will be no result. In order for this man to enjoy himself with her, she would have to exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 225) says:

> When [the example] is joined to the meaning [it is as follows]:
>
> > [The Bhagavan said:] "Great King, similarly, also childish ordinary beings bereft of hearing, upon seeing forms with their eyes, strongly cling to forms that bring mental happiness. Through strongly clinging to them, longing is produced. From longing, they strongly create [actions] with body, speech and mind that arise from attachment, arise from hatred, and arise from confusion. Having strongly created an action, it ceases. When ceased, it is not supported on, that is, it does not abide in, the southern direction...

through

… it does not [abide] in the intermediate directions."

'Those bereft of hearing' are those who have not realized the teachings on suchness through hearing. 'Strong adherence' is adherence to true existence. The three actions [of body, speech, and mind] that arise from longing are both virtuous and non-virtuous actions. The actions [of body, speech, and mind] that arise from hatred are non-virtuous. [The actions of body, speech, and mind] that arise from confusion are also both [virtuous and non-virtuous] actions.

When ordinary beings see forms, they generate attachment and hatred. For example, when they see an attractive form, they generate attachment for it. Due to this attachment, they create virtuous and non-virtuous actions. On the other hand, when they see an unattractive form, they generate hatred, due to which they create only non-virtuous actions, not virtuous actions. In other words, due to the generation of hatred for an unattractive form, one creates negative actions of body, speech, and mind; one does not create virtuous actions of body, speech, and mind due to hatred. When ordinary beings see forms that are neither attractive or unattractive, they generate confusion, or ignorance, due to which they create actions of body, speech, and mind that can be either virtuous or non-virtuous. In short, due to the arisal of any of the three afflictions — attachment, hatred, and confusion — in one's mental continuum, one creates actions.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "'Those bereft of hearing' are those who have not realized the teachings on suchness through hearing." This means that they have not heard teachings on emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 226) says:

An action created immediately ceases conventionally. The rest [of the passage] negates that cessation is established by way of its own entity. Then, [the sutra continues]:

[The Bhagavan said:] "At some other undetermined time, when abiding close to the time of death, having already projected an action congruent with that, when the final consciousness ceases, it is like the example of [OK?] the lovely townswoman for the man who has awakened from sleep, in that the mind is thoroughly directed toward that very action."

'Congruent' [means] a similar type of aggregates. Having extinguished the actions for abiding in this life, when the final consciousness of this life ceases – like one possessing longing who, immediately upon awakening, remembers the lovely woman of a dream and directs his mind to her – at the time of death, without remembering it the mind is directed toward an action that activates the potential of an action which will ripen into a future life.

In short, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas even though actions do not exist inherently, they yield a result. Contrarily, the lower schools say that if actions do not exist inherently they do not exist at all, due to which their results also would not exist. From the point of view of the lower schools, the Prasangika Madhyamikas have fallen into the extreme of annihilation. The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond to this accusation saying that it is the lower schools who have fallen into the extreme of permanence.

Friday morning, 29 September 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 226) says:

[The sutra continues:]

"[Great King], thus, the final consciousness ceases and the initial consciousness included in the factor of rebirth yet again [arises] among the gods...

through

> ... yet again arises as a hungry ghost."
>
> 'The final [consciousness] ceases' refers to [the consciousness] of this life. Since the statement "there arises the initial consciousness included in the factor of rebirth among the gods" does not refer to [the consciousness of] the intermediate existence of the six [classes of] migrating beings, it refers to the consciousness of the birth existence. Although there is an intermediate existence between the two, birth and death, it is not mentioned [here], but, since it appears in many [other texts], the way in which actions and results are mainly related from the point of view of birth and death is asserted to be settled.

After the final consciousness, that is, the consciousness just prior to death, ceases, a consciousness arises of any of the six classes of migrating beings, such as that of a god or a hungry ghost. Does the birth existence arise immediately after the death existence? It does not, since there is an intermediate existence between them. However, this is only from the point of view of taking rebirth in the desire realm and form realm in that when one takes rebirth in any of the four levels of the formless realm, there is no intermediate existence. In this case, when the final consciousness ceases, the consciousness of any of the four levels of the formless realm immediately arises. On the other hand, when taking rebirth in the desire and form realms, it is necessary to pass through an intermediate existence. This intermediate existence is not a birth existence.

There are four types of existence:
1. birth existence,
2. intermediate existence,
3. previous time existence, and
4. death existence.

The birth existence is the moment in which a human being, for example, is conceived in the mother's womb. The previous time existence is from the second moment subsequent to the birth existence through to just prior to death. The death existence occurs when one dies and is followed by the intermediate existence, when one passes into the intermediate state. In which of the six classes of beings is the intermediate existence included? It is not included in any of the six migrations. Is the intermediate state being a god, an anti-god, a human being, an animal, a hungry ghost, or a hell being? It is not any of these.

Thus, when the sutra says: "the initial consciousness included in the factor of rebirth yet again [arises] among the gods..." through "... yet again arises as a hungry ghost," it refers to the birth existence. The sutra does not mention the intermediate existence because the main point is to settle the relationship between actions and their results in terms of birth and death.

As a human being, we previously had an intermediate existence; both the body of the intermediate state and the body of the human being are projected by one single projecting action. Thus, there is only one projecting action that is the cause of both the body of the intermediate state and the body of the human being. Thus, the body of the intermediate existence, the body of the birth existence, and the body of the previous time existence are all thrown by the same projecting action. In addition to these bodies, there exists a fruitional body and a developing body. The developing body is the body that grows and develops due to eating food and so forth. On the other hand, the fruitional body does not change. However, these two bodies do not exist in two different locations. These two types of body are discussed extensively in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* and Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition*.

Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* describes the intermediate existence as having complete sense powers and the ability to travel wherever it likes without being obstructed by walls, rocks, doors, and so forth. In regard to this, there is a story about a minister in Tibet called Timonpa who became very sick. His children placed him in a room, locked the door, closed the windows, and went outside. However, they were soon surprised to see him walking along the edge of the roof. When they

asked him how he had managed to get out of the room, the father answered them as if sleep walking and was surprised to find himself on the roof. When one attains a body in the nature of mind, one will also be able to do likewise.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 226) says:

> Then, [the sutra continues]:
>
> "[Great King], as soon as the initial consciousness ceases, there arises a continuum of mind congruent with manifesting the fruitional [result] to be experienced."
>
> "Great King, with respect to that, no phenomenon whatsoever transfers from this world to the next world, yet death-transference and birth do manifestly exist."

When the sutra says "as soon as the initial consciousness ceases, there arises a continuum of mind congruent with manifesting the fruitional [result] to be experienced," it refers to a congruent cause (literally, an equal fortune cause). "No phenomenon whatsoever transfers from this world to the next world" means that nothing transfers from one inherently existent life to another inherently existent life yet, conventionally, death-transference and birth do exist. "Death-transference" refers to death, which is followed by transference.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 227) says:

> "Great King, with respect to that, the cessation of the final consciousness is called 'death-transference.' The arisal of the initial consciousness is called 'birth.'"

Thus, once again, there is no mention in the sutra of the intermediate existence. Although it is not mentioned, it should be understood to exist between the birth existence and the death existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 227) says:

> "Great King, when the final consciousness has ceased, it also does not go anywhere. When the [initial] consciousness included in the factor of rebirth arises, it also does not come from anywhere. Why is that? It is because they are devoid of inherent existence."

An inherently existent final consciousness does not go anywhere, and an inherently existent initial consciousness does not come from anywhere.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 227) says:

> "Great King, with respect to that, the final consciousness is empty of final consciousness. Death-transference is empty of death-transference. Actions are empty of actions. The initial consciousness is empty of initial consciousness. Birth is empty of birth. Actions are actualized without being wasted."

This does not mean that a final consciousness is empty of itself. There are two ways of being empty or devoid. The first is, for example, because the nature of a pot is not inherently existent, the pot is empty of inherent existence or, because the nature of the pot is not permanent, the pot is empty of permanence. The other type of empty is, for example, a temple that is empty of monks in the sense that there are no monks in the temple. In the second example, what is empty is not the nature of the

temple. Likewise, an empty house implies a house that is empty of furniture and so forth; it does not imply that it is empty of the nature of house.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 227) says:

> The results of previous actions that reconnect one to a birth existence, experienced as happiness and suffering, are produced from the initial mind of birth, the continuum of the consciousness that experiences them. While death-transference and birth exist in terms of conventions, they do not exist ultimately. For this reason, 'devoid of inherent existence' is to be affixed as a qualification to the object of negation, that is, it is to be affixed to the statements regarding the final consciousness and so forth each being empty of itself.
>
> Due to there being doubt through considering actions and results to not exist when presented like this, [Buddha] said that actions do not go to waste.

In short, actions do not go to waste.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that the karmic seeds and latencies are deposited on the mental consciousness and that this goes from life to life, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they are deposited on the mere I, which is a mere imputation. How can an imputation travel from life to life if the mind that imputes it does not travel together with it?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Without saying "the mere I which is a mere imputation," it is said that the karmic seeds and latencies are deposited on "the mere I." Does this mean that there is no consciousness? There is a consciousness. How does it go from one life to the next? The Prasangika Madhyamikas' explanation of this is the same as that of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas. The mere I is merely imputed on the aggregates. When that mere I goes from this life to the next, it travels together with the aggregates. What are the aggregates that go from life to life? It depends on the rebirth that one will take, in that if one will take rebirth in the desire realm or form realm there will be all five aggregates, whereas if one will take rebirth in the formless realm, there will only be four aggregates. This is because someone who will be reborn in the formless realm has only four aggregates, excluding the form aggregate. The mind is not physical and travels without impediment. In brief, when one goes to another life, the mere I goes together with the mind just like when the sun is shining, the shadow of the body accompanies the body wherever it goes. Thus, the I and the consciousness are inseparable when transferring from one life to another.

Student: Does that mean that the latencies of actions can be deposited on the form aggregate?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are deposited on the mere I.
Student: Therefore, they are deposited on a collection of the aggregates?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: For this school, the collection of the aggregates is not the mere I. When one analyzes whether the collection of the aggregates is the mere I, whether the collection of consciousnesses is the mere I, whether the shape of the body is the mere I, and so forth, the mere I is not found. To illustrate this, there is the example of a chariot. A chariot is composed of many parts, but if it is asked "Is the collection of the parts the chariot?", it is not, because if all the parts of the chariot are dismantled and laid out on the ground, that collection of parts is not a chariot. This is because the collection of parts is unable to perform the function of a chariot. Thus, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that even the mere collection of the parts of a chariot are not the chariot; if it were, then when the chariot is dismantled and its parts are laid out on the ground, the collection of parts should be able to perform the function of a chariot, whereas it cannot.

Student: If the latencies are deposited on the mere I and the mere I is imputed on a mental consciousness, what is the fault of saying that the latencies are deposited on the consciousness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is no fault in saying that the latencies of actions are deposited on the consciousness. However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that latencies are *occasionally* deposited on the consciousness. For example, Beth is occasionally in the temple, but if it is asked whether Beth's abode is the temple, the answer is that it is not because she only comes here occasionally. Thus, the temple is not her abode. Likewise, because the latencies of actions are only occasionally deposited on the consciousness, the consciousness is not said to be the abode of the latencies of actions.

Student: Are the latencies of actions deposited on the consciousness until they are exhausted or purified? Is this the meaning of 'occasionally deposited'?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is not. If the Prasangika Madhyamikas were to posit one of the five aggregates as a basis for the infusion of the latencies of actions, they would become like the lower schools. That is, if the Prasangika Madhyamikas were to find something among the five aggregates that is a basis for the infusion of the latencies of actions, it would mean that there is an inherently existent basis.

Student: Is it because the consciousness is impermanent and changing, whereas the mere I is not?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The mere I is also impermanent and changing.

Student: When you absorb in emptiness and arise as the deity and your mere I arises as the deity, what are you doing?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The mere I in that case arises from emptiness as Manjushri thinking "I am Manjushri."

Student: Why did Chandrakirti not say that there is "no production from *inherently existent* other" [rather than just "there is no production from other"]?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That there is no production from other means that there is no production from inherently existent other. When there is production of a son from a mother, is the mother not other than the son? Are the mother and son one? They are other. For example, smoke arises from fire but they are not one. Does smoke arise from other? The Prasangika Madhyamikas would say that it does not. If one says that it does because it arises from fire, the Prasangika Madhyamikas would respond that smoke arising from fire does not mean that smoke arises from other; however, the fire and the smoke are not one. Even in terms of that renowned in the world, fire and smoke are not one, they are different. Yet worldly beings do not say that smoke arises from otherness, they simply say that smoke arises from fire. A Prasangika Madhyamika is one who propounds in accordance with that renowned in the world and is therefore called "a Madhyamika who accords with worldly renown."

Student: When one is reborn as a human being, where is the mere I in terms of the five aggregates and how long does one need to reconstruct it?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In terms of constructing a *specific* I of a new life, it takes some time, but in terms of constructing the *mere* I it is always there, like the continuous flow of a river. There are three types of I:
1. an I that comes from a past life to this life,
2. an I specific to this life, and
3. an I that goes from this life to the next life.

What is the difference between these three I's? One can read about this in the *Great Commentary on Fundamental Wisdom*. Does the I specific to this life go from this life to the next? It does not. The I specific to this life does not go to the next life because that I is, for example, the monk Losang Chogyal. Such a specific I does not go to a next life. But does one go to the next life? Yes, one does.

One goes to a next life because there is an I that pervades all three times, past, present, and future. Since there is such an I, it is said that one goes from life to life. But does the I specific to this life come from a previous life? It does not. Then, has this I specific to this life not taken previous lives? It has not, yet the I that pervades all three times has. This is a complicated subject. For example, when someone who was a god in a previous life is reborn as a human being, has the god of the previous life been reborn as a human being? Or, in the case of someone who was an elephant and then is reborn as a human being, has that elephant become a human being? The previous elephant has not become this present human being, but the mere I of the elephant life has become a human being.

END

Monday afternoon, 2 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 227) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2C Dispelling arguments with respect to presenting in this way

1 Dispelling the argument that [actions] would endlessly yield a fruitional [result]
2 Dispelling the argument that this would contradict the scriptures that teach the existence of a mind-basis-of-all

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2C1 Dispelling the argument that [actions] would endlessly yield a fruitional [result]

Chandrakirti autocommentary (Tibetan text page 83) says:

If it is considered: If that which is not inherently produced is asserted to mature since it is inexhaustible, it is like that and, just as maturation arises because of not ceasing, similarly, although an action has already produced maturation, it would mature. And because the action there is inexhaustible, although the action has already matured, because if it would mature again, there would be the fault of endless [maturation].

That is not so, since:

Just as, although objects are similar in not being merely existent,
Those bearing cataracts perceive the aspect of falling hair,
Not the aspects of other things. Similarly,
That matured actions do not mature again, should be known. [6.41]

For example, while objects are alike in not being existent, those bearing cataracts see the entities of falling hairs and so forth that are not existent. They do not [see] the aspects of things other than that such as the horn of an ass and the son of a barren woman and so forth. Similarly, while the self-natures of actions are similar in not ceasing, there is certainty regarding maturation.

I shall explain the aforesaid:

Therefore, non-virtuous maturation is perceived to be from
Black actions; just virtuous maturation from virtue and
Having awareness that lacks virtue and non-virtue will be liberated,
So, thinking about actions and effects is refuted. [6.42]

If the two actions of virtue and non-virtue are also indeed without self-nature, even in that case, because of that very certainty to perceive falling hairs and so forth, pleasant maturation is not [arisen] from non-virtue, unpleasant maturation is not [arisen] from virtue. Due to not referring to [inherently existent] virtuous and non-virtuous actions, one becomes liberated.

Therefore, with regard to those making analysis about extreme certainty, the Bhagavan considered that ordinary beings would come to destroy the conventional through denying actions and effects. Hence, saying "The maturation of actions and effects is inconceivable," [he] acts to refute thinking dependent on actions and effects.

The lower schools say to the Prasangika Madhyamikas that if actions did not exist inherently there would be no extinguishment of actions, due to which production of their results would be endless. That is, when an action yields a result it would continue to yield that result. The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond that although actions do not inherently exist there is not the fault of their producing their results endlessly. Chandrakirti gives the example that even though there are things that are the same in terms of their not existing, such as falling hair and the horns of a donkey, those with cataracts see falling hair alone and do not see the horns of a donkey. This example indicates the

certainty that a virtuous action will give rise to a pleasant fruitional result and not an unpleasant fruitional result, whereas a non-virtuous action will give rise to an unpleasant fruitional result and not a pleasant fruitional result. Buddha, in order to dispel particular doubts regarding the relationship of actions and results, clarified the certainty of their results. Their relationship is, however, said to be inconceivable. In fact, the relationship between actions and results is so subtle that it is seen by buddhas alone; not even tenth ground bodhisattvas can see it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 227) says:

> LOWER SCHOOLS: If it is asserted that a fruitional [result] arises due to an action that is not inherently produced and not inherently extinguished, similarly, an action that has already ripened would ripen again, due to which there would be the fault of [an action ripening] endlessly.

Here the lower schools debate the Prasangika Madhyamikas, saying that if actions did not exist inherently, they would not exist at all. This being the case, it would follow that due to actions not existing inherently, their results would ripen endlessly.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 227-8) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Just as, although similar in being non-existent objects,*
> *Those with cataracts see the aspect of falling hair,*
> *But not the aspect of other things,*
> *Likewise, understand that ripened actions do not ripen again.* [6.41]
>
> *Just as*, that is, for example, *although similar in being non-existent objects*, the eyes of *those with cataracts see the aspect of falling hair* and so forth which does not exist but do *not* see the *aspect of things* that are *other* than that, such as the aspect of the horns of a donkey, the son of a barren woman, and so forth, *likewise*, *understand* that, although actions are similar in not existing inherently, actions that have not yet ripened ripen and *actions* that have already *ripened do not ripen again*.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that it is to be understood that a [non-inherently existent] action that has already ripened does not ripen again, whereas an action that has not yet ripened will ripen.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 228) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Therefore, a non-virtuous fruition is seen*
> *To be from a black action; a virtuous fruition from virtue.*
> *Those having the awareness that virtue and non-virtue do not exist will be liberated.*
> *Thinking about actions and results is also to be repudiated.* [6.42]
>
> From this example, not only are the results of actions established to be certain, it is also explained that the results of pleasantness and unpleasantness from virtuous and non-virtuous actions are individually certain, [just as] it is certain that the eyes of those with cataracts see falling hair and so forth and do not see the horns of a donkey and so forth. *Therefore*, a pleasant fruitional [result] does not arise from a non-virtuous action, while an unpleasant fruitional [result] does not [arise] from a virtuous action. A *non-virtuous fruition*, that is, the unpleasant, is from a *black action*. A *virtuous fruition*, that is, the pleasant, *is seen to be* that which arises *from virtue*. *Those having the awareness that virtuous and non-virtuous* actions *do not exist* – that is, those who realize that they are not observed to inherently exist – *will be liberated* from cyclic existence.

Although falling hair and the horns of a donkey are similar in terms of their not existing, those with cataracts see falling hair alone. Similarly, virtuous and non-virtuous actions are similar in not existing inherently but each gives rise to a certain result:

- a non-virtuous action gives rise to an unpleasant fruitional result and
- a virtuous action gives rise to a pleasant fruitional result.

A non-virtuous action is called a black action, while a virtuous action is called a white action. Lama Tsongkhapa says that those who realize that the relationship between actions and results does not exist inherently will be liberated from cyclic existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 228) says:

> Therefore, the Conqueror, [by] thinking that, finely and definitely performing analyses by means of the reasonings that establish the correct reason that this-and-that specific result arises from this-and-that specific action, ordinary beings would destroy conventionalities by deprecating actions and results, said that the fruitional results of actions are inconceivable. [Thus,] *thinking*, that is, analysis, based on *actions and results is also to be repudiated*.

The presentation of actions and results is not to be analyzed because it is not realized by means of inference through the power of the fact. The relationship of actions and results is extremely subtle and can only be realized in dependence on the words of the Buddha. 'Deprecating actions and results' occurs when the relationship of actions and results is analyzed too deeply and one comes to the conclusion that conventionalities do not exist at all.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 228-9) says:

> Fearing that confidence in [the law of] actions and results will diminish through the many approaches such as these in this text, it should be understood that this is a method for generating confidence in actions and results by means of many approaches. In addition to [receiving] help from the view of emptiness in making one's confidence in [actions and results] firm, from now on, having traveled to a place of jewels, put effort into not returning empty-handed.

When one reflects on actions and results one should do so in order to gain certainty in their relationship. Otherwise, it would be like someone returning empty-handed from a place of jewels. Gaining certainty in emptiness also helps to deepen one's confidence in the relationship of actions and results. While one cannot realize the relationship of actions and results by means of inference through the power of fact, one can realize emptiness in this way. Therefore, the relationship of actions and results is even more difficult to realize than emptiness. In addition, emptiness can be established in dependence on external examples and so forth, whereas the relationship of actions and results is very subtle.

In short, the relationship is that from a virtuous action comes a pleasant result and from a non-virtuous actions comes an unpleasant result. It is impossible for virtue to give rise to an unpleasant fruitional result and for non-virtue to give rise to a pleasant fruitional result. For example, when one plants a pea seed, one will definitely reap the result of peas and not wheat, whereas if one plants wheat, one will reap the result of wheat and not peas. Just as the relationship between external causes and results is definite, so too is the relationship between internal causes and results.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 229) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2C2 Dispelling the argument that this would contradict the scriptures that teach the existence of a mind-basis-of-all

A Actual meaning of the words that dispel contradiction with the scriptures [that teach the existence of a mind-basis-of-all]
B The manner of explaining and not explaining a mind-basis-of-all that is a different entity from the mental consciousness
C Presenting an example taught from the point of view of the intention [in teaching the existence of a mind-basis-of-all]

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2C2A Actual meaning of the words that dispel contradiction with the scriptures [that teach the existence of a mind-basis-of-all]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: If the relation of the effect of actions is presented like that, then in the *Exalted Descent into Lanka [Sutra]* and so forth, that which is taught as the consciousness-basis-of-all, the substratum with the potential of infinite phenomena, like an ocean with respect to waves, all seeds, the cause of generating all things; does it not exist in any way?
>
> [Response:] It is not like that, since it was finely indicated so in order to indicate it as merely existing to those who are dull. For the sake of subsequent involvement with the self-nature of all things, only emptiness should be understood as indicated by the words 'consciousness-basis-of-all.'
>
> Not only is the consciousness-basis-of-all [indicated] to exist, also the person [is indicated] to exist [substantially] because beings subdued by that are cared for through indicating it as merely existing.
>
> As was taught:
>
> > Bhikshus, the five aggregates are the burden; the carrier of the burden is the person.
>
> For some [disciples], a mere aggregate was indicated. That called "mind" or "mental perceiver" or "consciousness" is explained saying:
>
> > If fully infused by [faith,] morality, and so forth for a long time and progressed higher, later one will progress to high status.
>
> All these are taught through the power of intention.

Why did the Buddha teach a mind-basis-of-all? He did so with the specific intention of subduing particular beings, or because he taught it as being a term for emptiness. The Buddha understood that it in some cases it was necessary to teach the existence of a mind-basis-of-all, just as in order to guide particular disciples he initially taught them the existence of a self of persons and later taught them the selflessness of persons. The Buddha did this because he saw that it would not be beneficial to teach the selflessness of persons right from the beginning, just as when a doctor first diagnoses jaundice he initially advises the patient to avoid fatty foods, but later on may advise the same person to eat fatty foods in order to counteract another problem. This is mentioned in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* saying: "Just as a patient is advised by a doctor, so too are sentient beings guided by the Buddha."

In short, for these reasons the Buddha taught all phenomena to be mere mind (mind only) or the mere nature of the mind. Thus, the Buddha taught differently on different occasions in order to benefit particular disciples, such as initially saying to them that there is a mind-basis-of-all and then later on saying that it does not exist. This is the main point here. Therefore, a mind-basis-of-all was taught in the context of subduing specific disciples, just as a self of persons was taught in order to subdue others. In a similar manner, the Buddha taught: "Bhikshus, the five aggregates are the burden; the carrier of the burden is the person." In this case, the Buddha taught that the person is a different entity from the aggregates, thereby indicating the person to be self-sufficient substantially existent. On the other hand, the Buddha taught other disciples that the mind is the person, the mental perceiver is

the person, the consciousness is the person, and that the person is not substantially existent but depends on the aggregates.

Buddha said: "If fully infused by [faith,] morality, and so forth for a long time and progressed higher, later one will progress to high status." This too was taught with a particular intention and is, therefore, an interpretable meaning teaching.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Who is intended here?
> It is expressed:
>
> *"A basis of all exists," "a mere person exists,"*
> *"Only these aggregates exist;"*
> *This demonstration is for those who would not understand*
> *The meaning of such profound phenomena.* [6.43]
>
> Since some disciples have familiarized themselves with the views of the Forders for a long time, they are unable to engage in the profound dharmata, and are afraid at only the beginning having heard about the dharmata that was taught saying:
>
> The self does not exist; it will not arise.
>
> Considering the Teacher's fine indications to be like an abyss, by backing away from them they will not achieve the great meaning.
>
> By teaching a consciousness-basis-of-all and so forth at the very beginning, having avoided the Forder system, it induces their great meaning and, later, since those unmistakenly understanding the meaning of the scriptures will abandon those by themselves, only qualities arise; faults will not.
>
> As explained by Aryadeva [in the *Four Hundred Verses*, 5.10]:[35]
>
> One should analyze beforehand this and that which someone enjoys.
> The disinclined are not vessels of the highest Dharma in any way.

It is better to initially avoid teaching the selflessness of persons to those who have familiarized for a long time with the Forder's system and so forth but instead to teach the existence of a self of persons, truly existent aggregates, and so forth. This is because if they are taught the selflessness of persons and the absence of true existence from the beginning, they will generate fear.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 229) says:

> QUESTION: If in that way, a relationship between actions and results can be posited even though a basis-of-all does not exist, then when the *Descent into Lanka [Sutra]* and so forth, that is, the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* and the *Mahayana Sutra of Knowledge*, say that the so-called "mind-basis-of-all" is the special basis of the potentials for all functional phenomena, and all the seeds, like the arising of waves on the ocean, are the cause for the production of all internal and external things, is this not the setting out of a presentation of [a mind-basis-of-all] in all its aspects?

[The lower school] says it is not correct that a mind-basis-of-all does not exist because this contradicts the *Descent into Lanka [Sutra]*, the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought*, and the *Mahayana Sutra of Knowledge*, all of which set out a mind-basis-of-all. The *Sutra Unraveling the Thought*, roughly translated, says: "The appropriating consciousness is very profound and subtle and the seeds on it flow like a river. Since

[35] Unidentified by Poisson. Second line corrected to *de.yis* in accordance with the root text.

people conceive a self, I do not teach this, [selflessness,] to the childish." In this way this citation presents a mind-basis-of-all. The *Mahayana Sutra of Knowledge* also sets out a mind-basis-of-all.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 229) says:

> RESPONSE: It is not so because by presenting that a basis-of-all exists, as is mentioned above, it is presented as existing for the dull. Hence, since a basis-of-all is presented to be asserted in the perspective of trainees in virtue of a [particular] purpose, therefore, when it is taught in our system it has a [specific] intention. The basic intention for teaching [a basis-of-all], through intending it for some, is to be understood as the intention that only the emptiness which is an emptiness of inherent existence is indicated by the term "mind-basis-of-all." This is said to be a basis-of-all because that nature adheres in all things.
>
> Not only is a mind-basis-of-all taught to exist in virtue of a [particular] purpose, but also the person is taught to exist substantially because it is presented as existing in order to care for the beings subdued by that [teaching]. As taught [in sutra]:
>
> > Monks, the five aggregates are the burden; the carrier is the person.

The Buddha taught a mind-basis-of-all with a particular intention – that of caring for particular sentient beings. However, a mind-basis-of-all is actually equivalent to emptiness because emptiness is a basis-of-all in the sense that the emptiness of all phenomena of being established by way of their own character is the basis for establishing actions and results. The Buddha taught a mind-basis-of-all specifically in order to subdue the Chittamatrins, who say that all phenomena arise due to the activation of latencies deposited on a mind-basis-of-all. The Chittamatrins say that if there were no mind-basis-of-all, the relationship of actions and their results would not be admissible, due to which the taking of rebirth would not be possible.

Lama Tsongkhapa composed a text called the *Ocean of Eloquence: An Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of Mentality and the Mind-Basis-of-All*, which sets out eight reasonings establishing the existence of a mind-basis-of-all.

If someone is a Chittamatra is he pervaded by accepting a mind-basis-of-all? He is not. For example, the false aspectarian Chittamatrins.

The sutra that says that the five aggregates being the load and the person being the carrier was specifically taught to the Vatsiputrya Vaibhashikas. This school is a subdivision of the Vaibhashika school that asserts a self-sufficient substantially existent person. Thus, the Buddha taught this sutra with a particular purpose. Although some people say that the Buddha taught this sutra in order to convert non-Buddhists to Buddhism, if it is asked whether there are non-Buddhists who are trainees intent on this sutra, the answer is that there are not. However, by reading this sutra, which sets out a self-sufficient substantially existent person, they will be led to the right view.

In short, when the Buddha taught the existence of a mind-basis-of-all and a self of persons he did so with a specific intention in mind.

Tuesday morning, 3 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 230) says:

> In response to questions by those who hold there to be a self-sufficient substantially existent person, [Buddha] did not indicate it to be non-existent but taught that a person who is a carrier exists. Therefore, although the words are not explicitly [mentioned] the meaning is that [the person] exists substantially.

Although there are Buddhists who assert a self-sufficient substantially existent person, there are no Buddhists who assert a permanent, partless, and independent person. This is an important point to keep in mind because, as Khedrup Je says, someone who does not assert the four seals does not have the slightest trace of being a Buddhist. The four seals are:
1. all compounded phenomena are impermanent,
2. all contaminated phenomena are miserable/suffering,
3. all phenomena are empty and selfless, and
4. nirvana is peace.

In this context, 'empty' refers to the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent person; therefore, there are Buddhists who accept a self-sufficient substantially existent person. In the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way,'* in regard to the refutation of a self of persons, it says:

> *Some assert the person [as] substantially existent,*
> *Inexpressible [as] thatness, otherness, permanent, impermanent, etc.*
> *That is asserted as the object of the six consciousnesses and*
> *That is also asserted as the basis of I-grasping.* [6.146]

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, although the words are not explicitly [mentioned] the meaning is that [the person] exists substantially." The Svatantrika Madhyamika system says that, although the person is not substantially existent, there is no contradiction in the illustration of the person, the mental consciousness, being substantially existent. In short, the illustrative mental consciousness is substantially existent. There are different ways of positing substantial existence. However, in general, substantial existence is an existence that does not depend on the apprehending of some other phenomenon in order to appear in the perspective of an awareness. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas posit four types of substantial existence (see Lopez, *A Study of Svatantrika*, page 95):
1. substantial existence which is established by reasoning.
2. substantial existence which is steady and unchanging,
3. substantial existence that is the ability to perform a function, and
4. substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency

See Khedrup Je's *Dose of Emptiness* for an explanation of this. Stable and unchanging substantial existence refers to emptiness which is a thoroughly established phenomenon. The third type of substantial existence refers to functioning things. Is that which is able to perform a function imputedly existent or substantially existent? It is substantially existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 230) says:

> Moreover, for some trainees [Buddha] presented mere aggregates which are not a substantially existent person, saying:
>
> > 'Mind, 'mentality,' and 'consciousness,' when fully infused with faith, ethics, and so forth for a long time and having progressed higher, will later progress to high status.
>
> In addition, thinking that no matter how many assertions are made those who conceive the manner of progressing to high status and emancipation to be truly existent will not refute objects due to adhering to their true existence, when [Buddha] presented mere aggregates, he implicitly presented the aggregates as being truly existent. All these [teachings] are taught by virtue of their intention.

Although the person is not explicitly said to be substantially existent, this is implied by saying that there is a consciousness that progresses to high status and emancipation. Thus, for a particular purpose the Buddha presented the aggregates to be truly existent to certain disciples. The purpose

was to cause those who hold this view to cultivate a path and thereby achieve high status and liberation. Thus, there are three factors in teaching such things:
1. the basis of intention
2. the purpose, and
3. the harm to accepting it literally.

In short, the Buddha said that the aggregates are truly existent and that the person is substantially existent with a particular purpose.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 230) says:

> QUESTION: For which trainees are these [teachings] intended, that is, for whom are they taught?
> RESPONSE:
>
> *"A basis-of-all exists and a person exists,*
> *While the aggregates alone are existent";*
> *These teachings are for whoever would not understand*
> *Such a very profound meaning.* [6.43]
>
> *The teachings that "A* mind-*basis-of-all exists and* a substantially existent *person exists*, *while the aggregates alone*, that is, merely them, *are* truly *existent*," *are* intended, that *is*, are taught, *for whichever* trainees *would* temporarily *not understand*, i.e., realize, *such a very profound meaning*, that is, *like that* explained before.

For those trainees who are temporarily unable to understand the profound meaning, emptiness, the Buddha said that a mind-basis-of-all exists, the person is substantially existent, and the aggregates are truly existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 230-1) says:

> Some trainees, due to having familiarized themselves with the views of the Forders for a long time, are unable to engage the profound reality (dharmata). As [Nagarjuna's] *Precious Garland* says:
>
> "Self is not existent. It will not become existent.
> Mine is not existent. It will not become existent."
> The childish fear such.
>
> When reality is initially presented, those who, out of fear, consider the Buddha's teachings to be like an abyss, by turning their backs on the teachings and not engaging in them, will not accomplish the great aim. For them a mind-basis-of-all, truly existent aggregates, and so forth are presented without, at the beginning, presenting the final point which is very profound. Thereby, that is, in dependence on that, they give up the Forders' system and are led to the great aim. Then later on those who understand the meaning of scriptures well will by themselves abandon conceiving a mind-basis-of-all and so forth to exist. Therefore, in presenting in this way there arise only excellent qualities, not faults.

If those who have familiarized themselves with the Forders' system are, from the very beginning, taught emptiness they will turn their back on this teaching, whereas if they are taught that the aggregates exist truly and that there is a substantially existent person they will engage in these teachings. Thus, the Buddha skillfully taught in this way so as to make particular trainees enter into the realization of the selflessness of persons by initially teaching them the existence of a self of persons.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 231) says:

> Intending that it is to be done in such stages [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas* (v. 5.10) says:

> Someone liking something
> Should first enjoy this and that.
> The disinclined are not at all
> Vessels of the supreme Dharma.

The Buddha, being very skilled in means, taught whatever is necessary in order to subdue trainees of different levels.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 231) says:

> The purpose for presenting a mind-basis-of-all which is a different entity from the collection of six [consciousnesses] is that, due to the need to negate external [objects], it is taught for those who are suitable vessels for [the teachings on] the mere suchness that is the emptiness of apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances. On the other hand, even those who do not assert a mind-basis-of-all like that explained above will not understand the very profound meaning due to their not understanding how to posit the relationship between actions and results.

The Buddha taught a mind-basis-of-all that is a different entity from the collection of six consciousnesses for those who (i) accept that apprehendeds and apprehenders are empty of being different substances and who (ii) negate the existence of external objects. However, even those who do not accept a mind-basis-of-all, that is, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, do not know how to posit the relationship between actions and results that are not inherently existent. Without understanding this, they are not able to understand the profound meaning, emptiness.

In short, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas do not know how to posit a relationship between actions and results that do not exist inherently and are, therefore, unable to realize the relationship between such actions and results. Although the relationship between actions and results does not exist inherently, for those who are unable to realize the absence of inherent existence the Buddha taught that it does exist inherently. Thus, because Buddha taught this by virtue of a particular intention or purpose, it is not literally acceptable. Regarding those who are suitable vessels for the teaching on emptiness, Chandrakirti's *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* says:

> *Even while an ordinary being,*
> *On hearing about emptiness inner joy arises again and again,*
> *Tears arising from this happiness moisten the eyes,*
> *And the hairs of the body stand on end.* [6.4]

> *Such [persons] have the seed of the awareness of a perfect buddha.*
> *They are vessels for the teaching of suchness.*
> *The ultimate truth is to be taught to them.* [6.5abc]

In short, those who are suitable vessels for the teachings on emptiness should be taught emptiness. Also, Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* says:

> *Those who did their duties with respect to the buddhas,*
> *Sowed roots of virtue in regard to them,*
> *And are under the protection of virtuous spiritual friends*
> *Are vessels for listening to this.* [4.6]

> *Due to having served the buddhas, questioned, and*
> *[Having] the conduct of generosity, ethics, and so forth,*

Vessels who keep, retain, and so forth
Are considered to be holy beings. [4.7]

These are the characteristics of a suitable vessel for the teachings on emptiness. Similarly, Lama Tsongkhapa quotes Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Verses*:

Someone liking something
Should first enjoy this and that.
The disinclined are not at all
Vessels of the supreme Dharma.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 231) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2C2B The manner of explaining and not explaining a mind-basis-of-all that is a different entity from the mental consciousness

When presenting the enumeration of consciousnesses in the many [scriptures], such as the *Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* and so forth, there are many sutras that do not explain more than the explanation of the collection of six consciousnesses. Therefore, in regard to relating the two ways of positing and not positing a mind-basis-of-all in the sutras, also Venerable Maitreya, when commenting on their meaning, presents a mind-basis-of-all in his *Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes*, *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras*, and *Discrimination of Phenomena and the Nature of Phenomena* and explains the position that there are no external [objects]. However, in his *Ornament for Clear Realizations* and *Sublime Continuum* he does not present a mind-basis-of-all and explains the position that does not refute external [objects]. The great master Asanga also does not explain the intention of *Sublime Continuum* as being the Cognition Only system but explains it to be the Madhyamika system, whereas in his *Compendium on the Mahayana* he cites the Abhidharma scriptures as proof of a mind-basis-of-all. The commentary on *Sublime Continuum* says:

> Even though in sentient beings there in fact exists that which becomes the essence constituting a tathagata's constituents, sentient beings do not know this.

There are sutras that present a mind-basis-of-all and those that do not. For example, in the definitive meaning sutras, the *Hundred Thousand, Twenty-Five Thousand,* and *Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutras*, Buddha only mentioned six consciousness. Then, there are other sutras in which a mind-basis-of-all is taught, such as the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* and the *Mahayana Sutra of Knowledge*; however, these are interpretable meaning sutras.

Maitreya composed five commentaries on the definitive meaning sutras of the Buddha. Of these five, he explained three – the *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras*, *Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes*, and *Discrimination of Phenomena and the Nature of Phenomena* – in terms of the Chittamatra point of view and, therefore, said that a mind-basis-of-all exists and external objects do not exist. On the other hand, in his *Ornament for Clear Realizations* and *Sublime Continuum*, Maitreya did not present a mind-basis-of-all and explains the position that does not refute external [objects].

Asanga explains the *Sublime Continuum* in accordance with the Prasangika Madhyamika system. On the other hand, in his *Compendium on the Mahayana*, Asanga establishes a mind-basis-of-all by quoting the Abhidharma scriptures.

The citation from the commentary on *Sublime Continuum* that, although sentient beings have the tathagata essence, they do not realize it, is asserted to be the scriptural source establishing the existence of a mind-basis-of-all. The true aspectarian Chittamatrins posit the tathagata essence as the seed of an uncontaminated mind existing on the mind-basis-of-all. According to the Chittamatra

system, the naturally abiding lineage has three attributes, due to which it must be a compounded phenomenon and not an emptiness. The three attributes of the naturally abiding lineage are:

1. it continues from beginningless lives,
2. it is attained by nature,
3. it is a seed of an uncontaminated mind existing on the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness.

This is a presentation of the false aspectarian Chittamatrins who accept only six consciousness as opposed to the true aspectarian Chittamatrins who accept eight. The naturally abiding lineage must be the seed of an uncontaminated mind. The false aspectarian Chittamatrins posit it to exist on the sixth consciousness, whereas the true aspectarian Chittamatrins posit it to exist on the mind-basis-of-all. In this way there are differences between the two sub-schools of Chittamatra.

In addition, there are some who say that all sentient beings already possess the sugata essence, a body that is adorned with the major and minor marks. Although each sentient being possesses it, they do not realize it. All of these statements are interpretable meaning teachings. The definitive meaning is that each and every sentient being has a lineage that will transform into a body adorned with all the major and minor marks. Although in every sentient being there exists such a lineage having this potential, sentient beings do not realize its existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 232) says:

> As the [Abhidharma scripture] itself says:
>
> > The constituents of beginningless time
> > Are the abode of all phenomena.
> > Due to their existing, all migrations,
> > As well as nirvana, are attained.
>
> By citing the proofs for the existence of a lineage of reality in sentient beings, this master, because of agreeing with the explanation that the basic intention of a mind-basis-of-all is emptiness, asserts that a mind-basis-of-all which is a different entity from the collection of six [consciousnesses] is taught by virtue of a [particular] purpose in the perspective of some trainees.

The intention behind Buddha's teaching a mind-basis-of-all is the emptiness of true existence.

Tuesday afternoon, 3 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 232) says:

> QUESTION: Well then, how is the [following] statement in [Nagarjuna's] *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* regarding existence (rebirth) being taken by a mind-basis-of-all to be interpreted?
>
> > Due to proximity to a magnet
> > Iron quickly spins.
> > Mind does not exist in that,
> > Yet it appears as though possessing mind.
> >
> > Similarly, a mind-basis-of-all,
> > The non-true seeming to be true,
> > When moving, going and coming,
> > Takes existence.

> Just as a log in the ocean,
> Moves although mind does not exist;
> Likewise, a mind-basis-of-all
> Moves in dependence on a body.
>
> RESPONSE: The Chittamatra [system] – which having refuted external objects that are objects other than mind does not refute an inherently existent mere mind – is taught in order for every childish being to abandon fear regarding the teachings on emptiness; in reality [a mind-basis-of-all] does not exist.

The *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* says that when iron is placed close to a magnet it moves, whereby it appears that a mind exists in the iron, although it does not. Likewise, although a mind-basis-of-all does not exist truly, it seems to exist truly and to move from a former to a later life, thereby taking existence. Similarly, just as a log appears to have a mind when it is moved by the force of the ocean, likewise, a mind-basis-of-all appears to move when a new body is taken.

Thus, the question here is "How is the statement that a mind-basis-of-all takes existence to be interpreted?" The Chittamatrins interpret it to mean that all phenomena are the nature of mind and that external objects do not exist. However, the Buddha initially taught the existence of a mind-basis-of-all to those trainees who would have been frightened by the teachings on emptiness. Thus, the teaching that there exists a mind-basis-of-all and that external objects do not exist is to enable specific trainees to cultivate the realization of the coarse selflessness of phenomena. However, it is not a definitive meaning teaching but was taught with a particular intention.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 232-3) says:

> When refuting the Yogacharins assertion that the inherently existent purity of the mind that becomes a basis is established to be an object of [the exalted wisdom] of individual cognition, the response to the implied debate thinking "If the mind is not truly existent it would not be appropriate for it to migrate – coming from a former world to this one and going from this [world] to a future one" is indicated stating: "Although mind does not exist in iron and a log, they move as though it exists. Likewise, although the mind-basis-of-all is not truly existent, it appears together with the movements of going and coming as though truly existent." Therefore, a mind-basis-of-all like that explained in other texts is not asserted to be established by way of its own character.

Here the Yogacharins are clearly the Chittamatrins and not the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika, because the latter do not assert the mind to be truly existent. On the contrary, the Chittamatrins accept that mind is truly existent saying that if it were not truly existent it would not exist at all, due to which there would be the extreme of annihilation. The Chittamatrins say that the very fact that the mind is truly existent enables it to migrate from a former to a later life.

The false aspectarian Chittamatra school does not assert a mind-basis-of-all, therefore, it is not asserted by them to be established by way of its own character. In addition, if according to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system it is said that a mind-basis-of-all is not established by way of its own character there is no fault.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 233) says:

> OBJECTION: Although not asserting a basis-of-all that is established by way of its own character, there are those who assert all the seeds of all the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure phenomena, like illusions that are different entities from the collection of six [consciousnesses].

Although not asserting a mind-basis-of-all, there are those who assert a supporting consciousness which is a basis-of-all [and a supported seed which is a basis-of-all]. There are two types of basis-of-all:
1. a supporting basis-of-all which is a mind, and
2. a supported basis-of-all which is a seed.

Therefore, the supported is the basis-of-all that is a seed and the support is the basis-of-all which is a consciousness. "All the seeds of all the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure phenomena" indicates the supported basis-of-all which is a seed. When the supported basis-of-all, a seed, encounters particular conditions it gives rise to a result, [all the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure phenomena].

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 233) says:

> RESPONSE: When such a basis-of-all is asserted, there amounts to nothing more than appearances as forms, sounds, and so forth from the ripening of the latencies on the mind-basis-of-all. If it must be asserted that external objects do not exist, [Nagarjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment*] says, [as follows,] that since the two, external objects of knowledge and internal consciousnesses, are similar in terms of existing and not existing, if one does not exist the other does not exist.
>
> > Consciousnesses realize objects of knowledge;
> > Without objects of knowledge there are no consciousnesses.
> > Since that is the case, do not assert
> > "Objects of cognition and cognizers do not exist."
>
> Since this [citation] is not different from the scripture that says that since the two, objects and consciousnesses, are the same in not existing ultimately and the same in existing in conventional terms, it is not justified to distinguish existence and non-existence in regard to those two in terms of either of the two truths. Therefore, it is not the assertion of this master, [Chandrakirti,] that there exist consciousnesses without external [objects].

In short, if it is asserted that there exists a basis-of-all while external objects do not exist it contradicts what is said in Nagarjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment*. Because a consciousness, or a cognizer, cognizes an object of knowledge, without an object of knowledge a consciousness, or cognizer, does not exist. In short, there does not exist an object-possessor without an object.

Internal consciousnesses and external objects of knowledge are the same in existing and not existing; that is, they are the same in not existing ultimately and they are the same in existing in conventional terms. Because they are the same the master Chandrakirti does not assert a consciousness that is without external objects. Therefore, external objects do exist for the Prasangika Madhyamika system.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 233-4) says:

> For this reason, since he does not assert a basis-of-all which is a different entity from the mental consciousness, "a basis-of-all" is, in general, a mere mind that is clear and knowing which is posited as a basis-of-all, and is specifically the mental consciousness:
> - because, in terms of the response that negates an inherently existent mere general mind, a non-truly existent mind is the way in which agents and actions are suitable,
> - because the mind that takes rebirth in existence is the mental consciousness, and
> - because the mental consciousness is the basis of all the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure.

With what intention did the Buddha teach a basis-of-all? He taught it thinking of the mere mind that is clear and knowing, specifically, the mental consciousness. In the phrase "Because, in terms of the response that negates an inherently existent mere general mind, a non-truly existent mind is the way in which agents and actions are suitable," the words 'mere general mind' refer to the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness. "Because the mind that takes rebirth in existence is the mental consciousness" indicates that it is the mental consciousness that takes birth in cyclic existence and not a sense consciousness. "Because the mental consciousness is the basis of all the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure" indicates that the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness, is a basis for all thoroughly afflicted and completely pure phenomena. Thus, Buddha used the term "basis-of-all" to refer to that specific mind, the mental consciousness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 234) says:

> Also in [Bhavaviveka's] *Heart of the Middle Way* the literal meaning of a 'basis-of-all' is refuted. In addition, Acharya Jnanagarbha asserts external [objects], therefore, he does not assert a basis-of-all. Even with respect to the Chittamatrins who negate external objects there appears to be two [kinds]: those who assert and those who do not assert a mind-basis-of-all. Also according to Acharya Kamalashila, who does not assert external objects, the awareness which is mentality alone is able to connect with other rebirths.

In his *Heart of the Middle Way* Bhavaviveka negates a mind-basis-of-all saying that there does not exist a consciousness apart from the collection of six consciousnesses. Jnanagarbha accepts the existence of external objects and, therefore, does not assert a mind-basis-of-all, as does Bhavaviveka.

Within the Chittamatra system there are those who assert a mind-basis-of-all, the true aspectarian Chittamatrins, and those who do not assert a mind-basis-of-all, the false aspectarian Chittamatrins. In addition, the true aspectarian Chittamatrins assert that there are three final vehicles, whereas the false aspectarian Chittamatrins assert only one final vehicle. True aspectarian Chittamatrins also say that when someone who has attained a nirvana with remainder passes away all his aggregates cease, whereas the false aspectarian Chittamatrins do not agree with this. This was discussed before in the context of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*.

Kamalashila does not assert either external objects or a mind-basis-of-all but says that "the awareness which is mentality alone is able to connect with other rebirths." Therefore, according to him the sixth, the mental consciousness, connects to other rebirths. For this reason, he posits the mental consciousness as the illustration of the person.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 234) says:

> [Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*] also says:
>
> > That which cuts and rejoins, is free from attachment,
> > Deteriorates, dies, and is reborn
> > Is asserted to be the mental consciousness alone.

The word "cuts" is in reference to the cutting of the roots of virtue, whereas "rejoins" is in reference to the rejoining with roots of virtue. That which cuts and rejoins to roots of virtue is the mental consciousness. According to the *Treasury of Knowledge* roots of virtue are cut by generating wrong views such as thinking that there is no law of actions and results. However, later when this person comes to think that there is a law of actions and results he once again rejoins with the roots of virtue. "Is free from attachment" refers to a foe destroyer whose mental consciousness is free from attachment. Likewise, the word "deteriorates" refers to the deterioration from their realization which

is also due to the mental consciousness. Likewise, death and rebirth are due to the mental consciousness.

Student: How can a foe destroyer's realizations deteriorate?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: This is according to the *Treasury of Knowledge* which says that a foe destroyer's realization can deteriorate through his generating attachment. This comes from the Vaibhashikas' assertion that it is not necessary to have all three conditions in order to generate attachment. There three are:
1. not having abandoned the subtle increasers,
2. proximity to an object of attachment, and
3. improper mental attention.

On the other hand, the Sautrantikas say all three conditions are necessary. Because for the Vaibhashikas all three are not needed, they say that due to proximity to an attractive object attachment is generated in a foe destroyer whereby his realizations deteriorate. However, they also say that a foe destroyer will not die until his realization is restored. If a foe destroyer can generate attachment due to proximity to an object what need is there to mention ourselves?!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 234) says:

> Also the great master Shantarakshita, by quoting from the *Treasury of Knowledge*, clearly does not assert a mind-basis-of-all. Abhyakara is also similar.

Shantarakshita is considered to be the founder of the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika school, while Bhavaviveka is considered to be the founder of the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika school. Shantarakshita greatly benefited the people of Tibet after having been invited there to teach. It is recounted that, while performing his many Dharma activities, he experienced many interferences from spirits and others and so invited Padmasambhava to Tibet to subdue them. The great abbot Shantarakshita, the great acharya Padmasambhava, and the Dharma King Trisong Detsen were contemporaries who together came to be commonly referred to, in brief, as "abbot-master-Dharma." In fact, images of the three of them are found in the homes of many Tibetans along with those of Lama Tsongkhapa and his spiritual sons.

Abhyakara was a master well known in the field of tantra who composed *Garland of Vajras* and other texts, such as one of the commentaries by Indian masters on the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 234) says:

> Although "a mind-basis-of-all" is mentioned in other mahayana scriptures, except for the mere name it does not clearly appear to be identified. However, in analyzing the meaning it only appears to not be asserted to be a different entity from the collection of six [consciousnesses]. Also, since this system seems to [take] the position of asserting external [objects], it imputes such a name on the mental consciousness. Although it is in fact necessary to settle these [statements] extensively, I have not written about it through fearing too many [words].

Although there is a reference to a mind-basis-of-all in many mahayana scriptures, when it is analyzed it is found to not be a different entity from the collection of six consciousnesses and to mainly refer to the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness. Lama Tsongkhapa says that, although there is need to explain this more extensively, he has not done so due to fearing too many words.

Wednesday morning, 4 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 234) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B1E-2C2C Presenting an example taught from the point of view of the intention [in teaching the existence of a mind-basis-of-all]

Here an example is presented from the point of view of Buddha's intention in teaching a mind-basis-of-all.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to convert [disciples], not only was a consciousness-basis-of-all indicated, moreover:
>
> *Although free of the view of the transitory collection,*
> *Just as Buddha indicated I and mine,*
> *Similarly, although indeed all things do not inherently exist,*
> *"Existence" was indicated as only an interpretive meaning.* [6.44]
>
> Although grasping to I and grasping to mine were already abandoned by abandoning all views regarding the transitory collection, 'I' and 'mine' were mentioned. Because of being a means of understanding by the worldly, the Bhagavan indicated such saying 'I' and 'mine.' Similarly, although things do not inherently exist, they were finely indicated to be merely existent. Because of being a means of understanding by the worldly, [he] indicated them to be merely existent.

The Buddha gave various teachings in order to lead sentient beings into the hinayana and mahayana teachings, for example, he taught a self of persons in order to lead some trainees into the hinayana and a mind-basis-of-all in order to lead others into the mahayana. Although Buddha himself was free of the view of the transitory collection he still taught saying "I" and "mine." Similarly, although things lack inherent existence, the Buddha said that they have inherent existence; however, this is an interpretable meaning teaching.

In short, the point here is that although Buddha is free from the view of the transitory collection he still said "I" and "mine" in order to lead others to understand the conventions of the world. Also when the Buddha taught that things exist inherently, he did so in order to lead particular trainees at the beginning, but later on he taught them that things do not exist inherently.

Chandrakirti then quotes a text of the Purvashaila sect (the Eastern Mountain sect), [a subdivision of the Vaibhashika school], which says that phenomena do not have inherent existence and presents a selflessness of persons:

> As extensively taught in verses in accordance with the Purvashaila sect:
>
> If the guides of the world do not accord with the world,
> would anyone know Buddha and what is Buddha's very Dharma? No.
>
> To indicate the three realms with regard to asserting the aggregates,
> elements and entrances of one nature; this accords with the world.
>
> To openly express to sentient beings through the names of the inconceivable,
> those of phenomena that lack names; this accords with the world.
>
> To finely indicate non-things and, by remaining in the buddha nature,
> that non-things do not exist here at all; this accords with the world.
>
> To teach the best of utterances, cessation and the ultimate,
> about not perceiving objects and non-objects; this accords with the world.
>
> To indicate an eon of burning, although equal in the sphere of dharma,

with regard to non-destruction and non-production; this accords with the world.

To indicate even a character of sentient beings with regard to not observing,
a self-nature of sentient beings in the three times; this accords with the world.

When the guides of the world lead worldly beings, they do so by teaching in accordance with how worldly beings think. This is why in the *Supplement* it says that one should not forsake the conventions renowned in the world. In fact, this is characteristic of the Prasangika Madhyamikas who are known as "those who propound in accordance with the views of the world."

This text, in the translation of Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination*, says:

With regard to asserting the aggregates,
Constituents, and spheres to be the same nature
He taught the three realms;
This is guiding in keeping with the world.

The guides of the world teach that the five aggregates, eighteen constituents, and twelve spheres do not exist inherently, thus presenting the selflessness of phenomena. The next verse then says:

Those phenomena without names,
Since inconceivable, he expressed
By means of names to sentient beings;
This is guiding in keeping with the world.

Phenomena without inherently existent names are expressed to sentient beings by means of names. The lack of inherent existence is inexpressible and inconceivable. The subsequent verse says:

He taught non-things in detail and,
By remaining in the buddha nature,
[Taught] that non-things do not exist here at all;
This is guiding in keeping with the world.

'Non-things' in this context refers to inherent existence, which is what does not exist. It does not mean that non-existent things, such as the son of a barren woman, the horns of a donkey, and so forth, do not exist. In general, worldly beings do not discuss inherent existence but in regard to something simply say "It exists" or "It does not exist."

The next verse says:

Regarding the non-seeing of objects and non-objects
The best of proclamations is
Cessation and the supreme object;
This is guiding in keeping with the world.

'Cessation' refers to true cessation. Supreme object (*dam pa'i don*) refers to the supreme which is the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise and its object emptiness.

The text continues:

> Although non-disintegration and non-production
> Are the same in the sphere of phenomena,
> He taught the eon of burning;
> This is guiding in keeping with the world.

'Non-disintegration' and 'non-production' refer to non-inherently existent disintegration and non-inherently existent production. In the sphere of phenomena, all phenomena are the same in lacking inherent existence, yet the eon of burning, for example, does exist. The eon of burning refers to the eon in which a world system is destroyed by fire.

The next verse is:

> The inherent existence of sentient beings
> Is not observed in the three times,
> Yet he also taught the dispositions of sentient beings;
> This is guiding in keeping with the world.

This verse presents the selflessness of person, whereas the previous verses present the selflessness of phenomena. Here it says that sentient beings are not observed to exist inherently.

In short, this text of the Purvashaila sect clearly shows that there is also a presentation of the selflessness of phenomena in the hinayana scriptures.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 234) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Although free from the view of the transitory collection,*
> *The Buddha taught I and mine.*
> *Likewise, although things are indeed without inherent existence,*
> *He taught "existence" as an interpretable meaning [teaching].* [6.44]
>
> Not only is a mind-basis-of-all initially taught for the sake of involving trainees, in addition, *just as*, for example, even though he has abandoned all conceptions of I and mine due to being *free from the view of the transitory collection* together with its latencies, *the Buddha* Bhagavan *taught* saying "*I and mine*" because stating "I and mine" is the method by which the world comprehends the meaning of phenomena. *Likewise*, although *things are indeed without inherent existence*, *teaching* "inherent *existence*" *as an interpretable meaning* [*teaching*] is a method by which the world gradually comes to comprehend suchness.

Although the Buddha Bhagavan is completely free from the view of the transitory collection, he still taught saying "I" and "mine." He did so as a method to guide worldly beings in the meaning of suchness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 235) says:

> In short, as in the cases of [Buddha] teaching "I" and "mine," even if it seems as though he had thoughts of this and that, definitively he had no such thoughts. Likewise, [in the case of] the teaching that phenomena are inherently existent, although this appears to be the intention of the Buddha, the definitive meaning [teaching] is that phenomena do not exist in this way.

When the Buddha taught "I" and "mine," the interpretable meaning teaching is that the Buddha conceives "I" and "mine," whereas the definitive meaning teaching is that he did not conceive "I" and

"mine." Similarly, the Buddha taught that phenomena are inherently existent with a particular intention, whereas his teaching that they do not exist inherently is a definitive meaning teaching.

The way of guiding in keeping with the world is as it is taught in the text by the Purvashaila sect. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 235) says:

> The presentation of conventionalities is the way of guiding in keeping with the world. Also, the verses that accord with the Purvashaila sect extensively teach:
>
> If the guides of the world
> Do not guide in keeping with the world,
> One would not know what Buddha's reality is
> And also who Buddha is.
>
> With regard to asserting the aggregates,
> Constituents, and spheres to be the same nature
> He taught the three realms;
> This is guiding in keeping with the world.
>
> Those phenomena without names,
> Since inconceivable, he expressed
> By means of names to sentient beings;
> This is guiding in keeping with the world.
>
> He taught non-things in detail and,
> By remaining in the buddha nature,
> [Taught] that non-things do not exist here at all;
> This is guiding in keeping with the world.
>
> Regarding the non-seeing of objects and non-objects
> The best of proclamations is
> Cessation and the supreme object;
> This is guiding in keeping with the world.
>
> Although non-disintegration and non-production
> Are the same in the sphere of phenomena,
> He taught the eon of burning;
> This is guiding in keeping with the world.
>
> The inherent existence of sentient beings
> Is not observed in the three times,
> Yet he also taught the dispositions of sentient beings;
> This is guiding in keeping with the world.
>
> The last of these verses indicates the selflessness of persons, which is the lack of inherent existence of sentient beings, whereas the remaining [verses] indicate the selflessness of phenomena, which is the lack of inherent existence of phenomena that are things and non-things. Since the Purvashaila sect is explained in [Bhavaviveka's] *Blaze of Reasoning* to be a subdivision of the Mahasamghikas, it appears that it is very clearly taught in the hearers' sutra basket that phenomena do not inherently exist.

Bhavaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* sets out a detailed explanation of the eighteen subdivisions of the Vaibhashika school. Because the Purvashaila sect is one of them, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "it appears that it is very clearly taught in the hearers' sutra basket that phenomena do not inherently exist." According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system there is a presentation of the selflessness of phenomena in the uncommon sutra basket of the hearers, whereas the Svatantrika Madhyamika

system says that there is no such presentation. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say this because they assert that those who are definite in the hearer lineage do not realize the selflessness of phenomena, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they do realize it. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that if the uncommon hinayana sutra basket presents the selflessness of phenomena, then a mahayana sutra basket would be meaningless. The Prasangika Madhyamikas refute this saying that even though the uncommon hinayana sutra basket presents the selflessness of phenomena this does not render the presentation in the mahayana sutra basket meaningless because the presentation of the selflessness of phenomena in the uncommon hinayana sutra basket is very brief, whereas that in the mahayana sutra basket is very extensive in that it is set out together with many reasonings. This was discussed before in the context of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 236) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2 Refuting the Chittamatra system in particular

A Refuting an inherently existent consciousness that is without external [objects]
B Refuting a valid cognizer that proves other-powered phenomena inherently exist
C Indicating that the term 'only' of that called Mind-Only (Chittamatra) does not refute external objects

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A Refuting an inherently existent consciousness that is without external [objects]

1 Stating the other system
2 Refuting that system

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-1 Stating the other system

In this context, "the other system" refers to the Chittamatra system. A proponent of Mind-Only (a Chittamatrin) is a person who asserts that all phenomena are established to be the entity of mere mind (or mind only). More precisely, according to the presentation in *Tenets*, the definition of a proponent of Mind-Only (a Chittamatrin) is: a person who is a proponent of mahayana tenets who does not assert external objects but asserts self-cognizers.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, the proponents of [inherently existent] consciousness cannot tolerate the Madhyamika system that was shown and in order to clarify the system explained by those positing a meaning by way of expressing a system concocted by their own imagination, it is mentioned:
>
> *Since apprehendeds do not exist, apprehenders are not perceived and*
> *Due to fully realizing the three existences as mere consciousness*
> *The bodhisattva abiding in wisdom*
> *Will realize thusness as mere consciousness.* [6.45]

The Chittamatrins do not tolerate the Madhyamikas' presentation of [a non-inherently existent] consciousness and, therefore, express a system concocted by their imagination. In this way, they refute the Madhyamikas' presentation of external objects saying:

> *Since apprehendeds do not exist, apprehenders are not perceived and*
> *Due to fully realizing the three existences as mere consciousness*
> *The bodhisattva abiding in wisdom*
> *Will realize thusness as mere consciousness.* [6.45]

'The three existences' are either (i) the existence below the ground, (ii) the existence on the ground, and (iii) the existence above the ground, or (a) the desire realm, (b) form realm, and (c) formless realm. These are the three types of environments in cyclic existence. The Chittamatrins say that within the three existences there are no inherently existent and externally existent apprehendeds. Due to this, there are no valid cognizers realizing such apprehendeds. In this way the Chittamatrins say that all three existences are the entity of mere mind, given that they all arise from latencies deposited on the mind. Because of this, a bodhisattva abiding in wisdom realizes that the three existences are the entity of mere mind. "Abiding in wisdom" can be understood to refer to a bodhisattva abiding on the sixth ground, Approaching, the ground on which the surpassing perfection of wisdom is completed. Such a bodhisattva realizes that all three existences are the entity of mere mind. However, "abiding in wisdom" can also be understood to refer to a bodhisattva abiding on the path of seeing who directly realizes emptiness.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The term, 'abiding,' applies to residing. One who abides in wisdom, abides in wisdom since he has it. Hence, abiding in wisdom should be taken as meditating on wisdom. "The bodhisattva" means one who fully abides on [the sixth ground] Approaching.

Therefore, in this context a bodhisattva abiding in wisdom is a bodhisattva abiding on the sixth ground.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> He who realizes, perceives, and understands suchness unmistakenly and does not strongly superimpose [apprehended objects and apprehenders as different substances], realizes thusness. Hence the phrase "will realize suchness as mere consciousness" is joined. Since [external] form does not exist, in order to realize also minds and mental factors as merely dependently arisen properties, "realize thusness as mere consciousness" is stated.
>
> Further, if asked: How will he realize thusness as mere consciousness?
>
> Therefore, it was stated like this [in v. 6.45ab]: *since apprehendeds do not exist*, *apprehenders are not perceived and due to fully realizing the three existences as mere consciousness...*
>
> Because this bodhisattva, due to the reasoning that will be explained, does not see even an apprehender itself, as the mind just does not have apprehended [objects], and meditates for a long time that "these three realms are mere consciousness." Also, from having meditated upon that, he perceives with self-knowing [consciousness] a mere inexpressible property. Therefore, by these stages, he will realize suchness as mere consciousness.

The first paragraph of the above explains the line in the root text: "Will realize thusness as mere consciousness." Here "He who realizes" refers to those on the path of preparation, "perceives" refers to those on the path of seeing, and "understands" refers to those on the path of meditation. That, thusness will be realized as mere consciousness is a particular view of the Chittamatrins who assert that all phenomena are in the nature of the mind and that external objects do not exist.

Since there are many people who admire and adhere to the Chittamatra view, it is very important to understand it.

Wednesday afternoon, 4 October 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: If these are mere consciousness, then, without an external object, how would the mere consciousness possessing the aspect of that be produced?
>
> It was mentioned:
>
> *Just as, due to arousal by the wind,*
> *Waves emerge from the great ocean, similarly*
> *From the "basis of all," the seed of all,*
> *Due to its own potential, a mere consciousness emerges.* [6.46]
>
> Just as from the sections of the ocean water that are the support of waves being moved everywhere by the wind, due to the condition of mere wind approaching near, sleep-like waves are realized to run everywhere, like acquiring one's body by way of competition.
>
> Similarly, here too, the transmission from one consciousness to another has been engaged in since beginningless time.

How is mere consciousness produced without the existence of external objects? The Chittamatrins reply:

> *"Just as stirred by the wind*
> *Waves of water arise from an ocean,*
> *Similarly, from that called 'the basis of all the seeds of all,'*
> *Its potentials, arises mere consciousness."* [6.46]

Just as waves arise from an ocean due to the wind blowing, likewise, from the activation of a potential deposited on the mind-basis-of-all there arises mere consciousness. Just as in the case of previously dormant waves which activated by the condition of the wind arise, in the same way previously dormant latencies when activated give rise to the result of a mere consciousness. That we travel from life to life together with the consciousness is due to the activation of latencies. This particular latency is the latency of the conception that form and the valid cognizer apprehending it are different substances.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> From the maturation of the imprints of strongly settling upon apprehended [objects] and apprehenders, due to essential properties ceasing to attain existence, the distinction of whatever imprint [implanted] on the consciousness-basis-of-all becomes the cause of generating another consciousness that is related to its own aspect.
>
> Gradually, due to meeting the condition of its maturation, it attains maturation. From that, whatever mere completely impure other-powered phenomena is thoroughly produced, to that childish beings imagine the concepts of apprehended and apprehender. Yet, an apprehended object that is a different substance from consciousness does not exist at all.

Due to the activation of the latencies deposited on the mind-basis-of-all there arise different types of results, that is, rebirth in any of the six classes of migrating beings such as among human beings, animals, hungry ghosts, and so forth. The type of rebirth that is taken is further subdivided in terms of other aspects; for example, due to the activation of a latency on the mind-basis-of-all one is reborn as a human being but with a particular color and shape. For example, there are differences even between

the human beings born in the same family in that each has a different type of body and a different way of thinking. Why is that? Only a buddha can answer this specifically, but, in general, the reason is due to their particular actions (karma). Even in the continuity of a single human being there are different stages, that of an infant, child, teenager, adult, and old person, during which the body changes and gradually loses its beauty. These changes occur because of aging, the twelfth link of the twelve links of dependent-arising.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> For example, those propounding Ishvara as a [primal] cause say:
>
> > The cow is the cause of cow sounds, as is water-crystal of water and
> > as is the *balagsha* [tree]of branches. He is the cause of all the embodied.[36]
>
> – propounding Ishvara and so forth as the very creator of migrators. Similarly, also those propounding a consciousness-basis-of-all, since the consciousness-basis-of-all is the very support of the seeds of referents, of all properties, call it the seed of everything.
>
> > "Whatever is Ishvara is permanent; the consciousness-basis-of-all is impermanent."
>
> – This is the difference.

The Vaishashika, a non-Buddhist school, asserts that Ishvara is the cause of all migrating beings. They say that because everything arises from a movement of Ishvara's mind, Ishvara is the creator of the world. This is mentioned to illustrate the meaning here, which is that the latencies deposited on the mind-basis-of-all are the creator of everything. Thus, in the Chittamatra system the latencies deposited on the mind-basis-of-all are the creator of the world. However, there is an important difference between the illustration and its meaning in that the example, Ishvara, is posited as permanent by the Vaisheshikas, whereas the mind-basis-of-all and the latencies deposited on it are asserted to be impermanent by the Chittamatrins.

In short, the Chittamatrins say that external objects do not exist but that a mind-basis-of-all exists. This is the main point of this passage.

It can be said that either the mind-basis-of-all or the latencies on it are the creator of all, including consciousness itself. This is similar to what was said before in terms of there being a basis-of-all that is a support, the consciousness, and a basis-of-all that is the supported, the seeds.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Since the presentation of the scriptures is renowned to be this:
>
> > *Therefore, whatever is the entity of other-powered phenomena*
> > *Becomes the cause of imputedly-existent things and*
> > *They emerge without external apprehended [objects], exist [inherently]*
> > *And have a nature that is not the object of any elaboration.* [6.47]
>
> This entity of other-powered phenomena should undoubtedly be accepted because it is accepted as the basis of each and every net of conception.

Other-powered phenomena in general are compounded phenomena, that is, phenomena that are produced from their respective causes and conditions, however, in this particular passage the words

[36] Compare with Poisson, p. 326.

"other-powered phenomena" refer specifically to the mind-basis-of-all. The Chittamatrins say that a mind-basis-of-all is to be accepted without doubt because it is the basis of each and every net of conception, that is, of both good and bad conceptions. In addition, the 'net of conception' can also refer to the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena, both of which are based on the mind-basis-of-all. In other words, in dependence on a mind-basis-of-all there arise the net of conceptions that are the conceptions of a self of persons and the conceptions of a self of phenomena. Due to this net of conceptions we create various kinds of actions and then experience their respective results, good and bad.

The two types of conceptions of a self are called 'a net' because, just like a net catches and holds fish as long as it is not removed, likewise, as long as one has these conceptions one will not be free from cyclic existence. In short, the mind-basis-of-all acts as a basis for the two conceptions, that of a self of persons and that of a self of phenomena.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> To mistake [a rope] as a snake having the reason of a rope; that is unreasonable without relying on the [rope]. To mistake as a vase having the reason of earth and so forth, [that] will not arise in the quarters of space without relying on earth and so forth. Similarly, here too, if an external object does not exist, what reason would the conception of blue and so forth have? Therefore, without doubt, the cause of conceptions – the entity of other powered phenomena – should be accepted because of being the cause of the fully deluded and the completely pure.

When a striped coiled rope is mistaken as a snake, the cause is the rope itself. However, it is not just any striped coiled rope that is mistaken to be a snake, rather it is a striped coiled rope of a particular time, for example, a striped coiled rope in dim light. Another mistake is to take that which is not a vase, for example, a lump of earth, to be a vase. Also in this case, without depending on a basis, the earth, there would be no such mistaken conception. There cannot be such a mistaken conception of a vase without a basis, the earth, in that it does not arise by gazing into the sky.

If there are no external objects, what reason would there be for a conception apprehending blue and so forth? Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, without doubt, the cause of conceptions – the entity of other powered phenomena – should be accepted because of being the cause of the fully deluded and the completely pure." Thus, the Chittamatrins say that a mind-basis-of-all, which is the creator of all, is definitely to be accepted.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In that case, because that which does not exist on something is perfectly subsequently perceived as emptied of that; "That which is left here as a remainder, truly exists here," fully knowing perfection just as it is – this will properly uphold even emptiness through statements such as "unmistakenly engaging emptiness" and so forth.

When an object, such as a form, which is empty of being an external object, is realized to be empty of being an external object the reality of that form is realized. In other words, when the emptiness of apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances is realized emptiness is realized. According to the Chittamatrins the emptiness of apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances is truly existent; this is 'the perfect' or 'the just as it is.' When this emptiness is realized, reality is realized.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That also bears a nature that is not the object of any elaboration. Hence, because full expression grasps an imputed aspect, as long as full expression exists, for that long the thing is not expressed.

Emptiness, or the lack of duality, is not an object of elaboration. Here "full expression" (actual expression) refers to one of the three types of latencies:
1. a latency of actual expression,
2. a latency of similar type, and
3. a latency of a view of a self.

These latencies are discussed by Khedrup Je in his *Dose of Emptiness*.

An eye consciousness seeing blue as blue is due to the activation of a latency of similar type. Due to the activation of a latency of actual expression, one discriminates big and small, beautiful and ugly, and so forth. In addition, the Chittamatrins say that the appearance of forms, sounds, and so forth as though existing externally is due to the activation of the latencies of the view of a self. In conclusion, according to the Chittamatrins everything arises due to the activation of one of the three types of latencies.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, if briefly summarized, here, with regard to the entity of other-powered [phenomena], three [distinctions] are presented:
>
> 1.emerging from only their own imprints, without an [external] object of knowledge,
>
> 2.just existing [inherently], and
>
> 3.not being the object of any elaboration.
>
> Because the very cause of imputedly existent things is established through [inherent] existence itself, that is not different from the three.

The first characteristic of an other-powered phenomenon is to emerge from latencies without the existence of external objects of knowledge. The second characteristic is to exist, either conventionally or truly. According to the Chittamatrins other-powered phenomena such as the mind-basis-of-all are conventional truths and truly existent. The third characteristic is to not be the object of any elaboration.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 236) says:

> Due to [the proponents of] consciousness not being able to tolerate that taught in the Madhyamika system and due to it not being the intention of the Conqueror to posit the meaning in terms of expressing a system that is concocted by their own imagination, in order to clarify the system that is explained in our scriptures it is initially mentioned [as follows].
> CHITTAMATRINS:
>
> *"By not seeing apprehenders without apprehendeds and*
> *Thoroughly realizing the three existences as mere consciousness,*
> *Bodhisattvas abide in wisdom and*
> *Thereby realize suchness as mere consciousness."* [6.45]
>
> Sixth ground *bodhisattvas abiding*, that is, dwelling, *in* the surpassing perfection of *wisdom* and familiarizing themselves with it, by means of reasoning realize, see, and comprehend suchness unmistakenly and without strongly superimposing apprehendeds and apprehenders as different substances, thereby realizing it. Hence, the phrase "*realize suchness as mere consciousness*" (v.

> 6.45d) is joined [here]. Furthermore, since external forms do not exist, in order to also realize that minds and mental factors are mere things that arise without depending on external forms, it is said that [bodhisattvas] "*realize suchness as mere consciousness*."

The Chittamatrins do not accept what is asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas and say that their assertions are not the words of the Buddha.

The Chittamatrins say that a bodhisattva abiding on the sixth ground realizes emptiness unmistakenly. How does he realize emptiness? He realizes it without superimposing apprehendeds and apprehenders as being different substances. These bodhisattvas "realize, see, and comprehend suchness unmistakenly." Earlier I said that the word "realize" refers to the path of preparation, "see" to the path of seeing, and "comprehend" to the path of meditation, but here it clearly says that this is a bodhisattva on the sixth ground. Thus, it can be said that the sixth ground bodhisattva realizes emptiness just like a bodhisattva on the path of preparation realizes emptiness, just like a bodhisattva on the path of seeing sees emptiness, and just as a bodhisattva on the path of meditation comprehends emptiness.

This sixth ground bodhisattva realizes that things are the entity of mere consciousness and are not external objects. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Furthermore, since external forms do not exist, in order to also realize that minds and mental factors are mere things that arise without depending on external forms, it is said that [bodhisattvas] "realize suchness as mere consciousness." Thus, forms and so forth do not exist externally. When minds and mental factors are realized, also phenomena that are dependent-arisings are realized, yet this does not mean that phenomena exist externally. Thus, things are realized to be mere consciousness or they are realized to not exist externally. In short, a sixth ground bodhisattva realizes that phenomena are merely the nature of mind and do not exist externally.

Thursday morning, 5 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 236-7) says:

> QUESTION: How does that bodhisattva realize suchness in that way?
> CHITTAMATRINS' RESPONSE: That bodhisattva, by means of the reasonings that will be explained regarding forms and so forth arising from the ripening of internal latencies, does *not see* the mind, which is *without apprehended* [objects] that are other than itself, as *apprehending* that which is a different object from itself, *and thoroughly realizes the three existences*, that is, realms, *as* "*mere consciousness*." By this, that is, through this, [the bodhisattva] familiarizes for a long time with the suchness that is the emptiness of duality, [that is, apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances]. Also through familiarizing with this, the thing that is inexpressible as suchness by means of a term – the mere entity of the emptiness of duality – is directly seen by a self-cognizer. Therefore, by means of the previous stages of familiarity, the sixth grounder realizes suchness as mere consciousness.

How does the bodhisattva realize suchness? He realizes it by means of the activation of latencies deposited by previous familiarization with suchness. What emptiness does that bodhisattva realize? According to the Chittamatrins he realizes the emptiness of apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances. The bodhisattva through the process of strong familiarization with emptiness beginning with the path of accumulation, then progressing through the path of preparation and the path of seeing, is able, when he attains the sixth ground, to realize all phenomena in the three existences as mere mind. When Lama Tsongkhapa says "directly seen by a self-cognizer," the term 'self-cognizer' does not refer to the usual self-cognizer but to a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. In short, although in general the Chittamatrins assert the existence of a self-

cognizer, in the context of the realization of emptiness a self-cognizer is specifically a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 237) says:

> QUESTION: If there are mere cognizers without external [objects], here how is a mere mind having the aspect of [external objects] produced without external [objects]?
> CHITTAMATRINS' RESPONSE:
>
> > *"Just as stirred by the wind*
> > *Waves of water arise from an ocean,*
> > *Similarly, from that called 'the basis of all the seeds of all,'*
> > *Its potentials, arises mere consciousness."* [6.46]
>
> *Just as*, that is, for example, *from an ocean*, the basis of waves, *stirred*, i.e., blown, *by the wind*, *waves of water* are made to race though previously abiding without moving as though asleep – like winning one's body through a competition; *similarly*, *from that called '*the mind *basis of all the seeds of all* external and internal things,' due to attachment and so forth and faith and so forth ceasing, latencies deposited on the basis-of-all, *the potentials* appropriate to *it*, ripen, whereby there *arises that which is mere consciousness*, an impure other-powered phenomenon. Regarding that itself, the childish conceive it in a manner of apprehending apprehendeds and apprehenders to be cut off and distant external and internal [objects]. However, apprehendeds that are different substances from the consciousness do not exist in the slightest.

Here someone asks the Chittamatrins: "Given that there are no external objects, how does the aspect of the appearance of external objects arise?" They answer this question by positing the ocean as an analogy saying that just as there are no waves when the ocean is calm, but when stirred by the wind waves arise, likewise, prior to the activation of latencies there are no appearances to the mind, but when the activation of latencies occurs the aspect of external objects arises. Having committed an action motivated by either afflictions such a attachment and so forth or by faith and so froth, when that action ceases a latency is deposited on the mind-basis-of-all. Then, upon the ripening of the latencies, various appearances arise. In addition, due to the force of latencies, appearances seem to be cut off and distant, that is, apprehendeds and apprehenders appear to be separate external and internal objects.

In short, without external objects how do appearances arise? The aspect of external appearances arises due to the activation of latencies. What is it that deposits these latencies? It is the various minds and mental factors such as the six root and twenty secondary afflictions. On the other hand, there are also virtuous latencies that are deposited by faith and so forth. Later these latencies, both virtuous and non-virtuous, are activated. For example, when any of latencies of the eleven virtuous mental factors of faith and so forth ripen, one experiences happiness, whereas due to the activation of the non-virtuous latencies of attachment and so forth, one experiences suffering. How does attachment arise? When an animate or inanimate thing is seen as having an attractive aspect, due to improper mental attention the wish to not be separated from it arises. This wish to not be separated is likened to oil on paper in that when oil absorbs into paper it is difficult to separate the two, likewise it is difficult to separate the mind from attachment. Similarly, with respect to an unattractive contaminated thing, due to improper mental attention there is the wish to not abide together with the object. Due to the condition of attachment and hatred, whereby objects appear respectively as pleasant and unpleasant, we mainly accumulate non-virtuous actions. Although it is possible that due to attachment one accumulates virtuous actions, when motivated by hatred it is not possible to accumulate virtuous actions.

In short, due to the motivation of mental factors such as attachment, we engage in actions whereby latencies are deposited on the mind-basis-of-all. When they ripen in the future, we will experience the result of those actions.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the potentials appropriate to it, ripen, whereby there arises that which is mere consciousness, an impure other-powered phenomenon." Here 'impure other-powered phenomenon' refers to either the mind-basis-of-all or an impure other-powered phenomenon that is a later similar type to the mind-basis-of-all or the afflicted mentality, which is an eighth consciousness asserted by the Chittamatrins.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the childish conceive it in a manner of apprehending apprehendeds and apprehenders to be cut off and distant external and internal [objects]." 'The childish' are ordinary beings who conceive apprehendeds and apprehenders to be different substances, although they are not.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 237-8) says:

> For example, those propounding Ishvara and so forth as a cause propound Ishvara and so forth as the creator of migrating beings saying:
>
> > Like a cow is the cause of mooing,
> > A water-crystal [the cause] of water and
> > Like the *balagsha* tree [is the cause] of branches,
> > He is the cause of all the embodied.
>
> Similarly, the proponents of a mind-basis-of-all also propound that, since the consciousness is the basis of the infinite things that are its observed objects, it is the seed of everything. [However,] there is the difference that while Ishvara is said to be permanent, the mind-basis-of-all is said to be impermanent. Because of this, those who have familiarized themselves with the views of the Forders in many other lives are subdued by explaining a basis-of-all.

According to the Vaisheshikas the environment and the beings therein are created by arising in the mind of Ishvara. In the *Compendium of Valid Cognition* the existence of Ishvara is refuted by three reasonings.

Here, the creator of the world is compared to the way in which a cow is the cause of mooing, given that without a cow there would not be any mooing. Similarly, a water-crystal is the cause of water and a balagsha tree is the cause of its branches. In the same way, Ishvara is the cause of all the embodied.

Here Ishvara is likened to the mind-basis-of-all because the mind-basis-of-all is said to be the creator of the world since it contains the seeds from which all functioning things and non-functioning things arise. All phenomena are established by the ripening of the activation of seeds deposited on the mind-basis-of-all, therefore, the mind-basis-of-all is said to be the creator of all.

If we apply the assertion of a mind-basis-of-all to ourselves, while we are all gathered together here in the meditation hall each one of us has both common and uncommon latencies due to which we see the meditation hall. For each of us there is an uncommon appearance of the meditation hall due to the activation of an uncommon latency; such a way of appearing to one does not appear to another. This is the position of the Chittamatra system.

However, there is an important difference between Ishvara and the mind-basis-of-all: Ishvara is asserted by the Vaisheshikas to be permanent whereas the mind-basis-of-all is asserted by the Chittamatrins to be impermanent. If Ishvara is asserted to be permanent does this mean that there exists a permanent being? The Vaisheshikas do assert a permanent being. Among the non-Buddhist schools there are many that posit a permanent being in that they posit the being and the self, which are synonymous, to be permanent. Shantarakshita, in one of the beginning chapters of his *Compendium*

of Valid Cognition and Thusness, presents the tenets of the non-Buddhist schools that present a permanent self. Even now many Hindus think of this text as a non-Buddhist text. The first chapter sets out the general principal as propounded by the Samkyas, the second sets our Ishvara, and so forth. However, although this text initially explains the non-Buddhist schools in detail it later refutes them all. There is a also commentary by Kamalashila on the difficult points of this text, which explains the general principal and Ishvara in detail.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Because of this, those who have familiarized themselves with the views of the Forders in many other lives are subdued by explaining a basis-of-all." Non-Buddhists who are familiar with the doctrine of Ishvara as a creator of all, through being presented a mind-basis-of-all that is consistent with a creator of all, are skillfully led in the Buddhist teachings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 238) says:

> QUESTION: Well then, when the assertions of the Chittamatrins are stated in the commentary:
> - it is said many times that "external [objects] do not exist,"
> - in particular, it is mentioned that "Apprehendeds that are different from consciousness do not exist in the slightest" and that "Apprehendeds that are forms and so forth do not exist ...which are different from consciousness," and
> - in the commentary on [the line] "Is conceived to be 'a physical eye sense power'" (v. 6.62d) it says "An eye sense power that is different from consciousness does not exist,"
>
> are these [statements] to be asserted in the context of Chittamatra by affixing the qualification to the object of negation as before? Or is it to be asserted that "the five, forms and so forth, and the five physical sense powers do not exist" without affixing the qualification?
> RESPONSE: Although here in the commentary there are both [cases of] affixing and not affixing the qualification, since there occur many [instances in which] the qualification is affixed to the object of negation in regard to production and cessation, also in all the cases in which it does not occur it is to be borne [in mind]. Similarly, also do the same here.

The Chittamatrins assert the non-existence of external objects, therefore, the object of negation is: form and the consciousness apprehending it being different substances. That object of negation does not exist, that is, apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances does not exist. That which is being negated is consciousness being a different substance from form. In fact, there is no external object that is a different substance from mind. In general, it is said that external objects do not exist, but when this is qualified it means that external objects which are a different substance from the mind do not exist.

Although there are both occasions in the texts when the qualification is explicitly affixed to the object of negation and occasions when it is not affixed, even when it is not explicitly affixed one should bear in mind that it is to be affixed.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 238) says:

> [Asanga's] *Compendium on the Mahayana*, which states the former position, says:
>
> > QUESTION: Why is it called 'the appropriating consciousness'?
> > RESPONSE: [It is so-called] because it is the cause of all the physical sense powers and the source for appropriating all bodies, hence, for as long as it continues to operate, it takes the five physical sense powers without disintegrating.
>
> And [this text] says:
>
> > The common is whatever is a seed of the environmental world. The uncommon is whatever is a seed of one's own individual spheres. That which is common is a seed of what arises devoid of feeling.

Here 'appropriating consciousness' refers to the mind-basis-of-all. In fact, there are various names for the mind-basis-of-all, such as appropriating consciousness, fruitional consciousness, and so forth. The mind-basis-of-all is the cause of the physical sense powers. It is also the source for taking rebirth, that is, taking a body. What is the appropriator of our present body? It is the mind-basis-of-all. As long as the body remains, the physical sense powers connect with it remain. In other words, as long as the abode of the sense powers, the body, remains so too do the sense powers. On the other hand, when the abode of the sense powers ceases, so too do the sense powers cease. When the mind-basis-of-all leaves the body, the physical sense powers cease.

Asanga's text says: "The common is whatever is a seed of the environmental world." For example, buildings and so forth that are commonly seen are the result of common actions and, therefore, common latencies. For example, according to the Chittamatrins the environment of Italy would be the consequence of the ripening of common seeds created in the past.

The text then says: "The uncommon is whatever is a seed of one's own individual spheres." On the other hand, personal form spheres, such as the objects of eye consciousness that appear uncommonly to one particular person, arise due to the ripening of uncommon latencies.

Asanga says: "That which is common is a seed of what arises devoid of feeling." 'What arises devoid of feeling' refers to the environment, for example, a table, cup, and so forth. They appear commonly to us due to the activation of common latencies. According to the Chittamatrins when a hundred people look at a table, the commonly seen object is the table. However, there is also a uniquely appearing table which appears to each of the hundred people due to the ripening of individual uncommon latencies. Such an uncommon table does not appear to others. For example, when a hundred people look at Joan, they see a head which is common to all of them and also see a head that is uncommon to each of them. Therefore, does Joan have a hundred heads? This is an example of how the Prasangika Madhyamikas would debate the Chittamatrins. Another example is that in an assembly hall in which there are a hundred people, there is a common assembly hall seen by all of them and a hundred individual uncommon assembly halls seen by each individual. According to the Chittamatrins the existence of an uncommon assembly hall, due to the ripening of uncommon latencies, explains why of the hundred people some experience it as happiness and others as suffering.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 239) says:

> Thus, the seed of the environmental world which is on the basis-of-all is said to be the seed of things that are devoid of feelings. It is also taught similarly in [Asanga's] *Compendium of Ascertainments*.

The latencies that bring about the environment are latencies of things that are devoid of feelings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 239) says:

> In the commentary on the *Sutra of Dependent Relation* there is an explanation in which (i) name – the four remaining aggregates – and (ii) the forms that are elements and the forms that are evolutes of the elements are explained to constitute 'name and form' due to the condition of the basis-of-all.

'Name' refers to the four mental aggregates, whereas 'form' refers to the four elements and the forms that are evolutes of the elements. Forms are: (1) colors and shapes, (2) pleasant and unpleasant odors, (3) pleasant and unpleasant sounds, (4) pleasant and unpleasant tastes, and (5) soft and rough tangible objects. Name and form arise due to the condition of the basis-of-all, meaning that they arise due to the activation of latencies deposited on the mind-basis-of-all

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 239) says:

> There are also explanations that, although such, [name and form,] do not exist in the formless realm, they do exist in the two other realms and so forth.

While both name and form exist in the desire and form realms, in the formless realm there is only name.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 239) says:

> Thus, there appear to be infinite assertions of form in the Chittamatra system. If that were not the case, then in terms of the form aggregate in the context of Chittamatra it would seem that all designated forms, sounds, and so forth would not at all be suitable to be designated by means of a new, uncontrived, imputed convention. Seeing such conventions as unsuitable yet still saying "This tenet system is excellent" does not occur with respect to any of the Buddhists of the noble land (India).

In short, the Chittamatrins do assert the existence of forms, but do not assert forms that are a different substance from consciousness. Therefore, they say that the form aggregate is the same substance as the consciousness and arises due to the activation of latencies.

Think about the meaning of the statement: "in terms of the form aggregate in the context of Chittamatra it would seem that all designated forms, sounds, and so forth would not at all be suitable to be designated by means of a new, uncontrived, imputed convention."

Thursday afternoon, 5 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 239) says:

> Also the meaning of the name "proponents of objects of knowledge as inner" is that, objects of knowledge being forms, sounds, and so forth, they are so called in that they do not assert [objects of knowledge] to be external but propound them to be things which are inner consciousness.

For the Chittamatra system an object of knowledge is always posited to be established through the activation of a latency on the mind-basis-of-all and is never established to be an external object. Haribhadra's *Commentary Clarifying the Meaning* says: "Through correctly realizing objects of knowledge as inner, one will be released." The Chittamatra (Mind-Only) are so-called because they assert that all phenomena are the entity of mere mind.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 239) says:

> OBJECTION: When the Chittamatrins assert forms, sounds, and so forth, [but] refute them being external [objects], this becomes an argument about mere words because those very forms and so forth that appear to be external are posited as external.
> RESPONSE: [This argument] and the Madhyamikas having refuted forms and so forth to be established by way of their own character, in positing forms and so forth, since those very forms and so forth appear to be established by way of their own character, they are posited to be established by way of their own character, is like calling a non-existent argument about the existence or non-existence [of external objects for the Chittamatra and forms and so forth to be established by way of their own character for the Madhyamika] "an argument."
> Since [these arguments] appear to be the most difficult points of both tenet systems, not only is the mode of the Madhyamikas difficult but also in the Chittamatra system, when external [objects] are

> refuted, forms and so forth also become non-existent, and, when forms and so forth are posited, there is seen to be the need to also posit external [objects]. Although this is indeed difficult, I have not written about it through fearing too many [words.]

Forms, sounds, and so forth are asserted in the Chittamatra system, but they are negated to exist as external objects. The Chittamatrins say that they are not external objects but are established by the activation of latencies.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "because those very forms and so forth appear to be established by way of their own character, they are posited to be established by way of their own character." Just as the Chittamatrins assert forms but negate externally existent forms, similarly the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert forms and so forth but negate forms that are established by way of their own character. Although they negate forms and so forth that are established by way of their own character, there do exist awarenesses to which they appear to be established by way of their own character. The Chittamatrins say that it follows that the Prasangika Madhyamikas would have to posit that the forms and so forth that appear to be established by way of their own character are forms and so forth that are, in fact, established by way of their own character. Since the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that forms and so forth appear to be established by way of their own character, they should posit them in accordance with how they appear, [just like they say that forms and so forth appear to exist externally and are therefore posited to exist externally].

The Chittamatrins debate with the Prasangika Madhyamikas saying that if forms and so forth are negated from being established by way of their own character, then forms and so forth would also have to be negated, whereby they would not exist. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the Chittamatrins posit forms and so forth, they have to posit externally existent forms and so forth. In this way they turn the Chittamatrins' own logic back on them. The Chittamatra system says that even if forms and so forth are posited, there is no need to posit forms and so forth as being external objects. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the Chittamatrins posit forms and so forth, they also have to posit external objects and if they refute external objects they also have to refute forms and so forth. The Chittamatrins do not accept this. The Chittamatrins say to Prasangika Madhyamikas that if they posit forms and so forth that appear to be established by way of their own character, then they have to posit them as being established by way of their own character. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not accept this. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that, although there are forms and so forth that appear to be established by way of their own character, there are no forms and so forth that are established by way of their own character. The Chittamatrins do not recognize this distinction.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 240) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS:
>
> *"Because of that, whatever is the entity of the other-powered*
> *Becomes the cause of imputedly existent things."* [6.47ab]
>
> Therefore, the presentation of the scriptures is renowned as being that explained before. *Because of that*, *whatever is the entity of the* inherently existent *other-powered* is to be unquestionably asserted. Given that, *imputedly existent things*, apprehendeds and apprehenders, are asserted *to become the cause*, that is, the basis, for all the net of conceptions without exception that conceive them to exist as different substances and so forth.

The Chittamatrins say that the other-powered phenomenon, [the mind-basis-of-all], has to be asserted as established by way of it own character and inherently existent because it is said so in various scriptures. This other-powered phenomenon is the basis for all the net of conceptions that conceive apprehendeds and apprehenders to be different substances and so forth. The Chittamatrins assert that

other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are established by way of their own character.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 240) says:

> Mistaking a snake on account of a rope is not produced on the basis of a non-existent rope and making a mistake on account of a pot and so forth is not produced in the area of the sky which is without earth. Likewise, if external objects do not exist, in what way do the mistaken conceptions of blue and so forth as external objects have a mistaken basis as their cause? Because of that, unquestionably the cause of the mistaken conception of them as external objects is necessarily asserted to be an impure other-powered phenomenon which is the dualistic appearance of apprehendeds and apprehenders as being different substances because the very basis of appearance is the cause of both the bondage to and freedom from the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure.

In order to mistake a rope as a snake, there must exist a rope. In other words, without the presence of a striped coil of rope there could be no mistaking a snake on account of a rope. Similarly, mistaking a pot and so forth is not produced in the area of the sky which lacks earth; meaning that a pot can be mistaken on the basis of a lump of earth, but not on the basis of the sky which is free from earth. In short, there has to exist a lump of earth in order to mistake the presence of a pot. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Likewise, if external objects do not exist, in what way do the mistaken conceptions of blue and so forth as external objects have a mistaken basis as their cause?" For example, in relation to blue there can arise the mistaken conception of it as being an external object. The main point here is that the basis of mistake, an impure other-powered phenomenon, must exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "because the very basis of appearance is the cause of both the bondage to and freedom from the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure." The 'basis of appearance' is the mind-basis-of-all which acts as the cause of both bondage and freedom. This means that the latencies of familiarity with virtue that are deposited on the mind-basis-of-all act as a cause of freedom, that is, liberation, whereas the latencies of familiarity with non-virtue that are deposited on the mind-basis-of-all cause of bondage to the thoroughly afflicted, that is, to cyclic existence. Thus, in this sense the mind-basis-of-all is the basis for both bondage and freedom.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 240) says:

> If, in either the Madhyamika or Chittamatra systems, they appear to sentient beings like that, and the emptiness of the referent object – the basis adhered to as being truly existent just as it appears – is taught, the realization of that emptiness becomes a path. However, ordinary beings establishing another emptiness as truly existent, without it acting as a path realizing the emptiness which is a rejection of the referent object adhered to as truly existent, become tired without result due to it not becoming the antidote to either the coarse or subtle adherences to true existence which have been engaged in since beginningless time.

When one teaches that there is no referent object of the conception of a self of persons, this helps to attain the realization of selflessness or emptiness. On the other hand, if this is not taught this realization will not be attained.

In order to realize emptiness, a basis is necessary. This is because it is necessary to realize how the basis conceived by the conception of true existence does not exist. Without a basis, there will be no such realization. In other words, if the referent object of the conception of true existence is not repudiated, one will not realize emptiness. The mere word 'emptiness' is not sufficient to gain its realization. It does not harm the beginningless conception of true existence. In order to realize emptiness, one has to meditate with respect to a basis by examining whether or not it exists truly until

one comes to repudiate, with respect to that same basis, the referent object of the conception of true existence, thereby realizing emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 240) says:

> This being the case, a non-existent imputational factor is the referent object of the conception that an other-powered phenomenon that appears dualistically exists as it appears, that is, as if apprehendeds and apprehenders were different substances. That basis is perfectly and subsequently seen to be empty of the object of negation, whereas what remains here is the basis of emptiness and the emptiness. These are truly existent. By thoroughly knowing the perfect just as it is, this, as well as the meaning of emptiness, will also be perfectly upheld.

When one realizes that the object of the conception of duality conceiving apprehendeds and apprehenders to be different substances, that is, the imputational factor, does not exist, one will realize the perfect meaning. In order to realize emptiness it is essential to realize that the self which is to be negated does not exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 241) says:

> Here, regarding the setting out of the former position, in the commentaries on the *Bodhisattva Grounds* and the *Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes* it is explained according to the meaning above of "Whatever non-existent regarding any" and so forth. In the *Sublime Continuum*, the commentary on the meaning of the statement "Whatever does not exist anywhere" and so forth [accords with] the Madhyamikas' way of commenting which is not at all the same as the previous two [texts]. However, fearing too many [words] I have not written about it.

'The former position' is that of the Chittamatrins. The two commentaries, that on the *Bodhisattva Grounds* and that on the *Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes*, explain the meaning of the statement "Whatever non-existent regarding any." 'Any' refers to the basis, and 'whatever non-existent' to the object of negation. Thus, this phrase means that the duality of apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances is non-existent regarding any basis. On the other hand, the commentary on the meaning of "Whatever does not exist anywhere" in the *Sublime Continuum* differs from that of the previous two commentaries in that it is written from the point of view of the Prasangika Madhyamikas. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, the meaning of the statement "Whatever does not exist anywhere" is that 'whatever does not exist' refers to the object of negation, true existence, and 'anywhere' means that such an object of negation does not exist anywhere. The word 'whatever' or 'any' (Tibetan *gang*) occurs in many contexts, however, in the Prasangika Madhyamika system it refers to an inherently existent basis, which does not exist. Lama Tsongkhapa says that he could have elaborated on this subject but chose not to.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 241) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS:
>
> *"They arise without existing as external apprehendeds,*
> *Exist, and have the nature of not being the object of all elaborations."* [6.47cd]
>
> Other-powered phenomena:
> 1. *arise* only from their respective latencies *without existing as external apprehendeds*,
> 2. *exist* inherently, *and*
> 3. *have the nature of not being the object of all elaborations* that superimpose the ultimate of this system

> because the actual expression of the outer and inner are held to be explicitly non-investigated aspects.
> In short, other-powered phenomena have three characteristics:
> 1. they arise without existing externally,
> 2. they exist inherently, and
> 3. they are not objects of what are elaborations as ultimate.

An indicative conception, an other-powered phenomenon, exists, although it does not exist externally, but rather arises due to the activation of latencies. It exists inherently and is not the object of elaborations that superimpose the ultimate of this system. This is because "the actual expression of the outer and inner are held to be explicitly non-investigated aspects."

In this context "other-powered phenomena" refers specifically to indicative conceptions, it does not refer to other-powered phenomena in general. Although other-powered phenomena are in particular asserted by the Chittamatrins, they are also defined by the other schools as that which is produced by its respective causes and conditions. This is the reason they are said to be *other* powered, that is, they do not arise by their own power.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that this other-powered phenomenon has three characteristics:
1. it arises without existing externally,
2. it exist inherently, and
3. it is not an object of what are elaborations as ultimate.

These three characteristics are set out in the root text saying:

> *"They arise without existing as external apprehendeds,*
> *Exist, and have the nature of not being the object of all elaborations."* [6.47cd]

They are also listed in Chandrakirti's autocommentary saying:

> Therefore, if briefly summarized, here, with regard to the entity of other-powered [phenomena], three [distinctions] are presented:
>
> 1.emerging from only their own imprints, without an [external] object of knowledge,
>
> 2.just existing [inherently], and
>
> 3.not being the object of any elaboration.

Other-powered phenomena are explained in detail by the Chittamatrins because it includes the mind-basis-of-all which exists and exists inherently, but does not exist externally. That it is not the object of any elaboration of the ultimate means that it is free being able to be expressed by either two, terms and conceptions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 241) says:

> The cause of the imputedly existent, due to being included among the things that are inherently existent, is not different from the three characteristics. Stating "other-powered phenomena exist" is the characteristic of existence that is not mere existence. Acharya Sthiramati, in saying "The non-perfect is an indicative conception," accords with the statement "[The word] 'inherently' is the rest of the phrase." The ascertainment of this particular is an important point below.

The cause of the imputedly existent is included in things that are inherently existent. Therefore, it cannot be different from the three characteristics:
(1) not arising externally,
(2) existing inherently, and

(3) not being the object of elaborations of the ultimate.
Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Stating "other-powered phenomena exist" is the characteristic of existence that is not mere existence." "The non-perfect is an indicative conception" means that other-powered phenomena are not perfect. An indicative conception is a category of afflictions.

Whenever the text below says 'exist,' in accordance with the Chittamatra point of view, it should be understood to mean 'inherently exist.'

What is an other-powered phenomenon? It is that which is produced by its respective causes and conditions. Are we other-powered phenomena or self-powered phenomena? We are other-powered phenomena because we are under the influence of causes and conditions. In terms of those things that are under the power of afflictions, the majority of them are sentient beings. Although stones and tables are under the power of the afflictions, sentient beings are under their power even more. Due to being under the power of afflictions we experience much suffering, whereas, although stones and tables are under the power of afflictions, they do not experience suffering due to it.

Friday morning, 6 October 2000

An other-powered phenomenon is not a final observed object of an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise because an other-powered phenomenon is a basis for the category of afflictions. Are other-powered phenomena pervaded by being indicative conceptions? They are not.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: How would you posit the three times, past, present, and future, in terms of a table? What is a future table? What is a past table? What is a present table? From among the three times of the table which occurs first?
Student: The present occurs first because the present is the immediate perception of the table on the basis of which one can posit the past and future.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Which occurs first, the past Cristiana, present Cristiana, or future Cristiana?
Student: The past Cristiana.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: (laughs uproariously) Then, the past Cristiana occurred without being born! Among the three, the past Cristiana, present Cristiana, and future Cristiana, which comes into existence first? If one says that it is the past Cristiana that means that the past Cristiana arose followed by the future Cristiana and then the present Cristiana. What do you think?
Student: Going back to the table, in the context of Chittamatra the present table is the present ripening of latencies, the future table is a latency that is not yet activated, the past table is a latency that has already ripened.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It seems that the first to occur is the future table, in that even before the table comes into existence there are the causes for its production. Then comes the present table, the table that has come into existence and not yet ceased. Then comes the past table, the table that has been produced and has ceased.
Student: How can we talk of a "future table" without there being a present table?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is there not a future house, a future baby, and so forth? Are you thinking that there necessarily occurs the past table, then the present, and then the future? In the fourth chapter of *Ornament for Clear Realizations* it says that if one takes fire as the basis of argument, fire itself is not past. But what is the fire at the time of the smoke? It is past. Or we can take ourselves as an example: on the basis of ourselves our parents are past, but the parents themselves are not past. There are also explanations of this in the *Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes* and Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Verses*.

Student: In Chittamatra it is not necessary to assert the existence of external objects in order to assert other-powered phenomena such as the mind-basis-of-all and dualistic appearance. The imputational factor is duality, the apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances. What is the impure other-powered phenomenon in this context?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is the latencies on the mind-basis-of-all. Why is there the appearance of apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances? It is due to the activation of latencies. What are these latencies? They are the latencies of the view of a self. Because of the activation of these latencies there arises dualistic appearance. When the view of a self is defined it is said to be the conception of a self of persons and the conception of self of phenomena. Among these two, the conception of self of phenomena is the basis. What is this view of a self of phenomena? It is the conception of apprehendeds and apprehenders as being different substances. This is how the Chittamatrins posit the conception of a self of phenomena. Any consciousness that is polluted by that conception is an impure other-powered phenomenon. However, in general, impure other-powered phenomena are all true sufferings, anything that is produced by the force of actions and afflictions. This is one way of positing impure other-powered phenomena. There are impure other-powered phenomena and pure other-powered phenomena. What are pure other-powered phenomena? The environment and inhabitants of a pure land, such as Sukhavati. Another way of positing pure other-powered phenomenon is that it is a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. In this case, all other other-powered phenomena are impure other-powered phenomena.

What is the cause of form appearing to be an external object? It is a latency, specifically, the latency of a view of a self. Just as form appears to be an external object due to the latency of a view of a self, likewise, apprehendeds and apprehenders appear to be different substances due to the activation of a latency of a view of a self. The basis of the infusion of these latencies, the mind-basis-of-all, is said to be the cause of bondage and freedom.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "because the very basis of appearance is the cause of both the bondage to and the freedom from the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure." Form is the basis of appearance, which is the basis of bondage and freedom. However, if instead it is said that form is the basis of bondage and freedom this would not have much meaning. Also, it is said that the appearance of external objects is the cause of bondage and freedom this would be meaningless because the appearance of external objects is the basis of bondage but not of liberation. Think about it.

Student: What is meant by "renowned in the world"?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: "Renowned in the world" is discussed extensively in the third chapter of the *Compendium of Valid Cognition*. There are three types of renown: (1) that which is yet to be renowned in the world, (2) that which is already renowned, and (3) that which is suitable to be renowned. In short, "renowned in the world" means whatever is commonly expressed by worldly beings, such as farmers. However, it can be asked "Is a field an object that is renowned in the world because it is commonly expressed by worldly beings?" One text says that the moon is commonly renowned in the world as "rabbit-bearer," meaning that the moon is also called "rabbit-bearer." Is there pervasion? No, because even a book is suitable to be called a rabbit-bearer just because it is an object of conception. For example, Chogyal can be called a buddha or "Omniscient One" just because he is an object of conception. Or we can call him

Production from other is not renowned to worldly beings, that is, they do not talk about production from other. They may say "There is a sprout in my field" but they do not say, "It is produced from other."
Student: If it is not renowned to worldly beings, what about it being renowned to ordinary Svatantrika Madhyamikas?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Common worldly people who have not learned a tenet system do not propound production from other.

Student: What about Ishvara who is renowned in the world?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Ishvara is renowned as existing in the world. Although there is no Ishvara that is permanent, partless, and independent, there is mere Ishvara. The point is that an Ishvara that is permanent, partless, and independent is not renowned in the world, whereas mother and father are renowned in the world.
Student: If it is renowned in the world does it have to exist?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If is renowned in the world there is no pervasion that it exists because worldly beings talk about things that do not exist. The *Compendium of Valid Cognition* mentions three types of renown:
(1) the renowned that is already renowned,
(2) the renowned that will be renowned, and
(3) the renowned that is suitable to be renowned.
For example, Jonathan is suitable to be renowned as a meditator or as a talker.

Are you certain that there does not exist the son of a barren woman? If someone says this is certain, we ask: "Is the barren woman a mother?" No, she is not. Has she been a mother? Yes, she has been a mother.

Student: The Svatantrika Madhyamikas posit things to conventionally and inherently exist, and that in meditative equipoise a superior realizes the lack of inherent existence. The Prasangika Madhyamikas debate them saying that, if it were so, conventional objects would be destroyed in meditative equipoise because they are not seen. How do the Svatantrika Madhyamikas respond to this?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Some Svatantrika Madhyamikas posit conventional objects to be an object of negation in the perspective of a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. Therefore, both Svatantrikas and Prasangikas say that a conventional truth existing in the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is an object of negation.
Student: Do the Svatantrikas agree with the Prasangikas that conventional objects are destroyed by the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: No.
Student: Then what happens to inherent existence?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Inherent existence does not exist for the Prasangika Madhyamikas. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if there were inherent existence then it follows that a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise destroys things. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that there is no such fault, in that although functioning things do not exist in the perspective of superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise they are not destroyed by it. According to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas if something does not exist inherently it does not exist at all. For the Prasangika Madhyamika system inherent existence is not seen in meditative equipoise and in this sense it is annihilated or destroyed. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas would not agree with this.

Student: How can establishment by way of its character, which depends on an imputing cognizer, be equated with the Prasangika view of inherent existence which does not depend on anything at all? It would seem that inherent existence is not defined in the same way in the two schools.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: When the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that "merely imputed by conception," the word "mere" negates something in particular, whereas when the Svatantrika Madhyamikas say "merely imputed by conception" the word "merely" does not negate the same thing. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas "merely imputed" means that everything is only imputed and that not the slightest atom exists from its own side; in this way, the word "mere" negates existence from its own side. In the Svatantrika Madhyamika system the word "mere" negates existence from its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of a non-defective awareness. Thus, the difference between these school is in terms of how they understand the word "mere." In

both cases they say it is merely imputed by conception, but the word "mere" negates something different:

- in the Prasangika Madhyamika system it negates existence from its own side and
- in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system it negates existence from its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of a non-defective awareness.

Student: What does "imputed" mean?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It means that, with respect to a particular basis, a conception thinks "This is a table," "This is a cup," and so forth. "Merely imputed by conception" means that a basis is imputed, that is, it is given a name, by conception.
Student: When an eye consciousness sees pot, in the second moment we conceive pot, call it a pot, and impute pot. Is that right?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Yes, first we directly see pot, then in the second moment there arises the conception "This is a pot." For example, when I look out my window and see Jonathan turning the prayer wheel, first there is contact, the meeting of my eye consciousness, eye sense power, and Jonathan's body, which is then followed by the conception "There is Jonathan."

Student: How does imputation function in babies, insects, and beings who do not think in words? Does imputation mean something other than just labeling? Imputation generally seems to imply labeling, but babies do not have words. They do not know "table," but do they impute "table" when they see table?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: All that is imputed is not necessarily imputed by the conception [of a particular person]. When someone sees something there is not necessarily imputation by conception at that time. Imputation by conception occurs even in those who are not trained in tenets. When someone sees something and thinks about it, this is not necessarily an imputation by the conception of that person. In general everything is imputed by conception, but in the case of a particular person it is not necessarily imputed by the conception of that person. Does it seem to you that a meaning generality is an imputation? In the *Compendium of Valid Cognition* there is a difference between the appearance of a term generality and the appearance of a meaning generality. In the case that someone sees a pot for the first time and then generates a conception apprehending pot, there is the appearance of a meaning generality because that person has an awareness which is a mental image of the shape of the object that is seen. This is the appearance of a meaning generality. However, this person does not have the appearance of a term generality because this person does not know the term 'pot,' he just has the appearance of the meaning generality pot but is unable to give it the name 'pot.' For example, if Bethanne were to go outside for a walk and be seen by a stranger, that man thinks "There is a woman" and has the appearance of a meaning generality of Bethanne but does not have the appearance of term generality of Bethanne. He does not have the appearance of the term generality of Bethanne because he does not know that she is called "Bethanne." He does not have the appearance of the term generality of Bethanne because he does not have the appearance of her in dependence on the term "Bethanne."
Student: He has the meaning generality of Bethanne, but does he impute "Bethanne"?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: No pervasion. In the *Compendium of Valid Cognition* there is a case in which there is the appearance of a meaning generality without the appearance of a term generality. There can also be the appearance of a term generality without the appearance of a meaning generality.
Student: Can there not be the appearance of a term generality but not a meaning generality, for example, when I hear a word in Tibetan is there a term generality but not a meaning generality?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If you do not know Tibetan, when you here the Tibetan word "bumpa" there is just the hearing of sound, it does not have any meaning for you.

END

Monday afternoon, 9 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 241-2) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2 Refuting that system

A Extensively stating the refutation [of that system]
B Brief conclusion of such a refutation

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A Extensively stating the refutation [of that system]

1 Refuting the examples of an inherently existent consciousness that does not have external objects
2 Refuting the meaning that a consciousness empty of objects is produced from the potential of latencies
3 Indicating that the two, refuting such and meditation on repulsiveness, are not contradictory

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A1 Refuting the examples of an inherently existent consciousness that does not have external objects

A Refuting the example of a dream
B Refuting the example of seeing falling hair

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A1A Refuting the example of a dream

1 The example of a dream does not establish an inherently existent consciousness
2 The example of a dream does not establish the non-existence of external objects when awake
3 The example of a dream establishes all things as false

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A1A-1 The example of a dream does not establish an inherently existent consciousness

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 89) says:

I shall explain about this:

The example of a mind without external objects – where does it exist? [6.48a]

One should correctly analyze this very statement. It is mentioned:

If said, "like a dream," … [6.48b]

By lying down and falling asleep inside a very small room, if one dreams about a herd of intoxicated elephants within the house, they would not exist in any way. Therefore, this consciousness should be accepted without doubt, without external objects existing. In order to show that this is also without essence, it is explained:

… that should be considered. [6.48b]

The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask the Chittamatrins "What is an example of a mind without external objects?" The Chittamatrins respond saying "A dream." If someone falls asleep and dreams of a herd of crazed elephants in the same room, how do those elephants exist in that room? The Chittamatrins say: "Therefore, this consciousness should be accepted without doubt, without external objects existing." The Prasangika Madhyamikas then negate that there exists an inherently existent consciousness without external objects saying "that should be considered."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Further, if it is asked: How is that? It is explained:

When for me, even in a dream, mind
Does not exist, then your example does not exist. [6.48cd]

Whatever consciousness has the aspect of a herd of intoxicated bulls, for us, that does not exist like the object, because it is not produced. Also, if consciousness does not exist, since there does not exist an example established for both, a consciousness without an external [object] does not exist.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas says that even if someone dreams of a herd of bulls/elephants, it does not exist because it is not produced. Just as the crazed elephants of a dream do not exist, likewise, objects do not inherently exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If it is thought: Then, if an erroneous consciousness does not exist in a dream, due to waking at that time, one would not remember the experience of the dream. This is also unsuitable. Like this:

If, through remembering a dream when awake, mentality
Exists, external objects would also be similar. [6.49ab]

In a dream, the dream consciousness perceives various objects which, upon awakening, are remembered. The Chittamatrins say that external objects do not exist and that consciousness exists inherently. They say that, for example, having dreamed of a herd of crazed elephants in the room, when one wakes one remembers them even though they do not exist. Based on this example, the Chittamatrins say that consciousness is inherently existent because if it were not inherently existent there could not be memory of the dream elephants. The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond: "This is also unsuitable" and "If, through remembering a dream when awake, mentality exists, external objects would also be similar." They say that just as there exists a mentality that remembers dream objects when awake, likewise, would external objects exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If asked: Why?

Just as you remember, thinking "I saw,"
It exists like that also for external objects. [6.49cd]

It should be ascertained that, "just as mental [consciousness] is just existing through remembering a dream experience, similarly, since a memory about the experience of the object also exists, the object also exists – or else consciousness would not exist either."

Just as there exists memory of the experience of dream objects, likewise, there also exists memory of external objects. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that, therefore, the Chittamatrins should either assert the existence of external objects, or else they should assert that just as external objects do not exist, likewise, consciousnesses also do not exist. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas the position that external objects exist and the position that consciousness are without inherent existence are complementary because they negate the existence of an inherently existent consciousness and accept the existence of external objects.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 242) says:

PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:

Where is the example that external objects do not exist while mind does? [6.48a]

When you Chittamatrins assert that, while *external objects do not exist*, a *mind* that is established by way of its own character exists, the *example* of this stating "For example, it is like this..." should be analyzed asking, "*Where is it?*"

CHITTAMATRINS:

"It is just like a dream." [6.48b]

For example, having lain down and fallen asleep in a very small room the elephants of a dream herd of crazed elephants do not exist in that room in any way. Therefore, *just like a dream*, likewise, external objects do not exist. Similarly, inherently existent consciousness is definitely to be asserted.

In short, the Chittamatrins say:
(1) external objects do not exist and
(2) consciousness is inherently existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 242) says:

PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:

This should be thought about. [6.48b]

Furthermore, [this example] is explained because [things] are taught to be essenceless. This very example *should be thought about*, that is, analyzed, here.

CHITTAMATRINS: Moreover, what is to be analyzed?

PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:

When mind, even in a dream, does not exist for us,
Then you do not have an example. [6.48cd]

Even in a dream, a *mind* established by way of its own character having the aspect of a herd of crazed elephants *does not exist for our* system – just as the object, the elephants, does not exist – because it is not produced.

The herd of crazed elephants in a dream does not exist; if it did exist it must be produced whereas it is not.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 242-3) says:

If consciousness is not established by way of its own character, *then you do not have an example* that is established for both [the Prasangika Madhyamikas and the Chittamatrins]; therefore, a consciousness without external objects [also] does not exist.

Here, just as the elephants appearing in a dream do not exist, likewise, it must definitely be asserted that while an object-possessor, that is, a consciousness, is not indicated to not exist, an inherently existent consciousness is indicated to not exist.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that objects and object-possessors should be the same in terms of either both existing or both not existing. The Chittamatrins are unable to posit a common example that establishes for both the Prasangika Madhyamikas and Chittamatrins that external objects do not exist and that consciousness exists inherently; therefore, this is not justifiable.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they do not establish the non-existence of consciousness, but establish the non-existence of an inherently existent consciousness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 243) says:

> The Chittamatrins, as explained above, assert that other-powered phenomena do not exist externally because other-powered phenomena are inherently existent.
>
> The meaning of these refutations in brief [is as follows]. In the commentary on [the lines in the root text] "In brief, [understand the meaning that] 'Just as objects of knowledge do not exist, likewise, awarenesses also do not exist'" (v. 6.71cd) it is clearly said: "Understand that even an awareness that has the aspect of an object of knowledge is not produced by way of its own nature."

The Chittamatrins assert that other-powered phenomena do not exist externally, but that the mind exists inherently. In other words, there are no objects of knowledge that exist externally, but the mind exists inherently. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if there do not exist external objects, likewise, also object-possessors would not exist: "Just as objects of knowledge do not exist, likewise, awarenesses also do not exist" (v. 6.71cd). This means: "Understand that even an awareness that has the aspect of an object of knowledge is not produced by way of its own nature." The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that external objects exist and consciousness does not exist inherently. Thus, the Chittamatrins and Prasangika Madhyamikas make exactly opposite assertions. The debate between them can be synthesized in this main point.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 243) says:

> Furthermore, for those with realizations there is no basis of doubt regarding propounding consciousness to be non-existent in this school:
>
> - because in the two, the root text and commentary, when such reasonings are refuted there are many cases of affixing a qualification to the object of negation and
> - because [the root text] that says "Why, in that, did the Mahatma once again say 'Mind is produced from ignorance and actions'?" (v. 6.88cd), meaning that ignorance produces karmic formations [and] karmic formations produce consciousness, is also our system.
>
> Therefore, all equality in the existence and non-existence of objects of knowledge and consciousness should be understood in terms of the qualification of the object of negation.

The words "existence" and "non-existence" should be qualified by adding the word "inherent." In this way it is clear that the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not say that the mind does not exist, but that it does not exist inherently. It is not that consciousness does not exist because it is their system that ignorance produces karmic formations and karmic formations produce consciousness. Therefore, they do accept the existence of consciousness or mind. In the context of the twelve links the *Supplement* says: "Why, in that, did the Mahatma once again say 'Mind is produced from ignorance and actions'?" (v. 6.88Cd). This means that consciousness, or mind, arises from karmic formations and karmic formations arise from ignorance. Therefore, there are no Prasangika Madhyamikas who say that consciousness does not exist.

Objects of knowledge and consciousnesses are equal in terms of the qualification of the object of negation. When it is said that if objects exist also object-possessors exist and if object-possessors do not exist objects do not exist, this is in the context of affixing the qualification 'inherently exist.' However, in the specific context of consciousnesses and external objects the object of negation is different in that objects lack *external* existence, whereas consciousnesses lack *inherent* existence. In the Chittamatra system the existence of external objects is the object of negation, whereas in the Prasangika Madhyamika system an inherently existent consciousness is the object of negation. The basis of the debate regarding "existence and non-existence" is in terms of affixing the respective qualifications to objects of knowledge and consciousness. In general, when there is no object of

knowledge there is no consciousness because without an object of knowledge a consciousness cannot be produced. Likewise, if there is no consciousness how can there be an object of knowledge?

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 243) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS: Supposing there are no mistaken consciousnesses in a dream, then later upon awakening one would not remember the experiences at the time of the dream.
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: That is an argument [of those who] think that if a consciousness does not exist by way of its own entity a consciousness does not exist at all. Such an argument is also not appropriate.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the argument that if consciousness does not exist by way of its own entity it does not exist at all is incorrect. A dream [consciousness] is an example of a mistaken consciousness in that a dream is not considered to be true because the objects of a dream consciousness are non-existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 243-4) says:

> *If, due to remembering a dream at the time of waking,*
> *Mentality exists, also external objects would be just like that.*
> *Just as you remember thinking "I saw...,"*
> *Also like that the external exists.* [6.49]

> *If*, *due to remembering* the experience of *a dream at the time of waking* from sleep, a dream *mentality* inherently *exists*, *also* the elephants and so forth of a dream, *objects* that appear to be *external*, *would exist just like that* mentality. Why is that? *Just as* when *you* are awake, there exists mentality through there existing the *memory* of an object-possessor *thinking* "When dreaming *I saw...*," likewise, due to there *existing* memory *also* regarding *the external*, that is, objects, *like* the object experienced thinking "That object was seen when dreaming," one should assert either "Objects also exist" or else "Consciousness also does not exist."

The argument is: "If, due to remembering the experience of a dream at the time of waking from sleep, a dream mentality inherently exists, also the elephants and so forth of a dream, objects that appear to be external, would exist just like that mentality." That is, just as there exists a mentality dreaming of elephants, so too should its object, the elephants, exist. Do dream elephants exist in reality? They do not exist in reality. Although a dream consciousness observes elephants, those elephants do not exist in reality. However, do the dream elephants exist? If they do exist, what do they look like? Is a dream elephant like a reflection? Is it the appearance of the form of an elephant? Is the dream elephant a non-existent or an existent?
Student: A dream elephant exists.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is the elephant of a dream an elephant? To what kind of consciousness does the dream elephant appear? Does it appear just to the dream consciousness?
Student: It appears just to the dream consciousness.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is the appearance of elephant to a dream consciousness, however, the elephant that appears to a dream consciousness is not really an elephant. But is there the appearance of a dream elephant?
Student: There is.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is the dream consciousness a sleep consciousness or something else?
Student: A dream consciousness and a sleep consciousness are two different things.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Therefore, a sleep consciousness does not have the appearance of elephant?
Student: Maybe.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What is that appearance of a dream elephant to the dream consciousness? Is it form, consciousness, or a non-associated compositional factor?
Student: It is the appearance of form.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Therefore, is it form?
Student: It is a form sphere.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is that appearance a form sphere or a phenomena sphere?
Student: A form sphere.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It follows that if it is a form sphere it is an object apprehended by an eye consciousness, that is, shape or color. It follows that an eye consciousness functions while dreaming. Is it not usually said that during sleep all sense consciousnesses are unmanifest? Is the consciousness that sees elephant not a manifest consciousness? Is it an eye consciousness? It is not, it is a mental consciousness.

A dream elephant does not exist in reality, but... Think about this. A dream elephant can perhaps be defined as: a form that appears to a dream consciousness as the shape of an elephant.

Tuesday morning, 10 October 2000

A Re-illumination of the Thought Regarding the Explanation of the 'Supplement to the 'Middle Way'" (Tibetan text page 183-5) by Jedzun Sherab Wangpo, a disciple of Chogyi Gyeltshen, says:

1 Identifying form that is a phenomena sphere

Illumination says:

> In regard to that, the five forms that are phenomena spheres are not imputed by the tenets of the materialists, but are taught in sutra and are also explained like that by me.

When such is explained [it is as follows]. The definition of form that is a phenomenon sphere is: the appearance of form that appears as form to a mental consciousness, this being the principal from among the two, mental consciousness and sense consciousness. It has five types. The *Compendium of Knowledge* says:

> What is form that is a phenomenon sphere? That in relation to the five types is:
>
> 1. form arising from aggregation,
> 2. space-form,
> 3. form arising from a promise,
> 4. imaginary form,
> 5. form for one with meditative power.
>
> Individual illustrations are the following:
>
> - The appearance of subtle and coarse particles appearing to a non-conceptual mental consciousness is form that is a phenomenon sphere of aggregation.
> - The appearance that is the clear space appearing is form that is a phenomenon sphere that is space-form.
> - The form that is a vow of individual liberation and a non-vow is form that is a phenomenon sphere arising from a promise.

- The appearance of clearly appearing skeletons, although no skeletons exist, to the meditative stabilization meditating on repulsiveness is the imaginary form that is a phenomenon sphere.
- The appearance appearing as an earth totality to the meditative stabilization of a totality is form that is a phenomenon sphere for one with meditative power.

Although asserting virtuous and non-virtuous actions of body and speech, the vows of individual liberation, and so forth to be physical matter that is truly existent alone is the Vaibhashika system, in this system there is necessarily asserted to be a common basis of virtuous and non-virtuous actions, vows, and so forth and the physical because in *Fundamental Wisdom* it is taught that there is a common basis of karmic formations and form:

> Existence, moreover, the five aggregates...

Because there is a common basis of ethics and the physical the *Supplement* says:

> *Like the autumn moon, always completely pure,*
> *Peace and brilliance; he is beautified by them.* [2.2cd]

Therefore, form must be divided into two: (1) form that is a phenomena sphere and (2) form that is a form sphere. The appearance of an elephant that appears to a dream consciousness is, moreover, an external form that is a phenomena sphere because it is a form that is a direct object only of the mental consciousness that takes it as its appearing object. It is not a form that is a form sphere because there are no sense consciousnesses in a dream.

The appearance of an elephant to a dream consciousness is form because it is a form that is a phenomena sphere. This also applies to other objects that appear to a dream consciousness such as horses, houses, and so forth.

In the Prasangika Madhyamika system vows and non-vows are form. They assert that whatever refrains one from a negative action, just as a dame stops the flow of water, must be form. Further on, Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 264) says:

> In regard to that, the five forms that are phenomena spheres are not imputed by the tenets of the materialists, but are taught in sutra and are also accordingly asserted by me. Therefore, also clearly appearing non-existent skeletons are necessarily asserted to be physical, like reflections, but since they appear only to a mental consciousness they are not form spheres as are reflections. Since they are also not any of the nine remaining physical spheres, it is said "They are imaginary forms that are phenomena spheres."

The form that comes from correct assumption refers to the form that arises from taking vows or non-vows. The Vaibhashikas and Prasangika Madhyamikas assert vows and non-vows to be form. Included in the forms that are vows and non-vows are both revelatory forms and non-revelatory forms. Revelatory form, which is seen by the eye consciousness, is that which permits one to infer the motivation of a person. An example of correctly assuming a non-vow is to decide to be a soldier and to kill people or to be a butcher and to kill animals. When that decision is made, that person receives a non-vow. How are non-vows relinquished? For example, having become a soldier, one later decides to give up being a soldier and to correctly assumes a vow. The *Treasury of Knowledge* (v. 4.41ab) (page 187) says:

How is a non-vow relinquished?
It can be relinquished in three ways:
By taking a vow, dying, and the two organs."

[The commentary by Gendun Drup, the I Dalai Lama, on the *Treasury of Knowledge* says:

b) The manner of giving up a non-vow
What is the manner of giving up non-vow?
A non-vow is given up when a vow is obtained, because at that time a powerful antidote counteracting that [non-vow] is generated. It is given up at the time of death, because at that time the basis [of the non-vow] is destroyed. It is also given up by the occurrence of the two sex organs at the same time, because at that time the basis is damaged.]

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 244) says:

QUESTION: Since the memory of the objects and object-possessors of a dream also exists in our system, how do these two exist or not exist?
PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS' RESPONSE: Here in the commentary (1) the memory of the experience of a dream and (2) the memory of the dream object that is experienced are explained. Therefore, just as, for example, when the reflection of a face is seen, although the eye consciousness to which it appears does not experience a face, there is an object experienced relative to that reflection; likewise, when elephants and so forth appear during a dream, although the object experienced, crazed elephants, does not exist even while dreaming, due to the existence of the experienced object, which has the appearance of [crazed elephants,] there is also the memory of the experience of that object that says "I remember that object."

Just as both objects and object-possessors exist in a dream, likewise, are there two memories: (1) the memory of the object and (2) the memory of the object-possessor. For example, one can recall dreaming of such-and-such an object, such as a house, elephant, and so forth. In this case, what is remembered is the appearance of the respective object. On the other hand, when one recalls "I dreamt such-and-such," one is remembering the object-possessor of the dream.

When one sees the reflection of a face in a mirror, one sees only a reflection of a face and not an actual face. Does the eye consciousness of the person looking in a mirror experience an actual face? It does not, it experiences an object in dependence on that reflection. Likewise, in a dream one experiences a dream elephant and not a real elephant. But, in dependence on a dream consciousness that has the appearance of elephant, there is an experience of the appearance of elephant.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 244) says:

Distinguishing between the observed object and experience is, except for a few cases, not necessary in most such cases.

The ninth chapter of Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says: "Like recollecting the poison of a rat." This is one case in which it is necessary to distinguish between the observed object and the experience. The example here is of a bear who, having been wakened by thunder in the spring, experiences the pain of poison deposited by a rat and remembers that in the winter, while hibernating, he was bitten by a rat. Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 334) says:

For example, although the poison of the rat entered the body [of a bear] when bitten in the wintertime, at that time [the bear] experienced the bite but did not experience the poison. Later, upon hearing the sound of thunder, he generates a memory thinking, "When I was bitten before, the poison entered [my body]."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 244) says:

> Therefore, an established by way of its own character other-powered phenomenon that is empty of externality cannot be posited. Since there does not exist an obvious example of [such an other-powered phenomenon] – just as, for example, an obvious example is also not possible in proving the existence of past and future rebirths – and there also does not exist an example of [such an other-powered phenomenon] that proves it, for example, by means of a different way of setting out the syllogism, refuting the Chittamatrins should be understood to be extremely powerful reasoning.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it is not possible to posit an example of an established by way of its own character other-powered phenomenon that does not exist externally, just as there is no example that proves the existence of past and future lives. Since there is no such direct example, what the Chittamatrins assert does not have all three modes complete because there is no forward pervasion. When there is forward pervasion, then, if it is the sign it is necessarily the predicate, but here this is not the case. However, it has to be taken into account that signs can either be in terms of 'being' or 'existing.'

In other words, the Chittamatrins are unable to posit an example concordant with the subject. This is likened to the case of future lives in which the following syllogism can be set out: "The consciousness of an old man who is about to die, as the subject, joins to a future consciousness because it is a consciousness that is together with constant attachment; for example, attachment." As in the former case, this syllogism does not explicitly prove the existence of past and future lives, given that the predicate is not "there exist past and future lives."

In brief, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the Chittamatrins are unable to establish an other-powered phenomenon that does not exist externally but exists inherently because they are unable to posit an example of it.

Tuesday afternoon, 10 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 244) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A1A-2 The example of a dream does not establish the non-existence of external objects when awake

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 90) says:

> It is mentioned here: If the form of elephants and so forth existed in a dream, eye consciousness would also exist because it would apprehend that. Yet, that does not exist either, because confounded by sleep, the collection of the five consciousnesses is impossible. Like this:
>
> *If, since eye consciousness is impossible in sleep,*
> *[External form] does not exist – only mental consciousness exists.*
> *Settling upon the aspect of that as just external,*
> *Just as a dream, the same is accepted here. If [so]:* [6.50]

Is the elephant of a dream observed by an eye consciousness? It is not. Why is that? The elephant of a dream is not observed by an eye consciousness because, due to being confounded by sleep, there does not exist the collection of the five consciousnesses – the eye consciousness through the body consciousness. Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says: "If, since eye consciousness is impossible in sleep, [external form] does not exist – only mental consciousness exists." Hence, the consciousness that perceives an elephant in a dream is the mental consciousness alone. External form does not exist in a dream. The form of an elephant in a dream is not a form sphere because there is no eye consciousness

in a dream. Or, because there is no eye consciousness in a dream the form of an elephant in a dream cannot be a form sphere.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If it is said: During a dream, eye consciousness does not exist in any way. Since that does not exist, the visual form of elephants and so forth, the objects to be apprehended by the eye entrance, do not exist; mental consciousness exists.

This passage indirectly indicates that in a dream there exists only form that is a phenomena sphere, in that a form that is apprehended by the mental consciousness alone is a form that is a phenomena sphere.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, external form is only non-existent and strongly settling upon the aspect of the [mental] consciousness as just external is without reversal.

The Chittamatrins assert that external form is non-existent. However, in spite of it being non-existent the strong settling upon the existence of external form is not averted.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as mere consciousness arises without an external object during a dream, similarly, it will also [arise] here.

The word 'here' probably refers to the waking state.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is not like that, because during a dream the arisal of mental consciousness is impossible.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas the arisal of an inherently existent mental consciousness is impossible. Therefore, they refute the Chittamatrins' assertion that, although there do not exist external forms, consciousness exists inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is like this:
>
> *Just as your external object is not produced in a dream,*
> *Similarly, mentality is not produced either.* [6.51ab]

The statement "mentality is not produced either" means that an inherently existent mentality is not produced either. According to the Chittamatrins, since external objects do not exist they cannot exist inherently. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that, just as external objects do not exist inherently, likewise, consciousness does not exist inherently and is not produced inherently. The Chittamatrins

say that these two, external objects and consciousness, are completely different, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they are the same.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore:
>
> *The eye, eye's object, and the mind produced from that –*
> *All three are also false.* [6.51cd]

The three, the form sphere, eye sense power, and eye consciousness, do not exist inherently and are false.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as the three – eye, form, and mentality – approach when seeing a form; similarly, also during a dream, when an object is fully investigated, the three are observed to collect. Just as the two, eye and visual form, do not exist in that [dream], similarly the eye consciousness does not exist either.

In order for an eye consciousness to perceive form the three need to come together: (i) the observed object condition, (ii) the empowering condition, and (iii) the immediate condition. Likewise, when an object is fully investigated, these three are observed to come together in a dream. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that in a dream the eye sense power does not exist and the object of eye, form, does not exist, due to which eye consciousness does not exist. However, this means that eye consciousness does not inherently exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as these three, similarly:
>
> *The remaining triads, ear and so forth, are also without production.* [6.52a]
>
> The words 'and so forth' of "ear and so forth" include from sound and ear consciousness through the mental [sense power], the dharma element (i.e., mental object), and the mental consciousness. Therefore, during a dream, all these triads are false. Therefore, the statement "mental consciousness exists in a dream" is unreasonable.

Also a sound sphere, ear sense power, and ear consciousness do not exist in a dream. Similarly, in a dream there is no odor sphere, nose sense power, and nose consciousness through to no tangible object sphere, body sense power, and body consciousness. Here it would seem that the mental consciousness is included in this list, however, it should be understood to mean that the phenomena sphere, mental sense power, and mental consciousness do not exist inherently. "Therefore, the statement 'mental consciousness exists in a dream' is unreasonable" means "Therefore, the statement 'mental consciousness *inherently* exists in a dream' is unreasonable." During a dream the collection of phenomena sphere, mental sense power, and mental consciousness does exist, but it does not exist inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Someone considers: A form included in the dharma entrance, an object to be apprehended by mental consciousness, exists in a dream. Therefore, consciousness does not exist at all without an object.
>
> That also is unreasonable because the three are not possible in any way in a dream. But when accepted like that in order to dispel the system of others' scriptures, then the example of a dream becomes just meaningless because it is impossible to show the meaning of the properties arisen from the example as just bearing a false meaning, since it bears a meaning that is not false.

The form included in the phenomena sphere (dharma entrance) exists in a dream. For example, the appearance of form appearing as an elephant to the mental consciousness in a dream is form that is a phenomena sphere. Therefore, all consciousnesses necessarily have an object.

"That also is unreasonable because the three are not possible in any way in a dream" means that an inherently existent phenomena sphere, inherently existent mental sense power, and inherently existent mental consciousness are unreasonable. Or it can be said that the three of a dream, the observed object condition, empowering condition, and immediate condition, which are inherently existent are unreasonable. Chandrakirti says: "But when accepted like that in order to dispel the system of others' scriptures, then the example of a dream becomes just meaningless because it is impossible to show the meaning of the properties arisen from the example as just bearing a false meaning, since it bears a meaning that is not false." If something is not false, it must be true; by taking an example that has a true meaning, one cannot prove something to be false.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 244) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS:
>
> *"When asleep an eye awareness is not possible,*
> *Therefore, they do not exist; only mental consciousness exists.*
> *There is adherence to the aspect of that as actually external.*
> *Just as in a dream, so to is it asserted here."* [6.50]
>
> If the forms of elephants and so forth exist in a dream, so also the eye consciousness that apprehends them would exist in a dream; however, that is not suitable. *Upon* falling *asleep*, due to being affected by sleep, *an eye awareness*, that is, an eye consciousness, *is not possible*, *therefore*, the forms of elephants and so forth *do not exist* as objects apprehended by an eye sphere; *only mental consciousness exists*. Because of that, external form spheres are just non-existent and strong *adherence to* the mere appearance of *the aspect of that* external [object] *as* being *actually external* arises for the mental consciousness without opposition. *Just as* mere consciousness without external [objects] arises in *a dream*, *so too is it asserted here* on the occasion of waking.

The appearance of an elephant in dream is not a form sphere because there is no eye consciousness in a dream, there is only mental consciousness. Since whatever appears in a dream cannot be a form sphere, it is the mere appearance of a form that is a phenomena sphere to an mental consciousness. The mental consciousness then adheres to this appearance as though it were an external object. In short, a mental consciousness has the appearance of a form that is a phenomena sphere and adheres to it as external object. This is what the Chittamatrins assert.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 245) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: Even allowing that that does not establish the previous example, you think that the example of a dream establishes that there is consciousness that does not have external [objects] during the waking state. [Chandrakirti's autocommentary] says:

> It is not like that because it is impossible for mental consciousness to arise in a dream.

When Chandrakirti says that "it is impossible for mental consciousness to arise in a dream," he means that it is impossible for an inherently existent mental consciousness to arise in a dream.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 245) says:

> This means that even assuming that there do not exist form spheres in a dream, since an inherently existent mental consciousness that does not have [external objects] is not possible even in a dream, the combination of the two – non-existent external objects and inherently existent mental consciousness – is not suitable as an example.

The Chittamatrins say that (1) external objects do not exist and (2) mental consciousness exists inherently and posit the example of a dream to prove this. The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond that an example that makes use of this combination is not suitable.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 245) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Just as for you external objects are not produced*
> *In a dream, likewise, also mentality is not produced.*
> *The eye, objects of the eye, and the mind produced by them,*
> *All three, are also false.* [6.51]
>
> Thus, *just as* according to *you external objects are not produced in a dream, likewise, also mental* consciousness *is not* inherently *produced*. Therefore, just as when forms are seen while awake, the three, eye, form, and mentality, come together, likewise, also in a dream when objects are perceived the three are observed by an awareness to come together. Just as in that dream, the two forms, the *eye and the objects of the eye*, do not exist, likewise, *the mind produced by those* two, an eye consciousness, also does not exist. Therefore, *all three*, the eye, forms, and mentality, of a dream *are also false*.

When awake, a form sphere, eye sense power, and eye consciousness exist. That eye consciousness is produced in dependence on an observed object condition, empowering condition, and immediate condition. Likewise, when objects are perceived in a dream the three – a phenomenon sphere which is the object of a mental consciousness, a mental sense power, and a mental consciousness – come together. This means that, during a dream, a mental consciousness is produced by the coming together of an observed object condition, empowering condition, and immediate condition. In order for a mental consciousness in a dream to realize or perceive an object, these three conditions are necessary.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 245) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Also the remaining triads, the ear and so forth, are not produced.* [6.52a]
>
> Just like these three, *also the remaining triads* [other than] the triad of the eye, that is, those of *the ear and so forth, are not* inherently *produced*.

The remaining triads, those of the ear, nose, and so forth, also do not exist inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 245-6) says:

> Just as (i) the four, from the ear sense power through the body sense power; (ii) the four, from the sound sphere through the tangible object sphere; and (iii) the four, the ear consciousness and so forth – which are mentioned in [Chandrakirti's autocommentary] saying "Here the term 'and so forth' includes from sounds and ear consciousness through mentality, the phenomena constituent, and the mental consciousness" – are explained regarding the triad of the eye above, likewise, although they do not exist in a dream, due to their appearance [as inherently existent] they are false. Although the triad of mentality exists in a dream, it does not exist inherently, but likewise, due to appearing as that, it too is a falsity.

Here Lama Tsongkhapa elaborates on the meaning of the statement in Chandrakirti's autocommentary: "Here the term 'and so forth' includes from sounds and ear consciousness through mentality, the phenomena constituent, and the mental consciousness" [by setting out the remaining four objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses]. He then says: "Although the triad of mentality exists in a dream, it does not exist inherently." While the other five triads, that of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body, do not exist in a dream, the triad of mentality does exist in a dream, however, it does not exist inherently. Because it appears to exist inherently, it too is a falsity.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 246) says:

> Therefore, taking the existence of sense consciousnesses in a dream to be the system of this master and then refuting that is an extremely rough application of intelligence, due to which you are renowned as "the rising sun that refutes without the dawning of the former position." Therefore, those who have cast that far away, that is, some arrogant Tibetan scholars [who think] they are powerful mahasattvas skilled in such tenets, not understanding even roughly the system of those who are well known, consider [Acharya Chandrakirti] to be a field for continuously accumulating non-meritorious [actions] and appear to lead many sentient beings in the non-meritorious. Therefore, they should be careful!

Lama Tsongkhapa scolds those who think that Acharya Chandrakirti says that there exist sense consciousnesses in a dream and then refute him. He says that doing so is a sign that they are of little intelligence. "The rising sun that refutes without the dawning of the former position" likens such scholars to a sun that rises before the dawn, thereby, indicating that those who hold this position should abandon it. Lama Tsongkhapa says that those who hold this position deprecate Acharya Chandrakirti, due to which they continuously create non-meritorious actions and also lead others in the non-meritorious. Therefore, those who do so should be careful.

One text says:

> *It is not existent, it is not seen by the Conqueror,*
> *It is not non-existent, it is the basis of cyclic existence and nirvana.*

Some people say that all phenomena are not existent and not non-existent. At one time, there was the flourishing of this wrong view which is known as "the view of not existing, not non-existing." This wrong view flourished due to not understanding the meaning that although something does not exist inherently it does exist conventionally, "not existing" meaning not existing inherently, and "not non-existent" meaning not non-existent conventionally. We should be careful not to fall into this wrong view.

Wednesday morning, 11 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 246) says:

> Here in regard to such explanations by the Chittamatrins as "If, in a dream..." and so forth, our own system posits [as follows]. [As quoted in the autocommentary,] Acharya Bhavaviveka, when giving the answer that the example is not established, says:
>
> > BHAVAVIVEKA: Forms included in the phenomena sphere are objects apprehended by a mental consciousness. Since they exist in a dream, consciousness does not exist at all without an object.
> >
> > PRASANGIKA MADHYAMAKAS: That too is not suitable because the three are not possible in all ways in a dream.

The Chittamatrins say that in a dream there are no sense consciousnesses, only mental consciousness. When Acharya Bhavaviveka is quoted as giving the answer that the example is not established, it is not clear whether he is referring to the example set out by the Chittamatrins or that set out by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. However, he says: "Forms included in the phenomena sphere are objects apprehended by a mental consciousness. Since they exist in a dream, consciousness does not exist at all without an object." According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas "That too is not suitable because the three (object, sense power, and consciousness) are not possible in all ways in a dream."

In other words, Bhavaviveka (a Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika) says that in a dream a phenomenon sphere, mental sense power, and mental consciousness exist. The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond that that too is incorrect, in that the three existing in a dream is not possible. When they say that "the three are not possible in all ways in a dream," they mean that the three cannot inherently exist in a dream.

In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the three, object, sense power, and consciousness, that exist inherently are not possible in all ways even in a dream. On the other hand, according to Bhavaviveka's system, [the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika], the triad, object, sense power, and consciousness, must exist inherently because if they did not exist inherently they would not exist at all.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 247) says:

> > However, when asserting in that way in order to dispel others' scriptural systems, at that time the example of a dream becomes meaningless because that which has a meaning that is not false cannot present the actual meaning that arises from that example as a false meaning.
>
> The meaning of [this passage from the autocommentary is as follows]. Because the three, object, sense power, and consciousness, that exist inherently are not possible in all ways even in a dream, when explaining the statement "Forms that are phenomena spheres, objects other than consciousness, are not suitable to exist in a dream," we must also assert forms. Since it is not contradictory for [forms] to exist even in a dream, the reason that they do not exist is due to Bhavaviveka clearly asserting that forms are established by way of their own character.

Bhavaviveka asserts forms are established by way of their own character; for the Prasangika Madhyamikas such forms do not exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 247) says:

> Supposing the Chittamatra system that forms included in external spheres do not exist as different objects [from consciousness] can be eliminated by positing a dream as an example. Therefore, in

> order to eliminate that [assertion], if [Bhavaviveka] asserts that those forms are established by way of their own character it is meaningless for the Madhyamikas to set out the example of a dream in order to establish the absence of true existence.

The Chittamatrins posit a dream as an example proving that external spheres are not different from consciousness. It seems here that Lama Tsongkhapa says "When they assert that those forms are established by way of their own character, it is meaningless for the Madhyamikas to set out the example of a dream in order to establish the absence of true existence" to Bhavaviveka who asserts that forms are established by way of their own character but are not truly existent and in order to prove this sets out the example of a dream. "Meaningless" refers to the fact that it is meaningless to present the example of a dream to the Chittamatrins.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 247) says:

> Dreams would have a meaning that is not false due to their being established by way of their own character. Therefore, in the context of this example it is not possible to establish [dream objects] as false, the real meaning indicated by this [example]. This is because as long as inherent existence is not negated, the sign and predicate in the proof of the absence of true existence do not follow from that example. Thus, our system's response above – that all the appearances in a dream do not inherently exist – is the very best.

If an example has a true meaning, how can it represent a false meaning? The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to Bhavaviveka: "This is because as long as inherent existence is not negated, the sign and predicate in the proof of the absence of true existence do not follow from that example." According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas it is not correct to negate true existence but not to negate inherent existence because for them they are the same. In this sense, no matter what syllogism is made in the proof of the absence of true existence, the forward pervasion would not be established. In other words, one also has to negate inherent existence because if something is inherently existent it cannot lack true existence. For example, if a syllogism is set out negating true existence and the example given is that of a dream, the forward pervasion is not established. In order to take a dream as an example what sign is necessary? In general, a dream is an example of what is not true.

In conclusion, "Thus, our system's response above – that all the appearances in a dream do not inherently exist – is the very best." In short, the answer given by Bhavaviveka is not correct because he accepts that a dream is inherently existent but does not exist truly. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say so because according to them true existence and inherent existence are mutually pervasive.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 247) says:

> QUESTION: Well then, does or does not our own system, [the Prasangika Madhyamika,] assert the clearly appearing forms of a dream to be forms that are a phenomena sphere?
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKA'S RESPONSE: Since sense consciousnesses do not exist in a dream, what appears as the five objects appears to the mental consciousness alone. Although the five, the form sphere and so forth, are not present [in a dream], just as the clearly appearing skeletons in the perspective of mere mentality are posited as phenomena spheres, so too are they [posited as] forms that are phenomena spheres. Also, from among the five forms [that are phenomena spheres], they are imaginary forms. Therefore, understand that there are many such [forms].

Any appearance of form, sound, odor, taste, and tangible object in a dream is only an object of mental consciousness. These appearances in a dream are forms that are phenomena spheres, and specifically, from among the five types of forms that are phenomena sphere, they are imaginary or imputed forms.

Likewise, the clearly appearing skeletons in the perspective of mere mentality are posited as forms that are phenomena spheres; they too are imaginary or imputed forms.

Student: Do the Chittamatrins assert the five types of forms that are phenomena spheres?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The Chittamatrins do not assert them because they do not accept that vows are form, rather they say that they are mind. Only the Vaibhashikas and Prasangika Madhyamikas assert vows to be form. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Ocean of Vinaya* says: "Actions of body and speech caused by the motivation of renunciation are form. The intention to abandon them is constant and they have a seed. Regarding this assertion there are two: (1) that of the lower schools and that of our own system and (2) that of the higher schools."

Student: What are the five appearances of form, sound, and so forth to a dream consciousness for the Chittamatrins?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are imputed existents. However, the Chittamatrins do discuss different types of forms as set out in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Essence of Eloquence*. In short, for the Chittamatra system the five types of forms that are phenomena spheres are not forms. These five types of forms are asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

In a dream there is the appearance of sound, for example, when one dreams of a group of people singing. This sound appears only to a mental consciousness, therefore, it is not an actual sound. In a dream when there is the appearance of a good odor, like that of the perfume called 'Samantabhadra water,' it too is not an actual odor. Such an odor is the appearance of an odor to a mental consciousness alone. Likewise, when one dreams of tasting pizza or other good food, the appearance of the taste of food appears only to a mental consciousness, it is not the real taste of food.

Student: Are those appearances permanent or impermanent?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are impermanent because they are form; specifically, they are imaginary forms from among the five types of forms that are phenomena spheres.
Student: Therefore, they are not a meaning generality?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are not. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert that a meaning generality is definitely permanent, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas might not agree with that. On the other hand, in the Vaibhashika system, the actual sound of the name 'Jampa Gendun' is sound, it is not name. For them a name is the appearance of Jampa Gendun that arises to a mental consciousness upon hearing the sound 'Jampa Gendun.' This name is not a form but a non-associated compositional factor. The Tibetan nomads say "Thirty people have thirty minds, and thirty yaks have sixty horns," meaning that thirty people each have a particular view or opinion. In the same way, the four schools each have particular views.

The main point in this entire discussion is:
- the Chittamatrins assert that external objects do not exist and that consciousness inherently exist;
- the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert the existence of external objects and that the consciousness does not inherently exist; and
- Bhavaviveka (a Svatantrika Madhyamika) asserts that external objects exist and that objects exist inherently but do not exist truly.

Thus, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas and Prasangika Madhyamikas both assert the existence of external forms, but differ in asserting respectively that external forms are inherently existent and that external forms are not inherently existent. Chandrakirti says that his system is the best, whereas Bhavaviveka says that his system is the best. The Chittamatrins, on the other hand, would assert that

Chandrakirti has fallen into the extreme of annihilation. We should use our own intelligence to discriminate which system is the best.

Wednesday afternoon, 11 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 247) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A1A-3 The example of a dream establishes all things as false

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 91) says:

> Because all three are also untrue in a dream, therefore, because the unestablished is proved by means of the fully established, even at the time of waking, all phenomena would be proved as just non-inherently existent. It is explained:
>
> *As a dream, likewise, awake also here*
> *Things are false. The mind does not exist,*
> *There are no objects of experience and also no senses.* [6.52bcd]

By understanding that the three, the object of a dream, the sense power of a dream, and the consciousness of a dream, do not exist truly, one should also understand that the three also do not exist truly when awake. To prove this Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says that just as the object, sense power, and consciousness of a dream are false, similarly, they do not exist truly or inherently when awake. "There are no objects of experience and also no senses" means that there are no inherently existent objects of experience and no inherently existent sense powers when awake.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as objects, senses, and consciousnesses are false during a dream; similarly, it should be understood "they are also [false] when awake."

A dream is taken as an example, which is then to be applied to the waking state. Hence, just as objects and so forth are false in a dream so too are they false when awake in the sense that they do not exist inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, it is stated [in sutra]:
>
> Just like observing illusory sentient beings,
> So too, although appearing, they are not real in suchness.
> Illusion-like, similar to a dream –
> Such phenomena were taught by the Sugata.

When illusory sentient beings are emanated by a magician they appear to be actual beautiful women, horses, and so forth, but are falsities because they do not exist as they appear. This is similar to the case of a dream.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, [the *King of Meditative Stabilization Sutra*] says:
>
> > The migrators of existence are dream-like –
> > Whoever is in it is not born, does not have death –
> > Nor are name and life of sentient beings found;
> > These phenomena are like bubbles and plantain trees.
>
> Such statements as these and so forth will also be excellently explained.

The Buddha taught that the migrating beings of cyclic existence are like dreams in that they are not inherently born and do not inherently die. Nor is an inherently existent name or an inherently existent life of sentient beings found to exist. Therefore, such phenomena are like water bubbles and banana trees in the sense of being essenceless. A banana tree is taken as an example of something that is essenceless because when its layers are pealed away no essence is found; similarly, when all phenomena are searched for they are not found. Likewise, although a water bubble appears to be solid, when touched it immediately disappears. This will be well explained later on.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, having relied on waking consciousness, it is explained that also all three are not produced. Having relied on dreaming consciousness in a dream means:
>
> > *Here, just as awake, likewise, as long as*
> > *Not awake, that long the three exist for that.* [6.53ab]

Just as is the case in a dream, so too when awake are the three not inherently produced. As long as one is awake there do not exist the objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses of a dream, whereas when asleep these three do exist for the dream consciousness.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as, although the sleep of unknowing exists, for someone awake due to separating from sleep that is different than that, while the sleep of ignorance has a dream, all three again exist with such a nature although not produced by their own essential nature. Similarly, also for those not arisen from a dream situation, that is, not separated from sleep, the three also exist with a nature like that.

Although awake, due to ignorance it is as if one is asleep. Due to this sleep, it appears that objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses exist inherently. When one awakes from sleep the objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses of a dream do not exist, likewise, when one awakes from the sleep of ignorance inherently existent objects, inherently existent sense powers, and inherently existent consciousnesses do not exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> > *As the three do not exist when one is awake,*
> > *That is similar through waking from the sleep of confusion.* [6.53cd]
>
> Just as for one who is awake due to the ceasing of sleep, the three observed in a dream do not exist; similarly, also for those who eradicated entirely the sleep of ignorance, manifesting the sphere of dharma, since the three do not exist, consciousness without an external object does not exist.

For one who has awakened from the sleep of ignorance there is no conception that objects, sense powers, and consciousness exist inherently. In short, the Prasangika Madhyamika system is that a consciousness without an external object does not exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 247), in relation to the outline "The example of a dream establishes all things as false" says:

> [Chandrakirti's autocommentary] says
>
> > The three that appear as objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses in a dream are not true. Therefore, in order to prove other phenomena that are not [yet] established to be non-truly existent through thoroughly establishing a dream to be non-truly existent, it is proved that even when awake all phenomena are just not inherently existent. This is explained [as follows]:
> >
> > *Just like dreams, likewise, also here when awake,*
> > *Things are false. The mind does not exist,*
> > *Objects do not exist, and the sense powers also do not exist.* [6.52bcd]
>
> *Just as* the objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses of *dreams* are false, *likewise, also here* on the occasion of being *awake things are false*. Therefore, *the mind does not exist* inherently. Similarly, *the objects* of the sense powers, forms and so forth, *do not exist* [inherently] *and the sense powers are also not* inherently produced.

Just as the objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses of a dream are not true, likewise, they are not true when awake in the sense that they are false because they do not exist inherently. "True" means that an object's mode of abiding and mode of appearing are concordant, whereas "false" means that its mode of abiding and mode of appearing are discordant. In the perspective of what are the mode of abiding and the mode of appearing concordant? They are concordant with respect to their main object-possessor, a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. This being the reference point, it can be said that in the perspective of a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise the mode of abiding and the mode of appearing of ultimate truth are concordant. On the other hand, the two modes of a table are not concordant with respect to its principal object-possessor, an eye consciousness. These two modes are not concordant for an eye consciousness because the table appears to exist inherently (its appearing mode) but does not exist inherently (its mode of abiding).

Student: Why does a table appear as truly existent to an eye consciousness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It just appears like that! A table appears to be truly existent to an eye consciousness due to the latencies of ignorance in our continuum. To us, the table appears to be solid and concrete, without changing from day to day and moment to moment.
Student: But the eye consciousness does not ascertain that appearance?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It does not ascertain it. A table appears to be truly existent to an eye consciousness, but an eye consciousness does not ascertain it to be truly existent.
Student: So the identification of the object of negation is made by the mental consciousness alone?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is.
Student: Because it requires thought?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is right. A sense consciousness is not able to recognize it. However, in the Prasangika Madhyamika system it is said that the object of negation appears to a sense consciousness. On the other hand, the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that an object of negation does not appear to a sense consciousness.

Student: Does the eye consciousness see the object as cut off and at a distance?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system, the eye consciousness sees the object as cut off and at a distance. According to the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika system, the object of negation, true existence, does not appear to a sense consciousness, whereas according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system it does appear to it. My own opinion is that, when the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that true existence appears to a sense consciousness, this is the measure of the establishment of true existence. According to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system that measure of establishment of true existence also appears to a sense consciousness. The difference is that the measure of establishment of true existence is an object of negation for the Prasangika Madhyamika system but is not an object of negation for the Svatantrika Madhyamika system. This is what appears to an eye consciousness. In other words, a table appearing to exist from its own side is the object of negation for the Prasangika Madhyamikas, but not for the Svatantrika Madhyamikas. The measure of true existence that is posited by the Svatantrika Madhyamika system does not appear to the eye consciousness according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas. Why? The measure of true existence posited by the Svatantrika Madhyamikas is: that which exists by its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. This does not appear to an eye consciousness according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system. This is my own thought on the matter.

When we conceive something to be truly existent, we conceive it to be independent. Sometimes there is only the appearance of true existence but no conception of it, sometimes there is both the appearance and conception of true existence. For example, in the case of the conception of true existence of a table there is both the appearance of true existence and the conception of true existence. On the other hand, an inferential valid cognizer realizing the table to be non-truly existent has the appearance of true existence of the table but does not conceive it to be truly existent, rather it conceives it to be non-truly existent.

There are different types of thoughts, for example, correct assumption, inferential cognition, and subsequent cognition. Thought that reflects on something is necessarily one of these three. The sense consciousnesses do not think and analyze; they do not conceive. The sense consciousnesses merely have appearance but do not think about and analyze it. For example, no one would say "My eye consciousness thinks such-and-such." When we say "I think" this is definitely a function of a mental consciousness.

Student: In the transcript of 3-7 July 2000, Geshe-la is quoted as saying "Ordinary beings absorbed in meditative equipoise do not have the appearance of true existence, but in subsequent attainment they have the appearance of true existence."
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: When it is said that the appearance of true existence does not appear to ordinary beings absorbed in meditative equipoise we can talk about either (i) the appearance *to the mind of the person* absorbed in meditative equipoise and (ii) the appearance *to the person* absorbed in meditative equipoise. In this case, which one is it? While an ordinary being is absorbed in the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise on the reality of a pot, there is no appearance of pot to his exalted wisdom. However, that ordinary being's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise on the reality of the pot is a conceptual consciousness. Since it is conceptual, it is a mistaken consciousness. With respect to what is it mistaken? It is not mistaken with respect to its object of the mode of apprehension. Is it mistaken with respect to its appearing object? Is it not a valid cognizer with respect to its appearance? In the Prasangika Madhyamika system all valid cognizers are pervaded by being a valid cognizer with respect to their appearance. If a consciousness is a valid cognizer with respect to its appearance, it cannot be mistaken with respect to its appearance. Think about this.

Since the exalted wisdom of an ordinary being is a conceptual consciousness, it has the appearance of the object of negation, true existence. Since there is the appearance of the object of

negation, there is the appearance of true existence. Therefore, it is not correct to say that there is no appearance of true existence to an ordinary being's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise absorbed on reality. Is an exalted wisdom conceptual or non-conceptual?
Student: It is non-conceptual.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It would follow that an ordinary being does not have exalted wisdom. In short, the mind of an ordinary being only has a conceptual realization of reality (however, this conceptual realization is an exalted wisdom).

Thursday morning, 12 October 2000

With respect to the subject under discussion, Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2A2A-1A3 It proves all functional things are false

As in the dream state, even here awake
All things are false. That mind does not exist,
There are no objects, nor do the senses exist. [6.52bcd]

You should understand that those minds do not inherently exist, the objects do not inherently exist, and the senses do not inherently exist. For, as in the dream, so also in this state of wakefulness, functional things are false.

Just as for a waker here, as long
As he is not awake, the three exist,
And when he awakes, the three do not exist.
So waking from the sleep of delusion's the same. [6.53]

It is not to be admitted that external objects do not exist and consciousness exists. For just as in this world, the way the three things exist for one waking from ordinary sleep – as long as he has not awoken from ordinary sleep, for the consciousness of that person there are the three things, but if he wakes up there are not the three things – so similarly, for the person who has awoken from the sleep of delusion, and perceives absolute reality as it is, these two, object and knower, are both non-existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 248) says:

[Chandrakirti's autocommentary] says:

Therefore, sutra says:

Just like observing illusory sentient beings,
Even though they appear, in thusness they are not real.
The illusion-like and dream-like –
The Sugata taught such phenomena.

And:

The migrating beings of existence are like dreams;
One in [cyclic existence] is not born, does not die,
Nor are the name and life of sentient beings found;
These phenomena are like bubbles and plantain trees.

These statements and others will be well explained.

> That no one dies and so forth is to be affixed, like qualifying the object of negation saying "In suchness they are not real." [Chandrakirti says that] it will be well explained that the explanation in these sutras, by means of the example of a dream, that all phenomena are not established in suchness is acceptable to the Madhyamikas, but not to the Chittamatrins.

The explanation that all phenomena are not established in suchness is acceptable to the Madhyamikas but not to the Chittamatrins. In the first verse cited above from sutra, the Buddha says that phenomena are like illusions and dreams, whereas in the second he says that they are like bubbles and plantain trees, as well as like dreams. In short, these examples indicate that there is no inherently existent production. When the sutra says "Nor are the name and life of sentient beings found" it means "Nor are an inherently existent name and an inherently existent life of sentient beings found." All phenomena are essenceless like plantain trees in that when they are searched for they are not found, just as when the layers of a plantain tree are pealed away no essence is found. These examples from sutra are acceptable to the Madhyamikas, but not to the Chittamatrins.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 248) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *Here, just as for the awakened, likewise, as long as*
> > *They have not awakened, until then the three exist for them.*
> > *Just as all three no longer exist when awake,*
> > *It is the same for them through waking from the sleep of ignorance.* [6.53]
>
> Therefore, although there also exists the sleep of unknowing *here* in this world, *for* the few *awakened*, who are free from the ordinary sleep which is different from that, all three exist in the perspective of that observed by those dreaming a dream due to the sleep of ignorance, even though they are not produced by their own nature. *Likewise*, also *as long as* those who have *not awakened*, that is, those who are not free from sleep, *until then for them*, that is, in their perspective, *the three*, objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses, also *exist*. *Just as all three* of a dream *no longer exist when awake*, similarly, for the buddhas *who* have actualized the sphere of phenomena *through extinguishing the sleep of ignorance*, that is, banishing it without exception, all three do not exist. Therefore, there does not exist consciousness that does not have external objects.

The Chittamatrins say that there are no external objects but that consciousness is inherently existent. On the contrary, the Prasangikas say that there exist external objects and that consciousness does not exist inherently.

For a buddha who has completely eradicated ignorance, there is no appearance of true existence. In other words, he does not have mistaken appearance. When ordinary beings sleep they dream of many things. As long as they remain asleep, the objects of a dream, the sense powers of a dream, and the consciousness of a dream exist, but when they awake these three no longer exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 249) says:

> Furthermore, in the perspective of a seer of modes there is no appearance of the three, whereas in the perspective of a seer of varieties, even though object-possessors do not appear [to a buddha] through the force of being polluted by the latencies of his own ignorance, those that appear through the force of the polluted consciousness of other persons are known by a buddha through appearing to him by way of appearing to [a seer of varieties].

A buddha does not have mistaken appearances but, because ordinary beings have mistaken appearances due to their latencies, they appear to him. This is because there is nothing that is not realized by a buddha, therefore, whatever is perceived by the minds of ordinary beings is also

perceived by a buddha. Ordinary beings have the latencies of true existence due to which phenomena appear to them as truly existent. This mistaken appearance is an existent and is therefore seen by the mind of a buddha. Thus, although a buddha himself does not have mistaken appearance, because he realizes all phenomena they do appear to him. Are there unpleasant tastes in the world? Do unpleasant tastes appear to a buddha? If it is an established base does it not necessarily appear to the eye consciousness of a buddha? If someone says all consciousnesses in a buddha's continuum are omniscient mind then it follows that a buddha's eye consciousness also perceives this unpleasant taste, as well as sounds, odors, etc. On the other hand, if someone does not accept that all consciousnesses in a buddha's continuum are omniscient mind then it follows that the sense consciousnesses of a buddha are not omniscient mind. This second position is that of Panchen Sonam Drakpa, whereas the first is that of Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen.

Student: Does the taste or the appearance of the taste to sentient beings appear to a buddha's mind?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The taste itself.

There is a story about Jangkya Rolpe Dorje, a Tibetan Buddhist master of the past, who toward the end of his life became blind and was unable to read texts with his eyes. However, he was able to read them by passing his index finger over the words. Someone asked him: "If your eye consciousness does not see, how can your finger see?" He responded saying that he had this capacity because earlier on in his life he had propounded that if it is a sense consciousness in the continuum of a buddha it is pervaded by being omniscient mind and that its fruitional result was that his body consciousness was now able to see.

Mistaken appearances are known by a buddha because they exist for ordinary beings. In the eighth chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* it says that to a buddha's tongue even a bad taste appears to be good taste. There is a story about Shakyamuni Buddha who, one day when he was begging for alms, was offered the dregs of wine by a family. Although one of his disciples, Nanda, pleaded with the Buddha to not eat it, he ate what had been offered in his alms bowl saying that it was delicious. Then, in order to prove this, he took a tiny piece from between his teeth and gave it to Nanda to try. Nanda discovered that it was completely delicious and asked for more! The reason that the Buddha has the experience of good taste from that which would usually have a bad taste is that he has completed the two collections and purified the two obstructions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 249) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A1B Refuting the example of seeing falling hair

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 92) says:

> If said: Well then, because those with cataracts observe falling hair and so forth that do not exist, consciousness exists even without external [objects]. That is not admissible either.

The Chittamatrins posit that although falling hair does not exist it is seen by some, those with cataracts. It appears that the Chittamatrins say that although falling hair does not exist there is a consciousness that sees falling hair. Taking this as an example, they say that, although there do not exist external objects, consciousness exists inherently. In other words, the Chittamatrins say that there do not exist external objects and that consciousness exists inherently just like, although falling hair does not exist, there is a consciousness to which they appear. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "That is not admissible either."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Why?
>
> *Due to a sense with cataracts, whatever awareness*
> *Sees whatever hairs through the strength of the cataract,*
> *Relative to their awareness, the two are true – yet,*
> *For one seeing objects clearly, both are also false.* [6.54]
>
> They are to be viewed as only a dream. Having relied on sight of one with cataracts, the aspect of falling hairs also exists. Having relied on one without cataracts, neither are produced, because of the difficulty in ascertaining consciousness without an object.

To those with cataracts there is the appearance of falling hair; for them both falling hair and the eye consciousness to which they appear are true, due to which they affirm, "I see falling hair." For them they are true because they do see falling hair in dependence on their eyes having cataracts. On the other hand, "For one seeing objects clearly, both are also false," meaning that for those without cataracts both falling hair and the eye consciousness to which they appear are false. This eye consciousness and the form that appears to it are false for the person who sees clearly because they are conventional truths.

In short, for a person with cataracts the falling hair and the eye consciousness to which they appear are true, whereas for those without cataracts they are both false. For someone without cataracts there is no falling hair and no eye consciousness to which they appear; for this person both the object and the object-possessor are not produced. This is because an object-possessor cannot be posited without an object.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> This must be accepted without doubt, since, if not like that:
>
> *If awareness existed without an object of knowledge,*
> *Also for one without cataracts whose eyes contact that*
> *Hair's location, there would be awareness of falling hairs,*
> *[But] it is not like that. Therefore, that does not exist.* [6.55]
>
> If, for one with cataracts, a consciousness having the aspect of falling hair is produced without falling hair, awareness of falling hair like that would exist also for one without cataracts who directed the eye there to wherever place the one with cataracts saw falling hair. Therefore, the statement "consciousness is produced without an object" is illogical, because of similarity in terms of the object not existing.

If falling hair were true, it should also be true for a person without cataracts. If that were the case, then, when someone without cataracts directs his eye consciousness to the place of falling hair he should see falling hair but he does not. In other words, if falling hair exists inherently, it should be seen by those without cataracts. This is because those with cataracts and those without cataracts are similar in terms of the object not existing.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 249) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS: Because those with cataracts observe falling hair and so forth which do not exist, consciousness is inherently existent even though external [objects] do not exist.

PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: That too is unjustifiable. Why is that?

Any awareness of a sense power that has cataracts
Sees hair through the force of those cataracts.
Relative to that awareness both are true;
For those who clearly see objects both are false. [6.54]

When *any awareness* of an eye *sense power that has cataracts sees* falling *hair through the force of those cataracts*, *relative to* the sight of *the awareness of that* person *both* the eye consciousness and the aspect of falling hairs, that is, the object that appears as falling hair, exist, whereas relative *to those who clearly see objects*, that is, those who see with eyes that lack cataracts, *both* the appearance of falling hair and the consciousness to which they appear *are false*, that is, they are not produced. This is because it is difficult to ascertain consciousness exists without even an object that is a mere appearance. This must be unquestionably, definitely asserted in this way.

[For those without cataracts] the eye consciousness of a person with cataracts and the falling hair that appear to it are both false.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 249-50) says:

If there exists awareness without an object of knowledge,
Also for those without cataracts who direct their eyes
To the location of that hair there would be an awareness of falling hair.
Therefore, this not being the case, it does not exist. [6.55]

Otherwise, that is, *if* for those with cataracts *there exists* the production of an inherently existent *awareness* that has the aspect of falling hair *without* falling hair, *the object of knowledge*, *also for those without cataracts who direct their eyes to*, that is, who focus their eyes on, *the location* where falling *hair* is seen by those with cataracts, *there would be* the production of *an awareness* that sees *falling hair*, like there is for those with cataracts, because they are similar in terms of the object not existing.

If it is produced from an inherently existent other, it implies that it is produced from everything that is other. Similarly, if an inherently existent consciousness is produced, given that [those with cataracts and those without cataracts] are the same in terms of the object – falling hair – not existing, it would not be justifiable for the sight of [falling hair] to be produced in those with cataracts but for the sight of [falling hair] to not be produced in those without cataracts. This is because the consciousness would become unrelated since [an awareness of falling hair] would be able to come to the fore without depending on cataracts. *Therefore*, *it not being the case* that an awareness that has the appearance of falling hair is produced for those without cataracts, an inherently existent consciousness without external [objects] *does not exist*.

With respect to this section Gyelwa Gendun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson*,* says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2A2A-1B Refuting the example of seeing falling hair

If you say, "awareness of the appearance of hair falling down is an example of consciousness inherently existing without external object," then:

The mind affected by distorted sight,
And the hair which it sees, due to that fault,
Are, in relation to that mind, both true.
But for one who sees objects clearly, both are false. [6.54]

It follows it is not, for the awareness with distorted vision which [sees], and the falling hair from the effect of the distortion which [is seen] – with respect to the awareness of that seer, the eye

consciousness and the falling hair are true; while with respect to one who sees objects clearly, both those are false.

If the awareness existed without what is known,
Then, when his eye contacted the place of that hair,
Even one lacking distortion would have that awareness
Of hair, which is not so, therefore it does not exist. [6.55]

It follows that without the falling hair existing, that awareness of the appearance of hair falling down does not exist inherently. For if, without the object of knowledge, the falling hair, existing, the awareness of the appearance of hair falling existed inherently; then in one who did not have distorted sight whose eye met the object of that perceiver of falling hair, awareness of the appearance of hair falling would also arise; which is not the case.

In brief, the Chittamatrins posit the example of falling hair as proof that external objects do not exist and that consciousness exists inherently. The Prasangikas say that this is not admissible.

Thursday afternoon, 12 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 250) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A2 Refuting the meaning that a consciousness that is empty of objects is produced from the potential of latencies

- A Refuting that a consciousness to which an object appears is produced and not produced from the ripening and non-ripening of latencies
- B Once again refuting the way of stating the existence of consciousness without external objects
- C Indicating that the refutation of the Chittamatra system is without harm from the scriptures

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A2A Refuting that a consciousness to which an object appears is produced and not produced from the ripening and non-ripening of latencies

1. Stating the other system
2. Refuting that system

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A2A-1 Stating the other system

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

It is mentioned: Here, if the very existence of an object is the cause of generating consciousness, it would be like that. If asked: Why? The ripening and non-ripening of previously deposited imprints of consciousness are the causes of generating and not generating consciousness. Therefore, whoever has matured imprints that were deposited by another consciousness bearing the aspect of hair, in only he will a consciousness arise that bears the aspect of that. It will not [arise] in others.

[The root text] explains that, "This is also unsuitable":

Since those who see, lack the ripened potential
Of awareness, therefore, for them awareness does not arise.
Not due to absence of an existent thing – a knowable object. [6.56abc]

If the existence of the appearance of falling hair were the cause of producing a consciousness having the appearance of falling hair, then it would follow that falling hair should also appear to someone without cataracts. Why? Chandrakirti says: "The ripening and non-ripening of previously deposited imprints of consciousness are the causes of generating and not generating consciousness." If a

previously deposited latency ripens then consciousness will be produced, whereas if one does not ripen consciousness will not be produced. Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, whoever has matured imprints that were deposited by another consciousness bearing the aspect of hair, in only he will a consciousness arise that bears the aspect of that." The Chittamatrins say that only in someone who has the latency of the aspect of falling hair will a consciousness having that aspect arise. This is because a consciousness is produced only in dependence on the ripening of a latency. For this reason a consciousness having the aspect of falling hair does not arise in everyone. Or else it can be said that to those who are free from falling hair there is no appearance of such. Regarding this Chandrakirti says: "It will not [arise] in others."

In those who do not have cataracts there is no production of an awareness having the appearance of falling hair. Those having the appearance of falling hair do not have a consciousness free of falling hair. In this context, 'knowable object' (object of knowledge) refers to falling hair. For those who are free from falling hair there is no production of a consciousness having the appearance of falling hair. This is what the Chittamatrins assert, but it will be refuted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 250) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS:
>
> > *"Therefore, for those who see, there is no ripening of potentials for an awareness.*
> > *Because of that, for them there is no awareness;*
> > *It is not due to the absence of a thing existing as an object of knowledge."* [6.56abc]
>
> If the very existence of an object such as falling hair, which appears to be falling hair, were the cause for the production of consciousness there would be the appearance of falling hair also to those without cataracts, but there is not. Why is that? [Because] the ripening and non-ripening of previously deposited latencies that produce consciousness are the cause for the production and non-production of consciousness. Therefore, a consciousness having the aspect of falling hair arises only for a person who has the ripening of latencies deposited by another previous consciousness having the aspect of hair. *Therefore*, *for those* without cataracts, those *who see* objects, *there is no ripening of potentials*, that is, latencies, *for an awareness* to which falling hair appears. *Because of that, for those* without cataracts an *awareness* that sees falling hair *is not* produced; *it is not* that that awareness is not produced *due to the absence of a thing that exists as* falling hair, that is, as *an object of knowledge*.

The Chittamatrins say that a consciousness having the appearance of falling hair is produced only when latencies for the appearance of falling hair ripen. Therefore, if latencies for the appearance of falling hair do not ripen there is no such production of consciousness. Is the consciousness to which there is the appearance of falling hair a mistaken consciousness? It is a mistaken consciousness. Is it conceptual or non-conceptual? Does falling hair appear to the eye consciousness alone or also to a conceptual consciousness?

Student: It would seem like something, perhaps a meaning generality, appears to a conceptual consciousness, but the falling hair does not appear to it.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: How does a meaning generality appear to a conceptual consciousness?

Student: There is the appearance of falling hair to eye consciousness and the appearance of a meaning generality of falling hair to conceptual consciousness.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Are you saying that actual falling hair appears to an eye consciousness and then, in dependence on that, there is a conception thinking, "I see falling hair"?

Student 2: I would agree with that.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is the sense consciousness that has the appearance of falling hair a mistaken consciousness? Is it not a wrong consciousness?

Student: It is not a wrong consciousness, it is only mistaken.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why is it not wrong?
Student: Because it perceives its appearing object.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Kor sum! It follows that if it is a sense consciousness it is pervaded by not being a wrong consciousness.
Student: I was mistaken.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Therefore, it is a wrong consciousness. Then, an eye consciousness having the appearance of falling hair is not mistaken with respect to its appearance but is mistaken with respect to its appearing object? Is there a difference between the object of the mode of apprehension and the appearing object of an eye consciousness having the appearance of falling hair?
Student: There is a difference.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What is the difference? In other words, what is the object of the mode of apprehension of an eye consciousness having the appearance of falling hair? What is the appearing object of an eye consciousness having the appearance of falling hair?
Student: For the eye consciousness there is no difference, but for the mental consciousness there is a difference.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Think about it. These objects are defined in *Awarenesses and Knowers*. What do you think about it?
Student: An eye consciousness having the appearance of falling hair does not have an object of engagement and, therefore, does not have object of the mode of apprehension, but it does have an appearing object.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What is the appearing object?
Student: The appearance of falling hair.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The object of the mode of apprehension should be falling hair, but the falling hair does not exist. What is the definition of a wrong consciousness?
Student: The Svatantrika Madhyamika definition of a wrong consciousness is: a knower that engages its object perversely.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 236-8) says:

> The [Prasangika Madhyamika] definition of a wrong consciousness is: an awareness where there exists a valid cognizer in contradiction with its mode of apprehension.

This concludes the outline stating the Chittamatra system. Now this will be refuted.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 251) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A2A-2 Refuting that system

- A Refuting inherently existent potentials for present [entities]
- B Refuting inherently existent potentials of future [entities]
- C Refuting inherently existent potentials for past [entities]

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A2A-2A Refuting inherently existent potentials for present [entities]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Since that potential does not exist, this is not proved.* [6.56d]
>
> "Absence of an existent thing – a knowable object" means "a knowable object does not exist." If 'potential' alone existed, then, in ripening and not ripening that, a consciousness would arise and not arise. Therefore, this is not proved.

"Since that potential does not exist" means "since an inherently existent potential does not exist." Since there is no potential that exists inherently, it cannot be proven that a result arises from it. Chandrakirti's *Supplement* (v. 6.56c) says: "absence of an existent thing – a knowable object." It cannot be proven that there is an inherently existent potential for a present [entity] because the present [entity] itself cannot be proven to exist inherently.

Similarly, "if 'potential' alone existed" means "If 'potential' alone existed inherently." Chandrakirti says: "then, in ripening and not ripening that, a consciousness would arise and not arise. Therefore, this is not proved." The existence of a potential that is inherently existent cannot be proved.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Further, if asked: Why does a potential not exist? It is explained:
>
> *Potential for the produced is impossible.*
> *Nor does an unproduced entity have a potential.* [6.57ab]
>
> Here, if this potential were fully investigated, it would be supposed to have a relationship with present consciousness or to have a relationship with past or future consciousness.

Here the question is: "Why does a potential not exist inherently?" Chandrakirti says: "Potential for the produced is impossible." This means a potential for that which is inherently produced is impossible. Chandrakirti says: "Nor does an unproduced entity have a potential." This means that an entity that is not produced does not have a potential that produces it. When such a potential is investigated is it found to be related to a present consciousness, a past consciousness, or a future consciousness?

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, a potential is not possible for a consciousness produced at present, [for], when there is the sixth [case, i.e., the genitive case] – "of a potential" – at that time, it is unsuitable to say that consciousness – being the entity of the effect – exists also as the very cause. If it did, the effect would have no cause and even if a sprout was born, the seed would not be destroyed. Therefore, potential for the consciousness produced [at present] is impossible.

According to the Chittamatrins there is an inherently existent potential for a consciousness that is produced in the present, whereas Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is not possible, given that an inherently existent potential in the present is not possible.

An example of the genitive, or connective, case is "A potential of a consciousness." Here in the context of the present, there is no inherently existent potential that produces a consciousness. If the Chittamatrins say that there exists such a potential this would be incorrect.

Friday morning, 13 October 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When there is the fifth [case, i.e., the ablative case] – "from a potential" – at that time, it is unsuitable for a produced consciousness to arise from a potential "because [the effect] exists," as was already explained before. Thus, a potential for that produced in the present is impossible.

[Inherently existent potentials for the present] are not justifiable in the context of either applying the connective, or genitive, or originative, or ablative, case. The eight cases are:
1. nominative
2. objective
3. agentive
4. purposive/beneficial
5. originative or ablative
6. genitive or connective
7. locative
8. vocative

In both Sanskrit and Tibetan grammar there are either seven or eight cases. Each of the seven cases, those excluding the vocative, are each further divided into three: the singular, dual, and plural, which are indicated by specific particles that are added to the noun. The originative case shows the origin of something, for example, crops from a field, oil from olives, and milk from a cow. Here the Prasangika Madhyamikas' argument is that in the context of the originative case inherently existent potentials in the present are not possible. The statement "potential for that produced in the present is impossible" means "an inherently existent potential for that produced in the present is impossible."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 251) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *Since potentials do not exist, they are not established.* [6.56d]
>
> If "potentials" exist inherently, then, even if it were justifiable for consciousness to arise and not arise from the ripening and non-ripening of those potentials, *since* established by way of their own entity *potentials do not exist they are not established*.

If potentials existed inherently then stating that from their ripening or non-ripening arises or does not arise a consciousness would be justifiable, but since such potentials do not exist this is not justifiable. A result does not arise from an inherently existent potential.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 251) says:

> Why are they not established?
>
> *A potential for that produced is impossible.*
> *There also does not exist a potential for an unproduced entity.* [6.57ab]
>
> When potentials are conceived, they are counted as either having a relationship with a present consciousness or a relationship with a past consciousness or a future consciousness. An established by way of its own entity *potential for that produced* in the time being, that is, for a present [phenomenon], *is impossible*. *There also does not exist a potential for an unproduced*, that is, a future, *entity*.

When potentials are investigated they should be found to have a relationship with a present consciousness, a relationship with a past consciousness, or a relationship with a future consciousness. Inherently existent potentials having a relationship with a present consciousness is impossible. Likewise, it is also established that there are no inherently existent potentials for past [consciousnesses] or inherently existent potentials for future [consciousnesses].

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 251) says:

> If a potential for a present consciousness is asserted, both the consciousness and the potential would exist at the same time. When, with respect to the two, the potential and that having the potential, it is stated "Consciousness of a potential" in the sixth case, [the connective case,] then those two are not suitable to be different objects. Therefore, the consciousness of a potential is not suitable to exist as the potential itself. If it did exist [as the potential itself], a result would have a non-existent cause which is other than itself and even when a sprout is produced the seed would not be destroyed.
> [On the other hand,] when, with respect to the two, the potential and that having the potential, it is stated "Consciousness from a potential" in the fifth case, [the originative case,] then it is not suitable for the consciousness produced to arise from a simultaneous potential because [this would mean that] the result would also exist at the time of the cause. This being the case, there does not exist a potential which is a cause of a consciousness in the present.

In the context of the sixth case, "Consciousness of a potential," [the three times would mean] the past consciousness of a potential, the present consciousness of a potential, and the future consciousness of a potential. Since the potential and consciousness would exist simultaneously, there could not be a relationship of cause and result between them.

In the context of the fifth case, the originative case, it would mean that from a potential arises a consciousness. This is not justifiable because the consciousness would already exist at the time of potential and it is not possible for a consciousness to arise from a potential that exists at the same time as itself. If that were the case it would follow that a result already exists at the time of its cause. Therefore, it is not correct to posit a potential of a consciousness as a cause for a present consciousness. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "This being the case, there does not exist a potential which is a cause of a consciousness in the present."

What is a potential? Is it not a latency? A potential is a latency. A latency is of two types: (i) a latency that is able to produce an affliction and (ii) a latency that is not able to produce an affliction. If it is a latency it is not pervaded by being a seed, whereas if it is a seed it is pervaded by being a latency because it will give rise to an affliction. This discussion of latencies is peculiar to the Chittamatrins in that they assert that all phenomena arise from the activation of latencies deposited on the mind-basis-of-all. Therefore, according to them everything arises from the activation of latencies. For this reasons, the subject of latencies is very important for the Chittamatrins. When a latency is defined it is said to be a potential.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it has the ability (potential) to perform a function is it pervaded by being a potential? For example, is a table a potential?
Student: No, a table is not a potential.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Potential also exists for the Prasangika Madhyamika system, but, it is not inherently existent. In the Prasangika Madhyamika system if it is a compounded phenomenon is it pervaded by being a potential? If it were so, the table would be a potential. The point is that a potential does not have to be latency. You as a person are a potential, but you are not a latency.
Student: If it is a potential does it not have to be a non-associated compositional factor?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why?
Student: Because it is neither mind nor matter.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it is a potential is it pervaded by being a compounded phenomenon that is not mind or matter? Does a table have a potential?
Student: It does.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: A table is that which has the ability (potential) to perform a function. Is the table a potential? It would seem that consciousness is pervaded by not being a potential. In both the Chittamatra and Prasangika systems a potential is posited as a latency. However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that there is no need to posit a basis for the infusion of latencies because a

disintegrated action itself is a functioning thing that brings about a result. Other schools say that a disintegrated action is permanent, it is not a functioning thing.
Student: Is a disintegrated action called a latency?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: No, it is not.
Student: In the Prasangika Madhyamika system "the latencies of actions" are discussed. If it is not a disintegrated action, what is the difference?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that there are latencies of actions, but these latencies are not disintegrated actions.
Student: Do they not say that the disintegratedness of an action is deposited on the mere I?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: No, they do not say that. However, when they are forced to posit something upon which the latencies are deposited, they would say that the latencies of actions are deposited on the mere I. But, they say that there is no need to posit a basis for the infusion of the latencies of actions because a disintegrated action itself is a functioning thing. Because it is a functioning thing it is able to bring about a result. This is one of the eight uncommon or unique tenets of the Prasangika Madhyamika system.

Student: Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 214) says:

> Here, when establishment by way of its own character is not negated conventionally, one will not realize the very subtle selflessness, whereby it also becomes difficult to not generate the very subtle views of permanence and annihilation in one's continuum. Therefore, the abandonment of all views of permanence and annihilation without exception is the excellent quality of refuting the object of negation conventionally. If it is refuted to be conventionally existent, not only will one not fall into the views of permanence and annihilation relative to the ultimate, one will [also] not be polluted by the stains of the views of permanence and annihilation relative to the conventional. Hence, [refuting inherent production] has the excellent quality of easily abandoning the views of permanence and annihilation.

Does this mean that when inherent existence is refuted conventionally, the object of negation is more subtle than when inherent existence is refuted ultimately?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In general, there is conventional truth and mere conventionality. Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:

> *Conventional truth is the means and*
> *Ultimate truth arises from means.* [6.80ab]

However, this can be inverted – that is, "conventional truth arises from the means and ultimate truth is the means" – because in order to realize subtle conventional truth it is necessary to first realize ultimate truth. However, in general, in order to realize ultimate truth it is necessary to first realize conventional truth. For example, in order to realize the selflessness of persons it is necessary to first realize the person, which is a conventional truth. In this way, the realization of the person becomes the means for realizing the selflessness of persons.

When one realizes the emptiness of true existence of a pot and thereby negates its true existence, what is left? Is there something left or is there nothing left? It is not that nothing is left because having negated the object of negation, true existence, of a table there still remains a conventional table that is able to perform the function of a table. In the place of the negation of true existence, there is a subtle conventional truth; this is what is difficult to realize.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Here, when establishment by way of its own character is not negated conventionally, one will not realize the very subtle selflessness." Establishment by way of its own character does not exist either conventionally or ultimately. Although it does not exist ultimately, someone may think that it exists conventionally, whereby it becomes difficult for that person to realize the very subtle selflessness. If one does not realize that establishment by way of its own character does not exist conventionally and ultimately, then it will be difficult to realize the very subtle selflessness.

However, the negation of establishment by way of its own character on any basis is itself very subtle selflessness. In other words, if one is unable to negate a table's establishment by way of its own character, one will not be able to realize the subtle selflessness of the table. If one does not generate the realization of very subtle selflessness, it will be difficult to not generate a view of the two extremes of permanence and annihilation.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, the abandonment of all views of permanence and annihilation without exception is the excellent quality of refuting the object of negation conventionally."

Therefore, when it is asked whether there are subtle and coarse conventionalities, the answer is that there is. Chandrakirti says:

> *Conventional truth is the means and*
> *Ultimate truth arises from means.*
> *Those who do not know the distinction of the two*
> *Have entered a bad path due to wrong conceptions.* [6.80]

In another text, perhaps Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom*, it says the opposite – conventional truth arises from the means and ultimate truth is the means. *Fundamental Wisdom* [24.10] (see Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, page 401) says:

> *Without relying on conventionalities*
> *The ultimate cannot be taught.*
> *Without realizing the ultimate*
> *Nirvana is not attained.*

Student: Is a potential disintegratedness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Disintegratedness is a potential.

Student: Why according to the teaching on the twelve links is death the cause of ignorance?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The twelfth link, death, is one of the six results, whereas ignorance is one of the six causes. More specifically, ignorance is one of the three projecting causes, and death is one of the three actualized results. In short, the death and ignorance included in the twelve links have this relationship of cause and result.

Student: It was said that the life force stops at the time of death and then begins at the next life. Is it not that an intermediate state being has a life force?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: When the life force of this life ceases, at that time there is death. When that being is reborn in the intermediate state, it has the life force of an intermediate state being. In this way, the life force of an intermediate state being is newly acquired. When the intermediate state being is then reborn, the life force of the intermediate state ceases. Therefore, it is not that there is no life force in the intermediate state. Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* says that an intermediate state being has all sense powers complete and is able to travel without obstruction; this being is a smell-eater. Intermediate state beings are smell-eaters in the sense that they are nourished by means of odors. For this reason in some countries, such as Tibet, there are rituals performed during the 49 days after a person's death that involve the burning of various types of food in order to provided food for the dead.

END

Monday afternoon, 16 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 251) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A2A-2B Refuting inherently existent potentials of future [entities]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Nor does a consciousness with an unproduced nature have a potential, since:
>
> *Without a distinction, there is no bearer of the distinction.*
> *That would follow as existing even for the son of a barren woman.* [6.57cd]
>
> Without a distinction, that which is to be distinguished just does not exist.

Inherently existent potentials of future entities just do not exist. A consciousness which is not produced does not have a potential because an unproduced consciousness has not come into existence. "Without a distinction, there is no bearer of the distinction" means that if there is no basis of qualification (bearer of the distinction), there is no qualification (distinction). For example, if Sherab does not exist here, Sherab's hand does not exist here. If there were to exist a qualification without a basis of qualification, it would follow that even the son of a barren woman exists.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: In what way?
>
> Saying, "potential of consciousness" – consciousness is the distinction of potential [and] potential is the basis of distinction.

In the case of "potential of consciousness," the consciousness is the qualification (distinction), and the potential of the consciousness is the basis of qualification (basis of distinction).

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That which is unproduced is unable to be indicated by the entity of negation or affirmation saying "consciousness" or "not consciousness." When it is like that, then saying "This is its potential" – by what will the potential be distinguished? When thus, the distinction does not exist, then saying "This arises from it," not mentioned as the distinction, it will not indicate even a little.
>
> Further, if a potential is asserted for the unproduced, it is necessary to be asserted also for the son of a barren woman. Therefore, the unproduced does not have a potential.

It is not appropriate to say "This is the potential of consciousness" and "From such a potential there arises consciousness" because, being a future consciousness, it has yet to be produced. For example, if someone points to Joan and says that she is a mother it is because she has given birth to a child. On the other hand, if she has not given birth to a child it would not be correct to call her a mother. Likewise, a potential of consciousness is called "a potential of consciousness" on the basis of having given rise to a consciousness. Therefore, because a future consciousness has not yet been produced, it is not correct to say "a potential of consciousness."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Suppose it is thought: Having in mind some consciousness that will be produced from a potential, a consciousness that will arise, one says "This is the potential of this consciousness" and "This [consciousness] will arise from this [potential]."

If someone, thinking of a consciousness that will be produced, says "This is the potential of this consciousness" and "This [consciousness] will arise from this [potential]," that too would be incorrect.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The properties of distinction and basis of distinction are established like that, for, just as "Cook the boiled rice," "Weave the piece of cloth on this warp" are mentioned in the world, the *Treatise* [*Abhidharmakosha*, v. 3.17] also explains:
>
> > Three enter into the womb, the chakravartin and the two self-arisen.

In the world, thinking of rice that has yet to be boiled, people say "Cook the boiled rice." Likewise, thinking of the cloth that has yet to be made, on the basis of a ball of yarn they say "Weave this bolt of cloth." The *Treasury of Knowledge* also says: "Three enter into the womb, the chakravartin and the two self-arisen." This means that when someone [who will become a chakravartin] is conceived in a womb it is said "A chakravartin has entered the womb," and when someone [who will become one of] the two self-arisen, a solitary realizer or a buddha, is conceived it is said that a solitary realizer or a buddha has entered the womb. A chakravartin knows that he has been conceived, but does not know that he is abiding in the womb and that he will be born. A solitary realizer knows that he has been conceived and knows that he is abiding in the womb, but does not know that he will be born. A buddha knows that he has been conceived, knows that he is abiding in the womb, and knows that he will be born.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to express that too as just without essence, [the root text] explains:
>
> *If asserted to describe it by that to arise,*
> *Without potential, no future arisal of it exists.* [6.58ab]
>
> If there will be something at some time, that will arise; that which is always certain not to arise, the son of a barren woman etc. and space etc., will not. Therefore, here, if [an inherently existent] potential were to exist, the future arisal of consciousness would become a fact. But when the potential is just non-existent since the future consciousness just does not exist, then, like the son of a barren woman etc., without potential, its future arisal itself will not exist. This [reasoning] explains also rice and so forth.

In dependence on a consciousness that is not yet produced, one should not say "This is the potential of that consciousness," "The potential of a future consciousness," or "The potential of an unproduced consciousness." Because the son of a barren woman does not exist, there does not exist a potential that will give rise to him. Similarly, because a future consciousness does not exist, the potential that will give rise to it also does not exist.

"This [reasoning] explains also rice and so forth" refers to the statements "Cook the boiled rice" and, on the basis of a ball of yarn, "Weave the bolt of cloth," which are not correct because the boiled rice and the bolt of cloth are yet to be produced.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 251) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *Without a qualification, that which is qualified does not exist.*
> *It follows that it exists even for the son of a barren woman.* [6.57cd]
>
> If there existed a potential for an unproduced consciousness, when 'the potential of a consciousness' is joined to it, the potential would be the basis of qualification and the consciousness would the phenomenon qualified. A future unproduced consciousness cannot be indicated to be an affirmative entity saying "consciousness," and it cannot be indicated to be an inherently existent negative entity saying "non-consciousness."

A non-existent consciousness cannot be indicated to be an inherently existent negative entity saying "non-consciousness." Can a future consciousness (literally, a consciousness that has not yet come) be indicated to be a negative? What is posited as a present consciousness? What is posited as a future consciousness? What is posited as a past consciousness?
Student: A past consciousness is a moment of consciousness that has ceased, a future consciousness is a moment of consciousness that has yet to be produced, and a present consciousness is a moment of consciousness that is abiding now.

Student: Is there a difference between future pot and future of the pot?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does a future pot exist?
Student: If it is an established base it is necessarily a present phenomenon.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: This is the assertion of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas.
Student: Past, present, and future are posited on the basis of a particular phenomenon.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Do you not agree with the usual definitions of past, present, and future?

- Past is that which has been produced and has ceased.
- Present is that which has been produced and has not yet ceased.
- Future is that which has the cause for its generation but has not yet been produced.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 252) says:

> Since a future consciousness does not exist as a consciousness in the present, in terms of stating "This potential is the potential of that consciousness" by what is the potential qualified? It is not [qualified]. If that is the case, *without the qualification* 'consciousness,' the potential *that is qualified* by it *does not exist*. If that is not the case, *it would follow that* a potential *exists even for the son of a barren woman*.
> CHITTAMATRINS:
>
> *"We wish to say that, due to what will arise."* [6.58a]
>
> Through thinking deeply that any consciousness whatsoever is produced from a potential, such statements as "This is the potential of this consciousness and this consciousness arises from that potential," are the things that are the qualification and the basis of qualification just as in the world it is said "Cook the boiled rice" and, in regard to yarn, "Weave this bolt of cloth," through thinking about the boiled rice and the woolen cloth that will arise. The *Treasury of Knowledge* (v. 3.17ab) also says:
>
> Three enter a womb:
> Universal monarchs and the two self arisen.
>
> Those who will become universal monarchs (chakravartins) enter a womb. Just as it is explained that they enter a womb, likewise, through thinking about a consciousness *that will arise*, we *wish to say* "the potential of a consciousness."

This is the assertion of the lower school.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 252-3) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *There does not exist the arisal of that without a potential.* [6.58b]
>
> Furthermore, that is without essence. If [something] will become existent at some time, that result would arise now. That which is always definite to not arise at any time, the son of a barren woman and so forth and uncompounded space and so forth, do not arise ever, now or later. Therefore, even assuming that consciousnesses would arise if inherently existent potentials were to exist, since inherently existent present and future consciousnesses do not exist at any time the potentials that produce them [also] do not exist at all. At that time, just as in the case of the son of a barren woman and so forth, *there does not exist the arisal of that* – an inherently existent consciousness – *without* a *potential* that produces an inherently existent consciousnesses.

This is a debate between the Prasangika Madhyamika school and the lower school, the Chittamatra. The lower school says that an inherently existent potential of a consciousness produces an inherently existent consciousness. Our own system says that since there are no inherently existent future or present consciousnesses, there are no inherently existent potentials. It is like the case of a barren woman who does not have the potential to produce a son and therefore a son cannot be born from her. It can be debated: Is it certain that a barren woman does not have a son? Even if she has not had a son in this life could she not have had a son in a previous life? Is it not correct to meditate on a barren woman as having been our mother countless times and having been kind to us? When one meditates on recognizing all sentient beings as having been one's mother, one should include all sentient beings. Someone could respond: "If she is a barren woman now there is no pervasion that she was always a barren woman."

Tuesday morning, 17 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 253) says:

> On the many occasions of their refuting an established by way of its own character production of a sprout, the main point of the Madhyamikas in flinging the absurd consequence "If a sprout is produced even though it does not exist at the time of the seed, it follows that also the horns of a rabbit and so forth will be produced" is for the reason that an established by way of its own character sprout becomes undifferentiable from a non-established base because if it does not exist on one occasion it necessarily does not exist at any time. It is not at all the refutation "In general, although a sprout does not exist at the time of the seed, if it is produced, it follows that the horns of a rabbit are also produced." This reasoning is also an explanation of the boiled rice and so forth because if inherently existent production were the case also the boiled rice and so forth that will arise must not exist at all.

The Madhyamikas fling the absurd consequence "If a sprout is produced even though it does not exist at the time of the seed, it follows that also the horns of a rabbit and so forth will be produced." This absurd consequence is flung in order to prove that there does not exist a sprout that is established by way of its own character; in fact, a sprout does not exist at the time of the seed. The Madhyamikas say that if there is one occasion when there exists a sprout that is established by way of its own character, then it should exist all the time. But, since there is no such occasion, there is no established by way of its own character sprout. Likewise, inherently existent rice cannot be boiled, in that it does not exist at all, whereas, rice, in general, can be boiled.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore, consciousness and potential indeed rely on transformation through mutual reliance. Nevertheless, the dependent entity does not exist in fact.

The consciousness in this case is a consciousness that will arise. This consciousness will exist and is posited in dependence on a potential of consciousness the exists now. Therefore, a consciousness arises from a potential. This way of positing them in dependence on each other is not suitable, in the sense that their being posited as *inherently* depending on each other is not suitable. Chandrakirti says: "Nevertheless, the dependent entity does not exist in fact." This means that a future consciousness, a dependent entity, does not exist now because it has yet to arise. This is the similar to the example given in the scriptures of a man who thinks to build himself a particular house to which he will bring his future bride, and in which his son will be born and be given the name Chandrakirti. However, none of this actually existed at the time in that this man did not yet have a house, a wife, a son, and so forth. This story indicates that it is meaningless to talk about something that does not yet exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is like this:
>
> *Existence dependent on mutual presence,*
> *Noble ones say, "Does not exist at all."* [6.58cd]
>
> It is said that when consciousness exists there is its potential and from it there is the arisal of consciousness. Thus, they are dependent on mutual presence.

Holy beings say that there does not exist inherently existent mutual dependence.

With respect to this, Gendun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

For if you say, "I wish to call it 'the potential of the consciousness', thinking of the consciousness that will come," then the being-to-come of that consciousness does not inherently exist, for the potential which generates the consciousness does not inherently exist; and if you say, "The consciousness and the potential are posited by regard to one another," then, of course, it follows that the consciousness and the potential do not exist inherently, because of that.

> *Whatever exists in mutual dependence,*
> *The exalted ones have taught, does not exist.* [6.58cd]

This pervades, because the exalted ones have taught that what exists dependent on mutual support does not exist inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If it is said: It is like that indeed.
>
> [Noble ones] will say, "Consciousness does not inherently exist."

There is no consciousness that is inherently existent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> For example, as when long exists there will be short; when short exists there will be long; when the other side exists there will be this side; and when this side exists there will be the other side – there is no self-nature established in those that are imputed. If it is like that, it is in exact agreement with our proposition.

Long and short are posited in dependence on one another, so too are the other side and this side. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that since they are posited in mutual dependence they are not inherently existent. On the other hand, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that if short and long do not exist inherently they would not exist at all, like the horns of a rabbit. The Svatantrikas say that consciousness and its potential are established in mutual dependence and that if mutual dependence did not exist inherently, that is, if short did not exist inherently, then long could not be posited in dependence on it because short would not exist at all. The Chittamatrins posit this similarly in that they say that a consciousness is ultimately or truly existent and that if this were not the case consciousness would be non-existent, like the horns of a rabbit. The Prasangika Madhyamikas refute these assertions.

Chandrakirti says: "If it is like that, it is in exact agreement with our proposition." Chandrakirti says to the Chittamatrins that, if they assert [mutual dependence in this way], they would be in agreement with the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As explained in the *Four Hundred* [*Verses*, 9.8]:
>
> > Causeness does not exist in a cause without an effect.
> > Therefore, all effects will follow as just causes.

A result depends on a cause because without a cause there will be no result. Similarly, a cause is dependent on a result since a cause cannot be posited without a result. Therefore, cause and result are established to be mutually dependent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is also taught in the *Treatise* [o*n the Middle Way*, 10.10]:
>
> > Whatever thing is established [through] reliance,
> > If that which is the object of reliance is established
> > Through relying also on that itself,
> > [Then] through relying on what is something established?
>
> The meaning of this [verse] is this. Whatever thing, such as consciousness and so forth, is established through relying on the distinction of a potential, if that which is the object of reliance – the functioning thing, distinction of potential – is established through relying also on that itself in order to prove an essential nature by consciousness; now, through relying on which of the two objects to be established must it be said that something is established?

(This verse (v. 10.10) as translated in *Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way* reads:

If that on which an entity depends
Is established on the basis
Of the entity depending on it,
What is established in dependence on what?]

Consciousness and the potential of consciousness are posited in mutual dependence. If there exists that which is relied on (the object of reliance) there exists that which relies on it.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Furthermore, it is taught [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 10.11]:

Whatever is established through relying on a functioning thing,
If that does not exist, how does it rely?
If said that an existent relies,
That is illogical to rely on.

(This verse (v. 10.11) as translated in *Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way* reads:

What entity is established through dependence?
If it is not established, then how could it depend?
However, if it is established merely through dependence,
That dependence makes no sense.]

In short, there is no inherently existent dependence.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Also, the meaning of this [verse] is this. If consciousness is established through reliance on a potential, is that which relies on a potential existent or not existent? If it is not existent, like the horns of an ass, it will not rely on a potential. Yet, if an existent relies on [a potential], because of existing, it is unsuitable to rely.

Thus, "existence that depends on mutual function does not exist" was taught by those possessing exalted wisdom. Therefore, like that, potential does not exist also in the future.

In short, if something is established through mutual dependence or reliance it necessarily is not inherently existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 253) says:

Furthermore, in regard to positing the potential of that [consciousness] in dependence on there existing a consciousness that will arise, if a consciousness is posited in dependence on a potential saying "Consciousness arises from a potential" there would be *mutually dependent existence*.
CHITTAMATRINS: That is acceptable.
PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:

Mutually dependent existence,
The holy say, "Does not exist." [6.58cd]

> In that case, *the holy* masters of wisdom *say*, "Consciousness *does not exist* inherently." When the commentary says that [things] that exist dependently, such as long and short and over there and over here, are imputedly existent but not inherently existent, it should be understood that it does not refute existence in general but refutes inherent existence in particular. When stating such, one becomes a follower of our propositions. This being the case, potentials for future consciousnesses also do not exist.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if things exist in mutual dependence then they cannot exist inherently. In fact, they say that things lack inherent existence because they are dependent-arisings. Dependent arising means existing in mutual dependence. In the term 'dependent-relation' the word 'dependent' negates the extreme of permanence, whereas 'relation' negates the extreme of annihilation. Having applied many different types of reasonings, the conclusion that is reached is that it does not exist truly because it is a dependent-arising. Thus, the reasoning of dependent-relation is known as the king of reasonings, just as in the case of a monarchy it is the king who makes the final decision.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 253) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A2A-2C Refuting inherently existent potentials for past [entities]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, in order to show that "a potential does not exist also for the past," it is explained:
>
> *If it transformed from the ripening of a potential of the ceased,*
> *One would arise from another's potential.* [6.59ab]

If there were arisal from a potential of the ceased, it would follow that anything can arise from any potential whatsoever.

With respect to this Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *If it comes from the ripe potential of what's created,*
> *Then other arises from an other's potential;*
> *The stream-members there are different from each other.* [6.59abc]

If you say, "A future consciousness is produced from the ripening of the potential of a consciousness which has ceased," then it follows that a result which is other would arise from a potential which is inherently-existently other, for among the successively arising members of this series, earlier and later ones exist as inherently different from each other.

> *Therefore all things will arise from everything.* [6.59d]

If you accept this, then all functional things will arise from everything, cause or not, because of that assertion.

> *If you say, "The stream-members there are different, but*
> *The stream in them is not different, therefore*
> *There is no problem," this remains to be proved,* [6.60abc]

If you say, "The members of the continuum there, arising earlier and later in succession, are different in entitiness but they do not have different inherently existent streams, they have one, therefore there is not the fault of everything being produced from everything," then you have to prove this single stream in what are different in entitiness.

For this stream which is different cannot occur. [6.60d]

Phenomena based on Maitreya and Upagupta,
Because of otherness, can't be in one stream.
Whatever are by their own nature different
Can never belong to one continuum. [6.61]

It follows it is not established, for the case of an identical stream existing in what are different in entitiness is impossible, because what are different by their own nature cannot belong to one continuum. For example, the phenomena concerning Maitreya and Upagupta, because of the otherness of the separate personalities, do not belong to one continuum: it is like this.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If, for an effect due to a consciousness that is ceasing [after] having been produced, a distinction of potential is deposited on the consciousness-basis-of-all, giving rise to the consciousness that is to arise from that which is the ripened potential of the ceased consciousness – then, one (literally, 'another') will arise from the potential of another.

The Chittamatrins say that when a consciousness ceases it deposits a potential on the mind-basis-of-all which will give rise to a future result. When that potential deposited on the mind-basis-of-all ripens it will give rise to a consciousness.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 96) says:

> If asked: Why?
>
> Because:
>
> *Those having continuity have mutual difference.* [6.59c]
>
> It is said: "*Tanu* is for extension."[37] Hence, since there is a succession,[38] it is a continuity.[39] If continuity, like the continuity of a river, is applied to the system of continuity and the relationship of cause and effect, due to the succession of birth and death, without an interval, it abides not interrupting the stages – the instant of formation acts to possess appropriation of the three times.

There are twenty-two particles of condition in the Sanskrit language, one of which is called "*tanu*." When translated, this word means extension in the sense of something continuing.

Tuesday afternoon, 17 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 253-4) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: Now, in order to indicate that "Potentials also do not exist for the past," [Chandrakirti] explains:
>
> *If it comes from the ripening of a potential of the ceased,*

[37] In the grammar texts with regard to the stem of the word 'continuity,' Skt. *samtana*; Tib. rGyun.

[38] Tib. brGyud

[39] Tib. rGyun

> *There will arise other from a potential that is other.* [6.59ab]
>
> A consciousness that has been produced and is ceasing deposits an instance of a potential, which is a latency, for a concordant result on the mind-basis-of-all. *If* a consciousness that *will* arise *from the ripening of a potential of a ceased* consciousness arises, *there will arise other*, a resultant consciousness, *from* an inherently existent *potential that is other*. Why is that?
>
> *For you those that have continuity exist as mutually different.* [6.59c]
>
> It is because *those* moments *that have continuity* arise sequentially, but *for you*, that is, according to you [Chittamatrins], former and later [moments] *exist as mutually different* by way of their own entity.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas there is no arisal of an inherently existent resultant consciousness from a potential of a consciousness that has ceased. In the Chittamatra school, the potential of a consciousness that is ceasing or has ceased is deposited on a mind-basis-of-all; later, when activated, that potential will bring the result of a consciousness. According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system, moments that have continuity arise sequentially, whereas for the Chittamatrins "former and later [moments] exist as mutually different by way of their own entity."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 254) says:

> Furthermore, [with regard to the stem of the word 'continuum], in the [Sanskrit] *Grammar Text* it says "*Tanu* is extension...," meaning that, due to continuing through the issuing forth of conditions, it is "a continuum." When, like the continuum of a river, the relationship between causes and results operates continuously, there is uninterrupted abiding without empty gaps due to the continuum of birth and death. [A continuum] is taken to be the appropriator of the three times of the composite in that it is a possessor of parts which are parts of some moments; it is not a mere non-interruption of former and later [moments].

Sentient beings are without empty gaps between birth and death because death follows birth and birth follows death continuously without empty gaps.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "[A continuum] is taken to be the appropriator of the three times of the composite." An appropriator is that which appropriates something; what does a continuum appropriate? It appropriates the composite, the aggregates, of all three times. "Appropriator of the three times of the composite" refers to the appropriation of the aggregates in all three times. The taking of a human rebirth implies the appropriating of human aggregates. The aggregates are a composite because they are composed of parts. That which is appropriated is the appropriated, contaminated aggregates. They are a continuum without any gaps during which the aggregates do not exist. What is the appropriator of the aggregates? The appropriator is sentient beings; sentient beings abide uninterruptedly without empty gaps due to the continuum of birth and death. Only sentient beings are the appropriator of the composite of the three times, it is not a river nor a pot.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> Since it has substantial moments that are parts of a continuum, the components of a continuum – that is, the substantial moments – are called "possessors of a continuum." Since the parts and components of a continuum belong to a continuum that is a possessor of parts, that continuum is called "an appropriator of [parts]," like, for example, a pot is the appropriator of the lip and neck of the pot.
>
> Former and later moments are asserted by opponents to be:
>
> 1. (i) mutually other and different as other and
> 2. (ii) an established by way of their own character otherness.

> If that were the case, that which is other would arise from a potential that is an inherently existent other.

The opponents here are the Chittamatrins who assert that former and later moments are (i) mutually other and different as other and (ii) an established by way of their own character otherness. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "If that were the case, that which is other would arise from a potential that is an inherently existent other."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 254) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS: There is no fault in asserting that.
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *Because of that, everything would arise from all.* [6.59d]
>
> *Because of that*, *every* thing *would arise from all* the things that are other than itself.

If something arises from an inherently existent other, it follows that a pot would arise from everything that is other than itself. Likewise, it would follow that darkness would arise from everything that is other than itself, for example, from fire light and a butter lamp. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is not the case.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 255) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS:
>
> *"Regarding them, those having continuity are different,*
> *Because the continuum regarding them is not different,*
> *There is no fault."* [6.60abc]
>
> In addition, former and later moments operate sequentially. *Regarding them,* substantial moments *having continuity*, being established by way of their own entity mutually *different*, in fact exist as otherness. Also, that being the case, *because* the *continuum regarding those* former and later moments *is not different*, that is, it is only one, *there is not the fault* of the consequence of everything being produced from everything. Former and later [moments] are a single continuum. This is the actual response that abandons the absurd consequences regarding production from other.

The Chittamatrins say that former and later moments do not exist as different continuum, but are a single continuum; therefore, there is no fault that everything arises from everything. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if former and later moments are established by way of their own entity then everything would arise from everything. The Chittamatrins say: "Former and later [moments] are a single continuum. This is the actual response that abandons the absurd consequences regarding production from other." The Prasangika Madhyamikas fling the consequence that, if something arises from other, then everything that is a result arises from everything that is either a cause or a non-cause. The Chittamatrins respond that their assertion does not have the fault that everything arises from everything because former and later moments are not a different continuum but are a single continuum.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 255) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *That is to be proven.* [6.60c]

> If individual former and later [moments] established by way of their own entity are established to be a single continuum, even assuming that there is no fault, since that single continuum is not established, *that* single continuum *is to be proven*.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say "since that single continuum is not established, that single continuum is to be proven."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 255) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS: Why is that?
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *Because they are not suitable as an occasion of a non-different continuum.* [6.60d]
>
> *Because* established by way of their own entity different former and later [moments] *are not suitable as an occasion of a non-different continuum*, that is, of a single continuum.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *The qualities based on Maitreya and Upagupta*
> *Are not included in a single continuum because they are otherness.*
> *It is not reasonable for whatever are individually established by way of their own character*
> *To be included in a single continuum.* [6.61]
>
> For example, [*the qualities*] *based on*, that is, included in, the continua of *Maitreya and Upagupta are not included in a single continuum because they are otherness* in that they are individual persons. Similarly, *it is not reasonable for whatever* former and later [moments] *are individually established by way of their own character to be included in a single continuum*, that is, to be just one.

The Chittamatrins respond to the absurd consequence flung by the Prasangika Madhyamikas regarding production from other by saying that former and later moments are a single continuum, therefore, there is no fault that everything arises from everything. This passage regarding everything being produced from everything also occurred earlier in the sixth chapter saying:

> *If in dependence on other there arises another,*
> *In that case even from tongues of fire there would arise thick darkness.*
> *Also from all, all would be produced. Because of that*
> *There would not be anything at all that acts to produce and they would be concordant with otherness.* [6.14]

The two absurd consequences flung by the Prasangika Madhyamikas are: (1) thick darkness would arise from tongues of fire and (2) everything would arise from everything. To this the Chittamatrins respond that there is not the fault of everything arising from everything.

Chandrakirti then gives the example of Maitreya and Upagupta who are different continua, that is, who are not one continuum. The Chittamatrins say that former and later moments are a single continuum. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this assertion is made on the basis of former and later moments being an established by way of its own character single continuum. They refute that his is so by giving the analogy of Maitreya and Upagupta who are not a single continuum. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "Similarly, it is not reasonable for whatever former and later [moments] are individually established by way of their own character to be included in a single continuum, that is, to be just one." This is in response to the Chittamatrins assertion that former and later moments are individually established by way of their own character as a single continuum.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 255) says:

> That being the case, in regard to dispelling the faults of flinging the absurd consequences regarding production from other, the point is that the faults cannot be dispelled by saying: "A rice seed and rice sprout are a single continuum, whereas a barley seed and a rice sprout, or a rice seed and a barley sprout, are not a single continuum, therefore, everything is not produced from everything." The opponents are shown to rely on the assertions of an established by way of its own character other, due to which, very clearly not implying a mere other, they persist in grasping at straws and so forth. Due to not understanding that "established by way of its own character other" is affixed as a qualification to the object of negation, they posit reasons for saying that glorious Chandrakirti is unable to dispel faults, and formulate conceptions that were not taught, thereby corrupting correct tenets.

The Chittamatrins say that there is not the fault of everything arising from everything because a rice sprout arises from a rice seed, whereas it is not the case that a rice sprout arises from a barley seed. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The faults cannot be dispelled by saying: 'A rice seed and rice sprout are a single continuum, whereas a barley seed and a rice sprout, or a rice seed and a barley sprout, are not a single continuum, therefore, everything is not produced from everything.'" Although a rice seed and rice sprout are in fact a single continuum, and a barley sprout and a rice seed are not a single continuum, the faults are not dispelled because the Chittamatrins assert establishment by way of its own character. When the Prasangika Madhyamikas fling the absurd consequence that everything would be produced from everything, it is not flung with respect to production from mere other but with respect to production from an established by way of its own character other. In short, when the Prasangika Madhyamikas fling the absurd consequence "it would follow that everything is produced from everything," it is only with respect to the Chittamatrins' position that an inherently existent other is produced from other, it is not with respect to a mere other being produced from other.

Wednesday morning, 18 October 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That is explained saying "The limbs of continuity possess continuity in the substantial instants," since the parts of the continuity exist in substantial instants. Those [former and later instants] are accepted by others (the Chittamatrins) as mutually other and different as other, and as an otherness [established by its own characteristic].

That which possesses components (limbs) is a continuum. The substantial instants that are the components of a continuum are factors that continue on [in time]. A continuum is the appropriator of the three times. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the components of a continuum, that is, the substantial moments, are called 'possessors of a continuum'" and "that continuum is called "an appropriator of [parts]."

Chandrakirti says: "Those [former and later instants] are accepted by others (the Chittamatrins) as mutually other and different as other, and as an otherness [established by its own characteristic]." This can be applied to any basis; for example, a pot has different substantial former and later moments of its continuum. A pot is a possessor of parts; the parts being the eight types of particles that compose it which arise from the activation of a latency on the mind-basis-of-all. Are the eight types of particles that compose the pot and the pot itself one or other? They are other. The Chittamatrins say that the eight types of particles are inherently existent; that is, the pot is produced from other. What is a gold pot made of? It is made of gold. What is the substantial cause of the pot? It is the gold itself. In the case of a clay pot, the substantial cause is the clay from which it is made. Such

a clay pot is produced from other. This is the way in which the Chittamatrins prove that there exists a cause that is established by way of its own character from which comes a result that is established by way of its own character.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, concerning the resultant instant – the possessor of the cause of imprints – arising at a later time, there exists an otherness from the causal instant [that] deposits the imprint. Hence, one would arise from a potential that is other.

Through the depositing of a latency, when it is activated later there arise a resultant consciousness. According to the Chittamatrins all compounded phenomena arise from the activation of latencies deposited on a mind-basis-of-all. They say that from a former instant of a latency comes a later moment, due to which there exists a continuum. When that latency ripens there arises a resultant consciousness. Thus, they posit:
(i) the consciousness that deposits a latency,
(ii) the basis on which the latency is deposited, and
(iii) the resultant consciousness that arises due to the activation of that latency.
All three of these are other.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Suppose it is thought: Because it is [our] assertion, this is not a fault.

The Chittamatrins say "this is not a fault." [The Prasangika Madhyamikas then refute this as follows.]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is not like that. If asserted like that, one could say [as in 6.14c] "*everything would be produced from everything* [*else*]." It is explained:
>
> *Therefore, everything would arise from everything.* [6.59d]
>
> Since this was already explained in refuting production from others, it will not be expressed again.

This is the Prasangika Madhyamikas response to the Chittamatrins. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that, if there is production from an inherently existent cause, it follows that a result would be produced from everything that is both a cause and a non-cause because whatever is established by way of its own character is completely independent. Thus, if there exists an independent result it can arise from anything. Since this was already explained in the context of refuting production from other (v. 6.41), Chandrakirti says that he will not explain this again.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is mentioned here:
>
> *If said: "In that, [those] having continuity are different, yet*
> *They do not have different continuities. Therefore,*
> *There is no fault"...* [6.60abc]

> If said, further, the substantial instants having continuity in that [progressive engagement] indeed have mutual otherness. Nevertheless, since the continuity is only one, everything will not follow as being produced from everything.

This is the Chittamatrins' response. They say that there is not the fault [that everything would be produced from everything] because they are not different continua but are a single continuum.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In that case, then although there would be no fault, since this itself is not proved:
>
> *... This is to be proved,* [6.60c]

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that their existing as a single continuum has yet to be proved by the Chittamatrins. That which is to be proven cannot itself be used as a proof.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Why?
>
> *Because the occasion of an undifferentiated continuity is illogical.* [6.60d]
>
> Occasion means chance. In order to show that "one's mutually different properties are unworthy to exist as the very support of an undifferentiated continuity because of being otherness, like another continuum," it is explained:
>
> *The qualities based on Maitreya and Upagupta*
> *Are not included in one continuum because of otherness.*
> *Whatever is distinct by their own characteristic*
> *They are illogical to include in one continuum.* [6.61]

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the Chittamatrins have not yet proven that a continuum established by way of its own character is a single continuum. It has not been proven to be a single continuum because establishment by way of its own character has not been proved.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas give the example of Maitreya and Upagupta. These two people are not included in a single continuum because they are not the same continuum. In fact, because each is an individual continuum they are different continua.

In short, if there existed a former continuum established by way of its own character and a later continuum established by way of its own character they could not form a single continuum. Therefore, a continuum that is established by way of its own character cannot be posited. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas a continuum and that established by way of its own character are contradictory because a continuum comes from, and is therefore dependent on, a former moment, whereas that which is established by way of its own character does not exist in this way. This is because that which is established by way of its own character does not rely on anything else but is independent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Likewise, also here, it was taken into consideration that oneness of continuum does not possess reason.

> There, the statement that was mentioned: "Due to a ripened potential existing and not existing, there is existence and non-existence of consciousness. It is not due to the existence and non-existence of a knowable object" is dispelled in this way – by expressing potential as impossible. Therefore, "there is non-existence of consciousness due to the non-existence of a knowable object." – this statement remains.

Consciousness and object of knowledge are established in mutual dependence on each other. Thus, since there is no inherently existent object of knowledge there is no inherently existent consciousness. That things are produced from an inherently existent cause is negated; for example, that there is an inherently existent latency that brings the result of a consciousness is negated. What is mainly negated here is that an inherently existent potential produces an inherently existent resultant consciousness. The Prasangika Madhyamikas in general accept that conventionally there exists a potential that brings about a resultant consciousness. Nagarjuna's *Refutation of Objections* says that a valid cognizer is posited in dependence on an object of comprehension, and an object of comprehension is posited in dependence on a valid cognizer. Such a way of positing them is similar to that of the Chittamatrins. The other lower schools also say that, because there are two types of objects of comprehension, there are also two types of valid cognizers. The two types of objects of comprehension are: (i) hidden phenomena and (ii) manifest phenomena. Manifest phenomena are realized by a valid direct perceiver, whereas hidden phenomena are realized by an inferential valid cognizer. These phenomena and their subjects (the consciousnesses apprehending them) are posited in mutual dependence. This is so because without an object of comprehension there is no valid cognizer and without a valid cognizer there is no object of comprehension.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A2B Once again refuting the way of stating the existence of consciousness without external objects
>
> 1 Stating the others' system
> 2 Refuting that system
>
> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A2B-1 Stating the others' system

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 98) says:

> That statement was indicated and again the propounders of consciousness (the Chittamatrins) imagine to accomplish [their] strongly desired goal by assiduously expressing their own system and propound:
>
> *Immediately, from whatever one's potential to produce*
> *Visual awareness, it will be entirely produced.*
> *In the potential that supports its consciousness*
> *Is perceived the physical organ called the eye.* [6.62]

Although the Chittamatrins' assertions were already set out above, once again these propounders of consciousness insist on explaining their views in order to accomplish their desired aim.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2A2A-2B1 Stating the hypothesis

You may say:

"A visual consciousness arising grows directly
And entirely from its own potential.
In this potential, the basis of its consciousness,
Is seen the physical organ, known as the eye. [6.62]

"There is no external object of different substance from the consciousness, because a visual consciousness which is born is born entirely from consciousness, directly from the ripening of some potential of its own left in the basis-of-all; and that potential which is the support of the eye's own consciousness is perceived as the physical sense organ called 'the eye,' but there is no eye of different substance from consciousness;

"Consciousness which arises from a sense,
An appearance of blue and so on, springs from its seed
With no external object. Not seeing this,
People here claim the mind grasps external objects. [6.63]

"And because in this world, not perceiving that a consciousness arising from a sense organ, an appearance of blue and so on, arises without an external object from the ripening of its own seed, people simply assert that that appearance of blue and so on in the mind is the apprehension of an external object.

"As in a dream, with no separate form-object there,
Consciousness of that aspect arises from
Its potential ripening, so here too, awake,
Mind exists, without externals," you say. [6.64]

"In the same way, just as in a dream, without a separate form-object, a consciousness which has the aspect of that form arises from the ripening of its own potential, so also in this waking state, mind[40] exists without external objects."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If some imprint of visual consciousness is deposited on the consciousness-basis-of-all by another consciousness upon its destruction, later, from the maturation of that, consciousness will be produced that accords with its aspect, and to the consciousness produced from some uninterrupted instants of potential – the uninterrupted instants of potential that became the support – due to confusion, the world perceives the physical organ, considering it as the eye. Yet, an eye organ different from consciousness does not exist. The other faculties also should be ascertained similarly.

The Chittamatrins say that eye consciousness arises from the activation of a latency deposited on the mind-basis-of-all by a previous consciousness upon its destruction. When such a latency is activated, eye consciousness is produced. Therefore, external objects do not exist. Such a potential deposited on the mind-basis-of-all is called "eye sense power." In the Chittamatra system is an eye sense power, form?
Student: It is.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:

The potential that is the basis of its respective consciousness,
Is perceived calling it 'a physical eye sense power.'" [6.62]

It seems that according to the Chittamatrins the potential that is the basis of a consciousness is perceived to be a physical eye sense power. Gedun Drup says: "that potential which is the support of

[40] *yid*

the eye's own consciousness is perceived as the physical sense organ called 'the eye,' but there is no eye of different substance from consciousness." Chandrakirti says: "due to confusion, the world perceives the physical organ, considering it as the eye." In brief, the potential that is the basis of eye consciousness is known in the world as the physical eye sense power. That potential is called "a physical eye sense power," although there does not exist form that is different from consciousness. The Chittamatrins do not assert matter from among the three – matter, consciousnesses, and non-associated compositional factors – but do assert form. The Chittamatrins say that matter does not exist because there does not exist form composed of external particles. However, if the Chittamatrins are asked whether form exists, they would say that it does. While the Chittamatrins do not discuss matter, consciousnesses, and non-associated compositional factors, they do discuss forms, consciousnesses, and non-associated compositional factors.

Does form exist on the buddha ground? Form does exist because a buddha has a form body. Is the form body of a buddha composed of particles? It is not. What is it composed of? It arises from the collection of merit. In conclusion, there do no exist particles on the buddha ground, because it would follow that there also exists dust. This is my own thought, based on much debate, on this subject. The Vaibhashika system posits a buddha's form body to be a true suffering and to be composed of the eight particles. This system considers an eye sense power to be clear matter. Biologists also define the eye sense power, the rods and cones, as physical matter and say that when they deteriorate the eyesight deteriorates. Do worldly people consider the eye organ and eye sense power to be different?
Student: They consider them to be one.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What do they consider to be the eye?
Student: The eyeball.
Student 2: If the eyeball and the eye sense power were one, one would say that someone who is blind has no eyes, whereas this is not said.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: When the eye sense power is damaged the sight is lost. Lama Zopa Rinpoche's mother was blind for a long time but due to the power of her recitation of MANI mantras she regained her eyesight. Likewise, when cataracts are removed one regains one's eyesight. In short, the eye organ, or eyeball, and the eye sense power are different. Within the eyeball there is an eye sense power which is made of clear matter. Would the Chittamatrins accept this? Think about it.

Wednesday afternoon, 18 October 2000

Chandrakirti says: "an eye organ different from consciousness does not exist. The other faculties also should be ascertained similarly." Just as the eye sense power was explained to not be different from consciousness, the remaining sense powers should also be understood in the same way.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, like that, having indicated an eye faculty different from consciousness as non-existent, in order to indicate also form as merely abiding undifferentiated from consciousness, [the Chittamatrins] mention:
>
> *People in this [world] hold mind as an*
> *External apprehended [object], having not realized*
> *That cognition arisen from a sense – the mere appearance*
> *Of blue and so forth – arises from its own seed.* [6.63]

The Chittamatrins say that there is no eye sense power that is different from consciousness. This means that there is nothing that exists as a different substance from consciousness. Likewise, the form

that is seen is not a different substance from the eye consciousness that apprehends it; they are a single entity. Just as form and the eye consciousness apprehending it are one entity, likewise, sound and the ear consciousness apprehending it are one substance, odor and the nose consciousness apprehending it are one substance, taste and the tongue consciousness apprehending it are one substance, and a tangible object and the body consciousness apprehending it are one substance.

Thus, the root text indicates the Chittamatrins' assertion that there are no external apprehendeds. However, worldly beings, due to not realizing that there is no blue without its seed, assert external apprehendeds.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as when *bhandujivaka* and *kimshuka* [flowers] are produced having a red aspect, like jewels, they do not rely on an externally added color. Yet, the continuity of a sprout and so forth is observed to be produced in a mere special aspect through subsequent relation with the potential distinguished by its seed. Similarly, without an external form such as blue and so forth, consciousness arises appearing as blue and so forth. The world strongly settles on that which is the mere appearance of blue and so forth as the entity of an external object.

From a seed that is a potential there arises a specific result. Thus, the appearance of blue and so forth arise from a latency deposited on the mind-basis-of-all. In short, blue and so forth are not external objects. Those who do not understand this think that there are apprehendeds that exist externally. Although there are no such external apprehendeds, the Chittamatrins say that "the world strongly settles on that which is the mere appearance of blue and so forth as the entity of an external object."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> For example, within the water of a lake completely filled with very clear water, there exists the reflection of red rubies attached to the branches of a tree that grows around the shore. The appearance in the aspect of precious jewels is indeed observed as external within the water, yet that does not exist within it. It should be applied similarly also to consciousness. Hence, an external object does not exist other than consciousness.

The example given here by the Chittamatrins is the reflection of rubies hanging from a tree in a clear lake; although they appear to be real, they are not. To illustrate this there is the story about an intelligent rabbit who was able to kill a magnificent lion. On the night of the full moon the rabbit went to the lion's den and told him about a creature who was even more magnificent than him. The proud lion immediately wanted to see this creature and so the rabbit brought him to a big well and told him to look down. The lion, upon seeing his reflection, began to show off his strength but the lion in the well did the same. The lion became angry at this creature and jumped on him, his own reflection, thereby drowning in the well. This illustrates the fact that, although there existed the reflection of a lion in the well water, there is no such lion in reality. Likewise, although there is the appearance of forms as if existing externally and as if they are a different substance from the consciousness, there are no such forms.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> At one point:

If said: "In a dream, without a separate physical object,
Mind bearing the aspect of that arises from ripening
Its potential. Like [this], here also when awake,
Mentality exists without an external." [6.64]

Although different forms, people and so forth, are perceived in a dream, they do not exist. The forms and so forth seen in a dream arise from the activation of latencies. The Chittamatrins say that similarly, when awake, it seems as if there are apprehendeds that exist externally but in reality there are no such apprehendeds. Without external objects, there is only mentality. Everything is mere mind.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 256) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: The above passages have been presented, yet once again, thinking to accomplish their desired aims by emphatically stating their own system, the Chittamatrins mention [as follows].
> CHITTAMATRINS:
>
> *"From whatever respective potential produces an eye awareness,*
> *It will be thoroughly produced in that very moment.*
> *The potential that is the basis of its respective consciousness,*
> *Is realized to be 'a physical eye sense power.'"* [6.62]
>
> Another consciousness, when it itself is ceasing, *in that very moment* deposits on the mind-basis-of-all *its respective potential*, that is, a latency, *producing an eye awareness*, i.e., an eye consciousness. Through its ripening, a later eye consciousness, subsequently created in the aspect of the former, *will be produced*. An uninterrupted moment of *potential* produced from an uninterrupted moment of potential becomes *the basis of its respective consciousness*, that is, an eye consciousness. Due to ignorance, the worldly *realize it* thinking, "There is *a physical eye sense power*." An eye sense power different from consciousness does not exist. This is also to be applied similarly to the remaining physical sense powers.

A latency that produces a consciousness is deposited on the mind-basis-of-all by another consciousness. When is it deposited? It is deposited by that consciousness as it is ceasing. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Through its ripening, a later eye consciousness, subsequently created in the aspect of the former, will be produced." A result is produced from that latency in the same aspect as the previous consciousness.

"An uninterrupted moment of potential produced from an uninterrupted moment of potential becomes the basis of its respective consciousness, that is, an eye consciousness." The potential deposited on the mind-basis-of-all is a continuum of uninterrupted moments. The uninterrupted moment of potential, the basis of its respective eye consciousness, is called a physical eye sense power.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 256) says:

> A latency, the cause producing an eye consciousness, is the causal condition for [an eye consciousness], whereas the eye sense power is the empowering condition for eye consciousness. Here, the eye sense power that is presented as the direct cause of eye consciousness is that intended in the context of the ripening of latencies that produce eye consciousness; it is not any eye sense power.

The eye sense power that is the direct cause of eye consciousness is presented only in the context of the ripening of latencies; not all eye sense powers are the direct cause of eye consciousness. For example, when one sleeps there is an eye sense power but it does not act as a direct cause of eye consciousness. Likewise, there is a nose sense power when sleeping but it does not function as a direct

cause of a nose consciousness. Only when form is seen when awake is the eye sense power the direct cause of eye consciousness. A latency is the causal condition for eye consciousness, while the eye sense power is the empowering condition for eye consciousness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 256) says:

> Furthermore, Maitreya's *Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes* says:
>
> > Consciousnesses to which appear
> > Objects, sentient beings, self, and cognition,
> > Are thoroughly produced without objects.

"Objects" refers to forms, sounds, and so forth, and "sentient beings" to the five sense powers. For those who accept a mind-basis-of-all, the mind-basis-of-all can be considered to be a self since it is an illustration of the person. What is both self and cognition? It is the mind-basis-of-all. In short, self is the person, and cognition is the consciousness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 256) says:

> The statement that "Consciousnesses to which appear objects, forms and so forth, and sentient beings, the five sense powers, are produced" refers to a mind-basis-of-all.

From an object, an apprehended, and a sentient being, a sense power, there arises consciousness. These consciousnesses are produced without external objects.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 256) says:

> Acharya Sthiramati also explains that the physical sense powers are observed objects of a mind-basis-of-all. Therefore, those Chittamatrins that assert a mind-basis-of-all assert what appears to a mind-basis-of-all as a physical sense power to be an eye sense power and so forth.

The physical sense powers, an eye sense power and so forth, appear to a mind-basis-of-all. Does an eye sense power and so forth appear to a mind-basis-of-all? What is the observed object of a mind-basis-of-all? Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Acharya Sthiramati also explains that the physical sense powers are observed objects of a mind-basis-of-all." The *Supplement* says that only the sense powers and the five objects are the observed objects of a mind-basis-of-all. Thus, the observed objects of a mental consciousness are not the observed objects of a mind-basis-of-all. In short, for the Chittamatra system what are the observed objects of a mind-basis-of-all? They are (i) the five objects – forms, sound, odors, tastes, and tangible objects – and (ii) the five sense powers – the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body sense powers. The physical sense powers that appear to a mind-basis-of-all are the eye sense power and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 256) says:

> Having indicated that there does not exist an eye sense power and so forth that is different from consciousness, in order to indicate that forms also do not exist as objects other than consciousness, [the Chittamatrins] say:
>
> > *"Here, through not realizing that the cognizers that arise from the sense powers*
> > *Arise as the very appearance of blue and so forth*
> > *From their respective seeds, without external apprehendeds,*
> > *Beings assert that the mind apprehends externals."* [6.63]

With respect to the statement above that "there does not exist an eye sense power and so forth that is different from consciousness," there is debate as to whether an eye sense power and so forth are one with consciousness because they are not different from consciousness. This is because if they are not different, they must be one. Are eye sense power and eye consciousness one? "An eye sense power and so forth that is different from consciousness" means "an eye sense power and so forth that is a different substance or entity from consciousness." Both an eye sense power and an eye consciousness are compounded phenomena; when two compounded phenomena are one entity, they are also one substance. However, in general if it is one entity it is not pervaded by being one substance. For example, the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise single-pointedly realizing the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena are one entity, but they are not the same substance because the selflessness of phenomena is permanent. Similarly, the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise realizing non-duality and non-duality itself are one entity, but they are not one substance. So too are space and the valid cognizer apprehending it one entity but not one substance.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 256-6) says:

> *Here*, in this world, *through not realizing that the* five *cognizers that arise from the* five *sense powers arise as the very appearance of blue and so forth from* the ripening of *the seeds of the respective* consciousness *without external apprehendeds* such as blue and so forth, *beings assert*, that is, strongly adhere to, what appears to *the mind*, blue and so forth, to be *external apprehendeds*. Therefore, there do not exist external [objects] that are objects other than consciousness.

The Chittamatrins say that not realizing that there do not exist external objects, beings adhere to them as existing even though the appearance of blue and so forth arises due to the activation of latencies deposited on the mind-basis-of-all. Thus, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "beings assert, that is, strongly adhere to, what appears to the mind, blue and so forth, to be external apprehendeds." According to the Chittamatrins, the beings who, due to a lack of understanding, conceive blue and so forth to be external appearances are the Prasangika Madhyamikas who do not understand the appearance of blue in this way. The thesis of the Chittamatrins is set out here saying: "Therefore, there do not exist external [objects] that are objects other than consciousness."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 257) says:

> When this is explained in one way [it is as follows]:
>
> *"Just as in a dream, from the ripening of*
> *Their respective potentials, without forms that are other objects,*
> *There arise minds that have their aspect; likewise, here,*
> *Even when awake, there exists mentality without the external."* [6.64]
>
> *Just as in a dream, from the ripening of respective potentials* that are latencies, *without forms that are other objects there arise minds that have the aspect of* forms, sounds, and so forth; *likewise*, *here*, *even when awake, there exists mentality without external* objects.

The Chittamatrins set out the example of forms and so forth that appear in a dream but are not true. They say that their appearance arises due to the activation of latencies deposited on a mind-basis-of-all. For example, if one sees a show and then later on dreams of it, the Chittamatrins explain this as being due to the depositing of latencies on the mind-basis-of-all. Likewise, if having played with others one later dreams of it, this too arises from the activation of latencies.

Student: Is a disintegrated action a latency of an action?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is not. A disintegrated action is not a latency. Why? Where is a disintegrated action? For example, if we create a virtuous action through reciting a mantra many times, when the action stops the virtue created remains. When this action stops is this a virtuous disintegrated action? Is the stopping of a verbal action the disintegrated action? That disintegrated virtuous verbal action is not the latency of a virtuous verbal action. Does that verbal action deposit a latency? It does. Where? It is temporarily deposited on the continuum of the mental consciousness; in the long term it is deposited on the mere I.

Thursday morning, 19 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 257) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A2B-2 Refuting that system

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

That is not like that.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas refute the Chittamatrins assertion that there are no external objects and that consciousness exist inherently. Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, explains why as follows:

Why, as in dream, with no sight, mind consciousness
Of the appearance of blue and so on arises,
Is it not produced from its ripening seed
In a blind man here, without the sense of sight? [6.65]

Then why, just as in a dream, without sight, mind consciousness of the appearance of blue and so on arises naturally, is consciousness of the appearance of bright blue not produced in a blind man in this waking time, without sight, from the ripening of its own seeds? You should understand that it follows that it must be produced, for the blind man is equally without sight both in dream and awake.

The Chittamatrins say that when asleep those who are not blind, although lacking an eye sense power, have the clear appearance of blue and so forth to their mental consciousness. On this basis, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask them: "Why does a blind person not have the clear appearance of blue and so forth when awake, given that he is like one who is dreaming who does not have an eye sense power?" The Prasangika Madhyamikas' point is that according to the Chittamatrins it should be possible for there to be the clear appearance of blue and so forth to the mental consciousness of a blind man in the waking state because he is similar to one who is dreaming in not having an eye sense power. The Chittamatrins say that it is not like that because the clear appearance of blue and so forth in a dream is due to the ripening of latencies. The Prasangika Madhyamikas then ask why does a blind man in the waking state not have the clear appearance of blue to his mental consciousness due to the ripening of latencies? The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the waking state of the blind and dreaming state of the non-blind are similar in terms of the absence of an eye sense power. The eye sense power of the blind and the non-blind are similar in the sense of not functioning.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If asked: Why?

Just as without an eye, during a dream
Mental consciousness arises to which blue, etc. appear; like that,
Without an eye sense, why is it not produced here in the blind
Through the ripening of its own seeds? [6.65]

If, here, just as – being the waking state – visual consciousness arises very clearly through the eye viewing a form; similarly, also during a dream, without an eye, mere mental consciousness in accord with the aspect of a visual consciousness is produced through the ripening of its imprint – then, why does an aspect like that not arise through the ripening of its own imprint also in the blind in the waking state, due to which they would see like those who are not blind, because both are also similar in lacking eyes?

Then, if it is thought: The cause of mental consciousness with an aspect like that is not the lack of an eye. If asked: What is? It is the ripening of a potential for mental consciousness with such an aspect. Therefore, where there is the maturation of a potential, mental consciousness with such an aspect will arise there. Furthermore, it exists only in a dream due to the condition of sleep. It does not exist when awake.

The Chittamatrins say that the cause for the production of a mental consciousness having the clear appearance of blue and so forth in a dream is not the lack of an eye sense power, but is due to the ripening of latencies. The Chittamatrins say that the production of mental consciousness having the clear appearance of blue and so forth without an eye sense power only occurs during a dream due to the condition of sleep. The Prasangika Madhyamikas then say that this is not reasonable.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

If, in your view, there's ripening of the potential
Of the sixth in dream, but not awake,
Then why, just as here there's no ripe sixth's potential,
Should there not be none in the time of dreaming? [6.66]

If, in your view, you maintain it is not equal, since in dream there is the ripening of the potential of the sixth, mind consciousness, but in waking there is not, then why just as in this waking time there is no ripening of the potential of the sixth, should there not likewise be none in the time of dreaming?

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

[Response:] That also is unreasonable.

If asked: Why?

If, for you, there exists ripened potential
Of the sixth in a dream – while awake it does not exist,
Just as a ripened potential of the sixth is non-existent here,
Like that, why is it illogical to say "It is non-existent at dream time?" [6.66]

The "sixth" means "mental consciousness."

If by only a mere mode of speech (words), the ripening of a potential for mental consciousness with an aspect like that during a dream is asserted, but is not when awake; then, also by our words, here, just as the ripening potential for a consciousness with an aspect like that does not exist when awake, similarly, it must be asserted that "it is non-existent also in a dream."

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the Chittamatrins' statement "In a dream there is the activation of ripening, but in the waking state there is no such activation" is just words that allow the Prasangika Madhyamikas to say: "then, also by our words, here, just as the ripening potential for a consciousness with an aspect like that does not exist when awake, similarly, it must be asserted that 'it is non-existent also in a dream.'"

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> One can say:
>
> *Just as the absence of an eye is not its cause, so*
> *Also in dream, sleep is not the cause.* [6.67ab]
>
> Because dream vision – like that of the blind when awake – lacks a functioning faculty, the support of that [eye] consciousness, it is a reactivation of an aspect of the consciousness supported on the eye faculty that is named potential. It does not have a mental consciousness [that has arisen from] the transformation of the ripened potential for mental consciousness. Therefore, just as such, the absence of eyes is not a cause [for the ripening of the imprints of the appearance of objects] to this blind person who is awake, similarly, sleep is also not a cause for the ripening of the imprint of a consciousness during a dream.

The Chittamatrins say that the absence of an eye sense power is not the cause for a mental consciousness having the clear appearance of blue and so forth. Previously the Chittamatrins said that a mental consciousness having the clear appearance of blue and so forth in a dream is due to the condition of sleep. To this the Prasangika Madhyamikas now say: "If we say to you that sleep is not the cause of that mental consciousness, then what is?"

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *As lack of sight is not the cause of that,*
> *So also in dream, sleep is not the cause.* [6.67ab]

It follows there must be, for just as that lack of sight is not the cause of this production of consciousness of the appearance of the object in waking time, so also sleep is not the cause of inherently existing consciousness of the appearance of the object in dream. [For if inherently existent consciousness arises without externals, it cannot be dependent on the ripening of instincts].

> *Therefore, in dream too, that thing and the eye*
> *Are accepted as cause of a false perceiving subject.* [6.67cd]

In dream also, that functional thing, the [dreamt] form, and [dream-]sight, are to be accepted as the cause [or base] of a false perceiving subject [or consciousness], for from false imprints, false consciousness is born.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Since it is like that:
>
> *Therefore, also during a dream, the thing, eye [and]*
> *False subject are accepted as causes of perception.* [6.67cd]
>
> Therefore, also during a dream, one should accept that kind of knower with an object of that kind and that kind of what has become the support of visual consciousness.

The physical sense powers are the main cause for a mental consciousness having the clear appearance of blue and so forth during a dream. For example, having seen a show when awake, later when asleep one dreams of the forms and so forth that were seen; this is due to having seen them before in dependence on a non-defective eye sense power. If there were no such eye sense power there would not have been the appearance of the show to eye consciousness.

When the Prasangika Madhyamikas give these rebuttals the Chittamatrins continue to debate with them.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Since whatever answer he returns*
> *Is seen to be the same as what he'd prove,*
> *This argument is refuted.* [6.68abc]

You should understand that this argument of the Chittamatrin can be refuted; since whatever answer the Chittamatrin gives to the refutation of inherently existent dependent phenomena is seen to be similar to his thesis [i.e., merely asserts it].

The Chittamatrins continue to hold to the inherent existence of other-powered phenomena.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, if like that:
>
> *Since their giving such and such a reply*
> *Is seen as similar to this and that thesis,*
> *Their dispute is dispelled…* [6.68abc]
>
> "This triad of the waking state is emptied by nature, because of [being] a referent; like a dream" is indicated and some opponents mention, "Waking consciousness is emptied by objects because of being consciousness; like the consciousness of a dream," and, "The referent objects in the waking state are possessors of a false nature because of being objects; like the objects of a dream," and, "Similarly all the fully deluded and the completely pure are not existent because of a non-existent support; like a cloth of turtle hair."

The triad mentioned here is: (i) the form of a dream, (ii) the eye sense power of a dream, and (iii) the eye consciousness of dream.

In response to the syllogism ""This triad of the waking state is emptied by nature because of [being] a referent; like a dream," the Chittamatrins set out three syllogisms:

1. "Waking consciousness is empty of objects because of being consciousness; like the consciousness of a dream."
2. "The referent objects in the waking state are possessors of a false nature because of being objects; like the objects of a dream."
3. "Similarly all the fully deluded and the completely pure are not existent, because of a non-existent support; like a cloth of turtle hair."

The Prasangika Madhyamikas set out the first syllogism: In the waking state the three, object, sense power, and consciousness, as the subject, are empty of inherent existence because they are observed; for example, like a dream. To this the Chittamatrins respond:

1. "The consciousness of the waking state, as the subject, is empty of external objects because it is consciousness; for example, like a dream consciousness." In this way the Chittamatrins attempt to

prove the non-existence of external objects, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas are proving the lack of inherent existence.

2. "The observed object of the waking state, as the subject, is a falsity because of being an object; for example, like a dream object." Therefore, the Chittamatrins says that objects seen when awake are false just as the objects of a dream are without doubt false. If it is an object it is not pervaded by being a falsity, but what is perceived by a sense consciousness, the eye consciousness and so forth, is pervaded by being a falsity.
3. "All the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure are non-existent because their basis is non-existent; for example, like a turtle hair cloth." The Chittamatrins say that if other-powered phenomena were not inherently existent the basis for the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure would not exist, due to which they would be like a cloth made from turtle hair.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The examples of cataracts should be expressed similarly.

The example of cataracts is similar because when there are cataracts there is the production of a consciousness having the appearance of falling hair, whereas lacking cataracts no such consciousness is produced. Similarly, if there were no other-powered phenomena, the basis of the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure, there would not be the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When the wise Madhyamikas see the giving of such and such a reply by the Propounders of Consciousness by way of the likes of that and so forth, as similar to this and that thesis, this dispute – propounding as consciousness – is overcome.

The Madhyamikas say that no matter what the Chittamatrins say it does not harm them but instead becomes a condition for increasing their wisdom, just like fuel poured on dry wood does not harm the wood but instead acts to increase its ability to burn.

Thursday afternoon, 19 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 257) refutes the Chittamatrins assertions of (i) the non-existence of external objects and (ii) consciousness that is inherently existent saying:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: That is not reasonable.
>
> *Just as without an eye there arises a mind – the mental –*
> *To which blue and so forth appear in a dream,*
> *In the same way, why is it not produced in the blind*
> *From the ripening of its respective seed without an eye sense power?* [6.65]
>
> *Just as without an eye* sense power *there arises a mind* that is *a mental* consciousness *to which blue and so forth appear in a dream*, *in the same way*, *why is* the seeing of forms and so forth also *not produced without an eye sense power in the blind* who are awake *from the ripening of a seed*, a latency, of the *respective* consciousness, just as it is in those who are not blind, since both a dream and the waking [state] are similar in being without an eye sense power?

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it follows that a blind person would also clearly see form. Why? Just as in a dream forms clearly appear to a mental consciousness without an eye sense power, likewise, forms should also clearly appear to a blind person when awake without an eye sense power.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 257) says:

> Furthermore, if an inherently existent consciousness is produced without external forms and so forth, it is due to the essential point that there is no difference between the two, a dream and the waking [state].
> CHITTAMATRINS: The cause for the non-arisal of a mental consciousness having the clear appearance of forms and so forth, like that of a dream, is not the absence of eyes in the blind who are awake. What then is [the cause]? [The cause] is the non-ripening of potentials for the arisal of such a mental consciousness. For that reason, where there exists the ripening of potentials, there is the arisal of such a mental consciousness. Furthermore, it exists only in a dream due to the condition of sleep, it does not exist when awake.

Why does a blind person not have the clear appearance of forms to his mental consciousness in the same way that a person in a dream has the clear appearance of forms to the mental consciousness? The Chittamatrins say that the reason is not the absence of eyes, but that the blind person in the waking state does not have the clear appearance of forms and so forth to his mental consciousness because there is no ripening of a potential for the arisal of the clear appearance of forms and so forth to his mental consciousness. "Clear appearance" means appearance without a meaning generality. Here the Prasangika Madhyamikas refute the existence of clear appearance to an inherently existent consciousness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 257) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: That is not reasonable.
>
> *If, according to you, there exists in a dream*
> *The ripening of potentials for the sixth, whereas it does not exist when awake,*
> *Then, just as here the ripening of potentials for the sixth does not exist,*
> *In the same way why would it be unsuitable to say 'It does not exist at the time of a dream"?*
> [6.66]
>
> *If*, *according to you, there exists in a dream the ripening of potentials for* mental consciousness, *the sixth* [consciousness], *whereas it does not exist when awake*, *then just as*, *here*, that is, when awake, there *does not exist* for the blind *the ripening of potentials for* the clear appearance of forms and so forth to the mental consciousness, *the sixth*, *in the same way why would it be unsuitable to say "It does not exist at the time of a dream"?* It would [in fact] be suitable [to say that].
> Furthermore, this is a system which is based on the object of negation.

The Chittamatrins say that in a dream, due to the condition of sleep, there is the clear appearance of forms and so forth to a mental consciousness through the ripening of potentials. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "If such a potential ripens only at the time of a dream and not when awake, then just as there does not exist for the blind when awake the ripening of potentials for the clear appearance of forms and so forth to the mental consciousness in the same way why would it be unsuitable to say 'It does not exist at the time of a dream'?" Just as there is no clear appearance of forms and so forth to the blind, so should it be the case for one who is dreaming; this would be suitable. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "Furthermore, this is a system which is based on the object of negation." That is, there are no inherently existent forms that appear to a consciousness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 258) says:

> If someone speaks mere words without logic, we are permitted to say as above. Because sight in a dream, like that of the blind when awake, lacks a functioning sense power (the support of consciousness), the consciousness supported on an eye sense power which is called 'a potential' that takes the aspect [of an object] is not a mental consciousness that arises from the transformation of a ripened potential for mental consciousness.
>
> *Just as a lack of eyes is not the cause of that,*
> *Likewise, also in a dream, sleep is not the cause.* [6.67ab]
>
> Therefore, *just as a lack of eyes is not the cause of* the ripening of latencies for the appearance of objects in the blind who are awake, *likewise*, *also in a dream*, *sleep is not the cause* of the ripening of latencies for the appearance of objects because if an inherently existent consciousness without external objects were produced it would not depend on the ripening of latencies.

The support, or basis, is an eye sense power, whereas that supported on it is the eye consciousness. The supported eye consciousness takes the aspect of the specific object that is seen, for example, the aspect of blue when the object seen is blue, the aspect of long when the object seen is long, and so forth. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "[It] is not a mental consciousness that arises from the transformation of a ripened potential for mental consciousness."

The lack of an eye sense power is not the cause for the ripening of latencies for the appearance of external objects in a blind person who is awake, just as sleep is not the cause for the ripening of latencies for the appearance of objects in a dream. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the ripening of latencies would not be necessary in order to have the appearance of objects in a dream because dream objects are inherently existent. Since they are inherently existent, they do not need to depend on anything but can appear to anyone at anytime without depending on the ripening of latencies. In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Chittamatrins that the ripening of latencies is not necessary for the appearance of inherently existent objects. Thus, there is no mental consciousness that arises from the transformation of a ripened potential. In other words, a consciousness does not need to depend on the transformation of a ripened potential for its existence because it is inherently existent. That which is inherently existent cannot arise from the transformation of a ripened potential, therefore, an inherently existent mental consciousness does not arise from a ripened potential.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 257-8) says:

> *Because of that, also in a dream, things, the eye, and*
> *False object-possessors are asserted to be the cause of perception.* [6.67cd]
>
> Therefore, *because of* the production of a false consciousness, which has the appearance of dream objects, from false latencies, *also in a dream*, just as when awake, (i) *things* that are objects, (ii) *the false* consciousness that has the appearance of forms and so forth, and (iii) *the eye* of a dream *are asserted to become the cause*, that is, the basis, *of perception*, i.e., consciousness. Here in the autocommentary it says that when an object is perceived in a dream it is observed through the coming together of the three.

"The coming together of the three" refers to coming together of a mental object, mental sense power, and mental consciousness in a dream. This is because while dreaming the sense consciousnesses are not manifest, but have ceased. However, some scholars, such as Panchen Sonam Drakpa, say that if an eye consciousness is not manifest, it is non-existent. The Tibetan nomads say: "Thirty people have thirty opinions. Thirty yaks have sixty horns." Another example of many different opinions is the thirteen ways of commenting on the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*.

END

Monday afternoon, 23 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 258-9) says:

> It also says that the form sphere and the eye, as well as the eye consciousness that is produced by these two, do not exist in a dream. In this way, even though the three – (i) the objects of the five, the eye consciousness and so forth, (ii) the sense powers, and (iii) the consciousnesses – do not exist in a dream, since that observed to be the three exist in the perspective of the person who is dreaming a dream, the three – (i) the eye of a dream, (ii) the eye consciousness of a dream, and (iii) the form of a dream – are presented as being asserted. However, those three are not asserted to be established to be an eye and so forth. It is like [the fact] that even though a horse and elephant that are illusions and a human being that is an illusion are asserted, they are necessarily not asserted to be a horse and elephant and a human being.

In a dream there is no form, no eye sense power, and no eye consciousness that is produced by these two. Although dream objects do exist, they are not real. Does the eye of a dream exist? It does not. Thus, there does not exist the form, eye sense power, and eye consciousness of a dream, but in the perspective of the person who is dreaming there does exist the form, eye sense power, and eye consciousness of a dream. It is like the appearance of a horse or elephant created by a magician in that, although they seem to be real, they are not.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 259) says:

> *Since their giving such-and-such a reply*
> *Is seen to accord with this and that thesis,*
> *This debate is eliminated.* [6.68abc]
>
> Therefore, this being the case, *since* the Chittamatrins *giving such-and-such a reply* to the Madhyamikas *is seen to accord with this and that thesis*, i.e., probandum, not being established, *this debate* – the propounding of mere cognition – *is eliminated*, that is, overcome.

The Chittamatrins debate with the Prasangika Madhyamikas giving such-and-such responses to the Prasangikas, however these responses do not harm the assertions of the Prasangikas. This is because whatever syllogism the Chittamatrins set out, the probandum is not established. Instead, when the Chittamatrins debate with the Prasangikas, they actually harm their own theses.

That the Chittamatrins' probandum is not established is due to the fact that they set out syllogisms on the basis of an inherently existent thesis, due to which it cannot be proven. Thus, whatever reason they use against the Prasangika Madhyamikas it does not harm the Prasangika's reason but instead harms their own thesis.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 259) says:

> If this is expressed as an example [it is as follows]. When the Madhyamikas set out the statement "At the time of waking the three – (i) objects, (ii) sense powers, and (iii) consciousnesses – are empty of inherent existence because they are observed; for example, like a dream," the Chittamatrins say:
>
> - "The consciousness of the waking [state] is empty of external objects because it is consciousness; for example, like the consciousness of a dream,"
> - "Objects that are observed when awake are false because they are objects; for example, like dream objects," and
> - "Similarly, if other-powered phenomena, the basis of the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure, do not exist, then thoroughly afflicted and completely pure phenomena would not exist

> because the basis does not exist; for example, like a turtle hair cloth." They say: "Similarly, this should also be stated in terms of the example of cataracts."

When the Prasangika Madhyamikas say "At the time of waking the three – (i) objects, (ii) sense powers, and (iii) consciousnesses – are empty of inherent existence because they are observed; for example, like a dream," the Chittamatrins respond saying: "The consciousness of the waking [state] is empty of external objects because it is consciousness; for example, like the consciousness of a dream." The Chittamatrins also say "Objects that are observed when awake are false because they are objects; for example, like dream objects," to which the Prasangikas respond that there is no pervasion because if it is an object it is not pervaded by being a falsity. If they are asked to posit such an object they posit ultimate truth because ultimate truth is an object but is not a falsity, in that it is a truth.

The Chittamatrins also say: "Similarly, if other-powered phenomena, the basis of the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure, do not exist, then thoroughly afflicted and completely pure phenomena would not exist because the basis does not exist; for example, like a turtle hair cloth." In this way, the Chittamatrins say that if their bases, other-powered phenomena, do not exist, then also the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure would not exist, just as if turtle hair, the basis, does not exist, then turtle hair cloth does not exist.

The Chittamatrins then say: "Similarly, such should also be stated in terms of the example of cataracts." Cataracts obscure the eyes, but if there were no eye, their basis, the cataracts also would not exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 259) says:

> With regard to these [three] syllogisms, in the first two, since the example is not established, the proof and that which is to be proven are similar because in a dream there exists form that is a phenomena sphere which is a different entity from mental consciousness. Due to [the Chittamatrins] wishing to prove that the basis of the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure is established by way of its own character, the third syllogism does not establish that a mere basis does not exist; whereas, thinking that [the basis of the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure] is established by way of its own character, it is indefinite.

In order to prove a thesis, that which proves it has to be definite. Here the probandum and the proof are similar because in a dream there exists form that is a phenomena sphere which is a different entity from mental consciousness. With the third syllogism, the Chittamatrins want to prove that the basis of the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure is inherently existent phenomena and to do so set out the reason "because the basis does not exist." There are correct reasons and facsimiles of reasons. Each of these are further divided into three. The three divisions of facsimiles of a reason are:

1. a reason that is indefinite,
2. a reason that is not established, and
3. a contradictory reason.

Of these three, the reason in the third syllogism is a reason that is not established. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the third syllogism does not establish that a mere basis does not exist." Either the property of the subject is not established or the reason is not established. On the other hand, if one sets out the syllogism "thinking that [the basis of the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure] is established by way of its own character, it is indefinite." This means that the pervasion is indefinite because there is no pervasion.

The Chittamatrins say: "Similarly, if other-powered phenomena, the basis of the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure, do not exist, then thoroughly afflicted and completely pure phenomena would not exist because the basis does not exist; for example, like a turtle hair cloth." The reason "because the basis does not exist" is not established. When the Chittamatrins set out that reason, it is

held to be inherently existent; such an inherently existent reason is not established. Although the Chittamatrins wish to prove something is inherently existent, they give an unrelated reason saying "because the basis does not exist," due to which the pervasion is indefinite. For example, in the syllogism "sound, as the subject, is impermanent because it is an object of apprehension of eye consciousness," the reason is not established because sound is not an object of apprehension of an eye consciousness. On the other hand, in the syllogism "sound, as the subject, is impermanent because it is an object of comprehension," the reason is indefinite because if it is an object of comprehension it is not pervaded by being impermanent, for example, uncompounded space. What is an object of comprehension?
Student: It is mutually inclusive with existent, which is what is established by a valid cognizer.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to you because object of comprehension is mutually inclusive with existent the definitions are interchangeable?! So, what is the definition of object of comprehension?
Student 2: An object realized by a valid cognizer.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 259) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A2C Indicating that the refutation of the Chittamatra system is without harm from the scriptures

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, even the fault of damage by scripture is not possible since:
>
> *… The buddhas*
> *Never taught that "Things exist."* [6.68cd]

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that their refutation of the Chittamatrins' assertions is not harmed by scriptural authority. This is because no buddha ever taught that "Things exist," meaning that no buddha ever taught that things exist inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As taught [in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*]:
>
> The three existences are mere imputations, things do not exist by entitiness.
> Logicians will conceive the imputed as the entity of things.
>
> When there is no self-nature, no consciousness, no basis of all, and no things,
> the childish, bad logicians, the corpse-like, impute these.

[The MP translation of these verses says:

> The three existences are mere imputations,
> Things do not exist by way of their own entity;
> Logicians conceive
> An imputation to be the entity of the thing.
>
> When there is no nature and no cognition,
> No basis-of-all and no things,
> Still bad, childish logicians,
> The corpse-like, impute them.]

"The three existences" are either: (i) the existence below the ground, (ii) the existence on the ground, and (iii) the existence above the ground, or (a) the desire realm, (b) form realm, and (c) formless realm.

These three are mere imputations and do not exist by way of their own entity. "Logicians" are the hard-headed or stubborn people who say that if phenomena are merely imputed then suchness cannot be found. This is because they say that if phenomena are merely imputed, they do not exist inherently, and, if they do not exist inherently, how can truth be established? "Logicians conceive" means that the logicians assert this.

This text continues saying that there is no nature, no cognition, and no basis-of-all. The Chittamatrins assert a basis-of-all, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas negate the existence of a seventh consciousness, a mind-basis-of-all, which is a basis for the infusion of latencies, that is different from the sixth consciousness. That there are "no things" means that there are no functioning things – forms, consciousnesses, and non-associated compositional factors – that exist inherently. "Still bad, childish logicians, the corpse-like, impute them." The logicians are said to be like a corpse in terms of their inability to realize suchness just as a corpse is unable to perform activities.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is also illogical for the very non-existence of things to be due to the emptiness that is the absence of one [thing] in one [other], because it is set forth [in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*]:
>
> > O Mahamati! The emptiness of the absence of one in another (literally, 'one') is the lowest of all emptinesses.

The absence of one in one is the lowest of all emptinesses. In the phrase "Absence of one in one," the first word "one" refers to the duality of apprehendeds and apprehenders, whereas "in one" refers to other-powered phenomena. Therefore, this lowest of emptinesses is the emptiness is the lack of duality of apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances in other-powered phenomena. This is the non-existence of the imputational factor – apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances that are cut off and at a distance – in other-powered phenomena. This emptiness that is asserted by the Chittamatrins is the lowest type of emptiness.

Tuesday morning, 24 October 2000

> To say "A cow does not exist because of not being a horse" is also illogical; one should say "because it exists by its own essential-nature"[41] and so forth.

Such statements as "A cow does not exist because of not being a horse" are not correct reasoning because one could rebut those who propound this saying: "You are not a human being because you are not a horse."

> Similarly, it is set forth [in the *Meeting of the Father and Son Sutra*]:[42]
>
> > Bhagavan, they engage in the sphere of phenomena by engaging in the faculties. There are twenty-two faculties:
> >
> > 1. eye faculty,
> > 2. ear faculty,
> > 3. nose faculty,
> > 4. tongue faculty,

[41] Lama Tzong Khapa (p. 274) quotes the translation of Nag Tshos, who translates the phrase as 'because its own essential nature exists.'

[42] Source noted by Lama Tzong Khapa, p.275, b6.

5. body faculty,
6. mental faculty,
7. female faculty,
8. male faculty,
9. life faculty,
10. faculty of pleasure,
11. faculty of suffering,
12. faculty of mental happiness,
13. faculty of mental unhappiness,
14. faculty of equanimity,
15. faculty of faith,
16. faculty of joyous effort
17. faculty of mindfulness,
18. faculty of meditative stabilization,
19. faculty of wisdom,
20. faculty that acts to know all unknowing,
21. faculty of knowing all, and
22. faculty that possesses all knowing.

These faculties, or powers, are described in detail in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*, which says:

> *Five exert influence over four matters;*
> *Four over two – they claim.* [2.1ab]

Vasubandhu's autocommentary says

> The *five* sense powers of the eye and so forth *exert influence over four matters* because they exert influence over
>
> 1. beautifying the body,
> 2. safeguarding the body,
> 3. generating their specific consciousnesses together with the [mental factors] bearing similarities with them and
> 4. uncommon causes.
>
> They exert influence over beautifying the body because if they are absent the body is not beautiful. They exert influence over safeguarding the body because the eye and ear safeguard through seeing unpleasant visible forms and hearing unpleasant sounds, and because the three, nose, tongue, and body, protect the body through utilizing gross food (sustenance). They exert influence over uncommon causes because the eye exercises authority over viewing visible form through the body exercises authority over knowing tangible objects.
>
> *Four* – the male, female, life, and mental faculties – each exert influence *over two* matters.
>
> The two, male and female faculties, each exert influence over two matters because they exert influence over the particulars (i.e., gender) and differences of sentient beings. This is because it is in terms of the possession of male and female faculties that the particular (genders) of sentient beings are distinguished and because it is terms of the possession of male and female faculties that the differences of sentient beings are distinguished, such as large and small breasts and facial hair, tight and loose flesh, high and low pitched voice, etc.

An eye sense power is a clear physical form that is able to produce its result, consciousness, by its own power. "Five" refers to the five physical sense powers which exert influence over four matters. The "four" are the male, female, life and mental faculties which exert influence over two matters.

Treasury of Knowledge then says:

> *The five and eight,*
> *Over the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure.* [2.1cd]

The *five* faculties of feeling exert influence *over the thoroughly afflicted* because (i) attachment develops from feelings of pleasure and mental happiness, (ii) hatred from feelings of suffering and mental unhappiness, and (iii) confusion from neutral feelings, and the thoroughly afflicted develop from them.
The final *eight* faculties exert influence *over the completely pure* because the contaminated ones suppress the manifest afflictions and the uncontaminated ones eliminate the seeds of the afflictions.

Five faculties – suffering, happiness, mental suffering, mental happiness, and equanimity – exert influence over the thoroughly afflicted. Eight faculties – faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, wisdom, the faculty that acts to know all the unknown, the faculty knowing all, and the faculty that possesses all knowing exert influence over the completely pure.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 102) continues to quote from sutra:

> There, the eye faculty is also not observed in the three times. That which is not observed in the three times is not the eye faculty. That which is not an eye faculty, how does one present[43] its designation? It is like this, for example: nihilistic emptiness is false, is not real and does not exist. It is limited to being imputed thus in name – ultimately, empty is not observed nor is nothingness observed. Similarly, also the eye faculty, like nihilistic emptiness, is false and does not exist, it is not real. It has a seductive quality, deceives the childish, does not exist, is not real. It is limited to being imputed thus in name – ultimately, eye and faculty are not observed.

"The eye faculty is also not observed in the three times" means that an inherently existent eye sense power is not observed to exist in the three times. Nihilistic emptiness "is not real and does not exist. It is limited to being imputed thus in name – ultimately, empty is not observed nor nothingness observed." Likewise, the eye sense power is false and does not exist inherently. It is a deceptive substratum (translated here as "seductive quality") and "deceives the childish, does not exist, is not real." That "It is limited to being imputed thus in name – ultimately, eye and faculty are not observed" means that ultimately things are not observed to exist inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote from sutra:

> The Bhagavan, having gained the exalted wisdom of omniscience, for the sake of caring for however many sentient beings abide in the mistaken, imputed "eye faculty," but it is not ultimately so. Faculty is separated from a self-nature and emptied by faculty-ness. There, an eye does not exist as eye-ness, a faculty does not exist as faculty-ness. If asked: Why? Eye is separated from a self-nature of eye. Whatever phenomenon does not have a self-nature, that is not a functioning thing. That which is not a functioning thing is not fully established. It is not produced, is not ceased. It is not to .be imputed saying "past and future."
> and so forth and:

[43] Tib. *Tshal Bar bGyi* – Huntington (p. 243) takes the phrase 'present its designation' as 'actively manifests (itself) as a conventional reality.'

The Bhagavan said "eye sense power," not inherently existent eye sense power, in order to care for however many sentient beings there are who abide in mistaken conception by leading them to correct conception. A faculty, or sense power, is free from inherent existence (translated here as self-nature). "Emptied by faculty-ness" seems to mean that a faculty is empty of itself. With respect to this it can therefore be asked: "Is an eye sense power empty of being an eye sense power?" An eye sense power is empty of being an inherently existent eye sense power; [it is not empty of being an eye sense power]. Therefore, the statement "There, an eye does not exist as eye-ness, a faculty does not exist as faculty-ness" means that an eye does not exist as an inherently existent eye and a sense power does not exist as an inherently existent sense power. Therefore, an eye is empty of being an inherently existent eye. "Whatever phenomenon does not have a self-nature, that is not a functioning thing" means that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence and that this emptiness of inherent existence is not a functioning thing (*ngo po*), although it does exist. Or this statement can be understood to mean that inherent existence is not an existent (*ngo po*). Therefore, instead of saying "That which is not a functioning thing is not fully established it can be said "That which does not exist is not fully established." This discussion comes because the Sanskrit word *bhava* (Tibetan *ngo po*) can mean either 'functioning thing' or 'existent.' The Vaibhashikas say that if it is an established base it is pervaded by being a functioning thing and if it is an existent it is pervaded by being a functioning thing. On this basis, they divide functioning things into permanent functioning things and impermanent functioning things. As examples of permanent functioning things they posit (i) analytical cessations, (ii) non-analytical cessations, and (iii) space. They say, for example, that the function of space is to allow movement. Other schools negate this saying that if space is a functioning thing it is result and therefore ask the Vaibhashikas: "Of what is space the result?" If it is a result it should be one of the five types of results (see *Middling Collected Topics*):

1. fruitional result,
2. dominant (environmental) result,
3. result similar to its cause
4. result of the activities of beings, and
5. result of separation.

Are all of these fully qualified results? They are not. Space is none of these types of results, whereas, analytical cessations and non-analytical cessations can be considered results of separation which, however, are not fully qualified results; they are only results nominally.

The sutra quoted in Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues:

> Bhagavan, it is like this, for example: in one man's dream, he laughs, is happy and plays. Waking from a long sleep, that is recalled. Although remembered, that will not be gained. If asked: Why is that? If those are not gained by him even in the dream, what need to say when awakened from sleep? There is no abidance of that. Similarly, faculties are like a dream. Similarly, also all phenomena do not come to be observed due to entitiness. Therefore, they are said to be 'inexpressible.'

The example here is that during sleep a man dreams of enjoying a beautiful object, then, upon awakening, remembers this beautiful object even though it does not actually exist since it cannot be found when sought. If it is not found in a dream there is no need to mention that it is not found when awake. The things of a dream do not exist. When awake, although remembered, the objects of a dream cannot be obtained even by way of great effort.

The sutra says: "There is no abidance of that. Similarly, faculties are like a dream. Similarly, also all phenomena do not come to be observed due to entitiness." This means that phenomena are just like dream objects in that they appear to exist inherently but do not. "Therefore, they are said to

be 'inexpressible.'" That they are inexpressible is to be understood to mean that although phenomena, the faculties, can be expressed by words they are not inherently inexpressible.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Hence, aggregates, elements, entrances, dependent arisings, and so forth are fully explained like the faculties, thus, how could they have such a self-nature?

The five aggregates – form, feeling, discrimination, compositional factors, and consciousness aggregates – are also empty of inherent existence. So too are the twelve entrances, or twelve spheres – the six external and six internal. The six external spheres are the form sphere, sound sphere, odor sphere, taste sphere, and tangible object sphere, and phenomena sphere. The six internal are the eye sphere, ear sphere, nose sphere, tongue sphere, body sphere, and mental sphere.

The eighteen constituents are divided into three groups: six observed objects, six supporting sense powers, and six supported consciousnesses. The six observed objects are the form constituent, sound constituent, odor constituent, taste constituent, tangible object constituent, body constituent, and phenomena constituent. The six supporting sense powers are the eye constituent, ear constituent, nose constituent, tongue constituent, body constituent, and mental constituent. The six supported consciousnesses are the eye consciousness constituent, ear consciousness constituent, nose consciousness constituent, tongue consciousness constituent, body consciousness constituent, and mental consciousness constituent.

"Dependent-arisings" refers to the two sets of twelve links: (1) the set of the thoroughly afflicted and (2) the set of the completely pure. The twelve links in relation to the thoroughly afflicted side are:

1. ignorance,
2. karmic formations,
3. consciousness,
4. name and form,
5. six spheres,
6. contact,
7. feeling,
8. craving,
9. grasping,
10. existence,
11. birth, and
12. aging and death.

The twelve links in relation to the completely pure side are:

- due to the ceasing of ignorance, karmic formations cease,
- due to the ceasing of karmic formations, consciousness ceases,
- due to the ceasing of consciousness, name and form cease,
- due to the ceasing of name and form, the six spheres cease,
- due to the ceasing of the six spheres, contact ceases,
- due to the ceasing of contact, feeling ceases,
- due to the ceasing of feeling, craving ceases,
- due to the ceasing of craving, grasping ceases,
- due to the ceasing of grasping, existence ceases,
- due to the ceasing of existence, birth ceases, and
- due to the ceasing of birth, aging and death cease.

All of these links do not exist inherently but do exist conventionally.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, formulated without the skill of wisdom due to not analyzing the intention of the scriptures of emptiness, this Propounder of Consciousness (*vijñanavadin*) is only an object to be dispelled.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas the Chittamatrins' assertions are only to be refuted.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 259) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *... The buddhas*
> *Never said "Things exist."* [6.68cd]
>
> Not only is the refutation of the Chittamatra system not harmed by reasonings, it [also] cannot be harmed by the scriptures because in our own system *the* perfectly complete *buddhas never said* in their scriptures "*Things exist* truly." In addition, the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* says:
>
> > The three existences are mere imputations,
> > Things do not exist by way of their own entity;
> > Logicians conceive
> > An imputation to be the entity of the thing.
> >
> > When there is no nature and no cognition,
> > No basis-of-all and no things,
> > Still bad, childish logicians,
> > The corpse-like, impute them.
>
> The first line indicates that the three existences exist as mere imputations by an awareness. The second line indicates what this means. Moreover, by indicating that things established by way of their own entity do not exist, [the sutra] says that things that are not established by way of their own entity are not non-existent from the beginning. Hence, that "The logicians who have not found the meaning of suchness assert what is merely imputed by an awareness to be a thing that is established by way of its own character" is shown by stating [the word] "imputation" twice. Non-establishment by way of its own entity is indicated in general, but [when] discerned, that is, indicated, in particular [it is as follows].
>
> The [Sanskrit term] "*rupa*" refers to both nature and form, but here that it [refers to] what possesses form is [understood] through pairing it with "cognition."

"The three existences are mere imputations" means that the three existences are merely imputed by an awareness and do not exist from their own side. "Things do not exist by way of their own entity" means that because things are merely imputed by an awareness they do not exist by way of their own entity. That they "do not exist" means that they do not exist by way of their own entity, it does not mean that they do not exist at all.

The word "imputation" occurs twice in the first verse: once in the first verse and once in the fourth line of the English translation. In short, these first four lines indicate that things do not exist inherently.

"There is no nature" refers to form which does not exist inherently, whereas "no cognition" refers to consciousness which does not exist inherently. "There is no nature" is to be understood here to mean form by pairing it with cognition. Thus, this line means that form and consciousness do not exist inherently or truly.

Tuesday afternoon, 24 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 260) says:

> Since the [word] 'things' of [the line] "things do not exist" was already indicated to [mean that] the things that are consciousness and those that are physical do not exist, here it is in regard to [their] entity. Moreover, in other [contexts] it [refers to] the entity that is the negation of truly existent things and to non-things. The way that [childish logicians] are like a corpse is that they do not have minds that are able to analyze suchness.

In the line from the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* which says "Things do not exist (*dngos po med*) by way of their own entity," the words "things do not exist" refer to the things that are form and consciousness which do not exist [by way of their own entity]. They are again mentioned saying: "When there is no nature and no cognition." In other contexts, "things do not exist" (*dngos po med*) refers to the entity that is the negation of truly existent things and to non-things (*dngos por med pa*). What are non-things? They are, for example, the forty isolates of the forty people here in the gompa, or generally characterized phenomena. Because the childish are unable to analyze emptiness they are likened to an unmoving corpse.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 260) says:

> This scripture negates the assertion that the other-powered phenomena of the three existences exist inherently.

In short, the Chittamatrins' assertion that the three existences exist inherently is negated by this scripture.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 260) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS: These scriptures do not harm [our assertions] since they indicate one, the other-powered, to be empty of the other one, the imputational factor – the entity of apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances.
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: That is not suitable as perfect emptiness because the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* says:
>
> > Mahamati, the emptiness of one not existing as one is the lowest of all emptinesses.

The Chittamatrins say that there is no harm from such scriptures because they present one, other-powered phenomena, as empty of one, the imputational factor, the entity of apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances. However, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, as it says in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*, the emptiness of one, the other-powered, not existing as one, the imputational factor, is the lowest of all emptinesses. In fact, this is considered to be a type of emptiness by the Chittamatrins, but is not so considered by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 260-1) says:

> The autocommentary says:
>
> > Saying "An ox does not exist because it is empty of being a horse" is also not suitable; one should say "Because it is [empty of] existing by way of its own nature" and so forth.

> In regard to [the word] 'by nature,' the translation by Nagtso as 'Because it [is empty of] having its own nature' is excellent.

The autocommentary says "existing by way of its own nature," whereas Nagtso's translation says "has its own nature." "Existing by way of its own nature" means inherently existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 261) says:

> **The way in which the emptiness of one of not existing as the other is like the example expressed**
>
> The Bhagavan taught the emptiness that is devoid of inherent existence [as follows]. In order that sentient beings overcome the strong adherence conceiving things that are forms and so forth to be truly existent, he necessarily indicated that those very other-powered phenomena that appear as forms and so forth lack true existence. Without indicating that, if instead he had indicated "Other-powered phenomena, apprehendeds and apprehenders, do not truly exist as different substances" it would be like saying that the reason for the non-existence of an ox is "An ox does not exist as a horse."

This is Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary on the phrase in the autocommentary "A ox does not exist because it is empty of being a horse."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 261) continues:

> Hence, also for the systems of anyone who is a Madhyamika or Chittamatra there is no difference in regard to the bases of strong adherence functioning as what appears to sentient beings to be external and internal phenomena. Although they are indeed indicated to be empty in order to overcome strong adherence to those bases, the uncommon way of adhering by the Chittamatrins is that through the two, apprehendeds and apprehenders, seeming to appear as distant external and internal [objects], apprehendeds and apprehenders are adhered to as different substances. As an antidote to that, through taking appearances to be the substrata of other-powered phenomena, they refute that apprehendeds and apprehenders exist as different substances, whereby they negate that which is the basis of negation, the object of negation.

The Chittamatrins posit strong adherence to, or the conception of, a self of phenomena to be the conception that apprehendeds and apprehenders are different substances. In the Chittamatra system that which is empty of this duality is a thoroughly established phenomenon and the selflessness of phenomena. This view is incorrect according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, who assert that apprehendeds and apprehenders are different substances.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 261) says:

> According to the Madhyamikas the way of adhering is that appearances are not posited by an awareness of conventions, but are adhered to as truly existent. As an antidote to that, through taking appearances to be the substrata, they negate [true existence] saying "There is no such true existence." Furthermore, the basis of negation, which is the object of negation, is negated
>
> - because when sentient beings adhere [to a basis], they do not conceive that basis to exist as a different object, the object of negation, rather they adhere to that basis as being the entity of the object of negation, and
> - because emptiness is also necessarily indicated to be empty of existing in the way in which it is adhered to.

The Madhyamikas say that appearances are existent phenomena or conventional phenomena or dependent-arisings that do not exist inherently. These appearances are adhered to as truly existent instead of being realized to be merely imputed. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Three Principal Aspects of the Path* (v. 11) says:

> As long as the two understandings of (i) appearances as infallible dependent relations and (ii) emptiness as free from assertion appear to be separate, you have not realized the thought of the Subduer.

In short, appearances are dependent-arisings. There are two modes of negating:
(1) negating something being the object of negation and
(2) negating something existing as the object of negation.
When the object of negation is negated on a pot, the pot that is truly existent is negated, not the pot existing as truly existent. For example, on an ocean at night where there is no fire, as the subject, there does not exist smoke because there does not exist fire. This is in the context of someone seeing mist on the ocean at a long distance at night and doubting that there is fire. In this case, it is easy to negate the existence of fire because if there were fire it would easily be seen at night. Another example is: on a smoky mountain pass, as the subject, there exists fire because there is smoke.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: When it is said that there is no pot on this table what is negated?
Student: The presence of a pot on the table is negated.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There are two types of object of negation: being and existing. What is the difference? "There is no pot on the table" is an example of negating the object in terms of existing. "The table is not a pot" is an example of negating the object in terms of being.

Wednesday morning, 25 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 262) says:

> Therefore, taking the emptiness of true existence of the bases of present appearances to be a nihilistic emptiness (nothingness) and setting it aside, then taking another appearance to be the basis of emptiness and, rather than presenting it as empty of being the object of negation, presenting it as empty of existing as a thing, is not the system of any Madhyamika or Chittamatrin. In regard to the beginningless strong adherence in the continua of sentient beings, look inward and investigate whether or not you have an awareness conceiving such an object of negation. Thus, glorious Dharmakirti says:
>
> > That also was subsequently expressed,
> > Hence, it is pervaded by the darkness of evil.
>
> At the time of the flourishing [of the darkness of such evil], this is to be understood with the light of intelligence.

There are two way of negating the object of negation: (i) in terms of being and (ii) in terms of existing. The way of negating in terms of existing is not the system of any Chittamatrin or Prasangika. What is to be negated is appearances being the object of negation. Here 'beginningless strong adherence in the continua of sentient beings' refers to the conception of true existence. How does this beginningless strong adherence adhere to the object of negation? The mind conceiving existence as a thing is not an awareness adhering to the object of negation. In other words, the conception of true existence is not a conception of existing as a thing. If existence as a things were the object of negation then beginningless strong adherence should adhere to it, but it does not. Therefore, the emptiness of existing as a thing is not presented by any Chittamatrin or Prasangika.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that some take the emptiness of true existence of the bases of present appearances, dependent-arisings, to be a nihilistic emptiness. They then take the bases of present

appearances to be empty of existing as a thing rather than presenting them to be empty of the object of negation. In this eon of degeneration there are many different opinions. 'The flourishing of darkness' refers to the flourishing of the five degenerations (literally, dregs). Those with the light of intelligence should be careful about this.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 262) says:

> Here, the autocommentary, in regard to settling the twenty-two powers as lacking inherent existence, cites the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra* saying:
>
> > Thus, they are limited to being verbal designations. Ultimately, the eye and the sense power are not observed.
>
> And:
>
> > Likewise, all phenomena are also not observed to exist by way of their own entity.
>
> Stating that all phenomenon do not exist ultimately nor by way of their own entity, in that they are nothing more than mere verbal designations, is to say that in affixing a qualification to the object of negation the two, [not existing ultimately and not existing by way of their own entity,] are enumerated and that all the positions positing their own presentations are to be taken to be mere verbal designations. Since [sutra] says "If the objects that bring enjoyment in a dream are not obtained by him even in a dream, what need is their to mention [that he does not obtain them] when awake?" and many [other] such statements, it is totally inadmissible to say "There is no difference between the man of a dream and the man of the waking state in terms of their being or not being a man" because it is said that those sentient beings who contribute to his enjoyment are also not found to be sentient beings at the time of a dream, whereas they are necessarily posited to be found at the time of waking. Hence, it should be understood that stating that for this system the sense consciousnesses, such as the eye consciousness and so forth, exist in a dream is a big mistake. This being the case, applying it to the Chittamatra tenets which lack skill in the wisdom realizing the final definitive meaning, they are only to be eliminated.

The *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra* lists the twenty-two powers and establishes them to be without true existence. It sets out two ways of enumerating the object of negation: (1) ultimate existence and (2) existence by way of its own entity. These are two different names but the meaning is the same. In general, in the Prasangika Madhyamika system there are six qualifications in affixing an object of negation:

1. existence by way of its own character,
2. existence from its own side,
3. inherent existence,
4. true existence,
5. ultimate existence, and
6. existence as reality.

On the other hand, for the Svatantrika Madhyamikas only the latter three are objects of negation.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas posit all phenomena as a mere verbal designation.

Student: What is the difference between "six qualifications in affixing the object of negation" and "six objects of negation"?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are all objects of negation but they are also in relation to a particular basis, such as a pot. Thus, true existence, for example, is negated on the basis of pot. Thus, these qualifications have to be affixed to the pot. All 108 phenomena do not exist truly, inherently, etc. Qualifications in affixing an object of negation means that a particular object of negation is to be affixed to a basis of emptiness, for example, a pot. Affixing a qualification means to affix certain words

to the object of negation; for example, inherent existence. If one were to say "Such-and-such does not exist" it would not be correct, instead one must say "Such-and-such does not exist inherently." Object of negation by itself does not have much meaning; one has to affix that object of negation, for example, ultimate existence, to something.

One enjoys oneself in a dream, but the object of enjoyment, another person, is not found when sought in a dream. Due to this, there is no need to mention that he or she is not found when awake. If someone says that there is no difference between the man of a dream and the man of the waking state, this is incorrect "because it is said that those sentient beings who contribute to his enjoyment are also not found to be sentient beings at the time of a dream, whereas they are necessarily posited to be found at the time of waking." The man of a waking state does exist, whereas the man of a dream does not. The people who one contacts when awake actually exist, whereas the people of a dream do not. In the Prasangika Madhyamika system there do not exist eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousness in a dream; therefore, saying that according to them there exist such sense consciousnesses in a dream would be incorrect. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "This being the case, applying it to the Chittamatra tenets which lack skill in the wisdom realizing the final definitive meaning, they are only to be eliminated." In short, the Chittamatrins lack skill in the wisdom realizing emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 263) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2A3 Indicating that the two, refuting such and meditation on repulsiveness, are not contradictory

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If it is mentioned here: If a knower does not exist without an object, then how is it that yogis see the ground as completely filled by skeletons through the precepts of the gurus?
>
> It is explained:
>
> *Wherever a yogi, through a guru's precept,*
> *Sees the ground filled with skeletons,*
> *There also, the three are seen as without production.* [6.69abc]
>
> [In other words:] Object, sense faculty, and consciousness.
>
> If asked: Why is that?
>
> *Because that meditative stabilization is indicated as wrong attention.* [6.69d]
>
> Because it is set forth saying "attention to what is not thus." This is to be accepted like that without doubt.

"If a knower does not exist without an object" refers to a consciousness which does not exist without an *external* object.

A guru give precepts, or instructions, to a disciple who then meditates and comes to see the ground as completely filled with skeletons. This meditation on skeletons is taught in the *Treasury of Knowledge*. One begins by visualizing that a small piece of flesh falls from the center of one's forehead revealing the bone below. Then gradually all the remaining flesh falls away leaving one's own body a mere skeleton. This skeleton body should then be expanded horizontally in all directions until the whole ground is filled with skeletons. Having done so, one then retracts all the skeletons back into oneself, only to once again expands them out in all directions. This meditation on repulsiveness is done in dependence on the precepts of a guru, due to which one attains a meditative stabilization seeing the whole ground pervaded by skeletons. Is this meditative stabilization mistaken or not? It is

mistaken in the sense that what is seen by this meditative stabilization does not actually exist. Is the whole ground pervaded by skeletons as it is seen by this meditative stabilization? It is not, therefore, such a meditative stabilization is taught to be mistaken. This meditative stabilization is a wrong attention. On the other hand, in the context of the ten totalities, when the ground is seen to be pervaded by gold this is said to be correct. Why is this?
Student: Because the ground, as well as water, contains gold and is, therefore, a suitable basis to be transformed into gold. On the other hand, the ground is not suitable to be transformed into skeletons.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why cannot the ground be transformed into skeletons?
Student: Perhaps it is because gold is actually an element in the earth that is stable, whereas skeletons are an organic structure that degenerates.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: This subject of the totalities was discussed in the eight chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* saying that inner spheres cannot be taken as an object of meditation of the meditative stabilizations of the totalities. Specifically, that which is conjoined with consciousness, as well as sound, is not an appropriate object of a meditative stabilization on the totalities. Sound is not an object of a meditative stabilization on the totalities because sound does not have a continuum of similar type. The five sense powers are not objects of a meditative stabilization on the totalities because they are included in the continuum.

Thursday afternoon, 26 October 2000

(Masters Program Correspondence Course students please note that there were no teachings the afternoon of October 25th and the morning of October 26th.)

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 40), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2A2A-3 That such refutation and meditation on foulness are not contradictory

"If there is no inherently existent consciousness without external objects," you may say, "It is contradictory to say that a yogin, on the instructions of his guru, sees the earth full of skeletons."

For the yogin too, who, on his guru's advice,
Perceives the earth as full of skeletons,
We see that none of the three things exists,
For this is taught as a "wrong" act of attention. [6.69]

It is not contradictory, since it is seen that even that yogin who, on his guru's instructions, sees the earth full of skeletons, does not have the three inherently existent things, object, organ, and consciousness; for that samadhi is taught as a "wrong" act of attention, one of conviction[44], [not absolutely real].

Wrong attention, in this context, is mere belief or conviction. When a yogi meditates on the ground filled with skeletons, the object, sense power, and consciousness do not exist inherently. Gedun Drup says: "We see that none of the three things exists." Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says: "Because that meditative stabilization is indicated as wrong attention." His autocommentary says: "Because it is set forth saying 'attention to what is not thus.' This is to be accepted like that without doubt." In short, this meditative stabilization is a wrong attention because it believes that the ground is pervaded by skeletons, whereas it is not.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

[44] *mos pa*

If it were not like that:

If [the objects] of the mind of repulsion are just like
The objects of your sense awareness,
Likewise, due to another directing awareness to that place
They would perceive that; it would no more be false. [6.70]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

If, for you, objects of the mind of foulness
Are also like those of sensory consciousness,
Then, turning his mind to that place, another would see
Likewise, and it would no more be false. [6.70]

For you Chittamatrins, just as objects of sense consciousness are perceived by one and perceived by another, so it follows also that if a yogin with consciousness of foulness sees skeletons, then when another person, not a yogin, turned his mind to that place, he would perceive the skeletons likewise. That samadhi would not be false, a convictional act of attention. This is because the samadhi clearly perceiving skeletons exists inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as when you view a demonstration of drama and so forth, through directing the eyes to that place, just as a visual consciousness bearing that aspect is produced in one, similarly it is also [produced] in others. Similarly, like the yogi, also in those non-yogis viewing the place of skeletons and so forth, a consciousness bearing that aspect would be produced; like a consciousness of blue and so forth. This concentration would no more be an attention to what is not thus.

Here the example of a drama, or a show, is given. When someone looks at a show an eye consciousness is produced; likewise, an eye consciousness is produced in another person who looks at that show. Then, just as when a yogi views skeletons due to the force of his meditation, so should others who are not yogis view skeletons when they look at that place. When a yogi looks at skeletons an eye consciousness is produced having the aspect of skeletons, just as when someone, even a dog, looks at blue, an eye consciousness having the aspect of blue is produced, whether or not that person is a yogi.

Chandrakirti says: "This concentration would no more be an attention to what is not thus."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

Like the man with a distorted sense
Is the preta *on a riverbank, seeing pus.* [6.71ab]

It follows that the consciousness of a preta on a river bank, perceiving pus and blood, is also not an example of consciousness inherently existing without external objects, for it is the same as the perception of falling hair by a person with distorted sense, being false.

Falling hair does not exist as seen by a person with cataracts and, likewise, the pus and blood seen on a flowing river by a hungry ghost do not exist. When a hungry ghost, who is thirsty, approaches a flowing river it sees only pus and blood. Some hungry ghosts do not even see that, but only see a dry riverbed. This is due to actions (karma). Some hungry ghosts may see fruit trees in the distance, but

upon drawing near they see only bare limbs. Some hungry ghosts feel cold in the sunlight and hot in moonlight.

If a human being fills a cup with water, a human being sees it as water, a god sees it as nectar, and a hungry ghost sees it is pus and blood. When all of them grab for it, if the human being obtains it he drinks water, if the god obtains it he drinks nectar, and if the hungry ghost obtains it he drinks pus and blood. This is all due to karma. The substantial cause of the liquid are the particles of water, whereas the cooperative cause is the karma of each individual. Based upon the substantial cause which is the particles of water, a human being drinks water, a god drinks nectar, and a hungry ghost drinks pus and blood. For the valid cognizer of a human being it exists as water, but for the god it exists as nectar, and for the hungry ghost it exists as pus and blood.

Another example is Mount Meru: trainees intent upon the *Kalachakra Tantra* see it as round whereas trainees intent upon the *Treasury of Knowledge* see it as square. Since there are two different ways of seeing the same thing, the debate is: in its place it follows that there are two Mound Merus, one established as square by the valid cognizers of trainees intent on the *Kalachakra Tantra* and one established as round by trainees intent on the *Treasury of Knowledge*. What do you think? Should we rely on those who see the world as flat or those who see the world as round? Another example is two people seeing the same person, one of whom sees him as humble and the other who sees him as arrogant.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, it should be known that:
>
> *The awareness of pus with a preta at a flowing river, also*
> *Is equivalent to one having a sense with cataracts.* [6.71ab]
>
> Equivalent to what was explained saying [6.54b]: *sees whatever hairs through the strength of the cataract*, one should understand also others having a type like that. You can elaborate.

Similarly, due to jaundice one sees a white conch as yellow, due to another disease one sees a white snow mountain as blue, due to a malformation of the veins of the eye one sees things unclearly, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 263) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS: If there does not exist an inherently existent consciousness that has clear appearance of forms, sounds, and so forth without external objects, how is it justifiable for the yogis who meditate on repulsiveness following the instructions of a lama to see the ground filled with skeletons because, even though the skeletons do not exist, an inherently existent consciousness does exist?
> PRASANGIKA MADHAYAMIKAS:
>
> *Those yogis who, through the instructions of a lama,*
> *See the ground filled with skeletons,*
> *Also see all three as without production*
> *Because it is indicated to be a wrong mental attention.* [6.69]
>
> *Those yogis who,* meditating on repulsiveness *through the instructions of a lama, see the ground filled with skeletons, also see all three* – the object, sense power, and consciousness – *as without* inherent *production because that* meditative stabilization *is indicated*, that is, it is taught in sutra, *to be a wrong mental attention*, that is, not what actually is. If the consciousness to which skeletons appear were inherently existent, the appearance of [skeletons] would also become such, due to

> which that mental attention would become an object-possessor of what actually is. This should be unquestionably asserted in this way.

For a yogi meditating on repulsiveness through the instructions of a lama, object, sense power, and consciousness do not exist inherently. This meditative stabilization is considered wrong because it is mental attention believing in what actually is not there.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the consciousness to which skeletons appear were inherently existent then it would follow that the ground would actually be pervaded by skeletons just as they appear. If that were the case, then that mental attention would become an object-possessor of what actually is, that is, ground pervaded by skeletons. In other words, the ground would actually be filled with skeletons and there would be an object-possessor that has this as its object.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 264) says:

> *If, for you, just like the objects of a sense awareness*
> *So too are those of a mind of repulsiveness, then,*
> *Likewise, since others who direct their awareness to that place*
> *Would realize them, this would also not be [attention] to the false.* [6.70]

> *If* this were not the case, then *for you* – just as when looking at a theatrical show, through directing the eyes to that place, there is the production *of a sense awareness*, an eye consciousness, having the aspect of that *object* in one person, likewise, there would also be the production [of an eye consciousness] having such an aspect in others – *so too*, like the yogis who have *a mind of repulsiveness*, [also] *others*, that is, non-yogis, *who direct their awareness to the place* where yogis see skeletons, that is, those desiring to look at a place of skeletons and so forth, *would realize* skeletons, that is, would generate the seeing of skeletons; for example, like a consciousness of blue.

If a yogi creates a theatrical show such as transforming himself into a skeleton and then performing for others, those who look at him would see a skeleton and the yogi would also see himself as a skeleton. Can a yogi not do this? When the Buddha was about to become enlightened, while sitting in meditation position under the bodhi tree, the maras manifested beautiful seductive young women in order to distract him from his meditation. However, the Buddha by the power of his meditative stabilization on repulsiveness was able to transform them into ugly, old women, wrinkled and toothless. The maras then manifested soldiers who shot poisonous arrows at the Buddha but he transformed them by the power of his meditative stabilization on love into a rain of flowers as they touched his body.

There is also a story of Naropa, who when he first encountered Tilopa, saw him cooking live fish in a fire and eating them, while piling the bones up beside him. But Tilopa then threw the bones into the river and live fish swam away.

There is also a story about two people who traveled from Nepal to Tibet to meet the king, Trisong Detsen, an emanation of Avalokiteshvara, to ask him to teach the Dharma. However, upon arriving at this palace, they were shocked to see many piles of human heads and wondered how he could be an emanation of Avalokiteshvara. They then met with the king who asked them what they wanted, but, instead of requesting teachings, they told him that they planned to leave very quickly to return home. Trisong Detsen then gave them each a handful of sand and told them to keep it, offered them a meal, and invited them to sleep in the palace that night. The next morning when they awoke they were surprised to found themselves in their home and that the sand had been transformed into gold.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 264) says:

> Here, in accordance with the autocommentary, the translation [of the above verse from the *Supplement* (v. 6.70)] could also have been:
>
> *For you, just like those directed to the objects of a sense awareness,*
> *So too is it for those possessing a mind of repulsiveness.*
> *Likewise, through also being produced in others who direct*
> *Their awareness to that place, that too would not be false.*

Lama Tsongkhapa provides another possible translation of the same verse from the *Supplement*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 264) says:

> This meditative stabilization *would also not* be mental attention *to the false*, that is, to a wrong object. Also [the assertion that] yogis and non-yogis would equally [see skeletons] is in terms of the main point that if consciousness were to exist inherently then dependence on meditating on the instructions regarding skeletons could be negated.

If consciousness were inherently existent there would be no need to depend on the instructions of a lama in that skeletons would be seen whether or not one is a yogi. That is, both yogis and non-yogis would equally have the appearance of skeletons. But, since consciousness does not exist inherently, it is necessary to rely on a lama's instructions on repulsiveness, whereby there is a difference between yogis and non-yogis.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 264) says:

> *Like those possessing a sense power with cataracts,*
> *So too is the mind of pus in a hungry ghost on the bank of a flowing river.* [6.71ab]
>
> Similarly, also understand the way of responding to the examples set forth, such as those of illusions, reflections, and so forth, as being *like those possessing a sense power with cataracts*. *Also* understand the production of a *mind of pus* and blood *in a hungry ghost on the bank of a flowing river* to be as above.

The example of an illusion, such as a horse or elephant, created by a magician and that of a reflection of a face in a mirror are examples that show things do not exist inherently. This is because if consciousness, such as an eye consciousness, existed inherently it would follow that spectators would not need to depend upon the magician's mantras, blowing on pebbles, and so forth in order to see illusions. Also the seeing of a reflection would arise without looking in a mirror. This, however, does not occur. The Tibetan nomads say: "There are eyes that see others' faces, but there are no eyes that see one's own face." This means that one has to rely on a mirror to see one's own face. In short, everything is a dependent-arising.

Friday morning, 27 October 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 264) says:

> In regard to that, the five forms that are phenomena spheres are not imputed by the tenets of the materialists, but are taught in sutra and are also accordingly asserted by me.

The five forms that are phenomena spheres were already discussed. They are not imputed by the tenets of the materialists but are taught in sutra and by Lama Tsongkhapa. The five forms that are phenomena spheres asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas are:

1. form arising from aggregation,
2. space-form,
3. form arising from a promise,
4. imaginary form, and
5. form for one with meditative power.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 264) says:

> Therefore, clearly appearing, though non-existent, skeletons are necessarily asserted to be physical, like reflections, but since they appear only to a mental consciousness they are not form spheres as are reflections. Since they are also not any of the nine remaining physical spheres, it is said "They are imaginary forms that are phenomena spheres."

The appearance of the ground pervaded by skeletons to a yogi is not a form sphere, nor is it any of the other nine remaining physical spheres:

1. sound sphere,
2. odor sphere,
3. taste sphere,
4. tangible object sphere,
5. eye sphere,
6. ear sphere,
7. nose sphere,
8. tongue sphere,
9. body sphere.

What is the eye sphere, the ear sphere, and so forth? Are they clear matter or the actual organ?
Student: They are the clear matter in the eye and so forth, that is, the sense power.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There can be debate: "Is the eye sense power which is physical, a color or shape?" In short, the eyeball and the other sense organs are included in the form sphere. The eyeball is visual form in that it is an object apprehended by an eye consciousness. The eye sphere is the eye sense power, the ear sphere is the ear sense power, and so forth. The sense consciousnesses are included in the mental sphere.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 265) says:

> The appearance of falling hair to an eye consciousness is a form sphere, as is a reflection. Since the appearance of a river as pus and blood to hungry ghosts appears to their eye consciousnesses, it is necessarily posited as a form sphere. Also [Asanga's] *Compendium on the Mahayana* says:
>
> > Because for each of the classes of hungry ghosts,
> > Animals, human beings, and gods,
> > One thing is different for their minds,
> > Objects are asserted to not be established.
>
> Regarding this, the *Compendium on the Mahayana* does not clearly explain the way in which they individually see the same object. The explanation composed by Bhadantopasaka of this [stanza] is:
>
> > By the force of the ripening of one's own personal actions, the thing that is a river is seen by hungry ghosts to be filled with pus. For animals, such as fish and so forth, due to their awareness [perceiving] an abode, the very [same river] functions as an abode.

> On the other hand, human beings conceive it to be water that is sweet, limpid, and cool, use it to wash, and engage in drinking it. The gods absorbed in the infinite space sphere are described as seeing it as space because they have destroyed the discrimination of form.

To hungry ghosts a river appears as pus and blood, to animals it appears as an abode, and to humans it appears as water for drinking, washing, and so forth. To the gods, in general, a river appears as nectar but here is said that the gods of infinite space see "it as space because they have destroyed the discrimination of form." One single functioning thing is, thus, perceived in different ways by different beings. When the *Compendium on the Mahayana* says "Objects are asserted to not be established," it means that external objects are not established in that this text is renowned as having been written from the point of view of the Chittamatra tenets. However, the different ways in which different beings perceive the same object is not clearly explained in this text.

Bhadantopasaka says that, due to the ripening of their respective actions, a hungry ghost, for example, sees a river as pus and blood. On the other hand, to the gods of infinite space a river appears as space due to their having destroyed the discrimination of form.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 265) says:

> OBJECTION: The seer of migrating beings who think "It is that" is a valid cognizer of conventions. Yet, if a single base is established by a valid cognizer to be dissimilar [things], then the two – (i) being pus and blood and (ii) not being pus and blood – would not be contradictory and even that established by a valid cognizer would not be reliable.
> RESPONSE: If through understanding the meaning of the scriptures in this way one posits similarly, then valid cognizers would [in fact] become unreliable. Moreover, since that is unsuitable, asking "How is that?" is the questioning of the intelligent. If, through considering such understanding to be the meaning of [the scriptures], [someone] were to say "Establishment by a valid cognizer is unreliable" this would be completely unacceptable since it is never posited that "By understanding such-and-such an object it is realized like that" and because it deprecates all valid cognizers. Why is that? [In response,] an example is initially explained [as follows].

In short, if valid cognizers are unreliable then there is nothing that can be posited as true.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 265) says:

> Those who possess knowledge mantras are not burned even though they touch an incandescent iron ball burned by fire. When they take that iron ball in their hands, although their body consciousness apprehends the tangible object which is that iron, that tangible object is not generated in the aspect of being extremely hot and burning. This is due to the condition of washing their hands and so forth with water [blessed by] the recitation of knowledge mantras. For those who lack the recitation of such knowledge mantras, the tangible object that is the iron ball is generated in the aspect of being extremely hot and burning. This being the case, both the tangible object that does not burn and the tangible object that burns are necessarily a tangible object that is a single iron ball. The tangible object that is established by one of the two valid body consciousnesses is not established by the other. Due to this, both being asserted to be valid cognizers, that established by one is not negated by the other.

Someone who possesses the power of mantras can even lick an iron ball heated by fire without being burned. In fact, there is a Sera lama, who now lives in Australia, called Kunchog Rinpoche, who recites mantra, then heats an iron rod until it is burning hot and licks it without being burned and then uses it to cure the sick. Those with knowledge mantras who touch a burning iron ball actually perceive it to be the tangible object cold. For them, there is the production of the tangible object cold

due to the substantial cause of the particles of iron and the cooperative condition which is the knowledge-mantras. In this case of such persons, their body consciousness is established to be a valid body consciousness. Therefore, upon a single basis, a burning iron ball, two types of tangible objects are produced: (i) the tangible object hot for those without knowledge-mantras and (ii) the tangible object cold for those with knowledge-mantras. Thus, on the basis of a single iron ball there are two different tangible objects.

Another example is to put some salt in a cup of tea, then when different people drink the same tea, some perceive it to be too salty, others to lack salt, and others to be just right. Why does this happen? Think about it. This was my own experience when it was my turn to shop for and prepare food in Buxa. Some people would compliment me on the food, others would say that there was too much oil, others that there as too much onion, and so forth.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: For the Prasangikas, even the mind, like any other phenomenon, is merely imputed by conceptuality. What subject imputes mind? On what basis of imputation is mind imputed?
Student 2: Mind is imputed by mind just as is any other phenomenon. The basis of that imputation is that which is clear and knowing.
Student 3: Mind is imputed by a conceptual valid cognizer.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What is your name?
Student: Maurizio.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to the Prasangikas that is a mere imputation. Who imputed that name? The basis of imputation is a human being, the subject that imputed 'Maurizio' is also a human being. The imputer does not need to be oneself. For example, if someone says to you "Maurizio is very intelligent," it is another person imputing this. It is not necessary that oneself imputes these qualities to oneself, it can be done by another person.

Student: What is the difference between substantial existence and true existence?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In the Prasangika Madhyamika system they are the same. In the Svatantrika Madhyamika system they are different – there is no true existence but there is substantial existence. According to the Svatantrikas there is imputed existence and substantial existence, whereas according to the Prasangikas there is no substantial existence and everything is imputedly existent. If there were substantial existence then phenomena would exist from their own side.

Student: In the Chittamatra system if all other-powered phenomena arise in dependence on latencies of a similar type how can there be a consciousness newly realizing emptiness? If someone puts a pot in front of someone who has never seen a pot before, what happens?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: At that time a latency of similar type ripens due to which there is the new realization of pot.
Student: But what if that sentient being has never realized pot before?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Then it is due to the ripening of a latency of actual expression (linguistic latency). However, there is no need that with respect to a latency of similar type that the mind is perceiving the same object that was perceived before. Also this person might have seen pot many eons earlier.
Student: But what about the new realization of emptiness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is not that the activation of a latency of similar type means that there was a previous realization of emptiness, it is enough that there are the latencies of having heard about and thought about emptiness. Later on due to the activation of the latencies of hearing and thinking about emptiness, there arises the direct realization of emptiness. Although emptiness is not realized while

one is hearing and thinking about it, latencies are still deposited. In order to activate these latencies it is necessary to have particular conditions. Due to the power of the infusion of latencies on the mind of hearing and thinking about emptiness, one day there will arise the realization of emptiness.

The Chittamatrins posit a naturally abiding lineage and a developmental lineage; the developmental lineage is the nourishing of the naturally abiding lineage by hearing and thinking. The naturally abiding lineage is the seed of an uncontaminated mind, according to the Chittamatrins it has three features:

1. it has come from beginningless lives,
2. it is obtained by the power of reality, and
3. it is the seed of an uncontaminated mind.

Student: Is true existence as defined in the Chittamatra school equivalent to the measure of true existence as set out by the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika school?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Probably there is some small difference. The Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika say that the definition of the measure of true existence is: that which is established by its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being posited by the force of a non-defective awareness. On the other hand, the Chittamatrins say that the definition of the measure of true existence is: that which is established by way of its own uncommon objective mode of subsistence without being posited by conceptuality. The measure of the object of negation is different in these schools. In the Chittamatra system if it is established through being posited by conceptuality then its true existence is negated; thus, they say that other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are truly existent. In the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamika all phenomena are merely imputed by conception. However, when it is asked what is negated by the term 'merely' in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system and what is negated by it in the Prasangika Madhyamika system the answer is different.

END

Wednesday afternoon, 1 November 2000

(Masters Program Correspondence Course participants please note that there were no teachings 30-31 October and the morning of 1 November 2000)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 266) says:

> Similarly, in any place where there is a basis that is a flowing river, when one part of that river is generated by the force of their previous actions as pus and blood for hungry ghosts and another part of the river, without appearing as pus and blood, is generated by the force of their previous actions as water for drinking and washing for human beings, both of them are each parts of the same river. Therefore, the two, the object established by a hungry ghost's valid eye consciousness and the object established by a human being's valid eye consciousness, are also individual things. Due to this, how can the very object that is established by one of the two [valid eye consciousnesses] be established as the opposite by the other? Likewise, [Nagarjuna's] *Letter to a Friend* also says:
>
> > For hungry ghosts, in springtime
> > Even the moon is hot; in winter even the sun is cold.
>
> For hungry ghosts, due to the force of their previous actions, in springtime the tangible object that is moonlight is generated as extremely hot, whereas in winter the tangible object that is sunlight is cold. However, it is not contradictory for the moonlight and sunlight to be produced [respectively] in the aspects of cold and warmth for human beings. The very tangible object that is measured as hot by one of the two valid cognizers is not measured as cold by the other and both posit a tangible object that is the light of the same moon or sun. Since "one thing" is also taught, when there arises coarse understanding without finely analyzing the meaning of the scriptures, do not settle upon it satisfied.

When hungry ghosts have the appearance of a flowing river as pus and blood, it is due to a substantial cause, which is part of the flowing river, and a cooperative condition, which is the actions of hungry ghosts. The eye consciousness of a hungry ghost that sees a flowing river as pus and blood is a valid cognizer. On the other hand, human beings see the same river as water for drinking and washing due to a substantial cause, which is part of the flowing river, and a cooperative condition, which is the actions of human beings. The eye consciousness of a human being that sees a flowing river as water is also a valid cognizer. Therefore, the eye consciousnesses of both the hungry ghost and the human being are valid cognizers.

In addition, Nagarjuna's *Letter to a Friend* says that in spring, moonlight, which is generally felt to be cool, feels hot to the hungry ghosts. The substantial cause for this is a part of the moonlight, whereas the cooperative condition is the actions of the hungry ghosts. Contrarily, in the winter sunlight appears as cold to hungry ghosts due to a substantial cause, which is part of the sunlight, and a cooperative condition, which is their actions. The *Compendium on the Mahayana* was previously quoted as similarly saying: "One thing is different for their minds." This means that what appears to hungry ghosts is not the same as that which appears to human beings. Here 'one thing' refers to one single basis, such as a flowing river, that is the basis for different appearances, such as water or pus and blood. Another example of one base appearing differently to different beings is sunlight and moonlight. Sunlight, which in general appears as hot, appears to hungry ghosts as cold even in winter, and moonlight, which in general appears as cool, appears as hot to hungry ghosts even in springtime. This is due to the particular actions (karma) of hungry ghosts.

Another example is that of two human beings looking at a third person, each of which has a different way of seeing that person. The appearance from the side of the object is different to these two human beings and therefore the feelings that arise in them are also different. For example, it is recounted in sutra that when Shakyamuni Buddha was alive, Lekpe Karmo, who had memorized the

three mother sutras, saw him as a deceitful monk, whereas another person saw him to be an actual supreme emanation body. This difference is due to their respective karma.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 266) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2A-2B Brief conclusion of such a refutation

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *In brief, "Just as objects of knowledge are non-existent,*
> *Likewise awareness is also non-existent." Know this meaning.* [6.71cd]

This means that just as objects of knowledge are non-inherently existent, so too are awarenesses non-inherently existent.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2A2B Conclusion

> *In short, just as knowables don't exist,*
> *Neither does the mind. Understand this.* [6.71cd]

In short, this meaning should be understood: that just as objects of knowledge do not inherently exist, so too the mind does not inherently exist. For it is not admissible that objects of knowledge should not exist and the knowing exist.

In short, both objects of knowledge and the minds that know them are the same in not existing inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It should be understood that just as an object of knowledge lacks inherent existence, similarly also an awareness bearing the aspect of an object of knowledge is not produced by its own essential-nature. As was taught [in the *Praise of the Supramundane*, 10]:[45]
>
> > Not knowing, there is no object to be known.
> > Without that, consciousness is non-existent.
> > Therefore, knowers and objects to be known
> > Were taught by you as without self-nature.

If no one knows it, then it is not an object of knowledge. If there is no object of knowledge, there is no knower. Therefore, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas objects of knowledge and knowers, or consciousness, are not inherently existent, instead they exist in mutual dependence.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly [in the *Samyuttanikaya*]:[46]

[45] Correctly attributed by Poisson in his Tibetan text but unattributed in the translation. See Lindtner, p. 132-133.

[46] Attributed by Poisson in the Tibetan text to *Samyuttanikaya*, as cited in *Madhyamakavritti*, 41.11. See also the earlier quotation in the first section, Tib. p. 22, where the Tibetan of the overlapping lines is slightly different.

> Consciousness as similar to an illusion was taught by the solar kinsman.
> Likewise, also its referents are definitely like illusory things.

Consciousnesses were taught by Shakyamuni Buddha to be like illusions, as were their observed objects. They are said to be like illusions because just as illusions are false and lack true existence, likewise, consciousnesses and observed objects are false and lack true existence.

The epithet "solar kinsman," which refers to Shakyamuni Buddha, has its source in a particular story. There was once a fully ordained monk named Gautam who was doing retreat in a sugarcane field. One day the wife of the king of the area, when out walking in the sugarcane field with her retinue of five hundred young women, came across Gautam. Upon seeing him, she generated faith in him, became his follower, and remained there in the sugarcane field with him. When she did not return to the palace, the king sent someone to find out why and the messenger returned to say that she had remained with Gautam. The king became very angry and ordered Gautam to be impaled on a wooden trident. As Gautam was dying, the gods became concerned that his lineage would be lost and sent a cool breeze which, upon touching the monk, caused him pleasure, due to which he lost a drop of semen. This drop that fell in the sugarcane field was heated by the sun and gave rise to a human being who became known as the "solar kinsmen." For this reason Shakyamuni Buddha is also known as the Sugarcane One.

Shakyamuni Buddha is also called the 'Lion of the Sakya Clan,' the word '*sakya*' meaning 'able.' The origin of this epithet comes from the story of a king who had many wives. One day some of his wives sent some of his sons and daughters away to the forest. Due to their isolation, they procreated amongst themselves; their children came to be known as '*sakya*' meaning 'able.'

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, this deprecation about external objects – held by the demon of forgetfulness who propounds consciousness as a substance – will in no way make one fall into the ravine. Having intensively subdued it by giving the excellent secret mantra of scriptures and reasoning of the holy compassionate practitioners, it should be retained.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 266-7) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *In brief, understand the meaning that "Just as objects of knowledge*
> *Do not exist, likewise, awarenesses also do not exist."* [6.71cd]
>
> The meaning *in brief* of the previous extensive explanation [is as follows]. By saying that one should *understand* and cherish *the meaning that* "*Just as objects of knowledge do not* inherently *exist*, *likewise*, *the awarenesses* that have the aspects of those objects of knowledge *are also not* produced by way of their own nature," [Chandrakirti] indicates that there is no difference between objects of knowledge and consciousnesses in terms of their existing or not existing inherently.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that external objects and consciousnesses are (i) the same in not existing inherently and (ii) the same in existing. On the other hand, the Chittamatrins say that external objects do not exist and that consciousnesses exist inherently. Nagarjuna never differentiated external objects and consciousnesses in this way.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 267) says:

> The statements

- "If falling hair does not exist, also the consciousness to which it appears does not exist,"
- "If the referent object of the adherence to an illusory horse and elephant does not exist, also the consciousness that apprehends them does not exist,"

and so forth are not at all the system of this master, [Chandrakirti].
[Nagarjuna's] *Praise of the Supramundane* also says:

> Without consciousness, there is no object of knowledge.
> Without that, consciousness does not exist.
> Therefore, consciousnesses and objects of knowledge
> Were taught by you to not exist inherently.

[*Samyuttanikaya*] also says:

> Consciousness being like an illusion
> Was taught by the Solar Kinsman.
> Likewise, also its observed objects are
> Definitely likened to illusory things.

If "by such a consciousness" is not posited, objects of knowledge cannot be posited. If "this knows such an object" is not posited, also consciousness cannot be posited. Therefore, without objects of knowledge, consciousnesses also do not exist. Consciousness and object of knowledge are posited in relation to one another, due to which it is taught "Both of them were indicated by you to not exist inherently."

"Both of them were indicated by you to not exist inherently" refers to external objects and consciousnesses [which are indicated by the Prasangika Madhyamikas to not exist inherently].

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 267) says:

Therefore, the assertion of Arya [Nagarjuna] is that there is no distinction between one of the two truths and not the other existing with respect to the two.
[Nagarjuna's] *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* also says:

> Consciousnesses realize objects of knowledge;
> Without objects of knowledge, consciousnesses do not exist.

Since this is similar in meaning to the *Praise [of the Supramundane]* which was cited before, it is the scriptural source [for saying] that objects and consciousness are similar in terms of existing and not existing.

According to the Chittamatrins external objects do not exist, while consciousness does exist. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is not correct in that these two are similar in terms of existing. The Chittamatrins say that since external objects exist there is no need to mention that they do not inherently exist. That is, because external objects do not exist, they do not exist inherently, whereas because consciousnesses exist, they exist inherently. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that external objects and consciousnesses are the same in either existing inherently or not existing inherently.

Thursday morning, 2 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 267) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B Refuting a valid cognizer that proves other-powered phenomena inherently exist

1 Refuting self-cognizers, the proof of other-powered phenomena
2 Indicating that the Chittamatra system has deviated from both truths
3 Hence, it is suitable to be a follower only of Nagarjuna's system

4 Indicating that the two refutations of other-powered phenomena and worldly conventions are not similar

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1 Refuting self-cognizers, the proof of other-powered phenomena

A Through questioning the proof of other-powered phenomena, indicating that [self-cognizers] are inadmissible
B Refuting the others' response that [self-cognizers] are admissible
C Indicating also by other reasonings that self-cognizers are inadmissible
D Indicating that inherently existent other-powered phenomena are like the son of a barren woman

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1A Through questioning the proof of other-powered phenomena, indicating that [self-cognizers] are inadmissible

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 105) says:

> Therefore, having shown consciousness without external objects as impossible, in order to refute existence itself in mere things, it is explained:
>
> *If an other powered thing exists which, without an apprehended,*
> *Is separated from apprehension itself and emptied by the two,*
> *What will know the existence of this?*
> *It is unsuitable to say "It exists although not apprehended."* [6.72]
>
> If an other powered [phenomena] exists emptied by the two, "apprehended and apprehender," by what consciousness will you observe the existence of that? It is incorrect that it be apprehended by itself, because of the contradiction in its acting on itself. Like this, the very edge of a sword does not cut itself, the tip of a finger does not touch itself, even a well trained expert athlete is unable to mount on his own shoulders, fire does not burn itself, and an eye does not view itself.

In short, the Chittamatrins assert self-cognizers.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2B1A Demanding and refuting proof of dependent phenomena

If without object, and separate from subject,
Empty of both, exists a dependent thing,
By what can its existence be perceived?
It's improper to say, "Although not perceived, it exists." [6.72]

If the functional thing of a dependent phenomenon exists without external object and free of a subject separate in substance, empty of both object and subject of different substance, then by what is the existence of that dependent phenomenon known? A proof must be stated, for it is improper to say, "Although it is not apprehended by valid cognition, it exists."

If you say, "It is established by self-knowing consciousness," then:

It is not established that it is perceived by itself. [6.73a]

It follows that it is not established that that consciousness is experienced by itself, self-knowing consciousness, because self-knowing consciousness is not established.

In short, the Chittamatra system asserts consciousness to be an other-powered phenomenon that is without external objects. If they are asked what consciousness knows the existence of that other-powered phenomenon, they respond that is a self-cognizer. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is incorrect because the Chittamatrins' reason has yet to be established. This is because the

Chittamatrins prove that there is an inherently existent consciousness without external objects by using self-cognizer as a reason, whereas this reason has yet to be established. For this reason the coming verse of the *Supplement* says:

> *If established through remembering later,*
> *This unestablished [memory] expressed in order to prove*
> *The unestablished [self-cognition] is not a proof.* [6.73bcd]

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that self-cognizers do not exist because an object-possessor that cognizes itself is not possible. Chandrakirti says: "It is incorrect that it be apprehended by itself, because of the contradiction in its acting on itself." To prove this Chandrakirti then sets out the following examples: "Like this, the very edge of a sword does not cut itself, the tip of a finger does not touch itself, even a well trained expert athlete is unable to mount on his own shoulders, fire does not burn itself, and an eye does not view itself." No matter how sharp a sword is, it cannot cut itself, whereas it can be used to cut another sword. Likewise, the tip of a finger cannot touch itself but can touch the tip of another finger. Similarly, an athlete, no matter how flexible he is, cannot mount on his own shoulders. Fire also does not burn itself and an eye does not see itself, no matter how clear one's sight is. These five examples are set forth by the Prasangika Madhyamikas in order to prove the non-existence of self-cognizers.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Nor is that apprehended by another consciousness because of contradiction with one's own [Chittamatrin] tenets. This is because it is set forth [in the Chittamatrin scriptures] that "If another cognizer is the object of a cognition, it will harm mere cognition-ness." Therefore, like that, there does not exist an apprehender of that in any way. That not apprehended does not have existence-ness.
>
> If it is mentioned here: Even if apprehension of other by another does not exist, nevertheless, self-cognition exists. Therefore, because only self-cognition apprehends that, there will be existence-ness.
>
> To explain that, that also is not so:
>
> *It is not established that it is experienced by itself.* [6.73a]
>
> To say "It is apprehended by itself," this is not established.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if consciousness were apprehended by another consciousness this would also contradict the Chittamatrins' tenets; therefore, there are no self-cognizers. The Chittamatrins' scriptures say that "If another cognizer is the object of a cognition, it will harm mere cognition-ness." Thus, they say that although there is no apprehension of one consciousness by another consciousness, self-cognizers do exist. To this the Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "Therefore, like that, there does not exist an apprehender of that in any way. That not apprehended does not have existence-ness."

The main point here is that the Chittamatrins say that consciousness is an other-powered phenomenon that exists inherently and is established by a self-cognizer. Thus, they say that a self-cognizer apprehends a consciousness that is an other-powered phenomenon that exists inherently. The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond: "It is not established that it is experienced by itself." In brief, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas self-cognizers are not established.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 268) says:

> Hence, having indicated that consciousness without external objects is not possible, now there is [the following] explanation for the purpose of refuting inherently existent mere other-powered things not qualified by lacking external objects.

Having already refuted the existence of an inherently existent consciousness without external objects, the Prasangika Madhyamikas will now refute *mere* inherently existent other-powered things, that is, mere inherently existent consciousnesses that are not qualified by being without external objects.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 268) says:

> QUESTION BY MADHYAMIKA PRASANGIKAS TO THE CHITTAMATRINS:
>
> *If, without apprehendeds, there are no apprehenders and*
> *If things that are other-powered phenomena which are empty of duality exist,*
> *What will know their existence?* [6.72abc]
>
> *If*, due to there being *no* external *apprehendeds*, *there are no apprehenders* that are objects other than them, *and if things that are other-powered phenomena which are empty of duality* – apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances – *exist*, *which* of your consciousnesses *will know the existence of those* other-powered phenomena*?* It is not admissible for a specific consciousness to apprehend that consciousness itself because it is contradictory for it to engage in its respective function with respect to itself. Similarly, the very edge of a sword does not cut itself, the tip of a finger does not touch itself, a well-known and well-trained athlete cannot mount on his own shoulders, fire cannot burn itself, and an eye does not see itself.

In short, the Chittamatrins assert self-cognizers, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas refute them. Dignaga's *Compendium of Valid Cognition* contains a debate in which the Chittamatrins say: "An apprehender of blue, as the subject, there exists an experiencer of it because a memory of it is subsequently produced; for example, of blue." The predicate "there exists an experiencer of it" implies a self-cognizer. What experiences blue? Blue is experienced by an eye consciousness apprehending blue. What experiences the apprehender of blue? The apprehender of blue is experienced by a self-cognizer. This what the Chittamatrins say. The Chittamatrins and Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas do not accept external objects but accept self-cognizers. On the other hand, the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamikas, such as Bhavaviveka, do not accept self-cognizers but accept external objects. For example, if someone sees a show and the next day remembers it, the Chittamatrins and Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas would say that the memory of the show is due to a self-cognizer – the experiencer of the eye consciousness that saw the show. On the other hand, the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that in order to have memory it is not necessary to have a self-cognizer. Then, how is it remembered? It is remembered just by, for example, seeing the place where the show took place. For example, when an eye consciousness sees the place where a show took place, one remembers the show thinking, "I saw a show here." Another example is if someone slips on the stairs one day, even after the pain has disappeared, he remembers the pain on seeing those stairs once again.

Thursday afternoon, 2 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 268) says:

> Here, the others' system that explains it is not admissible for a specific consciousness to apprehend that consciousness itself will be explained in particular.

This system will be explained later on.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 268) says:

> A consciousness is not apprehended even by a consciousness that is an object other than itself because this would contradict the Chittamatra tenets in that it is said in the Chittamatra scriptures: "When abiding in the result is not yet obtained, if a cognizer that is another object is the appearing object of a cognizer this would undermine propounding mere-cognition." Because of that, according to the Chittamatrins there does not exist such apprehenders in any way.

A consciousness is not experienced by a consciousness that is an object other than itself. What is consciousness experienced by? It is experienced by a self-cognizer. For example, an eye consciousness is not experienced by an eye consciousness but is experienced by a self-cognizer. For example, Chogyal's eye consciousness is not experienced by Sonam's eye consciousness. What realizes Chogyal's eye consciousness? It is realized by a self-cognizer.

What consciousness realizes or experiences consciousness? According to the Chittamatrins all consciousness are necessarily experienced by a consciousness that is one substance with itself, not by a consciousness that is a different substance from itself. The Chittamatra scriptures say: "When abiding in the result has not yet been obtained, if a cognizer that is another object is the appearing object of a cognizer this would undermine propounding mere-cognition." "Abiding in the result" refers to omniscience; as long as this is not attained if a cognizer that is another object is the appearing object of a cognizer this would undermine propounding mere-cognition. In other words, if a consciousness were an appearing object of a different consciousness this would undermine the meaning of mere-cognition.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 269) says:

> *It is not suitable to say "It exists even without being apprehended."* [6.72d]
>
> *It is not suitable to say "It exists even without being apprehended* by consciousness."
> CHITTAMATRINS: Moreover, even though it is not apprehended by a consciousness which is another object, there exists a self-cognizer. Therefore, because the other-powered is apprehended by a self-cognizer alone, [self-cognizers] exist.

The Chittamatrins say that a consciousness does not apprehend a consciousness that is a different substance from itself. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "It is not suitable to say "It exists even without being apprehended." To this, the Chittamatrins respond that even though consciousness is not apprehended by a consciousness that is a different substance from itself, it is apprehended by a self-cognizer. The Chittamatrins say: "Therefore, because other-powered phenomena are apprehended by only self-cognizers, [self-cognizers] exist." In this context, "other-powered phenomena" are specifically consciousnesses.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 269) says:

> MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *It is not established that it is experienced by that itself.* [6.73a]
>
> *It is not established that it is experienced by that* consciousness *itself*.

"That consciousness itself" refers to a self-cognizer.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 269) says:

> Here, if the scriptural source of the above position asserted by the Chittamatrins, regarding what a self-cognizer is like, is explained a little bit [it is as follows]. [Bhavaviveka's] *Blaze of Reasoning* says:
>
> > CHITTAMATRINS: Consciousness has two appearances: (i) [a consciousness] to which itself appears and (ii) [a consciousness] to which an object appears. A consciousness to which an object appears, having become the aspect of an external object, becomes the object of a consciousness to which itself appears.

Bhavaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* shows how Chittamatrins assert self-cognizers. The Chittamatrins say: "Consciousness has two appearances: (i) [a consciousness] to which itself appears and (ii) [a consciousness] to which an object appears." For example, an eye consciousness apprehending form has the appearance of a form sphere, whereas a self-cognizer has the appearance of the eye consciousness having the appearance of a form sphere. Thus, the Chittamatrins say that there are two appearances:

- the appearance of a form sphere to eye consciousness and
- the appearance of an eye consciousness having the appearance of a form sphere to a self-cognizer.

What appears to a conception apprehending form? Form appears to it. What appears to the self-cognizer experiencing a conception apprehending form? The conception apprehending form appears to it.

It can also be said that there are two different appearances to a self-cognizer. For example, a self-cognizer experiencing the conception apprehending form has the appearance of:

- the conception apprehending form and
- the appearing object of the conception apprehending form.

The main point here is that a self-cognizer also realizes the appearing object of the conception. Therefore, a direct self-cognizer explicitly realizes the conception and implicitly realizes the appearing object of that conception.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 269) says:

> RESPONSE:
>
> It appears just like the very mind
> Which is other than that which appears as an object.
>
> By the explanation "That appearing as itself which is other than – that is, which is not – that appearing as an object is not seen," the Chittamatrins avert all dualistic appearances for inwardly-directed consciousnesses and assert such a consciousness to be a self-cognizer that cognizes itself by itself. This also being the case, they assert that in the perspective of this consciousness the object cognized and the cognizer do not appear as different.

"The Chittamatrins avert all dualistic appearances for inwardly-directed consciousnesses" refers to self-cognizers which are inwardly-directed and do not have dualistic appearance. There also exists a direct self-cognizer. What is the pervasion between a self-cognizer and a direct self-cognizer?

The definition of self-cognizer is: that which is inwardly directed and selects an apprehender (*dzin pa yan gar ba*) (see page 441 in *Unique Tenets*). The word 'selects' (*yan gar ba*) implies that it only takes a consciousness as its object of the mode of apprehension. In other words, the object of the mode of apprehension of a self-cognizer is only consciousness.

The short definition of a self-cognizer is: that which has the aspect of an apprehender. On the other hand, the definition of an other-cognizer is: that which has the aspect of an apprehended.
The definition of a direct self-cognizer is: that which is inwardly directed, selects an apprehender, is free from conceptuality, and non-mistaken.
The definition of a valid direct self-cognizer is: that which is new and incontrovertible, inwardly directed, selects an apprehender, is free from conceptuality, and non-mistaken.

The Chittamatrins say that a self-cognizer does not have dualistic appearance. This can be debated asking: "If a self-cognizer does not have dualistic appearance, do two not appear to a self-cognizer?" However, it means that to a self-cognizer there is no appearance of external objects, only consciousness appears to it.

The Chittamatrins "assert such a consciousness to be a self-cognizer that cognizes itself by itself." Does an eye consciousness cognize itself? Think about it.

Which of the four schools assert self-cognizers? This can be understood by the definitions of the propounders of these tenets:

- The definition of a Vaibhashika is: a propounder of hinayana tenets who asserts external objects to be truly existent but does not assert self-cognizers.
- The definition of a Sautrantika is: a propounder of hinayana tenets who asserts both self-cognizers and external objects.
- The definition of a Chittamatra is: a propounder of mahayana tenets who does not assert external objects but asserts self-cognizers to be truly existent.
- The definition of a Madhyamika is: a propounder of mahayana tenets who does not assert truly existent things even conventionally.

Friday morning, 3 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 269) says:

> Also the autocommentary on the [Jnanagarbha's] *Two Truths*, when refuting self-cognizers, says:
>
> > A consciousness arises as a cognizer – an entity devoid of dualism – and knows without that, because it would be unsuitable if it were not like that.
>
> When the Chittamatrins prove that other-powered phenomena are empty of the imputational factor, which is apprehendeds and apprehenders being different substances, they establish an other-powered phenomenon which is consciousness – a self-cognizer that arises as a cognizer in an entity devoid of dualistic appearance. Hence, that basis is to be understood in terms of apprehendeds and apprehenders not existing as different substances. In that case, if that previous basis were not established by a self-cognizer, having apprehended that basis it would not be established to be empty of the imputational factor.

Jnanagarbha, the author of the *Two Truths*, is a Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika and, therefore, does not accept self-cognizers. A self-cognizer is characterized by being devoid of dualism. That the appearance of dualism has vanished for it means what appears to a self-cognizer is merely that which is clear and knowing. In other words, a self-cognizer merely experiences that which is clear and knowing; forms and so forth do not appear to a self-cognizer.

In order to understand that apprehendeds and apprehenders are empty of existing as different substances, self-cognizers must first be established. That consciousness, an other-powered phenomenon, is then taken as the basis upon which the emptiness of the imputational factor is established. Simply put, in order to ascertain that an object, this being a consciousness, and an object-possessor, this being a self-cognizer, are empty of existing as different substances, one must first

ascertain a self-cognizer. For example, before ascertaining that the object, a mental direct perceiver apprehending form, and the object-possessor, the self-cognizer experiencing it, do not exist as different substances, one must first ascertain a self-cognizer. In other words, prior to understanding that the other-powered phenomenon is empty of the imputational factor, one must first understand what that other-powered phenomenon is. For example, in order to ascertain that Chogyal is not a lay person, one must first know who Chogyal is.

The Chittamatrins assert that the other-powered phenomenon's emptiness of the imputational factor is the thoroughly established phenomenon. With respect to imputational factors in general there are two types:

1. an imputational factor that is an object of negation and
2. an imputational factor that is not an object of negation.

An imputational factor that is an object of negation is of many further types, meaning that there are subtle and coarse imputational factors that are objects of negation, these being a self of phenomena and a self of persons. The imputational factor that is an object of negation which is a self of persons is a self-sufficient substantially existent person. The imputational factor that is an object of negation which is a self of phenomena is, for example, a form and the consciousness apprehending it being different substances. Other examples are a form established by way of its own character that is an affixing basis for the term 'form' and a form established by way of its own character that is an adhering basis for the conception apprehending form.

According to the Chittamatra system the realization that apprehendeds and apprehenders are empty of being different substances is a realization of the selflessness of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 270) says:

> This is explained [as follows]. According to you [Chittamatrins] the proof of other-powered phenomena is necessarily established by a self-cognizer that is free from dualistic appearance; this is what is refuted saying "It is not established." Therefore, it is the talk of the foolish that by refuting self-cognizers (*rang rig*) "Individual yogis refute the individual cognition (*rang rig*) that cognizes suchness, while the worldly refute the self-cognition (*rang rig*) that is the object of the convention 'I cognize myself.'"

For the Chittamatrins the main other-powered phenomena are consciousnesses. To prove consciousnesses they use a self-cognizer as a reason. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say this reason is not established, in that self-cognizers do not exist.

It is the talk of the foolish that by refuting self-cognizers, yogis refute the individual cognition of suchness and the worldly refute the self-cognition that thinks "I cognize myself." Here the individual cognition of suchness refers to the exalted wisdom of individual realization that realizes suchness. This, as well as the thought "I cognize myself," are refuted when one incorrectly refutes self-cognizers. Thus, saying so is the talk of the foolish.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: How does Chittamatra prove by reasoning that there are sentient beings who are different entities from one's own mind?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Other sentient beings appear to us due to the activation of latencies. The Chittamatrins say that when all of us look at Patrick, for example, each one of us has an individual appearance of Patrick. The reason for this is due to both the particles of Patrick's body and the ripening of uncommon latencies. Therefore, if fifty people look at Patrick, fifty uncommon Patricks appear. The Prasangika Madhyamikas debate this saying: "It follows that Patrick has fifty heads, a hundred ears, and so forth." However, the Chittamatrins do not accept this. They say that Patrick is only one, but due to the ripening of the uncommon latencies of fifty people there are fifty appearances

of Patrick, although, there are not fifty Patricks. There are not fifty heads, noses, and so forth because the Patrick that appears to one person does not appear to another person, only one Patrick appears to each of them.

That there are sentient beings who have continua separate from our own is something that is seen with our eyes. This does not need to be established by reasoning because it is directly seen by our eyes. If there are fifty people here, they are directly seen by each one of us to be individual.

Student: All my appearances of Sherab, Geshe-la, and others are due to the activation of latencies, so what is the proof that Sherab, Geshe-la, and others each have their own minds? What is the proof that there exist sentient beings who are different substances from my own mind?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Without the activation of latencies you would not see Sherab, Geshe-la, and so forth. This is a tenet of the Chittamatrins, they have eight reasons that establish a basis-of-all. They say that latencies are deposited on the mind-basis-of-all and that due to their activation one perceives various phenomena.

Student: According to Prasangika, a disintegrated action can bring about a result. However, Prasangika also seems to assert the existence of latencies that are posited on the mere I. Why is it necessary for them to posit latencies?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In general, Prasangika says that a disintegrated virtue is virtuous and a disintegrated non-virtue is non-virtuous. This disintegrated virtue or non-virtue remains until it ripens. Thus, there is no need to posit a basis for the infusion of latencies. Although there is no need to posit this, if the Prasangikas are pushed to assert a basis for the infusion of latencies they say that it is the mere I. Unlike disintegrated actions, the latencies are unspecified phenomena.

Student: What is the difference in function between the disintegratedness of an action and that of the latency of an action?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The difference is that a disintegrated virtue and a disintegrated non-virtue yield their respective fruitional results, whereas a latency of an action does not yield a fruitional result because it is an unspecified phenomenon.

Student: What is the result of the disintegratedness of a seed?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is the production of a sprout. For example, if one plants a barley seed in a pot and gives it water and warmth, a sprout is produced. When the sprout is produced, the potential of the seed has disintegrated. On the other hand, if one burns a rice seed, what is the result of that disintegrated seed? A tiny bit of ashes. If a bird eats the seed, what is the result of that disintegrated seed?!

Student: Chandrakirti says:

> *Just like dreams, likewise, also here when awake,*
> *Things are false. The mind does not exist,*
> *Objects do not exist, and the sense powers also do not exist.* [6.52bcd]

> *Just as* the objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses of *dreams* are false, *likewise*, *also here* on the occasion of being *awake things are false*. Therefore, *the mind does not exist* inherently. Similarly, *the objects* of the sense powers, forms and so forth, *do not exist* [inherently] *and the sense powers are also not* inherently produced.

How does this establish that all things are false even when awake? Are they falsities because they appear to a dreaming mind to be sense consciousnesses, sense powers, and sense objects but are not? Would that qualify them as being non-inherently existent? Would that establish all things as false even in the waking state? Or are they falsities because they are produced in mutual dependence?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There are two explanations, one of which I already gave. However, in brief it is as follows. A dream is an example of the false. For example, one dreams of having a picnic in a pleasant park. However, all that is perceived in the dream is false. Why? Because when one awakes one does not find the pleasant park and so forth. One just finds oneself in one's bed! That the sense consciousness, sense power, and objects of a dream are false is because when one awakes they are not found. These three do not exist inherently either in a dream or when awake. However, in a dream, even though the three are deceptive, they perform a function. The objects seen in a dream do not exist. While dreaming objects are found and perceived to be true, although they are not.

Student: If they are falsities because they do not exist as they appear, in that they appear as sense consciousnesses but are mental consciousnesses and so forth that would not qualify them as false in the waking state. The only reason that establishes them as false both in a dream and in the waking state is that they do not exist inherently. So how do they not exist inherently?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They do not exist inherently because they are dependent-arisings.

END

Monday afternoon, 6 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 270) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1B Refuting the others' response that [self-cognizers] are admissible

1 Stating the others' system
2 Refuting that system

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1B1 Stating the others' system

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Here, someone accepts the Sautrantika position and in order to strongly prove self-cognition says [as follows]. Just as when fire is produced, not operating dually upon itself and vases and so forth, it illuminates them together; also a term indicates itself and its meaning – similarly, also when consciousness is closely produced, not operating dually, it acts to perfectly know the individuals, itself and the object. Therefore, "self-cognition" is only existent. Even someone who did not assert it must undoubtedly accept self-cognition. Otherwise, there would not be remembrance of the object with the memory that arises at a later time thinking "[The object] was seen" and there would not be memory of the [subjective] experience of the object thinking "I saw."

Here the Chittamatrins take the position of the Sautrantikas in order to prove the existence of self-cognizers. To do so they take the example of fire which simultaneously illuminates itself and a pot. Another example is that of a term, such as "pot," which indicates itself and its meaning. In other words, the word "pot" indicates both the definiendum itself and its meaning, that is, its definition – that which is bulbous, flat bottomed, and capable of holding fluid. It indicates its meaning in that through the term "pot" there is the appearance of that which is bulbous, flat bottomed, and capable of holding fluid.

These are the examples themselves, whereas there meaning is related to self-cognizers. For example, when an apprehender of blue perceives blue, a self-cognizer simultaneously experiences the apprehender of blue. Thus, it can be said that the seeing of the object and the seeing of the object-possessor occur simultaneously. Therefore, the Chittamatrins say that there are definitely self-cognizers. They say that even those who did not accept self-cognizers in the past from now on must do so!

Therefore, the subsequent memory of an object-possessor, an apprehender of blue, and the subsequent memory of the object, blue, arise simultaneously. The Chittamatrins take this reason of subsequent memory as the reason proving self-cognizers. In brief, the Chittamatrins say: An apprehender of blue, as the subject, has an experiencer because there is a subsequent memory of it; for example, such as blue. According to the Chittamatrins this kind of syllogism is one of the best reasonings proving self-cognizers.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Why?
>
> If memory had an experience as its object, since, [according to you who do not accept self-cognition,] the knower would not even be experienced, memory would not exist. Once self-cognition is non-existent, the experience of that [knower] by itself does not exist a little while. It is also unreasonable for another knower to experience that [knower].

Memory is an object-possessor that experiences. What does it experience? It experiences a consciousness. There is no memory that is without the experience of a consciousness, for example, the memory thinking "I saw blue." When one thinks "I saw," one is remembering the object-possessor. What did one see? "Blue was seen." When these two memories, that of the object-possessor and that of the object, are combined, one says "I saw blue." For example, when one says "I saw Aldo in the kitchen yesterday," the words "I saw" indicate that the object-possessor is remembered, whereas "Aldo was seen" indicates that the object is remembered. Therefore, the memory of the object-possessor and the memory of the object occur simultaneously. The Chittamatrins say that just as these two types of memory occur simultaneously, so do the two experiences: (i) the experience of the object and (ii) the experience of the object-possessor. They say that because there exists such subsequent memory there are self-cognizers.

According to the Chittamatrins there are two types of experiencers: (i) self-experiencer, and (ii) other-experiencer. They say to the Prasangika Madhyamikas: "You do not accept self-experiencers because you do not accept self-cognizers." They also say that other-experiencers are not admissible. Regarding this Chandrakirti says: "Once self-cognition is non-existent, the experience of that [knower] by itself does not exist a little while. It is also unreasonable for another knower to experience that [knower]."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Why?
>
> If experienced by another knower, it will follow as endless. It is like this: if it is accepted that one knower that analyzes blue is investigated by a consciousness that arises just after that, it is necessary to have another experiencer also for that knower of the knower of blue. And, since it is necessary there be another also for that, there follows the fault of endless [regression].

The Chittamatrins debate the Prasangika Madhyamikas saying: "If a consciousness were experienced by another consciousness, it would follow that there would be endless regression." In this way, they say to the Prasangika Madhyamikas that it follows that there is no experience:

- because there is no self-experiencer of a consciousness since there is no self-cognizer and
- because there is no other-experiencer of a consciousness that is another consciousness due to the absurd consequence of endless regression.

The Chittamatrins then state their position: "There is an experiencer because we assert self-cognizers and thereby avoid the fault of the endless regression of other-experiencers."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> A knower would also not analyze another object because every movement (or continuity) of consciousness would have another knower as its object and because sentient beings are a single continuum of consciousness. Consciousness, like the piercing of a hundred *utpala* petals, seems to engage together those which arise serially [due to rapid engagement]. Therefore, in order to fully avoid the fault of endless [regression], self-cognition must undoubtedly be accepted.

According to the Chittamatrins, another absurd consequence would be that other objects would not be perceived because when a later consciousness perceives an earlier consciousness it would not perceive other objects, such as form, sound, and so forth. Another reason that other objects would not be perceived is because sentient beings are each a single continuum of consciousness. Due to this there would be the fault of a consciousness not transferring to another object. On the other hand, if there

were no such fault, it would follow that two similar types of eye consciousness that are different substances would be simultaneously produced in the continuum of a single person. If that is accepted, it would contradict the sutra that says "Sentient beings are a single, that is individual, continuum of consciousness."

The Chittamatrins say, for example, that when an arrow is shot through a hundred utpala petals, although it seems that the hundred petals are pierced simultaneously, in fact they are pierced sequentially. This topic is discussed at length in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition*. The example indicates that if one accepts self-cognizers there will not be the fault of endless regression because just as a single arrow pierces a hundred petals sequentially but appears to do so simultaneously, similarly, a self-cognizer experiences many former and later moments of consciousness. On the other hand, if it were the case that a consciousness is experienced by another consciousness there would be the fault of endless regression. Thus, a continuum of consciousness is one but is composed of many moments, all of which are experienced by a self-cognizer.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thereupon, also the arisal at a later time of memories that have as their objects the two thoughts "I saw" are established, since except for a self-cognizing nature of knowers, the memory having that as its object is illogical.

There are self-cognizers because subsequently there is the simultaneous memory of both the object-possessor and object; for example, the memory "Yesterday I ate food." In this case, one simultaneously remembers oneself, the object-possessor, eating, and the object, the food.

Tuesday morning, 7 November 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, through generating a remembering consciousness at a later time considering "I saw," the essential-nature of the consciousness which experiences and the essential-nature of the object – from which memories that have both as their objects are produced at a later time – are inferred to be experienced and produced. Therefore, through memory at a later time, self-experience is established and when self-experience exists, also other-powered phenomena are indeed existent. Hence, this is finely indicated to whoever states "There, it will be said 'By what will this be known to exist?'"

When a self-experiencer is established through memory, then also the other-powered phenomena – consciousnesses that are established by way of their own character – exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 270) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: Here, some, that is, the Chittamatrins, assert the position of the Sautrantikas [as follows] in order to prove self-cognizers.
> CHITTAMATRINS: Just as when fire is produced it does not operate to gradually illuminate the two, itself and a pot, but illuminates them simultaneously, and just as when [the word] "pot" is uttered the two, the observation of the term itself and the observation of the pot, its object, are produced, likewise, also when consciousness is produced it does not operate with respect to the two, itself and the object, separately and serially but cognizes them simultaneously. Therefore, self-cognizers only exist.

In short, the Chittamatrins once again assert self-cognizers. They say that self-cognizers definitely exist because there is a consciousness that simultaneously remembers both the object and object-possessor. For example, they say that when an apprehender of blue experiences blue simultaneously a self-cognizer experiences the apprehender of blue; due to this the subsequent memory simultaneously remembers not only the blue but also the eye consciousness apprehending blue.

Here in the text the example of the term "pot" is given. When the word "pot" is pronounced both the object-possessor "pot" (the term itself) and the object "pot" are observed, due to which there are two consciousness produced: (i) a consciousness observing the term itself, the object-possessor, and (ii) a consciousness observing the pot, the object. An expressive term is considered to be an object-possessor.

The definition of an object-possessor is: a thing that possesses any type of respective object. (Purbuchog's *Awarenesses and Knowers* says: a thing that possesses its respective object.) From among the two, objects and object-possessor, when object-possessors are divided there are three: (i) expressive sounds, (ii) consciousnesses, and (iii) persons.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 270) says:

> If they were not asserted, there would not be
> - the memory of an object later on saying "Earlier that object was seen" and
> - the memory of the object-possessor that experienced that object thinking "Earlier I saw it."
>
> Why is this? Since it is not possible to generate a memory of that which was not experienced before, if memory is the object-possessor of a previous experience, according to you, [Madhyamikas], who do not assert self-cognizers, since the consciousness that apprehended blue before was not experienced at its respective time, a later memory [of blue] is not established to exist.

An eye consciousness experiences blue and simultaneously a self-cognizer experiences the apprehender of blue; however, self-cognizers do not experience blue.

If something is not experienced previously it cannot be remembered. When someone says "This table was seen" and also says "I saw the table," the first is a memory of the object, the table, and the second is a memory of the object-possessor, I. Both object and object-possessor must have been experienced before since only in this way can there be a subsequent memory of them. In brief, if there is no previous experience of something it cannot be remembered later on. Thus, the Chittamatrins prove that self-cognizers exist by saying that when an eye consciousness apprehends blue there is necessarily a self-cognizer that perceives that apprehender of blue, otherwise there could be no subsequent memory of the apprehender of blue.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 271) says:

> Hence, that an experiencer of an earlier apprehender of blue exists is proven through the reason 'subsequent memory.' When proving that "a self-cognizer that is a self-experiencer of a previous apprehender of blue exists," it is not proven in that way because an example that establishes it for others is not found. When establishing that the experiencer of an apprehender of blue exists, two [types] are determined in regard to the experiencer of that [apprehender of blue]: (i) self-experiencers and (ii) other-experiencers. However, the first is not suitable to you [Madhyamikas]. When our system refutes the second, it is negated saying "If that which pervades experience is repudiated, mere experience is also not admissible." Therefore, the reasonings that prove self-cognizers are the best.

The Chittamatrins say that when proving a self-cognizer they do not assert: "An apprehender of blue, as the subject, has a self-cognizer that is an experiencer because there is subsequent memory." Instead they say: "An apprehender of blue, as the subject, has an experiencer because there is subsequent memory." This is because, if they were to say "a self-cognizer that is an experiencer," they could not posit a concordant example.

Lama Tsongkhapa says there are two possibilities regarding an experiencer of an apprehender of blue: (i) that is a self-experiencer or (ii) that it is an other-experiencer. The Madhyamikas do not accept self-experiencers, whereas the Chittamatrins negate other-experiencers. The Chittamatrins say that if other-experiencers are accepted there would be the consequence of endless regression: that is, a consciousness apprehending blue would be apprehended by another consciousness, which in turn would be apprehended by another consciousness, which in turn would be apprehended by another consciousness, and so on without end. The Chittamatrins say that if the two types of experiencers, self-experiencers and other-experiencers, are inadmissible then it would follow that there is no experience at all.

In short, when proving self-cognizers the predicate "has an experiencer," rather than "has a self-cognizer which is an experiencer," is the best reasoning.

> It is also not suitable for an apprehender of blue to be experienced by a consciousness that is an object other than itself. If that were suitable there would be two invalidations of it, the first being that it would follow that there would be endless [regression], in that if a consciousness that perceives blue is perceived by another consciousness which arises after it either:
>
> - a consciousness that is another object that comprehends it would be necessary or
> - [a consciousness that is another object that comprehends it] would not be necessary.
>
> If [such a consciousness] is not necessary, also the earlier consciousness would not be necessary. On the other hand, if [such a consciousness] is necessary, there would be the fault of endless [regression] due to the need for another [consciousness] also with respect to that. And, if there were endless regression, there would be the fault of not establishing the experience of the first apprehender of blue.

If there is a need for another consciousness to perceive an earlier consciousness, it would follow that there would be the need for endless consciousnesses that perceive each other. On the other hand, if one refutes endless regression there would not be the need for even one other consciousness to perceive the earlier consciousness. In addition, if there is the fault of endless regression it would follow that the first consciousness would not be established.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 271) says:

> The second [invalidation] is the absurd consequence that other objects would not be perceived. When an earlier consciousness is perceived by a later one, [that later consciousness] does not perceive other objects, such as form, sound, and so forth, and it does not transfer to them because the flow of consciousness, that is, its entire movement, is an object-possessor of another earlier consciousness.

If there is need for another consciousness to perceive an earlier consciousness, whereby there would be endless regression, then an apprehender of blue would not be able to apprehend blue. That is, if a later moment of consciousness only perceives a former moment of consciousness, it could not perceive other objects such as forms, sounds, and so forth. "It does not transfer to them" means that a later consciousness that is perceiving an earlier consciousness does not operate with respect to forms, sounds, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 271) says:

> This is not an indefinite pervasion because, if each earlier consciousness is perceived by a later consciousness, the later [consciousness] is necessarily produced through taking the previous one as its apprehended object because at that time, having been cast toward a close apprehended object that is an inner component, it does not engage an external object that is at a distance.

If all former moments of consciousness are perceived by a later consciousness, it follows that consciousnesses would only be cast toward close apprehended objects that are internal, that is, consciousnesses, and would not engage objects that are distant, that is, external objects. For example, when someone is occupied at the computer he does not go out for a walk, meet other people, and so forth; similarly, if a consciousness is occupied with another consciousness it does not perceive other objects.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 272) says:

> OBJECTION: The two,
> (i) a later consciousness that is an apprehender of blue that perceives an earlier consciousness that is an apprehender of blue and
> (ii) a consciousness that is an apprehender of blue that perceives blue,
> are produced simultaneously. Therefore, there is no fault of not transferring to another object.
> RESPONSE: If that were the case, two similar types of eye consciousness which are different substances would be produced in the continuum of a single person at the same time. If that is accepted, it would contradict [the sutra] that says "Sentient beings are a single, that is individual, continuum of consciousness."

This objection is wrong because it is not possible for two similar types of consciousness which are different substances to be produced in the continuum of a single person. Some say that one consciousness operates with respect to one object and not with respect to different objects. In Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* it says: "One does not know two because the object of a sense [consciousness] is determined." This means that a particular sense consciousness only knows its respective objects and does not know other objects. Therefore, the two, (i) an apprehender of blue perceiving an earlier apprehender of blue and (ii) an apprehender of blue perceiving blue, cannot be produced simultaneously.

Tuesday afternoon, 7 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 272) says:

> Here, the autocommentary says:
>
> > Consciousnesses, like the piercing of a hundred utpala petals, arise serially but manifest as though operating simultaneously.
>
> [Jayananda's] *Explanatory Commentary* says:
>
> > QUESTION: When one enters the house of a performer, are the five consciousnesses that simultaneously apprehend the five objects, such as the face of the performer, a tune, and so forth, not consciousnesses that are simultaneously produced?
> >
> > RESPONSE: The consciousnesses that apprehend the five objects arise serially, but, due to operating quickly, manifest as though produced simultaneously.

> This explanation is completely inappropriate. The Sautrantikas and Chittamatrins who prove self-cognizers say "Sentient beings are an individual continuum of consciousness." The meaning of this accords with what is said in [Dharmakirti's] *Commentary on [Dignaga's] 'Compendium of Valid Cognition*':
>
> > They definitely can,
> > Other than those of similar type.
>
> Similar types of consciousness are asserted to not be produced simultaneously in the same person because consciousnesses of dissimilar type are not at all asserted to not be produced simultaneously.

I looked at Jamyang Shepa's commentary on the passage in the autocommentary "Consciousnesses, like the piercing of a hundred utpala petals, arise serially, but manifest as though operating simultaneously," however, the meaning is still not very clear to me. Many similar types of consciousnesses cannot arise simultaneously in one continuum, whereas many dissimilar types of consciousnesses can arise simultaneously. When Jayananda's *Explanatory Commentary* says that many dissimilar types of consciousness do not arise simultaneously, this is incorrect. Jayananda says that these consciousness operate extremely quickly and for this reason appear to arise simultaneously, although in fact they arise serially. We can take the example of entering a discotheque, whereupon one simultaneously sees many people dancing, hears music, and so forth. In this way, the eye consciousness sees people dancing, the ear consciousness hears music, and the nose consciousness smells perfumes and other odors. In addition, the tongue consciousness can simultaneously taste a candy and the body consciousness can simultaneously feel the touch of one's partner. In this way one can verify that all five sense consciousnesses can arise simultaneously. However, it seems that according to Jayananda these sense consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously but arise serially. For this reason, Lama Tsongkhapa says that the explanation that "The consciousnesses that apprehend the five objects arise serially, but, due to operating quickly, manifest as though produced simultaneously" is completely inappropriate. The Sautrantikas and Chittamatrins, who prove self-cognizers, say "Sentient beings are an individual continuum of consciousness." In a single continuum many similar types of consciousnesses cannot arise simultaneously, whereas many dissimilar types of consciousness can arise simultaneously.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 272-3) says:

> Many Tibetans when looking at [a piece of] brocade ask: "Are not many consciousness apprehending white, red, and so forth produced simultaneously?" Those who, in response to that, say "Although those consciousnesses arise serially, they appear to be produced simultaneously," appear:
>
> - to not have understood the intention regarding similar types of main consciousnesses, this being the meaning of saying "[Sentient beings are] an individual continuum of consciousness," and,
> - to also not realize that an eye consciousness apprehends a mottle [of colors] due to not understanding that a single eye consciousness apprehends many different colors.

The particular type of brocade mentioned here is no longer found but we can take any type of brocade as an example. Some Tibetans think that when one sees the mottle of colors of a piece of brocade there arise many eye consciousnesses apprehending the individual colors which, although they actually arise serially, appear to arise simultaneously. This idea is incorrect and occurs due to not understanding the meaning of what is said in sutra: "Sentient beings are an individual continuum of consciousness." The intention of this sutra passage is that many similar types of consciousness do not arise simultaneously, whereas many dissimilar types of consciousness do arise simultaneously; this is what has not been understood. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "[They] appear to not have understood the

intention regarding similar types of main consciousnesses, this being the meaning of saying "[Sentient beings are] an individual continuum of consciousness." They have also not understood that a single eye consciousness apprehends a mottle of colors. One can verify this oneself by looking at a piece of multi-colored cloth and then closing one's eyes, whereby there arises a mental image of the many colors. Therefore, a single eye consciousness can apprehend many colors, many faces, and so forth. This is the meaning of the example given here of brocade.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 273) says:

> Hence, although in response to the debate about similar types of consciousness being produced simultaneously, it appears as though necessary to explain that "Although they are produced serially, due to their operating quickly they seem to be produced simultaneously," the two [schools, the Sautrantika and Chittamatra,] which prove self-cognizers, [actually] negate – in [Dharmakirti's] *Commentary on [Dignaga's] 'Compendium of Valid Cognition'* – that their quick operation is the cause for mistaking them to be simultaneous. Since it appears difficult to posit this passage [in the autocommentary] as the system of these two [schools], the intelligent should examine whether it is likely that there is the fault of corruption in the Sanskrit text.

Here it says that in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* the Chittamatrins and Sautrantikas negate that their quick operation is the cause for mistaking them to be simultaneous. Since this contradicts what was said before in the autocommentary it should be examined. When Lama Tsongkhapa says that there may be the fault of corruption in the Sanskrit text, he refers to the passage in the autocommentary: "Consciousnesses, like the piercing of a hundred utpala petals, arise serially but manifest as though operating simultaneously."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 273) says:

> Therefore, in order to dispel the faults of (i) endless [regression] and (ii) the non-analysis of another object, self-cognizers must unquestionably be asserted. For this reason, through the later production of a memory of both the object and the object-possessor, it is to be inferred that earlier, when blue was seen, there existed [both] the experience of the object and the experience of the object-possessor. That being the case, if there exists a self-cognizer that is a self-experiencer, also the existence of other-powered phenomena is established by that self-cognizer. Thus, the response to the Madhyamikas' question "What will know their existence?" is finely indicated.

The Chittamatrins say that if self-cognizers are not accepted then it follows that an earlier consciousness would be experienced by a later consciousness due to which there would be (i) the fault of endless regression and (ii) the fault that consciousness would not experience an object other than consciousness. Therefore, self-cognizers do in fact exist.

The Chittamatrins posit two types of experiencers: self-experiencers and other-experiencers. Among these two, self-experiencers are acceptable to the Chittamatrins. On the other hand, they say that if self-experiencers are not accepted, there would be other-experiencers due to which there would be (i) the fault of endless regression and (ii) the fault that consciousness could not transfer to another object. The Chittamatrins say that an experiencer of an apprehender of blue is established because there is a subsequent memory of both the object, blue, and the object-possessor, the apprehender of blue.

Therefore, due to the existence of self-cognizers, other-powered phenomena are established. In this way the Chittamatrins respond to the Madhyamikas' question "What will know their existence?" In other words, previously the Madhyamikas asked: "What knows the existence of an inherently existent consciousness that is an other-powered phenomenon?" The Chittamatrins respond: "It is known by a self-cognizer."

Next comes the Prasangika Madhyamikas refutation of the Chittamatrins' assertions.

Wednesday morning, 8 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 273) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1B2 Refuting that system

A The actual refutation of the other system
B In our own system, the way in which memory is produced in spite of self-cognizers not existing
C Dispelling arguments regarding such refutation

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1B2A The actual refutation of the other system

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

In order to indicate that "that too is unreasonable," it is explained:

It is not established that it is experienced by itself.
If established through remembering later,
This unestablished [memory] expressed in order to prove
Unestablished [self-cognition] is not a proof. [6.73]

There, first of all, if it was mentioned in terms of being a substantial proof, then, since memory is impossible in any way because there is no production from self and other, how could an unestablished memory prove an unestablished self-cognition? Moreover, if it was in terms of worldly convention, in that case too, memory having self-cognition as its cause is just impossible.

In order to prove self-cognizers the Chittamatrins set forth the reason "because there is subsequent memory." However, in the proof of self-cognizers this is a reason that is not established. A memory that is not established cannot be set forth as a reason proving an inherently existent consciousness which is an other-powered phenomenon. Chandrakirti says: "This unestablished [memory] expressed in order to prove unestablished [self-cognition] is not a proof."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2B1B-1 The substance

If it's established from later remembering,
Then to establish the unestablished, this
Unproven thing put forward is no proof. [6.73bcd]

If you say, "Self-knowing consciousness is established from the inherently existing memory at a later time," then to establish the unproven self-knowing consciousness, this inherently existent memory put forward is not a proof of self-knowing consciousness, since it is not established.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Chittamatrins that they cannot prove their probandum, "an inherently existent consciousness which is an other-powered phenomenon" by setting forth the unestablished reason "because there is inherently existent memory." Since the proof is not established, the probandum is not established. Chandrakirti says: "There, first of all, if it was mentioned in terms of being a substantial proof, then, since memory is impossible in any way because there is no production from self and other, how could an unestablished memory prove unestablished self-cognition? Moreover, if it was in terms of worldly convention, in that case too, memory having self-cognition as its cause is just impossible."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Why?
>
> If here, like fire, self-cognition were established due to some knower [and] if, due to the existence of that, like fire due to smoke, there were certainty as to its very existence via the memory that would arise afterwards – since that self-cognition has still not been established, how could there be memory that is caused by self-cognition which does not arise without self-cognition?

Self-cognizers cannot be established in the same way that fire is established through the existence of smoke. In other words, while in the world it is conventionally said that "fire exists because there is smoke," the case of self-cognizers is not the same. The existence of fire is understood in dependence on the reason "because there is smoke." This is because, fire being the cause of smoke and smoke being the result of fire, they have a causal relationship. The Chittamatrins liken the case of self-cognizers to the example of the result, smoke, and the cause, fire, saying that a self-cognizer is the cause and subsequent memory is the result, and therefore use the existence of subsequent memory to establish the existence of self-cognizers. However, because self-cognizers, the cause, have yet to be established, the sign that is their result, "because there is memory," cannot be used to establish them. In short, a causal relationship between self-cognizers and memory has not been established.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is like this: from seeing merely water or from seeing merely fire, a jewel water-crystal or a jewel fire-crystal cannot [be inferred to] exist because even without those [jewels], water and fire arise from rain, etc., and from rubbing a fire-stick,[47] etc.. Similarly, here too, the way in which memory arises without self-cognition will be presented like that.

Even without the existence of a jewel water-crystal and a jewel fire-crystal, rain and fire are still seen to exist in dependence on rain and the rubbing together of kindling. In this way, the Prasangika Madhyamikas show that self-cognizers do not exist saying that, even though there are no self-cognizers, memory can still arise. In short, memory exists without the existence of self-cognizers just as water and fire exist without the existence of a jewel water-crystal and a jewel fire-crystal.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, since memory caused by self-cognition is non-existent without it, this unestablished [thing] expressed [by] the word 'memory' in order to prove the unestablished, self-cognition, is not established as having the purpose of proof, since "like the very object to be apprehended by eye consciousness, in [the proof of] sound as impermanent" is taken into consideration.

In proving the existence of self-cognizers, the reason "because there is memory" is not a correct proof, just as the reason is not established in the syllogism "Sound is impermanent because it is the apprehended object of eye consciousness." In proving the existence of self-cognizers the actual syllogism set forth by the Chittamatrins is: An apprehender of blue, as the subject, has an experiencer because there is a inherently existent subsequent memory; for example, like blue.

[47] Skt. *arani* – a piece of wood used for kindling fire by friction.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> But, having admitted thorough analysis like that,
>
> *Suppose one relies on established self-cognition.*
> *Even so, memory's recollection is not reasonable*
> *Because other; like production in an unknowing continuum.*
> *This reasoning also destroys distinctions.* [6.74]
>
> Even if a knower were to cognize its own self and object, nonetheless, for a remembering consciousness to recollect those is unreasonable because remembering consciousness was accepted as just other than the knower that experiences the object.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Suppose one found establishment of self-knowing:*
> *Even so, the remembering cannot remember,*
> *For it's other, as if born in someone not the experiencer.* [6.74abc]

Even if supporting establishment of self-knowing consciousness were found: nevertheless, it would follow that the remembering consciousness could not remember the object and the experiencing, since [according to you] the [earlier] experiencing and the [later] remembering are inherently other – just as, for example, experience not cognized by Upagupta cannot be remembered by a remembering consciousness produced in Upagupta's mind stream.

You may say, "It is not similar, because if they exist inherently and are earlier and later, then they exist as cause and effect."

> *This argument even eliminates distinctions.* [6.74d]

This too is unacceptable, for this argument, "Because they are inherently other," destroys every distinction of cause and effect, etc.

"This reasoning also destroys distinctions" means that inherently existent self-cognizers and inherently existent memory destroy the relationship of cause and result because they are inherently other. Chandrakirti says: "Even if a knower were to cognize its own self and object, nonetheless, for a remembering consciousness to recollect those is unreasonable because remembering consciousness was accepted as just other than the knower that experiences the object." In brief, because the subsequent memory is inherently other than the consciousness that experiences the object, this reasoning is inadmissible. This is because if the consciousness that experiences the object and the memory of it were inherently other, they would be a completely unrelated other. That is, because they are inherently other, a cause could not be inferred in dependence on a result.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is like this: Maitreya's self-cognition of a knower and experience of an object is not remembered by Upagupta's knower since not experienced before. Similarly, like production in a continuum (or: like knowing from a continuum) that did not know since it is other, because the knowers and objects are not experienced even by a consciousness included in one's own continuum that arises at a later time, there will be no memory.

A consciousness in Maitreya's continuum cannot remember a consciousness in Upagupta's continuum. In short, Maitreya's consciousness cannot remember Upagupta's consciousness. For example, in the case of the two nuns, Micaela and Cristiana, if Cristiana has an idea in her mind that idea cannot be remembered by Micaela. Why is that? Because they are different continua. This is the essence of what Chandrakirti says.

With respect to this, there is a story of an event that happened in Tibet. There was a mother who had a daughter, and whatever the mother said the daughter would say "I also thought that." One day the mother said to the daughter "Today, lets give the yogurt to the dog." The daughter replied, "I also thought to do that." Another time when the mother was grinding barley she said to the daughter "What do you think about dispersing this barley flour to the wind?" The daughter replied, "I also thought to do that." In fact, the daughter had no idea what her mother planned to do because they are two different continua.

Wednesday afternoon, 8 November 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If it is thought that because the properties of cause and effect abide in those included in one continuum memory will exist, that also does not exist, since *this reasoning also destroys distinctions* [6.74d]. This which is the reasoning stating "because of being other" completely destroys all distinctions of inclusion in a single continuum and the properties of cause and effect and so forth.
>
> Because an instant of remembering consciousness arising later than the time of the experience is other, like the knower of another continuum, it is not included in a single continuum with the experiencing consciousness – the properties of cause and effect do not even abide. By this very reasoning that states "because of being other," [such as] the [aforementioned] statements and so forth, it is to be extensively refuted.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 273) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *If it is established from a memory of a later time,*
> *That non-established expressed in order to prove*
> *The non-established does not prove it.* [6.73bcd]
>
> From the point of view of an established by way of its own character substance, *if* a self-cognizer – an earlier consciousness of a remembered object – *is established from a memory of a later time*, *that non-established* inherently existent memory *expressed in order to prove non-established* self-cognizers to opponents *does not prove* self-cognizers; like an apprehended object of the eye with regard to proving sound to be impermanent.

The Chittamatrins prove that there exists an experiencer, a self-cognizer, by the reason of an inherently existent memory. That reason, inherently existent memory, which is used to prove not yet established self-cognizers is itself not established. It is like the syllogism: sound, as the subject, is impermanent because it is an apprehended object of eye consciousness. That sound is an apprehended object of eye consciousness is not established; therefore, the reason is not established because it is not the property of the subject.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 273) says:

> In addition, in terms of worldly conventions there is no memory that is a result of a self-cognizer. Why is that? Here when establishing fire, just as smoke is understood to be its result, likewise, when establishing self-cognizers, if they are established in relation to the memory that arises from them, then, if it is ascertained that there exist self-cognizers other than memory, since self-cognizers are still not established for the opponents, how can the result of a self-cognizer – the memory that does not arise without a self-cognizer – exist?

Even from the point of view of worldly conventions, it is not said that memory is the result of a self-cognizer. Therefore, self-cognizers do not exist. When fire is established, it is understood in the world that smoke is its result. If fire is not established, then smoke does not exist. Likewise, if it is accepted that self-cognizers are established, from them there should arise the result, memory, due to which they would have a causal relationship. If this relationship could be established, then self-cognizers could be established by the reason "memory." However, self-cognizers have not yet been established for "the opponents," the Prasangika Madhyamikas. Since self-cognizers are not established for the Prasangika Madhyamikas, how can there be the result, memory, from a yet to be established self-cognizer?

In order to prove that there is no causal relationship between inherently existent self-cognizers and inherently existent memory the Prasangika Madhyamikas say:

> Lacking a relationship, an example of what is not established [is as follows]. Through seeing mere water and mere fire, a water crystal-jewel and a fire crystal-jewel are not inferred because, even without these two, water and fire arise [respectively] from rain and so forth and from rubbing kindling together and so forth. Similarly, also here it will be explained how memory arises without a self-cognizer.

For example, someone thinks "There is a water crystal-jewel here because there is water" or "There is a fire crystal-jewel here because there is fire." However, this is incorrect reasoning "because, even without these two, water and fire arise [respectively] from rain and so forth and from rubbing kindling together and so forth." Without a relationship, the subject cannot be proven by the reason. A proof requires that there is a relationship between the subject and the reason.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 274) says:

> CHITTAMATRIN'S RESPONSE TO THAT REFUTATION: In terms of proving memory and a self-cognizer to be cause and result, like fire and smoke, it is not that due to memory a self-cognizer is inferred, rather, as was explained before, it is that due to memory the existence of an experiencer of an earlier consciousness is inferred.
>
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: Having distinguished two, (i) a self-experiencer and (ii) an other-experiencer, when they are refuted, although it is indeed said "Itself experiencing itself is established," the cognition by a consciousness that is posited by the Sautrantikas and Chittamatrins is not determined to be the two [types of experiencers]. Therefore, just as a lamp itself does not illuminate itself but nonetheless it illuminating it is not precluded; likewise, a consciousness itself does not experience itself, as is asserted by the former party, but mere experience in regard to it is not precluded.

The Sautrantikas and Chittamatrins say that there are two types of experiencers: self-experiencers and other-experiencers and that due to there being self-experiencers there are self-cognizers. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that there do not exist these distinctions of experiencers, there is only mere experience. Although they assert two types of experiencers, the Sautrantikas and Chittamatrins negate other-experiencers saying that if an earlier consciousness is experienced by another later consciousness there would be two absurd consequences: (i) the fault of endless regression and (ii) the fault of it not transferring to other objects.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "just as a lamp itself does not illuminate itself but nonetheless it illuminating it is not precluded; likewise, a consciousness itself does not experience itself, as is asserted by the former party, but mere experience in regard to it is not precluded." Therefore, although a self-cognizer is not asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas as it is by the former party, this does not mean that there is not mere experience. Consciousness itself is experience because it experiences objects.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 274) says:

> OBJECTION: A lamp itself illuminates itself.
> RESPONSE: In that case, darkness itself would obscure itself. If that were asserted, just as a pot is not seen in the dark, so too darkness would not be seen.

If it were the case that darkness itself obscures itself, it would follow that darkness would not be seen in the dark. For example, just as a pot is not seen in the dark because it is obscured by darkness, similarly, darkness would not be seen in the dark because it would obscure itself.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 274) says:

> Similarly, *Fundamental Wisdom* also says:
>
> If a lamp acts to illuminate
> The things that are itself and other,
> Also darkness would, doubtlessly,
> Obscure the things that are itself and other.

In short, darkness does not obscure itself.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 274) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Even in dependence on establishing a self-cognizer,*
> *A memory remembering such is not reasonable*
> *Because they are otherness – like the production in a continuum of the unknown.*
> *This reasoning destroys even those instances.* [6.74]
>
> Supposing, even having given up such analysis, that *in dependence on establishing* – that is, allowing for the establishment of – a consciousness that *cognizes* the nature of *itself* and the object that is cognized, a *memory* consciousness *remembering* that object and that object-possessor *is not reasonable because* the two – the later remembering consciousness and the earlier consciousness that experiences the object – *are* asserted by you [Chittamatrins] to be an established by way of their own character *otherness*.

The Chittamatrins set forth inherently existent memory as a reason proving self-cognizers. This is negated by the Prasangika Madhyamikas who say that if memory is inherently existent it would be an other that is not related to a self-experiencer.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 274) says:

> Like Maitreya's self-cognizing consciousness and his experience of an object are not remembered by Upagupta's consciousness since they were not experienced [by him] before, similarly, because of being inherently existent other – *like the production in* [someone's] *continuum of the unknown*,

> that is, the not experienced before – there would be no memory because the consciousness and the object would also not be experienced by a consciousness included in one's own continuum that arises at a later time.

What one person experiences is not remembered by another person because they are two different continua. Similarly, if a self-cognizer and subsequent memory were inherently existent they would be unrelated.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 274) says:

> Thinking "because the things that are cause and result abide as those that are included in a single continuum, memory exists" is also not suitable [because] *that reasoning* – "Because of being an established by way of its own character other" – acts to thoroughly *destroy even those instances* of cause and result included in a single continuum. This was already extensively explained in the context of stating above "[The qualities] based on Maitreya and Upagupta" (v. 6.61).

When the reason "because of being an inherently existent other" is set forth, it destroys the relationship of cause and result. This is because if there were inherent existence, all presentations of cause and result would be inadmissible. In that case, also the presentations of one continuum and different continua would also not be admissible.

The Chittamatrins say "Although one does not remember the experiences of another continuum, one remembers the experiences of one's own continuum." They prove the existence of a self-cognizer due to the existence of a subsequent memory in the same continuum. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the Chittamatrins accept inherently existent other then none of the above is acceptable.

Thursday morning, 9 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 275) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1B2B In our own system, the way in which memory is produced in spite of self-cognizers not existing

1 The system explained in this very text
2 The system explained in other texts

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1B2B-1 The system explained in this very text

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: How is it according to you?
>
> [The root text] expresses:
>
> *Because, for me this memory does not exist*
> *Other than that by which the object was sensed,*
> *Therefore, it is remembered thinking, "I saw."*
> *This is also the custom of worldly convention.* [6.75]
>
> How a remembering consciousness does not exist as just other (i.e., naturally other) than the consciousness by which the object was sensed (the object was experienced), has already been explained before. Because an otherness of memory does not exist, therefore since that which is sensed by experience is not unsensed by a remembering consciousness, memory arises having an object. Since that which is discerned by an experiential consciousness is not undiscerned, one can say, "I saw it."

> This is also the custom of the world and is not to be excessively analyzed because it is worldly convention as it just has a false significance [in that one cannot find the imputed object when it is sought].

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that even without a self-cognizer, there is memory.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2B1B-2 How memory is produced although there is no self-knowing consciousness

"If there is no self-knowing consciousness," you may ask, "Then how is memory produced?"

> *Because, for us, this memory is not separate*
> *From that by which the object is experienced,*
> *Therefore, I remember that I saw.* [6.75abc]

One remembers in the mind that he saw this object because as, for us Madhyamikas, this memory is not inherently separate from what experienced the object, that which was taken as an object by the experiencer is not unexamined by the memory.

> *This is also the way of worldly convention.* [6.75d]

This way of remembering is also the worldly conventional way, but the imputed object is not to be posited after being sought, for if the imputed object is sought it is not found, being a worldly convention.

Chandrakirti says: "How a remembering consciousness does not exist as just other (i.e., naturally other) than the consciousness by which the object was sensed (that is, by which the object was experienced), has already been explained before." This means that it has already been explained that there is no consciousness that experiences a previous consciousness, no consciousness that experiences that consciousness, and so forth. In other words, there is no experiencer of a previous experiencer, no experiencer of that experiencer, and so forth.

The statement in the autocommentary "Because an otherness of memory does not exist" means that there is no established by way of its own character memory.

Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, since that which is sensed by experience is not unsensed by a remembering consciousness, memory arises having an object." By means of a consciousness experiencing an object, there is a memory of that object. Chandrakirti says: "Since that which is discerned by an experiential consciousness is not undiscerned, one can say, 'I saw it.'" Thus, even though there is no self-cognizer, there is subsequent memory.

When one says "I saw blue before," saying "I" indicates a memory of the object-possessor and saying "blue" indicates a memory of the object. This accords with worldly conventions; it is not posited by means of thorough analysis. The Prasangika Madhyamikas are known as "those who propound in accordance with that renowned in the world." Chandrakirti says: "This is also the custom of the world and is not to be excessively analyzed because it is worldly convention as it just has a false significance [in that one cannot find the imputed object when it is sought]." When an object is sought by means of thorough analysis it is not found.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 275) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS: If, according to you, self-cognizers are not asserted, how is memory produced?
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *Because for us there does not exist a memory other than*
> *What experienced the object,*

There is memory thinking "I saw."
This is also the way of worldly conventions. [6.75]

The way in which for this system there *does not exist* a *memory* consciousness *that is* an [established] by way of its own character *other than* the previous consciousness – the consciousness that *experienced the object* – was already explained. Since it was already explained before that ordinary worldly awarenesses do not conceive substantial causes and results, such as a seed and sprout, to be an established by way of their own character other, also innate worldly awarenesses do not conceive the cause and result that are an earlier experience of an object and a later memory of it to be an established by way of their own character other. Not only does that not exist, but when there is the later memory of an object that was previously seen by an apprehender of blue, conventionally one says: "I also saw that before." For this reason, it is clear that ordinary worldly beings do not conceive the two, experience and memory, and the two objects of those times to be conventions by way of their own character. If that were not the case, even the experiences of another continuum would produce memory in oneself.

The Chittamatrins ask the Prasangika Madhyamikas: "If there are no self-cognizers, how is memory produced?" The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond that, although there is no memory established by way of its own character and no experience established by way of its own character, there is the worldly convention "I saw that." Thus, although there are no self-cognizers, there is a subsequent memory of both the object-possessor and its object. For example, when someone says "Yesterday I saw Cristiana buying matches in Pomaia," there is a memory of both the object-possessor and the object in that "Cristiana buying matches" indicates the object and "I saw" indicates the object-possessor, the eye consciousness. This way of positing accords with worldly conventions.

The innate awareness of ordinary worldly beings does not conceive an inherently existent other; that is, it does not conceive one substance to be an inherently existent other from another substance. The innate awareness of ordinary worldly beings does not investigate and does not analyze. In fact, worldly beings do not discuss inherently existent things.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "If that were not the case, even the experiences of another continuum would produce memory in oneself." For example, Sherab's experience of the taste of drinking tea is not remembered by Dondrub, however, if ordinary worldly beings conceived the two, experience and memory, and the two objects of those times to be conventions by way of their own character, then Dondrub should be able to remember Sherab's experience of the taste of drinking tea.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 275) says:

Therefore, since that experienced and perceived by an earlier consciousness which experienced the object is not not experienced and not not perceived by a later memory consciousness, *memory* is produced *thinking "I* also *saw* that before." *This also* being *the way of worldly conventions*, do not posit [memory] – not being content with mere imputed conventions – through analyzing it by means of seeking the imputed object because it is a worldly convention that has the very meaning of being a falsity that is not found when the imputed object is sought.

For example, when the taste of tea is experienced by Sherab's tongue consciousness it is also perceived, that is, realized; due to this, later on Sherab thinks 'I tasted tea before." Lama Tsongkhapa says: "memory is produced thinking 'I also saw that before.'" This is also the way of worldly conventions in that worldly beings commonly say "I saw that before," "I heard that before," "I tasted that before," and so forth. These are not posited by worldly beings by means of thorough analysis. On the other hand, if worldly beings were to seek the imputed object it would not be found. This is because objects have the meaning of being falsities; that is, they are falsities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 276) says:

> The autocommentary, after refuting self-cognizers and memory which are established by way of their own character substances, says:
>
> > Moreover, even from the point of view of worldly conventions, memory having a self-cognizer for a cause is just not possible.
>
> In regard to refuting self-cognizers not only ultimately but also conventionally [the autocommentary] says:
>
> > The way in which memory occurs without a self-cognizer will be taught.
>
> Although self-cognizers do not exist, the way in which memory is produced from experience is taught in this context.

Self-cognizers do not exist either ultimately or conventionally. The way in which memory is produced without a self-cognizer will be explained later on.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 276) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS: The memory thinking "I saw" is the memory of an object-possessor, whereas the memory thinking "That, such as blue, was seen" is the memory of an object. In addition, the thought "I remember the very thing I saw before" is a specific way of remembering. If that arises for memory, it is clear that the object-possessor, the consciousness, that earlier saw, for example, Maitreya, itself experienced itself because memory follows experience accordingly.

It is commonly said "I saw" and "I remember seeing." We also remember sounds heard yesterday, odors smelled yesterday, tastes tasted yesterday, and so forth. Even without a self-cognizer such memories are produced.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 276) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: Although our system asserts this to be the way of remembering that appears to the world, given that the way of remembering is such, it is not that it arises by the force of a previous consciousness, that experienced an object, itself cognizing itself. Rather, the memory "I also saw Maitreya before" is produced by the force of a single object, that very one perceived by an earlier experience that is also perceived by memory. Hence, the convention such as "I remember I saw" is also asserted by us. Although this is asserted, in dependence on it understand that it also differs from the self-cognizer that is refuted.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that memory arises from the experience of an object. We remember only those things that we experienced before, for example, we remember "Yesterday I had a bad headache" due to the suffering feeling experienced yesterday. Or we remember "Yesterday I met an old friend" due to the pleasant feeling experienced yesterday.

Thursday afternoon, 9 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 277) says:

> It has already been explained before in many [texts] that the other systems posit experience and memory and the two objects of those times to be an established by way of their own character other. Due to this, although they indeed assert the two, experience and memory, to have the same object, and these two to be a single continuity, they are unable to posit them as that. It is to be understood, by observing one's own awareness, that, even though one says "That Maitreya," one

> conceives mere Maitreya without the conception thinking "The Maitreya, who is qualified by the time of when that was stated and the place where he was abiding at that time, was seen earlier."

'The other systems' are the Chittamatrins and Sautrantikas who posit experience and memory and the two objects of those times to be an established by way of their own character other. These two systems say that experience and memory have the same object and are the same continuity, however, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas they cannot posit this.

"Even though one says "That Maitreya," one conceives mere Maitreya without the conception thinking 'The Maitreya, who is qualified by the time of when that was stated and the place where he was abiding at that time, was seen earlier.'" When one remembers "I saw Maitreya," this memory is not qualified by place and time. For example, when one remembers "I saw Cesare," the memory does not need to be qualified by time and place. Also when one remembers "I drank coffee," this memory is not qualified by the place in which one drank the coffee, the time when it was drunk, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 277) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1B2B-2 The system explained in other texts

This section does not have a corresponding part in the autocommentary.

> There are two great systems regarding the way in which memory is produced without a self-cognizer. Of these, the system of glorious Shantideva is as his *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:
>
> > If self-cognizers do not exist
> > How is consciousness remembered?
>
> The systems of the former parties, [the Sautrantika and Chittamatra], were extensively explained before.

The two great systems regarding how memory is produced without a self-cognizer are those of Chandrakirti's *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* and Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*. The system of glorious Shantideva is discussed in his *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* in the context of the question: "If self-cognizers do not exist how is consciousness remembered?"

> QUESTION: Since the response to both the former parties' consequence and objection is that there is no pervasion, how is memory produced in spite of self-cognizers not existing?

The former parties say that without self-cognizers there would not be memory. The Chittamatrins set out the consequence: "It follows that there does not arise subsequent memory because there is no experiencer that is a self-cognizer." When that consequence is flung, the response of the Prasangika Madhyamikas is that there is no pervasion. The Chittamatrins objection is: "There is a self-cognizer because there is the arisal of subsequent memory." The response to this objection is also that there is no pervasion. For this reason, someone asks: "Since the response to both the former parties' consequence and objection is that there is no pervasion, how is memory produced in spite of self-cognizers not existing?"

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 277-8) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS' RESPONSE: When an object (a thing that is an apprehended object which is other than the consciousness that is the apprehender) is experienced by an awareness, there arises the memory of the object-possessor – a consciousness other than the consciousness that experienced the object.

OBJECTION: It is not reasonable that the memory of an object-possessor is produced from the experience of another object because there would be an absurd consequence.
PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS' RESPONSE: There is no fault. When the memory of an object-possessor is produced from the experience of an object, it is not that there is memory through abandoning the consciousness, instead it is because there is the memory "That form was seen before" through the relationship of – that is, in relation to – the two, the object and object-possessor. For example, when the body [of a bear] is bitten by a rat in wintertime, even though the rat's poison enters [its body], the bite is experienced but the poison is not experienced. At a later time, when [the bear is awakened by] hearing the sound of thunder, even though there is the memory "When I was bitten, poison entered [my body]," the poison was not experienced at that earlier time.

- [The bear] being bitten by the rat is like an object experienced by an apprehender of blue.
- The entering of the poison at the same time as the bite is like the experience of the object-possessor which exists at the same time as the apprehension of the object.
- The object-possessor not experiencing itself at that time is like [the bear] not experiencing the poison at the time of the bite.
- The memory of the poison later on is like the memory of the experiencer of an object.
- By remembering the experience of an object, an object-possessor, even without itself experiencing itself, is remembered, like, by the force of remembering the bite itself, even though the poison that entered [the body] earlier on was not experienced, it is remembered.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas' answer to the question in *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* "If self-cognizers do not exist how is consciousness remembered?" is given as (see *Unique Tenets* page 168):

> *Memory occurs due to the relation with the experience of other,*
> *Like [remembering] the poison of a rat.*

When a hibernating bear is bitten by a rat, at that time it experiences the bite but does not experience the poison entering its body. Later, in springtime, when the bear is wakened by thunder, the effect of the poison that entered his body begins to be felt and the bear remembers that the poison came from the rat's bite. In this way, the bear is able to remember "When I was bitten, poison entered my body."

For example, having seen blue before, there arises a subsequent memory of the object, blue. When that object, blue, is remembered, the eye consciousness to which the blue appeared is also remembered. In short, by the force of remembering the object, the object-possessor is also remembered. Thus, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that self-cognizers are not necessary for memory because just by remembering the object, the memory of its object-possessor arises. The eye consciousness apprehending blue experienced the object, blue, but it did not experience itself.

In short, when a hibernating bear is bitten by a rat, the bite is experienced but the poison entering its body is not experienced. Only later, when awakened by thunder, does the bear remember that the poison entered its body earlier on when it was bitten by the rat. The bear remembers that poison entered its body only when it begins to experience the result of that poison, pain in its body.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 278) says:

> This reasoning of the production of memory without a self-cognizer set forth by the lord of scholars seeming to be outstanding accords with how it is seen by those who explain [Shantideva's] *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*. It is not at all the assertion of the great conqueror's son that:
>
> > The response to the [consequence] "In general, it follows that a memory which is a later consciousness is not admissible because an earlier consciousness does not itself experience itself" is that the pervasion is not established. Therefore, the intention of *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* is not to refute self-cognizers conventionally.

Friday morning, 10 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 279) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1B2C Dispelling arguments regarding such refutation

1 Dispelling arguments regarding other direct valid cognizers and inferential cognizers
2 Dispelling arguments that there are other mental consciousnesses

These topics are not discussed in Chandrakirti's autocommentary. The Chittamatrins set out two arguments: (i) one regarding other direct valid cognizers and inferential cognizers and (ii) one regarding other mental consciousnesses. [Both these arguments are dispelled by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.]

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1B2C-1 Dispelling arguments regarding other direct valid cognizers and inferential cognizers

OBJECTION: In our own system, all the consciousnesses that are apprehenders of blue and so forth are necessarily asserted to exist. In that case, just as was said to others [as follows] there will also be that fault for us:

What will know their existence?
It is not suitable to say "It exists even without being apprehended." [6.72cd]

If an apprehender of blue itself knows its existence, then self-cognizers must be asserted because a consciousness cognized by another object is also inadmissible.

The Chittamatrins say: "You Prasangika Madhyamikas say that an apprehender of blue exists and that this apprehender of blue knows itself to exist. Therefore, you accept self-cognizers." The Chittamatrins say that consciousness cognized by another object is inadmissible; that is, other-experiencers are inadmissible.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 279) says:

RESPONSE: Since this is very difficult point I will explain it. If I raise, that is, explain an example of how there is memory of objects and object-possessors, it will be easily realized. With regard to this, by remembering the object, the object-possessor is also remembered, therefore, no additional memory of an object-possessor being necessary, through establishing blue (the object of an apprehender of blue), the comprehender of blue is established.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that this being a difficult point, he will explain it. In short, by remembering the object, the object-possessor is also remembered, therefore, there is no need to posit an additional consciousness that is an experiencer of the object-possessor.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 279) says:

A way of establishing a comprehender of blue that is other than the way of establishing blue is not necessary. In addition, that blue is established through the dawning – due to blue – of an aspect similar to itself on an apprehender of blue is also similar to [that asserted in the] other system.

The object, blue, is said to dawn on or appear to an apprehender of blue. However, there is discussion regarding the statement "through the dawning – due to blue – of an aspect similar to itself on an apprehender of blue," in that some say that it has an aspect similar to itself and others than it is not so.

Here "other system" refers to the Chittamatrins; the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the way in which blue dawns on an apprehender of blue is similar to what the Chittamatrins say.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 279) says:

> However, the difference is that when [the Chittamatrins] establish an apprehender of blue, it is established by means of a self-cognizer that selectively experiences the aspect of an apprehender free from dualistic appearance. Moreover, the assertions of the other system is similar with respect to all consciousnesses.

According to the Chittamatrins an apprehender of blue must have an experiencer which is a self-cognizer. They say that it is the same for all other consciousnesses.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 279) says:

> However, here, as is taught in the root texts and commentaries on the *Heart of the Middle Way* and the *Two Truths*, [consciousnesses] that select the aspect of an apprehender are asserted to not be possible. Therefore, [an apprehender of blue] is not established by the self-cognizer that experiences it; instead, an apprehender of blue is established by establishing blue. For example, it is like by remembering an object, the object-possessor is remembered; it is not like the memory that arises by the force of a previous object-possessor itself experiencing itself as others assert.

The Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamikas' point of view , which is set forth in the *Heart of the Middle Way* and the *Two Truths*, is that consciousnesses that select the aspect of an apprehender are impossible. The *Heart of the Middle Way* is by Bhavaviveka and *Two Truths* is by Jnanagarbha (His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama often says that the *Heart of the Middle Way* is an essential text in terms of practice, but that the lineage of the transmission of this text is not intact). These two masters say that even though self-cognizers do not exist, there is memory of an object-possessor because by establishing blue the apprehender of blue is also established.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 280) says:

> The purpose of saying so is clearly taught in *Clear Words*:
>
> > It is because the enumeration of valid cognizers is from the point of view of other, that is, objects of comprehension, and because the respective entity of valid cognizers that are found to have their own entity is posited through the mere taking of the aspect of an object of comprehension.

There are two types of objects of comprehension: the manifest and hidden. Just as there are two types of objects of comprehension so too are there two types of valid cognizers: direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers. This is mentioned in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* saying: "Due to there being two objects of comprehension, there are two valid cognizers. They are those having the ability to perform a function and those not having that ability." The latter phrase refers to the objects of comprehension of valid cognizers. For the Sautrantikas, things that have the ability to perform a function are ultimate truths, whereas things that lack the ability to perform a function are conventional truths. Thus, they say that ultimate truths are the objects of direct valid cognizers, whereas conventional truths are the objects of inferential valid cognizers. Another interpretation is that "those having the ability to perform a function and those not having that ability" can be taken to refer to specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena, or they can be taken to refer to manifest phenomena and hidden phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 280) says:

> The meaning of these [statements] is:
> 1. because they are posited from the point of view of valid cognizers being definite as two and objects of comprehension being definite as two and
> 2. [because of] positing the existence of the respective entities of valid cognizers which are comprehenders from the point of view of an aspect of an object of comprehension dawning on a valid cognizer.
>
> Stating [in *Clear Words*] "through the mere," [indicates], according to the assertions of the Chittamatrins and Sautrantikas, that an object of comprehension is established by a valid cognizer taking an aspect just like, that is, similar to, the object of comprehension. Hence, apart from the way of establishing valid cognizers [mentioned] above, the refutation of the respective entity of a valid cognizer being established by a self-cognizer which selectively experiences the aspect of an apprehender free from dualistic appearance is the meaning of [a valid cognizer] being established by merely establishing its object of comprehension.

The Sautrantikas and Chittamatrins say that consciousness is established by a consciousness that selects the aspect of an apprehender, whereas the Madhyamikas say that a consciousness is established by merely establishing its object.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: In the transcript of week 23, Geshe-la said that for Chittamatra, the appearances of form and so forth to a dream consciousness are imputed existents. If those appearances are existent imputational natures (*kun btags*), what are the other-powered phenomena (*gzhan dbang*) they are imputed on?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In the Chittamatra system, if it is an imputational nature, or imputational factor (*kun btags*), it is pervaded by having a basis of imputation that is an other-powered phenomenon. Bases of imputation are of two kinds: a mere basis of imputation and a final basis of imputation. A mere basis of imputation is not pervaded by being an other-powered phenomenon, whereas a final basis of imputation is pervaded by being an other-powered phenomenon. Imputational factors (imputational natures) are also of two kinds: existent imputational factors and non-existent imputational factors.

Since it was said that the form and so forth that appear to a dream consciousness are imputed existents, they need to rely on something else in order to appear in the perspective of a consciousness. On what do they need to rely in order to appear? For example, if someone dreamt last night about being in a nice park, when he awakes he has the appearance of that nice park and so forth that were seen in the dream. The existence of the appearance of the nice park in a dream is posited in dependence on a consciousness of the waking state. Therefore, when the consciousness of the waking state posits the existence of the appearance in a dream it does so in dependence on a memory which is a conceptual consciousness. That conception imputes "I saw a nice park." What is the basis of imputation? It is the appearance to a sleeping consciousness, an other-powered phenomenon.

Student: Tsongkhapa states that sense consciousnesses do not exist in a dream. Then how can it be explained that one can be awakened while dreaming by sounds, smells, and so forth?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Lama Tsongkhapa says that sense consciousnesses are not manifest while dreaming, whereas Panchen Sonam Drakpa says that there are no sense consciousnesses when one is in deep sleep. If sense consciousnesses exist when dreaming but are not manifest, then, when there is a loud sound, the person is awakened due to the activation of a sense consciousness. There are no

sense consciousnesses in dream in the sense that they are involuntarily withdrawn. In fact, the definition of sleep is: the involuntary withdrawing of the sense consciousnesses.

Student: Chittamatra posits that there are no objects that are a different entity from the mind. However, they also assert separate mental continuums that are different entities from each other. Will Geshe-la please address this seeming contradiction? How would Chittamatra assert the existence of different mind-bases-of-all that are different entities from one's own continuum?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is no contradiction because whatever appears is only due to the activation of latencies deposited on the mind-basis-of-all. When Sonam appears to Sherab and a table appears to Sherab there is no difference in terms of how they come to appear to the mind, that is, they appear due to the activation of latencies, but there is a difference in terms of the object. The Chittamatrins say that when a hundred people look at Sherab each of the hundred people have an uncommon appearance of Sherab due to the activation of uncommon latencies.

END

Monday afternoon, 13 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 280) says:

> This is the intention of Arya [Nagarjuna's] statement [in his *Refutation of Objections*]:
>
> > If valid cognizers are established from themselves
> > Without depending on objects of comprehension,
> > Your valid cognizer would be established.
> > Here they would be thoroughly established without depending on other.
>
> If, without it being enough that valid cognizers are established by merely establishing their object of comprehension, valid cognizers are established from themselves – that is, from valid cognizers – as others assert, then valid cognizers would be established without depending on objects of comprehension. When that is asserted, through refuting the statement "Things would be thoroughly established without depending on other, that is, causes and conditions," it is indirectly taught that valid cognizers are established by merely establishing their objects of comprehension.

This passage by Arya Nagarjuna comes from his text *Refutation of Objections*. Since valid cognizers are established by merely establishing their objects of comprehension, there is no need for a valid cognizer to establish a valid cognizer due to which there is no need for a self-cognizer. This statement also indicates that objects of comprehension are posited in dependence on valid cognizers.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 280-1) says:

> In that case, an apprehender of blue is not established by a self-cognizer as it is in other systems; instead, it is indicated to be established by a sense direct valid cognizer because its existence is realized through the very establishment of the object of comprehension by an apprehender of blue. Therefore, all valid cognizers whatsoever are established by establishing their objects of comprehension.

According to Acharya Bhavaviveka, the founder of the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika system, are valid cognizers established by merely establishing their objects of comprehension or are they established in another way? According to the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamikas all existents are inherently existent. Is an apprehender of blue established merely by establishing blue, its object of comprehension? In the Prasangika Madhyamika system is a direct valid cognizer that is an apprehender of blue established merely by establishing blue? Does an apprehender of blue itself realize itself? According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas self-cognizers do not exist, but do they accept that consciousness itself cognizes itself? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 281) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1B2C-2 Dispelling arguments that there are other mental consciousnesses

There is no corresponding discussion of this section in the autocommentary.

> OBJECTION: Well then, this system posits even reflections, echoes, and so forth, as was explained before, to be form spheres, sound spheres, and so forth. *Clear Words* also says:
>
> > Two moons and so forth are not direct [objects] in relation to consciousnesses that do not have cataracts, but are direct [objects] solely in relation to those that have cataracts and so forth.
>
> This system indicates that the term "direct" with respect to objects such as forms, sounds, and so forth is an actual name, whereas with respect to the object-possessors that are their apprehenders

> it is an imputed name. In this context, although there is a difference regarding the appearance of two moons and so forth being or not being direct objects of comprehension in relation to ordinary worldly beings, for our own system the appearance of two moons and so forth are also asserted to be manifest phenomena, direct objects of comprehension. Therefore, even though in relation to ordinary worldly beings there are [both] mistaken and unmistaken sense consciousnesses, by means of establishing their respective objects of comprehension, the object-possessors are established.

Is a reflection a form sphere, an echo a sound sphere, and so forth? "This system" refers to the Prasangika Madhyamika system which asserts that a reflection is a form sphere, an echo is a sound sphere, and so forth, as was explained before. Are the horse and elephant that appear in a dream form spheres? They are forms that are phenomena spheres because they are the appearance of form appearing to a mental consciousness from among the two, sense consciousnesses and mental consciousnesses.

"Two moons and so forth are not direct [objects] in relation to consciousnesses that do not have cataracts" means that when one moon appears as two moons it is due to the defect of cataracts. What are cataracts?

Student: The convex lens of the eye which is clear becomes opaque due to age. Due to this there is the loss of the ability to focus on an object and the eyesight becomes unclear.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Does one moons appear as two?

Student: It can happen that things appear as double because the changes that occur in one eye do not necessarily occur in the other.

Two moons and so forth "are direct [objects] solely in relation to those that have cataracts and so forth." The appearance of two moons is a direct object only for those who have cataracts, whereas it is not a direct object for those who do not cataracts in that they do not have this appearance. The Tibetan word "*mngon sum,*" translated here as direct, is defined as: that which directly appears. According to the lower schools *mgnon sum* necessarily refers to a consciousness, but in the Prasangika Madhyamika system it can also refer to a direct object.

The term "direct" is an actual name when applied to forms, sounds, odors and so forth, whereas it is an imputed name when applied to their apprehenders. What is an actual name and what is an imputed name? If it is an actual name affixed to that phenomenon is it pervaded by being the actual name of that phenomenon? The answer is that there is no pervasion in that if it is an actual name affixed to that phenomenon it is not pervaded by being the actual name of that phenomenon. For example, the name "thing" is affixed to a table as an actual name but it is not the actual name of the table. Why? Because by hearing the name "thing" there is no pervasion that one comes to understand table. In other words, when one hears the name "thing" the appearance of table does not arise in the mind. However, the name "thing" is affixed to the table as an actual name even though it is not its actual name. Why is that? The name "thing" is affixed to the table as an actual name because the table is "that which is able to perform a function."

If it is an actual name affixed to a phenomenon it is not pervaded by being the actual name of that phenomenon. For example, the name "definition" is the actual name of a definition but it is not affixed to it as an actual name. Why? Because a definition is not a definition. Why? Because it is a definiendum. Can you posit the definition of definition?

Student: That which fulfills the three qualities of substantial existence.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is the definition of definition in the lower schools, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas would argue with "the three qualities of substantial existence" because they do not posit substantial existence saying that if there were substantial existence there would be true existence. There are other illustrations of the fact that if it is an actual name of that phenomena it is not pervaded by being affixed to that phenomenon as an actual name. For example, the name "Sherab"

(wisdom) is the actual name of Sherab (the translator) but it is not affixed to him as an actual name because he is not Sherab (wisdom) because he is not a consciousness, he is a person.

The term "direct" is an imputed name with respect to object-possessors; for example, an eye consciousness apprehending form, an ear consciousness apprehending sound, and so forth. Why is the term "direct" only an imputed name with respect to consciousnesses? It is because apprehenders are not directly perceived by the sense consciousnesses of an ordinary being. On the other hand, forms, sounds, and so forth are "direct" because they can be directly perceived by the sense consciousnesses of ordinary beings.

If it is an imputed name of that phenomenon is it pervaded by being affixed to that phenomenon as an imputed name? What is the definition of an imputed name? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "for our own system the appearance of two moons and so forth are also asserted to be manifest phenomena, direct objects of comprehension." From among manifest phenomena and hidden phenomena, the Prasangika Madhyamikas classify the appearance of two moons as a manifest phenomenon. The appearance of two moons is or is not a direct object depending on whether or not an ordinary being has cataracts or not. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "there is a difference regarding the appearance of two moons and so forth being or not being direct objects of comprehension in relation to ordinary worldly beings."

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "Therefore, even though in relation to ordinary worldly beings there are [both] mistaken and unmistaken sense consciousnesses, by means of establishing their respective objects of comprehension, the object-possessors are established." All consciousnesses realize or establish their respective objects of comprehension. Therefore, regardless of whether or not a consciousness is mistaken it realizes its object of comprehension; hence, by means of establishing its object of comprehension, the object-possessor is established. In other words, all consciousnesses realize their respective appearances. For this reason, in the Prasangika Madhyamika system if it is a consciousness it is pervaded by being a valid cognizer with respect to its appearance.

The objection continues in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 281) saying:

> However, for those who do not assert self-cognizers, a mental consciousness of the time of the base that is mistaken with respect to its appearing object and referent object is not established to exist because the object-possessor is not established through comprehending its respective object of comprehension.

In this way the Chittamatrins say: "If there are no self-cognizers, how do you Prasangika Madhyamikas establish a mental consciousness of the time of the base that is mistaken with respect to its appearing object and referent object?"

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 281) says:

> RESPONSE: The explanation of this is that, since this system does not assert a consciousness that is a different entity from the collection of six consciousnesses, there does not exist other than the two:
> 1. valid cognizers that are directly based on the physical sense powers and
> 2. valid cognizers that are based on a mere mental sense power.
>
> Moreover, valid cognizers are taught in *Clear Words* saying:
>
> > The explanation of the four – the two, direct and inferential [valid cognizers], valid cognizers of scriptural authority, and valid cognizers that fully comprehend or that comprehend through an example – is based on the root text and commentary of [Nagarjuna's] *Refutation of Objections*. The last two valid cognizers are included in inferential cognizers. The commentary on [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas* also

says:

> All things are not comprehended by a directly perceiving consciousness, instead they are conceived by an inferential cognizer.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not assert a consciousness that is a different entity from the collection of six consciousnesses. On the other hand, the Chittamatrins posit eight consciousnesses and others posit nine consciousnesses. The nine consciousnesses are the six, the eye through mental consciousness, plus the mind-basis-of-all, afflicted mentality, and a stainless consciousness. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not posit a consciousness other than the six. The Prasangika Madhyamikas posit two types of valid cognizers:

1. valid cognizers that are directly based on a physical sense power and
2. valid cognizers that are based on a mere mental sense power.

In *Clear Words* four valid cognizers are explained based on Nagarjuna's *Refutation of Objections*. The four valid cognizers are: "the two, direct and inferential [valid cognizers], valid cognizers of scriptural authority, and valid cognizers that fully comprehend or that comprehend through an example." However, in reality there are only two types of valid cognizers: (i) direct valid cognizers and (ii) inferential valid cognizers because "valid cognizers of scriptural authority, and valid cognizers that fully comprehend or that comprehend through an example" are included in inferential valid cognizers. "Valid cognizers of scriptural authority" are inferential valid cognizers through belief. For example, the citation "from generosity, wealth," as the subject, is incontrovertible with respect to the main object taught because it is a scriptural citation certified as pure by way of the three-fold analysis. "Valid cognizers that fully comprehend or that comprehend through an example" are, for example: the black mass in front, as the subject, is an ox because it is a composite of a hump, dewlap, and so forth; for example, like a bamen. Thus, one comprehends a bamen (a type of cattle) in dependence on an ox.

In conclusion, valid cognizers are either direct valid cognizers or inferential valid cognizers. All four Buddhist schools posit these two types of valid cognizers. Inferential valid cognizers are further divided into: inference through the power of the fact, inference through belief, and inference through renown. The lower schools posit four types of direct valid cognizers, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas posit only three: (i) sense direct valid cognizers, (ii) mental direct valid cognizers, and (iii) yogic direct valid cognizers. When four direct valid cognizers are posited, the fourth is a self-cognizing direct valid cognizer. What is a yogic direct valid cognizer? Is the exalted wisdom directly realizing all phenomena a yogic direct valid cognizer? Think about it. In the Prasangika Madhyamika system if it is a yogic direct valid cognizer it is not pervaded by being unmistaken and free from conception.

Tuesday morning, 14 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 282) says:
(see Unique Tenets page 251)

> With respect to direct valid cognizers, from among the four explained in other systems direct self-cognizers are refuted, whereas mental direct perceivers are also not asserted as they are explained in [the texts on] valid cognition. [Chandrakirti's] commentary on [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas*, when explaining the meaning of the passage in the *Treasury of Knowledge* that the five, forms and so forth, are each known by sense and mental consciousnesses, says:
>
> > The two consciousnesses do not know the same object. The first directly perceives the aspect of an object, that is, it is what is initially produced. The second does not know it directly, but when, by the force of a sense consciousness, it conceives and is produced as such it is referred to saying "It too knows its object."

> It is said that the first, a sense consciousness, directly cognizes its object, such as a form and so forth, whereas a mental consciousness cognizes that by the force of a sense consciousness; it does not directly cognize it as does a sense consciousness. It is also said that [that mental consciousness] is memory.

In the Prasangika Madhyamika system there are only three direct valid cognizers and not four as in the other systems; this is because they refute self-cognizing direct valid cognizers. Mental direct perceivers are also not asserted by them in the same way as they are asserted by the texts on valid cognition. A mental direct valid cognizer does not cognize form in the same way that an eye consciousness does.

There are five types of mental direct perceivers: mental direct perceivers apprehending a form, mental direct perceivers apprehending a sound, mental direct perceivers apprehending an odor, mental direct perceivers apprehending a taste, and mental direct perceivers apprehending a tangible object. The lower school assert mental direct perceivers to be free from conceptuality and unmistaken. However, according to *Illumination* it seems that mental direct perceivers are also conceptual in that it says: "a mental consciousness cognizes that by the force of a sense consciousness; it does not directly cognize it as does a sense consciousness. It is also said that [that mental consciousness] is memory."

The lower schools say that there is both a sense direct valid cognizer apprehending form and a mental direct valid cognizer apprehending form. For the lower schools such a mental direct valid cognizer is necessarily free from conception. This is not necessarily the case in the Prasangika Madhyamika system. The mental consciousness that arises after a sense consciousness also remembers the object of that sense consciousness.

"The two consciousnesses do not know the same object." This can be understood to mean either that a mental direct perceiver and a sense direct perceiver do not know the same object or that two sense direct perceivers do not know the same object. If it is the first then the following consequence can be flung: "It follows that a mental direct perceiver that comes after an eye consciousness apprehending form does not apprehend form."

The commentary on Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas* says: "The first directly perceives the aspect of an object, that is, it is what is initially produced. The second does not know it directly, but when, by the force of a sense consciousness, it conceives and is produced as such it is referred to saying 'It too knows its object.'" The first is a sense consciousness, whereas the second is a mental consciousness. A mental consciousness does not know a form directly by its own force as does an eye consciousness; it only knows a form by the force of the eye consciousness that apprehended it previously. In Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* it says: "One does not know two because the objects of sense consciousnesses are determined." "One" is, for example, an eye consciousness which does not know two, "two" being, for example, a form sphere and a sound sphere.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 282) says:

> [Chandrakirti's] commentary on [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas* also says:
>
> > [Mental consciousness] is also not a type of experience as are feelings and so forth, nor is it that which perceives forms, sounds, and so forth by means of the sense powers.
>
> Therefore, two are taught with respect to direct comprehension:
> 1. the perceiving of forms and so forth by sense consciousnesses, for example, and
> 2. the perceiving of the internal, such as feelings of happiness, suffering, and so forth, by experience.

> The latter of the two must also be asserted to exist from the time of the base. Because direct valid cognizers are also not explained here to be more than four and, since self-cognizing direct perceivers are not suitable to be posited as valid cognizers, they are posited as yogic direct perceivers, sense direct perceivers, and mental direct perceivers.

When a mental consciousness comprehends a form it does not comprehend it in the way that a feeling of happiness and so forth are experienced. It also does not comprehend a form in the way that an eye consciousness perceives form. What is the definition of feeling? How does a feeling experience suffering? Are the observed object and experience of feeling the same or different?
Student: The observed object of feeling and the experience of feeling are different. The observed object of a feeling is, for example, the tangible object hot or cold, whereas the experience of feeling is unpleasantness or pleasure.
Student 2: It seems that they are different because a feeling of pleasure or suffering arises with respect to an object, whether an object of the senses or a mental image.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is a lot of debate about this subject. However, Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 244) previously said: "Distinguishing between the observed object and experience is, except for a few cases, not necessary in most such cases." Thus, there are cases in which it is necessary to differentiate the observed object and experience and others where it is not necessary.

How are forms and so forth perceived by a sense consciousness? Does an eye consciousness have the appearance of form or does the eye consciousness experience form? I think that the appearance of form directly appears to an eye consciousness.

Is a feeling of happiness that which becomes the entity of happiness and a feeling of suffering that which becomes the entity of suffering? In one text on *Awarenesses and Knowers* it says: "If it is suffering or happiness it is necessarily feeling." Thus, some say that happiness and suffering are necessarily feelings. This topic is discussed in relation to the three types of suffering.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The latter of the two must also be asserted to exist from the time of the base." This would seem to imply that an eye consciousness perceiving forms does not exist from the time of the base. What is "the time of the base"? It is related to the three: base, path and result. However, this is a subject of debate, for example: "Does the time of the base refer to conception in the mother's womb?"

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Because direct valid cognizers are also not explained here to be more than four and, since self-cognizing direct perceivers are not suitable to be posited as valid cognizers, they are posited as yogic direct perceivers, sense direct perceivers, and mental direct perceivers." "Here" refers to the Madhyamika scriptures in which direct valid cognizers are not explained to be more than four. It is not suitable to posit a self-cognizer direct perceiver as a valid cognizer, therefore, there are three direct perceivers: yogic direct perceivers, sense direct perceivers, and mental direct perceivers. These three can also be valid direct perceivers. For the lower schools a yogic direct perceiver can either be a valid cognizer or a non-valid cognizer, whereas for the Prasangika Madhyamikas if it is a yogic direct perceiver it is pervaded by being a yogic direct valid cognizer. This is because for the Prasangika Madhyamikas a valid cognizer is that which realizes its main object, whereas for the lower schools in order for it to be a valid cognizer it must be new.

Is a sense direct perceiver pervaded by being a sense direct valid cognizer? Is a mental direct perceiver pervaded by being mental direct valid cognizer? Is there not a sense direct perceiver that is an awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained? There is because the texts on awarenesses and knowers say that when the mind is focused on an attractive form the ear consciousness does not ascertain sound but this ear consciousness is still a sense direct perceiver because it is not a wrong consciousness. Is there not a wrong eye consciousness? There is, for example,

an eye consciousness perceiving a white conch to be yellow, an eye consciousness perceiving a white snow mountain to be blue, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> Even though mental direct valid cognizers do not accord with the propounders of valid cognition, [the Sautrantikas and Chittamatrins], it is not that mental direct valid cognizers are not asserted.

There are mental direct perceivers that are mental direct valid cognizers but the way in which they are asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas differs from how they are asserted by the propounders of valid cognition, the Sautrantikas and Chittamatrins. What is the difference between a mental direct valid cognizer posited by the Sautrantika and Chittamatra systems and that posited by the Prasangika Madhyamika system? What is the definition of a mental direct perceiver?
Student: The Sautrantikas define a mental direct perceiver as: 1) that which is generated in dependence on the mental sense power that is its own uncommon empowering condition and 2) is a consciousness that is an other-knower which is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken.

The definition of a mental direct perceiver in the Prasangika Madhyamika system is given in Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 331):

> The definition of a mental direct perceiver is: that which is a direct valid cognizer and a cognizer that is directly produced in dependence on a mental sense power, its own uncommon empowering condition, and which is incontrovertible with respect to the object of comprehension that becomes its respective object of the mode of apprehension.
> When divided there are two:
>
> 1. a conceptual mental direct perceiver and
>
> 2. a non-conceptual mental direct perceiver.
>
> Illustrations of the first, [a conceptual mental direct perceiver], are:
>
> - the three, happiness, suffering, and equanimity feelings, that arise in the retinue of a conception that is a mental consciousness in the continuum of a person who has not realized either coarse or subtle selflessness
>
> - and ascertaining consciousness that ascertains a common object, blue, which is produced after a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue.
>
> An illustration of the second is:
>
> - the clairvoyance knowing others' minds.

In the lower schools a mental direct perceiver is necessarily free from conceptuality. In fact, the definition of a mental direct perceiver according to the lower schools is: 1) that which is generated in dependence on the mental sense power that is its own uncommon empowering condition and 2) is a consciousness that is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken. A mental direct valid cognizer is defined as: 1) that which is generated in dependence on the mental sense power that is its own uncommon empowering condition and 2) is a consciousness that is free from conceptuality and a new and incontrovertible knower.

Thus, when the *Illumination* says "Even though mental direct valid cognizers do not accord with the propounders of valid cognition," this indicates that the way in which the Prasangika Madhyamikas posit mental direct valid cognizers differs from the way in which they are posited by the lower schools.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 283) says:

> Hence, since "feeling" is a word that is related to agent, activity, and object, there are three: "Feelings due to the person, feelings due to activity, and what is felt." The second of these is a valid cognizer, that is, it is the mental factor feeling. The third is an object of comprehension, that is, happiness, suffering, and equanimity. Moreover, this is from the point of view of a mental consciousness. The three feelings of the sense consciousnesses perceive forms, sounds, and so forth. The way in which they are established is as was explained before.

Feeling is related to "agent, activity, and object." The second, feeling related to activity, is the valid cognizer which is the mental factor feeling. The third, the object, is an object of comprehension: happiness, suffering, and equanimity. There are feelings that arise in the retinue of a sense consciousness and those that arise in the retinue of a mental consciousness. The feelings that arise in the retinue of a mental consciousness have happiness, suffering, and equanimity as their objects of comprehension, whereas the feelings that arise in the retinue of a sense consciousness have forms, sounds, and so forth as their objects of comprehension. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The three feelings of the sense consciousnesses perceive forms, sounds, and so forth." The objects of comprehension of the feelings that arise in the retinue of a sense consciousness are forms, sounds, and so forth. More specifically the feelings that arise in the retinue of an eye consciousness perceive a form sphere, the feelings that arise in the retinue of an ear consciousness perceive a sound sphere, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The way in which they are established is as was explained before." It can be asked: "When was this established before?" Perhaps it refers to the previous passage in *Illumination*:

> [Chandrakirti's] commentary on [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas*, when explaining the meaning of the passage in the *Treasury of Knowledge* that the five, forms and so forth, are each known by sense and mental consciousnesses, says:
>
> > The two consciousnesses do not know the same object. The first directly perceives the aspect of an object, that is, it is what is initially produced. The second does not know it directly, but when, by the force of a sense consciousness, it conceives and is produced as such it is referred to saying "It too knows its object."

What is perceived by, or what appears to, a feeling that arises in the retinue of an eye consciousness apprehending a form? A form sphere appears to that feeling. Why is that? That form sphere appears to its principal object-possessor, an eye consciousness. Since it appears to its main object-possessor, it also appears to the feeling that bears five similarities with that main object-possessor. Thus, whatever appears to an eye consciousness also appears to the five omnipresent mental factors in its retinue. The five similarities are base, observed object, aspect, substance, and time.

Tuesday afternoon, 14 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 283) says:

> QUESTION: When the feelings that are mental consciousness perceive manifest phenomena, such as happiness, suffering, and so forth, do they not become self-cognizers?

RESPONSE: There is not this fault:

- because the self-cognizers that are refuted are all inwardly-directed consciousnesses that select the aspect of an apprehender for which the appearance of what is cognized and what cognizes as different has vanished, and
- because here 'a particular experience' is taught in sutra to be the definition of feeling; whereas also among worldly conventions it is said, "[I] experience happiness and suffering."

Because what is experienced and what experiences appear as different, they are not the same as the self-cognizer of the previous party, [the Chittamatrins]. Therefore, through establishing experience, happiness and so forth, feelings are established.

The question here is based on the thought that when feelings perceive happiness, suffering, and so forth they are self-cognizers. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that there is not this fault for the two reasons given above. Do feelings experience themselves? Do feelings perceive themselves? If someone were to say that they do perceive themselves, then we would say: "Do those two feelings not exist as what cognizes and what is cognized?" If feeling experiences feeling does it follow that the experiencer and what is experienced are one? In sutra the definition of feeling is given as 'experience.' When feeling experiences happiness is that the feeling of happiness? For example, if you are pricked with a needle and experience pain is that experience of pain a feeling? When one drinks good tea is that experience a feeling? There would be a pleasant feeling. When there is that pleasant feeling what is the object being experienced, the tea or something else? In the case of being pricked with a needle is the needle the object experienced and the feeling the experiencer? When one is pricked with a needle there is suffering. It is clear that the needle itself is not the pain. Then, what is it? Is it the pricking itself? For example, when one goes on a picnic there is a pleasant feeling. The object experienced is different from the pleasant feeling.

According to the Chittamatrins, what is cognized and what cognizes do not appear as different to a self-cognizer. On the other hand, in the case of feeling, what is experienced and what experiences do appear as different.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 283) says:

> When there is the appearance of form that is a phenomenon sphere, such as the clear appearance of skeletons in the perspective of a mental consciousness, through the dawning of the aspect of those [skeletons] on the mental consciousness, those [skeletons] are established by that [mental consciousness]. When [that happens], the establishment of the consciousness that is their apprehender is as above. Those objects are a different entity from the mental consciousness.

The mental consciousness to which there is the clear appearance of skeletons and the object, the skeletons, are different entities. When there is the clear appearance of skeletons to the mental consciousness, the mental consciousness apprehends the skeletons. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the establishment of the consciousness that is their apprehender is as above." When debating this subject, someone can cite the passage "through the dawning of the aspect of those [skeletons] on the mental consciousness, those [skeletons] are established by that [mental consciousness]. When [that happens], the establishment of the consciousness that is their apprehender is as above" and then ask what "as above" refers to. Perhaps it refers to the previous verse in the *Supplement* that says:

> *Those yogis who, through the instructions of a lama,*
> *See the ground filled with skeletons,*
> *Also see all three as without production*
> *Because it is indicated to be wrong mental attention.* [6.69]

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 283) says:

> The way of establishing consciousnesses that are mental consciousnesses such as the two conceptions of a self is to be understood from [the following] passage in *Clear Words*:
>
> > If either the basis that characterizes, the specifically characterized, or the generally characterized exist in the world, all of them would be that which is directly observed (*mngon sum du dmigs par bya ba*); therefore, they would not be hidden [phenomena]. Therefore, they, along with the consciousnesses that are their object-possessors, are presented to be direct (*mngon sum*).

How are the two conceptions of a self, the self of persons and the self of phenomena, established? They are established because of being that which is directly observed. What are the basis that characterizes, the specifically characterized, and the generally characterized? On the basis 'pot' what is asserted to be a specifically characterized phenomenon and what is asserted to be a generally characterized phenomenon? The specifically characterized and the generally characterized can be understood in the context of the four close placement of mindfulness to be the specific characteristics of form and the general characteristics of form. The specific characteristics of form are posited to be those that are uncommon or exclusive attributes of form, whereas the general characteristics of form are posited to be those attributes that are common to other phenomena. Another possibility is to understand specifically characterized phenomenon and generally characterized phenomenon as do the lower schools who say that all phenomena are included in these two.

Clear Words says: "If either the basis that characterizes, the specifically characterized, or the generally characterized exist in the world, all of them would be that which is directly observed (*mngon sum du dmigs par bya ba*); therefore, they would not be hidden [phenomena]." That which is directly observed is a manifest phenomenon and not a hidden phenomenon. If everything that exists in the world is that which is directly observed, it follows that there are no hidden phenomena and that all phenomena are manifest phenomena. If there are no hidden phenomena it follows that there is nothing to be realized in dependence on a sign or reason, whereby it would follow that there are no inferential valid cognizers and that there are only direct valid cognizers. If only one type of valid cognizer is posited this would be similar to the Charvaka system in that one text says: "If you accept valid cognizers as being only one, direct valid cognizers, you would enter the Charvaka system." This system only accepts that which is directly observed.

Once in Sarnath there was a meeting of Indian philosophers, some of whom belonged to the Charvaka system, some to the Samkhya, some to the Vaishashika, some to the Nigranthas, and so forth, who debated amongst themselves in Sanskrit. The Charvakas said that they accept only that which is directly observed. To this, someone else said: "Then you do not accept the hairs on the back of your head!" The Charvaka said: "I accept them because I can touch them with my hand." The other said: "Do you accept your own heart?" The Charvaka responded that he did, and the other asked: "How can you accept it if you cannot see or touch it?!"

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 284) says:

> In regard to this, since the two – (i) the basis that characterizes, or illustration (*mtshan gzhi*), and (ii) what is characterized, or definiendum (*mtshon bya*) – are equivalent terms [in Sanskrit], some translators translate it as 'basis that characterizes' and some as 'what is characterized.' Then, [this text] says:
>
> > The explanation that

1. all definitions that act to characterize and
2. the bases of characterization of what are characterized

> are that which is directly observed is in the context of identifying direct valid cognizers when valid cognizers are taken to be four [in number]. Because of that, they are not indicated as that which is directly observed by the omniscient. Following from that, an object-possessor of a hidden phenomenon – a consciousness produced from a reason that is unmistaken with respect to the probandum – is an inferential cognizer.

> By saying this it is also not taught that all specifically and generally [characterized phenomena] are manifest phenomena and not hidden phenomena. Hence, there arises the appearance of these two – [specifically and generally characterized phenomena] – also to the consciousnesses that observe either of the two, specifically or generally [characterized phenomena]. That appearance itself is the direct object of that consciousness. In positing both that [appearance] and the consciousnesses which is its object-possessor as direct (*mngon sum*), it is asserted that the term 'direct' is actually applied to the object and imputedly applied to the object-possessor.

In short, the term 'direct' is an actual name with respect to objects, forms and so forth, and an imputed name with respect to object-possessors.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the two – (i) the basis that characterizes, or illustration (*mtshan gzhi*), and (ii) what is characterized, or definiendum (*mtshon bya*) – are equivalent terms [in Sanskrit]." This means that in Sanskrit there is a single world, this being *lakshya*, for the two Tibetan terms *mtshan gzhi* and *mtshon bya*. What is the definition of the basis that characterizes, or illustration (*mtshan gzhi*)?
Student: The *Middling Collected Topics* says that the definition of the basis that characterizes is: that which is a basis that characterizes the definiendum in the context of a definition.

The basis that characterizes is the basis upon which one understands the definition prior to establishing its definiendum. For example, a table is a basis that characterizes functioning thing. Why? Because a table is that which is able to perform a function. Table, as the subject, is a functioning thing because it that which is able to perform a function. Table, as the subject, is impermanent because it disintegrates momentarily, or because it is momentary. Through understanding a definition in terms of a base, one subsequently establishes the definiendum on that base. For example, table, as the subject, is a form sphere because it is an object to be apprehended by eye consciousness. In this case, the table is the basis that characterizes (the illustration), the definiendum is the form sphere, and the definition is "an object to be apprehended by eye consciousness."

The text says: "The explanation that (1) all definitions that act to characterize and (2) the bases of characterization of what are characterized are that which is directly observed is in the context of identifying direct valid cognizers when valid cognizers are taken to be four [in number]. Because of that, they are not indicated as that which is directly observed by the omniscient." This last phrase is related to the previous passage in *Clear Words*: "all of them would be that which is directly observed (*mngon sum du dmigs par bya ba*), therefore, they would not be hidden [phenomena]." Therefore, it means that "that which is directly observed" is not explained in terms of being directly observed by the omniscient.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "By saying this it is also not taught that all specifically and generally [characterized phenomena] are manifest phenomena and not hidden phenomena." Thus, the previous passage does not teach that all specifically and generally characterized phenomena are manifest phenomena and not hidden phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Hence, there arises the appearance of these two – [specifically and generally characterized phenomena] – also to the consciousnesses that observe either of the two, specifically or generally [characterized phenomena]. That appearance itself is the direct object of that consciousness. In positing both that [appearance] and the consciousnesses which is its object-

possessor as direct (*mngon sum*), it is asserted that the term 'direct' is actually applied to the object and imputedly applied to the object-possessor." The consciousness to which specifically and generally characterized phenomena appear is also posited as direct (in the sense of direct perceiver). When the term 'direct' is applied to an object it is an actual name, whereas when it is applied to an object-possessor it is an imputed name. This seems to say that all specifically characterized phenomena or generally characterized phenomena that appear are actually direct [objects], whereas their object-possessors are not actually direct [perceivers].

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 284) says:

> If all the appearances that appear in any way to any consciousness are the direct objects of that consciousness, those appearances are manifest phenomena for that consciousness. Moreover, if they are incontrovertible consciousnesses with respect to those [appearances], since incontrovertible consciousnesses are renowned in the world to be valid cognizers, they are valid cognizers. Then, when the appearance of an object of comprehension is what establishes that consciousness, the establishment of the object-possessor is as above.

In the Prasangika Madhyamika system if a consciousness is incontrovertible with respect to its appearance it is a valid cognizer. Thus, in this system all consciousnesses are pervaded by being valid cognizers with respect to their appearance, although they are not all valid cognizers in general. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "when the appearance of an object of comprehension is what establishes that consciousness, the establishment of the object-possessor is as above." This means that when an object is established, its object-possessor is established.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 284) says:

> For this reason, there also arises the direct appearance of the two selves to [mental consciousnesses] such as the two conceptions of a self. At that time, the appearance of an object of comprehension, a manifest phenomenon, is established by the object-possessor and so forth as [was explained] above. That [object-possessor], moreover, is to be understood as being mistaken with respect to its referent object.

The two conceptions of a self are valid cognizers with respect to their appearing objects, while being mistaken with respect to their referent objects. What is the appearing object and referent object of the conception of a self of persons?
Student: Its appearing object is a meaning generality of a truly existent I and its referent object is a truly existent I.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is the appearing object the meaning generality of a self of persons or the meaning generality of a truly existent I? Think about it.

Wednesday morning, 15 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 284-5) says:

> In that case, consciousnesses are likewise established as manifest appearing objects that appear as objects. Since they have the great difference of becoming and not becoming valid cognizers with respect to
> 1. the two selves and the two selflessnesses, and
> 2. permanent and impermanent forms and so forth,
>
> it is also established that with respect to awarenesses there is a presentation of valid cognizers and non-valid cognizers. The mental consciousnesses that were explained to be valid cognizers with

> respect to their appearing objects are also mental direct valid cognizers with respect to manifest objects because other options have been repudiated. They are not self-cognizing direct valid cognizers because they have dualistic appearance regarding their objects.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The mental consciousnesses that were explained to be valid cognizers with respect to their appearing objects..." This is the position of the Prasangika Madhyamikas who say that all consciousnesses are pervaded by being valid cognizers with respect to their appearances.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Since they have the great difference of becoming and not becoming valid cognizers with respect to (1) the two selves and the two selflessnesses, and (2) permanent and impermanent forms and so forth, it is also established that with respect to awarenesses there is a presentation of valid cognizers and non-valid cognizers." This means that consciousnesses are not valid cognizers with respect to the two selves, but are valid cognizers with respect to the two selflessnesses. Similarly, consciousness are not valid cognizers with respect to permanent form, but are valid cognizers with respect to impermanent form. Consciousnesses are not valid cognizers with respect to the two selves because they do not exist and are, therefore, not objects of a valid cognizer. Therefore, there are no consciousness that become valid cognizers with respect to the two selves. Similarly, consciousnesses do not become valid cognizers with respect to permanent form. On the other hand, they do become valid cognizers with respect to impermanent form. For this reason, there is a presentation of two types of awarenesses: (i) valid cognizers and (ii) non-valid cognizers. In *Awarenesses and Knowers* there is a presentation of seven types of awarenesses. Is there a similar presentation in the Prasangika Madhyamika system? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "[They] are also mental direct valid cognizers with respect to manifest objects because other options have been repudiated. They are not self-cognizing direct valid cognizers because they have dualistic appearance regarding their objects." What are the other options that have been repudiated? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 285) says:

> Even though dualistic appearance has vanished for an uncontaminated consciousness of meditative equipoise, the two – reality and [that uncontaminated consciousness of meditative equipoise] – become what is cognized and what cognizes. Although all inwardly-directed consciousnesses avoid dualistic appearance, they become what is cognized and what cognizes. However, the two, [uncontaminated consciousness of meditative equipoise and all inwardly-directed consciousnesses], are not the same in all ways. This is because:
>
> - with respect to the latter, excluding the mere objects and object-possessors imputed by tenets, there does not arise the two appearances of what is cognized and what cognizes by means of conception no matter how much one focuses the mind,
> - whereas with respect to the former, in dependence on focusing the mind, the aspects of the object-possessor, consciousness, and the object, reality, definitely arise as different.

What is the dualistic appearance that has vanished for an uncontaminated consciousness of meditative equipoise? Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the two – reality and [that uncontaminated consciousness of meditative equipoise] – are what is cognized and what cognizes." A superior's uncontaminated exalted wisdom engages its object, emptiness, free from the appearance of duality. What is the duality that has vanished? The *Ornament for Clear Realizations* says that there are three types of duality:

1. the appearance of object and object-possessor as different,
2. the appearance of conventionalities to meditative equipoise, and
3. the appearance of an object of negation, whether the self of persons or the self of phenomena.

In this context, what is meant by dualistic appearance? Here there is no appearance of conventionalities to a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, no appearance of a self that is an object of negation, and no appearance of object-possessor and object as different. Therefore, the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise engages its object, emptiness, without dualistic appearance, like water poured into water.

"The two" are what is cognized and what cognizes. When a second mind focuses on a first mind it is similar to the case of a self-cognizer in that when a cognizer looks at a cognizer there is only the appearance of the factor of clarity and knowing. In other words, when a consciousness focuses on a consciousness, the consciousness that observes is a factor of clarity and knowing and the consciousness that is observed is also a factor of clarity and knowing; therefore, the two do not appear as different. This is like when the object experienced by a self-cognizer and the experiencer, the self-cognizer itself, are sought, all that is found is a mere factor of clarity and knowing; an object experienced and an experiencer that are different are not found.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "with respect to the former, in dependence on focusing the mind, the aspects of the object-possessor, consciousness, and the object, reality, definitely arise as different." 'Focusing the mind' could refer to the mind of subsequent attainment that focuses on the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise and its object. To this mind these two do not appear as one, but appear as different.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "with respect to the latter, excluding the mere objects and object-possessors imputed by tenets, there does not arise the two appearances of what is cognized and what cognizes by means of conception no matter how much one focuses the mind." Self-cognizers are only imputations by tenets, however, if one were to focus on the experiencer, the self-cognizer, and that which is experienced, one would not find two different things.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 285) says:

> When the non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise establishes reality, its object of comprehension, the exalted wisdom which is the object-possessor is established by the force of that. The distinction of the dissimilarity between
>
> - the dualistic appearance that is the separate appearance of what is cognized and what cognizes that has been averted [for the non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise] and
> - all inwardly-directed consciousnesses that select the aspect of an apprehender for which dualistic appearance has been averted that are asserted by other systems
>
> will be explained in the context of the resultant ground.

The non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is established by the force of establishing its object of comprehension. For this non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, it and its object do not appear as distinct, due to which dualistic appearance has been averted for it. The vanishing of dualistic appearance with respect to all inwardly-directed consciousnesses and the vanishing of dualistic appearance with respect to a non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise are different. This difference will be explained later in the context of the resultant ground. For the Prasangika Madhyamika system the vanishing of dualistic appearance with respect to all inwardly-directed consciousnesses that select the aspect of an apprehender does not exist at all because self-cognizers do not exist. Only the lower schools assert self-cognizers that are inwardly-directed consciousnesses that select the aspect of an apprehender.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 285-6) says:

> When the harm expressed to others by our stating 'What will know their existence?' (v. 6.72c) and so forth is turned against us, such a subtle presentation as this is not necessary for those who do

> not understand the subtle presentations of the individual systems of the great [masters] and those who do not understand how to interpret the subtle meaning of the definitive meaning scriptures of our own system and the subtle methods of reasoning that are extremely difficult to realize – those hopeful ones who make mere denials saying "Since we do not have that assertion in our position, there is no fault."

For the Prasangika Madhyamikas object-possessors are established by establishing their objects. If a self-cognizer exists, how does it exist? No matter how much one examines a self-cognizer and its object, consciousness, they do not appear as having different aspects. However, when the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise and its object, emptiness, are examined they do appear as having different aspects.

Chandrakirti in his *Supplement* asks "What will know their existence?" meaning that if there are self-cognizers, what is it that knows their existence. How is this question, which is a refutation of self-cognizers, turned back against the Prasangika Madhyamikas?

"Those hopeful ones who make mere denials" are (i) those who do not understand the subtle presentations of the individual systems of the great masters and (ii) those who do not understand how to interpret the subtle meaning of the definitive meaning scriptures of their own system, the Prasangika Madhyamika, and the subtle methods of reasoning that are extremely difficult to realize. When their own refutations are turned back asked themselves, such people say "I do not have that fault because I do not have that thesis." "Those hopeful ones who make mere denials" are those who say whatever comes to their mind. In other words, when they are asked a precise question, they respond to it by saying whatever comes to their mind. Thus, when confronted with contradiction in their assertions, such people respond by denying that they even have that thesis.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 286) says:

> However, thinking of the welfare of wise scholars and the extremely intelligent, those who do not believe without seeing the path that distinguishes faults and qualities by means of subtle points of reasoning, I have presented a mere portion of this supreme system, the position that is posited as being without mistakes.

"I have presented a mere portion of this supreme system" refers to this particular section of Lama Tsongkhapa's text.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 286) says:

> QUESTION: The I who remembers "I saw blue" is the person. Since the two – the consciousness that is the apprehender of blue and [the person] – are contradictory, in this case how does that memory remember the apprehender of blue?
> RESPONSE: Although the two – the eye consciousness that is the apprehender of blue and the person who is the seer of blue – are contradictory, it is not contradictory to posit "I saw" in dependence on that consciousness seeing blue. So why would it be contradictory that by remembering the person thinking "I saw blue before" in dependence on remembering the consciousness that is an apprehender of blue seeing blue, for there also to be a memory of the consciousness that is the apprehender of blue?

The one who remembers (that is, the person) and the apprehender of blue (that is, the consciousness) are contradictory, so how does that memory remember the apprehender of blue? The response is that, although it is true that the one who remembers blue, the person, and the apprehender of blue, the consciousness, are contradictory, this does not contradict positing "I saw" in dependence on a consciousness seeing blue. On the basis of the person's eye consciousness apprehending blue, one

says "I saw blue." Therefore, due to an eye consciousness seeing blue, one can say "I saw blue" and remember seeing blue.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 286) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1C Indicating that self-cognizers are inadmissible also by other reasonings

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 108) says:

Because it is like that:

Therefore, if self-cognition does not exist,
What will apprehend your other-powered phenomena?
Since agent, acted upon, and action are not one,
It is not reasonable for that itself to apprehend that. [6.76]

In saying "to cognize the self," oneself who is cognizing becomes a property of that acted upon. Then, the very object to be cognized is also the agent and since the action is also undifferentiable, the agent, that acted upon, and the action will follow as one. Yet these are not seen as oneness.

Like this: the cutter, the tree, and the action of cutting are not one. Also, through this, since self-cognition does not exist, that is not apprehended by itself.

It is also taught in the *Exalted Descent into Lanka* [*Sutra*]:

Just as a sword does not cut its own edge, like a finger
does not touch itself – self-cognizing mind is the same.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2B1C Refuting self-knowing consciousness by other logic

Therefore, if there's no self-knowing consciousness,
By what is your dependent phenomenon perceived? [6.76ab]

By what is the dependent phenomenon of you Chittamatrins apprehended? It follows that it is not, for if that exists, it needs apprehension by self-knowing consciousness, whereas self-knowing consciousness does not exist, and that does not exist –

As the agent, object, and action are not one,
That cannot be apprehended by itself. [6.76cd]

It follows that it is impossible that that knowing should be apprehended by itself, self-knowing consciousness, since agent, object, and action are not one.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if there were self-cognizers it would follow that agent, object, and action would be one, whereas they are not. The Chittamatrins posit an other-powered phenomenon, that is, consciousness, based on its apprehension by a self-cognizer, but self-cognizers themselves do not exist.

Wednesday afternoon, 15 November 2000

The argument here is that if there were self-cognizers, it would follow that agent, action, and object would be one. Since they are not one, this is another way of refuting self-cognizers. Another way of refuting self-cognizers is through examples such as that of a sword not being able to cut its own edge,

a finger not being able to touch its own tip, and so forth. Although a sword can cut the edge of a sword it cannot cut its own edge, and, likewise, a finger can touch the tip of another finger but it cannot touch its own tip. Therefore, it is important to specify "itself" saying it cannot cut itself, it cannot touch itself, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 286) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *Therefore, if self-cognizers do not exist,*
> > *What apprehends your other-powered phenomenon?*
> > *Since agent, object of the action, and action are not one,*
> > *It is not reasonable for that itself to apprehend it.* [6.76]
>
> Because of that, it is so. *Therefore, if self-cognizers do not exist, what apprehends your*, Chittamatra, *other-powered phenomenon* – consciousness*? Since* (i) *the agent* that cuts wood, (ii) the *object of the action* of cutting, that is, the wood, and (iii) *the action* of cutting wood *are not one, it is not reasonable for that* consciousness *itself to apprehend it*.

What is the agent that cuts wood? There are two types of agents: a main agent and a common, or ordinary, agent. In regard to cutting wood, the main agent is the person, whereas the common agent is an ax, saw, knife, and so forth. The action is that of cutting and the object of the cutting is the wood. These three – agent, action, and object – are not one. For example, when one cuts an apple, oneself is the cutter, the object of the cutting is the apple, and the action is that of cutting. These three are not one.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that because these three are not one there cannot be self-cognizers. To this the Chittamatrins respond saying that these three factors are different with respect to other-powered phenomena. In this case, (i) the agent is the positor of other-powered phenomena, (ii) the action is that of positing other-powered phenomenon, and (iii) the object is other-powered phenomena, i.e., consciousnesses. Hence, the agent is a self-cognizer, the action is itself perceiving itself, and the object is the consciousness it perceives.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 286) says:

> The way of settling their invalidation is clearly stated in [Jnanagarbha's] autocommentary on the *Two Truths*:
>
> > Extremely subtle particles and the entity of things without duality do not appear to the nature of consciousness. In not appearing, it does not exist conventionally.

Extremely subtle particles and the entity of things without duality do not appear to the nature of consciousness. What is "the entity of things without duality"? Perhaps 'duality" refers to (i) the apprehended, the object, and (ii) the apprehender, the object-possessor; therefore, "without duality" would mean that object and object-possessor do not exist as two entities. Apprehendeds and apprehenders not existing as two entities it what does not exist conventionally, hence, they do exist as two entities. Jnanagarbha accepts external objects but does not accept self-cognizers, this being similar to what the Prasangika Madhyamikas say.

What are "extremely subtle particles"? Are these the most subtle particles that cannot be divided further or are they partless particles? The most subtle particles do not appear in isolation to the sense consciousness of an ordinary being. They do not appear even under a microscope! Are there partless particles? According to Jnanagarbha there are no partless particles because if it is an established base it is pervaded by having parts. Earlier it was said that:

1. having parts and being partless are direct contradictions,
2. the partless does not exist among objects of knowledge, and
3. if it is an established base it is pervaded by having parts.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 286) says:

> With respect to positing
> 1. the object cognized which is itself, an inwardly-directed consciousness that is a mere experiencer without dualistic appearance as was explained before, and
> 2. the cognizer of that itself,
>
> no matter how much one focuses on them, what is cognized and what cognizes do not appear as two even to conception. When positing the function of what is cognized and what cognizes there occurs the absurd consequence that agent, object of the action, and action would, moreover, be one.

When another consciousness focuses on a self-cognizer and its object, a consciousness, they do not appear as two but appear as the mere factor of clarity and knowing. When a conception focuses on the experiencer, a self-cognizer, and the object experienced, the consciousness, do they appear as two or as one? According to this presentation, what is cognized and what is cognized do not appear as different to the conception that focuses on them. When a conception focuses on the horns of a rabbit does it not have two meaning generalities? When someone analyzes whether or not rabbits have horns, the meaning generality of a rabbit's head appears. But does the meaning generality of the horns of a rabbit appear? Is there a meaning generality of the horns of a rabbit? There is a meaning generality of the horns of a rabbit because there is a conception apprehending the horns of a rabbit. If it is one of the two, existent and non-existent, is it pervaded by having a conception apprehending it? For example, a self of phenomena does not exist yet there is a conception apprehending it. Such a conception of a self is a valid cognizer with respect to the self that is its appearing object.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 287) says:

> Hence, the great acharya Jnanagarbha asserts that the two – the self-cognizers of the Chittamatrins and the partless particles of the hearer sect – are similar in terms of how they exist and do not exist. Also in regard to partless particles, they must have a locus, whereas, when their aspect dawns, there is no arisal that is not together with directional parts. Thus, (i) what is cognized and what cognizes and (ii) the directionally partless of those two, [the Chittamatrins and the hearer sect,] are only imputed tenets.

This is an explanation of the previous passage in that it refutes both the Chittamatrin's assertion of self-cognizers and the lower schools' assertions of directionally partless particles. Jnanagarbha refutes the lower schools' assertions of directionally partless particles saying that, when subtle particles appear, they appear together with directional parts. For this reason, all subtle particles have directional parts. Therefore, what is cognized and what cognizes in the context of self-cognizers and the existence of directionally partless particles are only a superimposition of tenets.

The definition of a partless particle is: a particle lacking directional parts which are their own entity. Based on this, one can debate about whether there are particles that have directional parts but do not have directional parts which are their own entity. The lower schools accept partless particles, whereas the higher schools from the Chittamatra through the Prasangika Madhyamika refute them. This was discussed in the *Essence of Eloquence*. Vasubandhu's *Twenty Stanzas Refuting External Objects* presents the reasoning that refutes partless particles.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 287) says:

> Then, these two appearing, but not being ascertained, is also refuted in [Jnanagarbha's] autocommentary on the *Two Truths* which says:
>
> > OBJECTION: Even though they appear, they are not ascertained.
> > RESPONSE: Such [things] do not exist conventionally. Stating "they appear" is to say "It is necessary to drink pledge-water because of lacking belief," in that the proof with regard to their appearing is also nothing more than a pledge.

The lower schools say that there are partless particles and the Chittamatrins say that there are self-cognizers.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 287) says:

> Also by means of stating the reasonings taught in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* self-cognizers are not suitable:
>
> > Just as a sword does not cut
> > Its own edge, like a finger
> > Does not touch itself,
> > So too is a self-cognizing mind.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 287) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-1D Indicating that inherently existent other-powered phenomena are like the son of a barren woman

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, like that, because self-cognition is non-existent:
>
> *If, unproduced and having an unknown self,*
> *A property of the entity of other-powered phenomena exists,*
> *Due to what is this not reasonable to exist?*
> *What harm did a barren woman's son bring to the others?* [6.77]
>
> Other-powered [phenomena] were demonstrated as not generating from self and others in general above and just now were demonstrated as also having a self-nature that is unknown [by self-cognition].
>
> Therefore, like that, if it is accepted that "an entity of other-powered [phenomena] exists, unproduced and having a self-nature unknown [by valid cognition]" – from what [reasoning] would this [son of a barren woman], also already the subject of similarity with other-powered [phenomena], not be asserted as indeed existing – what harm did the son of a barren woman do to you? It too should be asserted as indeed existing saying: "A so-called "son of a barren woman" exists – passed beyond all elaborations and the object of experience of the aryas' exalted wisdom, having an inexpressible nature."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2B1D An inherently existent dependent phenomenon is like a barren woman's son
>
> *If without birth, with nature undiscerned,*
> *A dependent phenomenon exists as a natural thing,*

What harm, for which he may not exist,
Has a barren woman's son done to the other? [6.77]

What harm has a barren woman's son done to [you] other, Chittamatrin, through which he is not permitted to exist? It follows you must admit that too, since you say a dependent phenomenon, which is without [inherent] birth and has a nature not understood [by valid cognition], is an inherently existent thing. [You ought to assert similarly that a "barren woman's son" exists with indescribable nature transcending all elaborations, an object of the wisdom-knowledge of the aryas.]

Functioning things that are other-powered phenomena do not exist inherently. Production from self and production from other have already been explained and refuted, therefore, inherently existent other-powered phenomena do not exist. If there were inherently existent other-powered phenomena, it would be necessary to say that the son of a barren woman has gone beyond elaboration, is the object of a superior's exalted wisdom, and is inexpressible. However, since there does not exist the son of a barren woman, how can he inflict harm? Inherently existent other-powered phenomena are likened to the son of a barren woman.

With respect to the son of a barren woman there is the following debate. Does there not exist a barren woman? Is a barren woman not a sentient being? Can she not be called 'mother'? Can one not meditate on her as having been one's mother? Is this mind of meditation a wrong consciousness? It must be because a barren woman is not a mother. She is not a mother because she does not have a son. The conclusion is that, although she is not a mother in this life, she has been a mother in other lives. When cultivating the mind of enlightenment, one first meditates on recognizing sentient beings as having been one's mother. While meditating on this, do you think that the meditator can be considered to be the son of a barren women since he meditates on the barren woman having been one's mother?

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 287) says:

PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:

If things by way of their own entity – other-powered phenomena
That are not produced and have the nature of not being known – exist,
Due to what would they be unsuitable to exist?
What harm is inflicted on the others by the son of a barren woman? [6.77]

It was already indicated before that other-powered phenomena are not produced from self and other, but now I will indicate that the self-cognizers that comprehend them also do not exist. Therefore, *if things* that are established by way of their own *entity – other-powered phenomena* that are *not* inherently *produced* and *have the nature of not being known* by a valid cognizer – *exist*, for *what* reason *would they be unsuitable to exist? What harm is inflicted on the others*, that is, you Chittamatrins, *by the son of a barren woman?* Then, what is not asserted to exist must be asserted to exist. In that case, [the son of a barren woman] should also be asserted to exist stating "The so-called 'son of a barren woman,' having passed beyond all elaboration and become the object of a superior's exalted wisdom, has an inexpressible nature."

The son of a barren woman has passed beyond all elaboration but is not the object of a superior's exalted wisdom. Does the son of a barren woman have an inexpressible nature? Can the son of a barren woman be expressed, that is, described? In short, the Chittamatrins would have to assert the existence of the son of a barren woman and would have to assert that he has passed beyond all elaboration, has become the object of a superior's exalted wisdom, and has an inexpressible nature. However, the son of a barren woman is not the object of a superior's exalted wisdom. Is he inexpressible or not? The conclusion is that there does not exist the son of a barren woman.

Thursday morning, 16 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 288) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-2 Indicating that the Chittamatra system has deviated from both truths

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If also that which was mentioned [in 6.47b]: *becomes the cause of imputedly existent things and...* – that is, other-powered [phenomena] – were to exist indeed, if one reasons,

When, if even a little other-powered does not exist,
What would be the cause of the deceptive? [6.78ab]

One will think: "The deceptive do not have even a little cause." Therefore, for this [Chittamatrin], since that which is the cause of worldly designation does not exist by itself, O! Alas!

By adhering to substance like the others,
Even all presentations of worldly renown break down. [6.78cd]

Due to lack of wisdom, having poured the water-like [inappropriate analysis] in the unfired vase of other-powered [phenomena], by way of adhering to a mere substantial knower, because of one's bad mode of intelligence, the worldly presentation established among only the worldly, such as saying "stay," "go," "do," "cook," and so forth and similarly those which are form and feeling and so forth – whatever there is – all those are realized as destroyed. Therefore, only deterioration will be possible for him – not sublime status.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, (Tibetan text page 43) says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2B2 The Mind-only school is wrong on the two levels of truth

If dependent phenomena do not exist at all,
What is the cause of a conventional thing? [6.78ab]

When a dependent phenomenon inherently exists, what will be the cause of a conventional thing[48]? It follows there will be none, since it does not exist at all.

On the other's view, attachment to a substance
Will destroy every distinction known in the world. [6.78cd]

On the view of the opponent, the Chittamatrin, it follows that every distinction known in the world is destroyed by his attachment to true existence for the substance of a dependent phenomenon.

The Chittamatrins say that if other-powered phenomena do not exist inherently they would not exist at all, whereby they would not be causes and so forth. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that inherently existent other-powered phenomena that are causes and so forth do not exist at all. They say: "Therefore, for this [Chittamatrin], since that which is the cause of worldly designation does not exist by itself, O! Alas!" The Prasangika Madhyamikas set out the example of an unfired vase which, when water is poured into it, is destroyed, and liken this to the Chittamatrins assertion that other-powered phenomena are inherently existent. Just as an unfired vase is demolished by pouring water into it, also the assertion of inherently existent other-powered phenomena demolishes that which is renowned in the world. 'That renowned in the world' is what is posited without thorough

[48] *kun.rdzob.pa*

investigation and analysis. All of these conventionalities would be destroyed by the Chittamatrin's assertion of inherently existent other-powered phenomena. This is the meaning of: "By adhering to substance like the others, even all presentations of worldly renown break down" (v. 6.78cd). Thus, the aggregates, forms, and so forth would be destroyed. Chandrakirti says: "the worldly presentation established among only the worldly, such as saying "stay," "go," "do," "cook," and so forth and similarly those which are form and feeling and so forth – whatever there is – all those are realized as destroyed. Therefore, only deterioration will be possible for him – not sublime status." It would be impossible for the Chittamatrins to attain sublime status. For this reason, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the Chittamatrins have deviated from the two truths.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 288) says:

> [The Chittamatrins] say: "[Because of that, whatever is the entity of the other-powered] becomes the cause of imputedly existent things" (6.47ab). Moreover, if other-powered phenomena exist inherently, the reasoning [would be as follows].
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *When other-powered phenomena do not exist in the slightest,*
> > *How can they be the cause of conventionalities?*
> > *In the case of others, due to attachment to a substance,*
> > *All the presentations renowned in the world are also demolished.* [6.78]
>
> *When* inherently existent *other-powered phenomena do not exist* even *in the slightest, how can they be the cause* – that is, the substantially established basis – *of* the mistaken which are *conventionalities*, that is, conventions*?* They are not that [cause] in the slightest. Hence, those who assert other-powered phenomena to be ultimately established are taught to have deviated from the ultimate. Because of that, for the Chittamatrins whatever is the cause of worldly conventions would not exist by way of its own entity. Therefore, alas, *in the case of others*, the Chittamatrins, due to their lacking the energy of the wisdom distinguishing the final definitive meaning, *through attachment*, which is adherence *to* mere consciousness – *a substance* that is an other-powered phenomenon – as truly existent, they pour their water-like improper analysis into the unfired pot of other-powered phenomena. Then, because of, that is, for the reason of, the inferior viewpoint of their own intelligence, *all the presentations renowned in the world* – that established only among the worldly such as saying "Stay," 'Go," "Do," and so forth and, likewise, external forms, the feelings that are produced from observing external [objects], and so forth – *are also demolished*, that is, destroyed. Therefore, only decline becomes possible for the Chittamatrins, not the attainment of the high, that is, the sublime, state.
>
> When external objects are refuted, for the reason that "Go" and so forth also become non-existent, ["Go" and so forth] are related to external objects. Hence, [the Chittamatrins] are taught to have deviated from conventional truths.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas the Chittamatrins have deviated from the two truths. They have deviated from the ultimate truth through asserting inherently existent other-powered phenomena. This is because according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system the emptiness of true existence of other-powered phenomena is ultimate truth, whereas the Chittamatrins assert other-powered phenomena to be truly existent. Through asserting other-powered phenomena to be inherently existent, the presentation of all conventionalities is destroyed. In other words, based on this assertion the worldly presentations of "Stay," 'Go," and "Do" are destroyed. Likewise, external forms, the feelings that are produced from observing external objects, and so forth are destroyed. They are destroyed because if a form, for example, were truly existent then a feeling could not arise in dependence on it. In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the Chittamatrins do not know how to posit the presentation of the two truths. By their positing phenomena to be truly existent, the Chittamatrins deviate from both conventional and ultimate truths.

On the other hand, in the Chittamatra system other-powered phenomena are inherently existent, for if they were not inherently existent they would not exist at all. Thus, the Chittamatrins would say that they do not have the fault of deviating from the two truths but that they in fact take the position of the middle way.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Chittamatrins that the inferior viewpoint of their intelligence, like pouring water into an unfired pot, destroys the presentation of that renowned in the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 288) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-3 Hence, it is suitable to be a follower only of Nagarjuna's system

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 110) says:

> Therefore, through mistaken masters like that, they entered only a path system concocted by their own conceptions.
>
> *Those outside the path of the venerable*
> *Acharya Nagarjuna do not have the means of peace.* [6.79ab]

Those who remain outside Acharya Nagarjuna's path will not attain the peace of nirvana.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Why?
> Like this:
>
> *They deviate from the deceptive and suchness truths.*
> *Due to deviating from these, achievement of liberation does not exist.* [6.79cd]
>
> Again, if asked: Why is liberation not attained due to fully deviating from the two truths?
>
> It is explained:
>
> *Conventional truth is the means and*
> *Ultimate truth arises from means.*
> *Those who do not know the distinction of the two*
> *Have entered a bad path due to wrong conceptions.* [6.80]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 43), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2B3 Therefore one must follow Nagarjuna

> *Those outside the path of the holy Master*
> *Nagarjuna lack the means of peace.*
> *They fail in the truths of convention and reality,*
> *And by failing there, do not reach liberation.* [6.79]

For those outside the path of the holy Master Nagarjuna, the chief means of attaining tranquillity, or nirvana, is lacking; because they fail in conventional truth and in the truth of ultimate reality, and by failing in these two truths, there is no attainment of liberation while they do not reject that.

> *The conventional level of truth becomes the means,*
> *And ultimate truth is what comes from the means.*

Who does not understand the distinction of these two,
By this misconception enters an evil path. [6.80]

This is because perceiving conventional truth is the means, and perceiving ultimate truth is what comes from the means – whoever does not understand the distinction of these two, by that wrong conception enters an evil path.

If one does not understand the two truths as they are presented by Acharya Nagarjuna, one will not be able to attain liberation even though one exerts effort for a long time. Conventional truths include external objects such as forms, sounds, and so forth and inner objects such as the form aggregate and so forth. Based on understanding such conventionalities, one comes to realize the emptiness of these bases. In other words, one first realizes conventional truths and then realizes the ultimate truth in terms of them. However, the opposite can also be said, that is, ultimate truth is the means and conventional truth is what arises from the means. This is in the sense that one first realizes ultimate truth, the emptiness of true existence of all phenomena, and then on this basis comes to realize subtle conventionalities, the feasibility of cause and result.

Therefore, to understand conventional truth as the means is to first understand the 108 phenomena, forms through the exalted knower of all aspects, and then on this basis to come to understand their emptiness of true existence or ultimate existence, that is, ultimate truth. In the case of the ultimate truth being the means, having first realized the emptiness of all phenomena of true existence, one then asks: "If it does not exist truly is it non-existent?" They are not in that through negating true existence phenomena do not become non-existent because there remains a subtle conventionality. This subtle conventionality is the feasibility of the presentation of conventionalities that are causes and results.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was taught in the *Exalted Meditative Stabilization Definitely Indicating Thusness* [*Sutra*]:
>
> Not listening to others, the Knower of the World
> Indicated these two truths by himself.
> The deceptive [and], likewise, the ultimate –
> A third truth does not exist at all.

There is no presentation of a third truth, that is, there is only conventional truth and ultimate truth. Therefore, the truths are definite as two in number. Therefore, all truths must be included in these two. It can be asked: "If there is no third truth, why did the Buddha teach four truths?" However, that is a different subject and, in addition, one cannot indicate four truths that are not included in the two truths. This is because in the Prasangika Madhyamika system true cessations are included in ultimate truth and the remaining three truths are included in conventional truths. On the other hand, in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system all four truths are included in conventional truths. Also according to the Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra systems there is no phenomenon that is not included in the two truths. Thus, does there exist a school in which the four truths are not included in the two truths? There does not, even though the two truths are presented differently in each of these schools.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Due to which, migrators will produce faith
> In the Sugata for the sake of happiness;
> The Conqueror taught the deceptive for the welfare of migrators,

In order to benefit the world.

Migrating beings strive to attain the state of a sugata and for this reason generate faith. This is not the faith that follows from mere words, but is the faith of conviction in the teaching on the two truths. The Sanskrit word 'Sugata,' which can be translated literally as 'Gone to Bliss,' indicates that through following the path to bliss one will attain the resultant state of bliss. However, there are different interpretations of what gone to bliss, or sugata, means. According to the second chapter of Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* there are two types of gone to bliss: gone to bliss in terms of abandonment and gone to bliss in terms of realization. Each of these possesses three attributes.

Dignaga's *Compendium of Valid Cognition* similarly says:

To the one who has promised to benefit others and is valid,
The Teacher, Sugata, Refuge, I prostrate.

Here the word 'Teacher' has the meaning of the wisdom directly realizing selflessness. "One who has promised to benefit others" refers to compassion. On the basis of this wisdom and compassion, one becomes a sugata, one gone to bliss. Having gone to bliss, one becomes a refuge. The expression of worship in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* says:

To the one who has dispelled the net of conceptions,
Who possesses a body profound and extensive,
Having Samantabhadra rays of light
Constantly radiating, I prostrate.

This expression of worship is recited in monasteries following the recitation of the expression of worship in Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* and that in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. The expression of worship in Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* (see *Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way*) is:

I prostrate to the perfect buddha,
The best of teachers, who taught that
Whatever is dependently arisen is
Unceasing, unborn,
Unannihilated, not permanent,
Not coming, not going,
Without distinction, without identity,
And free from conceptual construction.

The expression of worship in Maitreya's *Ornament for Clear Realizations* is:

By the knower of all, hearers seeking pacification are led to peace;
By the knower of paths, those benefiting migrating beings accomplish the welfare of the world;
By the perfect possession of it, the subduers teach the varieties possessing all aspects;
To these mothers of the buddhas, together with the host of hearers and bodhisattvas – homage.

Thursday afternoon, 16 November 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Whichever of the six migrations of the multitude of sentient beings
> Was indicated – sentient beings of hell, animals, hungry ghosts,
> Demigod status, men, and the gods –
> The Lion of Men designated as the deceptive.

The Lion of Men, Shakyamuni Buddha, taught the two truths in order to benefit the six classes of sentient beings: hells beings, animals, hungry ghosts, animals, anti-gods, and gods. What is the definition of each to them? If it is a sentient being is it necessarily one of the six classes of migrating beings?
Student: No, for example, an arya bodhisattva in a pure land.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why is he not one of the six? Is that bodhisattva not a human being? Is he not a god?
Student: I'm not sure whether he is a god or not.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If he were, there must be two types of gods, those who are not born in a pure land and those who are born in a pure land. It would be the same for human beings. Can you posit a human being who is pure?
Student: An arya bodhisattva who takes rebirth as a human being.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is an arya bodhisattva who takes rebirth in a pure land not a migrating being?
Student: He is not because he does not take rebirth under the power of afflictions and karma.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it crawls on all fours is it pervaded by being an animal? The Tibetan word for animal literally means "walking with the head down," whereas the Tibetan word for a hungry ghost means "one who constantly thinks of food and drink due to hunger and thirst." The Sanskrit word for human being '*manusha*' means "one possessing ability," in the sense of having the ability to talk and understand meanings. If it is a god it is not pervaded by being a god of the desire realm, form realm, or formless realm because there are gods who have passed beyond the three realms. What is the difference between god and anti-god? Think about this.

When the six realms are described in terms of their respective sufferings, it is said that hell beings experience the suffering of hot and cold, hungry ghosts the suffering of hunger and thirst, animals the suffering of being stupid and mute, anti-gods the suffering of jealousy and fighting, and gods the suffering of the signs of impending death. The sufferings of human beings are something we know based on our own experience.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Inferior lineages as well as high lineages,
> Rich families and poor families,
> Groups of slaves and, likewise, groups of servants,
> The host of women, men, and eunuchs –
>
> However many distinctions of migrators are suitable,
> You, the Matchless One showed the world.
>
> Having borne in mind due to skill in deceptive truth,
> The Knower of the World indicated that to humanity.
>
> Migrators who take joy in it will engage in
> The eight dharmas of migrators in samsara:
> Finding and not finding, fame and infamy,
> Praise and blame, and happiness and suffering.

Migrating beings engage in the eight worldly concerns: finding and not finding, fame and infamy, praise and blame, and happiness and suffering. "Finding" is to gain material things, such as money, due to which one to become happy, whereas due to not finding them one becomes unhappy. People also become happy when they have fame and unhappy when they have a bad reputation. Similarly, when they are praised they become happy, and when they are blamed they become unhappy. Likewise, people are happy when they have happiness and are unhappy when they have suffering. We should avoid coming under the influence of these eight worldly concerns.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When found, attachment to that is produced.
> When not found, that too will disturb [them].
> The others not indicated should be known in this manner.
> The eight diseases will harm their continuities.

The result of gaining material things is to generate attachment, whereas to not gain material things disturbs the mind. The remaining six worldly concerns should be understand in the same way. "The eight diseases" are the eight worldly concerns; they are so-called because they bring us mental pain and thereby harm our continua in that they distract us and prevent us from practicing the Dharma and thereby subduing our mind. The way in which the eight worldly concerns prevent us from practicing Dharma is that when we have happiness we do not think to practice Dharma and when we have suffering we are also unable to think of practicing Dharma. Thus, the eight worldly concerns prevent the practice of Dharma and thereby prevent the increase of realizations.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Those propounding the deceptive as the ultimate,
> Should be known as having erring intellects.

Those who propound the conventional truth to be the ultimate have a mistaken understanding.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> To propound the repulsive as attractive, suffering as happiness,
> The selfless nature as a self and
>
> To propound impermanent phenomena as "permanent" and
> Pleased like that, whoever abides in signs,
> When they hear the teaching of the Tathagata,
> Afraid and not understanding appropriately, they will reject it.

These lines indicate the four mistaken conceptions related to the four attributes of true sufferings:

1. conceiving what is impermanent to be permanent,
2. conceiving what is suffering to be happiness,
3. conceiving what is impure to be pure, and
4. conceiving what is selfless to be a self.

For example, the words "propound the repulsive as attractive" refers to the mistaken conception thinking that the aggregates are pure although they are impure. "Suffering as happiness" refers to the mistaken conception thinking that the contaminated body is happiness although it is suffering in

nature. "The selfless nature as a self" refers to the mistaken conception thinking what is selfless is a self. "Propound impermanent phenomena as "permanent" refers to the mistaken conception thinking that what is impermanent is permanent. Those who have the four mistaken conceptions reject the Buddha's teachings.

> Having rejected the Sugata's teaching,
> They will experience unbearable suffering as hell sentient beings.
> Although they seek happiness, [due to] inappropriate [means],
> The childish will find hundreds of sufferings.

This verse describes the result of rejecting the Buddha's teachings saying: "They will experience unbearable suffering as hell sentient beings." "Hundreds of sufferings" refers to the several sets of a hundred sufferings listed in Asanga's *Bodhisattva Grounds*. Even in one day we experience many sufferings.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When someone fully realizes with unmistaken awareness,
> The doctrine that benefits the world,
> Completely abandoning like an old snake skin,
> Having passed beyond all becoming, there will be peace.

When someone properly understands the Buddha's teachings, he will attain nirvana. "There will be peace" refers to both liberation and enlightenment; one leaves behind the ocean of sufferings of cyclic existence and attains peace.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> "All these phenomena are isolated by nature –
> Empty, signless – the ultimate."
> Whoever will produce joy having heard [this],
> They will attain peerless enlightenment.

This refers to the three doors of liberation: emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness. Whoever produces joy upon hearing these teachings will attain peerless enlightenment.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> You the Conqueror see the aggregates as isolated;
> Also the elements and entrances and, likewise,
> The city of the senses are isolated from signs.
> All are also seen by you the Sage as they are.

The Buddha has seen the purity of the aggregates, elements, entrances (spheres), and so forth. The aggregates are the five, the form aggregate and so forth. The elements are the six, the earth element and so forth. The entrances (spheres) are the six, the form sphere and so forth. Are all phenomena included in the five aggregates? They are not. Posit! Uncontaminated space. If it is a phenomena is it pervaded by being included in the eighteen constituents? It is. Then, which constituent is

uncontaminated space? It is included in the phenomena constituent. Are all phenomena pervaded by being included in the twelve spheres? They are. In which is emptiness included? It is included in the phenomena sphere. The *Treasury of Knowledge* says: "Those named 'constituent' are included in the constituents, those named 'sphere' are included in the spheres, those named 'aggregates' are included in the aggregates." For example, in the *Sutra of the Three Heaps* (literally, three aggregates) what are the three heaps?
Student: They are the heaps of confession, rejoicing, and dedication.

Then, the verse from sutra says: "city of the senses are isolated from signs." The word translated here as "city" could actually be translated as village. Here "city of the senses" refers to the location of the sense powers, that is, the sense organs. The Tibetan words could also be translated as "city of Indra," but in either case they are devoid of the signs of true existence or inherent existence. "Signs" could also refer to the ten signs which were described in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, like that, for those isolated from the deceptive and ultimate truths, how could liberation exist? Therefore, those propounding consciousness, due to wrong conceptions, have only entered a deviant path. The conventional truth indicated here is the method.

When someone is devoid of the two truths, he cannot attain liberation. Here the Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Chittamatrins: "You who propound consciousness have entered a deviant path." The Chittamatrins propound consciousness in the sense that they say that all phenomena are the nature of mind. The presentation of conventional truth is the means or method by which one comes to understand the ultimate truth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was taught [in the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra*]:
>
> Whatever is heard and whatever is indicated
> About phenomena that are without letters,
> By superimposing on the unalterable,
> There is hearing and indication nonetheless.

The Sanskrit world for "letter" also means changing, therefore, "without letters" can mean unchanging. Does this mean letters are permanent? They are not. So in what sense are they unchanging? The definition of a letter in *Awarenesses and Knowers* is: the tone of a language that is the basis for composing words and phrases. Here unchanging (unalterable) means the intonation of a language by which one understands meanings.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Abiding in only the conventional truth is to indicate the ultimate. Also, from bearing in mind the indication of the ultimate, the ultimate will be attained.

The conventional truth is the basis in dependence on which one generates an understanding of ultimate truth, and the ultimate truth is the basis in dependence on which one attains nirvana. "Bear in mind" means to hear teachings on emptiness and then reflect on them, thereby generating a

wisdom arisen from thinking, and then, through meditating on them, to develop a wisdom arisen from meditation, whereby one attains nirvana.

> As taught in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, (v. 24.10)]:
>
> Not depending on the conventional,
> The ultimate will not be indicated.
> Not realizing the ultimate,
> Nirvana will not be attained.
>
> There, indication of the ultimate occurs through the method and is the effect; this [is the] meaning of "arisen from the method," "effect," "that to be attained" and "that to be realized."

The realization of conventional truth is the basis or cause from which there arises the realization of ultimate truth; from the realization of ultimate truth there is the attainment of nirvana.

Friday morning, 17 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 288) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Those outside the path of Venerable Acharya Nagarjuna*
> *Lack the method for attaining peace.*
> *They have deviated from the truths that are conventional and thusness.*
> *Due to having deviated from them, there is no attainment of liberation.* [6.79]
>
> Therefore, through mistaken masters who explain the interpretable meaning [teachings] to be definitive meaning [teachings], they enter a path, a system concocted by their own conceptions, that fails to become the Buddha's intention. *Those outside the path* founded by *Venerable Acharya* Arya *Nagarjuna lack the* main *method for attaining peace*, nirvana. Why is that? [The reason is] that *those* outsiders *have* definitely *deviated from the conventional* truth and *thusness*, ultimate *truth,*. *Due to having deviated from* the two truths, as long as they do not relinquish this, *there is no attainment of liberation*.

Those who are outside Acharya Nagarjuna's teachings have deviated from the two truths because they follow Chittamatra masters who teach that there are no external objects and that there are self-cognizers. Such a path is not a method for attaining peace, nirvana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 289) says:

> QUESTION: Why is liberation not attained by those who have deviated from the two truths?
> RESPONSE:
>
> *Conventional truth is the method,*
> *Ultimate truth arises from the method.*
> *Whoever does not know the distinctions of these two*
> *Enters an inferior path due to mistaken conceptions.* [6.80]
>
> An unmistaken presentation of *conventional truth is the method* for realizing ultimate truth just as it is. The realization of *ultimate truth* as it is, *arises from the method* explained before. *Whoever does not know the distinctions of these two* truths *enters an inferior path due to mistaken conceptions*.

An unmistaken understanding or realization of conventional truth is the method for achieving an unmistaken understanding or realization of ultimate truth. Those who do not know the distinction of these two truths enter an inferior path due to their mistaken conceptions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 289) says:

> Hence, it is taught that without the occurrence of a faultless presentation of the conventional there is no realization of ultimate truth just as it is. Therefore, one should only be a follower of the system founded by Nagarjuna.

How is conventional truth realized? An understanding of conventional truth implies knowing the definition of conventional truth. The definition of conventional truth in the Prasangika Madhyamika system is: an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing conventionalities with respect to which a valid cognizer analyzing conventionalities becomes a valid cognizer analyzing conventionalities. The definition of an ultimate truth is: an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate with respect to which a valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate becomes a valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate. If it is an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing conventionalities, is it pervaded by being a conventional truth? It is not. Posit! That which is an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing conventionalities but not a conventional truth is, for example, the emptiness of true existence of a sprout. This is an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing conventionalities because it is an object found by an omniscient mind realizing varieties.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 282) gives the definition of conventional truth as: an object found by a valid cognizer of conventions with respect to which it becomes a valid cognizer of conventions.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, one should only be a follower of the system founded by Nagarjuna."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 289) says:

> In regard to establishing this very system by sutra, the *[Sutra of] the Meditative Stabilization Definitively Indicating Thusness* says:
>
> > The Exalted Knower of the World, without listening to others,
> > Himself indicated the two truths.
> > There is the conventional, likewise, the ultimate;
> > There is no third truth whatsoever.
>
> This means that Buddha indicated two truths under his own power and indicated that all objects of knowledge are definite in number as the two truths.

All objects of knowledge are definite in number as the two truths.

- The definition of conventional truth is: an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing conventionalities with respect to which a valid cognizer analyzing conventionalities becomes a valid cognizer analyzing conventionalities.
- The definition of an ultimate truth is: an object found by a valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate with respect to which a valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate becomes a valid cognizer analyzing the ultimate.

There is no third truth other than these two.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 289) says:

Then, [this sutra] says:

> For this reason, migrating beings will generate faith
> In the Sugata for the sake of happiness.
> The Conqueror, for the welfare of migrating beings,
> In order to benefit the world, taught the conventional.

This [verse] indicates [the Buddha's] purpose in teaching the conventional.

The Buddha's purpose in teaching the conventional is to generate faith in the continua of sentient beings in the incontrovertible law of actions and results, on the basis of which they put this into practice and eventually attain enlightenment.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 289-90) says:

> Whichever of the six migrating beings, the host of sentient beings, was indicated –
> Hell sentient beings, animals, and hungry ghosts,
> The state of anti-gods, as well as human beings and gods –
> The Lion of Men designated them as conventionalities.
>
> Inferior lineages as well as high lineages,
> Rich families and poor families,
> Assemblies of slaves and, likewise, assemblies of servants,
> The host of women, men, and hermaphrodites;
>
> However many distinctions of migrators are appropriate,
> You, the Matchless One indicated the world.
> Having borne this in mind due to skill in conventional truth,
> The Knower of the World indicated it to humanity.

This [verse] states the way in which [the Buddha] indicated the conventional.

These three verses show how the Buddha indicated conventional truth to different kinds of sentient beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 290) says:

> Migrating beings who enjoy them will engage in
> The eight concerns of migrating beings in cyclic existence:
> Gain and non-gain, fame and disgrace,
> Praise and criticism, happiness and suffering.
>
> When gain is found, attachment to it is produced.
> When there is no gain, that too is disturbing.
> The others that are not indicated should be known in this way.
> These eight diseases will harm their continua.

Enjoying conventionalities through adhering to them as truly existent, one engages in the eight worldly concerns. This says that one circles in cyclic existence through being tormented by them and that by indicating the first two of the eight concerns one should understand the remaining ones which are not indicated.

Due to adhering to phenomena as truly existent, one engages in the eight worldly concerns whereby one is continually tormented by sufferings. For this reason, one should strive to become free from the

eight worldly concerns. The remaining six worldly concerns are to be understood through the explanation of the first two.

Are gain and non-gain themselves worldly concerns? In other words, are simple gain and non-gain worldly concerns or is it the happiness that arises from gain and the suffering that arises from not gaining that are worldly concerns? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 290) says:

> Those propounding the conventional as the ultimate,
> Should be understood as having erroneous intelligence.
>
> By saying that those who propound "Conventionalities, the six migrating beings and so forth, are ultimately, that is, truly, existent" should be understood as having mistaken intelligence, it is taught that the our own [Buddhist] schools, those who assert this, are mistaken tenets.

Which Buddhist schools propound that conventionalities are ultimately or truly existent? They are the Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, and Chittamatra schools.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 290) says:

> Those who propound the unattractive as attractive, suffering as happiness,
> The nature that is selfless as a self,
>
> Those who propound impermanent phenomena saying "permanent," and
> Anyone who enjoys that, that is, anyone who abides in signs,
> Upon hearing the teachings of the Tathagata,
> Frightened and not realizing them correctly, they abandon them.
>
> Having abandoned the Sugata's teachings,
> They experience unbearable suffering as hell sentient beings.
> Although seeking happiness, due to the improper
> The childish will experience hundreds of sufferings.
>
> [These verses] indicate that those outsiders who have familiarized themselves with the four mistaken [conceptions] and are polluted by tenets that accept them, upon hearing the teachings of the Buddha abandon them and by the force of that become hell sentient beings. Although seeking the happiness of liberation, due to an improper method, not only will they not find that, they will be tormented by many sufferings.

The four mistaken conceptions are: (i) conceiving the impermanent to be permanent, (ii) conceiving the suffering to be happiness, (iii) conceiving the impure to be pure, and (iv) conceiving the selfless to be a self. These are related to the four attributes of true sufferings – impermanent, suffering, empty, and selfless – in the following way:

1. The mistaken conception conceiving the impermanent to be permanent is related to the attribute of impermanence.
2. The mistaken conception conceiving the suffering to be happiness is related to the attribute of suffering, or misery.
3. The mistaken conception conceiving the contaminated aggregates, which are empty of being permanent, partless, and independent, that are impure to be pure is related to the attribute of empty.

4. The mistaken conception conceiving the selfless to be a self – the conception that although there is no self-sufficient substantially existent self, there is such a self – is related to the attribute of selfless.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 290) says:

> When someone fully realizes with an unmistaken awareness
> The teachings that benefit the world,
> Through complete abandonment like an old snakeskin,
> Having passed beyond all existences, there will be peace.
>
> "All these phenomena are devoid by nature,
> Ultimately empty and signless";
> Those who generate joy on hearing this
> Will attain unsurpassed enlightenment.
>
> You, the Conqueror, see the aggregates as devoid,
> Likewise, also are the elements and spheres.
> The city of the senses is devoid of signs.
> Everything is also seen by you, the Sage, as it is.
>
> [These verses] indicate that when the meaning of the profound teachings is unmistakenly realized, one will be liberated from cyclic existence. Then, with regard to the thought "How is this realized?," it is taught that through rejoicing upon hearing the advice that "All these phenomena are devoid by nature" and so forth, when the meaning of this is realized one will attain enlightenment. Through indicating the conventional before, the ultimate is indicated.

This is a presentation of ultimate truth saying that all phenomena, the aggregates, elements, and spheres, are empty of inherent existence. By realizing the ultimate truth, one will attain nirvana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 291) says:

> "The elements" are the earth element and so forth. The "spheres" are forms, sounds, and so forth.

The elements are the six, the earth element and so forth. The spheres are the six external spheres, forms, sounds, and so forth. Is there a difference between earth and the earth element, fire and the fire element, and so forth? Is there a difference between an earth particle and the earth element?
Student: Earth and earth element are not the same.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What is the difference?
Student: Earth is that which contains the earth element, water element, fire element, etc., although the earth element is predominant. The earth element is that which is hard and solid.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The definition of earth is that which is solid. It would follow that earth is pervaded by being the earth element!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 291) says:

> How can there be liberation for those who are devoid of the knowledge that conventionalities are mere imputations and that ultimate truth is the lack of inherent existence? Therefore, those who propound mere consciousness have only entered an erroneous path. The conventional truth indicated here is the method.

This refers to the Chittamatrins who propound mere consciousness (consciousness only).

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: Could Geshe-la please explain why for Prasangikas it is not necessary to accumulate infinite merit in order to abandon the conception of a self of phenomenon which is an affliction?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The conception of a self of phenomena is an afflictive obstruction, therefore, in order to abandon it is necessary to accumulate merit. However, if by infinite merit you mean three countless great eons, then that is not necessary. According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system one can abandon the afflictive obstructions even in a single human lifetime without the need to accumulate merit over three countless great eons. The *Ornament for Clear Realizations*, which is written from the viewpoint of the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, says that hearers need to accumulate merit for three lifetimes, solitary realizers for a hundred eons, and bodhisattvas for three countless great eons. According to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas the conception of true existence is a knowledge obstruction, whereas according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas it is an afflictive obstruction. That the conception of a self of phenomena is an afflictive obstruction and that hearers and solitary realizers have the realization of the selflessness of phenomena are proved by the Prasangika Madhyamika system based on seven scriptural authorities and three reasonings.

Student: According to Chittamatra, the eye sense power is a latency. In the Chittamatra system, is this eye sense power a form, a non-associated compositional factor, or a consciousness? In *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism* by Lati Rinpoche (page 70), it says that the eye sense power in Chittamatra is a "potency… and is a 'form'." Would Geshe-la agree with this? If it is form, is this contradictory because latencies are non-associated compositional factors?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The word 'potency' (*nus pa*) can be interpreted in different ways. When it is taken to mean a latency, it is not form, whereas when it is taken to mean that which has the potential (the ability) to perform a function, a potency can be a form, for example, an eye sense power. Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:

> *The potential that is the basis of its respective consciousness,*
> *Is conceived calling it 'a physical eye sense power.'"* [6.62]

In the Chittamatra system a potency is neither form nor consciousness; it is a non-associated compositional factor.

Student: Regarding the causal condition, the empowering condition, the observed object condition, and the immediately preceding condition of an eye consciousness, are they all posited as latencies in Chittamatra? If so, are they all the same latency?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are not all posited as latencies because an immediately preceding condition is not a latency or a potency because it is a consciousness. According to the Chittamatrins there are two types of observed object conditions: an appearing observed object condition and an observed object condition that is a potency. The appearing observed object condition of an eye consciousness apprehending blue is blue. The observed object condition that is a potency of an eye consciousness apprehending blue is a potency that is able to bring about the appearance of blue to an eye consciousness. This is explained in Khedrup Je's *Dose of Emptiness*.

Student: Within the context of the two types of emptiness, emptiness in term of 'being' and emptiness in terms of 'existing' – is the emptiness in terms of 'being' a self-emptiness and the emptiness in terms of 'existing' an other-emptiness?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if it is an emptiness it is pervaded by being a self-emptiness, whereas in the Great Completion school (Dzog Chen) it is said that other-emptiness is the highest view. One can refer to the teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on this subject or those of Khenpo Tsultrim Gyatso who calls the view of other-emptiness the Great Middle Way.

Student: According to Prasangika, which of the selflessnesses asserted by the lower schools is self-emptiness and emptiness in terms of 'being'?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The emptinesses asserted by the lower schools are not the same as the emptiness asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas, yet they can be considered self-emptiness. Other-emptiness is illustrated by a Dharma center that is empty of an assembly of Dharma practitioners or a hand that is empty of money.

Student: Within the context of presenting the two modes of negating, Lama Tsongkhapa (*Illumination*, Tibetan text page 262) states that "taking the emptiness of true existence of the bases of present appearances to be a nihilistic emptiness (nothingness) and setting it aside, then taking another appearance to be the basis of emptiness and, rather than presenting it as empty of being the object of negation, presenting it as empty of existing as a thing, is not the system of any Madhyamika or Chittamatrin." Does this 'thing' refer to an object being empty of itself?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: I have to think about this. There was some problem with this passage in that in Chandrakirti's autocommentary there seems to be a spelling mistake in the Tibetan in that this text says 'empty fist' rather than 'nihilistic emptiness.'

END

Monday afternoon, 20 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 291-2) says:

> The *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra* says:
>
> Whatever is heard and whatever is taught
> About phenomena that are without letters,
> By superimposing on the immutable,
> Nonetheless there is hearing and teaching.
>
> The first two lines indicate that [phenomena] do not exist ultimately. Having superimposed on, that is, having imputed by conception to, that which is ultimately without letters, one hears and explains. Although the equivalent [Sanskrit] term for "letter," "*akshara,*" means both "without letters" and "immutable," if it is translated here as "without letters" that is fine. Although it is indeed explained in many [texts] that superimposition is, for example, to think "The non-existent exists and that which is not is," it is not only that, it is also that which is posited through imputation by conception in general.

There are no phenomena, including letters and so forth, that exist ultimately or truly, likewise, hearing and teaching do not exist ultimately. "Superimposing" refers to superimposing by conception; by superimposing ultimate or true existence one then hears and teaches. The Sanskrit word "*akshara,*" refers to both "without letters" and "immutable." A letter is posited as the tone of a language, whereas "without letters" refers to without inherent existence and true existence.

Superimposition is a conception that imputes existence to the non-existent and being to that which is not. On the other hand, deprecation is to impute non-existence to the existent and not being to that which is. However, superimposition in this context is not as it is usually understood, rather it is "that which is posited through imputation by conception in general."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 292) says:

> Through abiding in the conventional truth alone the ultimate is taught. In addition, one attains the ultimate, nirvana, through comprehending the ultimate. *Fundamental Wisdom* says:
>
> Without depending on the conventional
> The ultimate cannot be taught.
> Without realizing the ultimate,
> Nirvana will not be attained.

The understanding of the ultimate depends on the understanding of the conventional. Having realized the basis, a conventional truth, one realizes the ultimate. Having realized the ultimate, one attains peace, nirvana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 292) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2B-4 Indicating that the two refutations of other-powered phenomena and worldly conventions are not similar

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [The Chittamatrins] mention here: As you [Madhyamikas] mention that without much consideration for us, now we will not be patient toward you! If the [naturally existing] entity of other-powered [phenomena] is excluded to show oneself off as skilled in the mere rebuttal of another's position and because it is unreasonable due to the acceptability [of reasoning] – well then, now, because it is unreasonable due only to the acceptability [of refuting production from self and others, etc.] that was mentioned, the deceptive [truth] renown to you will be excluded.

"Now we will not be patient toward you" means that now the Chittamatrins will respond to the Prasangika Madhyamikas' refutation of the inherently existent other-powered phenomena asserted by the Chittamatrins. Their response is that, if the Prasangika Madhyamikas refute inherently existent other-powered phenomena, they also refute worldly conventions. The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond saying that the refutation of inherently existent other-powered phenomena and the refutation of worldly conventions are different.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [The Madhyamikas reply:] If you, having given poisoned food – by posing as a dear friend – to one who stole the collection of wealth accumulated through hundreds of hardships from beginningless time, were to rejoice by giving harm in return while stealing it back, how could it be? We will prosper and become virtuous.

This is the Prasangika Madhyamikas reply to the Chittamatrins' accusation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Like this:
>
> *The way you assert other-powered things,*
> *I do not accept even the conventional.*
> *For an effect, although non-existent, I mention*
> *These "exist" in compliance with the world.* [6.81]
>
> Just as you, through independent abidance, mention in your own scriptural system an entity of other-powered phenomena that is to be borne in mind by an arya's exalted wisdom; I do not [accept] the deceptive like that.

The way in which the Chittamatrins assert other-powered phenomena, that is, as inherently existent, is not the way in which the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert the conventional. This is because the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not assert worldly conventionalities to be inherently existent.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 44), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2B4 Refutation of dependent phenomena and worldly convention are not the same

You may say, "If you refute inherently existent dependent phenomena, that is the same as refuting worldly convention."

> *The way you maintain dependent things to be*
> *I do not accept conventional things are, even.*
> *For the result's sake, though these don't exist,*
> *With regard to the world I say they do exist.* [6.81]

It is not the same, since I do not accept that even the conventional is as you Chittamatrins assert the functional thing of a dependent phenomenon to be, inherently existent, but in order to attain the result of realizing absolute reality, although this form and other [sense objects] do not exist inherently, speaking with regard to the world I say that they do exist.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they do not assert worldly conventions in the same way that the Chittamatrins assert other-powered phenomena, that is, as inherently existent. The Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that which is renowned in the world to exist as existing and do not assert that which is renowned in the world to not exist as existing. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that when they refute inherently existent other-powered phenomena this does not imply that they refute worldly conventions. These refutations are not the same because the Chittamatrins assert other-powered phenomena to exist inherently, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not assert worldly conventions to exist inherently. According to the Chittamatrins other-powered phenomena exist inherently because if they were not inherently existent they would not exist at all. For the Prasangika Madhyamika system worldly conventions do not exist inherently but do exist. Therefore, in the Prasangika Madhyamika system 'not existing inherently' and 'existing' are not contradictory.

Similarly, although worldly beings say that such-and-such exists, they do not say that it exists inherently. The Prasangika Madhyamikas propound things to exist in the same way in which the worldly propound them to exist. For this reason, the Prasangikas are also called "those who propound in accordance with that renowned in the world."

The Prasangika Madhyamikas then tell the Chittamatrins to debate with the world in order to understand what the worldly say. However, in reality the Chittamatrins would not be able to debate with the worldly because the worldly would not understand their assertions about phenomena being the nature of the mind and mind being inherently existent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Well then, how?
>
> Although not existent, due to being renowned to only the world, "exist" is expressed on only the world's side, because subsequently expressing that is the method for overcoming that.
>
> As was taught [in *Indicating the Three Vows*]:[49]
>
> > The Bhagavan [said]: The world disputes together with me, yet I do not dispute with the world since whatever the world accepts as existent, I also accept that as existent; whatever the world accepts as non-existent, I also accept that as non-existent.

The Bhagavan proclaims in accordance with the world. Although things do not exist inherently, he proclaims them to exist because they are renowned to the worldly to exist. This way of proclaiming is "the method for overcoming" the bad tenets of the world, then, having overcome them, the Bhagavan explains the way to attain the realization of reality.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Moreover, this deceptive [truth]:
>
> *Just as there is no existence for arhats*
> *Engaged in peace through abandoning the aggregates, like that,*
> *If non-existent even for the world, similarly*
> *Also through the world, I would not say this "exists."* [6.82]
>
> Just as the deceptive does not exist in any form for arhats – those engaged in the sphere of the peace of nirvana without remainder of the aggregates – similarly, if it did not exist even for the world, like the aggregates and so forth of the arhat, also in dependence on the world, I would not

[49] Attributed by LTK, p. 308. Sanskrit uncertain.

say these "exist." Therefore, I accept the deceptive by way of reliance on others – not independently.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

If, as for the arhats who have abandoned
Their aggregates and entered peace, they don't exist,
They did not even for the world, accordingly
Even for the world, I would not say they existed. [6.82]

Without regard of the world, I do not accept the conventional; for if, just as form and the other [sense objects] do not exist with respect to the perception of arhats who have abandoned the aggregates and entered the sphere of tranquillity, they likewise did not exist even for the world, then I would not say they did exist even for the world as for those without remainder.

A foe destroyer who has a nirvana without remainder is absorbed in meditative equipoise and has no appearance of forms and so forth. Forms and so forth do not appear to such a foe destroyer due to the vanishing of the appearance of conventionalities. What is a foe destroyer abiding in a nirvana without remainder?
Student: For the Prasangika Madhyamikas a nirvana without remainder is when a foe destroyer is in meditative equipoise and there is no appearance of true existence, whereas a nirvana with remainder is when a foe destroyer is in subsequent attainment and has the appearance of true existence.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is right according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas. For them 'the remainder' is the appearance of true existence; therefore, one who does not have this appearance is 'without remainder." On the other hand, for the other schools 'with remainder' means to have suffering aggregates.

Whatever the worldly say exists is also propounded by the Prasangika Madhyamikas to exist. "The remainder" in this context refers to the remainder of the aggregates. 'The aggregates' are asserted differently according to the various schools, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas they are the appearance of true existence, whereas for the other schools they are the aggregates that are together with suffering. In the Prasangika Madhyamika system a nirvana without remainder exists only for those in meditative equipoise, whereas a nirvana with remainder exists for those in subsequent attainment. How are 'with remainder' and 'without remainder' defined by the Svatantrika Madhyamikas? For the Prasangika Madhyamikas one without remainder is pervaded by being in meditative equipoise, is it the same for the Svatantrika Madhyamikas?
Student: No.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Therefore, there is someone in subsequent attainment who is without remainder?
Student: Yes. The schools lower than the Prasangika Madhyamika interpret 'remainder' as the contaminated aggregates, therefore, for them foe destroyers, whether in meditative equipoise or not, are still with remainder.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is there a difference between the False Aspectarian and True Aspectarian Chittamatrins?
Student: There is a difference, this being that True Aspectarian Chittamatrins say that when a nirvana without remainder is attained the continuum ceases, whereas for the False Aspectarian Chittamatrins when a nirvana without remainder is attained the continuum does not cease.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is right. This is because True Aspectarian Chittamatrins say that there are three final vehicles, not just one. The True Aspectarian Chittamatrins say that when a nirvana without

remainder is attained the continuum ceases and all that remains is the sphere of phenomena. This can be understood to mean either that the aggregates completely cease to exist or that such a person is completely absorbed in meditative equipoise. In the True Aspectarian Chittamatra school when a foe destroyer with remainder becomes a foe destroyer without remainder has he abandoned the two obstructions? He has not abandoned them by means of the force of antidotes, but has abandoned them in the sense that the basis of the obstructions, the aggregates, has become non-existent. The aggregates have absorbed into the sphere of phenomena and therefore no longer exist. Because the aggregates are eliminated, the obstructions that are based on them are also eliminated. For example, when the sun shines in the morning, the darkness that was previously there is eliminated. What are darkness and light? In *Collected Topics* they are said to be two of the eight branches of color, therefore, they are color. Darkness and light are mutually opposite. Likewise, the wisdom realizing reality and the ignorance that is the conception of true existence are mutually opposite.

Tuesday morning, 21 November 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is accepted by only the world. Therefore, it is worthy to be excluded if excluded in dependence on only those who accept it; it is not in dependence on others (the Prasangikas). To explain the statement:
>
> *If you are not harmed by the world,*
> *Refute this with respect to the world itself!*
> *You and the world should debate about this and*
> *Afterwards I shall rely on the strong.* [6.83]
>
> We would abide in extremely great difficulty in order to overcome the deceptive of the world, whereas you dispel the deceptive of the world. If you are not harmed by the world, I shall also assist you! But, since there is harm from the world, I shall rely upon indifference. "You and the world should debate about this and," there, if you win, therefore, we shall rely on you by being in agreement with this. But, if you are defeated by the world, then we shall rely on the very strong world.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *If the world does you no damage, then*
> *With respect to this same world, refute these!*
> *Let you and the world debate about this,*
> *And afterwards we shall rely upon the stronger.* [6.83]

It follows that you Chittamatrins cannot refute the external objects well known in the world. For if the world does not harm you, just you refute these external objects with regard to this same world! You and the world should debate about this, and afterwards we shall rely on whoever is the stronger. And the way of the world is the stronger.

If the Chittamatrins debate with the worldly and win, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they will rely on and assist them. However, since the Chittamatrins' position is invalidated by the worldly, the Prasangika Madhyamikas will abide in equanimity prior to the debate without supporting either the Chittamatrins or the worldly. After the debate the Prasangika Madhyamikas will rely on whomever is the winner.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 292) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS: As you [Prasangika Madhyamikas] said the above without much regard for us, now we too will not be patient with you! If you eliminate the entity of inherently existent other-powered [phenomena] in order to show yourselves to be skilled in the mere rebuttal of others' position and because it is unreasonable by logical reasoning, then now, because it is unreasonable only by the logic that refutes production from self and others, the conventionalities renowned to you are eliminated.

The Chittamatrins say that when the Prasangika Madhyamikas refute inherently existent other-powered phenomena, they also refute the conventionalities renowned in the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 292) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: That would be as if you, having given poisoned food, by posing as a friend, to the one who stole a collection of wealth amassed through hundreds of hardships from beginningless time, were to rejoice in stealing it back again. Similarly, if we benefit you by stealing the object that is the conception of other-powered phenomena to be truly existent, if in return you delight and rejoice due to the harm inflicted upon us, in dependence upon that we will become of high status and virtuous.

This is similar to Chandrakirti's autocommentary. Who is the thief who steals the collection of wealth and what is that collection of wealth? The wealth is the collection of merit amassed through hundreds of hardships, whereas the thief is the conception of true existence. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "The conception of true existence has been stealing the collection of merit. The Chittamatrins assist the conception of true existence by saying that other-powered phenomena are truly existent. Although you Chittamatrins have been under the control of the conception of true existence since beginningless time, you still assist the conception of true existence which is like someone who poses as a friend and gives poisoned food to you. That conception of true existence has stolen the collection of merit before and is still stealing it even now." The example given here is of someone who has many material things that have been amassed over a long time, but then another person, posing as a friend, steals them away. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if you Chittamatrins were to help that thief is would not be beneficial because they would be causing him to create more negativities.

This passage, taken from the autocommentary, is not further explained by Lama Tsongkhapa. Then Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Similarly, if we benefit you by stealing an object that is conceived to be a truly existent other-powered phenomenon, if in return you delight and rejoice due to the harm inflicted upon us, in dependence upon that change we will become of high status and virtuous." The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "Since there is no true existence, I steal the conception of true existence away from you and thereby benefit you."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 293) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *The way in which you assert other-powered things,*
> *We do not assert even conventionalities.*
> *For the sake of the result, even though they do not exist,*
> *Taking the perspective of the world, we proclaim "They exist."* [6.81]
>
> In that case, *the way in which you* Chittamatrins *assert other-powered things*, that is, as established by way of their own entity, is to say "They exist for our system" through taking that which is comprehended by a superior's exalted wisdom to be independent (self-powered) in accordance with what is said in *Thirty Verses*: "Without seeing that is not seen." However, *we do not assert even*

> *conventionalities* to be inherently existent. Why? *Even though they*, the aggregates and so forth, *do not* inherently *exist*, since they are renowned only in the world, we *take* only *the perspective of the world* and then *proclaim "They exist*."

The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not assert conventionalities to be inherently existent because phenomena, such as the aggregates, are without inherent existence. However, the aggregates and so forth exist because they are renowned to exist in the world. In this way, the Prasangika Madhyamikas proclaim in accordance with the worldly who say that the aggregates exist, but do not say that the aggregates exist truly or inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 293) says:

> Here, there are two ways of positing the aggregates and so forth that are conventionalities in the perspective of worldly conventions. We Madhyamikas, positing them as conventionalities, assert them in the perspective of a valid cognizer of conventions; we do not posit them in the perspective of [a consciousness of an ultimate] type. The aggregates and so forth are posited as inherently existent in some cases from the point of view of a [particular] purpose; however, they are not asserted [to be inherently existent] in our system.

There are two ways of positing the aggregates and so forth in the perspective of worldly conventions. The first way is the way in which the Prasangika Madhyamikas posit them: they posit the aggregates and so forth in the perspective of a valid cognizer of conventions and not in the perspective of [a consciousness of an ultimate] type. In other words, for them conventionalities exist only in the perspective of a valid cognizer of conventions. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not posit conventionalities in the perspective of a consciousness of an [ultimate] type because the aggregates and so forth do not exist in the perspective of a consciousness of the ultimate; they exist only in the perspective of a valid cognizer of conventionalities. This means that conventionalities, the aggregates and so forth, do not exist in the perspective of an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise observing emptiness. However, for a particular purpose the aggregates and so forth are posited as inherently existent, even though they are not so asserted in the Prasangika Madhyamika system. The positing of the aggregates as inherently existent is asserted by other schools.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 293) says:

> Since this is asserted only in the perspective of others, the refutation of the two is not the same. [Inherently existent aggregates and so forth] are asserted in the perspective of others *for the sake of the result*, that is, a [particular] purpose. This is because, moreover, trainees are turned away from other bad tenets and because it is a method [for them] to gradually realize suchness.

The aggregates and so forth are posited on occasion as existing inherently for the purpose of turning trainees away from bad tenets and as a method for them to gradually realize suchness. For example, in the first wheel of Dharma the Buddha said that phenomena from form through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment exist inherently, whereas in the second wheel of Dharma he said that phenomena from form through the exalted knower of all aspects do not exist inherently. These two presentations would seem to be directly contradictory but they were taught for a particular purpose. Buddha taught that phenomena exist inherently in order to turn trainees away from non-Buddhist tenets and to lead them into the Buddhist teachings, thereby gradually leading them to a realization of suchness. If, instead of doing so, Buddha had said right from the start that phenomena do not exist inherently those who were followers of the Vaibhashika and Sautrantika tenets would have turned away from the Buddha's teachings. Saying "turned away from other bad tenets" refers to the tenets of non-Buddhist schools and not to the tenets of the Buddhist schools.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 293) says:

> Hence, it is to be understood, through citing the scriptures that make this known, that this does not at all mean that all the presentations by these passages are (i) made in the perspective of others and (ii) not made in the perspective of our own system. The scripture, *Indicating the Three Vows*, says:
>
> > The worldly argue with me; however, I do not argue with the world. Whatever is asserted to exist in the world, I too assert it to exist. Whatever is asserted to not exist in the world, I too assert it to not exist.

This refers to the three verses in the root text:

> *The way in which you assert other-powered things,*
> *We do not assert even conventionalities.*
> *For the sake of the result, even though they do not exist,*
> *Taking the perspective of the world, we proclaim "They exist."* [6.81]
>
> *Just as they do not exist for foe destroyers*
> *Who, having abandoned the aggregates, have entered peace,*
> *Similarly if they do not exist even for the world,*
> *We would not proclaim "They exist" also for the world.* [6.82]
>
> *If you are not invalidated by the world,*
> *You should refute them in relation to the world itself.*
> *You and worldly beings should debate about this;*
> *Afterward we will rely on the stronger.* [6.83]

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "this does not at all mean that all the presentations by these passages are (i) made in the perspective of others and (ii) not made in the perspective of our own system." In order to prove this Lama Tsongkhapa cites the scripture *Indicating the Three Vows*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 293) says:

> [Nagarjuna's] *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness* says:
> > Abidance, production, and degeneration,
> > Existing and not existing, the inferior, equal, and special,
> > Were taught by the Buddha from the point of view of what is said in the world;
> > Therefore, not from the point of view of the perfect.
>
> This means that everything that is posited as existing, not existing, and so forth is posited from the point of view of the way in which conventions are renowned in the world.

That which is taught by the Buddha is not always from the point of view of the perfect, he also taught from the point of view of that renowned in the world. "From the point of view of the perfect" means from the point of view of their true existence; therefore, Buddha taught abidance, production, degeneration, and so forth in accordance with worldly awareness, not from the point of view of their existing truly or not. In other words, the Buddha taught abidance, production, and degeneration, existing and not existing, and so forth from the point of view of conventions, not from the point of view of whether they are truly existent or not.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 294) says:

Chandrakirti says:

Just as they do not exist for foe destroyers
Who, having abandoned the aggregates, have entered peace,
Similarly if they were to not exist even for the world,
We would not proclaim "They exist" also for the world. [6.82]

How do conventionalities exist? *Just as* all conventionalities *do not exist for foe destroyers who, having abandoned the aggregates, have entered* the sphere of *peace* without remainder, *similarly if* those conventionalities *were to not exist even for the world*, as is the case for those without remainder, *we would not proclaim* those conventionalities saying "*They exist*" *also* in relation to the perspective of *world*ly conventions. Therefore, we assert conventionalities in terms of their very dependence on other, that is, worldly conventions; we do not assert them as independent, without relation to worldly conventions.

According to the True Aspectarian Chittamatrins when a foe destroyer who has a nirvana with remainder attains a nirvana without remainder, all conventionalities cease. That is, they assert that his continuum, which is a compounded phenomenon, ceases and that all that remains is abidance in the sphere of phenomena.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "We do not posit conventionalities relative to a foe destroyer abiding in a nirvana without remainder but posit them relative to what exists for the world." Thus, the Prasangika Madhyamikas posit phenomena to exist relative to worldly conventions and not independent of them.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 294) says:

We who say "Initially [conventionalities] are asserted by the world alone, therefore, since anyone's assertions can be eliminated in relation to that alone, it is fitting to dispel them; they are not [fitting to be dispelled] in relation to the other Madhyamikas," abide in meditation on the path [bearing] extremely great difficulty in order to overcome the mistaken appearances of conventionalities in our own continua.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that one has to meditate on a path bearing extremely great difficulty in order to overcome the mistaken appearances of conventionalities in one's own continuum. "The mistaken appearances of conventionalities" refers to the conception of true existence. All mistaken appearances are conventionalities; there are no mistaken appearances that are ultimates. The word 'conventional' (kun rdzob) of conventional truth is taken to mean mistaken or deceptive.

In short, the Buddha taught in accordance with the awarenesses of sentient beings and not from the point of view of the reality of objects.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 294) says:

Chandrakirti says:

If you are not invalidated by the world,
You should refute them in relation to the world itself.
You and worldly beings should debate about this;
Afterward we will rely on the stronger. [6.83]

If you are not invalidated by the world, *you should refute those* conventionalities *in relation to the world itself*. If you are able to refute [the world] by means of your reasonings, we too will ally ourselves with you, that is, we will assist you. However, since you are invalidated by the world, we, without assisting you, will abide in equanimity. The two, *you and worldly beings*, *should debate about this*; *after* the debate *we will rely on* whomever is *the stronger*. If you are victorious over them, we will rely on you by accepting that.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "We do not debate with the world, whereas you Chittamatrins should debate with the world. If you win the debate, we will support you. However, you Chittamatrins are unable to invalidate the world, therefore, we will abide in equanimity prior to the debate and afterward will support whoever wins the debate."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 295) says:

> On the other hand, if you are defeated by the world, you should rely on the world which is very strong. In that way, since the non-existence of external objects is invalidated by a valid cognizer of conventions, external objects cannot be established to not exist.

That there are no external objects is invalidated by a valid cognizer of conventions, therefore, the Chittamatrins cannot establish external objects to not exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 295) says:

> OBJECTION: Since there do not exist partless particles, the Chittamatrins, by means of the reasoning that refutes external objects composed of them, do not repudiate external objects that are directionally partless.
> RESPONSE: It is not said that they are not repudiated by a valid cognizer. Although they are repudiated, it is not necessary for external objects to not exist. Hence, although partless moments of consciousness and the continuum that justifies them are repudiated, it should be understood that consciousness is not repudiated.

Chittamatrins negate a composite of partless particles, as do the Prasangika Madhyamikas. However, although there are no external objects that are a composite of partless particles, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas external objects still exist.

Tuesday afternoon, 21 November 2000

The Chittamatrins do not assert objects composed of partless particles and refute others' assertions regarding external objects composed of partless particles. Someone thinks: "Since there do not exist partless particles, the Chittamatrins, by means of the reasoning that refutes external objects composed of them, do not repudiate external objects that are directionally partless." The response is "It is not said that they are not repudiated by a valid cognizer." Although external objects that are directionally partless are refuted, external objects are not repudiated. Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* (Tibetan text page 110) says:

> Although in this system partless consciousness is impossible, one should analyze the refutation and positing of the existence and non-existence of partless moments of consciousness. That there are many is to be understood from speech.

In the Chittamatra system there are no directionally partless particles. This is the same in the Prasangika Madhyamika system, but, as it says in this text, it should be analyzed.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Hence, although partless moments of consciousness and the continuum that justifies them are repudiated, it should be understood that consciousness is not repudiated." Are there partless moments of consciousness? There are not. Since they do not exist, a continuum composed of them cannot exist. The Vaibhashika school asserts directionally partless particles and partless moments of consciousness which are ultimate truths. This is because this school defines an ultimate truth as: a phenomenon that is such that, if it were broken or mentally separated into parts, the mind apprehending that object would not cease. They define a conventional truth as: a

phenomenon that is such that, if it were broken or mentally separated into parts, the mind apprehending that object would cease.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 295) says:

> OPINION: When the other system repudiates partless external objects, the unmistaken sense consciousnesses to which they appear are repudiated. Since a mistaken sense consciousness cannot posit an object, external objects are repudiated.

Someone says that if partless external objects are repudiated, then the unmistaken sense consciousnesses to which they appear are also repudiated. On the other hand, according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system a mistaken sense consciousness can posit an external object. For example, a mistaken sense consciousness that takes a form as its object posits that form. Because the object of negation, true existence, appears to a sense consciousness, this sense consciousness is mistaken with respect to its appearance which is true existence, the object of negation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> OPINION: Although here a mistaken sense consciousness cannot posit a true object of comprehension, it assists in positing a false object of comprehension.

Someone else says that a mistaken sense consciousness cannot posit a true object of comprehension but that it assists in positing a false object of comprehension. For example, an eye consciousness of an ordinary being apprehending a form posits that form. To that eye consciousness, the form appears to be exist truly. Therefore, to that eye consciousness of an ordinary being form appears to exist from its own side. Does it exist as it appears? It does not because it appears to exist from its own side but does not exist from its own side.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 295) says:

> Aryadeva also asserts that in his *Four Hundred Stanzas* saying:
>
> "One exists, one does not exist."
> It is not in suchness; it is also not for worldly beings.
>
> This is because it is taught that distinguishing objects and consciousnesses as existing and not existing is not the presentation of either of the two truths. Therefore, distinguishing them in this way is also not the assertion of Venerable Nagarjuna.

What does "One exists, one does not exist" mean? "One exists" means that external objects exist, whereas "one does not exist" means that self-cognizers and inherently existent consciousnesses do not exist. "Objects and consciousnesses" refers to external objects and self-cognizers. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "distinguishing objects and consciousnesses as existing and not existing is not the presentation of either of the two truths." This is also not Nagarjuna's assertion because distinguishing objects and consciousnesses as existing and not existing is not the meaning of distinguishing the two truths.

"It is not in suchness; it is also not for worldly beings." Perhaps this means that self-cognizers do not exist in reality and do not exist in worldly conventions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 295) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C Indicating that the term 'only' of that called Mind-Only (Chittamatra) does not refute external objects

1 Explaining the intention of teaching mind-only in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*
2 Indicating that the two, external objects and inner mind, are similar in existing and not existing
3 Explaining the intention of teaching mind-only in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-1 Explaining the intention of teaching mind-only in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*

A Proving, by means of the scripture of the *Ten Grounds*, that the term 'only' does not negate external objects
B Proving that very meaning also by other sutras
C The term 'only' proves that the mind is foremost

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-1A Proving, by means of the scripture of the *Ten Grounds*, that the term 'only' does not negate external objects

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [The Chittamatrins] mention here: If, although devoid of acceptable [analysis], you accept the deceptive out of fear of the world's harm, you should also accept mere mind due to fearing scripture's harm. As was taught [in the *Sutra of the Ten Grounds*]:
>
> > He considers it like this: These three realms are mere mind.

The Chittamatrins say to the Prasangika Madhyamikas: "Although you lack acceptable reasons, out of fear of the world's harm you accept conventionalities. This being the case, out of fear of scripture's harm you should also accept that all phenomena are only mind." They say "out of fear of scripture's harm" based on the statement "The three realms are only mind" in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*. While the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the term 'only' or 'mere' in this statement does not negate external objects, the Chittamatrins say that it does negate external objects. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not accept this interpretation of the Chittamatrins.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [The Madhyamikas reply:] I shall expound. On the mosaic pavement of the Sutra Pitaka arranged from the *indranil* jewel (blue sapphire) of the Sugata's speech, having not grasped the distinction of its self-nature, you mistake it as actually being in the aspect of the water of propounding consciousness as a functioning thing. You, due to wishing to scoop a little bit of the water of propounding consciousness as a functioning thing, cleanse and immerse the unfired earthen jug of your intellect. When it breaks up into a hundred kinds of pieces, you will become the very object of laughter of those knowing its nature. The intention of this sutra is not as it appears to your awareness.

In brief, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "You Chittamatrins do not understand the essence of the Sugata's speech. Not having grasped the qualification of true existence, you propound that all things are the nature of the mind and assert functioning things to be truly existent. Like immersing an unfired earthen jug in water, whereby it breaks into a hundred pieces, your assertions that phenomena are truly existent and the nature of mind are harmed by our reasonings. When someone who knows the nature of phenomena sees your jug fall apart, you Chittamatrins will become the object of his laughter." In other words, asserting that other-powered phenomena are truly existent and that the three realms are only the nature of the mind is an object of laughter, just as is someone who scoops up water with an unfired earthen jug. Just as an unfired jug is destroyed by immersing it in water, similarly, the Chittamatrins' reasonings are destroyed when analyzed by the Prasangika Madhyamika system.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Further, if asked: What is the meaning of the sutra here?
>
> Therefore, [the root text] explains:
>
> *That the Manifest, the approaching bodhisattva,*
> *Realizes the three existences as mere consciousness,*
> *Refuted a permanent-self creator, for the sake of realization,*
> *He realizes the creator as mind only.* [6.84]

Based on the citation from the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*: "The three realms are only mind," this verse negates a permanent self being the creator of the world.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2C1A The text of the *Sutra on the Ten Stages* establishes that the word 'only' is not denying external objects

You may say, "If you accept external objects from fear of refutation by the world then you should also accept, from fear of refutation by scripture, that external objects do not exist, since in the *Sutra on the Ten Stages* it is taught that these three realms are only mind."

> *That the bodhisattva of Become or Growing Manifest*
> *Perceives the three realms are only consciousness*
> *Is to know the creator's not a permanent self.*
> *He realizes the creator is only mind.* [6.84]

Then you should understand that it follows that the word 'only' in "these three realms are only mind," does not refute external objects; for this teaching, that the bodhisattva dwelling in the sixth stage, Become Manifest, perceives the three realms as only consciousness, is so that a denial that the creator is a permanent self may be understood, and teaches that he perceives that only mind is the creator.

Who is the creator of the world? It is only mind. Stating this refutes a permanent self being the creator of the world. On the other hand, some say that the creator of the world is God, some that it is the general principal, some that it is Ishvara, and so forth. The Buddhist schools say that only mind is the creator of the world because, for example, the mind first creates a plan for a new building, the one designs it on paper, and then one actually constructs it. In this way all comes from a mental plan. There is a story about a man who mentally planned to build a big house in a particular way, then to get married, to have a son, to name him Chandrakirti, and so forth. Likewise, we too plan to study here and then later teach this subject and benefit others and so forth. Thus, the creator of the world is only mind.

Student: What about the mountains, rivers, and so on? Who plans them?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Even mountains, oceans, and so forth come from mind in the sense that, due to the minds of sentient beings in previous lives, actions were collected through which there arose the appearance of empty space, then wind blew, clouds gathered, water condensed, the water was stirred, mountains were formed, and so forth. This formation of the world is similar to the way in which butter is formed from churning milk.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Since it was extensively taught in the that very *Sutra* [*of the Ten Grounds*]:[50]

> [Thus, the bodhisattva] fully reflects upon dependent-arising in the aspect of the order of arisal… "Thus, the aggregate of suffering, the tree of suffering, lacking agent and feeler, this alone will be manifestly established."
>
> He considers this: "Due to strongly settling upon the agent, actions come into existence.[51] Where the agent is non-existent, there the action is also not ultimately observed."
>
> He considers this: "Like this, these three realms are mere mind; all the twelve links of existence that the Tathagata differentiated and spoke of are also dependent on solely the mind."

The bodhisattva reflects upon the twelve links of dependent-arising in the forward order thinking:

- Due to the condition of ignorance, karmic formations arise.
- In dependence on karmic formations, consciousness arises.
- In dependence on consciousness, name and form arise.
- In dependence on name and form, the six spheres arise.
- In dependence on the six spheres, contact arises (the mere coming together of object, sense power, and consciousness).
- In dependence on contact, feeling arises.
- In dependence on feeling, craving arises.
- In dependence on craving, grasping arises.
- In dependence on grasping, existence arises.
- In dependence on existence, birth arises.
- In dependence on birth, aging and death arises.

Sutra then says that due to aging and death there is lamentation and so forth. Where does it meet back to? It meets back to the root, ignorance.

The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says: "He considers this: 'Due to strongly settling upon the agent, actions come into existence. Where the agent is non-existent, there the action is also not ultimately observed.'" "Where the agent is non-existent" means when the agent does not exist inherently or ultimately, there action is also not ultimately observed.

The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says: "He considers this: 'Like this, these three realms are mere mind; all the twelve links of existence that the Tathagata differentiated and spoke of are also dependent on solely the mind.'"

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, having thus refuted a permanent-self creator, conventionally only a mere-mind creator is seen and the three realms are realized as mere consciousness.

According to Chittamatrins the term 'only' or 'mere' in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* negates external objects, whereas according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas it does not negate external objects, rather it negates that a permanent self is the creator.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

[50] See Rahder's translation, end of section D, section E and beginning of section F, page 189.

[51] Rahder, reading the Sanskrit, has 'action is conventionally designated.'

> Bodhi (enlightenment) is the exalted wisdom of omniscience.

Here Chandrakirti gives the definition of enlightenment. The fifth chapter of *Ornament for Clear Realizations* says:

> *The exalted wisdom of the extinction and*
> *Non-production of stains is called "enlightenment."*

Wednesday morning, 22 November 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> One is a bodhisattva either due to having the intention – thought and consideration – for [enlightenment], or one is a bodhisattva due to having the existence – the possession – of the certainty for enlightenment, or the person – the sentient being – certain for enlightenment is the bodhisattva. The unmanifest words – the intervening words – were condensed.
>
> "Realizes" means "understands." "Approaching" is approaching the sphere of dharma. "Manifest" means "the sixth-grounder." Thus, these are the meanings of the branches.

The meaning of the word 'bodhisattva' is one who wishes to attain enlightenment for the sake of sentient beings or one thinking of enlightenment.

The word "realizes" in the root text means to comprehend or understand that the creator is only mind having negated the existence of a permanent self that is a creator. Chandrakirti says: "'Approaching' is approaching the sphere of dharma. 'Manifest' means 'the sixth-grounder.'" The word 'approaching' refers to a bodhisattva on the sixth ground, as does the name 'the Manifest.'

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 296) says:

> CHITTAMATRINS: If, although lacking the justifiability of analysis regarding suchness, that is, establishment by [a consciousness of an ultimate] type, you assert conventionalities through fearing the invalidation of worldly beings, you should also assert mind-only through fearing the invalidation of the scriptures. For example, the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says:
>
> > He thinks this: "Similarly, the three realms are only mind."
>
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: We will explain this. The even ground of sutra composed of the sapphire jewels of the Conqueror's speech, you, without knowing they are sapphires, mistakenly transform them into the aspect of the water of propounding consciousness to be a thing. Wishing to scoop a bit of the water of propounding consciousness to be a thing, you cleanse and immerse the unfired pot of your intellect in it, then, when it breaks into a hundred pieces, you become the object of the laughter of those knowing its nature.

The Chittamatrins assert that external objects do not exist and that the functioning things that are other-powered phenomena exist inherently. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that such a thesis is not firm but can be easily destroyed, just like an unfired pot used to scoop up water.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 296) says:

> The intention of this sutra is not as it appears to your awareness.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the intention of this sutra is not as it appears to your, Chittamatra, awareness. According to the Chittamatrins the statement in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* "Similarly, the three realms are only mind" means that all phenomena are the nature of mind and that external objects do not exist. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas this interpretation is incorrect.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 296) says:

> Here, moreover, what is the meaning of this sutra? Therefore, there is the [following] explanation. Chandrakirti says:
>
> *The Manifest, the bodhisattva who is approaching,*
> *Realizes that the three existences are mere consciousness.*
> *Having refuted a permanent self being the creator, in order to realize that,*
> *He realizes that the creator is mere mind.* [6.84]
>
> *The bodhisattva*, a sixth grounder, that is, *the Manifest*, his thought [directed] toward the exalted wisdom of an omniscient being, that is, enlightenment, who is *approaching* the sphere of phenomena, is said to *realize that the three existences*, i.e., realms, *are mere consciousness*, that is, mind. Therefore, *having refuted a permanent self being the creator*, *in order to realize* that a conventionality – mere mind – alone is the creator, *he*, the bodhisattva, *realizes that the creator* of the world *is mere mind*.

What is this bodhisattva on the sixth ground approaching? He is approaching the qualities of complete buddhahood. The sixth grounder is called the Manifest because the bodhisattva has attained the surpassing practice of wisdom and is able to meditate on the coarse and subtle aspects of the forward and reverse orders of the twelve links of dependent-arising.

The three higher trainings are the higher training in morality, the higher training of the mind (also called the higher training of meditative stabilization or concentration), and the higher training in wisdom. On the second ground, the bodhisattva attains the surpassing practice of morality, the higher training in morality. On the third ground, he attains the surpassing practice of patience, which is called the higher training of the mind because the mind, due to being well trained, is very stable and remains undisturbed. On the fourth, fifth, and sixth grounds the bodhisattva cultivates the surpassing practice of wisdom and on these grounds respectively gains the wisdom skilled in the coarse and subtle aspects of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, the wisdom skilled in the coarse and subtle aspects of the four noble truths, and the wisdom skilled in the coarse and subtle aspects of the forward and reverse orders of the twelve links of dependent-arising. On the sixth ground the bodhisattva attains the surpassing practice of wisdom.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 296-7) says:

> The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* extensively says:
>
> > [Thus, the bodhisattva] fully reflects upon dependent and related arising in the aspect of their forward order. He thinks: "In that case, the aggregate of suffering, the tree of suffering, only that which is not a creator and a feeler is manifestly established." He thinks this: "Due to strong adherence to a creator, actions come into existence. Wherever a creator does not exist, also actions are not observed to be ultimate." He thinks this: "Similarly, the three realms are only mind. All twelve links of existence revealed, that is, taught, by the Tathagata are also dependent on only mind."

In order to understand how everything comes from the mind the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* explains the twelve links, the first of which is ignorance. When it is said that the creator of the world is the mind,

we can understand this based on our own experience in that whatever we create it originates from the mind.

The sutra says: "Wherever a creator does not exist, also actions are not observed to be ultimate." This means that since a creator does not exist ultimately, actions also do not exist ultimately.

The statement "[Thus, the bodhisattva] fully reflects upon dependent and related arising in the aspect of their forward order" was explained in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. In this text is was said that the meditation on the twelve links in their forward and reverse orders is the main meditation practice of solitary realizers. Meditation on the forward and reverse orders of the twelve links is further divided into meditation on the thoroughly afflicted and meditation on the completely pure:

1. Meditation on the forward order in terms of the thoroughly afflicted is to think: "Due to the condition of ignorance, karmic formations arise; due to the condition of karmic formations, consciousness arises," and so forth.
2. Meditation on the reverse order in terms of the thoroughly afflicted is to think: "Due to what does aging and death arise? It arises from birth. Due to what does birth arise? It arises due to existence" and so forth.
3. Meditation on the forward order in terms of the completely pure is to think: "Due to the cessation of ignorance, karmic formations cease. Due to the cessation of karmic formations, consciousness ceases" and so forth.
4. Meditation on the reverse order in terms of the completely pure is to think: "Due to the cessation of what do aging and death cease? They cease due to the cessation of birth. Due to the cessation of what does birth cease? It ceases due the cessation of existence?" and so forth.

Thus, one should meditate on the twelve links in the forward and reverse orders in relation to both the thoroughly afflicted and the completely pure. There is a story in the teachings on the Stages of the Path about a man who, having become very old, was disrespectfully treated and insulted by his relatives. Due to this bad treatment, he went to a monastery to become a monk but there he was told that he was too old and lacked the roots of virtue necessary to attain liberation and could therefore not be ordained. Upon leaving the monastery sad and discouraged, Shakyamuni Buddha appeared before him and asked him what had happened. The old man explained that he had wanted to take ordination but had not been allowed to do so. However, the Buddha took him back to the monastery and told Maudgalyputra to ordain him. The old man took ordination but once again found himself insulted, this time by the younger monks. One day, when Maudgalyputra was absent from the monastery, the old man became very depressed thinking, "If I live at home I will be insulted by my relatives and if I live in the monastery I will be insulted by the younger monks, it is better if I were to die." He went to the bank of the Ganges and hung up his Dharma robe on a tree but suddenly Maudgalyputra arrived and asked him what he was doing. When the old man said that he wanted to die, Maudgalyputra ordered him to put his robes back on and to catch hold of the corner of his own robes. Maudgalyputra then flew over the ocean with the old man holding on to his robes. In the center of the ocean they landed on a mound that the old man discovered was a pile of bones. Maudgalyputra told the old man that the bones had been his own in previous lives and told him to meditate on the twelve links of dependent-arising. They sat there in meditation and the old man came to realize the forward and reverse orders of the twelve links and the coarse and subtle aspects of the four noble truths. Having gained these realizations, the old man was able to return flying by his own power. Thus, even the old should not be discouraged as it is still possible to gain high realizations.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 297) says:

> This sutra says that only that which is not a creator and a feeler is established and that when the meaning of mind-only is explained it is that the twelve links depend on only mind. Therefore, the term "only" in this sutra does not refute objects; instead it refutes a creator that is other than mind.
>
> The former position [is as follows]. [Asanga's] *Compendium on the Mahayana* says:
>
> > In regard to this, the scriptural authority [is as follows]. The Bhagavan in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* said:
> >
> > > "Similarly, the three realms are only mind."
>
> With respect to inferring mere cognition, the scriptural authority mentioned in the pair, scriptural authority and reasoning, refers to that, [the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]. Also [Vasubandhu's] autocommentary on the *Twenty Stanzas* cites that scriptural authority and says "mind" with the intention of that having concomitance, whereas saying "only" is explained to negate objects.
>
> The refutation like that [presented] above was first made by Bhavaviveka, then it was also made by Chandrakirti.

The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says that a creator, a feeler, and so forth do not exist inherently and that there is no creator other than the mind. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that in the statement "Similarly, the three realms are only mind" the word 'only' does not refute external objects, it just refutes there being a creator that is other than mind.

"The former position" is the Chittamatra position which asserts that the word 'only' means that the three realms are only mind. On this basis, they say that external objects do not exist and that all phenomena are the nature of mind. This is stated similarly in Vasubandhu's autocommentary on the *Twenty Stanzas* which negates external objects.

"The refutation like that [presented] above" refers to the refutation of a creator other than mind; this was first refuted by Bhavaviveka and then later on by Chandrakirti, in that Bhavaviveka lived prior to Chandrakirti.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 297) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-1B Proving that very meaning also by other sutras

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, having thus explained the meaning of the *Sutra* [*of the Ten Grounds*], because other sutras also indicate this very meaning, it is explained:
>
> > *Therefore, in order to increase the awareness of the intelligent,*
> > *In the* Descent into Lanka Sutra, *the omniscient one*
> > *Spoke this nature of vajra speech, destroying the high mountain peaks*
> > *Of the Forders, in order to discern the intention.* [6.85]
>
> To set forth the verse indicated by this "this [nature of vajra speech...]":
>
> > The person, continuum, aggregates, likewise, conditions, particles,
> > the principal, and Ishvara – these creators I explain as mind-only.
>
> This verse is set forth in the *Exalted Descent into Lanka* [*Sutra*, 2].[52]

The refutation of a creator that is other than mind is not only set out in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* but is also set out in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*.

[52] Suzuki, page 70.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 45), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2C1B Other sutras establish the same thing

Therefore, to develop the minds of the intelligent,
The All-Knowing taught in the Descent into Lanka Sutra
This speech-nature vajra, destroying the high mountain peaks
Of the non-Buddhists, in order to sharpen the meaning. [6.85]

Seeing that, as in their own treatises
The non-Buddhists speak of the person and so on,
These things are not the creators, the Conqueror
Said only mind's the creator of the world. [6.86]

Seeing that these things, the personality and so on, were not the creator, as the Extremists[53] spoke of them in this or that treatise of theirs, the Victorious One taught that the creator of the world is only mind in order to develop the minds of the intelligent, and because in that *Descent into Lanka Sutra* the All-Knowing taught this thunderbolt[54] of the nature of speech which destroys the high mountain peak of the Extremists' evil views:

"The stream of personality,
Aggregates, conditions, and atoms too,
The originator and the lord –
Creators I say are only mind."

in order to sharpen the meaning of the teaching in the *Sutra on the Ten Stages* that there is only mind.

Chandrakirti says: "in order to increase the awareness of the intelligent." The intelligent are the bodhisattvas; the Omniscient One taught this sutra in order to destroy the bad views of the Forders. The various types of Forders posit the creator differently in accordance with their respective tenets. They respectively say it is the "person, continuum, aggregates, likewise, conditions, particles, the principal, and Ishvara." On the other hand, the Buddha taught that the creator of the world is only mind.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

In order to unravel the meaning of this, it is explained:

Just like, in this and that of their treatises,
Those persons and so forth are propounded by the Forders –
Having not seen those as the creator,
The Conqueror taught mind only as the world's creator. [6.86]

Saying, "by the Forders," indicates predominance, that is, persons and so forth are also only imputed [as the creator] by [some] followers of this doctrine. Yet, in one way, they are also not followers of this doctrine because, like the Forders, they do not unmistakenly understand the meaning of the teachings. Therefore, this limited statement only pervades to all.

Among "the person, continuum, aggregates, likewise, conditions, particles, the principal, and Ishvara" some of the lower Buddhist schools also posit them as the creator. For example, one Buddhist school

[53] *mu.stegs*, non-Buddhists

[54] *rdo rje, vajra*

posits the continuum of the person as the creator. But it can be asked: "Which Buddhist school propounds conditions to be the creator of the world? Which one propounds particles and so forth to be the creator of the world?" One needs to study the tenets of the various schools in order to understand this.

The Samkhyas propound the general principal to be the creator of the world, whereas the Vaisheshikas propound Ishvara to be the creator of the world. The Vaisheshikas say that everything arises from the movement of Ishvara's mind. The second chapter of Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* explains this in the context of the three reasons that prove Ishvara to be the creator of the world.

Chandrakirti says: "Saying, 'by the Forders,' indicates predominance, that is, persons and so forth are only imputed [as the creator] also by [some] followers of this doctrine." 'Some followers of this doctrine' refers to those Buddhists who say that the person is the creator of the world or that the continuum of the person is the creator of the world. A discussion of this subject is found in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa' *Great Tenets*.

Wednesday afternoon, 22 November 2000

Those who proclaim this doctrine, that the person and so forth are the creator, are like the Forders. There are Buddhists who are Buddhists in terms of their conduct but not Buddhists in terms of their view. Those who proclaim this doctrine are like the Forders in that they do not correctly understand the meaning of selflessness. For example, the Vatsiputriya Vaibhashikas are Buddhist in terms of their conduct but not in terms of their view because they do not assert the selflessness of persons to be the lack of a self-sufficient substantially existent person. This will be discussed later on in the context of refuting the selflessness of persons.

Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, this limited statement only pervades to all." This is an explanation of the meaning of "the Forders" in this context.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was taught [in the *Precious Garland*, verses 61-62]:
>
> > Ask the worldly ones, the Samkhyas, the Owl Followers along with the Nirgranthas, who propound the person and aggregates, if they propound what has passed beyond existence and non-existence.
> >
> > Therefore, the teaching of the buddhas, explained as "deathless, passed beyond existence and non-existence, profound, an exclusive doctrine," should be known.

The Samkhyas and others propound a self of persons. The Samkhyas (the Enumerators) are so-called because they propound that all objects of knowledge are definite in number as twenty-five. The Owl Followers assert that all objects of knowledge are included in nine categories, whereas the Vaisheshikas assert that all objects of knowledge are included in six categories. The Nigranthas hold some views similar to those of the Buddhist schools. "They propound what has passed beyond existence and non-existence" refers to the extremes of permanence and annihilation.

The Buddha's teachings are "deathless, passed beyond existence and non-existence, profound, an exclusive doctrine." All the non-Buddhist schools assert a self of persons. There are several ways of categorizing these schools, for example, as five or six or eleven groups of logicians propounding a self of persons. All of them assert a permanent and substantially existent person.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Those strongly settling upon the aggregates and so forth are to be cognized as outsiders. "Just as [in this and that of] their [treatises]" means in their own tenets. Therefore, the Forders who assert even the aggregates and so forth as the very creator are finely identified.

Those who, in asserting a permanent self, conceive the aggregates and the self to be different entities are to be known as outsiders. "Just as in this and that of their treatises" (v. 6.86) refers to the tenets of these schools which are set out in their respective treatises. The Forders say that the aggregates and so forth are the creator of the world. They also assert particles to be the creator of the world.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Since this samsara is beginningless, what conception did not arise in it and what will not arise? Like this, even at the very present, among the White Abandoners and so forth, the aggregates and so forth indeed appear to be indicated.

Since cyclic existence is beginningless, we have had many bad conceptions in the past, have many of them now, and will have many of them in the future. "White Abandoners" are a Buddhist sect who say that the aggregates are substantially existent and the creator of the world.

In conclusion, Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> "The Bhagavan, not seeing these – the person and so forth – as the very creator, indicated no more than mind as the creator of the world." is the meaning of the sutra.

The Buddha did not see the person, the aggregates, conditions, particles, the general principal, and Ishvara to be the creator of the world; instead he saw it to be only mind. This is the meaning of the statement in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* that the three realms are only mind; it does not mean that all phenomena are the nature of only mind. The Chittamatrins interpret the sutra in this way because according to them all phenomena arise due to the activation of latencies deposited on a mind-basis-of-all.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 297) says:

> Having explained that the meaning of the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* is that the term 'only' of mind-only (*chittamatra*) refutes other creators, there is [the following] explanation because that very meaning is also indicated by other sutras.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Therefore, in order to develop the awareness of the intelligent,*
> *The Exalted Knower of All in the* Descent into Lanka Sutra
> *Taught this vajra – the nature of speech that destroys the lofty mountains*
> *Of the Forders – in order to discern the intention.* [6.85]
>
> That the term 'only' refutes other creators is the meaning of the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*. *Therefore*, *in order to develop the awareness of the intelligent* who are able to realize suchness, *the Exalted Knower of All in the* Descent into Lanka Sutra *taught this vajra* mentioned below – *the nature of speech that destroys the lofty mountains* of the inferior views in the continua of *the Forders* who assert a self, a general principal, and so forth to be the creator of the world – by teaching it *in order to discern the intention* of stating "mind-only" in other sutras. This vajra [speech] is taught in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* saying:

> The person, continuum, and aggregates,
> Likewise, conditions and particles,
> The principal and Ishvara – these creators
> I explain as only mind.
>
> This means that "The creator of those who propound from the person through Ishvara to be creators is not [any of] them, whereas I propound only mind to be the creator."

Once again it is stated that the term 'only' refutes the creator of the world being other than mind.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the nature of speech that destroys the lofty mountains of the inferior views in the continua of the Forders." This is similar to what is said in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* regarding the twenty wrong views of the transitory collection and so forth. Wrong views, such as the view of the transitory collection, prevent one from leaving cyclic existence like high surrounding mountains that prevent one from climbing upward due to obscuring the light and being very steep and shear preventing one from holding on to anything. If these mountains at least allowed light to pass one could possibly climb them but they are not. In addition, these mountains are covered in dense trees.

"To discern the intention of stating 'mind-only' in other sutras" means "to realize the intention of stating 'mind-only' in other sutras." The vajra speech in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* sets out the various types of creators, whereas the actual intention of this sutra is that Buddha explains mind only to be the creator.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 298) says:

> In order to unravel the meaning of this sutra [there is the following] explanation.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *In accordance with this and that in their own treatises,*
> *The Forders propound them, the person and so forth.*
> *Not seeing them to be a creator,*
> *The Conqueror taught only mind as being the creator of the world.* [6.86]
>
> *In accordance with*, that is, just like, *in this and that* tenet of *their own treatises*, *the Forders propound the person and so forth* – that is, the continuum, the aggregates, and so forth – to be a creator. *Not seeing them to be a creator, the Conqueror taught only mind as being the creator of the world*. Saying "the Forders" in the root text is with the thought that it is mostly them, in that Dharma practitioners, Buddhists, also impute the person, the continuum, and so forth, to alone be creators.

The non-Buddhists make various assertions based on the tenets in their own treatises. "The Forders" refers to various Indian schools that existed prior to the Buddha. Some of these schools, such as the Samkhya, Nigrantha, and Charvaka, are still extant in India even now.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 298) says:

> On the other hand, those who conceive the person and so forth to be creators are also not Dharma practitioners, Buddhists, in that, like the Forders, they do not unmistakenly realize the meaning of Buddha's teachings. Therefore, "the Forders" is a word that pervades them.

"Dharma practitioners, Buddhists" are Buddhists who are Buddhist in conduct but not in view. This is explained in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Tenets*. There are four great seals of the view and four great seals of conduct. The four great seals of the view are:

1. all compounded phenomena are impermanent,
2. all contaminated phenomena are misery,
3. all phenomena are empty and selfless,

4. nirvana is peace.

What do Buddhists consider to be the creator of the world? In general, it is said that actions (karma) are the creator. But what creates actions? The mind creates actions, therefore, the mind is said to be the creator of all. However, among Buddhists there are also those who posit the person, the continuum, the aggregates, and so forth to be the creator of the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 298) says:

> Also [Nagarjuna's] *Precious Garland* (v. 61-62) says:
>
> Ask the worldly who propound the person and aggregates,
> The Samkhyas, the Owl Followers, as well as the Nigranthas,
> Whether they propound
> Having passed beyond existence and non-existence.
>
> Therefore, understand that the ambrosia
> Of the buddhas' teachings,
> Having passed beyond existence and non-existence,
> Is the "profound" teaching, the exclusive Dharma.
>
> Ask those who propound the person and aggregates to be substantially existent and so forth whether they propound free from the two extremes of existence and non-existence; they would not have anything to say about the meaning of that. Therefore, the meaning of the teaching free from the two extremes of existence and non-existence is to be understood as the supreme, exclusive Dharma – that is, as the special Dharma that does not exist in other [systems].

When those who propound the person and aggregates to be substantially existent and so forth are asked whether they propound free from the two extremes of existence and non-existence, they are unable to respond. Being free from the two extremes of existence and non-existence is a special quality of the Dharma that refers to being free from the extreme of permanence and the extreme of annihilation. The extreme of permanence is to think that if phenomena exist they must exist truly, whereas the extreme of annihilation is to think that if phenomena do not exist truly they do not exist at all. The Buddha's teachings are free from these two extremes. Someone who is free from these two extremes and is still able to posit the feasibility of actions and results is a propounder of the middle way.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 299) says:

> Since cyclic existence is beginningless, what wrong conceptions have not arisen in it in the past? Also in the future what will not arise? Like this, even in the present it seems that the White Abandoners and so forth teach that substantially existent aggregates and so forth are creators. In regard to this, also in some texts it says "White Abandoners and so forth" and in the translation of [Jayananda's] *Explanatory Commentary* it says "the fully-ordained monk Kye Sing and so forth," whereas the meaning of this is that they are explained to be Jain monks. 'Abandoner' is a name for a meditator on the concentrations, therefore, they are the Buddhist school called "White Concentration Meditators" who propound substantially existent aggregates to be a creator.

"Abandoner" means a meditator in that it conveys the sense of having abandoned bad conduct of body and speech. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "they are the Buddhist school called "White Concentration Meditators" who propound substantially existent aggregates to be a creator." Thus, "Abandoners" refers to Buddhists who propound substantially existent aggregates. But, who are they? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 299) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-1C The term 'only' proves that the mind is foremost

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thereby, since other creators were refuted just now, in order to finish constructing the meaning, having expressed the term "only" as unable to refute [external] knowable objects, in order to indicate the impossibility to refute external objects also through explaining in another way, it is explained:
>
> *Buddha is ascribed to development in thusness.*
> *Exactly likewise, for mind only being foremost, the world,*
> *Was taught in the Sutra saying "mere mind." Form here*
> *Being refuted, such is not the meaning of the sutra.* [6.87]
>
> Just as one says "buddha" for development in suchness,[55] although the former phrase has been elided, there exists the complete explanation; likewise, one should know "the three realms are mere mind" also regarding mere mind being foremost, having refuted the other being foremost.

That the creator of the world is other than mind is refuted. Thus, the term 'only' does not refute external objects. The rejection of external objects is asserted by the Chittamatrins but refuted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

A buddha (literally, 'awakened-developed' according to the etymology of the Tibetan word *sangs rgyas*) is called 'developed' because his mind is developed with respect to thusness. The syllable *sangs*, awakened, means to have awakened from the sleep of the two obstructions, whereas *rgyas* means to have developed one's mind in thusness. On the other hand, the Sanskrit syllable '*bud*' of the word 'buddha' means 'intellect' or 'intelligence.' The word 'buddha' can also mean 'to comprehend' or 'to hold in mind.' This is an analogy that is set forth in the root text to explain the meaning of mind only.

The refutation of form is not the meaning of the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*; what is refuted here is that there is a creator of the world that is other than mind.

Thursday morning, 23 November 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, forms and so forth are indicated by this [passage] as excluded from being the foremost; their existence itself is not refuted saying "no more than a mind only exists, [external] form is non-existent." The meaning of this sutra is undoubtedly to be accepted according to how we explained it.

The meaning of the sutra is to be accepted as it is explained by the Prasangika Madhyamikas, that is, that the sutra does not refute external objects but only refutes there being a creator that is other than the mind.

---

[55] For 'buddha' we have Skt: *buddha* and Tib: *sangs.rgyas* – for 'developed in suchness' we have Skt: *tathata buddha* or *tathata vibuddha* (hypothetically) and Tib: *de.kho.na.nyi rgyas.pa*.

LTK commentary (page 314): Just as the development of intelligence concerning suchness is explained saying 'awakened-deve1oped,' having elided, i.e., not manifest, the former phrase, 'awakened,' yet the ascription saying 'awakened-developed' exists – exactly likewise, with regard to a mere mind being foremost from among the two, form and mind, having elided the later phrase, being foremost, it should be understood that the world, i.e., the three realms, was taught in the *sutra* saying 'mere mind.'

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> According to your system:
>
> *If, having known these as mind only,*
> *He refuted form itself in that [sutra],*
> *Again in that, why did the Mahatma teach*
> *Mind as produced from confusion and actions?* [6.88]

The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask the Chittamatrins: "If phenomena are only mind and external forms are refuted, why did the Mahatma say that mind is produced from confusion and actions?"

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2C1C The word 'only' establishes that mind is most important
>
> *As in "develops reality," "Buddha" is implied,*
> *So the Sutra, "In the world, only mind"*
> *Teaches only mind's important. To deny*
> *Forms here, such is not the* Sutra's *meaning.* [6.87]

In this teaching "mind only" in the sutras, the meaning of the Sutra is not like a denial of external forms, for just as in "develops awareness of absolute reality" the preceding word "Buddha" is implied and not expressed, so it is taught in the Sutra "In the world, only mind" without expressing the following word "is important" in "Out of form and mind, only mind is important."[56]

> *If he knows that these are only mind,*
> *And is denying form-objects in that,*
> *Then why does the Magnanimous say there again*
> *That the mind is born from* karma *and delusion?* [6.88]

If the Magnanimous One, the Buddha, knowing that these three realms are only inherently existing mind, was denying external form in that *Sutra on the Ten Stages*, then why, again in that *Sutra on the Ten Stages*, would he have taught that mind is produced from delusion[57] and karma? He could not have taught that, for if it existed inherently, that would contradict its being produced from a cause.

The Chittamatrins say that mind is inherently existent and that forms do not exist externally. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if this is so why did the Buddha say that mind is produced from ignorance and actions, given that if mind is inherently existent it cannot be produced from causes and conditions.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In that same *Exalted* [*Sutra of the*] *Ten Grounds,* consciousness is taught as having ignorance and [karmic] formations as its causes, it is not [taught as] inherently existent.

[56] Lama Tsongkhapa interprets the first line in terms of an explanation of the Tibetan word for buddha, which does not work in Sanskrit. It is not clear what Chandrakirti was referring to.

[57] *gti.mug*

The third link, consciousness, has ignorance and karmic formations as its causes, whereas if consciousness were inherently existent it could not have these as its causes.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> "If consciousness were existent by its own self-nature, that [consciousness] might not rely on ignorance or formation, but it does rely on them. Therefore, consciousness is just not naturally existent in any way, because, like falling hair and so forth observed by the possessor of cataracts, it exists when the condition of error is present, and, because, like only that, it does not exist when the condition of error is absent."

Falling hair only appears when there is the condition of cataracts; therefore, without this condition falling hair does not appear.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [Such] was considered. As was taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:[58]
>
> Thus, the bodhisattva fully reflects upon dependent arising in the aspect of the order of arisal. He considers this:
>
> 1. Not knowing the truths is ignorance with respect to the ultimate.

Ignorance is not knowing the correct meaning.

> 2. The maturations of actions produced by ignorance are [karmic] formations.

Due to ignorance, one creates actions.

> 3. The initial mind dependent on formation is consciousness.

Once an action has been created it is deposited on the consciousness, the third link. This particular consciousness is the consciousness at the time of the cause.

> 4. The four aggregates that take rebirth along with consciousness are name and form.

"Along with consciousness" refers to the consciousness at the time of the result. In the link of name and form, 'name' is the last four aggregates (the feeling aggregate, discrimination aggregate, compositional factors aggregate, and consciousness aggregate), whereas 'form' is the first of the five aggregates, the form aggregate.

> 5. The full development of name and form is the six entrances.

On the basis of establishing the locations of the sense powers, the organs, there arise the six entrances, or six spheres.

[58] See Rahder's translation, first passage from the end of section C through section D, pages 188-189; and the second passage, section G.

> 6. The contamination due to the meeting of the three – sense faculty, object, and consciousness – is contact.
> 7. Produced along with contact is feeling.
> 8. Clinging to feeling is craving.

Due to clinging to feeling, craving arises.

> 9. Full development of craving is grasping.
> 10. The contaminated action arisen from grasping is becoming.
> 11. The action's [effect] of similar cause is birth, the arisal of the aggregates.

Taking rebirth means to appropriate the aggregates of the next life.

> 12. The full maturation of the aggregates is aging. The destruction of the aged aggregates is death.

The full maturation of the aggregates does not necessarily imply *old* age. Aging is the changing of the fully ripened aggregates; thus, the term 'aging' does not refer to the aging renowned in the world, but implies the changing of the aggregates even in the mother's womb.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 118) says:

> At the time of death and separation, due to being demented and together with clinging, the tormented mind is sorrowful. Delirious expression arisen from sorrow is the tittering of lamentation. The falling into decay of the five faculties is suffering. The falling into decay of mental views is mental unhappiness. Much suffering and mental unhappiness arising is panic. Thus, the aggregate of suffering, the tree of suffering, lacking agent and feeler, this [alone] will be manifestly established.
>
> [He considers this: "Due to strongly settling upon the agent, actions come into existence. Where the agent is non-existent, there the action is also not ultimately observed."
>
> He considers this: "Like this, these three realms are mere mind; all the twelve links of existence that the Tathagata differentiated and spoke of are also dependent on solely the mind."][59]

In sutra it is said that at the time of death there is mental unhappiness, lamentation, sorrow, wailing, and so forth; in short, there is a great heap of suffering at this time.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There,
> 1) Ignorance is a participant[60] in two actions – fully confusing sentient beings regarding observed objects and also providing the cause that actualizes formation.
> 2) Formations are also participants in two actions – producing the future maturation and also providing the cause that actualizes consciousness.

[59] Partially quoted earlier after verse 6.84.

[60] Skt: *pratyupasthana*. Tib: *nye.bar gbas.ba*

> 3) Consciousness is also a participant in two actions – producing the joining of boundaries of existence (i.e., producing rebirth) and also providing the cause that actualizes name and form.
> 4) Name and form are also participants in two actions – producing mutual support and also providing the cause that actualizes the six entrances.
> 5) The six entrances are also participants in two actions – showing to differentiate their own object and also providing the cause that actualizes contact.
> 6) Contact is also a participant in two actions – producing contact with the observed object and also providing the cause that actualizes feeling.
> 7) Feeling is also a participant in two actions – experiencing the attractive, unattractive, and what is freed from both and also providing the cause that actualizes craving.
> 8) Craving is also a participant in two actions – always producing desire for things that are desirable and also providing the cause that actualizes grasping.
> 9) Grasping is also a participant in two actions – as above [producing bondage due to the fully deluded] and also providing the cause that actualizes becoming.
> 10) Becoming is also a participant in two actions – producing the presence of another continuity of becoming and also providing the cause that actualizes rebirth.
> 11) Birth is also a participant in two actions – as above[61] and also providing the cause that actualizes old age.
> 12) Old age is also a participant in two actions – producing complete transformation of the senses and also providing the cause that actualizes the meeting with death.
> As long as there is death, it also is a participant in two actions – producing annihilation of formation and also providing the cause of not cutting the continuity of not fully knowing.

Each of the twelve links participates or abides in two actions. What is posited as the ignorance that is the first link? Is the ignorance that is the first of the twelve links the ignorance that is a conception of a self of persons or the ignorance that is a conception of a self of phenomena? Ignorance, in general, is of two types:
(i) ignorance which is an obscuration with respect to causes and results and
(ii) ignorance which is an obscuration with respect to suchness.
Is the ignorance that is the first link, the ignorance which is an obscuration with respect to causes and results or the ignorance which is an obscuration with respect to suchness?
Student: It is the ignorance which is an obscuration with respect to suchness.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why is it not the ignorance which is an obscuration with respect to causes and results?
Student: Because that ignorance is not the root of cyclic existence, it is responsible for rebirth in the lower realms.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is the ignorance which is an obscuration with respect to causes and results non-virtuous? The ignorance that is the root of cyclic existence is necessarily unspecified. Is the ignorance which is an obscuration with respect to causes and results just an unknowing? If it is interpreted as unknowing, then there are many such ignorances since beginningless time. Here 'unknowing' means to not know the result of virtuous actions and the result of non-virtuous actions. This ignorance is obscured with respect to happiness arising from virtue and suffering arising from non-virtue.

In short, it is correct that the ignorance which is an obscuration with respect to causes and results is the cause of rebirth in the lower realms.

According to the lower schools the first of the twelve links, ignorance, is the ignorance that is a conception of a self of persons. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas this discussion is more

[61] Rahder, reading the Sanskrit, has 'It makes rising up (emergence) of aggregates,' i.e., 'producing emergence of the aggregates.'

complicated. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that the first link, ignorance, is the conception of a self of persons. They say that the conception of a self of phenomena is not the first link because it is not beginningless ignorance, the root of cyclic existence. This is because are some who have left cyclic existence but still have a conception of a self of phenomena, for example, the foe destroyers of the hearer and solitary realizer vehicles. Thus, the ignorance that is the root of cyclic existence can only be the ignorance that is the conception of a self of persons. However, there is much debate about this. Is the conception of the true existence of the person ignorance? If someone says that it is one asks: "Is it a mental factor?" If someone says that it is not, one says: "It must be a mental factor because it is one of the six root afflictions included in the fifty-one mental factors."

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas it would seem that a conception of true existence is not pervaded by being a mental factor. Since ignorance is the opposite of the knowledge that is the exalted wisdom knowing reality, they are a contradictory pair.

Karmic formations are projecting actions. A karmic formation is defined as: the mental factor intention that belongs to its respective cycle and functions to project a future rebirth.

Is the third link, consciousness, the consciousness upon which the latencies have just been deposited and that belongs to that same cycle? If someone says that it is, one says: "Is it necessary to posit a consciousness upon which karmic formations are posited?"

Thursday afternoon, 23 November 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> By such statements and so forth up to the aforesaid, consciousness is indicated as having ignorance and formation as its cause. Thus, since the condition of error exists to some extent, it is indeed made clear that consciousness exists, yet if it is asked how that [consciousness] also becomes non-existent due to that [cause] being non-existent, it is extensively taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:[62]
>
> > "Due to ceasing ignorance, formations are ceased" [means] due to the non-existence of the condition – ignorance – formations are thoroughly pacified and without support. "Due to ceasing formation, consciousness ceases" [means] due to the non-existence of the condition – formation – consciousness is thoroughly pacified and without support...

When the previous link ceases, the later link ceases up to when birth ceases, aging and death ceases. How does the link of ignorance cease? It is ceased by meditating on selflessness. [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas* say: "The beginning of cyclic existence has no limit, but the end has a limit." In other words, cyclic existence is without beginning but has an end. On the other hand, cyclic existence in general is said to be without a beginning and without an end, however, in the case of a particular individual, although cyclic existence is without a beginning, it does have an end because it is brought to an end through realizing selflessness. Such a person extinguishes the root of cyclic existence. Thus, when ignorance is abandoned the root of cyclic existence is eradicated.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Having said that, it is extensively taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:[63]

[62] See Rahder's translation, section H, page 190, last paragraph.

[63] See Rahder's translation, section O, page 193, line 2.

> He considers this: "Through gathering, the compounded arises. Through separation, the compounded does not arise. Through collection, the compounded arises. Through non-collection, it does not arise. Hence, I, having understood that this is so, that the compounded bring about the fault of many shortcomings, shall cut the continuity of this gathering and this collection and, in order to bring sentient beings to fruition, yet shall not attain utter pacification of formations."
>
> O children of the Conqueror, when he thus individually investigates what is subject to formation as bringing about the fault of many shortcomings and as without entitiness, unproduced and unceased, …

Due to karmic formations many shortcomings arise. On the other hand, through realizing that karmic formations are without the entity of being inherently existent, are not produced inherently, and do not cease inherently, these shortcomings are overcome.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, having thus seen the passage taught in that very [*Sutra on the Ten Grounds*], who with a mind would conceive consciousness to be substantially existent? That which is fully conceived of will be merely produced by view.

When the meaning of the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* is realized, one does not conceive consciousness to be substantially existent. On the other hand, when the consciousness is conceived to be truly existent this is due to view.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, teaching [the three realms] as mere mind is in order to fully clarify the fact that no more than a mere mind is foremost. This passage clarifies the fact that form does not exist [as foremost], not [that it is non-existent] in all ways.

When the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says 'only mind' it is in terms of mind being foremost, it is not in order to negate the existence of external objects. In this way the Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Chittamatrins that external objects do exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to indicate that foremost nature of mind, [the root text] explains:
>
> *By mind itself, the world of sentient beings and*
> *The extreme variety of the vessel world are formed.*
> *Migrators without exception are taught as produced from actions.*
> *Having rejected mind, action also does not exist.* [6.89]

The world of sentient beings and the world of the environment arise from the mind. How do they arise from mind? They arise from mind in the sense that due to mind sentient beings create actions, from which they and the environmental world arise.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

The mind itself has created all the variety
Of the world of beings and the vessel world.
It is said every sentient being is born from karma.
If mind is rejected, karma *too cannot exist.* [6.89]

It should be understood that, for the creator of the world, mind is the most important; for just mind built up and produced all the variety of the world of sentient beings and the vessel world, and it is taught that every samsaric being was born from karma; and when mind is rejected, karma too does not exist.

Form may exist, but if it does, it has
No creator which is like the mind.
Therefore, a creator other than the mind
Is refuted; forms are not denied. [6.90]

The teaching that these three realms are only mind refutes a creator other than the mind, but does not deny external forms; for if there is form, still there is no creator like the mind.

The contents of the vessel are sentient beings, whereas the vessel world is the environment. If it has a mind it is not pervaded by being a sentient being because there are two types of possessors of mind: ordinary beings and buddhas. A sentient being is defined as: a person who is polluted by the faults of afflictions and actions. One who is free from such pollution is a buddha.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, the world of sentient beings is the acquisition of one's own properties due to the sentient being's own karma and delusion. The vessel world is produced from the common karma of only those sentient beings – [from] the wind mandala and so forth [until] the finality of the celestial mansion of Akanishta.

Mountains, valleys, buildings, and so forth are constructed upon the formation of the wind mandala. In fact, the wind mandala is the basis of the world system up to the seventeenth level of the form realm, Akanishta. It is not the basis of the formless realm since this realm is without forms such as tables, houses, clothes, and so forth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says::

> There, that which is varied – such as the eyes of a peacock's feathers and so forth – are produced from the uncommon karma of only the peacock and so forth.

A peacock, due to its own uncommon actions in the past, has feathers of a particular color. Chandrakirti gives the example of a peacock because the Charvakas, in order to establish that there are phenomena that arise without a cause, give the example of the colors of a peacock's feathers. According to the Charvakas there is production without causes, this being illustrated by the colors of a peacock's feathers, the sharpness of thorns, and so forth. They say that because there is no one who paints the colors of a peacock's feathers, no one who sharpens thorns, and so forth, they arise without causes.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Varieties such as the lotus and so forth are produced from the common karma of all sentient beings. Others also should be understood similarly.

The blossoming of flowers is due to the collective or common karma of sentient beings.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As taught:[64]
>
> > By the power of sentient being's karma, the black
> > mountain is produced at the proper time. For example:
> > like hell beings [and] high status; in the world,
> > weapons and the precious tree.

Due to the power of sentient beings' karma, there arise weapons and so forth in the hell realm and precious trees and so forth in the god realms. The *Treasury of Knowledge* explains that in the northern direction above Bodhgaya there are nine mountain ranges, the last of which is a range of black mountains. In front of these mountain there is a lake, below which are located the hell realms. Due to karma, hell beings are tormented by weapons and so forth. In the world of high status, that of gods and human beings, the experience is different in that here there are precious objects and so forth. Also in the human realm there are rich people who have large houses, expensive jewelry, and so forth. All this is due to the respective actions created by each individual in the past. These uncommon actions ripen only upon the particular individual who created them, not upon anyone else.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Hence, thereby sentient beings without exception are produced from karma; and karma also is dependent on mind because karma is collected only together with mind, because when mind is non-existent, karma is non-existent.

Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* sets out two types of actions: intended actions (*sam pa'i las*) and actions of intention (*sems pa'i las*). Intended actions are actions created by body and speech motivated by the action of intention. Intention is one of the five omnipresent mental factors; it itself is mental action. When intention, the mental factor, moves toward an object, the result is actions of body and speech. What is the entity of intention? It is that which directs the mind to an object. When the mind is directed to an object, there follow actions of body, such as beating someone, and of speech. These two types of actions are taught in sutra.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says::

> Therefore, since mind itself is the principal cause for thorough engagement in migration – something else is not – a mere mind is posited as principal in the sutra, form is not.

Only the mind is posited as the main cause, form is not the main cause.

[64] Source not identified.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Why?
>
> *Even though form exists, in that,*
> *A creator like the mind does not exist.* [6.90ab]
>
> It is considered that "form is matter."
>
> *Hence, a creator other than mind*
> *Is averted; form is not refuted.* [6.90cd]

The existence of a creator that is other than mind is refuted, whereas forms that are external objects are not refuted.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says::

> In this matter, some (the Samkhyas, etc.) assert the principal[65] and so forth as the very creator, some (the Buddhists) assert the mind, yet, it is indisputable that form is not the very creator.

This means that although there is debate as to whether the general principal or the mind is the creator of the world, there is no debate about form not being the creator of the world. However, with respect to this one can ask: "What about those who say that particles are the creator of the world?" This question is based on the previous citation from the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* which says that particles are asserted to be the creator.

Those who assert the general principal to be the creator of the world are the Samkhyas. What is the general principal? It is an unclear cause on the occasion of an equilibrium of the three qualities: activity, lightness, and darkness. What are these three qualities? Some say that activity is attachment, lightness is hatred, and darkness is ignorance. It is said that if a Samkhya gives up his views and enters the Buddhist path, he will immediately become a Prasangika Madhyamika due to the similarity of their tenets.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, in order to exclude only the principal and so forth, imagined[66] [by some] as the very creator [but] without its characteristics, a mere mind that is seen as capable of being the very creator is expressed as the creator. Then, having excluded the principal and so forth to be the very creator, it is proper to say that the object that is the source of the dispute is suppressed. It is as if, having expelled one rival from among two kings who wish to rule a single country, one's country is acquired and the ordinary beings are not harmed because they are indispensable for both. Likewise, here too, form is not permanently harmed because it is indispensable to both. Hence, it should definitely be said that "Form is only existent."

The example given here is of two kings who wish to rule a single country. This, in present day terms, is like George Bush and Al Gore who both wish to be the president of the USA! In the end, one will win and one will lose. When such rivals argue they cannot harm the ordinary beings, otherwise they will definitely lose. Ordinary beings are indispensable to both rivals in that the king needs the support

[65] Skt: *pradhana*; Tib: *gtso.bo*.

[66] Tib: dogs.par.byas

of his subjects. Similarly, form is not harmed in that it is necessary for both the Chittamatrins and the Prasangika Madhyamikas. For example, the Chittamatrins are not formless, but have an aggregate of form. Therefore, form is necessary for both schools. In short, external forms exist, they are not to be refuted.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 299) says:

> In that case, since a creator other than the mind has been refuted for the time being, having said that the term 'only' is unable to refute external objects of knowledge, in order to complete the meaning of the term 'only' there is [the following] explanation for the purpose of showing that, other than the explanation that mind is foremost, other types [of explanation] that differ from that way of explaining cannot refute external objects.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Just as 'awakened-developed' is said regarding one developed with respect to thusness,*
> *Likewise, only mind being foremost,*
> *The world is taught in sutra saying "mind only."*
> *That here forms are refuted is not the meaning of the sutra.* [6.87]
>
> *Just as* when 'awakened-developed' (Tibetan, *sangs rgyas*; Sanskrit, buddha) is expressed *regarding* one whose awareness is *developed* (*rgyas*) *with respect to thusness*, '*awakened-developed*' (*sangs rgyas*) *is said* without evidencing the first word 'awakened' (*sangs*); *likewise*, it should be understood that *in sutra the world* – that is, the three realms – *is taught saying "mind only"* in terms of *only mind* (*sems tsam*) *being foremost* amongst the two, form and mind, without evidencing the latter word 'foremost.' Therefore, saying 'mind only' *here* eliminates forms and so forth as being foremost in establishing the three realms. The explanation that mind-only alone is inherently existent, whereas *forms are refuted* saying "They are non-existent," *is not the meaning of the sutra*. The meaning of sutra is to be unquestionably asserted as explained by us above.

This discussion is based on the statement in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* "The three realms are only mind." Although the world 'foremost' is not evidenced here, the meaning is that only mind is foremost. In other words, in establishing the three realms the foremost is only mind; form is not the foremost. This is the meaning of this statement in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*; it does not mean that mind is inherently existent and that external forms do not exist. The latter is how the Chittamatrins explain this statement in the sutra, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is not a correct interpretation of the sutra. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "The meaning of sutra is to be unquestionably asserted as explained by us above." Their explanation is that:

- mind is the foremost in terms of being the creator of the three realms and
- form is not refuted to be externally existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 300) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *If having understood them to be "only mind,"*
> *He refuted forms in that,*
> *Why would the Great Being once again say in that*
> *That mind is produced from confusion and actions?* [6.88]
>
> According to your system, *if having understood them* – the three realms – *to be "only* inherently existent *mind*," *he refuted* external *forms in that* Sutra on the Ten Grounds, *how would* it have been suitable for *the Great Being*, the Buddha, *to once again say in that* Sutra on the Ten Grounds *that mind*, consciousness, *is produced from* the two – *confusion* (i.e., ignorance) and *actions* (i.e., karmic formations) – saying "Due to the condition of ignorance, karmic formations; due to the condition of karmic formations, consciousness"? It would not have been suitable.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that way in which the Chittamatrins explain the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*, that the three realms are inherently existent mind, contradicts the Buddha's teaching on the twelve links which says that "Due to the condition of ignorance, karmic formations; due to the condition of karmic formations, consciousness."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 300) says:

> In that very *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* it says that consciousness is the result of ignorance and karmic formations, it does not say that it is established by way of its own character.

The twelve links meet back to the root, ignorance.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 300) says:

> In addition to saying that it is a dependent-arising, if it were also said to be established by way of its own character that would be nothing more than mistaken talk. Since in our system it cannot be asserted to be both [a dependent-arising and established by way of its own character], this should be understood to have been asserted [by Buddha] in the perspective of others in order to guide other trainees.

For the purpose of guiding particular trainees, the Buddha taught that phenomena exist inherently. This is why Lama Tsongkhapa says "this should be understood to have been asserted [by Buddha] in the perspective of others in order to guide other trainees." These trainees are the lower schools, the Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, and Chittamatra.

Friday morning, 24 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 300) says:

> Since being both [a dependent-arising and established by way of its own character] is not acceptable in our system, if consciousness were established by way of its own nature that consciousness would not depend on confusion or karmic formations. On the other hand, since it does depend [on them], it is not established by way of its own nature. For that reason, in all ways consciousness is just not inherently existent. One should think: "This is because [consciousness] is like the falling hair and so forth observed by those with cataracts which exists when the conditions for error exist, whereas, because it is like that, it does not exist when the conditions for error do not exist."

Being both a dependent-arising and established by way of its own character is not acceptable; it can only be one or the other. However, consciousness that is established by way of its own character is not acceptable because it arises in dependence on ignorance and karmic formations. Because consciousness is dependent on other, inherently existent consciousness is impossible in all ways. To illustrate this there is the example of falling hair which appears when there is the condition of cataracts and does not appear when there are no cataracts. Thus, the appearance of falling hair appears due to the condition of cataracts, it does not appear from its own side. For example, none of us see a white conch as yellow because we do not have the condition of jaundice. Another example is when we are in a moving car we see objects outside as if it were them that was moving, but when we stop the car we not longer have the appearance of houses, trees, and so forth as moving because the condition for that appearance ceases. Due to the moving car there is the mistaken appearance of moving houses and so forth. What is the condition for this mistaken appearance? This is taught in *Awarenesses and Knowers* in the context of the seven facsimiles of direct perceivers.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 300-1) says:

> "When the condition for error, ignorance, exists, consciousness exists" is indicated by the forward order of dependent-relation, whereas "When ignorance does not exist, consciousness is averted" is indicated by the reverse order.

"When the condition for error, ignorance, exists, consciousness exists" shows the forward order of the twelve links of dependent-arising. This is that when there is ignorance, karmic formations exist; when karmic formations exist, consciousness exists, and so forth. "When ignorance does not exist, consciousness is averted" is said to indicate the reverse order of the twelve links, but, in general, the presentation of the reverse order is somewhat different. Saying "When ignorance does not exist, consciousness is averted" is actually a type of forward order that is set out in terms of if the former does not exist the later does not exist. Perhaps this could more accurately be said to be the opposite side rather than the reverse order.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 301) says:

> At the end [of indicating this, the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*] extensively says:
>
> > [Children of the Conqueror,] when he thus individually investigates what is subject to formation as bringing about the fault of many shortcomings and as without entitiness, unproduced, and unceased...

Due to the creation of karmic formations there are many shortcomings. However, these karmic formations are without entity, unproduced, and unceased. In fact, all twelve links lack an inherently existent entity, are not produced inherently, and do not cease inherently. This is also mentioned in the Perfection of Wisdom sutras saying: "All phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 301) says:

> Therefore, having thus seen the passages taught in that very [*Sutra on the Ten Grounds*], who possessing a mind would conceive consciousness as substantially existent? It would not be [conceived as such], but, in the case that it were, it is [conceived as such] by tenets that conceive the true existence of inner [things].

Based on these passages in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* who would conceive a substantially existent consciousness? In short, consciousness is not substantially existent. However, if someone says that it is substantially existent, this would be due to tenets. In the autocommentary Chandrakirti says that this would be due to view, whereas Lama Tsongkhapa says that "it is [conceived as such] by tenets that conceive the true existence of inner [things]."

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: According to a transcript (#26), the self-cognizer experiencing the conception apprehending form has two different appearances: 1) the conception apprehending form and 2) the appearing object of the conception apprehending form. Is this correct?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is a passage regarding this in Gyeltsab Je's *Illuminating the Path to Liberation*. In this text it says that a self-cognizer experiencing the conception apprehending form has these two appearances. This self-cognizer has the appearance of the conception apprehending form

and also realizes the appearing object of that conception. Gyeltsab Je's *Illuminating the Path to Liberation* (Tibetan text page 107) says:

> One who asserts that this scripture teaches that in our system the apprehended object of an ascertaining consciousness is distinguished by being an ascertained object has not understood this presentation because that the apprehended object of conception is the object of comprehension of a direct self-cognizer is repeatedly taught by logicians.

Student: Does this apply equally to non-conceptual consciousnesses?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It does not. The apprehended object of an eye consciousness apprehending form is form. *Awarenesses and Knowers*, which is according to the Sautrantika system, says that the apprehended object and appearing object of a direct perceiver are mutually inclusive. Also the apprehended object of conception, the appearing object of conception, and permanent phenomena are mutually inclusive. The object of the mode of apprehension and the referent object of a conception are also mutually inclusive. These two objects are different from the appearing object. On the other hand, for a direct perceiver the appearing object and object of the mode of apprehension are mutually inclusive. If it appears to a direct perceiver it is not pervaded by being an appearing object; for example, an eye consciousness apprehending form has the appearance of product, impermanence, and the specific characteristics of form. According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system a direct perceiver can be a mistaken consciousness, whereas according to the lower schools this is not possible.
Student: Does the self-cognizer experiencing the eye consciousness apprehending form have two appearances?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It does not because the appearing object of an the eye consciousness apprehending form is form, whereas that form does not appear to a self-cognizer experiencing the eye consciousness apprehending form.

Student: According to Chittamatra, is the self-cognizer apprehending an eye consciousness the eye consciousness itself, a mental consciousness, or neither?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is neither. A self-cognizer is not an eye consciousness. Is it a sense consciousness or a mental consciousness? This is not clearly stated in any text but perhaps in response we can say that it is a mental consciousness, although there is debate about this. On the other hand, if we say that it is neither a sense consciousness or mental consciousness there is no further debate.

Student: A self-cognizer is said to experience that which is clear and knowing. How is that statement to be interpreted? Is it the self-cognizer that is clear and knowing or is it the consciousness that it observes which is clear and knowing?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: For a self-cognizer there is no dualistic appearance because dualistic appearance has vanished for it. The only function of a self-cognizer is that of an experiencer. However, this explanation is only valid for those who accept self-cognizers. A self-cognizer experiencing an eye consciousness apprehending blue does not have the appearance of blue, it has the appearance of that which is clear and knowing. In the Chittamatra school the self-cognizer, the experiencer, and the object experienced, the consciousness, are inseparable due to merely being the factor of experience. According to those who assert self-cognizers, consciousness alone is the object experienced by a self-cognizer; forms and so forth do not appear to it. However, when this is debated it is said: "Is there a phenomenon that is no realized by a self-cognizer? If there is, what is it? Is there a phenomenon that is not realized by a direct valid cognizer? Is there a self-cognizer that experiences omniscient mind? If someone says there is no such self-cognizer, one asks: "Is there not a direct valid self-cognizer in the continuum of a buddha superior?" If someone says that if it is a consciousness in the continuum of a buddha superior it is necessarily omniscient mind, then it follows that a direct valid self-cognizer is omniscient mind. If someone says that a consciousness in the continuum of a buddha superior it is not necessarily omniscient mind, then there would be more discussion. One text says that there is no

direct self-cognizer that is a sense consciousness, but that there is a direct self-cognizer that is a mental consciousness. I do not remember where I read this, but I thought that it was a strange statement.

Student: With regard to the river that is the substantial cause of a hungry ghost seeing pus and blood and a human being seeing water – is that river water, water element, both, or neither? Are water and the water element the same?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If water is poured into a cup in front of three beings, a hungry ghost sees it as pus and blood, a god as nectar, and a human being as water. The hungry ghost sees it as pus and blood because there is a particle in the water that functions as the substantial cause for a hungry ghost to see it as pus and blood and because the hungry ghost has the karma which is the cooperative condition to see it as pus and blood.

There is a difference between water and water element. If it is water element it is not pervaded by being water, for example, no one would say that there is water in fire yet there is the water element in fire.
Student: Is that particle that acts as a substantial cause water or the water element?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Perhaps we can say that it is the water element.

Student: Would Geshe-la please discuss introspection with regard to the following:
a. Introspection is sometimes described as a "corner" of the mind observing the rest of the mind. Is introspection the same entity as the mental consciousness meditating on an object? If it is, is it in the retinue of that main mind even though its observed object is not the same as that of the main mind?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Introspection is not included in the eleven virtuous mental factors. Perhaps it can be said that it is a part of the wisdom that is one of the five omnipresent mental factors. In the *Compendium of Knowledge* fifty-one mental factors are listed, whereas in the *Treasury of Knowledge* there are forty-six: the ten many levels of mind, the ten many levels of virtue, and so forth. Asanga's Compendiums included among his Five Treatises on the Levels say that there are seven mental factors, of which introspection is one. In another text, twenty-two mental factors are mentioned. When these are added together there are more than seventy mental factors.

Introspection is defined as that which guards the mind. Whatever introspection is in the retinue of a main mind shares the five similarities with it. Therefore, the main mind and the introspection in its retinue should have a common observed object. If a mental factor observes a particular object, is that object also observed by the main mind? This would seem to be the main point of the question here in that when introspection observes the mind it would seem that the mind is the observed object of that introspection. The main mind and the mental factor introspection in its retinue have the same observed object. They also have the same aspect, the same substance, the same base (the main mind and the mental factor have the same sense power which is their empowering condition), and the same time. They have the same observed object but if the mental factor in its retinue observes an object, it is not necessary that the main mind also observes it. For example, when one meditates on calm abiding taking oneself in the aspect of Chenrezig as the object, one focuses single-pointedly on this object. What does the main mind observe? It observes oneself in the aspect of the deity Chenrezig. What does the introspection in its retinue observe? It should also observe oneself in the aspect of the deity Chenrezig. This introspection functions to examine whether or not the mind remains on the aspect of the deity Chenrezig, therefore, it does share the same object. If the mind wanders, it has to be brought back to its object once again. It is said that it can happen that when someone meditates instead of having the appearance of the guru-deity he has the appearance of his beloved! This is because the mind has moved from its observed object.
Student: Does the introspection observe the mind having the aspect of the deity Chenrezig?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The main mind has the appearance of the aspect of Chenrezig, as does the introspection in its retinue. But, in addition, the introspection examines whether or not the mind remains on that object.
Student: Therefore, introspection observes the mind having the aspect of the deity Chenrezig?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: One can say that.

b. Does introspection observe the main mind simultaneously or does it necessarily observe a previous moment of consciousness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The main mind and the introspection in its retinue observe an object simultaneously. There is a discussion about whether introspection is always necessary because for someone who has attained calm abiding it is not necessary. If one has calm abiding, the mind remains on the object, therefore, introspection is not necessary. The use of introspection is necessary only when the mind is not stable.

Gyeltsab Je's *Illuminating the Path to Liberation* (Tibetan text page 28) says:

> Since the meaning of the sutra that says "I and those like me are the judge of the person; the person is not the judge of the person in that he would degenerate," means that, not seeing reasons, one should not in the least say "This person has those faults and does not have even the slightest good quality" and "It does not exist other than this and that." Not knowing who is a holy being and criticizing holy beings, one creates the perfect cause of the unbearable lower realms. Since this is thoroughly taught in sutra and tantra, like a firepit covered with dust, in this place the intelligent should be extremely careful.

This means that in daily life we should be careful to avoid criticizing others.

END

Monday afternoon, 27 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 301) says:

> [Nagarjuna's] *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* also says:
>
> That the world has ignorance as its condition
> Was taught by the complete buddha.
> Therefore, why is it not admissible to say
> "This world is conception"?
>
> When ignorance ceases
> What ceases?
> When it is superimposed through unknowing,
> How would it not become clear?.
>
> This means that if there were establishment by way of its own entity, it would be established as the mode of abidance. Then, when averting errors this should become clear; it would not be the opposite.

The Buddha taught that the world, cyclic existence, arises from the condition that is ignorance. Ignorance is, specifically, the causal condition for cyclic existence. From among the twelve links, the first, ignorance, is the root of cyclic existence in that due to ignorance one wanders in cyclic existence. Cyclic existence is the joining of one birth to another birth under the control of actions and afflictions. The world, literally, the perishable base (*'jigs rten*), refers in particular to the aggregates that are produced by actions and afflictions. In short, we are a base that is perishing momentarily.

Nagarjuna then says: "Therefore, why is it not admissible to say 'This world is conception'?" The world, the perishable base, is fabricated by conception. When ignorance ceases, what ceases? One who understands the twelve links would be able to respond saying "When ignorance ceases, karmic formations which are projecting actions cease." Due to ignorance there is unknowing, due to which there is superimposition. On the other hand, if there were establishment by way of its own character, it would be established as the mode of abidance. Then, when errors are averted, this should become clear, but it does not.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 301) says:

> The explanation in order to indicate that mind is foremost is [as follows].
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *The mind itself creates the world of sentient beings and*
> *The extremely varied world of the environment.*
> *Migrating beings without exception are said to be produced from actions.*
> *Having given up mind, actions also do not exist.* [6.89]
>
> *The world of sentient beings* is to acquire one's own existence (*dngos po*) by means of:
> 1. actions that are accumulated by their own minds and
> 2. afflictions.
>
> On the other hand, *the extremely varied world of the environment* (literally, the vessel) – from the wind mandala to the limits of the environment of Akanishta – *is created*, that is, produced, by common actions accumulated *by the very minds* of just those sentient beings. The varieties, such as the eye of a peacock's feather and so forth, are produced by the uncommon actions of just those sentient beings. The petals and various colors of a lotus and so forth are produced by the common actions of sentient beings. Other [things] should be understood similarly.

"Mind is foremost" means that the mind is the main creator in the sense that it creates both the environmental world and the inhabitants, sentient beings. Here the world *dngos po*, usually translated

as 'things' and sometimes translated as 'property,' means that the inhabitants, sentient beings themselves, acquire their own existence by the actions they created in the past.

"The extremely varied world of the environment" is produced by common actions of sentient beings. This refers to the houses, villages, the places we share with other people, and so forth that are all due to common actions created in the past. The environmental world consists of the wind mandala, the basis of the entire world system, up through Akanishta, the highest level of the form realm. The entire world system through the form realm arises from common actions, whereas in the formless realm, because there is no form, there is no environmental world.

On the other hand, the colors of the eyes of a peacock's feathers come from uncommon actions of individual sentient beings. "And so forth" includes the spots on a leopard's coat and so forth. For example, each one of the fifty people here has a particular complexion and shape, particular eyes, ears, and so forth. Although eyes, ears, and so forth are common to each, their specifics are different. All that is specific to a particular individual is due to his or her respective actions in the past.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The petals and various colors of a lotus and so forth are produced by the common actions of sentient beings." Such things are environmental results.

Thus, there are two kinds of results:

1. the results of common actions that are experienced by many beings and
2. the results of uncommon actions that are experienced by a specific individual.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 301-2) says:

> [Sutra] says:
>
> By the power of sentient being's actions,
> The black mountains are produced at that time; for example,
> The weapons and precious trees
> In the worlds of hell sentient beings and high status.

Gendun Drup's commentary on Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* (translated by David Patt) says:

> At the center of Jambudvipa is the vajra-throne in India. Going north from there beyond the nine black mountains, are the glorious Snow Mountains. North of that is the Mountain of Intoxicating Fragrance. Just this side of ten yojanas from there is the lake where the naga King Anavatapta lives, called Lake Anavatapta, full of water possessing the eight qualities, covered with blue utpalas, lotus, and red kumuda flowers, and so forth. The lake is square and the width is 50 yojanas on each side, or 200 around the edge.

In short, to the northern direction of the stupa of Bodhgaya there are nine mountains, the last of which are the black mountains. In front of them is a lake, below which are the hells. In the hell realm there are weapons that cut and kill, whereas in the worlds of high status there are precious trees. The precious tree, a wish-fulfilling tree, is the most precious object found in Jambudvipa (our world).

The main hells are the eight hot and eight cold hells, but there are also neighboring hells which surround the hot hells. In addition, there are occasional hells which exist even in the human realm. There are also different types of hungry ghosts, animals, and human beings. Among the human beings born in the southern continent, Jambudvipa, there are many different situations, different types of bodies, different levels of wealth, and so forth. For example, there are human being who experience great suffering due to lacking things, due to being killed, tortured, and so forth. According to the Buddha's teachings these are all due to actions (karma). On the other hand, because Hindus believe in both a creator of the world and karma, their explanation would be different. Christians would say that the suffering of human beings is due to not respecting the commandments given by God, in the same way that there is suffering due to not respecting the laws of a country. Hence, their explanation is

somewhat similar to the Buddhist explanation of karma because, even though they do not have the same concept of cause and result, they do say that particular sufferings are due to the actions of human beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 302) says:

> Since the two worlds produced by the two actions – the common and not [common] – are also explained in the Chittamatra scriptures, also for the Chittamatra system it is not that the world of the environment does not exist. Hence, *migrating beings without exception are taught to be produced from actions*. *Having given up mind, actions also do not exist*, that is, because only those who possess a mind accumulate actions, actions are also dependent on mind.

The Chittamatrins say that the two worlds are produced by common and uncommon actions. "The two worlds" refers to the environmental world (the vessel) and the inhabitants (the contents). In this way, the Chittamatrins say that the environmental world arises due to common actions, while the world of beings arises from uncommon actions. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Hence, migrating beings without exception are taught to be produced from actions." This is accepted by both the Chittamatrins and the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

"Having given up mind, actions also do not exist, that is, because only those who possess a mind accumulate actions, actions are also dependent on mind." This is also accepted by both the Chittamatrins and the Prasangika Madhyamikas in that they both say that minds are the creators of actions and that matter is not the creator of actions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 302) says:

> Hence, based on the teaching in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* "that which is not a creator and a feeler," the term 'only' is indicated to refute other creators. On the other hand, in dependence on the teaching that all twelve links [of dependent-arising] are also based on mind alone, the term 'only' indicates mind as being foremost. The former explanation is in terms of negation and the latter is in terms of affirmation.

"The former explanation is in terms of negation" refers to the explanation in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* that "the term 'only' is indicated to refute other creators." "The latter is in terms of affirmation" refers to the explanation in this sutra that the twelve links of dependent-arising are all based on mind alone due to which "the term 'only' indicates mind as being foremost."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 302) says:

> Because of that, mind itself is the main cause for the thorough engagement in migrating; that which is other than mind is not the main cause. For this reason, mind only is posited in sutra as being foremost; form is not.

Sentient beings continuously migrate due to contaminated actions created by their minds. Due to virtuous contaminated actions they are reborn in the upper realms and due to non-virtuous actions they are reborn in the lower realms. The aggregate of form is not the main cause of migrating, whereas mind is the main cause.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 302) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
> *Even though form exists,*

> *It, as does mind, does not exist as the very creator.*
> *Hence, a creator that is other than mind*
> *Is rejected; form is not refuted.* [6.90]
>
> *Even though form* is posited to *exist*, *that* form, *as does mind, does not exist as the very creator* of migrating beings. *Hence, a creator that is other than mind is rejected*, that is, refuted; external *form is not refuted*.

"External form is not refuted" means that external form exists. Although beings who migrate to the upper and lower realms have a physical form, it is not the main cause for their migrating. Is there a form that is the cause of migrating beings? Is the main cause of a house the mind or the bricks? Is the main cause for building a house the bricks, wood, and so forth or is the main cause the mind of the person who originally designed the house? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Hence, a creator that is other than mind is rejected, that is, refuted; external form is not refuted." According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas the statement in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* "The three realms are only mind" negates a creator that is other than the mind; it does not negate the existence of external form. On the other hand, according to the Chittamatrins this same passage negates external form.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 302) says:

> Some, such as the Samkhyas, assert a [general] principal and so forth to be the creator and some Buddhists assert the mind to be the creator, but there is no argument regarding form not being the creator.

No one asserts form to be the creator of the world. This is also stated in Chandrakirti's autocommentary but without specifying that they are the Samkhyas and Buddhists.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 302) says:

> Therefore, having questioned, that is, investigated, the creators [propounded] by others, the [general] principal and so forth, that which is eliminated is just a [general] principal and so forth that lack the characteristics of a creator. Therefore, when, due to seeing that it has the capacity to be a creator in conventional terms, mind only is said to be the creator, the [general] principal and so forth are eliminated as being the creator. Then, it is suitable to say "The object of the source of the argument which is the object expelled, the [general] principal and so forth, is suppressed" because it is like, having expelled one rival from among two kings wishing to rule a single country, the expeller wins his own country and the ordinary beings are not harmed because they are indispensable to both. Similarly, also here, since form is not harmed because of being indispensable to both, it should definitely be said that "Form only exists."

Here it says "that lack the characteristics of a creator," what are the characteristics of a creator? Think about it.

Tuesday morning, 28 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 303) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-2 Indicating that the two, external objects and inner mind, are similar in existing and not existing

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Therefore, by the manner that was thus indicated:

For those abiding with the reality of the worldly,
The aggregates renowned to the world – all five exist.
When the rising of exalted wisdom of reality is accepted,
To the yogi those five will not arise. [6.91]

All five aggregates exist in the presentation of the world, whereas they do not exist in the perspective of a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. This is because to a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise observing emptiness there is no appearance of conventionalities. The appearance of conventionalities to a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is an object of negation. This is because there are two types of objects of negation:

(i) an object of negation with respect to the perspective of a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise and
(ii) an object of negation in general.

This means that, even though in general conventional truths are not an object of negation, they would be an object of negation if they appeared to a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Since like that, therefore:

If form does not exist, do not hold that mind exists.
Also, if mind just exists, do not hold that form does not exist. [6.92ab]

Whenever, due to the acceptability [of searching for the imputed object], [external] form were realized as non-existent, then, because the existence of both is separated from acceptability, mind too would have to be realized as non-existent. Also, whenever mind was realized as just existent, then form too would have to be realized, because both are also renowned to the world.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 46), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2C2 Both object and mind are equally existent or non-existent

For one who dwells in the worldly people's reality,
All five aggregates known in the world exist.
To the yogin, striving that knowledge of reality
May arise, these five do not appear. [6.91]

If there's no form, don't hold that mind exists;
But if mind exists, don't hold that form does not! [6.92ab]

You should understand that you should know, "If there is no external form, do not hold that the mind exists! And if the mind exists, do not hold that external form does not exist!" For to one who dwells in the reality of the distinctions of worldly people, all five of the aggregates known in the world exist; but if the yogin is striving for the transcendent knowledge of absolute reality to arise, those five do not appear to him.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Chittamatrins: "If external form does not exist, you have to say that inner consciousness does not exist! If inner consciousness exists, you also have to say that external form exists!"

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is to be realized like that also through scripture, like this:
>
> *They were equally rejected by Buddha in the*
> *Sutra of the mode of wisdom and taught in the Abhidharma.* [6.92cd]
>
> All five of those aggregates of form and so forth were equally taught in *Abhidharma* by way of thorough divisions of specific and general characteristics. All five were also equally refuted in the wisdom gone beyond because it is taught [there] from "Subhuti, form is inherently empty" through "consciousness is [inherently empty]."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *In the* Sutras *on wisdom, the Buddha rejected them all*
> *Equally, but taught them in the* Abhidharma. [6.92cd]
>
> Those five aggregates are equally existent or non-existent, for in the sutras about the perfection of wisdom, the Buddha rejects their inherent existence equally, and in the *Abhidharma*, he teaches [all five] in terms of special and general characteristics.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that mind and forms are the same in being renowned to exist in the world. In the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras the Buddha equally negated that the five aggregates exist inherently. In the Abhidharma he equally explained the five aggregates in terms of their specific and general characteristics.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore:
>
> *Even having destroyed these levels of the two truths.* [6.93a]
>
> – established by scripture and reasoning like that,
>
> *Your substance, since refuted, would not be established.* [6.93b]
>
> Due to asserting a mere consciousness, without form, the levels of the deceptive and the ultimate that were mentioned would be destroyed. But having destroyed those levels of the truths like that, your substance would not be established.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Though you've destroyed this order of the two truths,*
> *Your substance, being refuted, is not proved.* [6.93ab]
>
> Although you have destroyed this order of the two truths, not existing ultimately and existing conventionally, it follows that the substance of the inherently existing dependent phenomena of you Chittamatrins is not established; since it is refuted by logic.

In short, external form and mind are the same in existing and not existing because they are equal in being devoid of inherent existence and equal in existing conventionally. Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the Chittamatrins cannot assert other-powered phenomena to be substantially

existent because by doing so they destroy the levels of the two truths, whereby the presentation of the two truths is lost.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Why?
>
> Since substance was previously refuted, therefore, your fatigue will be just useless!
>
> *Therefore, due to the levels like that, from the beginning, things*
> *Are to be known as not really produced, [yet] produced [for] the world.* [6.93cd]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Know therefore that by that order, from the beginning,*
> *Things are unborn in reality, born for the world.* [6.93cd]
>
> You should know that functional things, by the order like that explained above, have from the beginning been unborn ultimately and born in worldly convention, for what does not fail in the two truths must be admitted to not exist ultimately and to exist conventionally.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas substantial existence is not acceptable, instead all phenomena are pervaded by being imputedly existent in that they are imputed by a mind over there; they do not exist from their own side. On the other hand, the Chittamatrins say that mind exists inherently, whereas forms do not exist inherently because they do not exist at all. If it is not established by way of its own character is it pervaded by not being existent for the Chittamatrins system?
Student: For the Chittamatra system if it is not established by way of its own character it does not exist at all.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Kor sum! It follows that the imputational factor, generally characterized phenomena, and space, as the subject, are not existent because they are not established by way of their own character. In the Chittamatra system establishment by way of its own character and inherent existence are different. In the Svatantrika Madhyamika system and the Prasangika Madhyamika system they are the same, but in the Prasangika Madhyamika system both do not exist, whereas in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system both exist. In the Chittamatra system they are different because there are some natures that are not established by way of their own character and some that are established by way of their own character in that:

- the other-powered and the thoroughly established are established by way of their own character and
- imputational factors are not established by way of their own character.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 303) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *For those abiding in that reality of worldly beings*
> *The aggregates renowned in the world, that is, all five, exist.*
> *When wishing to manifest the exalted wisdom of suchness,*
> *Those five do not arise for yogis.* [6.91]
>
> Therefore, in that case, by means of the presentation mentioned above, *for those abiding in that reality* – that is, that presentation – *of worldly beings, those aggregates* that are external forms and so forth *renowned in the world*, *that is, all five* aggregates, *exist*. On the other hand, *when wishing to*

> *manifest the exalted wisdom* directly realizing *suchness, those five* aggregates *do not arise for yogis*, that is, they do not arise in the perspective of their meditative equipoise.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *If forms do not exist, do not conceive minds to exist;*
> *Also if minds exist, do not conceive forms to not exist.* [6.92ab]
>
> It being so, therefore, *if* external *forms* are asserted to *not exist, do not conceive minds to exist; also if* inner *minds* are asserted to *exist*, *do not conceive* external *forms to not exist*. At that time, when analyzing in terms of the acceptability of searching for the imputed object, if external forms are conceived to not exist, then, because the existence of both the external and inner is separated from acceptability, inner minds must also be realized to not exist. Also, at that time, if minds are conceived to exist, then also forms must be realized because both are renowned in the world.

(Note: Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 303) says *'thad pas las 'grub pa dang bral wa'i phyir,* however, *"las 'grub pa"* is to be omitted.)

In the reality of the world, that is, within worldly conventionalities, all five aggregates exist. On the other hand, they do not exist in the perspective of a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the Chittamatrins assert that external forms do not exist they should not assert that mind exists, whereas if they accept that inner mind exists they should not assert that external form does not exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 303-4) says:

> Here 'form does not exist' – which is explained by the Chittamatrins with regard to asserting the difference of the two, forms and minds, existing and not existing – is 'external form does not exist.' [Chandrakirti's *Supplement* previously] said:
>
> *Arise as the very appearance of blue and so forth*
> *From their respective seeds, without external apprehendeds...* [6.63bc]
>
> [Chandrakirti's] autocommentary on that also said:
>
> ... without external apprehendeds such as blue and so forth...
>
> The qualification 'external' is mentioned in regard to the object of negation 'form does not exist.' In addition, [Chandrakirti's] autocommentary [previously] said:
>
> ... having said that the term 'only' is unable to refute external objects of knowledge, [in order to complete the meaning of the term 'only'] there is [the following] explanation for the purpose of showing that, other than the explanation [that mind is foremost], other types [of explanation that differ from that way of explaining] cannot refute external objects.

The Chittamatrins qualify "form does not exist" by saying that it means "external form does not exist." They say that, although external forms do not exist, the appearance of external forms does exist. This appearance arises from the activation of latencies. There are three types of latencies:

1. latencies of actual expression,
2. latencies of a view of the self, and
3. latencies of similar type.

Due to the activation of which type of latency is there the appearance of blue? Think about it in the context of what is said in the autocommentary: "without external apprehendeds such as blue and so forth..."

The root text says "form does not exist" (v. 6.92a), whereas in the autocommentary the qualification 'external' is added, whereby it becomes "external form does not exist."

According to the Chittamatrins the term 'only' does not negate objects of knowledge and, while it does not negate form, it does negate external form.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 304) says:

> This is because the refutation of forms – in the teaching that the refutation of forms is not the meaning of the sutra – is explained to be the refutation of external [forms]. If this were not the case, when taken to be nothing more than the mere words, through saying "Having said that the term 'only' is unable to refute objects of knowledge" it should also be said that "The Chittamatrins assert that the term 'only' refutes objects of knowledge that are mind."

Saying that the term 'only' negates objects of knowledge that are mind is not correct.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 304) says:

> If the Chittamatrins do not assert that possessing form, when they present the reasonings that prove a basis-of-all [the following] statements in [Asanga's] *Compendium on the Mahayana* would be solely contradictory:
> - "It is inadmissible that there does not exist a fruitional consciousness other than that also apprehending the sense powers possessing form, those already connected at the time of joining" and
> - "Consciousness and name and form, like a tripod, are what are engaged in a manner of one depending on the other. Moreover, if a fruitional consciousness does not exist, this would not be suitable."
>
> This is because if they assert phenomena that possess form, it is asserted that they must assert external [objects].

If someone were to say that the Chittamatrins do not assert 'that possessing form,' it would contradict the reasonings proving a mind-basis-of-all presented in Asanga's *Compendium on the Mahayana*. In order to prove a basis-of-all the Chittamatra system sets out various reasonings of which one of the main reasonings is: "If there were no mind-basis-of-all then joining with a next life would not be possible." When this joining happens, the sense powers possessing form come into existence. They must have an agent that apprehends them that is a consciousness. What is that consciousness? The apprehender that takes the sense powers possessing form as an object must be a fruitional consciousness. What is this fruitional consciousness? It can only be a mind-basis-of-all since mind-basis-of-all and fruitional consciousness are synonyms. This passage thus proves that as the object of a mind-basis-of-all there are sense powers possessing form. This implies that the Chittamatrins accept form, therefore, they do not negate form. However, although they do not negate form, they do negate external form.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Consciousness and name and form, like a tripod, are engaged in a manner of one depending on the other." For example, when one binds three sticks together to form a tripod, they stand upright only in dependence on each other. Consciousness is the third link of the twelve links, whereas name and form are the fourth link. 'Name' refers to the last four aggregates, whereas 'form' is the first of the five aggregates. Consciousness and name and form depend on each other. Since Asanga's *Compendium on the Mahayana* sets out the twelve links, the Chittamatrins accept that consciousness and name and form depend on each other, Thus, Asanga's *Compendium on the Mahayana* shows that the Chittamatrins accept form and, therefore, do not negate it.

Asanga's *Compendium on the Mahayana* also says: "Moreover, if a fruitional consciousness does not exist, this would not be suitable." Fruitional consciousness, appropriating consciousness, and mind-basis-of-all are synonyms used on occasions that differ in regard to time. Lama Tsongkhapa in his text *Ocean of Eloquence: An Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of Mentality and the Basis-of-all* says: "Those beyond [the eighth ground] and foe destroyers do not have a mind-basis-of-all

because they do not have the two depositors." Since they do not have a mind-basis-of-all, what is that consciousness called on the eighth ground and above? It is called 'fruitional consciousness' and 'appropriating consciousness.' In the case of a buddha superior what is that consciousness called? It is called 'a mirror-like exalted wisdom.' This is what is asserted by the Chittamatrins.

Bodhisattvas on the eighth ground and above and foe destroyers do not have afflictions. Therefore, they do not have a mind-basis-of-all which is defined as: the observed object of afflicted mentality, the eighth consciousness. Thus, the afflictions of bodhisattvas on the eighth ground and above and foe destroyers do not increase by observing a mind-basis-of-all. This afflicted mentality is one of the two depositors. Having abandoned afflictions, there is no need for a basis for the infusion of the latencies of actions. Or it can be said, bodhisattvas on the eighth ground and above and foe destroyers do not take rebirth under the control of afflictions and actions.

There are eight reasonings proving the existence of a mind-basis-of-all.

For the Chittamatrins a fruitional consciousness is the consciousness that experiences the result of actions, therefore, it is the person. The Chittamatrins posit the appropriating consciousness as the illustration of the person. In the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* it says:

> "The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle,
> [Having] all the seeds, like the cascading flow of a river,
> When conceived as a self is not proper."
> I do not teach this to the childish.

A fruitional consciousness is the consciousness that experiences the fruitional result of actions. According to the Chittamatrins when the person is sought by thorough analysis it is found. They say that what is found is the illustration of the person: the appropriating consciousness, the fruitional consciousness, and the mind-basis-of-all.

The main points of debate between the Prasangika Madhyamikas and the Chittamatrins are:

1. the Chittamatrins negate external form, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that external form exists, and
2. the Chittamatrins assert that other-powered phenomena are inherently existent, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that they are not inherently existent.

You should debate this amongst yourselves by assuming their respective positions. With respect to this, there is a story about Aryadeva and Nagarjuna. Aryadeva received an invitation, which was carried to him on the Glorious Mountain by Mahakala in the form of a crow, to come to Nalanda to debate with the non-Buddhist, Ashvagosha. Aryadeva asked his master, Nagarjuna, what he should do, and Nagarjuna replied that before going to Nalanda they should practice the debate by means of Nagarjuna taking the position of the non-Buddhists. However, Nagarjuna held this position so convincingly that Aryadeva thought that he had come to really agree with it. Thus, he took off his shoes and circled them around Nagarjuna's head saying "Kor sum." Nagarjuna then predicted that Aryadeva would win the debate with Ashvagosha but due to this negative action would experience some obstacles. In fact, on the way to Nalanda, Aryadeva met an old man missing one eye who asked Aryadeva for one of his own eyes and Aryadeva, being a bodhisattva, was unable to refuse and gave him one of his eyes. Aryadeva then continued on to Nalanda where he debated with Ashvagosha. We too should debate like Nagarjuna and Aryadeva with great enthusiasm.

Tuesday afternoon, 28 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 304) says:

> Hence, even though they assert that "Due to the condition of consciousness, name and form are produced" and so forth, they assert that it is not necessary to assert external [form]. Do no propound the opposite to this [because], when presenting this uncommon presentation of Chittamatra, there are many such explanations. It should similarly be realized that also in this scripture the existence and non-existence of external objects and inner consciousnesses are the same.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *In the sutras on the mode of wisdom, the Buddha*
> *Equally rejected them and in the* Abhidharma *he taught them.* [6.92cd]
>
> Hence, *in the sutras on the mode* of the perfection of *wisdom the Buddha equally rejected*, that is, refuted, the inherent existence of all five aggregates, form and so forth, saying "Subhuti, form is empty of inherent existence" through "Consciousness is empty of inherent existence."

According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system, if that possessing form is asserted then external form is also to be asserted. Since the Chittamatrins also assert that "Due to the condition of consciousness, name and form are produced," they do assert form. However, even though they assert production of name and form from consciousness, they do not assert external form. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas that if one asserts form, one should assert external form.

Since there are many presentations regarding the production of form in the uncommon presentations of the Chittamatrins, although they do not assert external form, they do not negate form. Therefore, the Chittamatra system differentiates between form and external form. In the Chittamatra system form is asserted because they say that form is produced due to the activation of latencies in one's continuum. Such form is asserted to be one substance with inner mind, that is, the valid cognizer apprehending that form. External form is not asserted in this school because they say that

- there is no form that is a different substance from inner consciousness and
- there is no form composed of particles that does not depend on the activation of latencies in one's own continuum.

In this way, they differentiate between form and external form. However, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas external form and inner consciousness are not one substance, thus, form and the valid cognizer apprehending it are different substances. Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that form is composed of external particles and is not produced by the activation of inner latencies.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "It should similarly be realized that also in this scripture the existence and non-existence of external objects and inner consciousnesses are the same. Hence, in the sutras on the mode of the perfection of wisdom the Buddha equally rejected, that is, refuted, the inherent existence of all five aggregates, form and so forth, saying "Subhuti, form is empty of inherent existence" through "Consciousness is empty of inherent existence."" That external objects and inner consciousnesses are the same in not existing means that they are the same in being empty of inherent existence as is taught in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 305) says:

> *In the Abhidharma*, he also equally *taught* all five [aggregates] in terms of their specific and general characteristics and so forth.

The *Supplement* says: "in the *Abhidharma* he taught them." This means that in the Abhidharma the Buddha taught all five aggregates in terms of their specific and general characteristics and so forth. The Buddha said that all five aggregates are equal in terms of having specific and general characteristics. For example, the specific characteristic or specific definition of form is: that which is suitable to be form. The specific characteristic or specific definition of feeling is: experience. The specific characteristic or specific definition of discrimination is: that apprehending signs. The specific

characteristic or specific definition of a compositional factor is: that which strongly composes, or that which is other than the four aggregates. The specific characteristic or specific definition of consciousness is: that which fully cognizes.

Specific characteristic can refer to either something's individual definition or to something's specific characteristics. For example, the specific characteristics of form are, for example, light, heavy, beautiful, ugly, and so forth. Later on the *Supplement* says:

> *Form has the definition: suitable as form.*
> *Feeling has the nature of experience.*
> *Discrimination apprehends signs.*
> *Compositional factors strongly compose.* [6.202]
>
> *Individually cognizing objects*
> *Is the specific definition of consciousness.*
> *The specific definition of the aggregates is suffering.*
> *The nature of the elements is asserted as poisonous snakes.* [6.203]

These lines set out the specific definitions of the five aggregates. Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* also gives the definitions of the second four aggregates, which are the same except for that of compositional factors. This text says:

> *Feeling is experience;*
> *Discrimination is the nature of apprehending signs.* [1.11cd]
>
> *Compositional factors are that other than the four.* [1.12a]
>
> *Consciousness is an individual cognizer.* [1.13a]

In addition, each of the aggregates has individual characteristics which can also be considered to be their specific characteristics.

The general characteristics of the five aggregates are their common characteristics: impermanent, suffering, empty, selfless. These characteristics are shared by all five aggregates. This is the meaning of the specific and general characteristics in this context; it does not refer to the specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena asserted by the lower schools.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 305) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Even having destroyed the levels of the two truths,*
> *Your substance, due to being refuted, is not established.*
> *Therefore, by such stages understand that things are primordially*
> *Not produced in suchness and are produced in the world.* [6.93]
>
> Therefore, according to the opponents' previous explanation, *the levels of the two truths* that are established by scripture and reasoning – the two, external objects and mind, being equal in not existing ultimately and equal in existing conventionally – would be destroyed.

"The opponents" are the Chittamatrins who destroy the two levels of the truths by saying that external objects do not exist ultimately and conventionally, whereas consciousness exists ultimately.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 305) says:

> *Even having destroyed them* in that way, *your*, Chittamatra, *substantially* existent other-powered phenomena *are not established*.

The Chittamatrins cannot establish substantially existent other-powered phenomena no matter how much they try.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 305) says:

> Why is that? Because substantially existent other-powered phenomena *were refuted* many times before, your fatigue becomes meaningless.

Since substantially existent other-powered phenomena have already been refuted many times before they cannot be established even if the Chittamatrins put much effort into doing so.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 305) says:

> In order to not destroy the levels of the two truths, it is necessary to assert that [things] do not exist ultimately and do exist conventionally.

In short, external form and inner consciousness are the same in not existing ultimately and in existing conventionally.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 305) says:

> *Therefore*, [Chandrakirti] says that *by such* stages – those explained before – *understand that things are primordially not produced in suchness* and *are produced in world*ly conventions. Hence, through indicating that things are asserted to not be produced ultimately and to be produced conventionally, one should definitely affix this qualification to the object of negation.

Things are primordially not produced in suchness, that is, they are not produced ultimately. However, they are produced in worldly conventions. Not produced and produced are to be qualified by saying "not produced ultimately" and "produced conventionally."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 305) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-3 Explaining the intention of teaching mind-only in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*

- A Indicating that the teaching on only mind without external objects is an interpretable meaning [teaching]
- B Indicating the method for realizing the interpretable and definitive meanings of the sutras

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-3A Indicating that the teaching on only mind without external objects is an interpretable meaning [teaching]

1. Indicating it to be an interpretable meaning [teaching] by means of scriptures
2. Indicating it [to be an interpretable meaning teaching] by means of reasonings

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-3A1 Indicating it to be an interpretable meaning [teaching] by means of scriptures

- A Actual meaning
- B Indicating other such sutras as also being interpretable meaning [teachings]

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-3A1A Actual meaning

What are interpretable meaning and definitive meaning teachings? How are they defined in the Chittamatra system? What is an interpretable meaning sutra? What is a definitive meaning sutra? The Chittamatrins define them respectively as:

- An interpretable meaning sutra is: a sutra whose indicated meaning is not suitable to be accepted literally.
- A definitive meaning sutra is: a sutra whose indicated meaning is suitable to be accepted literally.

On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas define them respectively as:

- An interpretable meaning sutra is: a sutra that takes conventionalities as its main indicated subject matter.
- A definitive meaning sutra is: a sutra that takes the ultimate as its main indicated subject matter.

For example, when sutra says "All compounded phenomena are impermanent" the Chittamatrins say that this is a definitive meaning sutra because it is literally acceptable just as it is said. However, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, even thought it is literally acceptable, it is not a definitive meaning sutra because it does not present emptiness. Thus, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas 'interpretable meaning' refers to conventional truth and 'definitive meaning' to ultimate truth.

Here Chandrakirti first discusses "Indicating by means of scripture that the teaching on only mind without external objects is an interpretable meaning [teaching]."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If it is mentioned here: "Although one may explain the meaning of the sutra like that, yet even if it were like that, mind-only is ascertained as just existing from other scriptures. As was taught [in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*, 3.33]:[67]
>
> > Although the external appears, it is non-existent;
> > The mind appears as the variations.
> > The likeness of body, enjoyments, and abode,
> > I explain as mere mind.[68]

There are two types of sutras:

1. sutras that explain as being interpretable meaning and
2. sutras that are to be explained as being interpretable meaning.

In the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* the Buddha taught that all phenomena are mere mind, or mind only. Such a teaching is not a definitive meaning teaching but is an interpretable meaning teaching. In order for it to be an interpretable meaning teaching it must have certain attributes:

1. a basis of intention,
2. a purpose, and
3. harm or damage to its literal meaning.

The *Descent into Lanka Sutra* is an interpretable meaning teaching because it has these three attributes.

1. What is the basis of intention? When Buddha said that external objects do not exist, he said so thinking that there are no external objects from the point of view of there being no inherently existent external objects. Thus, he said "There are no external objects" thinking "There are no inherently existent external objects."
2. What is Buddha's purpose? Buddha said this in order to overcome some trainee's strong attachment and so forth to form.

[67] See Suzuki, page 133.

[68] See Hopkin's translation with bracketed commentary, page 613, and Cabezon, page 328, and note 1022 on page 507.

3. What is the harm? Saying that external objects do not exist receives harm from scripture, reasonings, and worldly conventions. There is harm from worldly conventions because no one says "External form does not exist," whereas the worldly do say "External form does exist."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, 'the body' is the entrances of the eye and so forth. 'Enjoyments' are the objects of form and so forth. The 'abode' is the vessel world. Because externality apart from the mind does not exist, if only a mere consciousness produces in appearance as body, enjoyments and abode, the body, and so forth, abiding in the category of objects, are manifest as though external, different from consciousness. Therefore, the three realms are mere mind."

"The body" is the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body spheres, or entrances. The 'enjoyments' are the form sphere, sound sphere, odor sphere, taste sphere, and tangible object sphere which are enjoyed by the five spheres, the eye sphere and so forth. The 'abode' is the vessel world or the environmental world which includes the houses we live in, villages, and so forth. There are no external objects apart from mind. There is only mind yet there is the appearance of bodies, enjoyments, and abodes. Mind manifests in this way because the three existences are only mind. This is the explanation of this verse in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* according to the Chittamatrins. However, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas this verse in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* is one that is to be explained as interpretable meaning:

> Although the external appears, it is non-existent;
> The mind appears as the variations.
> The likeness of body, enjoyments, and abode,
> I explain as mere mind.

How is it explained to be interpretable meaning? Think about it.

Wednesday morning, 29 November 2000

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to express also this sutra as bearing an intention, it is explained:
>
> *The sutra set in which "The external appears, it does not exist,*
> *The mind appears as the variations" is taught –* [6.94ab]

That this sutra bears an intention means that it is an interpretable meaning sutra. What is an interpretable meaning sutra? Saying that a sutra has an intention or that it is an interpretable meaning sutra mean the same.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Its intention is this:
>
> *Opposes form for those who are strongly attached*
> *To form – it too is of interpretative meaning.* [6.94cd]

Here Chandrakirti, by quoting the first two lines, explains that the following verse in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* is an interpretable meaning teaching:

> Although the external appears, it is non-existent;
> The mind appears as the variations.
> The likeness of body, enjoyments, and abode,
> I explain as mere mind.

What is Buddha's intention in teaching this sutra? His intention was to help those with strong attachment and so forth to form to overcome these afflictions. In short, this sutra was taught with the intention of overcoming their afflictions; thus, it is an interpretable meaning sutra.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> This is the interpretative meaning concerning that which is to be known: "Those who have over expectations in form will be made to uncontrollably engage it with subsequent attachment, anger, pride, and so forth that have that [over expectation] as their condition and to strongly settle upon it. Hence, they will be joined with great negativity and will degenerate from accumulating the collections of merit and wisdom. For them, the Bhagavan, in order to overcome the afflictions that have form as their condition – like the skeletons that destroy attachment to external objects in those having attachment – will teach as just mere mind as indeed like that, although not being like that."

Due to over expectation regarding form there is the production of strong attachment and so forth to it. Then, due to this attachment and so forth, one engages in actions without control. The Buddha taught this sutra in order to help such people overcome these afflictions. The purpose of teaching this sutra is thus to overcome strong afflictions and to avoid the consequent engagement in negativities. This way of teaching is similar to that on meditating on skeletons in order to overcome attachment. Attachment is mainly produced in relation to the five sense objects, forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. Due to attachment to forms and so forth anger also arises. For example, recently there was a story in the news about a young man who killed his ex-wife because she was going out with another man. Due to his strong attachment to this woman and jealousy toward the other man, he killed her and then cut his own throat. All such negativities are due to strong attachment and so forth.

Previously, in the context of the perfection of patience, Chandrakirti's *Supplement* said:

> *One moment of hating a conqueror child destroys*
> *The virtues arising from giving and ethics'*
> *Accumulated for a hundred eons.*
> *Thus there can be no [worse] sin than impatience.* [3.6]
>
> *It creates an ugly form, leads to the unholy,*
> *And robs discrimination that knows right and wrong.*
> *Through impatience one is quickly cast into a bad migration.*
> *Patience creates qualities opposite to those* [3.7]
>
> *Explained above. Through patience comes beauty, dearness*
> *To the holy, skill in discriminating between*
> *The right and wrong, birth afterwards as a human*
> *Or god, and the extinguishment of non-virtues.* [3.8]

In short, we should beware of strong attachment and so forth. Therefore, to enable those with strong attachment and so forth to overcome these afflictions the Buddha taught mind only without external form.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: But where can such statements as "This scriptural citation is of interpretative meaning, it is not of definitive meaning" be ascertained?

How is it ascertained that the verse from the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* has an intention and is therefore an interpretable meaning sutra?

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [It can be ascertained] from scripture and reasoning. Demonstrating just that is the statement:
>
> *The teacher taught that this is indeed interpretative meaning, and*
> *It is acceptable as just of interpretative meaning by reasoning.* [6.95ab]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 47), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2C3A-1A The substance
>
> You may say, "Indeed, it is not established from the *Sutra on the Ten Stages* that there are no external objects, but by the teaching in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* external objects do not exist":
>
> 'What appears external does not exist,
> Mind appears as the various things.
> I say that it is mind alone
> That's like the body, enjoyments, and place.'
>
> *The Sutra which says the external appears without*
> *Existing, and mind appears as the various things,*
> *Turns aside from forms those strongly attached*
> *To forms, and its meaning requires interpretation.* [6.94]
>
> *The Master taught its meaning was interpretive;*
> *By logic, its meaning's admitted to be interpretive.* [6.95ab]
>
> It follows that by depending on the teaching in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*, which is that the external appears and does not exist, and mind appears as the various things, one cannot prove that external objects do not exist; because that [teaching] is turning away from the defilements based on form those who are very attached to form, and is also of interpretive meaning. For the Master said it was of interpretive meaning, and by reasoning it is admitted to be of interpretive meaning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 305-6) says:

> OBJECTION: The meaning of the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* has indeed been explained in that way, however, even if it were so, another scripture, the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*, says:

> The external appear but do not exist.
> Mind appears as the varieties.
> The likeness of bodies, enjoyments, and abodes,
> I explain them as mind only.
>
> In regard to that, 'bodies' are the physical spheres, those of the eye and so forth. "Enjoyments' are the five objects, forms, sounds, and so forth. 'Abodes' are the environmental world. Because external objects do not exist apart from mind, when the appearance of bodies, enjoyments, and abodes are produced for the consciousness alone, one's own body and so forth – those abiding among things that are objects – manifest as if they were external objects different from consciousness. Therefore, the three realms are only mind.
> RESPONSE: There is [the following] explanation in order to express that this sutra also has a [particular] intention.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> > *Any sutra that teaches "The external appear but do not exist.*
> > *Mind appears as the varieties"*
> > *Opposes form for those who have strong attachment to form.*
> > *Moreover, this is interpretable meaning.* [6.94]
>
> The intention of *any sutra that teaches "The external appear but do not exist. Mind appears as the varieties"* is to be understood as follows. Whoever has attachment, anger, pride, and so forth subsequent to possessing the condition of *strong attachment to form* will involve themselves in it uncontrollably and, due to strong adherence to it, will be connected to great negativities while their accumulation of the collections of merit and exalted wisdom will decline. *For them*, the Bhagavan, in order *to oppose* the afflictions that have the condition of *form*, taught mind only as being like that, even though it is not so, just as he taught skeletons, which destroy attachment to external objects, to those who have attachment.

This is similar to what is said in Chandrakirti's autocommentary. 'Bodies' are the physical spheres, 'enjoyments' are the five objects, and 'abodes' are the environmental world. Are the eye sphere and the eye sense power the same or different? Are the physical spheres the eye organ or the clear eye sense power?
Several students: Both.
Other students: The clear eye sense power.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Since there are different views you should debate about it amongst yourselves!

What are the objects of eye consciousness? They are the form spheres, which include shapes and colors. Due to the appearance of shapes and colors we then either become attached to them or generate anger toward them. Buddha said that everything is mind only in order to overcome such strong afflictions. In this context there is debate as to the hell realms being only mind. Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:

> Who created the red-hot iron base?
> From where did the assembly of women come? [5.7cd]
>
> Buddha said that
> They arise from negative minds. [5.8ab]

Kunu Lama Rinpoche says that although the Tibetan version of this text usually says "mass of fire" this is a corruption in the spelling and that based on the original Sanskrit text it should read "the assembly of women." There are four neighboring hells in one of which one finds oneself at the base of a tree with razor-sharp leaves. One then hears the voice of someone dear calling one to climb up but as one climbs up one is cut to pieces by the sharp leaves. Then, when one reaches the top, one again hears the voice calling one to come down and once again climbs down experiencing great suffering.

Those who call are "the assembly of women." Shantideva says that this assembly of women, as well as the burning iron ground and so forth, are only appearances to the mind due to karma.

The meditation on skeletons is advice given by the Buddha as a method for reducing attachment to attractive forms. One visualizes the whole universe filled with skeletons, whereby one's attachment diminishes.

In conclusion, the Buddha's purpose in teaching this verse in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* is to diminish attachment to beautiful forms and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 306-7) says:

> QUESTION: It is stated: "*Moreover*, *this* scripture *is* an *interpretable meaning* [teaching] and not a definitive meaning [teaching]." From what is that ascertained?
> RESPONSE:
> *It was taught by the Teacher to be interpretable meaning and*
> *It is acceptable to be interpretable meaning by reasoning.* [6.95ab]
>
> Since the teaching "Mind only without external objects" *was taught by the Teacher to be an interpretable meaning* [teaching], it is established through scripture to be an interpretable meaning [teaching]; however, *this* sutra *is* also *acceptable*, that is, established, *to be interpretable meaning by reasoning*.

In brief, the verse in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* is proved to be interpretable meaning by both scripture and reasoning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 307) says:

> This is not explained by this master saying: "The term 'only,' which indicates [external objects] are mind only, in the lines 'The external appear but do not exist...' [in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*] does not refute external objects but refutes other creators as is explained in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*." Instead, he comments on this saying "Although the term 'only' refutes external objects, this sutra is an interpretable meaning [teaching]."

The term 'only' in the verse in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* is not explained by this master to not refute external objects but to refute other creators as is explained in terms of the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*. Instead, this master comments on this verse saying that the term 'only' refutes external objects but is an interpretable meaning sutra because it has an intention – that of reducing the strong attachment of those beings with strong attachment and so forth. 'This master' is perhaps Chandrakirti.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 307) says:

> The great master Bhavaviveka explains that also [according to] this sutra that the likenesses of minds, bodies, enjoyments, and abodes, that is, their aspects, change like shadows and explains that, since "The external does not exist" is also asserted to refute awarenesses seeing the aspectless, the term 'only' does not refute external objects.

Bhavaviveka says that the line in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* "I explain them as mind only" does not refute external objects, but refutes awarenesses seeing the aspectless. What does 'the aspectless' mean? There are two types of aspects:

1. the aspect of an object-possessor (subjective aspect) and
2. the aspect of an object (objective aspect).

Is there someone who asserts an awareness without an aspect? In general, it is said that the Vaibhashikas assert an awareness without an aspect. What do they mean by this? They mean that

there does not exist an aspect of an object. In other words, while other schools posit both the aspect of an object-possessor (subjective aspect) and the aspect of an object (objective aspect), the Vaibhashikas do not posit these two. They say that an awareness does not have the aspect of the object or that for an awareness objects are aspectless. This is because they equate awareness with wisdom. This assertion of the Vaibhashikas is extensively negated by the Svatantrika Madhyamikas in Shantarakshita's *Ornament for the Middle Way* in the section on the reasoning of one and many. Here there is a verse that says: "Functioning things that are asserted by others, the non-Buddhists, and by us, the lower Buddhist schools, do not exist truly because they are free from being an inherently existent one or an inherently existent many, like a reflection."

Bhavaviveka says: "the likenesses of minds, bodies, enjoyments, and abodes, that is, their aspects, change like shadows." This means that when an object is seen it is seen by means of its aspect. "Change like shadows" refers to the fact that when the sun shines the shadow of a body is formed that resembles the body itself.

There is a story about two kings, a king of a central country and a king of a border land. King Udayana of the border country sent a present of weapons made of precious things to the other king, Bimbisara. Bimbisara asked his ministers what gift he could send to the other king in gratitude and they suggested that he make an image of the most precious thing in their own land, the Buddha. However, as the artist tried to draw the Buddha's crown protrusion he could not do so as it grew higher and higher. To solve this problem, the Buddha told them to bring him a large piece of white cloth and spread it on the floor. The Buddha stood on this and the artist traced his shadow on the cloth. In this way an image of the Buddha was made and King Bimbisara gave it to King Udayana. Upon receiving this image, the king generated strong faith in the Buddha, gave up his kingdom to his son, became a monk, and went to meditate in Sravasti. There, he meditated, entered the path, and became a foe destroyer. However, in the meantime his son ruled the kingdom by oppressing the subjects. As a consequence one of the Dharma ministers requested Udayana to return to rule the kingdom. Udayana asked the Buddha what to do and the Buddha replied, "Seize your own karma." As Udayana was traveling back to his country, the non-Dharma ministers told the king's son that his father had not succeeded in his Dharma practice and was returning to take back his kingdom. The son, plotting to kill his father, awaited the returning king but rain began to fall and continued to fall for a whole week, followed by a rain of stones, sand, and so forth. At the end, the ground opened up and the son and his ministers disappeared into it.

Wednesday afternoon, 29 November 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 307) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-3A1B Indicating other such sutras as also being interpretable meaning [teachings]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Not only is this sutra of interpretive meaning, so too are others:
>
> *This passage clarifies also other sutra sets of that type*
> *As just of interpretive meaning.* [6.95cd]
>
> If asked: What are the sutra sets of that type?
>
> As was said in the *Sutra Definitely Unraveling the Intention* in the presentation of the three natures called "the imaginary, the other-powered, and the fully-established," [the statement that] "The imaginary is just non-existent and the other-powered is just existent" and similarly [in the *Sutra Definitely Unraveling the Intention*, 5]:
>
> "The consciousness taking [rebirth] – deep and subtle –

> [Having] all the seeds [and] descending like the continuum of a river
> Is unsuitable if conceived as the self" –
> I did not teach that to children.
>
> – and so forth.

Not only is the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* an interpretable meaning sutra, so too are other sutras.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2C3A-1B Other sutras like that are also of interpretive meaning
>
> *Other sutras of that kind also,*
> *This text makes clear, require interpretation.* [6.95cd]
>
> Other sutras like the kind explained above, maintained by the Chittamatrins to be of definitive meaning, are also of interpretive meaning; for this scripture,
>
> "Just as to one or another patient
> A doctor gives a medicine,
> Likewise, to sentient beings the Buddha
> Even teaches 'only mind',"
>
> says clearly that they are of interpretive meaning.

A doctor gives medicine to a particular patient in dependence on diagnosing the particular illness. Similarly, the Buddha gives teachings to sentient beings in accordance with their needs in order to dispel the illness of the mental afflictions.

Other sutra sets of that kind are:

1. the sutra that presents the three natures along with their characteristics

The *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* says that other-powered phenomena are established by way of their own character, whereas imputational factors are not established by way of their own character. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas:

- in the first wheel of Dharma the Buddha taught all phenomena from form through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as established by way of their own character and
- in the second wheel he taught that all phenomena from form through the exalted knower of all aspects as not established by way of their own character.

These teachings would seem to be contradictory but the Chittamatra explain this saying that this is clarified in third wheel of Dharma. They say that:

- in the first wheel the Buddha taught all other-powered phenomena from form through the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment as established by way of their own character, whereas
- in the second wheel he taught all phenomenon that are imputational factors as not established by way of their own character, and
- in the third wheel he clarified this saying that all phenomena included in other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are established by way of their own character, whereas phenomena included in imputational factors are not established by way of their own character.

For the Prasangika Madhyamikas the third wheel is interpretable meaning.

2. the sutra that presents a mind-basis-of-all

The *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* which says 'The consciousness taking rebirth..." and so forth is also an interpretable meaning teaching. The consciousness taking rebirth, or the appropriating consciousness, is the mind-basis-of-all. Because the mind-basis-of-all is the basis on which the

latencies of actions are continually deposited it is said to be "descending like the continuum of a river." It is not suitable to conceive the mind-basis-of-all to be the self which is an object of negation.

These two sutras are sutras that are to be explained as interpretable meaning, whereas the sutra that explains them to be interpretable meaning is the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [The *Descent into Lanka Sutra*: 2][69] says:
>
> Just as for diseases of the ill,
> The doctor gives medicines; so,
> The Buddha similarly, thoroughly teaches
> Also as mere mind to sentient beings.
>
> This passage [from the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*] clarifies these [passages from the sutra *Definitely Unraveling the Intention*] as merely of interpretative meaning.

Just as a doctor gives different medicines to different patients with different illnesses, likewise, the Buddha gave different teachings to different sentient beings. For example, to the Chittamatrins the Buddha taught (i) the three natures along with their characteristics and (ii) a mind-basis-of-all. However, these two sutra sets are interpretable meaning sutras.

Another sutra that is to be explained as an interpretable meaning sutra is the sutra which teaches that a permanent, stable, and enduring tathagata essence exists as a buddha body complete with all the signs in each sentient being. However, since such a tathagata essence does not exist, the sutra that says it does exist is an interpretable meaning sutra. Therefore, saying that there is such a buddha body unmanifest in all sentient beings is unsuitable. But then why did the Buddha say this? In other words, what was his intention in saying this?

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, [the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*, 2]:[70] says:
>
> [Mahamati said:] The tathagata essence taught in the sutras expressed by the Bhagavan is expressed by the Bhagavan as just completely pure from the beginning since clear light by nature [and] completely pure; [and as] existing, possessing the thirty-two signs, within the bodies of all sentient beings.
>
> If, like a gem of great value fully wrapped in a dirty cloth, the Bhagavan expresses that [tathagata essence] as being fully wrapped in the cloth of the aggregates, elements, and sources, overwhelmed by attachment, hatred, and confusion and] being dirtied by the stains of fully conceptualizing – as permanent, stable, and enduring – Bhagavan, how is this propounded as a tathagata essence by the Tathagata, unlike propounding as the self of the Forders? Bhagavan, the Forders also propound and teach as a self saying "permanent, not an agent, without qualities, pervasive, and not perishing."

[69] Suzuki, page 44.

[70] See Suzuki, page 68; Hopkin's partial translation of this passage, pages 615-616; Thurman's partial translation of Tzong Khapa's paraphrase, pages 347-348 and Cabezon's translation, pages 329-330.

Here it seems to say that a buddha body complete with the thirty-two signs exists in all sentient beings but is wrapped in the dirty rags of the aggregates, constituents, and spheres. It is likened to wrapping a precious object in dirty rags in order to protect it. In fact, when I was living in Sarnath a man named Loden told me that he went from Delhi to Bombay to buy a large number of a particular type of watch. Having bought them, in order to not have trouble he but them in an old and very dirty sack and put them under his train seat. No one said anything about that sack or even looked at it, whereby he arrived back in Delhi without any problems.

Similarly, Buddha said that within us there is a buddha body wrapped in the dirty cloth of attachment, hatred, and ignorance. However, such a buddha body does not exist. It exists only if it is understood in the sense of the buddha lineage, a naturally abiding lineage, existing within each one of us. Such a naturally abiding lineage is explained in Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum*, in the context of the nine similes and nine meanings, to be covered by nine types of stains. There are nine similes of how the naturally abiding lineage is covered by stains and nine meanings that explain these similes. For example, one simile is an ugly lotus that has not yet blossomed that contains a buddha thus preventing the buddha from being seen until it blossoms. The meaning of this simile is that attachment covers the naturally abiding lineage found within all sentient beings but when that attachment is eliminated the tathagata essence will be directly perceived.

In the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* Mahamati asks the Buddha: "Bhagavan, how is this propounded as a tathagata essence by the Tathagata, unlike the self propounded by the Forders? Bhagavan, the Forders also propound and teach a self saying 'permanent, not an agent, without qualities, pervasive, and not perishing.'" This is in reference to the Samkhyas assertion of a self that is an eater, permanent, not a creator, without qualities, and does not possess actions. Likewise, the Vaisheshikas also assert a self with particular qualities.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The Bhagavan said, "Mahamati, my teaching the tathagata essence is not similar with the propounding as a self that the Forders have. Mahamati, the tathagata foe destroyers, the perfectly completed buddhas, having indicated the tathagata essence with the meaning of the words emptiness, the limit of complete purity, nirvana, not produced, signless, wishless, and so forth; so that children might completely relinquish a state of fear due to the selfless, teach the non-conceptual state, the sphere without appearance.

Although the Buddha Bhagavan said that there is a tathagata essence, he did so thinking of "emptiness, the limit of complete purity, nirvana, not produced, signless, wishless, and so forth." In other words, the Buddha taught a tathagata essence intending that sentient beings achieve the three doors of liberation – emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness. Thus, when the Buddha said that all sentient beings have a buddha body complete with the thirty-two signs within them, he meant that they have a naturally abiding lineage. Therefore, the Buddha said this thinking that, because sentient beings are suitable to be transformed into the body of a buddha, a tathagata essence exists within them. The Buddha taught this so "that children might completely relinquish a state of fear due to the selfless." For this reason, the Buddha "teaches the non-conceptual state, the sphere without appearance." In short, when the Buddha said that all sentient beings have an essence that is permanent, stable, and enduring, a buddha body complete with the thirty-two signs, it was in order that sentient beings not be frightened. On the other hand, if he had taught them emptiness directly they would have been frightened.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Mahamati, the future and present bodhisattva mahasattvas should not strongly settle on a self. Mahamati, for example, a potter makes various kinds of vessels from a single mass of clay particles with his hands, manual skill, implements, water, thread, and [mental] dexterity. Mahamati, similarly, also whether that very selflessness in phenomena completely reversing all characteristics of conceptualization is taught by the tathagatas – with various means having wisdom and skill in means – as the tathagata essence or taught as selflessness, it is suitable. Like the potter, they teach with various formats of words and letters.

Just as a potter produces various kinds of vessels from a single lump of clay, the Buddha Bhagavan taught sentient beings either selflessness or the tathagata essence with skillful means. In other words, to those sentient beings ready to receive teachings on selflessness he taught selflessness, and to those ready to receive teachings on tathagata essence he taught a tathagata essence. Likewise, he also taught other suitable teachings to those who were not ready for either of these teachings.

The sutra says: "Like the potter, they teach with various formats of words and letters." This means that just as a potter makes different kinds of vessels from the same clay the buddhas teach in various ways.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thus, therefore Mahamati, the teaching on the tathagata essence is not the same as the Forders' teaching propounding a self. Mahamati, therefore, the tatagatas, in order to lead the Forders who strongly adhere to their propounding of a self, teach the tathagata essence, therefore, a tathagata essence is taught.

The teaching on the tathagata essence is not the same as the Forders' teaching propounding a self. However, the Buddha's purpose in teaching a tathagata essence was to lead the Forders who strongly adhere to a self. Due to this strong adherence to a self, the Buddha taught them that there exists a tathagata essence that is permanent, stable, and enduring.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> How will those with a thought falling into the view conceiving as a real self possess the thought of abiding in the sphere of the three complete liberations and how will they quickly become a manifest, complete buddha in peerless complete enlightenment?"
>
> And it is indicated in that very [sutra, 2]:[71]
>
> Mahamati, the characteristics of emptiness, no birth, no duality, and no self-nature inserted within the sutra sets of all buddhas...

In short, the Buddha taught the three doors of liberation by means of teaching a tathagata essence.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, thus having made abundantly clear by this scriptural passage that the sutra sets of that type – all asserted by the propounders of consciousness as just definitive in meaning – as being just interpretative in meaning;

[71] See Suzuki, page 68, (77); Thurman's translation and Tzong Khapa's comments, pages 351-352, and Cabezon's translation, pages 322-323.

The sutra set that teaches a permanent, stable, and enduring essence was taught for the purpose of leading the Forders into the Buddha's teachings.

In summary, Chandrakirti sets out three sutra sets that are to be explained as interpretable meaning sutras:

1. the sutra that presents the three natures along with their characteristics,
2. the sutra that presents a mind-basis-of-all, that is, an appropriating consciousness, and
3. the sutra that presents a tathagata essence that is a buddha body, complete with the thirty-two marks, existing in each sentient being.

These are sutras that are to be explained to be interpretable meaning, whereas the sutras that explain them to be interpretable meaning are:

1. the passage in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* that says:

   Just as for diseases of the ill,
   The doctor gives medicines; so,
   The Buddha similarly, thoroughly teaches
   Also as mere mind to sentient beings.

2. the passage in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* that presents the three doors of liberation.

(Masters Program Correspondence Course participants: Please note that there were no teachings Thursday, 30 November 2000, as we celebrated Geshe Jampa Gyatso's 20th anniversary of teaching in Italy with a long life puja.)

Friday morning, 1 December 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 307) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Also other sutra sets of this kind are*
> *Clarified by these passages as just being interpretable meaning.* [6.95cd]
>
> Not only [the passages] that indicate only mind exists without external objects such as "The external appear but do not exist" [in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*] are interpretable meaning [teachings], *also other sutras sets of the kind* explained before – among those asserted by the Chittamatrins to be definitive meaning [teachings] – *are clarified by these passages*, which will be explained, *as just being interpretable meaning*.

Not only is the verse in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* an interpretable meaning sutra, there are also other sutra sets that are interpretable meaning. One of these other sutras is the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* which teaches

- a mind-basis-of-all and
- the three natures along with their characteristics

which are asserted by the Chittamatrins to be definitive meaning teachings but are asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas to be interpretable meaning teachings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 307) says:

> QUESTION: Moreover, what are the sutras of this kind?
> RESPONSE: The *Sutra Unraveling the Thought*, in presenting the three natures, says:
>
> Imputational factors do not exist,
> The other-powered exist.

> Similarly, the autocommentary [cites this sutra] saying:
>
> "The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle,
> [Having] all the seeds, like the cascading flow of a river,
> When conceived as a self is not proper."
> I do not teach this to the childish.
>
> and so forth.
>
> This sutra distinguishes the existing and not existing which are
> 1. imputational factors not existing by way of their own character and
> 2. other-powered phenomena existing by way of their own character.
>
> Although established by way of their own character imputational factors such as those in regard to the two selves and imputational [factors] in regard to the entities and attributes of phenomena are not possible as objects of knowledge for this system, many imputational factors that are imputed as entities and attributes are established bases.

Lama Tsongkhapa clarifies the verse in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* as meaning that imputational factors are not established by way of their own character, whereas other-powered phenomena are established by way of their own character. The two selves, a self of persons and a self of phenomena, are imputational factors. The imputational factor that is a self of persons is

- a self-sufficient substantially existent person.

The imputational factor that is a self of phenomena is either:

- apprehendeds and apprehenders existing as different substances, or
- form established by way of its own character as a basis for affixing the term 'form,' or
- form established by way of its own character as an affixing basis for the conception apprehending form.

There are also imputational factors in regard to entities and imputational factors in regard to attributes. The imputational factor in regard to the entity of form is, for example, the conception 'This is form,' whereas the imputational factor in regard to an attribute of form is, for example, the conception 'This is the production of form' or 'This is the impermanence of form is impermanent.' These entities and attributes that are established by way of their own character are the object of negation. However, the basis of the conception 'form' and the basis of the conception 'the production of form' exist.

Student: Then the affixing basis does not exist?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The basis of adhering is related to the conception and the basis of affixing is related to the term.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 308) says:

> Although in the *Sutra [Unraveling the Thought]* both the other-powered and the thoroughly established are taught to be established by way of their own character, the autocommentary does not mention other than the mere other-powered because the main basis of the argument between the Madhyamikas and Chittamatrins about true existence and the lack of true existence is the other-powered because
>
> - the basis of imputing the imputational factor is also the other-powered and
> - the thoroughly established must also be posited in dependence on the other-powered.
>
> Distinguishing them in this way is also explained by this system to be an interpretable meaning [teaching].

In brief, the passage in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* that says that other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are established by way of their own character and that imputational factors are not established by way of their own character is an interpretable meaning

teaching. This is extensively explained by Lama Tsongkhapa in his *Essence of Eloquence* in the context of the three established meanings.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that the autocommentary only mentions other-powered phenomena because they are the basis of imputing the imputational factor and that basis's emptiness of the imputational factor is the thoroughly established.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 308) says:

> In addition, in this sutra, teaching a mind-basis-of-all that is a different entity from the six operational consciousnesses – which is taught in regard to a collection of eight consciousnesses stating "The appropriating consciousness" and so forth – is also explained to be an interpretable meaning [teaching]. If a mind-basis-of-all does not exist, also an afflicted mentality does not exist as posited.
>
> Since the words "and so forth" [in the autocommentary, mentioned after the verse "The appropriating consciousness..." from the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought*,] include the two,
>
> - the refutation of external objects in this sutra and
> - the explanation that there are three final vehicles,
>
> here there are four [points] that need to be explained as interpretable meaning [teachings]. Having seen that if one lacks a decisive understanding regarding these [points], one will not understand the difference between the Madhyamikas and Chittamatrins in general and the uncommon points of this system in particular, I have finely explained this in my *[Treatise] Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive*.

The verse in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* that says:

> "The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle,
> [Having] all the seeds, like the cascading flow of a river,
> When conceived as a self is not proper."
> I do not teach this to the childish.

is an interpretable meaning [teaching]. The words "and so forth" in the autocommentary include the refutation of external objects in this sutra and the explanation that there are three final vehicles.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that if there are is no mind-basis-of-all there is no afflicted mentality. This is because the afflicted mentality is defined as: that which takes the mind-basis-of-all as its observed object and has the aspect of a self-sufficient substantially existent I and mine. Therefore, since the afflicted mentality observes a mind-basis-of-all, if a mind-basis-of-all does not exist also an afflicted mentality does not exist.

The eye consciousness through the mental consciousness are called the six operational consciousnesses. According to the Chittamatrins these consciousnesses are unstable and therefore cannot serve as a basis for the depositing of the latencies of actions, whereas because the mind-basis-of-all is stable it can serve as the basis for depositing the latencies of actions.

Here, the third of the four points mentioned is the refutation of external objects which was explained before. The fourth point is the explanation of three final vehicles which has already been discussed in the past. Thus, the four points are:

1. The distinction between what is established by way of its own character and what is not
2. the existence of a mind-basis-of-all
3. the refutation of external objects and
4. the explanation of three final vehicles.

Which passages in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* set out the refutation of external objects? Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 308) says:

> The phrases in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* that indicate that external objects do not exist are the [following passages] and so forth cited in [Asanga's] *Compendium on the Mahayana*:
>
> > [Maitreya asked:] "Bhagavan, are the reflections that are the objects of meditative stabilization different from mind or are they not different?"
> >
> > The Bhagavan responded: "Maitreya, they are not different. Why is that? Because I explained this saying 'Consciousness is distinguished by the mere cognition of an observed object.'"
>
> This system explains all four points explained above as interpretable meaning [teachings]; it is not that from among them some are explained as interpretable meaning and some as definitive meaning.

For the Chittamatrins the statement "Consciousness is distinguished by the mere cognition of an observed object" means that apprehendeds are not posited as being different from their apprehenders but are posited as being the mere entity of their apprehenders. Thereby, form is presented as not existing externally but as being only the nature of mind. The statement "the reflections that are the objects of meditative stabilization" also indicates that apprehendeds are only the nature of mind.

In general it is said that the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* only mentions two of the four points but here Lama Tsongkhapa says that three are mentioned:

1. the presentation of a mind-basis-of-all,
2. the presentation of the three natures along with their characteristics, and
3. the refutation of external objects

This sutra does not present the explanation of the three final vehicles.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 309) says:

> Moreover, the explanation that there are three final vehicles is not mentioned in the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'* through intending that it can be understood from the establishment of one final vehicle in Arya [Nagarjuna's] *Compendium of Sutra*.

The autocommentary mentions three of these points; it does not mention the explanation of the three final vehicles.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: Will Geshe-la please explain the two types of negating: negating in terms of 'being' and negating in terms of 'existing'?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: An example of negating in terms of existing is that on the floor in front of me there does not exist blue, therefore, this space is empty of the existence of blue. Another example is a monk or nun empty of vows, whereby, the vows do not exist in that monk or nun. However, the usual example of negating in terms of existing is a temple empty of monks.

An example of negating in terms of being is blue being empty of not being a form. Another example is an impermanent pot empty of being permanent and Tashi empty of not being a human.

Student: If true existence is negated in terms of 'being,' would this be a self-emptiness? If true existence is negated in terms of 'existing,' would this be an other-emptiness?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That other-emptiness does exist will be explained later on. Other-emptiness is not emptiness and is not ultimate truth. Other-emptiness is not what is negated in terms of being. The emptiness of a temple of monks, which is negating in terms of existing, does exist.

Student: Is it correct to say that according to the Chittamatra system "imputational factors do not exist by way of their own character but do exist inherently?"
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is right.
Student: If this is correct, then what is the difference between 'existing by way of its own character' and 'existing inherently' in Chittamatra?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: This is mentioned in the *Essence of Eloquence* which says that although certain bases are not apprehended to be the former they are apprehended to be the latter. This means the Chittamatra system distinguishes between establishment by way of its own character and inherently existent. For the Chittamatrins inherent existence means that when the object is sought it is found. Therefore, when one seeks, for example, space, it is found. One can say "There it is"; it being the mere emptiness in front of oneself. Therefore, if it is established by way of its own character it must also exist inherently. Therefore, it must exist by way of its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being merely imputed by conception. Imputational factors are not established by way of their own character because they are not that which exists by way of its own uncommon mode of subsistence without being merely imputed by conception. This is because an imputational factor is merely imputed by the conception apprehending it.

Student: What is the observed object of an eye consciousness seeing falling hair?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: For the Prasangika Madhyamikas the observed object is falling hair, which does not exist.

Student: In the case of a self-cognizer cognizing a conceptual consciousness, why is there an appearance of the appearing object, whereas when cognizing a sense consciousness there is not an appearance of the appearing object?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Perhaps this question is related to what is said in Gyeltshap Je's *Clarifying the Path to Liberation*. The appearing object of an eye consciousness is form, but form does not appear to its self-cognizer. Does the self-cognizer realize form? It does not realize it. The apprehended object of a sense consciousness is not realized by a self-cognizer, whereas the apprehended object of a conception is realized by a self-cognizer. However, I have to think about this a bit more.

END

Monday afternoon, 4 December 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 309) says:

> Of the remaining three [points], the teaching that there is an inherently existent mind-only without external objects is clarified as being an interpretable meaning [teaching] by the passage in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* which says:
>
> Just as to patients who are ill
> A doctor gives medicines;
> The Buddha, similarly, also thoroughly taught
> Mind-only to sentient beings.
>
> Just as the giving of medicines to individual patients is not under the control of the doctor himself but necessarily accords with the type of illness of the patient, similarly, the teaching on mind-only is also not by the force of the Teacher's own system but is by the force of the minds of trainees. By this teaching, the above passage is understood to be an interpretable meaning [teaching].

There are four points that are interpretable meaning teachings. The first of these, the explanation of three final vehicles, is explained to be an interpretable meaning teaching in Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra*. The second, the explanation of mind only without external objects, is here clarified to be an interpretable meaning teaching by this verse from the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*. This verse says that, just as a doctor gives medicine based on the particular illnesses of his patients, so too the Buddha gave teachings based on the need of sentient beings. Therefore, the Buddha taught mind only in order to care for the Chittamatrins. Thus, this teaching is not to be taken literally and is an interpretable meaning teaching.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 309) says:

> The passages cited in the autocommentary from the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*, from
> Similarly,
>
> [Mahamati said: "The tathagata essence taught] in the sutras expressed by the Bhagavan...
>
> through to
>
> ...[how will they] become manifest, complete buddhas [in peerless, complete enlightenment?]
>
> after [the verse] "Just as to patients and so forth," are passages that present the basis-of-all – asserted by the propounders of cognition to be a definitive meaning [teaching] – as being an interpretable meaning [teaching].

Also the third point, the teaching on a mind-basis-of-all, which for the Chittamatrins is a definitive meaning teaching, is shown by these passages from the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* to be an interpretable meaning teaching for the Prasangika Madhyamika system. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that a mind-basis-of-all does not exist and was taught by the Buddha in order to guide the Chittamatrins. This teaching is not to be taken literally and is an interpretable meaning teaching. A mind-basis-of-all is mainly asserted by the true aspectarian Chittamatrins who say that without a mind-basis-of-all there would be no basis for the infusion of positive and negative latencies. They say this is because latencies cannot be deposited on the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness, because it is not stable, whereas the basis for the infusion of the latencies must be stable, due to which they assert a mind-basis-of-all. However, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas this is an interpretable meaning teaching because there is no need to posit any basis for the depositing of latencies.

In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that

- it not necessary to posit a consciousness as the basis for the depositing of latencies or
- it is not necessary to posit latencies.

However, when they are pushed to posit a basis for the infusion of latencies they say that it can be posited as the mere I.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 309) says:

> Here [Jayananda's] *Explanatory Commentary* says:
>
> > Stating "similarly" [in the autocommentary means that] just as the teaching on an essence that is permanent and stable is an interpretable meaning [teaching], so too is the teaching on mind-only taught to be an interpretable meaning [teaching].
>
> This is wrongly stated because in the autocommentary it is clearly explained that the meaning of stating "similarly" is that the teaching on mind-only is an interpretable meaning [teaching]. Hence, just as the statement "Just as to patients" and so forth explains the propounding of mind-only to be an interpretable meaning [teaching], likewise, also the teaching that an essence that is permanent and stable is an interpretable meaning [teaching] establishes the teachings on a mind-basis-of-all in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* and so forth to not be literal.

Just as the teaching on mind only is an interpretable meaning teaching so too are other teachings. The passage in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* "Just as to patients" and so forth establishes that the teaching on a mind only without external objects as being an interpretable meaning teaching. Just as the verse in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* "The external appear but do not exist..." is explained to be interpretable meaning teaching, so too the passage presenting a tathagata essence that is permanent, stable, and enduring is explained to be an interpretable meaning teaching.

The passages in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* "[Mahamati said: 'The tathagata essence taught] in the sutras expressed by the Bhagavan...'" through to "'...how will they] become a manifest, complete buddha in peerless, complete enlightenment?'" mainly explain the passages teaching a tathagata essence which is permanent, stable, and enduring and which is a buddha body adorned with the thirty-two major marks within each sentient being as being an interpretable meaning teaching. In addition, these passages from the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* also indicate that a mind-basis-of-all is not literal.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 309-10) says:

> In regard to that, the teaching that there is an essence right from the beginning must be understood as not being literal. Therefore, the teaching in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* says:
>
> > [Buddha] said: "Sutras that teach in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings have a mistaken meaning; they are not discourse on thusness. For example, just as a deer that adheres to a mirage as water is deceived due to the water being non-existent, so too the Dharma that is taught [in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings] pleases the childish, but is not discourse that pleases a superior's exalted wisdom. Therefore, you should follow the meaning and not be enamored of the expression."

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the teaching that there is an essence right from the beginning must be understood as not being literal." Here it is important to make the distinction that

- the statement "Right now there exists in each sentient beings' continuum a tathagata essence which is a buddha body adorned with the thirty-two major marks" is an interpretable meaning teaching,
- whereas the statement "Right now there exists in each sentient being a tathagata essence" can be taken literally.

If these two are not differentiated this would contradict Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* which says: "Due to the completely enlightened beings radiating rays of light, the thusness being inseparable, and due to sentient beings having lineage, sentient beings always have a sugata essence." Thus, the essence that is interpretable meaning teaching is the essence existing in each sentient being right now which is a buddha body having the thirty-two major marks.

"Sutras that teach in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings have a mistaken meaning" means that what is taught in these sutras does not conform with reality. Thus, whatever the Buddha said that is in accordance with the minds of sentient beings does not actually conform with reality or, in other words, it is not true. This is because such teachings are not discourse on reality which are what please the superiors. The *Descent into Lanka Sutra* says: "Just as a deer that adheres to a mirage as water is deceived due to the water being non-existent, so too the Dharma that is taught [in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings] pleases the childish, but is not discourse that pleases a superior's exalted wisdom." The Buddha gives the example here of thirsty deer who mistake a mirage to be actual water and going there to drink are killed by hunters; similarly, discourse that pleases the childish does not please the superiors.

"Therefore, you should follow the meaning and not be enamored of the expression" means that one should understand the meaning and not be attached to the mere words. One should keep the four reliances in mind:

1. one should not rely on the words but on the meaning,
2. one should not rely on the interpretable meaning but on the definitive meaning,
3. one should not rely on a mistaken consciousness but on an unmistaken mental consciousness, and
4. one should not rely on the person but on the Dharma.

One should not rely on someone just because he or she is famous but instead analyze his or her words. For example, Lobsang Rabjampa in his well-known book *The Third Eye* talks about lamas who open the third eye by cutting a hole in their foreheads! In short, we should rely on the meaning and not on pleasant words just as, for example, if someone were to put honey on the sharp edge of a sword and then taste it, although it may taste good there is the danger of cutting one's tongue.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 310) says:

> In that sutra Mahamati says:
>
> > "The tathagata essence taught [in the sutras expressed by the Bhagavan] is said [by the Bhagavan] to be clear light in nature, completely pure from the beginning, and to exist, possessing the thirty-two signs, in the bodies of all sentient beings. If, like a precious gem wrapped in a dirty cloth, [the Bhagavan] expressed that wrapped in and dirtied by the cloth of the aggregates, constituents, and spheres as permanent, stable, and enduring, how is this propounded as an essence different from the Forders' propounding of a self?"

Here Mahamati questions the Buddha as to how the teaching on a tathagata essence which is permanent, stable, and enduring and possessing the thirty-two signs differs from the Forder's assertion of a self having five characteristics such as being permanent and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 310) says:

> In response to that, since such teachings are not literal, the explanation of "It is different from the self of the Forders" [is as follows].
>
> - The *basis of intention* of this teaching intended for whomever is emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness – the selflessness of phenomena.

- The *purpose* of this intended teaching is that by teaching that there exists a permanent, stable, and enduring essence (i) in order for the childish to abandon fear of selflessness and (ii) in order to gradually lead to suchness the Forders who strongly adhere to propounding a self and those who have familiarized themselves with such views in the past, [the Bhagavan] said that the present and future bodhisattvas should not adhere to a self. On the other hand, if this were taken literally it would be similar to the Forder's adherence to a self, therefore, it literally means 'do not adhere.'

The basis of intention of teaching a tathagata essence that is clear light and so forth is emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness. The purpose of this teaching is:
(i) in order for the childish to abandon fear of selflessness and to be led into selflessness and
(ii) in order to gradually lead to suchness the Forders who strongly adhere to propounding a self and those who have familiarized themselves with such views in the past.

The three doors of liberation are:
1. emptiness – the entity of phenomena, non-inherent existence,
2. signlessness – all phenomena included in causes are pacified of signs of true existence, and
3. wishlessness – all phenomena included in results are not wished for as truly existent results.

They are explained in the *Questions of Dritarakshta Sutra* saying: "Sentient beings, due to not comprehending these three, wander continuously in cyclic existence." In brief, when the Buddha taught such a tathagata essence he did so thinking about the three doors of liberation, whereas the purpose was to lead the childish to the realization of suchness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 310) says:

- The *damage* to it being actually literal is that, if it is asserted to be literal, there would be no difference between it and the self of the Forders.

If one were to take this teaching to be literal it would be similar to the Forders' assertion regarding a self.

In short, here Lama Tsongkhapa sets out the three attributes of an interpretable meaning teaching. In order to define a text as interpretable meaning it must have three attributes:
1. a basis of intention,
2. a purpose, and
3. damage to it being actually literal.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 311) says:

> Since the meaning of these [statements] has already been extensively explained elsewhere, I will not elaborate upon it here.

There is debate as to where the meaning of these statements has already been extensively explained. However, it is explained a little bit in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive* and this could also refer to the sections in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Golden Rosary* that explain the lineage mentioned in Haribhadra's *Commentary Clarifying the Meaning* in which it is said that there are sutras having a basis of intention which are of four types and those which have a deceptive motive which are also of four types.

Tuesday morning, 5 December 2000

The autocommentary says:

Also that very [sutra] indicates:

> Mahamati, the characteristics of emptiness, unproduced, non-dual, and lacking inherent existence are inserted in the sutra sets of all the buddhas...

After this citation [the autocommentary] says:

> Therefore, in this way, it has been made utterly clear by these passages that the sutras of this kind – all those asserted by the propounders of consciousness to be definitive meaning – are interpretable meaning.

This is Chandrakirti's commentary on the following lines from the root text:

> *Also other sutra sets of this kind are*
> *Clarified by these passages as just being interpretable meaning.* [6.95cd]

In short, all the sutras asserted by the Chittamatrins to be definitive meaning are, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, interpretable meaning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 311) says:

> Sutras of this kind are not the two sections of the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* that were just cited because both of them are not asserted by the propounders of cognition to be definitive meaning and because they were clearly explained before in the autocommentary in regard to the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought*.

"Sutras of this kind are not the two sections of the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*" refers to the two sections extensively quoted in the autocommentary and briefly quoted in the *Illumination* saying:

1)

> [Mahamati said: "The tathagata essence taught] in the sutras expressed by the Bhagavan...

through to

> ...[how will they] become a manifest, complete buddha [in peerless, complete enlightenment?]

and

2)

> Mahamati, the characteristics of emptiness, unproduced, non-dual, and lacking inherent existence are inserted in the sutra sets of all the buddhas...

These two sections are not 'sutras of that kind' – those that are to be explained as interpretable meaning – but are those that explain the sutras which are interpretable meaning to be interpretable meaning. The root text says:

> *Also other sutra sets of this kind are*
> *Clarified by these passages as just being interpretable meaning.* [6.95cd]

"Clarified by these passages" refers to these two sections in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 311) says:

> The explanation in [Jayananda's] *Explanatory Commentary* that the statement "these passages" refutes a creator when investigating dependent-relation in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* is completely unsuitable in that the refutation of other creators is taught:
> - to make it understood that the term 'only' of 'mind only' mentioned in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* does not refute external objects;
> - not to make it understood that the refutation of external objects is taught to be an interpretable meaning [teaching].

Jayananda's explanation in his *Explanatory Commentary* that when the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* explains the twelve links it refutes a creator is incorrect. The passage "The three realms are only mind" in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*, having negated other creators, establishes only mind to be the creator. Thus, the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* does not negate a creator but instead establishes that mind only is the creator.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the refutation of other creators is taught to make it understood that the term 'only' of 'mind only' mentioned in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* does not refute external objects; it is not to make it understood that the refutation of external objects is taught to be an interpretable meaning [teaching]." In short, when the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says "The three realms are only mind," the term 'only' does not refute external objects. It also does not explain the refutation of external objects to be an interpretable meaning teaching.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 311) says:

> Hence, in regard to the passage in the root text "Clarified by these passages as just being interpretable meaning" (v. 6.95d), there are three [points]:

The three points are the three passages that are explained to be interpretable meaning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 311) says:

> 1. That which teaches that a mind-only which negates external objects is an interpretable meaning [teaching] is the four [lines] "Just as to patients..."

The four lines that teach that mind-only is an interpretable meaning teaching are found in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 311) says:

> 2. That which teaches that a basis-of-all is an interpretable meaning [teaching] is the passage that teaches that a permanent and stable essence is an interpretable meaning [teaching].

The sutras that are explained to be interpretable meaning teachings are
- the teaching on the non-existence of external objects and
- the teaching on a mind-basis-of-all.

The *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* presents a mind-basis-of-all saying:

> "The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle,
> [Having] all the seeds, like the cascading flow of a river,
> When conceived as a self is not proper."
> I do not teach this to the childish.

The sutra that presents an essence that is permanent, stable, and enduring explains that the sutra setting out a mind-basis-of-all is an interpretable meaning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 311) says:

> QUESTION: By teaching that the existence of a permanent and stable essence is an interpretable meaning [teaching], how is a basis-of-all established to be an interpretable meaning [teaching]?
> RESPONSE: The *Sutra on the Heavily Adorned* says:
>
> Grounds are the bases of all varieties,
> So too is the virtuous sugata essence.
> The Tathagata teaches that essence
> By the term 'basis-of-all.'
> Although the essence is proclaimed to be a basis-of-all,
> Those other awarenesses do not understand.
>
> The *Descent into Lanka Sutra* also says:
>
> The tathagata essence proclaimed as the mind-basis-of-all is together with the seven consciousnesses...

The *Sutra on the Heavily Adorned* says that an essence was taught using the term 'basis-of-all.' The *Descent into Lanka Sutra* also says: "The tathagata essence proclaimed as the mind-basis-of-all." "The essence is proclaimed to be a basis-of-all" means that the mind's emptiness of true existence is called a basis-of-all.

"The seven consciousnesses" are the six operational consciousnesses and the afflicted mentality. When the mind-basis-of-all is added to these seven there are a total of eight consciousnesses. The mind-basis-of-all is the basis, together with it are the other seven consciousnesses. Since the mind-basis-of-all is the illustration of the person, it can be said that the person possesses seven consciousnesses, the six operational consciousnesses and afflicted mentality.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 312) says:

> These two – [a basis-of-all and a tathagata essence] – are taught many times to be synonyms. Moreover, since, [among] these two, one is explained as permanent and one as impermanent the literal meaning of the two is not taught to be the same. However, since a mind-basis-of-all is taught through thinking about the very meaning of the essence that was taught through thinking about whomever [it was meant for], they mean the same since they are synonyms in terms of the intended meaning.

One can ask "If the basis-of-all is impermanent, whereas the tathagata essence are permanent, how can they be synonyms?" The response is that "the literal meaning of the two is not taught to be the same." On the other hand, since the basis of intention of teaching a basis-of-all and that of teaching a tathagata essence are the same they are synonyms in terms of the intended meaning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 312) says:

> Hence, the very teaching that the former is an interpretable meaning [teaching] also establishes the latter to be an interpretable meaning [teaching].

"The former" refers to the teaching on a tathagata essence that is permanent, stable, and enduring, whereas "the latter" refers to the teaching on a mind-basis-of-all.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 312) says:

> The autocommentary says:

> Because of permeating the nature of all things, understand that emptiness alone is indicated by the term 'mind-basis-of-all.'
>
> Having excellently matched the two teachings that [a mind-basis-of-all] and a permanent and stable essence are interpretable meaning [teachings], by means of these passages one should realize that a basis-of-all is taught to be an interpretable meaning [teaching].

By means of the passage regarding an essence that is permanent, stable, and enduring, the passage setting out a mind-basis-of-all is established to be an interpretable meaning teaching.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 312) says:

> 3. After saying "Mahamati, the characteristics of emptiness, unproduced, non-dual, and lacking inherent existence are inserted in the sutras of all the buddhas," the *[Descent into Lanka] Sutra* says:
>
> Whatever the sutra, this is suitable. This very meaning is to be comprehended in them.
>
> This is the passage that teaches that [the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought*] which distinguishes the first two natures as existing and not existing by way of their own character is an interpretable meaning [teaching].

The passage in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* "Mahamati, the characteristics of emptiness, unproduced, non-dual, and lacking inherent existence are inserted in the sutra sets of all the buddhas..." explains the sutra that sets out the first two of the three natures to be an interpretable meaning teaching. In other words, the sutra that says that other-powered phenomena are established by way of their own character and that imputational factors are not established by way of their own character is an interpretable meaning teaching. According to the Chittamatrins the passage in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* that says that imputational factors are not established by way of their own character and other-powered phenomena and that thoroughly established phenomena are established by way of their own character is a definitive meaning teaching, whereas according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas it is an interpretable meaning teaching that was intended only for the Chittamatrins. Although the Prasangika Madhyamikas accept the three natures in general, they posit them differently.

In the Prasangika Madhyamika system if it is an established base it is pervaded by being imputed by conception; therefore, it is merely imputed by conception. Therefore, if someone were to say that that which is merely imputed by conception is the imputational factor this would not be correct because then it would have to be said that other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are imputational factors because they are merely imputed by conception. Therefore, how do the Prasangika Madhyamikas define the imputational factor?

Student: They define it as the two selves, a self of persons and a self of phenomena.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Are there not two types of imputational factors, one that exists and one that does not exist?

Student 2: Existing imputational factors are permanent phenomena not produced by causes.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to Prasangika Madhyamika what is the definition of imputational factor?

Student: Phenomena that come into existence in dependence on an established base.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It follows that the person is an imputational factor because it comes into existence in dependence on an established base!

Student: An imputational factor is that which is superimposed by the conception apprehending it.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That would be the same as the Chittamatra way of positing the imputational factor. Think about it. Other-powered phenomena and the thoroughly established phenomena are defined by the Prasangika Madhyamikas just as they are defined by the Chittamatrins:

- an other-powered phenomenon is that which is produced by causes and conditions, and
- a thoroughly established phenomenon is the final observed object of a pure path

The Chittamatrins say that the first nature, the imputational factor, is not established by way of its own character whereas the other two natures are established by way of their own character. How is this explained to be an interpretable meaning teaching? What is the basis of intention for the Buddha to have taught this, the purpose, and the damage to the actual literal meaning? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 312) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-3A2 Indicating it [to be an interpretable meaning teaching] by means of reasonings

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

In order to clarify as just interpretative in meaning through reasoning:

The buddhas taught "When knowable objects do not exist,
The elimination of knowers is easy to acquire."
Since refutation of knowers is proved if knowable objects do not exist,
Initially, objects of knowledge are refuted. [6.96]

The buddha bhagavans lead those to be subdued to non-inherent existence gradually. For that, because those producing merits easily engage in reality (dharmata), just as they initially compose discourses on giving and so forth, similarly because refuting knowable objects is also a method of comprehending selflessness, the Bhagavan taught only refutation of knowable objects beforehand – because those understanding the selflessness of knowable objects easily engage in the selflessness of knowers.

As those understanding knowable objects as non-inherently existent will realize knowers (i.e., consciousnesses) as non-inherently existent somewhat by only themselves [and] will [realize it] somewhat by merely a little intensive teaching [by others], the mere refutation of knowable objects is taught beforehand.

The Buddha first taught that objects of knowledge do not exist externally, then later taught that consciousness does not exist inherently. The Buddha taught that objects of knowledge do not exist externally and that they do not exist inherently in order to gradually lead beings to the understanding that consciousness does not exist inherently.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 48), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2C3A-2 Showing by logic

The buddhas have taught that when knowables don't exist,
Removal of consciousness is easily obtained.
Since one achieves refutation of consciousness if
There's no knowables, first of all they deny the knowables. [6.96]

It should be understood that there is a reason that the Buddha first denies external knowable phenomena: it is because if there are no external knowable phenomena, refutation that consciousness ultimately exists is easily achieved. For the buddhas have taught that if external knowable phenomena do not exist, then elimination of a truly existent consciousness is easily obtained.

There is some discrepancy regarding the spelling in the various texts in that there appears both the Tibetan word *gsal* which means 'clarification' and the word *bsal* which means 'elimination.' This word can be understood in terms of clarification in the sense that when one understands that there is no external objects, it will be clear that there is no inherently existent mind. However, Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* explains the word *gsal* or *bsal* in terms of refutation or elimination in the sense that when it is understood that there do not exist external objects of knowledge, consciousness will be eliminated as being inherently existent

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 312) says:

> Now, in order to clarify by means of reasonings that the Chittamatra teachings are interpretable meaning, there is [the following] explanation.
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *The buddhas say "If objects of knowledge do not exist,*
> *The elimination of consciousness is easily acquired."*
> *Since if objects of knowledge do not exist, the refutation of consciousness is established*
> *Initially there is the refutation of objects of knowledge.* [6.96]
>
> Regarding that, just as they initially apply discourse on generosity and so forth as a means for those who have accumulated merit to easily engage in reality, likewise, the buddhas gradually guide those trainees – who are initially unable to realize the complete, profound meaning – to the realization of the lack of inherent existence.

The Buddha first teaches discourse on generosity and so forth to trainees in order to increase their accumulation of merit. He then teaches emptiness to them in order for them to increase their collection of wisdom. Thus, the Buddha first skillfully teaches generosity and only later teaches emptiness. Similarly, the Buddha first teaches that external objects do not exist and then later explains that consciousness does not exist inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 312-3) says:

> To such [trainees], *the buddhas say* "*If* first it is taught that external *objects of knowledge do not exist*, afterward *the elimination of consciousness* as inherently existent *is easily acquired*."

Note that although here the Tibetan text says *gsal* which means 'clarification' – whereby this sentence would read "afterward the clarification of consciousness as inherently existent is easily acquired" – this is not correct. Therefore, the Tibetan should be corrected to read *bsal* which means 'elimination.'

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 312) says:

> Hence, because the absence of objects of knowledge – that is, the initial refutation of external objects – is also a method to completely realize selflessness, the buddhas *initially* teach just *the refutation of* external *objects of knowledge* because, *if objects of knowledge do not exist*, those who understand the selflessness of external objects *refute consciousness* – that is, they easily *establish* its selflessness.

"They easily establish its selflessness" means that they easily establish consciousness to lack inherent existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 312) says:

> Those who understand that external objects do not exist inherently

- sometimes realize by themselves alone that consciousness does not exist inherently and
- sometimes realize it by means of a small amount of mere teachings from others.

When one understands that external objects do not exist inherently, one will then be able to realize that consciousness does not exist inherently either by means of thinking about this oneself or by means of receiving a small amount of teachings from others.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 312) says:

> That 'External objects do not exist and consciousness is inherently existent' is an interpretable meaning [teaching] is clearly taught in [Nagarjuna's] *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* which says:
>
> The Subduer taught
> "All these are only mind"
> So that the childish would abandon fear.
> That is not thusness.
>
> Also Aryadeva clearly taught this in his *Compendium of the Heart of Exalted Wisdom*.

When the Buddha taught 'External objects do not exist and consciousness is inherently existent,' he did so in order for the childish to abandon fear, listen to his teachings, and then gradually come to realize that consciousness is not inherently existent. Nagarjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* is a commentary on tantra, as is, perhaps, Aryadeva's *Compendium of the Heart of Exalted Wisdom*.

In summary, the four points to be explained as interpretable meaning teachings according to Prasangika Madhyamika are:
1. the third Dharma wheel, which according to Chittamatra is a definitive meaning teaching, that clarifies the three natures along with their characteristics,
2. the sutra set that explains a mind-basis-of-all,
3. the sutra set that explains three final vehicles, and
4. the sutra set that explains mind only without external objects.

Three of these are mentioned by Chandrakirti in his autocommentary. He does not mention the fourth, the explanation of three final vehicles, because he says that this is easily understood by consulting Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutras*.

Tuesday afternoon, 5 December 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 313) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-2B2C-3B Indicating the method for realizing the interpretable and definitive meanings of the sutras

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> To explain that "those with wisdom should also similarly investigate others":
>
> *Thus, one has understood the account of the scriptures –*
> *Whatever sutra concerns explaining what is not thusness,*
> *Teaches interpretative meaning but is to be interpreted through realization and*
> *[Whatever] concerns emptiness, the definitive meaning – should be known.*[72] [6.97]

[72] See Hopkins' translation, pages 617-618.

"Those with wisdom should also similarly investigate others" means that they should also similarly explain other sutras. A buddha, without explicitly teaching emptiness, knows how to teach it indirectly and thereby gradually leads others to its realization.

"One has understood the account of the scriptures" means that one should understand the account of what are interpretable meaning and what are definitive meaning teachings as in this way one will know how to interpret a particular passage as being either interpretable or definitive. Having understood that, one should assert that a sutra that does not explain emptiness but explains conventionalities is an interpretable meaning sutra. "[Whatever] concerns emptiness, the definitive meaning" means that if it is a sutra that mainly teaches emptiness it is a definitive meaning sutra.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 48), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-1A2B-2C3B The method of understanding the interpretive and direct meaning of sutras

Having understood like that the account of these scriptures,
You should realize the sutras whose subject is not reality
Are taught with interpretive meaning, and interpret them;
And know those whose subject is voidness are definitive. [6.97]

Having understood the account of the scriptures like that, you should know the interpretive and definitive. For sutras whose subject is mainly not absolute reality, but the conventional, are taught to be of interpretive meaning, and you should understand [this] and interpret [them], and those whose subject is voidness should be understood as of definitive meaning.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as those sutra sets that do not explicitly clarify dependent-arising – distinguished by non-production and so forth – become causes of engaging in non-inherent existence, they are to be explained like that.

Any sutra set that does not explicitly present emptiness or that does not set out the special reasoning of dependent-arising that establishes the lack of inherent existence is to be understood as a cause for engaging in the lack of inherent existence. These sutras are a method to gradually lead beings to the realization of reality.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> With regard to what was taught [in the *Praise of the Supramundane*,.5]:[73]
>
> "If the eye does not apprehend the elements,
> How can the eye apprehend that arising [from them]?"
> When you taught that about form,
> You overcame grasping to form.

This verse is from Nagarjuna's *Praise of the Supramundane*. Nagarjuna composed three collections: a collection of reasonings, a collection of discourses, and a collection of praises.

[73] See Lindtner's translation and note, page 130 with the Sanskrit and a different Tibetan version.

Are the elements apprehended objects of the eyes? They are not. What are they apprehended by? They are apprehended by the body consciousness because the four elements are tangible objects. Are the forms which are evolutes – "that arising from them" – apprehended objects of the eye? They are.

Nagarjuna says: "When you taught that about form, you overcame grasping to form." Form in this context is not just form in general, it is the form sphere in particular because form in general is not necessarily an apprehended object of eye consciousness.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is also taught in sutra:
>
> > The topic of impermanence means non-existence.

In the fourth chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*, in the context of the twenty-seven aspects of a knower of bases, it says:

> *From the aspect of non-existence through*
> *The aspect of unshakeability,*
> *They are explained as four with respect to each truth*
> *And as fifteen with respect to paths.* [4.2]

"The aspect of non-existence" refers to the attribute of impermanence of true sufferings. Similarly, also here in the sutra the word 'non-existence' is related to true sufferings which do not exist permanently. The citation "The topic of impermanence means non-existence" is from the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [Whatever] concerns emptiness should also be known as definitive in meaning as was said [in the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra*, 7.5]:
>
> > Know the feature of definitive meaning sutra sets
> > As the Sugata explained the empty.
> > [Those] in which sentient being, person, and being are indicated,
> > Know all those doctrines as interpretative meanings.[74]

The sutras that explain the sentient being, person, and being are interpretable meaning teachings. Thus, the interpretable meaning is conventional truth and the definitive meaning is ultimate truth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, it is taught [in the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra*]:
>
> > Whatever sutras I taught in a thousand world systems,
> > different words [yet] same in meaning – those incapable of the fully proclaimed.
> >
> > If contemplation is done on one thing, one will meditate on all those, hence
> > all buddhas thoroughly taught however many doctrines.

[74] See translations by Hopkins, page 600: by Thurman, quoted by Tzong Khapa, page 254, and by Cabezon, page 77.

> A self of all phenomena is non-existent. If some men skilled in the meaning were to train in this point, buddha-dharmas would not be difficult to find.

The first verse indicates that the Buddha gave different teachings in countless worlds. The second verse says that when one thinks about one phenomenon's emptiness of inherent existence, one also meditates on the lack of inherent existence of all phenomena. With respect to "one will meditate," among the two types of meditation, analytical meditation and stabilizing meditation, here it refers to analytical meditation because by contemplating and analyzing the emptiness of one thing one meditates on the emptiness of all phenomena. In other words, when one is able to meditate on the lack of inherent existence of one phenomenon, one is also able to meditate on the lack of inherent existence of all phenomena.

"Hence, all buddhas thoroughly taught however many doctrines, a self of all phenomena is non-existent" means that however many teachings the buddhas give they are all taught in order for sentient beings to realize selflessness. "If some men skilled in the meaning were to train in this point, buddha-dharmas would not be difficult to find" means that when someone is skilled in the meaning and trains in it the state of a buddha becomes easy to attain.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, that it is also taught extensively in the sutra sets such as the *Exalted* [*Teachings of*] *Akshayamati* [*Sutra*] and so forth should be realized.

The subject of the interpretable meaning and definitive meaning is discussed in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Treatise on the Interpretable and Definitive*. Here it says that Asanga bases his understanding on the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* while Nagarjuna bases his understanding on the *Teachings of Akshayamati Sutra*. Thus, in the Chittamatra system the distinguishment of the interpretable meaning and definitive meaning is based on the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought*, whereas in the Prasangika Madhyamika system the distinguishment of the interpretable meaning and definitive meaning is based upon the *Teachings of Akshayamati Sutra*.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> I shall express a little bit [about our own system's presentation].[75] For example, a snake is imagined (imputed) on a coiled rope – a dependent-arising – because that [snake] does not exist on that [rope]. The [snake] is fully established on an actual snake because it is not imagined.

The Prasangika Madhyamika sets out the example of a coiled rope in order to establish the lack of inherent existence, whereas the Svatantrika Madhyamika sets out the examples of a reflection, a magic show, and so forth in order to establish the lack of true existence. However, it is said that the example of a coiled rope is the best because its meaning is easier to understand. This example is of a coiled rope in a dim corner which someone mistakes for a snake. Having imagined or imputed the rope to be a snake, that person becomes frightened. Although there is no rope from its own side, it is imputed to be a snake. Chandrakirti says: "For example, a snake is imagined (imputed) on a coiled rope – a dependent-arising – because that [snake] does not exist on that [rope]."

"The [snake] is fully established on an actual snake because it is not imagined" means that on a real or actual snake 'snake' is thoroughly established. Thus, if there were a real snake in the dark

[75] See translation by Hopkins, pages 618-619.

corner it would not be imagined. Just as a snake is imputed on a coiled rope, all phenomena do not exist from their own side but are merely imputed by thought and term.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, a [final] nature is totally imagined in other-powered [phenomena] having production since [final] entitiness does not have production as it is set forth [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 15.2cd]:
>
> > Natures are not fabricated and are without dependence on others.[76]

Here Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* says that natures are not fabricated by causes and conditions and do not depend on others. However, if "natures" are taken to be emptinesses, this would not concord with saying that they do not depend on others. Therefore, perhaps this phrase has to be understood as meaning that natures are not fabricated by causes and conditions and do not depend on other causes and conditions, whereby the word "natures" would concord with meaning emptinesses. If it is not taken in this way, one could debate asking: "Is emptiness not a dependent-arising?"

"Since [final] entitiness does not have production" means that entitiness is not produced by causes and conditions.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That [final nature] that is imagined in presently apprehended reflection-like dependent-arisings having production is actual in the sphere of a buddha because it is not totally imagined. For, without contacting functioning things having production, he manifests (i.e., directly perceives) solely the [final] nature. Hence, because of comprehending thusness, he is called "buddha."

All phenomena that are reflection-like dependent-arisings are the direct sphere of activity (object) of buddhas. For a buddha there is no imputation by conception, things are always directly perceived or realized because a buddha has no conceptualization. Therefore, whatever he perceives is always directly perceived and not conceived. With respect to the statement "For, without contacting functioning things having production, he manifests (i.e., directly perceives) solely the [final] nature" it can be asked what does 'without contacting functioning things' mean? Does a buddha not realize all phenomena directly? Therefore, why say "without contacting functioning things having production, he manifests solely the [final] nature"? This means that in the perspective of a buddha's seer of suchness functioning things do not exist. Thus, for a buddha's seer of suchness there are no functioning things just as in the perspective of a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise there are no conventionalities. If there were conventionalities in its perspective what would follow? It would follow that they would be an object of negation. There are two types of objects of negation: (i) an object of negation in the perspective of a consciousness of an ultimate type (a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise) and (ii) the object of negation that is true existence.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

[76] See the translation of these two lines in the context of Nagarjuna's verses, and the *Autocommentary*, in Napper, page 127-129 and the notes on 713-716.

> Therefore, having thus realized the presentation of the three entities called "the imagined, the other-powered, and the fully-established," the intention of the sutra should be thoroughly explained.

Having identified the three natures along with their specific characteristics, one should thoroughly explain the sutra.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Because the two, apprehendeds and apprehenders, are other-powered and apart from them there are no things, it should be considered whether the two are indeed imagined in other-powered phenomena.
>
> Enough through elaboration, I shall explain the main [subject].

From the point of view of the Prasangika Madhyamikas all phenomena are pervaded by being included in either apprehendeds or apprehenders. Apprehendeds are external objects which exist and apprehenders are the consciousnesses that apprehend them. Both apprehendeds and apprehenders are other-powered phenomena. Thus, there are no functioning things that are not included in other-powered phenomena.

Wednesday morning, 6 December 2000

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 313) says:

> The explanation of "Those possessing wisdom should also similarly investigate[77] other interpretable meaning sutras that do not completely and explicitly indicate thusness" [is as follows].
> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *Having understood the account of such passages,*
> *One should also realize that any sutra whose meaning does not explain suchness*
> *Is an interpretable meaning teaching and then interpret it.*
> *Understand that those whose meaning is emptiness are definitive meaning.* [6.97]
>
> *Having understood the account* – that is, the presentation – of the interpretability and definitiveness *of such passages* as were explained previously, *one should also realize that any sutra* set *whose meaning*, that is, whose subject matter, *does not explain* the meaning of *suchness is* an interpretable meaning [sutra] – that is, *an interpretable meaning teaching* that does not explicitly clarify dependent-arisings qualified by being unproduced and so forth – and *then interpret it*. Similarly, those [passages] that become a cause for engaging in the realization of the lack of inherent existence are to be explained in that way.

If it is a sutra that does not present emptiness explicitly it is an interpretable meaning sutra. Such sutras, although not presenting emptiness explicitly, are a method to realize emptiness. Thus, all the teachings given by the Buddha are either explicit teachings on emptiness or indirect teachings that are a method for realizing it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 314) says:

> [Nagarjuna's] *Praise of the Supramundane* says:

[77] Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 126) says *brtag par bya* (investigate), whereas Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 313) says *bstan par bya* (teach). The first seems more appropriate.

> "If the eye does not apprehend[78] the elements,
> How does the eye apprehend their evolutes?"
> When you taught that about form,
> You overcame the apprehension of form.
>
> Sutra also says:
> The meaning of impermanence is the meaning of not existing.

The elements are not apprehended objects of the eye consciousness, whereas their evolutes, that which derives from them, are apprehended objects of the eye consciousness.

The sutra citation says that impermanence means not existing as permanent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 314) says:

> The way in which the first passage becomes a means to make it known [that these are interpretable meaning teachings is as follows]. In Abhidharma the Bhagavan taught:
> The four elements are tangible objects which are not objects of the eye, whereas the form spheres that are evolutes which arise from them are apprehended objects of the eye.

The four elements are not apprehended objects of the eye, whereas form spheres, which are either colors or shapes, are apprehended objects of the eye. Instead the four elements are tangible objects that are apprehended objects of the body consciousness as is taught in the Abhidharma by the Bhagavan and in *Collected Topics* by Purbuchog. Thus, they are not apprehended objects of the eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, and tongue consciousness. The five sense consciousnesses have their respective determined objects. Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* says: "One does not know two because the objects of the sense powers are determined."

On the other hand, the evolutes, that which derives from the four elements, are the apprehended objects of eye consciousness. The evolutes are, for example, form spheres.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 314) says:

> It being necessary to assert both, if, when teaching their suchness, they are established by way of their own entity, it must be asserted either:
> - that the elements are apprehended objects of the eye or
> - that objects, forms, are not apprehended objects of the eye.

If they are inherently existent, it must be asserted either that the elements are apprehended objects of the eye or that form spheres are not apprehended objects of the eye. In other words, if the four elements existed inherently they could be apprehended by an eye consciousness because they would arise independently from their own side. It also follows that if the four elements were inherently existent, then the forms that arise from them would not be apprehended objects of the eye.

If the four elements exist inherently why would it follow that they are apprehended objects of the eye? If the forms arising from them exist inherently why would it follow that they are not apprehended objects of the eye? Think about it. Since inherent existence means to exist independently from its own side, then forms and so forth could appear to any consciousness, for example, the form spheres that arise from the four elements would appear not just to the eye consciousness but also to

[78] Tibetan should read gsungs rather than gsugs.

the body consciousness or else they would not be perceived by any consciousness at all. Saying this is a way of pushing things to extremes.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 314) says:

> When this is understood, one understands that the first way of explaining does not teach their suchness. Having understood this, one newly realizes suchness and understands that the first way of explaining is taught as a method for engaging [suchness].

In brief, although a sutra does not explicitly present emptiness it is a means to lead others to engage in emptiness and to achieve its realization newly. Then one "understands that the first way of explaining is taught as a method for engaging [suchness]." This first way of explaining refers to that set out previously in Nagarjuna's *Praise of Supramundane Qualities*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 314) says:

> The meaning of the second passage is that, as in the first, it is to be understood that teaching things as being produced and disintegrating is on account of their lacking inherent existence.

"It is to be understood that teaching things as being produced and disintegrating is on account of their lacking inherent existence" means that, when the sutra says "The meaning of impermanence is the meaning of non-existence" it indicates that functioning things are produced having the nature of disintegration. "Teaching things as being produced and disintegrating" means that phenomena that are produced and disintegrate are empty of inherent existence. In short, impermanent things lack inherent existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 314) says:

> *Understand* that any sutra *whose meaning*, that is, whose explicit subject matter, *is* the *emptiness* of inherent existence of persons and phenomena *is* a *definitive meaning* [sutra].

Any sutra that explicitly presents the emptiness of inherent existence of persons and phenomena is a definitive meaning sutra.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 314) says:

> Hence, the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra* also says:
>
> Understand empty, as explained by the Sugata,
> To be the particularity of the definitive meaning sutra sets.
> Understand those that teach the sentient being, the person, the being,
> All these phenomena, to be interpretable meaning.
>
> The particularity of the definitive meaning sutra sets is the feature that is different from the interpretable meaning sutra sets. Indicating the person [in the sutra above] is just to illustrate, that is, to indicate, that the agent, object of the action, and activity exist. This is the scriptural source for the way of positing the sutra sets as the two – the interpretable and the definitive.

The *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra* explains the way of positing a sutra as either interpretable meaning or definitive meaning. In brief, any sutra set that presents emptiness is definitive meaning, while any sutra set that teaches the sentient being, person, and being, or agent, object, and activity, are interpretable meaning.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Indicating the person [in the sutra above] is just to illustrate, that is, to indicate, that the agent, object of the action, and activity exist." The subject matter of interpretable meaning sutras can also be anything other than the person; the person is just mentioned here as an illustration. Thus, while the sutra only explicitly mentions agent, it also implies objects and actions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 315) says:

> This very [sutra] also says:
>
> In a thousand world systems,
> Whatever Dharmas I teach,
> Different in words, same in meaning,
> Cannot be fully proclaimed.
>
> When one thing is thought about,
> One will familiarize with them all.
> Hence, all the buddhas thoroughly teach,
> However many Dharmas there are,
>
> A self of all phenomena does not exist.
> When those humans skilled in the meaning
> Train in this point,
> It is not difficult to find the Dharma of the Buddha.
>
> The four lines 'In a thousand world systems...' mean that however many sutra sets [the Buddha] taught, those that explicitly clarify the ultimate are those that explicitly lead to thusness. However, since even the interpretable meaning [sutra sets], which do not teach that, indirectly lead to thusness, the meaning is the same as leading to the ultimate.

If a sutra set explicitly presents emptiness, it explicitly leads to emptiness. However, also the sutras that do not present emptiness explicitly, indirectly lead to thusness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 315) says:

> Therefore, it is said "Since those who are beginners at training in the path are unable to seek out every sutra set that exists in the world systems, they should seek the meaning of thusness in one [text] that is a sutra set" because also those [sutras] that do not explicitly teach thusness are to be understood through citing them as a means to make it known that they must be explained as a cause for engaging [thusness].
>
> The two [lines] 'When thinking about one thing...' mean that, having understood well the thusness of one substratum, when one familiarizes oneself with it, it becomes familiarization with the thusness of all substrata, whereby it is not necessary to meditate individually on the reality of each and every substratum.

When one meditates on emptiness based upon one substratum, one also meditates on the emptiness of all other substrata, therefore, it is not necessary to meditate on the emptiness of each and every substratum.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 315) says:

> The presentation of what it is that 'when one has familiarized with one thing, one has familiarized with all' is indicated by the three lines 'Hence, all buddhas thoroughly teach...' Teaching in this way, stating 'A self of phenomena does not exist,' is not to say that one substratum is enough for those on the conduct side of the vast [path].

On the conduct side of the vast path there are many things to be practiced. Hence, the three lines "Hence, all buddhas thoroughly teach, however many Dharmas there are, a self of all phenomena does not exist" do not mean that it is enough for those on the conduct side of the vast path to meditate on one thing and not meditate on others. These lines specifically mean that by meditating on the emptiness of one substratum, one meditates on the emptiness of all other substrata.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 315-6) says:

> It is taught:
>
> > Just as the *Moon Lamp Sutra* teaches the way of positing [the kinds of sutra sets] as being definite in number, similarly, that this is extensively taught in the sutra set of the *Teachings of Akshayamati Sutra* and so forth should also be realized.
>
> I have already explained the conclusive analysis regarding these [statements] in the *[Treatise] Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive*.

Lama Tsongkhapa explains the interpretable meaning and definitive meaning in his *Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive* in the discussion of the Chittamatra system and in relation to the *Teachings of Akshayamati Sutra*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 316) says:

> [Chandrakirti's statement in his autocommentary] "I will explain this a little bit" [means that], when the explanation of the three natures in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* is explained to be of interpretable meaning, thinking "How are those three posited by our own system?", I will teach that a bit. For example, snake is wrongly imputed on a dependent-arising that is a coiled rope because that snake does not exist on that rope. [Snake] is thoroughly established in regard to an actual snake because it is not imputed while not existing. Similarly, a natural mode of being *(rang bzhin gshis lugs*) is also imputed on compounded other-powered phenomena while not existing on them. This is because the entity of the mode of being does not have production since *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 15.2cd) says:
>
> > Natures are not fabricated and
> > Do not exist in reliance upon other.

The three natures are:
(i) other-powered phenomena, the base upon which the imputational factor is imputed,
(ii) imputational factors,
(iii) thoroughly established phenomena, an other-powered phenomenon's emptiness of the imputational factor.

The base is an other-powered phenomenon which can be either (i) the person or (ii) any phenomena other than the person. One imputes a self of persons on the other-powered phenomenon that is a person and imputes a self of phenomena on the other-powered phenomena that are other than the person; these two selves are the imputational factors. The thoroughly established phenomenon is the base's emptiness of its respective object of negation:
(i) the person's emptiness of the object of negation is the thoroughly established phenomenon in relation to the base which is the person and
(ii) a phenomenon's emptiness of the object of negation is the thoroughly established phenomenon in relation to the base which is phenomenon.

The way in which we impute a self on a base is like the way in which a snake is imputed on a coiled rope in a dim place. Snake imputed on the dependent-arising that is a coiled rope is the way in which the imputational factor exists. On the other hand, snake imputed on an actual snake it is not an

imputational factor because an actual snake exists. Similarly, when we impute inherent existence, which is not there, on an other-powered phenomenon that is the imputational factor on the base of an other-powered phenomenon.

Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* says: "Natures are not fabricated and do not exist in reliance upon other."

The three natures are perhaps:

1. the nature itself,
2. non-fabricated, and
3. non-reliance on other.

These will be discussed later on. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says that there are two types of object of negation which are to be negated: one that is too extensive (over-pervasive) and one that is too limited (under-pervasive). This text says: "When the object of negation is posited to have the three qualifications it is under-pervasive."

"The mode of being" is emptiness, it is not produced.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 316) says:

> That nature imputed as the mode of being on reflection-like dependent-arisings that are being apprehended, that is, are being perceived, that have production – the sphere of activity of a buddha's seer of modes – is the actual mode of being because it is not imputed while not existing on them. Because of comprehending thusness by directly perceiving the nature alone without contacting the things that have production by causes and conditions with his exalted wisdom, he is called 'buddha.' The conclusive analysis regarding ignorance will be explained [below].

The mode of being is emptiness. When a buddha's seer of modes observes dependent-arisings, functioning things, it sees their mode of being. In other words, when a buddha observes the mode of being he does so without contacting conventionalities. In short, in the perspective of a buddha's seer of modes there is no appearance of conventionalities. Why? Because in the perspective of that seer of modes conventionalities do not exist.

"The conclusive analysis regarding ignorance will be explained [below]" means that ignorance will be explained later on.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> [The autocommentary says] "Therefore, like that, having realized the presentation of the three natures, I will explain the intention of the sutra." By means of this way of explaining, the intention of explaining the three characters in the "Questions of Maitreya Chapter" is also made known. Through that, the intention of explaining the three natures in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* as being an interpretable meaning [teaching] is also to be understood.

The way in which the three natures are explained in the "Questions of Maitreya Chapter" and the way in which they are explained in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* are different. There are ten chapters in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought*; the three natures are mainly discussed in the "Questions of Paramarthasamudgata Chapter." In short, the way in which the three natures are presented in the "Questions of Maitreya Chapter" and the way in which they are presented in the "Questions of Paramarthasamudgata Chapter" are different. This is discussed in the context of the presentation of the Chittamatra system in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 317) says:

> The Chittamatrins' imputing – in regard to the basis of imputation, other-powered phenomena – apprehendeds and apprehenders being two different entities as the imputational factor requires thought and investigation because the two, apprehendeds and apprehenders, are other-powered phenomena, whereas the other-powered phenomena that are not them are non-existent things.
>
> I have already explained the conclusive analysis regarding the presentation of the three natures which are explained in the "Questions of Maitreya Chapter" and the three natures in the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* in the *Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive*.

When it is said that the *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* presents the three natures it specifically means that the "Questions of Paramarthasamudgata Chapter" presents them. Thinking that the entire *Sutra Unraveling the Thought* presents the three natures is incorrect. There are ten chapters in this text which are questions put forth by ten different bodhisattvas.

The three natures or three characters are set forth in particular by the Chittamatrins but are also presented by the Prasangika Madhyamikas and the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, whereas they are not presented by the lower schools. However, they are presented differently by the Madhyamikas; for example, they present the imputational factor which to be negated differently. Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport*, in relation to the third chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*, defines the three natures. The *Ornament for Clear Realizations* says:

> *Forms and so forth, their impermanence and so forth,*
> *The incomplete and thoroughly complete,*
> *The application that stops the action*
> *With respect to non-attachment itself to that,* [*3.8]*
>
> *Not changing, the very non-existence of agents,*
> *The applications of the three types of difficult actions,*
> *Because of attaining a result according to one's fortune*
> *It is asserted there is a result,* [*3.9]*
>
> *Not relying upon others, and*
> *Appearances are to be understood as seven types.* [*3.10ab]*

When the Svatantrika Madhyamikas comment on the first of these stanzas, they say that other-powered phenomena and imputational factors are incomplete as a base for excellent qualities, whereas the thoroughly established alone are a thoroughly complete base for excellent qualities. Thus, stating "The incomplete" in the *Ornament* refers to other-powered phenomena and imputational factors, whereas 'thoroughly complete' refers to thoroughly established phenomena.

This concludes the refutation of the production from other. The next topics of discussion are the refutations of production from both and causeless production, which conclude the discussion of the self of phenomena. After that there is a discussion of the self of persons. Yogis refute a self of persons by taking the conventionally existent self of persons and then refuting the self of persons that does not exist. In general, we too should search for the "I" and "mine."

Wednesday afternoon, 6 December 2000

What is the main topic in the chapter on the sixth mind generation? The sixth chapter mainly explains the refutation of the four types of production:

1. production from self,
2. production from other,
3. production from both, and

4. causeless production.
This subject is discussed in relation to the verse in Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom*:

> Not from self, not from other,
> Not from both, not causelessly;
> Production of any thing anywhere
> Does not exist ever.

'Any thing' refers to any phenomena, 'anywhere' to any place or time. For example, there are some flowers that grow in some places but not in others and some flowers that grow in some times, or some seasons, but not in others. Contrarily, there is no exception regarding production by the four extremes in that it does not occur in regard to any thing, any place, or any time.

The main reasoning refuting production from self is that if there were production from self it would follow that production would be meaningless and endless. There is a refutation of production from other in general in regard to the lower schools and in particular with respect to the Chittamatra system. If there were production from other it would follow that darkness would be produced from tongues of fire, meaning that things would be produced from both causes and non-causes or that everything would be produced from everything. With respect to this Chandrakirti says:

> *If in dependence on other there arises another,*
> *In that case even from tongues of fire there would arise thick darkness.*
> *Also from all, all would be produced. Because of that*
> *There would not be anything at all that acts to produce and they would be concordant with otherness.* [6.14]

This verse sets out the general structure of the refutation of production from other. Although it is said that there is no production from other, it can be asked "Is a son not produced from his mother?" and "Are not crops produced from a field?" It can also be asked "Are mother and son not other?" and "Are crops and a field not other?" It would be quite a surprise if someone were to say that a son is not produced from his mother!

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: Are the following two equivalent:
i) the appearance to the conception of a self of persons and
ii) the appearing object of this conception?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are different because if it appears to a conception of a self of persons it is not necessarily the appearing object of that conception. Posit! A self of persons which appears to a conception of a self of persons but is not the appearing object of the conception of a self of persons. For example, when the shape of a table appears to eye consciousness what is the appearing object? It is the shape of the table. However, when the shape of the table appears, also product, impermanence, the ability to perform a function, and so forth appear. Thus, the impermanence of table appears to the eye consciousness but that impermanence is not the appearing object of the eye consciousness apprehending table. With respect to this, the first chapter of Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* says: "Therefore, by seeing a phenomenon, all its attributes also appear."

Student: Does the eye consciousness apprehending blue have two objects of comprehension – blue and the appearance of blue?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Blue is the object of comprehension of an eye consciousness apprehending blue because blue is the object of the mode of apprehension of the eye consciousness apprehending blue. The appearance of blue is not the object of comprehension of the eye consciousness apprehending blue. When debated it is said: "If it is an established base, an eye consciousness apprehending blue is pervaded by blue appearing to it." Although blue appears to an eye consciousness apprehending blue there is no pervasion that it appears to that eye consciousness apprehending blue. Posit! The color white. The color white, as the subject, does blue appear to an eye consciousness apprehending blue? It does.

Student: According to Prasangika is the object of comprehension (*gzhal bya*) of a consciousness the same as the appearing object of the consciousness or is it the object of engagement of the consciousness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In the Prasangika Madhyamika system the object of comprehension of a consciousness and the appearing object of that consciousness are the same. In other schools if it is the object of comprehension of a consciousness is it not necessarily the appearing object of that consciousness. In general, if it is the object of comprehension of a consciousness is not necessarily the object of engagement of that consciousness. For example, with respect to the conception apprehending blue the meaning generality of blue is the object of comprehension of the conception apprehending blue but it is not the object of engagement of that conception apprehending blue. This is because the object of the mode of apprehension or the object of engagement is blue alone, whereas the meaning generality of blue is the object of comprehension of the conception apprehending blue. Therefore, there is this difference.

Student: According to Prasangika is the object of comprehension of a consciousness necessarily an existent?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In general it is not. Posit! A self of persons is the object of comprehension of the conception of a self, but it is not an existent. If it is the object of comprehension of the conception of a self is it pervaded by being an object of comprehension of a consciousness? There is no pervasion. Posit! The self of persons which is the object of comprehension of a conception of a self but is not an object of comprehension of a consciousness. The definition of an object of knowledge is: that which is suitable to be the object of an awareness. For example, the horns of a rabbit are the object of comprehension of the consciousness apprehending the horns of a rabbit but they are not the object of comprehension of an awareness.

Student: What are the objects of comprehension of an eye consciousness to which a snow mountain appears as blue?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: An eye consciousness to which a snow mountain appears as blue necessarily has an object. Since it must have an object, it must have an object of comprehension. Posit! The object of comprehension is the appearance because in the Prasangika Madhyamika system all consciousnesses are pervaded by being valid cognizers with respect to their appearances, therefore, they have an appearance. Does that eye consciousness to which a snow mountain appears as blue have an object of the mode of apprehension? It does not because blue snow mountains do not exist.

Student: Is the mental direct perceiver that is induced by a sense direct perceiver necessarily conceptual according to Prasangika?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is not necessarily conceptual. When we see a cat outside there is an eye consciousness perceiving cat, then when we come inside there is a memory of that cat. In this case the conception remembering cat is induced by the eye consciousness that previously saw the cat.

According to Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Commentary on the Middle Way* if it is a remembering consciousness it is necessarily conceptual.

However, in general a mental direct perceiver that is induced by a sense direct perceiver is not necessarily conceptual. Posit! For example, an eye consciousness apprehending blue that is immediately followed by a non-conceptual mental consciousness which is a mental direct perceiver. This mental direct perceiver is not conceptual but it is of very short duration, just 1/65th of a fingersnap. After this mental direct perceiver there arises a conceptual mental consciousness. This is said in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* and I think that Prasangika also accepts this. In the Prasangika Madhyamika system a valid direct perceiver is not pervaded by being non-conceptual, whereas in all the lower schools a valid direct perceiver is pervaded by being non-conceptual and non-mistaken. Thus, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas even a conception can be a valid direct perceiver; for example, the subsequent moment of a valid direct perceiver apprehending blue. Then it needs to be examined as to whether or not the Prasangika's accept subsequent cognizers.

In short, if it is a mental direct perceiver induced by an eye direct perceiver it is not necessarily conceptual; for example, the 1/65th moment of a mental consciousness that comes after an eye direct perceiver apprehending blue. In Prasangika there exist all seven types of knowers: direct perceivers, inferential cognizers, subsequent cognizers, wrong consciousnesses, correct assumptions, awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained, and doubt. What is the 1/65th moment of a mental consciousness that comes after an eye direct perceiver apprehending blue? It is an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained.

Student: In Prasangika is a direct perceiver necessarily a valid cognizer?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: An awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained is a direct perceiver but is not a valid cognizer; for example, an eye consciousness apprehending blue while the mental consciousness is attracted to a pleasant sound. While the mental consciousness is attracted to a pleasant sound, one still sees people passing in front of oneself but this eye consciousness is an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained. This eye consciousness does not ascertain its object of engagement. Such an eye consciousness is a direct perceiver but it is not a valid cognizer because it is an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained.

Student: Regarding the mental consciousness that experiences feeling, what is the object of that feeling? Is it form, consciousness, non-associated compositional factor, or none of these?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What kind of feeling? If we take it to be the feeling of happiness, then what is its cause? Feeling arises due to one of the six operational consciousnesses, for example, when one watches a pleasant movie, hears nice music, tastes good food, and so forth, the feeling of happiness arises. Feeling is experience. In the *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 244) it says" Distinguishing between the observed object and experience is, except for a few cases, not necessary in most such cases." Thus, there are cases in which they do have to be distinguished. This explanation of observed object and experience is in terms of feeling. When a consciousness experiences feeling, what is the object of feeling? In the case of a mental consciousness experiencing, for example, the feeling of happiness that arises from conceiving a form that previously appeared to an eye consciousness, the mental consciousness experiences the feeling of happiness, whereas the object of this feeling is the beautiful form seen before. The conception and the feeling in its retinue have the same observed object. What is that observed object? It is the beautiful form. Likewise, when mental happiness is induced by an ear consciousness, the observed object would be a pleasant sound. On the other hand, a feeling of unhappiness arises from thinking about an unpleasant form seen previously; for example, seeing someone stabbing another person.

There are also feelings that are neither happiness or suffering.

END

Monday afternoon, 15 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 317) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-3 Refuting production from both

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, having thus also excluded production from others, now, with the wish to exclude production from both, it is explained:
>
> *Production from two is also not a reasonable entity,*
> *Because those faults that were already explained will accrue.* [6.98ab]
>
> There, those (the Nirgranthas or Jainas) who propound phrases in two possibilities,[79] consider production from both since production occurs from self and also occurs from others. There, if a vase is asserted to arise from a mass of clay, stick, string, water, potter and so forth, because the vase is produced solely existing as the nature of clay – since the two, the clay and the vase, are not states of otherness – it, therefore, is produced from self. Because the action of the potter and so forth – those which are other – will bring about its production, it, therefore, is produced from others. Thinking thus, they consider production from self and others. Just as for those externals, likewise there will be [production] from self and others also for internals.
>
> There, [the Jainas], having made a presentation of the meaning of the words, saying "the nine meanings of the words, life-force, not living, merit (dharma), negativity (non-dharma), contamination, restraint, and so forth (i.e., happiness, suffering, and the strength of formative actions that are produced from consciousness and that are the causes of consciousness),[80] are realities," say [the following]:
>
> Maitreya, who only existed as the nature of the life-force even in other lifetimes, takes this rebirth. Therefore, there is production from self because the two, Maitreya and the life-force, are not states of otherness. Because the life-force possesses migration, others assert it as even traveling to the migrations of the gods and so forth. Because he is produced from father, mother, dharma, non-dharma, contamination, and so forth – those which are other – therefore, there is also production from others. And, therefore, this statement, "there is no production from self and there is also no production from others," will not harm us because of not accepting production from only self and because of not accepting production from only others.

The Nirgranthas say that there is production from both self and other, but do not say that there is production from self alone or that there is production from other alone. Our own system refutes production from both saying that it is not feasible because the faults related to production from self and production from other would also apply here.

In short, although production from self alone and production from other alone were refuted, according to the Nirgranthas there does exist production from both. They say that there is production from self because, for example, a pot is produced from clay which is one nature with itself. On the other hand, the pot is also produced from other because it is produced from the activity of the potter, who is other, as well as from a stick, a string, water, and so forth, which are also other. They say that just as there is production of external objects from self and other so too is there production of internal things from both self and other; for example, the person is produced from both self and other. For

[79] Skt: *syadvada*; Tib: *gal nyi.su smra.ba* – 'those who propound two possibilities.' The phrase 'it might be,' or 'in the case that,' is especially used in Jain works.

[80] LTK, page 333.

example, because Maitreya is the nature of the life-force, Maitreya and the life-force are not other. Therefore, when someone dies in a past life and the life-force migrates and is reborn, Maitreya is said to be produced from self. Maitreya is also produced from other in that the person and the life-force are other; for example, the person who was a god died and is reborn as Maitreya, a human being, from the life-force of that god. Maitreya is also produced from other because he is produced from parents and so forth who are other.

The Nigranthas propound nine meanings of the words: (1) life-force, (2) not living, (3) merit (dharma), (4) negativity (non-dharma), (5) contamination, (6) restraint, and so forth, that is, (7) happiness, (8) suffering, and (9) strength. The life-force is the self. Non-life is the eye sense power and so forth. Merit is the cause of high status and definite goodness. A negativity is an action opposite to Dharma that causes rebirth in the lower realms. The contaminations are the afflictions. A restraint or a vow is what restrains one from bad conduct. Happiness is the experience of happiness. Suffering is the experience of suffering. Strength is the strength of formative actions (karmic formations) that are produced from consciousness and become the cause of consciousness. These nine are explained in greater detail in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Tenets* in the context of the assertions of the non-Buddhist schools.

These assertions of the Nigranthas are then refuted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

In the fourth chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* fourteen unspecified views are mentioned:
(1-4) the views that the self and the world have an end, do not have an end, have both, and have neither,
(5-8) the views that the self and the world are permanent, impermanent, both, and neither,
(9-12) the views that a tathagata arises after dying, does not arise, both, and neither,
(13-14) the views that the body and the life force are one and that they are other.
The Nigranthas are those who hold the views of 'both':

- the view that the self and the world both have an end and do not have an end,
- the view that the self and the world are both permanent and impermanent, and
- the view that a tathagata both arises after dying and does not arise.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 128-9) says:

> To explain this dispute as also just unreasonable, [6.98a]:
>
> *Production from two is also not a reasonable entity.*
>
> If asked: Why? [6.98b]:
>
> *Because those faults which were already explained will accrue.*
>
> Because those faults which were indicated about both positions will descend also on this position of both, production from the two is also not possible. Because the vase exists as the nature of the clay, it would therefore not be produced because of [already] existing. As was explained [6.8cd]:
>
> *If it arises from that, there is not even any quality,*
> *Also there is just no reason for the produced to be produced again.*
>
> and so forth. Likewise, it should be understood that "because of abiding as solely the nature of the life-force, production does not exist also for Maitreya."
>
> Since the vase does not completely abide as the nature of the water, string, wheel, and so forth, therefore, it is not produced from them. As was already explained [6.14]:

> *If another would arise in dependence on others,*
> *Then dense darkness would arise even from a flame and*
> *Everything would be produced also from everything, since*
> *All that not producing production is also similar in otherness.*

and so forth. Also, Maitreya being produced from father, mother, and so forth – those which are other – should be expressed similarly.

There, just as production from self and other was indicated above saying "unreasonable" as the world's deceptive [truth] and also as the ultimate, likewise, also to propound the phrases in two possibilities was indicated above saying "impossible" for as many reasons as were explained. For a final summary, it is mentioned:

> *This is not asserted in the world nor as thusness* [6.98c]

Also regarding the position of both, not only is production from both unreasonable through the sole reasoning previously explained, in order to indicate that "It is not [reasonable] also due to the explanation here," it is explained:

> *Since production from the individuals is not established.* [6.98d]

For example, since one sesame seed is able to give forth oil, many will also. Sand [in which] the ability is not seen does not. Like that, if there could be production by the individuals, also many bearing such a nature could. Therefore, also production from two is not reasonable.

Production from both self and other is not feasible because there is no production from self and no production from other, as was explained previously by means of many reasonings. For example, if there were production from self it would follow that it would already be produced, therefore, why would it need to be produced again? This is the reasoning that refutes production from self. In other words, since its nature has already been produced there is no need for it to be produced again, therefore, there is no production from self.

On the other hand, if there were production from other it would follow that everything would arise from everything; for example, dense darkness would arise from a flame.

The Nigranthas say that a person, such as Maitreya, is produced from other because he is produced from a father and mother. However, if it were the case that Maitreya is produced from other it would follow that Maitreya could be produced from both a father and a non-father, from both a mother and non-mother, and from any male or female because he is independently produced from other. If there were independent production then Maitreya could arise from anything, both causes and non-causes. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is so because if it is produced from other it is independently produced because it is inherently produced. Their conclusion is that because there is no production from self and no production from other there is no production from both.

Chandrakirti gives the example of a sesame seed from which, when squeezed, a drop of oil is produced, whereas when sand is squeezed oil is not produced. However, if there were independent production of oil, then oil should also be produced from sand. In short, production from both is inadmissible.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 317) says:

> NIRGRANTHAS, those who propound the two important phrases of production from self and other: If a pot arises from a lump of clay, a stick, a wheel, string, water, the potter, and so forth:
> - it is produced from self because the clay pot is produced having just the nature of clay, and
> - it is produced from other because the activity of the potter and so forth, that which is other, are producers of the clay pot.

> As for external objects, likewise, there is also production from both self and other for the inner.

We can take the example of this cup. The Nigranthas say that it is produced from self because it is produced from clay which is the same nature as the cup. In addition, they say that it is also produced from other because it is produced from the effort of the potter who made the cup, water, a string, a wheel, and so forth. In this way, the cup is produced from both self and other. However, the Nirgranthas specify that the cup is not produced from self alone and is not produced from other alone and, for this reason, claim that the faults of production from self and the faults of production from other do not apply to them.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 317) says:

> In regard to that, we present nine categories of words:
> 1. the life force that cherishes the person and the I,
> 2. the lifeless, the sense powers and so forth,
> 3. the Dharma of high status and definite goodness,
> 4. the non-dharma that is their opposite,
> 5. the contaminations that are the afflictions, and
> 6. the vows that counteract immorality.
>
> [Stating] "and so forth" [in the autocommentary includes]
> 7. happiness,
> 8. suffering, and
> 9. the strength of the karmic formations that are produced from consciousness and become the cause of consciousness.
>
> Because of taking this present rebirth due just to the nature of his life force existing also in other lifetimes, Maitreya is produced from self because the two – Maitreya and his life force – are not other. Because the life force possesses migration from one rebirth to another, others assert that it also travels to the migrations of the gods and so forth. Also, because Maitreya is produced from that which is other – his father and mother, Dharma and non-dharma, contaminations, and so forth – he is also produced from other. Therefore, since we do not assert production from just self or other singly, the refutation of production from self and other singly does not harm us.

Maitreya, for example, is asserted to be produced from both self and other. The Nirgranthas say: "Because of taking this present rebirth due to just the nature of his life force existing also in other lifetimes, Maitreya is produced from self because the two – Maitreya and his life force – are not other." On the other hand, he is also produced for other "Because the life force migrates from one rebirth to another." Thus, the Nirgranthas say that the person is produced from both self and other. However, our own schools say that it is not so because all the faults of production from self and production from other also apply in this case.

Maitreya and the life-force are not other because whenever Maitreya dies the life-force migrates. Thus, because Maitreya has the nature of the life-force, he is said to be produced from self. Maitreya is produced from other because having been born as a god previously he is then reborn as a human being, due to which the present human being is produced from a previous god who was other. In this way, Maitreya is said to be produced from other.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Also, because Maitreya is produced from that which is other – his father and mother, Dharma and non-dharma, contaminations, and so forth – he is also produced from other." Maitreya is produced from his parents. He is also produced from merit, that is, Dharma, and from non-Dharma, due to which he experiences suffering. He is produced from contaminations, that is, the afflictions, and actions. Therefore, he is, in short, produced from other.

The Nirgranthas conclude saying: "Therefore, since we do not assert production from just self or other singly, the refutation of production from self and other singly does not harm us."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 318) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *Production from the two is not a suitable entity. Why?*
> *Because the faults that were already explained also befall it.* [6.98ab]
>
> Not only is production from them singly not suitable, also *production from* a collection of *both* self and other *is not a suitable entity. Why? Because the faults that were already explained* before in regard to them singly *also befall* the position of production from both because:
>
> - when, based on the life force, Maitreya is asserted to be produced from self, this is refuted by the meaningless production and so forth that were explained before, whereas
> - when, based on his parents and so forth, he is asserted to be produced from other, this is refuted by the absurd consequence and so forth.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if there were production from both self and other then the individual faults of production from self and of production from other singly would occur. If Maitreya is asserted to be produced from self there would be the faults of the meaningless production and so forth that were explained before. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "when he is asserted to be produced from other based on his parents and so forth, this is refuted by the absurd consequence and so forth."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 318) says:

> Just as was taught above "Production from self and other is not suitable either in worldly conventionalities or ultimately," similarly, also here, in order to come to the conclusion that "Production from others is impossible," there is [the following] explanation.
>
> *That does not in the world; it is also not asserted in thusness,*
> *Because production from them singly is not established.* [6.98cd]
>
> *That* – i.e., production from both self and other – also *does not* exist *in the world*; *it is also not asserted in thusness*, that is, ultimately, *because*, since *production from* self or other *singly is not established*, production from both is also not suitable.

The worldly who are not trained in scriptures do not assert production from self and production from other either conventionally or ultimately. Therefore, the worldly do not say that production from self and production from other exist conventionally but do not exist ultimately, nor do they say that they exist ultimately but not conventionally. Thus, they do not propound production from self, production from other, and production from both. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that because production from self and production from other do not exist for worldly beings, what need is there to mention that production from both does not exist?

Tuesday morning, 16 January 2001

Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom,* in the context of the presentation of the actual body of the text, sets forth both a brief and extensive presentation. The brief presentation (v. 1.1) says:

> Not from self, not from other,
> Not from both, not causelessly;
> Production of any thing anywhere
> Does not exist ever.

This verse sets out the four extremes of production. Up to this point in Chandrakirti's *Supplement* and Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination*, production from self, production from other, and production from both have been refuted. Next causeless production, the thesis of the Charvakas (Hedonists) or the Ayatas (Gone Afar), is refuted. They are called Gone Afar (*rgyan phan pa*) because they assert that only what is perceivable exists and do not accept that what is not perceived exists. They are also so-called because they do not accept past and future lives, that is, distant phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 318) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1B-4 Refuting causeless production

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Here, [the Charvakas] propounding [arisal from] the entity itself mention: When there is production from cause, if there are those shortcomings due to the effect's becoming that which is self, that which is other, and that which is both, since I do not accept [production from] cause, there is no chance of the shortcomings that were explained. Therefore, the production of all things is solely arisen from their very entities. It is like this. The stems of the lotus, and the toughness and smoothness of its petals are not seen as endeavored – produced – by anyone. Also the various colors and shapes of its leaves, anthers, and center are not seen to be produced. Similarly, are the varieties of breadfruit, pomegranate, and so forth. Just as it is for externals, likewise also for the peacock, partridge, and crane – those having an inner nature – the color, shape, and so forth are just not observed as formed by anyone through carrying on with exertion. Therefore, the production of functioning things only arises from the entity itself.

The Charvakas say that they do not accrue the faults that were mentioned previously because they do not accept production from self, production from other, and production from both. Instead, they say that phenomena are produced without causes; for example, the color and shape of a flower, its leaves, anthers, and so forth arise without causes. Likewise, the varieties of fruits also have a specific shape and so forth which arise naturally without being created by anyone who is a cause. Similarly, the colors of the eyes of a peacock's feathers also do not arise from causes, that is, they are not designed by anyone. Thus, the thesis of the Charvakas is that such things arise without causes, that is, they are produced adventitiously. To this the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond as follows.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 130) says:

> I shall explain this:
>
> *If there were such production solely without cause,*
> *Then, all would always be produced from everything and,*
> *For the arisal of effects, the world would also not gather*
> *Seeds and so forth by means of hundreds [of hardships].* [6.99]
>
> If the production of functioning things were adventitious, just as the *panasa*[81] tree would not be the cause of its fruit, likewise, since all functioning things such as the *nimba*,[82] mango, and so forth are also not its cause, it would be produced from them because of their similarity in just not being causes. Also, just as the *panasa* fruit would be produced from what is not its cause, likewise, it would also [be produced] from the three realms. Also, whatever birth is produced from the ripening

[81] MMW: the breadfruit or Jaka tree, *Artocarpus integrifolia*.

[82] MMW: the Neemb tree, *Azadirachta indica*.

> of mango, *lakucha*,[83] and so forth, relying on the seasons and manifesting occasionally, that too would exist only perpetually due to them because of not relying on the relationship of seasons.
>
> Likewise, since the peacock would not be the cause of the collection of the peacock's tail feathers, the collection of tail feathers would also exist on the crow, and parrot feathers would exist on the peacock at all times – even in the period of the womb. Thus, if all us migrators are perpetually produced, it is unreasonable to propound [arisal from] their own entity since it does not even exist.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if there were causeless production then everything would be produced from everything because everything would be the same in not being a cause. In this case, the hardships of gathering crops and so forth in particular seasons would be meaningless because crops would arise at all times. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it is seen that hardships are born in order to reap a harvest.

Chandrakirti mentions the panasa fruit but we can talk about an apple. If an apple tree were not the cause of apples, then apples could be produced from anything whatsoever. In that case, apples would be produced also from nimbu trees, mango trees, and so forth. This is because results would arise from non-causes – those things that are not their causes. It would also follow that the ripening of fruit would not be related to a season because everything is produced without any relationship. Thus, according to the Charvakas fruit would ripen at all times without any relation to the seasons. This is the consequence that the Prasangika Madhyamikas fling at the Charvakas. They also say that if this were the case it would follow that there would be no time when fruit is not produced because fruit would arise naturally without depending on its causes, the season, and so forth.

Likewise, the particular colors of a peacock's tail feathers would also exist on a crow and a parrot's feathers would exist on a peacock even at the time of the womb. However, that such production occurs at all times is not feasible. Chandrakirti says: "Thus, if all us migrators are perpetually produced, it is unreasonable to propound [arisal from] own entity since it does not even exist."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Having thus expressed contradiction with reasoning, in order to express contradiction with perception (seeing), it was explained [6.99cd]:
>
> *For the arisal of effects, the world would not also gather*
> *Seeds and so forth by means of hundreds [of hardships].*
>
> Yet they do. Therefore, production does not arise from the entities themselves. Moreover:
>
> *If migrators were devoid of causes, just like the scent and*
> *Color of a sky utpala, they would just not exist as apprehendeds,*
> *Yet, there is apprehension of the world of extreme diversity. Therefore,*
> *Like one's mind, one should know the world as [produced] from causes.* [6.100]
>
> If migrators were devoid of causes, like the scent and color of the sky utpala, they would not be paths of apprehension – yet, they are. Therefore, one should understand that "like one's awareness, all migrators are produced from only causes."

"To express contradiction with perception (seeing)" means that it is seen that worldly beings endure hardships to gather a harvest. Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask the Charvakas: "If crops

[83] MMW: a type of breadfruit tree, *Artocarpus lacucha*.

are produced without causes why would hardships have to be endured?" In this way, the Charvakas contradict what is seen to exist in the world.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if migrating beings were without causes they would be like a sky utpala, that which cannot be apprehended because it does not exist. If migrating beings were like a sky utpala then they and other objects would be non-existent, due to which they could not be apprehended, could not move, and so forth. Just as the Charvakas know an awareness to be produced from a cause, so too should they know that external things are produced from causes.

The Charvakas engage in much study and accept that by means of this study there will be development over a long period of time. Just as they accept such development, so too should they accept that other phenomena arise from their causes. Therefore, the Charvakas should understand that migrating beings are produced from causes.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> According to you [Charvakas], an awareness having a blue aspect does not occur having removed the blue object; an awareness having a blue aspect is [produced] from only blue. Since [awareness] is not [produced] from the entity itself, it is unreasonable to propound [production from] the entity itself.

The apprehension of blue arises due to the existence of blue; without blue it does not arise. Because the apprehension of the aspect of blue arises in dependence on blue, it is not produced from its own entity. This is the Prasangika Madhyamikas' refutation of causeless production.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 318) says:

> CHARVAKAS (Hedonists, but literally, the Ayatas or Gone-Afar), who propound arisal from own entity: If there is production from causes, there would be errors due to there being production as self, other, and both in relation to the result. However, since we do not assert production from causes, we do not have the faults that were explained in regard to those three positions. Hence, the stems of lotuses and the toughness and smoothness of their petals are not seen to be created by anyone, nor are the various colors and shapes of their petals, anthers, and corolla seen to be created. Similarly, so too are the varieties of breadfruit (*panasa*), pomegranates (*bal lo se'u*), and so forth. Like external objects, similarly, also the color, shape, and so forth of those [things] having the nature of being inner, such as peacocks, partridges, cranes, and so forth, are not observed to be formed by anyone through striving in them with exertion. Therefore, the production of things arises just from their own entity.

The Charvakas say that if they were to accept production from self, production from other, and production from other they would in fact accrue the faults mentioned previously, however, because they do not accept these three types of production they do not have their faults. They say that a lotus is produced without causes because "the stems of lotuses and the toughness and smoothness of their petals are not seen to be created by anyone, nor are the various colors and shapes of their petals, anthers, and corolla seen to be created." In short, there is no being who creates the particular attributes of a lotus. Also various types of fruit, such as breadfruit, pomegranates, and so forth, which have a particular color, shape, taste, and so forth are not created by anyone. Our own system says that although they are not created by anyone they arise from various causes and conditions.

Just as external things, such as the various types of fruit, are produced without causes, so too are internal things like peacocks, partridges, cranes, and so forth. This is the thesis of the Charvakas who say: "Therefore, the production of things arises just from their own entity."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 319) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: This is explained [as follows]:
>
> *If it were the case that they are produced entirely without causes,*
> *Then all would also be produced from everything always.* [6.99ab]
>
> *If it were the case that* things are *produced entirely without causes*, *then all* things *would also be produced from everything* – that is, from things that are not their respective causes – because everything would be similar in also not being their cause.

In brief, if there were causeless production then everything would be produced from everything "because everything would be similar in also not being their cause."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 319) says:

> Also, whatever ripening of mangoes and so forth depends on the season and is visible at times, that too would just exist *always* because it would not depend on the season.

If what the Charvakas assert is true then the ripening of fruit should exist at all times because it would not depend on the season in that it is produced without causes. In this case, because it does not depend on the season, there would be the ripening of mangoes and so forth at all times. However, this is not seen.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 319) says:

> Similarly, crows would also have the eyes of a peacocks' feathers and peacocks would also have parrots' feathers even during the period in the womb because they would not depend on causes.

Crows would have peacocks' feathers and peacocks would also have parrots' feathers even during the period in the womb. Although a peacock in the womb does not have feathers, given that it is just an egg, if things were produced independently of causes then "peacocks would also have parrots' feathers even during the period in the womb." For this reason, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the Charvakas contradict both reasoning and perception.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 319) says:

> Thus, having explained the contradiction with reasoning, the contradiction with perception is explained [as follows].
>
> *For the sake of the arisal of a result, worldly beings would also*
> *Not have to gather seeds and so forth through hundreds [of hardships].* [6.99cd]
>
> *For the sake of the arisal of a result*, such as crops and so forth, *worldly beings would also not have to gather*, that is, amass, *seeds and so forth through hundreds* of hardships, whereas, because this is also done, there is no production from own entity.

That in order to harvest crops it is necessary to undergo hardships is seen by everyone. First the ground has to be plowed, then seeds have to be planted, then the field has to be fertilized with manure and watered in order for crops to arise. These hardships are engaged in for the sake of reaping a harvest as a result. On the other hand, according to the Charvakas such hardships would be useless because crops arise without causes. However, that this happens is harmed by direct perception.

In Varanasi some years ago there was a meeting during which an old wise man, a Charvaka, propounded that things that are not perceived do not exist. Another person, also propounding non-Buddhist tenets, asked him: "Do you not accept the hair on the back of your head because you do not see it? Do you not accept your intestines, lungs, and so forth because you cannot see them?" To this the Charvaka replied that this was not the case. However, one can in fact argue with the Charvakas about whether their children who are at home do not exist because they are not seen presently. To this a Charvaka would reply that although they are not seen now they are seen at times, therefore, they do exist. Someone else could say: "If things are seen at times, do they exist?" The Charvakas would say that they do, however, if they are never seen they do not exist. "Then what about your intestines, kidneys, and so forth which you have never seen? They too should not exist because you have not seen them. Even your own texts should arise without effort because things arise without causes." The Charvakas are unable to respond to such questions.

At the meeting, there was another old Indian man holding a staff in his hand who, in the context of discussing Dignaga's *Compendium of Valid Cognition*, was asked where he lived. Although it turned out that he was from a backward village and was very simply dressed, he was very well versed in the subject of valid cognition and was able to cite many scriptural references and could not be defeated in debate.

Therefore, even nowadays there are those in India who uphold non-Buddhist tenets, the majority of them being Vaisheshikas and Nirgranthas. Although at the meeting in Varanasi the followers of these schools presented themselves wearing jackets and ties, they were however, defeated by an old man wearing a dhoti!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 319) says:

> There are also other faults.
>
> *If migrating beings were empty of causes, like the fragrance and color*
> *Of sky-utpalas, they would be without apprehension,*
> *But, because there is also apprehension of the world that is extremely variegated,*
> *Just like one's own mind, likewise, the world should be understood as being from causes.*
>
> [6.100]
>
> *If migrating beings were empty of causes* – that is, if they were to arise without causes – those migrating beings, *like the fragrance and color of sky-utpalas*, *would be without apprehension*, *but, because there is also apprehension of the world that is extremely variegated*, *just like one's own mind* having the aspect of blue is produced from blue, *likewise*, *the* entire *world should be understood as* produced *from* just its respective *causes*.

Our own system says that there is nothing that is produced without causes, due to which everything is produced from causes. To the Charvakas, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that just as they understand that an awareness of blue arises from blue, so too should they understand that everything arises from causes.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Those [who say[84]] that mind transforms from the elements cannot deny observing causes because they are seen and because the faults that were explained would follow. [Thus], the property of cause and effect renowned to the world – this just exists.
>
> [The Charvakas] imagine [as follows]: Only the four elementary properties (*tattvas*), called earth, water, fire, and wind, are the causes of all the various migrators. From the differences of their

[84] JA, page 219B-1.

> thorough maturations, the varieties of lotuses, pomegranates, and so forth and peacocks, cranes, and so forth are acceptable just as they are presently seen. Not only that, also the awarenesses discerning the various natures (*tathata*) of things are produced from only that.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that since it is seen that sentient beings arise from the four elements, the Charvakas should not act like crazy people by denying this reality. In other words, phenomena that are causes and results are renowned and seen in the world, therefore, they should not be denied. However, here in fact it seems that the Charvakas do assert that beings arise from the transformation of the four elementary properties or thatnesses. They say that the various migrations exist due to the movement of wind and so forth and that due to the transformation of the four elements there arise sentient beings and the varieties of lotuses, peacocks' feathers, and so forth. They also say: "Not only that, also the awarenesses discerning the various natures (*tathata*) of things are produced from only that." "From only that" refers to the four elements – earth, water, fire, and wind.

In short, because the Charvakas are harmed by reasoning and perception, they gradually let go of their position and come to admit that sentient beings are produced from the four elements.

Tuesday afternoon, 16 January 2001

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, just as the cause of the inebriation and intoxication of living beings, the capacity of bringing about inebriation, is produced in beers from the differences of the processes of the meeting of the particular elements (i.e., from the differences of fermentation processes), likewise, awarenesses are produced from thoroughly maturing the distinctive great elements of the initial embryo[85] and so forth and through to also discerning all things. Therefore, external and internal things are solely arisen from causes of this world. The maturation of an action done somewhere[86] [arising] here or the maturation of what was done here arising in another world – the very existence of further worlds (i.e., lifetimes) – is not so.

Living beings become inebriated upon drinking alcohol due to the potential of the alcohol. This is seen to occur in the world. Awarenesses are produced from the thorough ripening of the distinctive great elements of the initial embryo (literally, the oblong state), after which these awarenesses thoroughly discern things. Therefore, here the Charvakas come to say that both external and internal things arise solely from the causes of this world, whereas the production of results occurs only in the present. In this way, the Charvakas have partially lost their original thesis which was that things are produced from their own entity without causes. They say that an action done in a past life cannot ripen in this life nor can an action done in this life ripen in a future life. Thus, they are called the Gone Afar in that they have gone afar from asserting past and future lives.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [The sage, Lokachakshu[87]] propounded:
>
> The pleasant is to be well enjoyed and eaten;

[85] Skt: *kalala*, Tib: *nur.nur.po.*

[86] JN. page 439, explains "somehow" –

[87] Skt: *rishi lokachakshu*; Tib: *drang.srong 'jig.rten.mig* – who composed the Charvaka text called *One Hundred Thousand Texts* – Tib: *gzhung (lugs) 'bum.phrag.gcig*. See *Thu'u.bkvan*, page 5, and Cabezon, page 291.

> Beautiful one, that which has passed will not occur for you.
> This body is a merely collected one,
> Fearful girl, what is gone will not return.
>
> This was mentioned out of desire to copulate with his daughter and out of desire that the daughter understand a world beyond as non-existent.

This verse is probably taken from the scriptures of the Charvakas. Out of desire to copulate with his daughter, this sage said that past and future lives do not exist. Also the so-called *Treatise on Taking One's Own Mother as a Bride*, which says that because mothers are very kind their kindness should be repaid and that the best way to repay it is to marry her and give her the pleasure of sexual intercourse, denies the existence of past and future lives.

Then this verse says "This body is a merely collected one" which means that this body is a mere gathering together. "Fearful girl, what is gone will not return" means that upon disintegrating one will not return. The purpose of this verse was to trick his daughter into having intercourse with him.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> I shall speak about this. Due to what is this certainty of yours that "a world beyond does not exist?"
>
> If it is said: Because of the state of not being directly perceived.
>
> What is your state of a world beyond not being directly perceived – is it deemed a direct perception or not a direct perception?
>
> If it is said: It is a direct perception.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask: "Why are you sure that a world beyond does not exist?" The Charvakas say that it is because it is not directly perceived. The Prasangika Madhyamikas then ask: "Is its direct non-perception directly perceived or not directly perceived?" The Charvakas respond that it is directly perceived.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [In that case], since the non-state [the opposite] of directly perceiving a world beyond would be a direct perception, a non-thing would also be a state directly perceived. Therefore, a non-thing would also be a thing for you because of being directly perceived – like a thing.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that because [the lack of a direct perception of a world beyond] is directly perceived it would be a thing.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, since a so-called "non-thing" would not exist at all, a thing would also be non-existent because the opposite-counterpart would not exist. If thing and non-thing did not exist, the [assertion about the] state of existence of the elements and the state of non-existence of a world beyond would also degenerate.

The Charvakas' theses regarding the non-existence of future worlds and the existence of production from the four elements would degenerate [as a consequence of their assertion that the non-direct perception of a world beyond is directly perceived] because it would follow that neither things or non-things exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In the case that [the non-existence of a world beyond] is not directly perceived, because a property (*tattva*) that is not directly perceived to some extent is not directly perceived (i.e., it is not manifest), it would not be apprehended [by a valid cognition]. Hence, how would a world beyond be inferred as non-existent by way of that non-apprehension?

How is a world beyond known to not exist? According to the Charvaka school there are only valid direct perceivers, that is, there are no valid inferential cognizers. This is mentioned in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* saying: "That valid cognizers are only one, direct valid cognizers, is established in the Charvakas' scriptures." Thus, the Charvakas' thesis is that there is nothing that is inferred to exist in dependence on a reason or sign, in other words, what exists is only what is directly perceived. Here, however, the Charvakas' thesis is weakened in that it is shown that there is something (the non-existence of a world beyond) that is known by an inferential cognizer. An inferential cognizer is an awareness that infers something in dependence on a reason.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is said: [The non-existence of a world beyond] is apprehended by inference.
>
> If the aims [of beings] are established also by thorough establishment through inference – this [verse refuting inference] is also accepted by you:
>
> As much as the sphere of the senses,
> The being is limited to only that much.
> Dear, what the highly learned propound,
> That is like the wolf-print.[88]

The first two lines mean that the existence of things is limited to what is directly perceived by the senses. In the next two lines the father says to his daughter that what the learned propound does not exist, but is deceptive like a wolf-print.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, if here [you] deprecate anything, I shall express refutation to everything following the path already explained refuting the existence of mind being [produced] from the elements.

[88] Jayananda explains the context of the last line as follows (page 411): "That which some highly learned ones propound, "a further world exists," is like the wolf-print," means "it is deceptive." An astrologer came to a land of fools and declared in front of many people "tonight a wolf will come and eat all of you." They then became afraid and terrified and at dark, leaving their houses, went to the mountains. The astrologer made many wolf prints in the road, went into their houses and took their wealth, thereby deceiving the many people. Likewise, it is said, "even the words of the highly learned are deceptive.

Jayananda says (441-442): The term etc. (missing in the Tibetan) includes [the verse]:

Dear, live happily until death; having died, there is no sphere of it.
How will the body, having become ash-like, be born again?

[See Hopkins, page 329, for another translation of this verse and see Thurman, page 15, for comparison with Epicurus.]

> Furthermore, just as the vision of one with cataracts apprehends that the entities of two moons and so forth that do not exist as "existent," also other such aspects to an imperfect subject, falling hairs, bees, and so forth, are only untrue.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the Charvakas deprecate everything. Although they have already refuted the Charvakas' assertion that an awareness is produced from the elements, here they continue their refutation. They say that those with cataracts have the appearance of two moons, falling hair, bees flying back and forth, and so forth which do not exist, therefore, it is possible for an object-possessor to have such appearances even though they are untrue. They are untrue because there do not exist two moons, falling hair, bees in a bowl, and so forth. Similarly, the Charvakas say that there is no world beyond, although this is not correct. In other words, the Charvakas' assertion of the non-existence of a world beyond is erroneous. The Prasangika Madhyamikas next prove this saying:

> Likewise, in order to indicate that your consciousness of a world beyond being non-existent, moreover, is just erroneous by way of erroneously conceiving visible things, it is explained:
>
> *If those elements do not have that essential nature,*
> *The essential nature by which they become objects of your mind,*
> *How could he who has this state of dense mental darkness*
> *Correctly realize a world beyond?* [6.101]
>
> Those four elementary properties that were mentioned, earth and so forth, do not exist as that essential nature such as to be the very object of your consciousness. When this very world is thus erroneously perceived, then how could the extremely subtle world beyond, that is the sphere of the divine eye consciousness, be realized? It is just impossible.

Here the Prasangika Madhyamikas set forth their argument on the basis of the Charvakas' assertion that there exist the four elements from which an awareness analyzing objects is produced. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that those with dense mental darkness cannot realize a world beyond and, since the Charvakas do not know even the present world, they cannot know what is extremely subtle such as a world beyond. In other words, if the Charvakas cannot perceive the coarse things of this life they definitely cannot perceive subtle things such as past and future lives.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 320) says:

> CHARVAKAS: The four essences (literally, thatnesses) – earth, water, fire, and wind – are the causes of all the varieties of migrations. From the differences of their thorough ripening, not only are the varieties of lotuses, pomegranates, and so forth, as well as peacocks, cranes, and so forth, admissible just as they are perceived, but also awarenesses perceiving the various suchnesses of things are produced from them alone. Just as the cause of the inebriation and fainting of living beings – the capacity to bring about inebriation – is produced in beer through the peculiarity of transformation upon the meeting of particular elements, likewise, awarenesses are produced from the special, thorough ripening of the great elements of the initial embryo (Tib. *nur nur po*, literally, oblong state) and so forth, and also function through to perceiving all things. Therefore, external and inner things arise solely from the causes of this world, whereas the ripening of actions done somewhere occurring here or the ripening of those done here occurring in another world – the very existence of a world beyond – is not so.

The Charvakas say that the varieties of migrations are produced from the four elements. From the differences of their ripening there arise different results such as the varieties of lotuses and so forth and the colors of the feathers of peacocks, cranes, and so forth. "Also awarenesses perceiving the various suchnesses of things are produced from them alone" means that awarenesses are also

produced from the four elements. Thus, the Charvakas assert that the four elements are able to produce results just as beer produces inebriation due to its special potential or capacity to bring about inebriation and fainting.

That "Awarenesses are produced from the special, thorough ripening of the great elements of the initial embryo (Tib. *nur nur po*, literally, oblong state)" means that due to the combination of semen and blood (sperm and ovum) there arise the various states of an embryo in which awarenesses are then produced.

There are five stages of development in the womb. When the semen and the blood first meet, the combination is not solid, but then slowly becomes more solid and gradually takes on a form, after which there slowly grow lumps that become the head, arms, and legs, until, in the fifth state, there is a fully developed fetus. The *Sutra on Entering into the Womb Joyfully* says that there are thirty-eight or thirty-nine weeks of gestation in the womb. During the first two weeks, due to karma a wind arises bringing about growth. Slowly the embryo becomes more solid and the bones, arteries, and so forth are formed. In the thirty-sixth or thirty-seventh week the body of fetus is completely developed and feelings begin to arise of not wanting to be in the womb due to the tight dark space, bad smell, and so forth. Due to this the baby's position changes coming to face downward and then its birth takes place. This is what is said in sutra and is also probably accepted by the Charvakas who assert the formation of an embryo is produced from the four elements.

"Therefore, external and inner things arise solely from the causes of this world." Here "this world" refers to what is directly perceived. The Charvakas do not assert that an action done in the past ripens in this life and that an action done in this life ripens in a future life; instead, they deny past and future lives.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 320-1) says:

> [The sage, Lokachakshu] said:
>
> Beautiful girl, by enjoying well and eating,
> A supreme body passed away will not arise for you.
> This body is a mere gathering together.
> Fearful girl, what is gone will not return.
>
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: This was said through desiring to have actual intercourse with his daughter and desiring that his daughter realize that there does not exist a world beyond. Nagtso translates this as: "Fear of passing away will not arise." This is explained [as follows]. For what reason are you certain that "A world beyond does not exist"?
> CHARVAKAS: It is because a world beyond is not directly seen in the present.
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: Is that direct non-seeing of a world beyond deemed to be directly perceived or not directly perceived?

The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask the Charvakas: "Is that direct non-seeing of a world beyond directly perceived or not directly perceived?" In other words, is the non-existence of a world beyond directly perceived or not? The Charvakas answer as follows, Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 320-1):

> CHARVAKAS: It is directly perceived.
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: If non-direct seeing is asserted to be direct perceiving, there would be no contradiction in directly perceiving even non-existent things. Therefore, for you even non-existent things would be things because they would be the direct object of comprehension of an actual direct perceiver not directly seeing lives beyond; like, for example, things.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Charvakas: "If you assert non-direct seeing to be direct perceiving, then there would be no contradiction in directly perceiving even non-existent things." In

other words, if not seeing directly is direct perceiving, then non-things would be directly perceived, due to which it would follow that non-things would also be things [in that they are directly perceived]. Chandrakirti says: "[In that case], since the non-state [the opposite] of directly perceiving a world beyond would be a direct perception, a non-thing would also be a state directly perceived."

In other words, if non-direct seeing is direct perceiving, it would follow that non-things would be things "because they would be the direct object of comprehension of an actual direct perceiver not directly seeing lives beyond; like, for example, things." For example, past and future lives are not seen directly, but if what is not seen directly is an object of comprehension of a direct perceiver it would have to be directly perceived in which case it would be a thing.

Wednesday morning, 17 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 321) says:

> Hence, since "non-things" do not exist at all, also things would become non-existent because their counterpart does not exist. If these two do not exist, also the theses regarding (i) the existence of the four elements[89] and (ii) the non-existence of a world beyond would decline. If [the non-existence of a world beyond] is not directly perceived, because it is not manifest at times it is not apprehended by a valid cognizer. Therefore, how is a world beyond inferred to not exist by means of that non-apprehension?
> CHARVAKAS: [The non-existence of a world beyond] is apprehended by an inferential cognizer.
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: In general, there are not only direct perceivers. However, if the objects of beings are established also by thoroughly establishing them through inferential cognizers, you do not assert inferential cognizers because you propound, [saying the following,] that valid cognizers that are the realization of objects by beings are not more than the direct perceivers seeing however many objects of the sense powers, the eye and so forth, there are:
>
> However many objects of the sense powers there are
> Beings are limited to only that many.
> Noble girl, what the learned propound,
> That is like the footprint of a wolf.

The Charvakas only accept that the things directly perceived by an eye consciousness and so forth exist. The Prasangika Madhyamikas systematically refute this position until the Charvakas come to say that there are things that are known by inferential cognizers, whereby they come to implicitly accept the existence of objects that are not directly perceived or manifest. Thus, the Prasangika Madhyamikas' reasonings repudiate the position of the Charvakas by pointing out the faults of their various assertions. For example, one assertion of the Charvakas is that only direct perceivers exist, that is, there are no other kinds of valid cognizers. However, when the Charvakas maintain this position that objects are only known by direct perceivers, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask them: "Are non-directly perceived objects (or non-manifest objects) known?" The Charvakas say that non-directly perceived objects, [such as a world beyond,] are known, then the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask "By what are they known?" If the Charvakas say that they are known by an inferential cognizer, the Prasangika Madhyamikas remind them that they do not assert inferential cognizers.

In other words, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask the Charvakas: "Are the objects realized by sentient beings known by inferential cognizers?" The Charvakas say that they are not because the "valid cognizers that are the realization of objects by beings are not more than the direct perceivers seeing however many objects of the sense powers, the eye and so forth, there are." In this way, when

[89] Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 132, line 2) says 'existence' (*yod pa*), whereas Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 321) says 'non-existence' (*med pa*). The version in the autocommentary appears to be more in keeping with the previous assertions.

the Charvakas are forced to respond to the various reasonings of the Prasangika Madhyamikas, they are left without anything to say.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 321) says:

> Chandrakirti says:
>
> *If those elements do not have the nature of that –*
> *The nature by which they become an object of your awareness,*
> *Since there is thick mental darkness regarding them,*
> *How can they correctly realize a world beyond?* [6.101]
>
> *If the* four *elements*, earth and so forth, *do not have a nature* like *that – the nature* explained in your scriptures *by which they become an object of your awareness*, *since there is thick mental darkness regarding* extremely coarse objects, *how can they correctly realize* whether or not *a world beyond*, which is very subtle, exists*?* They cannot realize it.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask: "If the Charvakas do not realize coarse objects, how can they realize such subtle objects as a world beyond?" 'A world beyond' refers to both past and future lives. The original thesis of the Charvakas was that only objects that are known by direct perceivers exist, here this position has been invalidated by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 49), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-1A2D Production from no cause

The Materialists (Lokayatas) say, "Since functioning things are born from no cause, the above disadvantages do not exist." –

If there were any production simply without a cause,
Then all would always be produced from everything,
And those of this world would not gather seeds and so on
In hundreds of ways, in order to make results arise. [6.99]

You should understand that it follows that all things would always be produced from everything, cause or not, and in order for the result, the harvest, to arise, this world would also not collect seeds and so on, by way of hundreds of difficulties, because, by assertion, there is some birth of things simply without cause.

If sentient beings were empty of causes, then, just like
A sky-lotus' color and scent, they could not be cognized.
But as the world, so very vivid, is perceived,
So know that, just like mind, the world depends on causes. [6.100]

That Materialists should understand that just as mind perceiving blue is produced from blue, so all the world is produced from causes. For if samsaric beings were empty of causes, then just like the smell and color of a blue lotus of space they would not exist as objects of cognition, but the world is perceived in all its vividness.

If those elements do not have that essence, the essence
By which they become objects of your mind,
Then how could anyone who has dense mental darkness
Even for these perceive correctly the world beyond? [6.101]

How could that Materialist perceive correctly the world beyond? It follows he could not, for if those [four] elements which he speaks of do not possess that essence, the essence by which, according to him, they become objects of his mind, then he has thick mental darkness even for these coarse objects.

When he dismisses the world beyond, he should understand

That he himself is perceiving the nature of knowables wrongly,
Since he has a body the same as the basis of that sort of view;
As when he accepts the elements' natural existence. [6.102]

He must understand that when he dismisses the world beyond, he himself is perceiving the nature of knowable phenomena wrongly; since he has indeed a body that is the same as the basis[90] of that view denying the world beyond as when he accepts the true existence of the nature of the material elements.

How those elements do not exist has already been explained:
Because above, production from self, from other, and from both
And absence of cause have already been refuted in general,
So these elements not explained do indeed not exist. [6.103]

These elements, which we have not explained above, do indeed not exist truly because how those elements cannot be truly existent has already been explained. If you ask why, it is because production from self, other, and both, and absence of a cause have already been refuted in general above.

This commentary by Gedun Drup covers the entire section on Charvakas' assertion of causeless production.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Furthermore:

It should be realized that at the time of refuting a world beyond,
Oneself erroneously views the nature of knowables
Because of indeed having the body, the similar support of that type of view,
As when accepting the very existence of the essential nature of the elements. [6.102]

'Similar' means "equivalent, or alike"; 'support,' the cause of abidance; 'body,' the trunk; 'that type of view,' the type of view denying a world beyond; "it is the support since it is also the similar," the qualifying compound.

What kind of body do the Charvakas have? The Charvakas have a body that is a basis for wrong views such as thinking that there is no world beyond, that is, that there are no past and future lives, and that there is no ripening of actions. This is the meaning of "Because of indeed having the body, the similar support of that type of view" (v. 6.102c). The Charvakas deprecate the existence of such things, that is, they assert the non-existence of what does exist. On the other hand, superimposition means to assert what does not exist to exist.

The Charvakas say that the four elements exist and that they are the cause of everything. Thus, awareness is produced from the four elements. This awareness is what analyzes objects. This is the basic thesis of the Charvakas. The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask the Charvakas "Do you know that a world beyond does not exist?" The Charvakas say that they know this. The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask "What awareness knows it? If you say that it is known by a direct perceiver then it follows that a non-existent world beyond is directly perceived. Since such a non-existent world beyond is directly perceived it would be a thing, whereby it follows that non-things are things. What awareness knows non-things?" The Charvakas say "It is known by a direct perceiver." The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "If it is known by a direct perceiver then it follows that a non-thing is directly perceived. If it is directly perceived then a non-thing would be a thing. You would have to accept this." This is the brief explanation of the statement in the autocommentary "even non-things would be things." Due to this

[90] *rten*

reasoning, the Charvakas begin to drop their thesis saying that it is not known by a direct perceiver but is known by an inferential cognizer, in this way their position that things are known only by direct perceivers declines. In other words, their thesis that valid cognizers are only direct perceivers is lost. In short, whereas previously the Charvakas said that there exist only direct perceivers, now they also assert the existence of inferential cognizers.

The Charvakas say that the support, or the basis, is the cause of abidance. What is the support? Is it the body?

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Since the body is indeed similar to the support, the phrase "the body that is similar to the support of that type of view" is added. Since it possesses that, the affix of *matup*[91] [is used]. The property of that is the reasoning: *because of indeed having the body, the similar support of that type of view.*

Here it would seem that the support is definitely the body. Thus, perhaps it means that the body, the support, is the basis of views. In this case, when the body disintegrates also the views supported on it disappear.

"The affix of *matup*" refers to a particular Sanskrit grammatical particle. Chandrakirti says: "Since it possesses that." This explanation is still in reference to the line in the root text: "Because of indeed having the body, the similar support of that type of view" (v. 6.102c). The affix *matup* is translated here into English as "indeed having." In the case of one who has a body, a Charvaka, the body is the subject that possesses or has the view of the non-existence of a world beyond. Thus, the body is the support of the view that deprecates the existence of a world beyond. Thus, "that type of view" is the view that deprecates the existence of a world beyond.

Chandrakirti then says: "The property of that is the reasoning: because of indeed having the body, the similar support of that type of view." If this is the reason, what is the predicate? The reason is: because of indeed having the body, the similar support of that type of view (v. 6.102c). The predicate is: "Oneself erroneously views the nature of knowables" (v. 6.102b).

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 133) says:

> As long as that support of [those for whom] the mind being [produced] from the elements does not become the very support that views or doubts a world beyond as indeed existent, that long it will be just the same as the support of the wrong view denying a world beyond. Hence, the Lokayatas[92] (Charvakas) do have the very possession of the same body as the support of that type of view also when they realize the essential nature of the elements as indeed existing. Thus, there are two such occasions: one is the occasion of comprehending a nature of the elements, the other is the occasion of denying other worlds.

The Charvakas have a wrong awareness because not seeing a world beyond and not doubting this at all they clearly state: "There is no world beyond." This is the thesis of the Charvakas. The Charvakas, thus, have a view deprecating the existence of a world beyond. The theses of the Charvakas has two occasions: the occasion of saying "We comprehend the nature of the elements" and the occasion of

[91] Refers to a grammatical affix [Tib: *rkyen*; Skt: *pratyaya*], called "*matup*" in Sanskrit, that is used to indicate the possessive case in a particular grammatical situation.

[92] Skt: *lokayata*; Tib: *'jig.rten rgyang.phan.pa* – or Materialists, is another name of the Charvakas. While they are called Gone-Afar, Skt: *ayata*; Tib: rgyang.phan.pa, because they have gone away from the right view, the etymology of *lokayata* is less clear. Perhaps it means those for whom the world, *loka*, has an end, *ayata* – i.e., no past or future lives.

deprecating the existence of a world beyond. Thus, on one hand, they say the four elements exist and are a cause producing the varieties of things and, on the other hand, they say that a world beyond does not exist. If this is analyzed, one discovers that their original thesis "things are produced without causes" is lost because they say that the four elements are causes producing the result of awareness. Thus, they contradict themselves here because initially they said that everything is produced from its own entity or produced naturally without depending on causes. Note that "produced naturally" does not imply they are produced from self. Thus, the thesis of the Charvakas has declined. If the Charvakas were to come to say that there is a world beyond they would clearly lose their position and even if they come to doubt the existence of a world beyond they would also lose the view of its non-existence. In this way, their thesis regarding the non-existence of a world beyond is lost.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, because if one is merely taken as the position the other is indicated as the example, [the root text] mentions, *as when accepting the very existence of the essential nature of the elements.* The very possession of the same body as the support of that type of view and erroneously viewing a nature of the elements also exist on that occasion.

The Charvakas accept the nature of the elements. In the statement "because if one is merely taken as the position the other is indicated as the example" the words 'one is merely taken as the position' refers to the predicate. In general 'position' refers to a thesis. In one text it says: "The collection is the thesis itself, the others are referred to as an imputation." In the syllogism "Sound, as the subject, is impermanent because of being a product," 'is impermanent' is the predicate and 'because it is a product' is the reason. 'The collection' refers to the combination of the subject and the predicate, in this case 'sound' and 'is impermanent.' In the case of the collection of the subject and predicate the term 'position' is an actual name, whereas in the case of the subject and the reason individually the term 'position' is only an imputed name. Dignaga's *Compendium of Valid Cognition* says: "Due to the reason of the property of the subject there is pervasion. That very reason is fulfills the three modes. If it does not, it is definitely not [a correct reason]. A facsimile of a reason is anything other than that."

In brief, the Charvakas' deprecation of the existence of a world beyond is a mistaken view because there do exist past and future lives.

Wednesday afternoon, 17 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 322) says:

> There are also other faults.
>
> *It should be realized that when refuting a world beyond,*
> *One mistakenly views the nature of objects of knowledge*
> *Because of possessing a body similar to the basis of that type of view;*
> *Like when asserting the nature of the elements to exist.* [6.102]
>
> *It should be realized that when refuting a world beyond, one*, that is, a Charvaka, *mistakenly views the nature of objects of knowledge because of possessing* the trunk of *a body* which is *similar to*, that is, like, *the basis of that type of view* deprecating a world beyond – that is, the cause for the abiding of that; for example, *like when asserting the nature of the elements to* be truly *existent*.

The view of the non-existence of a world beyond is a wrong view and a view that deprecates. On the other hand, the Charvakas say that the four elements are truly existent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is considered: The example is just devoid of the thesis[93] because I perceive unerroneously also on the occasion of realizing an essential nature of the elements to indeed exist.
>
> That is also not so because the fact of viewing erroneously is established since [that view] understands the elements that have the nature of not [truly] existing since they are not produced [in the four ways] as indeed produced and existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 322) says:

> CHARVAKAS: Also when the elements are realized to be truly existent, the example that is seen by an unmistaken conception is empty of the predicate.

This means that the thesis does not have a correct concordant example. Here 'the elements are realized to be truly existent' means 'the elements are asserted to be truly existent' because if the elements were realized to be truly existent they would in actuality be truly existent, whereas they are not.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 322) says:

> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: That too is not so because elements that are not produced inherently and do not exist inherently are realized to exist inherently and to be produced inherently, whereby this is established to be a mistaken view.

The Charvakas' do not have an unmistaken realization of the four elements "because elements that are not produced inherently and do not exist inherently are realized to exist inherently and to be produced inherently whereby this is established to be a mistaken view." Here too 'are realized to exist inherently' means 'are asserted to exist inherently.' If the four elements were realized to exist inherently and to be produced inherently this would not be mistaken whereas it is mistaken and is therefore a mistaken view. Therefore, this is to be understood in the sense that 'the four elements are asserted to exist inherently and to be produced inherently'; this is what is a mistaken view.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 322) says:

> Thus, taking that as an example in regard to applying the respective correct reason, it is indicated to necessarily not be empty of the predicate. That it is also similar in regard to taking it as a reason was explained earlier in terms of proving sound to be impermanent by setting out '[because] it is an apprehended object of the eye' as a reason that is not established, thereby, indicating that the three modes are necessary in order to prove a thesis by a reason.

When a correct reason is set out, the reason should not be empty of the predicate. Likewise, the example should also not be empty of the predicate. For example, previously the syllogism "Sound, as the subject, is impermanent because it is an appearing object of the eye" was set out. When a thesis is established, the reason must fulfill the three modes. If a thesis is realized only on the basis of fulfilling the three modes is it not possible to realize something by way of a consequence alone? This question is related to etymology of the name 'Consequentialist' (Prasangika) which is 'one who asserts that the former party is able to realize the thesis by means of a mere consequence.' The three modes are:

1. the property of the subject or the position,
2. the forward pervasion, and

[93] In the Tibetan phrase, *dpe bsgrub.byas stong.pa.nyi yin – bsgrub* is future tense and *byas* is past tense. LTK page 338, takes it as *dpe bsgrub.bya' chos.kyis stong.pa yin*, "is devoid of (by) the predicate of the probandum."

3. the reverse pervasion.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If it is said: It is necessary to establish that the elements are indeed not produced.
>
> It is not because it was already established.

Chandrakirti says that since he already explained the way in which the four elements do not exist inherently there is no need to repeat it here.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is explained:
>
> *How those elements do not exist was thus already explained –*
> *Because above, production from self, other, both, and*
> *Without cause were already refuted in common, therefore,*
> *These unexplained elements do not exist at all.* [6.103]
>
> When refuting the production of things in common from self, other, both, and without cause, I only refuted production of the elements in general. Hence, because [inherent] production is non-existent, the example is established since the elements do not have a self-nature.

Since nothing is produced from the four extremes, things, including the four elements, are refuted to be produced from the four extremes. In this way, the four elements existing inherently was implicitly refuted.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Likewise, to those denying omniscience, propounding things as indeed existent, propounding things as indeed non-existent, propounding Ishvara, time, particles, fundamental nature (*prakriti*), and entitiness, and also to others than those, one should add the erroneous state of understanding when propounding how their [tenets] are. It [6.102] should be composed like this:
>
> *It should be realized that at the time of refuting complete buddhahood,*
> *Oneself erroneously views the nature of knowables*
> *Because of indeed possessing the same body, the support of that type of view,*
> *As when accepting the very existence of the essential nature of the elements.*
>
> – and so forth, because of accepting to refute all views about states of being existent and non-existent.

Some tenets deny omniscience, while others propound things to be existent and others propound things to be non-existent. Some also propound Ishvara, time, particles, the fundamental nature, and entitiness to be the creators of the world. All of these are mistaken views. Chandrakirti says that one should refute these views by changing the words of verse 6.102 appropriately; for example, by changing "at the time of refuting a world beyond" to "at the time of refuting complete buddhahood." This change is made in order to "refute all views about states of being existent and non-existent."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> For us, there is never an occasion of acquiring undesired [consequences]. Therefore, with [the words of] this very verse skillfully changed, one should make certain that the former positions imagined by others are totally excluded because it is highly desirable to establish the exalted wisdom of the ultimate by totally refuting the nets of conceptions.

In order to eliminate the assertions of others the Prasangika Madhyamikas change the words of the root text to suit the context. In the statement "Because it is highly desirable to establish the exalted wisdom of the ultimate by totally refuting the nets of conceptions" 'the nets of conceptions' refers to the two conceptions of a self, a self of persons and a self of phenomena, these being the main nets of conceptions from which other afflictions arise.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is considered: This much also follows for you similarly.

The Charvakas say to the Prasangika Madhyamikas: "It would similarly follow for you." This is refuted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas saying:

> That is also not so because an example does not exist to establish us as in error.

In other words, the Charvakas are unable to find an example that establishes the Prasangika Madhyamikas to be mistaken.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That, at the time of realizing inclusion of other worlds just exists,
> One views the ultimate object, the nature of knowables, should be realized,
> Because of just possessing the body similar to the support of one's type of view,
> Like the time when accepting the selfless to be realized.
>
> – is also able to be expressed [like 6.102].

Here the words of verse 6.102 have been changed.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly:
>
> Here, that at the time of realizing the exalted knower of all exists,
> One views the ultimate object, the nature of knowables, should be realized.
>
> [Since] reason and example are only the two, similarly, it should also be added to "knowing all things."

The same words can be affixed to "knowing all things." In this way, these words of the root text can be affixed to either the position that negates the existence of a self or to the position that affirms the realization of selflessness as appropriate.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, in this way, it was mentioned [in verse 6.8ab]:
>
> *That itself does not arise from that, how could it from others?*
> *It also does not from both, how could it exist without cause?*
>
> Thus, whatever the thesis is, it is thoroughly established.

In short, the four theses set out in verse 6.8ab have been thoroughly explained; that is, production from self, production from other, production from both, and causeless production have been refuted. This concludes the section on the refutation of causeless production.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 322) says:

> CHARVAKAS: The elements must be proved to not be inherently produced.
> PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS:
>
> *The way in which those elements do not exist was already explained.*
> *How? Above, production from self, other, and both and*
> *The causeless were already refuted. Therefore,*
> *None of those unexplained elements exist.* [6.103]
>
> *The way in which those elements do not exist* inherently *was already explained* before. *How? Above*, when refuting *production from self*, *other*, *and both and causeless* production, I also *already refuted* inherently produced elements *in common*, that is, in general. *Therefore*, since *none of those*, that is, any, *elements* – those *not explained* by refuting in a general manner before – *exist*, the example is established. Similarly, also when refuting the tenets of those who deprecate the omniscient ones and who propound inherently existent things that are other than that, one should affix this mistaken realization [to the words of verse 6.102 of the *Supplement*]. For example, one should join [the following words] and so forth through wishing to refute all views of existence and non-existence:
>
> It should be realized that when refuting complete buddhahood,
> One mistakenly views the nature of objects of knowledge
> Because of possessing a body similar to the basis of that type of view;
> Like when asserting the nature of the elements to exist.

When production from self, other, both, and without causes is refuted, so too are inherently existent elements. The Charvakas say that the four elements are the cause of everything and are truly existent; this was refuted previously by the Prasangika Madhyamikas in general.

Who deprecates omniscient beings? Mainly the Charvakas deprecate them by asserting that things are only known by sense consciousnesses.

"One should affix this mistaken realization" means that when refuting the tenets of the Materialists, or proponents of inherent existence, one should affix "They are mistaken realizations or assertions" to all those who deny omniscient beings, who propound things to be existent, propound things to be non-existent and so forth.

"Refuting complete buddhahood" means that the Charvakas do not accept complete buddhahood. Due to this they "mistakenly view the nature of objects of knowledge." The Charvakas have this mistaken assertion because of having a body that is the support of this mistaken view. "Like when asserting the nature of the elements to exist" refers to the fact that the Charvakas assert that the elements exist truly and ultimately; in other words, they say that the true existence of the elements is their suchness. Such a view is a mistaken view.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 323) says:

OBJECTION: Also for you there would be a similar consequence.

The Charvakas say that they are correct and that the Prasangika Madhyamikas are wrong. To this the Prasangika Madhyamikas say:

PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKAS: Furthermore, that is not so because there does not exist an example that proves us to be mistaken. This can also be expressed saying:

It should be realized that, when it is realized that belonging to other worlds exists,
One views the nature of objects of knowledge, the ultimate object,
Because of possessing a body similar to the basis of that type of view of mine;
Like when asserting the realization of selflessness.

Here the words of verse 6.102 are changed to: "when it is realized that belonging to other worlds exists, one views the nature of objects of knowledge, the ultimate object." When one realizes selflessness, one unmistakenly realizes the nature of objects of knowledge.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 323) says:

Similarly, given that the reason and example are only two:

Then, it should be realized that when it is realized that "Omniscient ones exist"
One views the nature of objects of knowledge, the ultimate object,...

When it is realized that omniscient beings exist one correctly realizes objects of knowledge.

What does "given that the reason and example are only two"? Think about it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 323) says:

This should, similarly, also be joined to "all things."

What is to be joined to "all things"? The words of verse 6.102 should be joined by changing them appropriately, perhaps as follows:

It should be realized that, when it is realized that all things exists,
One views the nature of objects of knowledge, the ultimate object...
Because of possessing a body similar to the basis of that type of view of mine;
Like when asserting the realization of selflessness.

"All things" refers to the three – forms, consciousnesses, and non-associated compositional factors – which include all things. "All things" are also all the phenomena included in the five aggregates.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 323) says:

For this reason, in this way it is stated "The [following] four theses [set out in verse 6.8] are thoroughly proven":

That itself does not arise from that. How can it from other?
Neither does it from both. How can it causelessly? [6.8ab]

Therefore, one should not say "Others' systems have been refuted, but our own system has not been proven."

When others' systems are refuted, one proves one's own system. What is mainly refuted here is inherent production. Others' systems say that there is inherent production either because there is:
1. production from self,
2. production from other,
3. production from both, or
4. causeless production.

On the other hand, our own system refutes these four extremes of production and thereby establishes that there is no inherent production. Thus, by refuting inherent production, the lack of inherent production is established. Therefore, one should not say "Our own system has not been proven." Rather it has been proven by establishing the lack of inherent existence.

Thursday morning, 18 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 324) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A1C The meaning established by refuting production from the four extremes

This means the same as saying "The conclusion regarding the refutation of production from the four extremes."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is mentioned here: If things are not produced from self, other, both, and without cause, well then, how are they produced?
>
> I shall explain. If things had any self-nature they would, without doubt, be produced or observed from self or other or both or without cause because another conception of production is impossible. Even according to those who strongly assert things as being produced from Ishvara and so forth, they, Ishvara and so forth, are selves or are others or are both. Hence, even those propounding Ishvara and so forth do not pass beyond the faults already explained. Therefore, there does not exist another, a fifth, conception of the cause that produces production. Therefore, because another is non-existent and because production by the four conceptions was refuted, inherent production of things does not exist. In order to indicate that, [the root text] mentions:
>
> *Since there does not exist production from self, other, both, and*
> *Independent of causes, things are devoid of self-nature.* [6.104ab]

Nothing is produced from the four extremes. Since there is no fifth conception of the cause of production, there is no need to refute a fifth mode of production. Although there are those who say that Ishvara is the creator of the world, this is included in production from other in that Ishvara is other. How does Ishvara create the world? The proponents of Ishvara say that whatever he thinks of comes into existence. This can be debated asking: "If Ishvara thinks of an Italian pizza does it immediately appear on a table in front of him? If Ishvara would like everyone to be rich why are they not?"

Others propound a general principal as creator, the refutation of this is included in the refutation of production from self.

Those who assert production from self are the Samkhyas. Those who assert production from other are the lower Buddhist schools, that is, the Svatantrika Madhyamika and below. Those who assert production from both are the Nirgranthas. Those who assert causeless production are the Charvakas. The main theses of all these schools is that there exists inherent production. In order to

prove this, they set out various reasonings such as "because things are produced from self" and so forth. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that in refuting their proofs, their theses are refuted.

There are also other schools that assert time, particles, and so forth to be the creator; these types of production are also included in the four types of production, therefore, there is no fifth type of production.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 324) says:

> QUESTION: If things are not produced from self, other, both, or causelessly, well then, how are they produced?
> RESPONSE: This is explained [as follows]. If things had some inherent existence, they would unquestionably be produced from self or other or both or causelessly and would be observed [to be so] given that other conceptions of production are impossible. Even according to those who strongly assert that things are produced from Ishvara and so forth, they, that is, Ishvara and so forth, are either a self or other or both. Hence, also those propounding Ishvara and so forth to be the cause do not pass beyond the faults already explained, due to which there does not exist another – a fifth – conception regarding the cause of production. Therefore, because another [conception] does not exist and because that imagined by the four conceptions to be production is refuted, inherent production of things does not exist. In order to indicate this, it is mentioned:
>
> *Because production from self, other, both, and without depending on a cause*
> *Does not exist, things are free from inherent existence.* [6.104ab]
>
> For the reason that *production from self*, *other*, and *both and* production *without depending on a cause do not exist*, *things are free from inherent existence*. Through this, even though production from the four extremes is refuted by means of consequences, at the end the manner of producing an inferential cognizer in dependence on a reason is indicated. Moreover, "not produced from the four extremes" is the reason, "things" is the subject, and "free from inherent existence" is the thesis.

In the presentations of the refutations of production from the four extremes, various consequences were flung by the Prasangika Madhyamikas such as:

> Things, as the subject, it follows that their production is endless and meaningless because they are produced from self.
>
> A sprout, as the subject, it follows that everything is produced from everything because they are produced from other.

and so forth.

These consequences also apply to production from both. The consequence of causeless production is:

> A farmer's hardships in planting crops, watering them, and so forth, it follows that they would be meaningless because there is production without causes.

The concluding syllogism is:

> Things, as the subject, are free from inherent existence because they are not produced from self, other, both, and without causes.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 325) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A2 Dispelling arguments regarding those refutations

Here others present their arguments that the Prasangika Madhyamikas' refutations are not valid.

A Actual meaning
B Presenting a summary of that

3B1C-2B3E-2A2A Actual meaning

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

It is mentioned here: If inherent production of things is just non-existent, then, how are the unproduced, blue and so forth, apprehended?

I shall explain. The self-natures of blue and so forth do not in any way become the very objects of anyone, hence, the self-natures of blue and so forth are not apprehended.

If it is said: If that is the case, then, what is that which is seen to appear in front again and again as the very entity of the object suitable to be?

I shall explain. It is not self-nature since it is an erroneous state of being because only those together with ignorance observe that essential nature, because those separated from ignorance do not observe it. In order to indicate [the aforesaid], it is explained:

Since the worldly have dense bewilderment, similar to a mass of clouds,
Hence, objects erroneously appear. [6.104cd]

A mass of clouds [means] a mass of rain clouds. Because thick bewilderment like a mass of clouds remains, having covered the perception of the nature of blue and so forth, therefore, the childish do not have perception of the nature of blue and so forth. This erroneous self-entity, the source of strong settling, appears to the childish strongly settling upon truth.

Those possessing the dense darkness of the afflictions cannot see the real nature of objects such as blue. Although nature can refer either to the conventional nature or the ultimate nature, what is being discussed here is the ultimate nature; this is what is not seen by those with dense darkness.

The conventional nature is subdivided into coarse conventional nature and subtle conventional nature. The coarse conventional nature of blue is the coarse aspect of the color blue that is perceived by ordinary beings. This is evidenced by the fact that ordinary beings point to blue saying 'That is blue.' The subtle conventional nature of blue is that the blue, which is empty of inherent and ultimate existence, is merely imputed by conception. Such a subtle nature of blue is not perceived by ordinary beings who have the thick ignorance which is like a mass of rain clouds or thick fog obscuring one from seeing what is in front of oneself. In addition, this thick ignorance obscures one from seeing the ultimate nature of phenomena. Therefore, we need to eliminate ignorance. How is it eliminated? It is eliminated by hearing teachings on the emptiness of inherent existence, thinking about emptiness, and then meditating on it. This is the way in which to eliminate the mass of thick clouds of ignorance within us. Just as rain clouds are eliminated by a strong wind, so too can the strong wind of our effort in hearing, thinking, and meditation remove the clouds of ignorance.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 325) says:

OBJECTION: If things are not produced inherently, well then, how are the unproduced, such as blue and so forth, apprehended?
RESPONSE: No matter what the nature of blue and so forth is, it is just not an object that appears to someone polluted by ignorance. Therefore, the eye consciousness and so forth of such [persons] does not apprehend the nature of blue and so forth.
QUESTION: Well then, what is it that is fitting to be seen to appear again and again before oneself as the very entity of the object?
RESPONSE: Since it appears by the force of a mistaken [awareness], it is not the nature because of observing that essence through just the force of being polluted by ignorance. In order to indicate that, it is explained:

Because of that, the worldly have thick confusion like a mass of clouds,
Due to which objects appear mistakenly. [6.104cd]

Because of that, for that reason, *the worldly* – that is, sentient beings – have *thick*, or dense, *confusion, like a mass of* black rain *clouds* which abides obscuring them from seeing the nature of

> blue and so forth. *Due to this*, the non-seeing in the childish of the nature of blue and so forth is the source of the *mistaken* strong adherence to an own entity in *objects*, this being what *appears* to the childish who adhere to true existence.

Due to what are ordinary beings unable to see the nature of phenomena? It is due to their strong adherence to true existence. In other words, due to being obscured by thick ignorance ordinary beings are unable to see the nature of phenomena.

What is the blue that is seen again and again? The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the nature of blue is not apprehended by the eye consciousness and so forth. However, the lower schools say that the nature of blue should be apprehended by the eye consciousness because blue appears again and again to it. In other words, they ask the Prasangika Madhyamikas: "Since we see blue again and again, why do we not see its nature?" The response is that while blue appears to a mistaken awareness, an eye consciousness, the nature of blue does not appear to an eye consciousness. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "It is not the nature because of observing that essence through just the force of being polluted by ignorance." Due to ignorance, we see blue but not the nature of blue.

In this context 'the nature of blue' can refer to either (i) the ultimate nature of blue or (ii) the subtle conventional nature of blue. Ordinary beings are unable to know the subtle conventional nature of blue and the ultimate nature of blue because of being polluted by ignorance. The eye consciousness is unable to apprehend the subtle conventional nature of blue and so forth and the ultimate nature of blue and so forth; it only apprehends mere coarse blue. On the contrary, the lower schools say that the eye consciousness, in apprehending coarse blue, apprehends the nature of blue.

Thursday afternoon, 18 January 2001

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is mentioned here: If asked – "If inevitably[94] not perceiving thusness in any way because concealed by bewilderment, due to what is it erroneously perceived?"
>
> "Not being such, they appear as such an essential nature by the power of ignorance." In order to indicate this fact by way of an external example, it is mentioned:
>
> *Just as some, due to the strength of cataracts, wrongly perceive falling hairs,*
> *Two moons, peacock tail feathers, bees, and so forth,* [6.105ab]
>
> Just as one with cataracts is made to apprehend falling hairs and so forth as factual things due to the strength of cataracts, although they have already [been shown] to be of an unproduced nature,
>
> *Similarly, due to the power of the fault of bewilderment, the unskillful*
> *Intellectually understand some of the varieties of compounded things.* [6.105cd]

The childish, instead of seeing the reality of objects, see them in a mistaken way. Why is that? To explain this an analogy is set forth as follows. Just as those with cataracts see falling hair and so forth because their eye sense powers are impaired; similarly, due to being obscured by ignorance, phenomena are perceived to have inherent existence, although they do not exist inherently.

Other analogies are also set forth in the text such as that of two moons. Why is their the appearance of two moons? It is due to a superficial cause of error. Other analogies are seeing the eyes of peacock tail feathers in the space before oneself, bees in one's cup, and so forth due to an impairment of the eye sense power. Such things are seen although they do not exist. Similarly, due to

[94] LTK, p. 341, takes the phrase *mi.'gyur la rag.na*, "if inevitably" (literally "if relying on not changing") as *chug.kyang*, "although constrained to."

ignorance, phenomena appear to be truly existent and are conceived to be truly existent even though they do not have the nature of true existence.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says::

> These statements were spoken by the Bhagavan:[95]
>
> > "Through the condition of ignorance, [there is karmic] formation…"
>
> and, similarly,
>
> > "This person who is subsequently connected with ignorance, actually formulates the meritorious to be actually formulated, the non-meritorious to be actually formulated, and also the immovable to be actually formulated..."
>
> and, similarly,
>
> > "Through ceasing ignorance, [karmic] formation is ceased."

The Buddha said that due to the condition of ignorance, karmic formations are accumulated. "This person who is subsequently connected with ignorance" means "This person who has ignorance." A person who possesses the beginningless ignorance that is the first link of dependent-arising creates meritorious, demeritorious, and immovable actions. Specifically, a person with ignorance creates meritorious actions that lead to rebirth in the human or god realms, demeritorious actions that lead to rebirth in the lower realms, and immovable actions that lead to rebirth as a god in the form and formless realms.

Similarly, the Buddha said that by ceasing ignorance, karmic formations are ceased. Therefore, when ignorance ceases, karmic formations cease; when karmic formations cease, consciousness ceases, and so forth through to the twelfth link of aging and death.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, in this manner:
>
> > *"Action arises in dependence on bewilderment – without bewilderment,*
> > *It does not arise," was said undoubtedly to be known solely by the unwise.*
> > *The sun of fine intellect completely dispels dense darkness –*
> > *The wise comprehend emptiness and will be liberated.* [6.106]
>
> When the wise perceive that "Through the condition of ignorance, [there are karmic] formations," they not only comprehend formations as without self-nature; through realizing that, they abandon ignorance and also do not appropriate [karmic] formation because of abandoning the cause of appropriating it. Therefore, they will be completely liberated from *samsara*.

Due to ignorance there arises cyclic existence and the various types of suffering. This is because from ignorance come actions (karmic formations) and from actions come suffering. That karmic formations depend upon ignorance is in the case of the unwise who possess ignorance. That "action arises in dependence on bewilderment" (v. 6.106a) exists only in the case of the unwise. The root verse continues "without bewilderment, it does not arise." This is the case of the wise – those who know

[95] Possib1y in the *Sutra of Dependent Arising*.

how karmic formations are produced in dependence on the condition of ignorance and are thereby able to abandon ignorance.

In the line "The sun of fine intellect completely dispels dense darkness," 'fine intellect' refers to the wisdom realizing the lack of inherent existence of phenomena that dispels ignorance like the sun dispels darkness. "The wise comprehend emptiness and will be liberated" refers to superiors who realize emptiness and thereby will attain liberation.

When those possessing wisdom see that karmic formations arise due to the condition of ignorance, not only do they realize that karmic formations do not exist inherently, but, in addition, they also abandon ignorance and thereby do not appropriate or create new actions due to having abandoned their cause.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 325-6) says:

> OBJECTION: Even though it is granted that suchness is not seen because of being veiled by confusion, due to what [are things] seen mistakenly?
> RESPONSE: While not being established by way of their own entity, they appear to be so by the force of confusion. In order to indicate this by means of an external example [Chandrakirti says]:
>
> *Just as by the strength of cataracts some mistakenly apprehend*
> *Falling hair, two moons, the eyes of peacock feathers, bees, and so forth,*
> *Similarly, by the force of the fault of confusion, the unwise*
> *Realize the varieties, like compounded phenomena, with their intellect.* [6.105]
>
> *Just as by the strength of* a sense power impaired by *cataracts*, *some* [people] with cataracts *apprehend*, or see, *mistakenly* – that is, they apprehend what does not exist as though it exists – *falling hair, two moons, the eyes of peacock feathers, bees, and so forth*, *similarly, by the force of the fault of confusion, the unwise* – that is, ordinary beings – *realize*, or see, *the varieties, like* the *compounded phenomena* that are blue and so forth, *with their intellect*, that is, with their consciousness. The Bhagavan taught this in the *Sutra of Dependent Relation* stating:
>
> Due to the condition of ignorance, karmic formations...
>
> And:
>
> Likewise, a person who is subsequently connected with ignorance fabricates the meritorious which is what is fabricated, the non-meritorious which is what is fabricated, and the immovable which is what is fabricated.
>
> And:
>
> Similarly, due to ceasing ignorance, karmic formations cease...

Why do we not see the lack of inherent existence of phenomena? It is because our intellect or awareness is obscured by dense ignorance. Due to this ignorance, phenomena appear to be inherently existent although they are not. The external analogy set out by Chandrakirti to explain this is that of eyes impaired by cataracts due to which there is the appearance of falling hair, two moons, and so forth which do not actually exist. Another analogy is that of sitting in a moving car or train due to which houses, trees, and so forth appear to be moving although they are not. Just as these external things appear to move although they do not, similarly phenomena appear to exist inherently although they do not.

Buddha said: "Due to the condition of ignorance, karmic formations arise." It is our own experience that every day we create many actions due to ignorance, therefore, unless we are careful, we continually engage in creating actions that are the cause for cyclic existence. At times we create meritorious actions and at other times demeritorious actions, however, we do not create immovable actions. Because we continually create actions, we should try to create only meritorious actions and avoid demeritorious actions whether we are standing, walking, sitting, or lying down. Therefore, we have to make sure that we constantly possess mindfulness and introspection. In our daily life, we

have the habit of looking at the faults of others with our eyes, thinking of the faults of others with our mind, and criticizing the faults of others with our speech due to having done so also in previous lives. Because we have such habits, we should try to eliminate them. Our mind is as uncontrolled as a drunken crazed elephant. Just as we would tame a wild elephant, so too should we tame our uncontrolled mind. In order to tame an elephant one hooks their ear with an iron hook and beats them with an iron chain; the hook and the chain are analogies for mindfulness and introspection, the means to subdue or tame our uncontrolled mind.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 326) says:

> [Chandrakirti's *Supplement*] says:
>
> *The statement "Actions arise in dependence on confusion,*
> *They do not arise without ignorance" is certainly realized by only the unwise.*
> *The wise, whose sun of fine intelligence thoroughly dispels the thick darkness,*
> *Comprehend emptiness and will be liberated.* [6.106]
>
> Therefore, in this way, the *statement* that "*Actions*, which are karmic formations, *arise in dependence on confusion*, or ignorance, whereas actions *do not arise without ignorance*" *is certainly realized by* – that is, it is from the point of view of – *only the unwise*. When *the wise* see the teaching "Due to the condition of ignorance, karmic formations...," not only do they *comprehend* the *emptiness* that is the lack of inherent existence of compounded phenomena, also *the sun of* their *fine intelligence* realizing the suchness of dependent-arisings *thoroughly dispels*, or abandons, the ignorance that is like *thick darkness*. They also do not appropriate karmic formations because they have abandoned ignorance, the cause of appropriating those actions. Therefore, they *will* definitely *be liberated* from cyclic existence.

Those possessing the exalted wisdom realizing the non-existence of the referent object of the conception of true existence no longer appropriate or create karmic formations and, therefore, will cease to take rebirth. It is said: "One who sees the truth has no more projecting [actions]. One who is free from existence has no more rebirths."

Friday morning, 19 January 2001

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is mentioned here: If thus, there does not exist any self-nature ultimately in forms and so forth, then, because of not existing ultimately, like the son of a barren woman, their self-nature would not exist even deceptively. Yet, the self-nature of forms and so forth do exist deceptively. Therefore, their very existence only exists also ultimately.
>
> *If things did not exist in reality,*
> *Also conventionally, just like a barren woman's son,*
> *They will be just non-existent. Therefore,*
> *They just exist inherently.* [6.107]

The lower schools say that if forms and so forth do not have an ultimate nature then, like the son of a barren women, they would also not exist conventionally. They say that because forms and so forth exist conventionally they must exist ultimately. The lower schools say that if things do not exist ultimately they would not exist at all, meaning that they would not exist conventionally. For this reason, they say that if forms and so forth exist conventionally they should also exist ultimately. The analogy given here in support of this is that of the son of a barren woman which neither exists conventionally or ultimately.

I shall speak about this:

Since those falling hairs and so forth that are objects
Of those with cataracts and so forth are not produced,
One should dispute with just them at first,
Later with those afflicted with the cataract of ignorance. [6.108]

At the beginning you should debate with only those whose eyes are impaired by cataracts and so forth, saying, "Why do you see falling hairs and so forth – objects that do not exist – yet not the son of a barren woman?" Later, you must dispute and investigate with those whose eyes of awareness are covered by the cataract of ignorance, saying, "Why do you see forms and so forth – having unproduced self-nature – yet not the son of a barren woman?"

When the lower schools argue with the Prasangika Madhyamikas, the Prasangikas respond saying that the lower schools should first debate with those who have cataracts and only later with us. Those with cataracts see falling hair and so forth even though they do not actually exist. In brief, just as there is a mistaken consciousness perceiving falling hair which does not exist, so too is there the mistaken perception of phenomena as existing inherently even though they do not exist inherently. In other words, although forms and so forth appear to us as though inherently existent, they are neither inherently existent nor inherently produced.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Do not dispute and investigate this with us for we engage in explaining things as without self-nature exactly according to scripture from the viewpoint of the comprehension by a yogi's exalted wisdom saying, "The yogis see things like this and also those others who wish to attain a yogi's exalted wisdom should strongly appreciate the self-nature of phenomena that was explained." It is not [that we explain things as without self-nature] through relying on our own knowledge because we are those whose eyes of awareness are covered by the cataract of ignorance.

Phenomena do not exist inherently but seem to exist inherently; this lack of inherent existence is seen by a yogi's exalted wisdom.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 326) says:

The *Compendium* says:

Any bodhisattva who knows, by means of that wisdom,
That dependent and related arisings are unproduced and inexhaustible
Destroys the shadows of ignorance and attains the self-arisen,
Like a cloudless sun dispels darkness by radiating rays of light.

Bodhisattvas, with the wisdom knowing dependent-arisings, destroy the shadows of ignorance and attain the state of the self-arisen, the state of a foe destroyer, just like a cloudless sun dispels darkness by radiating light. "Wisdom" is the wisdom realizing dependent-arisings, in dependence on this wisdom bodhisattvas realize phenomena are empty of inherent existence and, therefore, are without inherent production and inherent cessation and thereby destroy the shadows of ignorance.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 327) says:

OBJECTION:

"If things do not exist in suchness,
Also in conventional terms, like the son of a barren woman,
They would not exist. Therefore,
They are just inherently existent." [6.107]

If – that is, if it were the case that – *things*, such as forms and so forth, *do not* at all have a nature *in suchness*, that is, ultimately, then *also in conventional terms, like the son of a barren woman*, their nature – that is, the entities of blue and so forth – *would not exist*. However, the entities of forms and so forth also exist conventionally. *Therefore*, their existence *is just*, that is, only, *inherent*, or ultimate, *existence*.

The lower schools say that if phenomena do not exist ultimately they would also not exist conventionally, like the son of a barren woman. Therefore, they say that forms and so forth exist ultimately because they exist conventionally.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 327) says:

RESPONSE: This is explained [as follows]:

Since falling hair and so forth,
The objects of those with cataracts, are not produced,
For a while you should debate with just them,
Then later with those who are afflicted with the cataract of ignorance. [6.108]

Since falling hair and so forth – the objects of the awarenesses *of those with cataracts – are not produced*, they are similar to the unborn son of a barren woman, so *for a while*, initially, *you should debate with just those* whose eyes are impaired by cataracts and so forth saying "Why do you see objects that do not exist, falling hair and so forth, but do not see the son of a barren woman?" *Then later*, that is, subsequently, you should dispute and investigate *with those who are afflicted with the cataract of ignorance* – those whose awareness eye is obscured by ignorance – saying "Why do you see forms and so forth which are the same in not being produced inherently, but do not see the son of a barren woman?" This is not to be disputed and investigated with us because in our case we engage in explaining things as lacking inherent existence in terms of what is comprehended by a yogi's exalted wisdom in accordance with the passage "Yogis who see things like this and also others who wish to attain a yogi's exalted wisdom should have strong conviction in the nature of phenomena explained above." We do not do so based on our own knowledge because our awareness eye is obscured by the cataract of ignorance.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that in the perspective of those with cataracts there is the appearance of falling hair and so forth, however, they do not exist and are not inherently produced, like the son of a barren woman. They say that since the lower schools accept that the falling hair does not exist although it appears to those with cataracts, why do those with cataracts see falling hair and so forth but do not see the son of a barren woman? The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the lower schools should dispute first with those who have cataracts and not with us because there is the appearance of falling hair, even though it does not exist, to those with cataracts. If one says to those with cataracts that falling hair does not exist, what would they respond? One can ask them why do they not see the son of a barren woman? One can also continue the debate asking: "Is a barren woman not a mother since all sentient beings are mothers? To be a mother is it necessary to give birth to a child? Do we not meditate on all sentient beings as having been our mothers, on the need to repay their kindness, and so forth? If there does not exist the son of a barren woman is there not a son who is a result of a barren woman?" If someone says there is not, one asks: "Is there not a son who is subsequently born to a barren woman? Is the definition of a result not that which arises later and the definition of a cause that which arises previously? Does a barren woman not assist sentient beings? Does she not assist sons and daughters?" If someone says that she does assist sons and daughters, one

says that since there are sons and daughters who are assisted and who will be assisted, the barren woman is a cause and the sons and daughters are the result since the definition of a cause is "that which assists" and the definition of a result is "that which is assisted." These definitions are also related to our daily life in regard to someone who adopts a child and then assists him or her.

To those with cataracts there is the appearance of falling hair, although the falling hair is unproduced. In a similar way, forms and so forth are seen to exist inherently although they do not. Why are forms and so forth seen to exist inherently? It is due to being afflicted with ignorance. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the lower schools should first debate with those with cataracts and then later on with those who have ignorance.

Yogis comprehend that phenomena lack inherent existence and the Prasangika Madhyamikas explain in accordance with this comprehension. Chandrakirti reduces his own pride by saying: "We engage in explaining things as lacking inherent existence in terms of what is comprehended by a yogi's exalted wisdom... We do not do so based on our own knowledge because our awareness eye is obscured by the cataract of ignorance." What ground has Chandrakirti reached? In some texts it says that Chandrakirti was on the path of accumulation at the time he composed this text.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: Is there any difference between conventional truth (*kun rdzob den pa*) and nominal truth (*tha snyad den pa*) or conventional existence (*kun rdzob yod pa*) and nominal existence (*tha snyad yod pa*)?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If something exists conventionally it is not necessarily a conventional truth, and if something exists nominally it is not necessarily a nominal truth, for example, a true cessation. Nominal truth and conventional truth are the same as are conventional existence and nominal existence. A true cessation exists nominally and exists conventionally, but is it a conventional truth? It is not. If it exists nominally it exists conventionally and vice versa but if it exists conventionally it is not necessarily a conventional truth, this having a particular etymology. Some say, however, that if it exists conventionally it is a conventional truth. To this, one says: "It follows that a true cessation does not exist because it does not exist nominally." A true cessation does not exist as an object concordant with conventionalities. Therefore, what is a nominality? Reasoning in this way, nominality come to mean the same as conventionality. Usually, the etymology of the word 'conventional' (*kun rdzob*) is said to be "that which acts to obscure." Nominalities (*tha snyad*) are of two types: (i) nominalities expressed by a term and (ii) nominalities labeled by conceptuality.

Student: In one of the transcripts (week 29), it is mentioned that in Buddhism there are four great seals of conduct and four great seals of view. What are the four great seals of conduct?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are explained in Khedrup Je's *Cleansing the Subduer's Doctrine* and in the Gomang text books. One of the four is to offer ablution to Dzambala, the deity of wealth, another is to give handprint tormas to the five hundred types of hungry ghosts. I do not remember the other two.

Student: For Prasangika, what valid cognizer establishes external phenomena?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Both direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers establish external phenomena. The Prasangika Madhyamika system sets out four types of inferential valid cognizers including an inferential valid cognizer realizing by means of an example. Although external objects are established by direct valid cognizers, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas a direct valid cognizer is not necessarily non-conceptual, it can also be conceptual. The Prasangika Madhyamikas also say that yogic direct valid cognizers exist in ordinary beings. Therefore, in brief, external phenomena are established by direct valid cognizers as well as by inferential valid cognizers.

Student: One of the transcripts (week 29) says: "According to the true aspectarian Chittamatrins when a foe destroyer who has a nirvana with remainder attains a nirvana without remainder, all conventionalities cease. That is, they assert that his continuum, which is a compounded phenomenon, ceases and *that all that remains is abidance in the sphere of phenomena*." Will Geshe-la please explain the latter part of this statement, that all that remains is abidance in the sphere of phenomena? Is this in accordance with the views of the true aspectarian Chittamatrins?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It does accord with the views of the true aspectarian Chittamatrins who assert three final vehicles. Thus, they say that when a hearer attains the nirvana of his vehicle he has attained a final vehicle. For them the term "without remainder" means that when a hearer foe destroyer dies all signs of compounded phenomena vanish because the base, the body, ceases. In fact, one text says: "Due to there no longer being a basis for the obstructions, the two obstructions are naturally eliminated." This is discussed in the sixth chapter of the *Supplement* in the context of a self of persons saying:

> *At the time of nirvana the self would definitely be annihilated.*
> *In the moments prior to nirvana, it would be produced and disintegrate.*
> *Since the agent does not exist, its results would not exist.*
> *That accumulated by another would be consumed by someone else.* [6.128d]

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that when there is what is attained (nirvana) there is no attainer (the foe destroyer) and when there is the attainer there is no object attained because when a nirvana without remainder is attained the aggregates cease. The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask the Chittamatrins: "Does a Mahayanist attain a nirvana without remainder?" Perhaps the Chittamatrins would say that he does not because a Mahayanist's nirvana is not a nirvana without remainder because a buddha superior abides as an enjoyment body until cyclic existence is emptied. Thus, a nirvana without remainder is only asserted by the Chittamatrins in the context of a hinayana nirvana and not in the context of the mahayana. Therefore, the terms 'with remainder' and 'without remainder' do not apply to the mahayana but only apply to the hinayana.

On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas define a nirvana with remainder and nirvana without remainder quite differently. According to the lower schools "the remainder" is the suffering aggregates, whereas for the Prasangika Madhyamikas "the remainder" is the appearance of true existence. Thus, in the Prasangika Madhyamika system a nirvana with remainder is the state of having attained a nirvana in which there is still the appearance of true existence, whereas a nirvana without remainder is the state of having attained a nirvana that no longer has the appearance of true existence. In brief, this means that the two types of nirvana correspond respectively to the period of meditative equipoise and to the period of subsequent attainment.

According to the true aspectarian Chittamatrins, when a buddha superior shows the aspect of passing away do the signs of compounded phenomena cease? Is the buddha who is a person severed completely and is the continuity of his aggregates severed? Think about this.

Student: According to Chittamatra, which consciousnesses – sense, mental, yogic, or self-cognizing – can be valid cognizers?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: All four can be valid cognizers. In fact, sense consciousnesses, mental consciousnesses, yogic consciousnesses, and self-cognizers can be either valid or not valid. Among the four, some can also be subsequent cognizers. In general, for the lower schools such as the Chittamatrins a subsequent cognizer cannot be a valid cognizer because it is not a new incontrovertible knower with respect to its object. This is because a subsequent cognizer realizes an object that has already been realized.

Student: Both the Charvakas and Western science believe that only direct perception or observation is valid. According to Western science, the mind is produced by physical processes (i.e., activities of the brain) due to which there is no need to posit a previous life as a cause of the mind of the present life. How would Buddhism prove that the mind is not physical? How would Buddhism prove that the mind must have a cause that is not physical?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Western science explains the physical to be that composed of atoms. According to science there are various functions of the brain that produce memory and so forth. However, although science does not talk about the mind directly they do refer to it in terms of intelligence, wisdom, and so forth. Therefore, I think that they do not say that the entity of intelligence is physical.
Student: Science says that there is nothing other than nerves, chemicals, etc. which explain all the functions of the mind.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The Buddhist teachings say that mind is not form and thus cannot be pointed to. Although mind is not form, it does have the capacity to perceive. Mind or consciousness is a complex subject that is extensively presented in the scriptures. However, it is true that when the brain is damaged it does have an effect on the person's ability to think and function. Based on this it would appear that the brain is fundamental, however, we need to examine the relationship of the mind and the brain. When the nervous system of the brain is damaged, the movement of the subtle winds does not flow properly. Due to this the minds mounted on these winds do not function normally. This corresponds with the explanation in tantra which says that when the mount is damaged the mind mounted on it no longer functions well. We can take the example of electricity; the electrical wire is like the winds and the electric current is like the mind. When the wire is cut the electricity is also cut off because the mount, the wire, of the electricity is damaged. Similarly, the mind does not function well when its mount, the subtle winds, are damaged. This is from the point of view of tantra.

From the point of view of sutra it is said that a sense consciousness, such as an eye consciousness, stops functioning well when the eye sense power is damaged. Likewise, if the ear consciousness does not function it is because the ear sense power which is clear matter is damaged. I cannot say more than this.

END

Monday afternoon, 22 January 2001

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was taught [in *Sutra*[96]]:
>
> That the aggregates are isolated from self-nature and just empty,
> Enlightenment is empty of self-nature and just isolated [and][97]
> Those who practice are also empty of self-nature,
> Is known by those possessing exalted wisdom, not by the childish.
>
> Exalted wisdom will be cognized as empty of self-nature.
> Having cognized the self-nature of knowables as empty,
> When realized to be like knowers
> They are said to be practicing the enlightenment-path.
>
> Therefore, this is not disputed and investigated with yogis, for they do not see self-nature of any phenomena, either deceptively or ultimately.

"The aggregates are isolated from nature and just empty" means that they do not exist inherently. Enlightenment is also empty of inherent existence. 'Those who practice' refers to those who see the nature of phenomena, the aggregates and so forth, to be like that. Those who have exalted wisdom know the nature of phenomena, whereas the childish do not. Exalted wisdom and objects of knowledge are also empty of inherent existence. Similarly, knowers are empty of inherent existence. This is the practice of the path to enlightenment.

Chandrakirti says that the nature of phenomena is not to be disputed and investigated with yogis since they know the nature of phenomena, that is, that they lack inherent existence both conventionally and ultimately.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> "Give up[98] the view to dispute and investigate with those having cataracts. At first, this is to be greatly disputed and investigated with yourself." [The root text] explains:
>
> *If dreams along with the city of gandharvas,*
> *Water of a mirage, magical illusions, reflections, and so forth,*
> *The unproduced, are perceived although similarly not existent,*
> *How does that happen for you? It is unreasonable.* [6.109]
>
> For example, although that observed in a dream and the son of a barren woman are alike in just not existing, the dream will be perceived, the son of a barren woman will not. Likewise, regarding also the city of the *gandharvas* (smell-eaters). "Water of a mirage" means "water in a mirage." Likewise, also regarding magical illusions. The phrase "and so forth" of "reflections and so forth" includes echoes, emanations, and so forth. For example, although being empty of self-nature, they are seen; the son of a barren woman is not. Therefore, first dispute and investigate with oneself, and then later dispute and investigate with me.

[96] Source unknown.

[97] This line is missing in Poussin, p. 219.

[98] LTK, p. 344, 5, has *zhog* (give up) for '*dug*.

'Those having cataracts' refers to those who have the cataracts of ignorance. Chandrakirti says that, having given up disputing with them, you should first dispute and investigate the nature of phenomena with yourselves.

Although dreams, mirages, magical illusions, reflections, and so forth are seen, they are unproduced in that they do not exist inherently. Thus, although they do not exist, it is admissible that they be seen.

Why is the son of a barren woman not taken as an analogy for the lack of inherent existence? It is because the son of a barren woman does not exist and is not seen. On the other hand, you accept that a dream is seen. Why do you make a distinction between a dream and the son of a barren woman? Likewise, you say that a city of gandharvas exists, as does the water of a mirage and magical illusions, and that they are the same in not existing inherently. Therefore, all of them can be taken as analogies for the lack of inherent existence. "The phrase 'and so forth' of 'reflections and so forth' includes echoes, emanations, and so forth." Echoes are sounds that subsequently resonate in an empty house or cave. Emanations means the creation of emanations, whereas magical illusions are due to mantras, a substance, and so forth.

"For example, although being empty of self-nature, they are seen, the son of a barren woman is not." Dreams and so forth, although empty of inherent existence, are seen, whereas the son of a barren woman is not seen. Why is that? Chandrakirti says that having disputed and investigated with yourselves, that is, having thought this over well, you should then dispute and investigate it with others.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Although these are thus without production in thusness*,
> *Since they are not like the son of a barren woman – not being*
> *The object of the perception of the world –*
> *Therefore*, *this statement is indefinite.*[99] [6.110]
>
> – is also able to be expressed.

The lower schools argue that if forms and so forth do not inherently exist, they would be completely non-existent, like the son of a barren woman. They say that the son of a barren woman is not seen in the world because it is not inherently existent, therefore, if forms and so forth were not inherently existent they would also not be seen in the world, whereas they are seen. When the lower schools fling the consequence "Forms and so forth, as the subject, it follows that they would not be seen in the world because they do not exist inherently, like the son of a barren woman," the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond saying "This statement is indefinite," meaning that the reason does not pervade the predicate because if it does not exist inherently it is not pervaded by not being seen. In order to prove this they set out the analogies of dreams and so forth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In the scriptural passage taught by the Bhagavan saying:[100]
>
> Migrators are explained as dreamlike,

[99] I.e., the statement that "if something is non-existent ultimately, like the son of a barren woman, it will not be seen even conventionally," is an indefinite reason. LTK, p. 344, 15-16.

[100] The source of this quotation has not been found. The being being talked to, Druma (Tib: *ljon.pa*), is a king of the *kinnaras* (Tib: *mi.'am ci*) – spirits who appear to be human – and a frequent personage at the Buddha's teachings.

They are not presented as reality.
Things do not exist in any dream,
[Yet] they are strongly settled upon [by those] with wrong awareness.

Just as, although the gandharvas' city appears,
The city does not exist in the ten directions nor elsewhere,
The city is thoroughly posited by a mere name –
The Sugata sees migrating beings similarly.

Although seen by those having discrimination of water,
Water in a mirage is non-existent.
Similarly, disturbed by total imagination,
What is not attractive is conceived as attractive.

In an extremely clear mirror,
Just as a reflection without self-nature
Appears, similarly,
Druma, all phenomena are to be known.

– while forms and so forth are not inherently produced, they are indeed objects of the world's perception. Since the son of a barren woman is not [an object of the world's perception], this [statement of yours] is indefinite for you on its own.

This just does not exist as a dispute for us, for we do not accept forms and so forth as inherently produced conventionally and then refute them ultimately.

Although migrating beings appear to exist inherently, they do not exist inherently, for example, like a dream. In brief, things do not necessarily exist the way they appear. For example, in a dream we see horses, elephants, a mansion and so forth but they do not exist. Even though we experience pleasure in a dream due to various objects they do not exist in reality. This indicates that whatever appears does not necessarily exist. Although forms and so forth appear to exist inherently, they do not necessarily exist in that way.

"They are not presented as reality" means that what is seen in a dream is not indicated to be reality or to be true. "Things do not exist in any dream" means that the objects which are seen in a dream do not exist. If someone were to think that they exist, this would be a wrong awareness. The meaning of this verse is that forms and so forth do not exist inherently and if they are conceived to exist inherently this is a wrong awareness.

"Just as, although the gandharvas' city appears, the city does not exist in the ten directions nor elsewhere" means that, although it appears, it is not found to exist. Where are these cities? It is generally said that if one cleans an offering bowl well and places it empty and right side up on a table, the gandharvas (smell-eaters) immediately form a city inside the bowl because of being attracted by the light shining from the bowl. If one then pours water into that bowl one will destroy their city and thereby create a negative action. I heard this when I was very young, but, in fact, when offerings are made it is taught that one should always begin by pouring a small bit of water into the bowl before placing it on the altar.

"The city is thoroughly posited by a mere name – the Sugata sees migrating beings similarly." The buddhas see migrating beings similarly.

"Although seen by those having discrimination of water, water in a mirage is non-existent. Similarly, disturbed by total imagination, what is not attractive is conceived as attractive. In an extremely clear mirror, just as a reflection without self-nature appears, similarly, Druma, all phenomena are to be known." Just as the reflection of things appears very clearly in a clean mirror,

likewise, the lack of true existence appears very clearly to those who have the exalted wisdom realizing the lack of true existence.

There is a sutra called the *Sutra Requested by Horse-Headed Druma*, Druma being a king of the gandharvas. In this sutra it says: "The father is skill in means and the mother is the perfection of wisdom." Also in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* it says: that mother-like faith is to be generated first, then all excellent qualities are to be increased by protecting it. First a mother gives birth to a child and then protects and nourishes him, likewise, faith gives birth to excellent qualities which it then protects and cultivates.

"While forms and so forth are not inherently produced, they are indeed objects of the world's perception" means that, although forms and so forth do not exist inherently, they are perceived by the worldly. "Since the son of a barren woman is not [an object of the world's perception], this [statement of yours] is indefinite for you on its own." That it is indefinite means that from among the three, an indefinite reason, a non-established reason, and a contradictory reason, it is an indefinite reason.

"This just does not exist as a dispute for us, for we do not accept forms and so forth as inherently produced conventionally and then refute them ultimately." The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not say that forms and so forth are inherently produced conventionally and are not inherently produced ultimately. In brief, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas forms and so forth are not inherently produced either conventionally or ultimately.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 327-8) says:

> As sutra says:
>
> > The aggregates are devoid of nature and just empty,
> > Enlightenment is empty of nature and just devoid,
> > Also who practices is empty of nature;
> > Those with exalted wisdom know this, the childish do not.
> >
> > Exalted wisdom is to be cognized as empty of nature
> > Because it is said "Having cognized the nature of objects of knowledge
> > As empty, when they are realized to be like the knowers,
> > That is the practice of the path to enlightenment."
>
> Therefore, this is not to be disputed and investigated with yogis for they do not see any nature of establishment by way of its own entity in any phenomena even conventionally, nor do they see it whatsoever even ultimately.

All the phenomena ranging from forms through an exalted knower of all aspects are empty of inherent existence. These total 108 phenomena of which 53 are thoroughly afflicted phenomena and 55 are completely pure phenomena. There is nothing that is not included in these two groups. Also the person who sees the reality of these 108 phenomena is empty of inherent existence. Who is this person? It is one who possesses the uncontaminated exalted wisdom directly realizing emptiness. On the other hand, the nature of phenomena is not seen by the childish. The childish are ordinary beings. A child compared to an adult has little knowledge, similarly, ordinary beings have little knowledge compared to superiors. The exalted wisdom knowing that phenomena lack inherent existence is that which enables one to attain enlightenment.

"This is not to be disputed and investigated with yogis" means this is not to disputed and investigated with superiors who have realized that phenomena do not exist inherently either conventionally or ultimately.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 328) says:

The explanation of the statement "Setting aside disputing and investigating with those who have cataracts, for a while dispute and investigate this with yourselves" is:

When you see the unproduced – dreams along with the cities of smell-eaters,
The water of a mirage, magical illusions, reflections, and so forth –
Although they are the same in just not existing,
Why for you is there that? That is unreasonable. [6.109]

[At first] you should dispute and investigate with yourselves stating "*When* you *see the unproduced*, that is, the non-existent – the houses of *dreams along with the cities of smell-eaters* – and see the men and women and so forth emanated by *magical illusion*ists, *the water in a mirage*, a face in a *reflection and so forth*, that is, and see echoes, emanations, and so forth, *although they are the same in just not existing, why for you are* they seen but the son of a barren woman is not seen*? That is unreasonable.*" Then, later, you should dispute and investigate this with me.

The houses of dreams are seen but do not exist. Similarly, if, on the basis of this pen, I were to create a magical emanation by way of performing a particular ritual involving mantras and so forth you would then see a beautiful young woman or a handsome young man and, even though he or she does not exist, you would then become attached to him or her. I have already told a similar story from sutra about a father and his son who went to see a magical show during which the magician emanated a beautiful woman with whom the son fell in love.

Another analogy is the reflection of a face in a mirror which appears to be an actual face but is not. Likewise, also echoes, emanations, and so forth do not exist in the way that they appear.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Although they are the same in just not existing, why for you are they seen but the son of a barren woman is not seen?" therefore, one should first dispute and investigate this with oneself, and then only later on with us.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 328) says:

Although they are similarly not produced in suchness,
Because it is not that they are not objects of worldly sight,
As is the son of a barren woman,
That statement is indefinite. [6.110]

Therefore, *although they*, forms and so forth, *are similarly* also *not produced in suchness, because it is not that they are not objects of worldly sight, as is the son of a barren woman, the statement* "If they do not exist ultimately, conventionally they are also not seen like the son of a barren woman" *is* an *indefinite* reason, that is, it is mistaken.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the reason given by the lower schools is an indefinite reason. The reason is: forms and so forth would not be seen by the worldly because they do not exist inherently, like the son of a barren woman.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 328) says:

The Bhagavan also said [in the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra*]:

I explain migrating beings to be like dreams,
I do not present them as suchness.
Those with wrong awarenesses strongly adhere to
Things that do not exist even in a dream

Just as though a city of smell-eaters appears,
The city does not exist in the ten directions nor elsewhere,
But is thoroughly posited by the mere name 'city';
Similarly, does the Sugata see migrating beings.

Even though it is seen by those discriminating water,
The water in a mirage does not exist.
Similarly, disturbed by thorough conceptualization,
What is not attractive is conceived to be attractive.

Just as in a very perfectly pure mirror,
Reflections which lack
Inherent existence appear, likewise,
Druma, understand phenomena.

These passages say that forms and so forth, while not being inherently produced, are apprehended objects of the world. Since the son of a barren woman is not [an apprehended object of the world], that [reason] is indefinite for you yourselves. This does not exist as an argument for us because we do not refute forms and so forth ultimately through asserting them to be inherently produced conventionally.

Tuesday morning, 23 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 329) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A2B Presenting a summary of that

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 140) says:

If asked: Why?

Just as:

The son of a barren woman has no production
By its own self-nature[101] *in thusness and in the world.*
Likewise, all these things are unproduced
Intrinsically in the world [and in] thusness. [6.111]

Because it is like this:

Therefore, the Teacher spoke thus: "All phenomena are
Primordially pacified and free of production,
Naturally completely passed beyond sorrow."
Therefore, production never exists. [6.112]

Because there are such scriptural citations, therefore, production never exists.

The son of a barren woman does not exist either nominally or ultimately. Forms and so forth exist conventionally in the world but do not exist ultimately. For this reason the Teacher taught that phenomena are pacified from the start, free from inherent production, and naturally completely passed beyond sorrow. Lama Tsongkhapa's *Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive* says that all phenomena are entitiless, unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and are, therefore, naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.

There are four types of nirvana (passed beyond sorrow):
1. nirvana with remainder,
2. nirvana without remainder,
3. natural nirvana, and
4. non-abiding nirvana.

[101] Tib: *rang.gi bdag.nyid kyis.*

Here "naturally completely passed beyond sorrow" refers to natural nirvana which is a nirvana only from an etymological point of view. The Buddha said that because phenomena are pacified from the start and free from production, they are naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> To express [such a] citation, [the *Cloud of Jewels Sutra*] says:
>
> > When the Dharma wheel was turned, you Protector, indicated phenomena that are
> > Primordially pacified and unproduced, naturally passed beyond sorrow.
>
> That is, because of being objects of pacified exalted wisdom, all phenomena are pacified.
>
> If asked further: Why are [they] objects of pacified exalted wisdom?
>
> [The text] mentions "unproduced," meaning "because unproduced." Because not [inherently] produced, they are, therefore, objects of pacified exalted wisdom.

"Unproduced" means "not inherently produced."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked further: Why [are they] unproduced?
>
> Because [the text] mentions that they are "naturally passed beyond sorrow." If something had self-nature, entity, and, if that were produced, that self-nature would also exist. Since it does not, what will be produced? Due to this, [phenomena] are indicated to be unproduced at any time; they will not arise later from what was not arisen before and what has arisen will not transform again later.

"Passed beyond sorrow" refers to the object of negation, inherent existence, that is, because phenomena are passed beyond inherent existence, they are naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow. On the other hand, if things had inherent existence, they would be inherently produced. But, because phenomena are not inherently existent, they are not inherently produced.

Phenomena, forms and so forth are indicated to not be inherently produced at all times. "They will not arise later from what was not arisen before and what has arisen will not transform again later" because they do not exist inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Then, what is the case?
>
> [They are] naturally completely passed beyond sorrow. By mentioning "primordially" it is not that they are unproduced on only the occasion of the yogi's exalted wisdom.
>
> If asked: Then, what?
>
> It indicates that "before that, also on the occasion of worldly convention, those *phenomena* are not produced by their own self-nature[102]." The term "primordial," a synonym of first, should be understood as "expressing the occasion of worldly convention."

[102] Tib: *rang.gi bdag.nyid kyis.*

"By mentioning 'primordially' it is not that they are unproduced on only the occasion of the yogi's exalted wisdom" means that phenomena do not exist inherently right from the beginning or primordially. Therefore, forms and so forth never exist inherently or by way of their own entity.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thus, saying "At the time of turning the Dharma wheel, you indicated phenomena…," the arya bodhisattva Sarvamvaranavishkambini praised the Bhagavan by way of expressing the perfection of qualities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 329) says:

> QUESTION: In your system, why do you not refute forms and so forth ultimately through observing them to be inherently produced conventionally?
> RESPONSE:
>
> *Just as the son of a barren woman is without production*
> *By its own nature in suchness and does not exist even in the world,*
> *Likewise, all things are not produced*
> *By their own entity in the world and in suchness.* [6.111]
>
> Just as *the son of a barren woman is without production by its own nature in suchness* and *does not exist even in* the conventions of *the world*, *likewise, all things*, forms and so forth, *are not produced by their own entity in* both the conventions of *the world and in suchness*. By stating this, with respect to things that exist in the perspective of the mistaken [awareness] that apprehends them to be produced by way of their own entity, the Prasangikas do not at all assert that they exist conventionally. However, it is to be remembered that "production by way of its own entity" is also clearly to be affixed as a qualification to the object of negation.
>
> *Therefore, in this way the Teacher taught "All phenomena*
> *Are quiescent from the start, free from production, and*
> *Naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow."*
> *Therefore, production is always non-existent.* [6.112]
>
> For that reason, this being the case, *therefore, in this way the Teacher* Bhagavan *taught "All phenomena are quiescent from the start, free from* inherent *production, and naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow*." *Therefore*, inherent *production is always non-existent*.

The son of a barren woman does not exist in worldly conventions and does not exist ultimately. Likewise, phenomena do not exist inherently either conventionally or ultimately. Forms and so forth are not produced by way of their own entity. Hence, conceiving forms and so forth to be produced by way of their entity is a mistaken awareness. That phenomena exist by way of their own entity is never accepted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. One should keep in mind at all times that the object of negation is qualified by "production by way of its own entity." Thus, whenever the text says "production" it should be understood to be qualified by the words "by way of its own entity."

The Buddha taught that all phenomena are quiescent from the start and free from inherent production. For this reason, forms and so forth are naturally thoroughly passed beyond sorrow. Therefore, Lama Tsongkhapa says: "inherent production is always non-existent." "Always" is mentioned here because there are some things that exist in the world at times and do not exist at other times; for example, some flowers blossom only in the spring and never blossom in the winter. There are many such things, the production of which depends on the season. On the other hand, inherent production does not exist at all times, that is, it never exists.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 330) says:

The way in which this is taught is that the *Cloud of Jewels Sutra* says:

> When you turned the wheel of Dharma,
> You, Protector, indicated phenomena that are
> Quiescent from the start and unproduced,
> Naturally passed beyond sorrow.

The suchness of phenomena is quiescent because of being the object of quiescent exalted wisdom. The reason for this is that [phenomena] are not inherently produced. Also the reason for this is that if something were established by way of its own nature, or by way of their own entity, it would be produced, but, since that nature also does not exist, what is produced? Because of that, [phenomena] have passed beyond sorrow, that is, they are completely pure.

If something were inherently existent it would be produced without depending on anything. Therefore, if it is inherently produced, it must have been produced from the start, however, phenomena such as this are known to not exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 330) says:

Stating "from the start" [indicates] it is not that phenomena are unproduced only on the occasion of a yogi's exalted wisdom. Why is that? Stating "Before that, even on the occasion of the conventions of worldly beings, phenomena are not produced by way of their own nature" indicates this. The term "start" is a synonym of the term "first."

The fact that phenomena are not produced inherently and do not exist inherently is not fabricated by a yogi's exalted wisdom, rather they are so from the start. Thus, when it is said in the world "There is a pot" or "There is pillar," the existence of the pot and the pillar depends on worldly conventions; they are not inherently existent from the start. Because of this, they are produced in dependence on worldly conventions and are established in dependence on the hardships borne in making them and so forth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

This is just not debated by our own sects.

If asked: Why?

Because they accept that:

> *Just as these vases and so forth do not exist in reality*
> *And exist in the renown of the world,*
> *Since it is likewise for all things, they*
> *Do not follow as similar to the son of a barren woman.* [6.113]

Pots and so forth are asserted by the lower schools to not exist in suchness or truly, but to exist only in the renown of the world. Because pots and so forth exist conventionally, they are not like the son of a barren woman.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Suppose [the following] is considered: If the supports of imputation, earth, water, fire, wind, visual form, smell, taste, tactility, and so forth, exist, it is therefore reasonable to say that "imputation as a base has a cause." Yet for those according to whom all phenomena are only mere

> imputations (i.e., the Madhyamika school)[103] for whom the substantial supports of imputation do not exist at all, the logical consequence [that phenomena are] like the son of a barren woman is just irreversible.

Pots and so forth are composed of eight particles: particles of earth, water, fire, wind, visual form, odor, taste, and tangibility. These are the basis of imputation of 'pot.' Pots, as well as all other gross forms, are an aggregation of these eight particles. Thus, these eight particles are the cause for the pot or the basis of imputation of pot.

Since in the Prasangika Madhyamika system all phenomena are only merely imputed and do not exist substantially, nothing exists substantially. They say that if something were substantially existent it would also be truly existent because it would be established without depending on name and conceptuality, whereas all phenomena depend on name and conceptuality. That phenomena are merely posited by terms and conceptuality is the dependent-relation set forth by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. Thus, the dependent-relation of the Prasangika Madhyamikas is very subtle compared to the dependent-relation of the lower schools who say that dependent-relation means either that phenomena depend on causes and conditions or that they depend on their parts.

Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that all phenomena are merely imputed and are, therefore, imputedly existent. For this reason, they say that a basis of imputation cannot be substantially existent, whereas the lower schools say that a basis of imputation must be substantially existent. For the lower schools a basis of imputation is substantially existent, while its imputed qualities are imputedly existent.

According to Bhavaviveka, the person is not substantially existent but is imputedly existent, while the basis of imputation of the person – the illustrative mental consciousness – is substantially existent. Thus, Bhavaviveka says that although the person in general does not exist substantially, its basis of imputation, the example of the person the illustrative mental consciousness, is substantially existent. For this reason, it is important to understand the difference between substantial existence and imputed existence. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas if it is substantially existent it would exist from the start, whereas for the lower schools this is not the case. In the lower tenet systems a substantial existent is defined as: a phenomenon that, in order to appear to an awareness, does not need to depend on the appearance of another phenomenon.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That too is unreasonable because one is unable to establish a substantial support of imputation. As was said [in the *Four Hundred Verses*: 14.15]:[104]
>
> > Just as vase does not exist apart from form and so forth,
> > Similarly, form also does not exist apart from wind and so forth.

Gross objects such as pots necessarily depend on their basis of imputation, a substance or particles. Without this pots and so forth would not exist. For this reason, Aryadeva says "form also does not exist apart from wind and so forth."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, it is taught [in the *Precious Garland*: verses 84-85]:[105]

[103] LTK, p. 347.

[104] Poisson incorrectly attributes this as verse 14, p. 275.

> Earth, water, fire, and wind, each are not existent in entitiness.
> Without any three, each is non-existent; without one, also three are non-existent.
>
> If without three, one is non-existent; without one, also three are non-existent,
> An individual itself does not exist; how will the composite be produced?

Jeffrey Hopkins' translation in *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation* says:

> Earth, water, fire and wind
> Individually also do not inherently exist.
> When any three are absent, an individual one does not exist.
> When one is absent, the three also do not exist.
>
> If when three are absent, an individual one does not exist
> And if when one is absent, the three also do not exist,
> Then each itself does not exist.
> How could a composite be produced?

Earth, water, fire, and wind are not established by way of their own entity. When the basis of imputation of pot, an earth particle, exists, it is always accompanied by the other three particles. There cannot exist one without the other three, and without one the other three also do not exist. In conclusion, a pot is not produced from an inherently existent aggregation of particles.

Tuesday afternoon, 23 January 2001

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as the impermanent is not asserted to be produced from the permanent, similarly, it is also unreasonable for the non-substantially existent to be produced from the substantially existent.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that a permanent cause does not produce what is impermanent and a substantially existent cause does not produce what is not substantially existent. On the other hand, the lower schools accept this because they assert that from a substantially existent cause there arises what is imputedly existent. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not agree with this. "It is also unreasonable for the non-substantially existent to be produced from the substantially existent" can also be read "A non-inherently existent or imputedly existent result cannot arise from an inherently existent or substantially existent cause."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As said [in the *Four Hundred Verses*: 9.11]:[106]
>
> How could a thing arisen from what is permanent be impermanent?
> Discordant characters of cause and effect are never perceived.

---

[105] Poussin does not attribute this citation in either the Tibetan or his translation.

[106] The Tibetan translations of this quotation in the *Autocommentary* and the *400 Stanzas* differ slightly. In the *400 Stanzas*: *dngos po rtag pa las skyes pa, ,ci lta bur na mi rtag 'gyur, ,nam yang rgyu dang 'bras bu gnyis, ,mtsan nyid mi mthun mthong ma yin* – hence the slightly different translations in Lang, p. 91, and Sonam, p. 208. Poisson does not attribute the stanza to the *400 Stanzas* but mentions a similar stanza in *Abhisamayalamkaraloka*.

It cannot be that a cause is permanent while its result is impermanent. In short, a result does not arise from a discordant cause. The lower schools also refute production from discordant causes and production without causes.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, in that way, for example, a mere imputed reflection is observed in a mirror in dependence on the collection of an imputedly existent face and so forth; a house is imputed in dependence on imputedly existent pillars and so forth and, similarly, a forest is imputed having the support of trees. Just as in a dream, a sprout having an unproduced nature is observed to be produced from a seed having an unproduced nature, similarly, it is reasonable for the imputation of any imputedly existent thing also to have the support of imputedly existent things.

Here Chandrakirti explains the meaning of imputedly existent by setting out some examples. The reflection of a face arises in dependence on the collection of an imputedly existent face and so forth. Similarly, a home is imputed in dependence on imputedly existent pillars and so forth. "Similarly, a forest is imputed having the support of trees" means that many trees grouped together are called a forest.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was said [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*: 17, verses 31-33]:[107]
>
> Just as when the Teacher emanated [emanations] through perfection of magic
> And those emanations also emanated again other emanations,
>
> Similarly, also whatever action is done [by] an agent is like a type of emanation,
> Like, for example, an emanation emanating another emanation.
>
> Delusions, actions, bodies, agents, and effects are
> Like the city of the gandharvas, a mirage, and a dream.
>
> – therefore, it is not to be debated.

What are the emanations emanated by the Teacher? There are very many since he can emanate whatever is necessary in order to fulfill the welfare of sentient beings, for example, emanating a ship for those who need a ship, a house for those who need a house, and so forth. These are skillful means for subduing sentient beings.

We already discussed the city of gandharvas earlier. A mirage is the appearance of water which arises from a hot sun shining on pale sand. A dream is something that is familiar to all of us.

Chandrakirti concludes: "Therefore, it is not to be debated."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 330) says:

> Our own schools do not dispute saying "If it does not exist ultimately, it also does not exist conventionally." Why is that?
>
> *Just as pots and so forth do not exist in suchness and*

[107] Poussin does not attribute this citation in either the Tibetan or his translation.

> *Do exist for the thorough renown of the world,*
> *Likewise, so too do all phenomena.*
> *Therefore, they do not follow as being similar to the son of a barren woman.* [6.113]
>
> Because they assert that, *just as pots and so forth do not exist in suchness*, that is, ultimately, *and do exist for the thorough renown*, that is, in the conventions, of *the world*, *likewise, so too do all phenomena. Therefore*, when they do not exist ultimately, *they do not follow as being similar to the son of a barren woman*.

The lower schools, that is, the Chittamatra and below, say that if it does not exist inherently it does not exist at all. If one were to debate this with the Chittamatrins, one could ask: "If it does not exist ultimately does it also not exist conventionally?" If they say accept this, one says: "Kor sum! Space, as the subject, it follows that it does not exist conventionally because it does not exist ultimately, because it is an imputational factor." Space is an imputational factor. If it is an imputational factor is it necessarily imputedly existent? What about the person? Is it an imputational factor? The person, as the subject, it follows that it does not exist ultimately because it exists imputedly.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 330) says:

> As is explained in [Vasubandhu's] *Treasury of Knowledge*:
> Whatever is such that the awareness of it no longer operates
> When it is destroyed or mentally dissected into other –
> Such as a pot and water – is conventionally existent.
> The rest are ultimately existent. [6.4]
>
> The commentary on the *Treasury of Knowledge* explains:
> That which by breaking it into parts the awareness of it no longer operates is conventionally existent; for example, a pot. When that is broken into bits the awareness of pot no longer operates. Also that which when mentally dissected into other phenomena the awareness of it no longer operates is conventionally existent; for example, water. When that is mentally dissected into other phenomena, form and so forth, the awareness of water no longer operates. That which, although destroyed, the awareness of it still operates and that which, although mentally dissected into other phenomena, the awareness of it still operates is ultimately existent; for example, form. Even though that is suitable to be finely broken into subtle particles [and] even though it is suitable to be mentally dissected into other phenomena, taste and so forth, an awareness of the nature of form still operates. Feelings and so forth should also be regarded similarly.

The *Treasury of Knowledge* mainly sets forth the tenets of the Vaibhashikas. Their definition of conventional truth is: a phenomenon that is such that, if it were broken or mentally separated into parts, the mind apprehending that object would cease. Their definition of ultimate truth is: a phenomenon that is such that, if it were broken or mentally separated into parts, the mind apprehending that object would not cease. Thus, a pot is a conventional truth because an awareness of pot no longer operates when it is broken into bits by hitting it with a hammer. Likewise, if a cup is broken the awareness of cup no longer operates. Ultimate truth is that which even when broken or mentally dissected, the awareness of it still operates.

The commentary on the *Treasury of Knowledge* sets out the example of water, this being the water that is contained in a pot. When the pot is broken, the water in it also dissipates due to which the awareness apprehending water no longer operates. Also if the water is dissected mentally, the awareness apprehending water no longer operates.

On the other hand, when form is mentally dissected, an awareness apprehending form still operates because the nature of form is still apprehended. The same is true of feelings and so forth.

This is because when feelings are dissected into various kinds of feelings, such as pleasant, painful, and neutral, the apprehension of the nature of feeling still remains.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> This means it is not appropriate to say "These schools [say] that, in general, if it does not exist ultimately, it does not exist conventionally." It does not present the two – (i) the way of existing as the two truths that is posited by them and (ii) what is posited by us – as being similar because what is posited by them as conventional existence is simply conceived to be the ultimate existence that is explained by the Madhyamikas.

According to the lower schools, in general if it does not exist ultimately it is not correct to say that it does not exist conventionally because there are examples of what does not exist ultimately but does exist conventionally, for example, in the Sautrantika system uncompounded space does not exist ultimately but does exist conventionally. According to this school, uncompounded space does not exist ultimately because it is not ultimately able to perform a function. This is because in the Sautrantika system the definition of ultimate truth is: a phenomenon that is able to perform a function ultimately. The definition of a conventional truth is: phenomenon that is unable to perform a function ultimately.

The way in which the lower schools explain conventional existence is similar to the way in which the Prasangika Madhyamikas explain ultimate existence. According to the lower schools what exists conventionally necessarily exists inherently because if it does not exist inherently it does not exist at all. Therefore, the lower schools posit both conventional truth and ultimate truth on the basis of their existing inherently, whereas for the Prasangika Madhyamikas inherent existence is ultimate existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 331) says:

> DOUBT: If it is suitable for that imputed as pot and so forth to have a cause or basis because (i) the four elements, the basis of imputing pot and so forth, (ii) the four evolutes, and so forth are substantially existent, then according to the Madhyamikas – for whom all phenomena are just mere imputations – the consequence that there is nothing that is a substantially existent basis of imputation, like the son of a barren woman, is not averted.

According to the lower schools the basis of imputation of a pot is the collection of the four elements and the four evolutes. The four elements are earth, water, fire, and wind, and the four evolutes are form, odor, taste, and tangibility. The lower schools say that the collection of these eight particles is substantially existent. However, this is not correct according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas because they say that the eight particles are also imputedly existent.

Someone says: "according to the Madhyamikas – for whom all phenomena are just mere imputations – the consequence that there is nothing that is a substantially existent basis of imputation, like the son of a barren woman, is not averted." For the Madhyamika school the basis of imputing pot cannot be substantially existent because it is merely imputed.

Student: Do the Vaibhashikas mention an imputed pot?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In order for pot to appear, something else must appear to the mind. That something else is "a bulbous-bellied, flat-bottomed water container."
Student: Then, would everything not be imputedly existent? For example, in order for the water element to appear it would be necessary for wet and moistening to appear.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is different because that is the nature of water.

Student: What about "a bulbous-bellied, flat-bottomed water container"?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it is bulbous-bellied, it is not necessarily a pot. If it is just bulbous-bellied and flat-bottomed it is not necessarily a pot, for example, a pot with the bottom broken due to which it does not hold water. It would follow that my own stomach is a pot because I am bulbous-bellied! In short, a pot is imputedly existent because it is imputed in dependence on other.

It would seem that a pot is defined here to be a gross aggregation of the eight particles. This gross aggregation of the eight particles is the cause or the basis of imputation. Perhaps it can be called a cause because due to it a pot arises.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas all phenomena are merely imputed. They say that there is no basis of imputation which is substantially existent. The lower schools say that if the basis of imputation of the pot does not exist substantially the pot would be like the son of a barren woman. The Prasangika Madhyamikas would not assert this.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 332) says:

> RESPONSE: That too is unreasonable because a basis of imputation cannot be proven to be substantially existent. For example, in dependence on the coming together of an imputedly existent face and so forth, a merely imputed reflection is observed. In dependence on imputedly existent pillars and so forth, a home is imputed. Similarly, that which has the basis of trees is imputed to be a forest. Just as in a dream the production of a sprout, which is the nature of being unproduced, from a seed, which has the nature of being unproduced, is observed; likewise, it is also suitable for the basis of imputation of all imputedly existent things to be imputedly existent things themselves.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "a basis of imputation cannot be proven to be substantially existent." A reflection is a mere imputation that depends on the coming together of an imputedly existent face and so forth. "In dependence on imputedly existent pillars and so forth, a home is imputed." A pillar is imputed on that which is able to hold up a beam. In addition to pillars, a house is imputed on the basis of its walls and so forth.

"Similarly, that which has the basis of trees is imputed to be a forest." An area in which there are many trees is called a forest.

"Just as in a dream the production of a sprout, which is the nature of being unproduced, from a seed, which has the nature of being unproduced, is observed" means that from a non-inherently existent seed there arises a non-inherently existent sprout. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "likewise, it is also suitable for the basis of imputation of all imputedly existent things to be imputedly existent things themselves." According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system both the basis of imputation and the phenomena that is imputed are imputedly existent.

Student: According to Chittamatra is the imputedly existent pot inherently existent?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: For the Chittamatrins it exists inherently, otherwise it would not exist at all. This is mentioned at the beginning of Lama Tsongkhapa's *Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive*. The Chittamatra make a distinction between inherently existent and establishment by way of its own character. For example, imputational factors are inherently existent but are not established by way of their own character.

Wednesday morning, 24 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 332) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2A3 How to cease wrong conceptions that hold to an extreme by means of the very production that is dependent-arising

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is mentioned here: If you refute production from self, other, both, and without cause also in both cases (i.e., the conventional and the ultimate), how can one ascertain consciousness, sprout, and so forth deceptively produced from ignorance, formations, seeds, and so forth?

Production from the four extremes has been refuted both in terms of the ultimate and in terms of the conventional. Thus, production from self, production from other, production from both, and causeless production do not exist either conventionally or ultimately. However, motivated by ignorance, conventionally karmic formations arise, from karmic formations a resultant consciousness arises, and so forth, and similarly, from the planting of a seeds a sprout arises, and so forth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> I shall expound that:
>
> *Because things are not produced without cause,*
> *From the causes of Ishvara and so forth,*
> *Self, other, and both – therefore,*
> *There is thorough production in dependence.* [6.114]
>
> Because, in the manner that was explained, the production of things does not arise from the entities themselves; nor is there [production] from Ishvara, time, particles, self-nature, beings, Narayana (i.e., Vishnu) and so forth; nor is there production from self, other, and both – therefore, in dependence on this, that arises. Depend on merely that much in order to not eliminate the conventions of the world.

Although things are not produced without causes nor are they produced from self, other, or both, nor from Ishvara and so forth, conventionally sprouts are seen to arise from particular conditions and so forth. "Ishvara" is similar to the God of Christianity in that according to those who propound Ishvara to be the creator everything arises from a movement of his mind, and likewise, Christians propound that things arise from God's wishes. The Tibetan nomads talk about someone called Old Man of Worldly Existence who thinks "How nice it would be if so-and-so were here. How nice it would if I had such-and-such." One day this old man modeled a small human being out of butter then blew into its nostrils and called out "Human being," however, nothing happened. After that, he modeled a human being out of mud mixed with his own blood and blew into its nostrils and called out "Human being" to which the human being responded "Ah?" This said to be the way in which human beings came into existence. In fact, it is said that human beings are precious because they are made by the hands of Old Man of Worldly Existence. This Tibetan story is similar to that of God being the creator of human beings.

In short, things do not arise from entitiness, Ishvara, time, particles, nature, beings, Narayana, and so forth, these being what are propound by the various schools as the creator. For example, the Vaisheshikas propound particles to be the creator. Here "nature" refers to the general principal, while "beings" refers to the Old Man of Worldly Existence.

"Therefore, in dependence on this, that arises" means that because there is this, that arises; for example, due to ignorance karmic formations arise or due to a seed a sprout arises.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

As the Bhagavan said [in the *Sutra of Ultimate Emptiness*]:[108]

> There, this is the designation of phenomena – thus, when this exists, that arises; due to this being produced, that is produced; due to the condition of ignorance about this, some formations...

– and so forth.

Chandrakirti quotes from sutra in order to establish his thesis that "in dependence on this, that arises." This quotation might be from the *Sutra of Dependent-Arising* (rather than the *Sutra of Ultimate Emptiness*).

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Similarly, it is said [in the *Precious Garland*: 48]:[109]

> Since this exists, that arises, as short, for example, when long exists.
> Since this was produced, that is produced, as light, for example, by the arisal of a lamp.

Because long is posited in dependence on short – without which long could not be posited – long does not exist inherently. Likewise, due to a lamp, light is produced.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Also, in the *Treatise [on the Middle Way*, 8, verses 12-13]:[110]

> The agent arises dependent on that acted upon, and that acted upon, too, in dependence
> On that very agent. Except for that, a cause of establishment is not perceived.
>
> Appropriation should be known likewise because action and that acted upon are excluded.[111]
> The remaining things should be known by [analyzing] the agent and that acted upon.[112]

Only this much was taught, [production from the four extremes was not taught].[113]

Also the three – agent, that acted upon, and action – are posited in dependence on each other. Thus, there is no agent without the object acted upon and the action, no object without the agent and the action, and so forth.

Nagarjuna says: "Appropriation should be known likewise because that acted upon and agent are excluded." The spelling of the Tibetan word translated here as "excluded" (*bsal*) appears in the *Illumination* as "clarified" (*gsal*). If this is taken to be spelled incorrectly in Chandrakirti's text and therefore to read "Appropriation should be known likewise because that acted upon and agent are

---

[108] Poisson notes this extract cited in *Bodhicharyavatara-pañjika*.

[109] Poisson only notes this stanza as attributed to the *Acharya* in Jayananda',s commentarv.

[110] Stanza 12 quoted in Hopkins, p. 168.

[111] The Tibetan in *Illumination* reads *gsal* (clarified) rather than *bsal* (excluded or eliminated); this line can be interpreted in either way.

[112] Parenthetical material from *rtza.she tik.chen*, p. 202.

[113] LTK, p. 349.

clarified," this means that, just like that acted upon and the agent, also the appropriator, the object to be appropriated, and the action of appropriation exist as mutual support and supported. However, if taken to be spelled correctly as "excluded" or "eliminated" (*bsal*), this line means that when someone understands that agent and that acted upon are mutually dependent wrong conceptions regarding them are eliminated. That is, through knowing that agents and the objects acted upon are mutually dependent, wrong conceptions of production from self, production from other, and so forth are abandoned.

"The remaining things should be known by [analyzing] the agent and that acted upon" means that all other things should be understood to be similar to agents and the objects of actions. "Remaining things" are, for example, an eater, the object to be eaten, and the action of eating which also exist in dependence on each other. Other example are a writer, the object of writing, and the writing; the one who dresses, the object of dressing, that is, clothes, and the action of dressing, and so forth. In short, whatever we do there is an agent, the acted upon (object of the action), and the action.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thus, when explaining the dependent arising of merely the state of having this as a condition (*idampratyayata-matra*),[114] not only are these conceptions of causeless production and so forth impossible, but also other conceptions – eternalism and nihilism, permanence and impermanence, both thing and non-thing and so forth – are just impossible.

The reasoning of dependent-arising cuts all the nets of bad views. "Bad views" are, for example, the view of permanence which is that phenomena exist inherently or truly and the view of annihilation which is that if phenomena do not exist inherently they do not exist at all. "Permanence and impermanence" refers the view of the self and the world as permanent and the view of the self and the world as impermanent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to indicate [the aforesaid], it is explained:
>
> *Because these conceptions cannot withstand investigation*
> *Since things thoroughly arise in dependence,*
> *Therefore, this reasoning of dependent arising*
> *Acts to cut all the nets of bad views.* [6.115]
>
> Because one finds the existence of the personal properties of conventional things by merely this much reasoning – "in dependence on this, that arises" – not in another way, therefore, this reasoning of dependent arising, the mere state of having this as a condition, cuts all the nets of bad views that were explained. Thus, those [Madhyamikas] who present a mere state of having this as a condition (*idampratyayata-matra*) as the meaning of dependent arising never accept self-nature in things.

A syllogism can be set out:

> External and internal things, as the subject, do not exist inherently because they are dependent-arisings.

This reasoning of dependent-arising cuts all the nets of bad conceptions. "The nets of bad views" include many types of bad views that can be condensed into the view of permanence and the view of annihilation since there are no bad views that are not included in these two. The term "dependent-

[114] Tib: *rkyen.nyid 'di.pa.tzam* – see Poisson, p. 278, and Nagao, p. 176.

relation" eliminates the two extremes of permanence and annihilation because "dependent" eliminates the view of permanence and "relation" eliminated the view of annihilation. Thus, what is able to simultaneously eliminate the views of the two extremes? It is the reasoning of dependent-arising.

Those who understand the meaning of dependent-arising well do not assert that phenomena exist inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was said [in the *Sixty Verses of Reasoning*: 19]:[115]
>
> > That which arises dependent on this and that, is not produced as its entity.
> > How can that which is not produced as its entity be called "produced?"

Phenomena are not produced by way of their own entity but are produced because they are produced in dependence on their respective conditions.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, it is taught [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*: 24.18]:
>
> > Whatever is a dependent arising, that is explained as just empty.
> > That is imputed causally[116] and just that is the middle path.

Because it is a dependent-arising it is explained to be empty, and because it is empty it is free from the two extremes of permanence and annihilation, due to which it is the middle way.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, as taught in [the *Questions of the King of Nagas, Anavatapta,] Sutra*:[117]
>
> > That which produced from conditions was not produced;
> > It does not have a self-nature of production.
> > That which relies on conditions is explained as empty;
> > He who knows emptiness is conscientious.

"That which produced from conditions was not produced" means that what is produced from conditions is not inherently produced. Therefore, things do not have inherent production. "That which relies on conditions is explained as empty" means that because of depending on conditions it is a dependent-arising due to which it is empty of inherent existence. "He who knows emptiness is conscientious" means one who has an understanding of emptiness is conscientious. On the other hand, if one is not on a correct path, one may think that one understands emptiness but in reality has fallen into the extreme of annihilation, in that thinking "things are empty of inherent existence" one may come to the conclusion that nothing exists.

---

[115] See Poisson, p. 278, and Lindtner, p. 108, for Sanskrit fragments.

[116] The version of the verse here is different than other sources, see Poisson, p. 278, n. 3. In the root text of Fundamental Wisdom, the phrase "causally" (*rgyur.bcas* in Tibetan, *sahetu* in Sanskrit) is replaced by "dependently" (*brten.nas* in Tibetan, *upadaya* in Sanskrit).

[117] Quoted in Hopkins, p. 161 and first line mentioned in *rtza.she tik.chen*, p. 401.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When thus self-nature is not accepted, then in which of those [ways] that were explained could a non-self-nature arise? If any self-nature were to exist, its production could arise from entitiness or from self, other, both, Ishvara, and so forth and conceptions could possibly occur [such as] eternalism – due to the abidance of what has been produced – and nihilism – due to disintegration – and so forth.

In short, inherent production is not admissible because production from the four extremes does not exist. If phenomena were inherently existent they would be unrelatedly established, whereas everything is dependently established.

Chandrakirti says that the abidance of what has been produced is the conception of permanence or eternalism, and the disintegration of what has been produced is the conception of annihilation or nihilism.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to indicate that [conceptions are] not [possible] in the other case, it is explained:
>
> *Conceptions will occur if things [are grasped to inherently] exist.*
> *Yet, as things were fully analyzed as non-existent,*
> *Without [grasping to] things, these [conceptions] will not arise,*
> *For example, as fire does not exist without fuel.* [6.116]

The view of permanence or eternalism is the view that what has been produced abides or remains, and the view of annihilation is that what has been produced has disintegrated. "Conceptions will occur" refers to the conceptions holding to an extreme.

In short, that things are inherently existent is incorrect because of what was already thoroughly analyzed before.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 52), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-1C How dependent origination stops grasping at the extremes
>
> *Since things are not produced without a cause,*
> *Nor from the cause of Ishvara and so on,*
> *Nor from self, from other, or from both,*
> *Therefore they are produced entirely dependently.* [6.114]

All functioning things are completely produced dependent on causes and conditions. For they are produced, but they are not produced without cause, from the cause of Ishvara and so on, or from self, other, or both.

> *Because, with things arising entirely dependently,*
> *These misconceptions cannot be conceived,*
> *This argument of dependent origination*
> *Cuts through all the nets of evil views.* [6.115]

You should understand that this reasoning of dependent arising cuts all the nets of evil views, because by realizing that functioning things arise entirely dependently, one cannot conceive them with[118] these wrong conceptions[119] grasping at the extremes.

> *The misconceptions arise if things exist.*
> *We've already analyzed how things don't exist.*
> *When things don't exist, these don't arise, just as*
> *For example, without the fuel, there's no fire.* [6.116]

When there is no grasping functional things as truly existent, these conceptions grasping at the extremes do not arise. For the conceptions grasping at extremes will arise if there is grasping of functional things as truly existent, but how functioning things do not exist truly has already been fully analyzed. It is, for example, as when there is no fuel, there is no fire.

Wednesday afternoon, 24 January 2001

"Things were fully analyzed as non-existent" (v. 6.116b) can be interpreted in various ways. One way of understanding this is that "things" refers to external and internal things; these are what were thoroughly analyzed previously as to their lack of inherent existence in terms of their not being produced from self, other, both, and causelessly.

"Without things, these will not arise" means that without a thing such as a seed there is no arisal of a sprout. "For example, as fire does not exist without fuel" refers to the fact that fire needs fuel, such as firewood, in order to exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Because, as a result of the reasoning that was explained, there is no possibility of [an inherently existent] thing in any way, therefore, those yogis manifesting the arya path by perceiving thusness through the mode of not perceiving [elaborations of appearance] do not observe even a mere atom of [an inherently existent] thing in any phenomena and the formations of conceptions of form, feeling, virtue, non-virtue, thing, non-thing, and so forth familiarized with from beginningless time will also be reversed in them. As for example, due to the application of eye medicine, the very reversal of conceptions about falling hair and so forth will result in those with cataracts – it is not that falling hair and so forth transform into objects of another nature.

By means of the reasonings explained before, one comes to the conclusion that there are no inherently existent things at all. That "there is no possibility of [an inherently existent] thing in any way" means that things do not exist inherently whatever the place, time, and circumstance.

"Those yogis manifesting the arya path by perceiving thusness through the mode of not perceiving [elaborations of appearance] do not observe even a mere atom of [an inherently existent] thing" means that when the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise perceives suchness it does so in a manner of lacking the appearance of conventionalities, the basis of that suchness. Thus, it does not observe even a mere atom of inherent existence. Or it can be understood to mean that in the perspective of that seer not even the slightest atom exists. This is because if a conventionality were to appear to the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise it would be an object of negation.

[118] *Gedun Drub* appears to be alone in interpreting "these" as an instrumental.

[119] *rtog.pa*

"The formations of conceptions of form, feeling, virtue, non-virtue, thing, non-thing, and so forth familiarized with from beginningless time will also be reversed in them" means that when the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise sees that there does not exist even an atom of inherent existence, the conception of inherent existence is eliminated. Due to this realization, all conceptions of forms as truly existent, feelings as truly existent, and so forth, which have been familiarized with since beginningless time, are eliminated or abandoned. Chandrakirti says: "As for example, due to the application of eye medicine, the very reversal of conceptions about falling hair and so forth will result in those with cataracts – it is not that falling hair and so forth transform into objects of another nature." This means that when one with cataracts, who sees falling hair, applies the appropriate medicine and thereby eliminates the cataracts, that person no longer has the appearance of falling hair. Thus, that appearance of falling hair merely disappears, it is not that they are transformed into something else.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 332) says:

> QUESTION: If you refute production from self, other, both, and without causes also in regard to both sides of the two truths, how can it be ascertained that karmic formations, consciousnesses, and so forth are conventionally produced from ignorance and that sprouts and so forth are conventionally produced from seeds and so forth?
> RESPONSE: This is explained [as follows]:
>
> *Because things are not produced without causes*,
> *From a cause which is Ishvara and so forth, and*
> *From self, other, and both,*
> *They are thoroughly produced in dependence.* [6.114]
>
> *Because*, by the way in which it was explained above,
> - the production of *things* does not arise from their own entity *without causes*,
> - they are also not produced from *a cause which is Ishvara and so forth*, that is, time, particles, nature, beings, Narayana (Son of Cravingless), and so forth, and
> - *they are not produced from self, other, and both*,
>
> results *are thoroughly produced in dependence* on causes and conditions.

Production from the four extremes has been refuted both conventionally and ultimately. For example, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas say "External and internal phenomena, as the subject, are not produced *ultimately* because they are not produced *ultimately* from self, other, both, or causelessly." In their case it is necessary to affix the qualification 'ultimately' because they accept production from other. Because they accept production from other they need to qualify this by saying 'Things are not produced *ultimately* from other." The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that there is production from other because smoke is produced from fire, a son is produced from a mother, a sprout is produced from a seed, and so forth. Thus, they say that cause and result are other. On the other hand, according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system there is no production from other without any need to affix the qualification 'ultimately' to the predicate and the reason.

Someone asks: "How can it be ascertained that karmic formations, consciousnesses, and so forth are conventionally produced from ignorance and that sprouts and so forth are conventionally produced from seeds and so forth?" Here the relationship between cause and result is explained saying that the ignorance which is the first of the twelve links motivates karmic formations due to which latencies are deposited on the consciousness and so forth. Similarly, conventionally a sprout arises from a seed. Thus, there is a relationship between cause and result both externally, for example, a sprout and as seed, and internally, for example, ignorance and karmic formations.

The root text says: "Because things are not produced without causes, from a cause which is Ishvara and so forth." 'And so forth' refers to various things such as time, particles, nature, beings,

Narayana (Son of Cravingless), and so forth. According to some, Ishvara is the creator of the world. One school says that particles are the creator, another that time is the creator, and so forth. This has already been discussed in detail. In conclusion, production from the four extremes has been refuted, therefore, "results are thoroughly produced in dependence on causes and conditions."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 332) says:

> Therefore, we rely upon the mere abandonment of production from the four extremes in order to not eliminate the worldly conventions of cause and result. The Bhagavan taught:
>
> > In regard to that, the designation of phenomena is that. It is like this: when this exists, that arises; due to the production of this, that is produced; due to the condition of ignorance, karmic formations...

Illumination (Tibetan text page 332) says rely (*rten*), whereas the *Supplement* (Tibetan text page 142-3) says supported (*brten*); think about it.

"When this exists, that arises" means that when ignorance exists, karmic formations arise, and so forth. "Due to the production of this, that is produced" means that due to the production of a seed, a sprout is produced, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 332-3) says:

> [Nagarjuna's] *Precious Garland* (v. 48) says:
>
> When this exists, that arises;
> Like when long exists there is short.
> Due to the production of this, that is produced;
> Like light due to the arisal of a flame.

This was already explained earlier.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 333) says:

> [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 8.12-13) says:
>
> Agent depends upon that acted upon and
> That acted upon also arises in dependence on
> The agent itself. Excluding that,
> A cause of establishment is not perceived.
>
> Understand appropriation to be similar
> Because that acted upon and agent are clarified.[120]
> By means of that acted upon and the agent,
> The remaining things should be understood.

By understanding the relationship between agent and that acted upon, one will understand the relation between the appropriator and the appropriated, this being the meaning of "Understand appropriation to be similar." In other words, the three – the appropriator, the appropriated, and the action of appropriating – are clarified through understanding that agent, that acted upon (the object), and action exist in mutual dependence. Having understood the relationship between the agent and that acted upon, one is able to understand all remaining things; for example, one who possesses excellent qualities and the excellent qualities that are possessed. There are many more examples of

[120] The *Supplement* says bsal, eliminated, whereas here it says gsal, clarified.

what can be understood in dependence on understanding agents and that acted upon, such as definition, definiendum, and illustration which also mutually related. Another example is a cook, food, and the action of cooking which are established in mutual dependence. This is also the case of a meditator, the object of meditation, and the action of meditating, as well as a listener, what is heard, and the action of hearing, a thinker, a thought, and the action of thinking. All of these are established in dependence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 333) says:

> [Nagarjuna] taught only that much, he did not teach production from the four extremes. Therefore, just as the Conqueror taught production that is mere conditionality, so too did Arya [Nagarjuna] teach in this way. In particular, by asserting the dependent relationship that is arisal in dependence – that agent depends on that acted upon and so forth, he distinguishes production in our own and other systems stating "Excluding that" (*Fundamental Wisdom*, v. 8.12c) and teaches that that is to be affixed to whatever things exist.
>
> Acharya [Chandrakirti] necessarily posits production in general and proves it with much exertion stating "Because they are not produced from the four extremes, they are produced in dependence." In regard to that, it should be understood that those who propound, through mistakenly opposing these systems, stating "If there is no production from the four extremes, there is no production at all" pollute well, with the dense stains of their bad conceptions, the unsurpassed system in which the meaning of profound dependent-arising – the unsurpassed reason for the realization of emptiness – arises as the meaning of emptiness.

Production in general exists, whereas production from the four extremes is refuted with much exertion by Acharya Chandrakirti who distinguishes production in the two systems, our own and others. In the context of production from the four extremes, 'other systems' includes the lower Buddhist schools and the non-Buddhist schools. The main school asserting production from self is the Samkhya. Production from other is asserted by non-Buddhists and the Buddhist schools below the Prasangika Madhyamika. Those asserting production from both are the Nirgranthas, whereas those asserting causeless production are the Charvakas. Their various assertions are refuted here.

Because it is a dependent-arising, it is not produced from the four extremes; this is to be similarly affixed to all things. Chandrakirti says: "Because they are not produced from the four extremes, they are produced in dependence." However, there are those who debate this due to not understanding that the meaning of emptiness is the meaning of dependent-arising. Through understanding dependent-arising, one realizes emptiness. Due to the dense stains of their bad conceptions, those who assert otherwise pollute the meaning of dependent-arising.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 333) says:

> Hence, when the dependent-relation that is mere conditionality is explained, in order to indicate that not only the four – production without causes and so forth – are impossible, but that also other imputed objects:
>
> 1. the view of permanence which superimposes inherent existence,
> 2. the view of annihilation which does not allow for agents and actions,
> 3. the conception of permanence which is that the very [thing] that existed at a past time also exists at later times,
> 4. [the conception of] the impermanence of inherently existent individual former and later moments, and
> 5. the conception of the two, things and non-things, as established by way of their own entity,
>
> and so forth are impossible, it is explained:
>
> *Since things thoroughly arise in dependence,*
> *These conceptions cannot be investigated;*

Therefore, the reasoning of dependent arising
Cuts all the nets of bad views. [6.115]

Not only is production from the four extremes negated, also the objects of other mistaken views are negated.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 333-4) says:

> By means of just this much reasoning stating "*In dependence on* this cause, that result *thoroughly arises*," the existence of a self of conventional *things* is found. Since it is not [found] in another [way], *the conceptions* of production from self, other, and so forth *cannot be investigated, therefore, the reasoning of dependent* and related *arising*, mere conditionality, *cuts all the nets of bad views* – the views of production from self, other, and so forth explained above.

The nets of bad views are severed by the reasoning of dependent-arising. Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, the reasoning of dependent arising cuts all the nets of bad views."

"The conceptions of production from self, other, and so forth cannot be investigated" means that they cannot bear investigation in the sense that because they are wrong they cannot bear investigation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 334) says:

> Hence, the Madhyamikas who posit mere conditionality as the meaning of dependent-relation do not assert inherent existence in regard to any thing. [Nagarjuna's] *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* (v. 19) says:
>
> Whatever arises dependent on this and that,
> Is not produced in its own entity.
> How can what is not produced
> In its own entity be said to be "produced?"
>
> That produced in dependence is not produced by way of its own entity. That being the case, how can it be said that sprouts and so forth are produced by way of their own entity?

Things are not produced by way of their own entity, that is, inherently. Therefore, if someone says that a sprout is inherently produced, one asks "How can it be said that an inherently existent sprout is produced from an inherently existent seed?" It cannot be said.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 334) says:

> [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 24.18) also says:
>
> Whatever is a dependent and related arising,
> That is explained as emptiness.
> That imputed by being what is caused,
> That is the middle way.
>
> This says that due to being a dependent-arising, it is empty of inherent existence.[121]
> Also the *[Questions of the King of Nagas, Anavatapta,] Sutra* says:
>
> What is produced from conditions is unproduced;
> It does not have the nature of production.
> Whatever depends on conditions is explained to be empty.
> Whoever knows emptiness is conscientious.

[121] *Illumination* mistakenly reads *stod par* rather than *stong par*.

This verse from sutra sets out a syllogism: "what is produced from conditions is unproduced" is the reason or sign, whereas "It does not have the nature of production" is the predicate.

Thursday morning, 25 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 334-5) says:

> "Produced from conditions" is the reason. The meaning of the predicate, "unproduced," is indicated by the second line; it means "not produced inherently," it is not that that is not affixed as a qualification to the object of negation because the Buddha himself asserted his intention in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra*, as quoted in *Clear Words*, saying:
>
> > Mahamati, through intending that they are not produced inherently, I said, "All phenomena are unproduced."

That the qualification "not produced inherently" is implicitly affixed to the object of negation in the *Questions of the King of Nagas, Anavatapta, Sutra* is explained by the Bhagavan in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* in which he specifies that he said 'All phenomena are unproduced' with the intention that "All phenomena are not inherently produced."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 335) says:

> Therefore, since the king of reasonings is the reasoning of dependent-arising itself, the very refutation of inherent production was taught by the Bhagavan. Therefore, having captivated his mind, Arya [Nagarjuna] in many of his texts, such as *Fundamental Wisdom* and *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*, composed praises to the Bhagavan from the point of view of this very teaching of dependent-arising. Those possessing wisdom should not propound like those who are emanations of darkness who state "Due to being produced in dependence, they are unproduced."

The Buddha taught the reasoning of dependent-arising to be the king of reasonings refuting inherent production. Nagarjuna, captivated by the teaching of dependent-arising, praised the Buddha from the point of view of this teaching in many of his texts such as *Fundamental Wisdom* and *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*. For example, the homage at the beginning of Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* (from *Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way*) says:

> I prostrate to the perfect buddha,
> The best of teachers, who taught that
> Whatever is dependently arise is
> Unceasing, unborn,
>
> Unannihilated, not permanent,
> Not coming, not going,
> Without distinction, without identity,
> And free from conceptual construction.

Student: Who would say "Due to being produced in dependence, they are unproduced"?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is hard to find someone who would say that! However, it means that one should not say "Due to being produced in dependence, they are unproduced" as this would be incorrect, like an emanation of darkness. On the other hand, saying "Due to being produced in dependence, they are not inherently produced" would be completely correct.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 335) says:

> When things are not asserted to exist inherently, then that which lacks inherent existence arises as what is produced from self or other and so forth. If [things] exist inherently, at that time
> - they would be produced from their own entity or produced from self, other, Ishvara, and so forth and
> - conceptions of (i) permanence, since what is already produced abides without disintegrating, (ii) of annihilation, since it disintegrates, and so forth could arise. In order to indicate "There are no other [conceptions] than these" it is explained [as follows]:
>
> *Conceptions arise when things exist,*
> *However, how things do not exist has already been thoroughly analyzed.*
> *Without things, they do not arise; for example,*
> *Like fire does not exist without fuel.* [6.116]
>
> *Conceptions* holding to an extreme *arise when things exist*, that is, when they are conceived to exist inherently. *However*, *how things do not exist* inherently *has* also *already been thoroughly analyzed* by means of the reasonings explained above. *Without* conceiving *things* to exist inherently *those* conceptions holding to an extreme *do not arise; for example*, *like* the result, *fire, does not exist without* its cause, *fuel*.

Due to the reasoning of dependent-arising, conceptions holding to an extreme do not arise. If, on the other hand, phenomena were inherently produced they would be produced by way of their own entity or produced from self, other, and so forth. However, this is impossible.

"Has also already been thoroughly analyzed by means of the reasonings explained above" refers to the refutations of production from the four extremes which were explained before. When production from the four extremes is refuted, inherent production is also refuted. This is because the lower schools set out the following reasons in order to prove inherent production:

1. because they are produced from self,
2. because they are produced from other,
3. because they are produced from both, and
4. because they are produced without causes.

When these reasons or signs are refuted, so too is the thesis "Things are inherently produced."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 335-6) says:

> Hence, through the familiarization that settles the meaning of suchness, the meditative equipoise actualizing the path of yogis, or superiors, sees suchness in a manner of not seeing the elaborations of appearances and also averts the conceptions, familiarized with since beginningless time, that strongly adhere to any phenomenon whatsoever as truly existent. For example, by the application of eye medicine there is the result that the appearances of falling hair and so forth are eliminated in those who have cataracts; it is not that falling hair and so forth, having become another nature, become the objects of [those who have cataracts].

Through familiarization settling the meaning of suchness, one comes to realize the suchness of phenomena. In this way one averts the conceptions of a self. This is likened to the fact that, due to the application of eye medicine, one with cataracts no longer has the appearance of falling hair and so forth, but it is not that the falling hair and so forth transform into another object. The eye medicine is likened to suchness, whereas the eye to which it is applied is likened to the wisdom realizing suchness. Due to this wisdom, the strong adherence to a self is eliminated.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 336) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2A4 Identifying the result of reasoned analysis

This refers the result of the analysis by Arya Nagarjuna and Acharya Chandrakirti that refutes production from the four extremes.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore:
>
> *Ordinary beings are bound by conceptions;*
> *Since non-conceptualizing yogis will be liberated,*
> *That which will reverse conceptions*
> *Was taught by the wise as the effect of complete analysis.* [6.117]
>
> Since ordinary beings – those not thus knowing this reality – are bound by only conceptions, therefore, when this thusness is thus comprehended, the aryas will be completely liberated. Therefore, Acharya [Nagarjuna] presented mere ceasing of conceptions without exception as the effect of the complete analysis explained in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*.

Chandrakirti says that ordinary beings are bound by conceptions of true existence, that is, the conception of a self. "Bound" indicates that because the conception of an inherently existent self is extremely strong it binds one in or causes one to remain in cyclic existence, without achieving liberation. On the other hand, yogis who do not conceive emptiness to exist inherently are liberated.

Chandrakirti says: "That which will reverse conceptions was taught by the wise as the effect of complete analysis" (6.117cd). Here, the word "conceptions" refers to bad views, such as the views holding to an extreme, which are averted as a result of thorough analysis.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 53), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-1D Knowing the result of the logical analysis
>
> *Ordinary beings are bound by misconceptions.*
> *The non-conceptualizing yogin becomes*
> *Freed. So this reversal of conceptions*
> *Is the result of analysis, sages have said.* [6.117]
>
> *The treatise did not analyze for love of wrangling,*
> *But showed reality to liberate.* [6.118ab]

That analysis of absolute reality in the treatise was not done for the sake of attachment to debating, but explained absolute reality for the sake of perfect liberation. For ordinary beings are bound by the conceptions grasping at extremes, but the yogin who does not conceptualize[122] incorrectly is then liberated. Therefore the reversal of the conceptions grasping at extremes, the learned say, is the result of the analysis of absolute reality in the treatise.

> *If, in explaining reality fully, others'*
> *Treatises are destroyed, there is no fault.* [6.118cd]

If, in fully explaining absolute reality, what is conceived in others' texts has been destroyed, it is no fault of the Madhyamikas; for at that time the opponents' positions destroyed themselves, by their own weakness.

> *Attachment to one's own views, and combativeness*
> *To the views of others, is a misconception.*
> *Therefore, one who eliminates desire and aversion*
> *And analyses will quickly achieve liberation.* [6.119]

[122] *rnam.par.mi.rtog.pa*

You should understand that one who completely eliminates attachment and aversion and analyses logically will quickly be liberated, for attachment to one's own view and likewise combativeness towards others' views is a conception which binds one.

This clearly shows the result of thorough analysis: through familiarizing with suchness, one comes to realize it, whereby bad conceptions, such as the conception holding to an extreme and so forth, are gradually eliminated.

Ordinary beings are called "Those who are bound by all" because they are bound by all the afflictions, not just by some of them. Nagarjuna and other masters taught for the purpose of liberating those who are bound by all the afflictions; they did not teach for the sake of argument or wrangling.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was taught [in the *Four Hundred Verses*, 16.23]:
>
> > If things existed inherently, what quality would exist in perceiving the empty?
> > Perception due to conception is bondage; just that is refuted here.

If things existed inherently, the perception of the emptiness of inherent existence would be meaningless because if they do not exist inherently then there would be no perceiving them to not exist inherently. Although things are empty, they appear as though inherently existent. "Perception due to conception" refers to the conception of a self due to which there is the appearance of inherent existence. "Just that is refuted here" means that the conception of a self is refuted here.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore:
>
> > *Analysis was not made in the treatise because of liking*
> > *Disputation. Thusness was indicated for complete liberation.* [6.118ab]
>
> Therefore, it should be known that the very many complete analyses that Acharya [Nagarjuna] made in the *Treatise on the Middle Way* were not made due to liking disputation, desiring to outshine others. When complete analysis was made in the *Treatise on the Middle Way* to indicate thusness, it was in order to completely liberate beings [thinking], "How wonderful it would be if sentient beings, having unmistakenly realized thusness like this, were to attain liberation."

Nagarjuna did not compose his *Treatise on the Middle Way* out of a liking for disputation, instead he did so for the purpose of liberating those who are bound. In other words, he did not compose this text in order to win debates. This implies that there are people who compose texts in order to win arguments, however, this is not Nagarjuna's case. Instead, he composed this text thinking: "How wonderful it would be if sentient beings, having unmistakenly realized thusness like this, were to attain liberation."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Did you not set forth entirely how to investigate the debates and were they not refuted in the *Treatise?* Therefore, since the employment of the *Treatise* is for the purpose of dispute, how can only a mere reversal of conceptions be presented as the effect?

> I say, indeed, this complete analysis was not made for the purpose of dispute. Nevertheless, when suchness is precisely indicated, the scriptural traditions of others – since inherently weak – do not establish themselves and like darkness when illumination approaches, will themselves be destroyed. Hence, we have no defect.

Although Nagarjuna did not compose his *Treatise on the Middle Way* for the purpose of dispute, as a result of his complete analysis others are not able to maintain their position regarding reality. For example, like placing a large piece of ice in the hot sunshine due to which the ice slowly melts even though the sun does not exist for the purpose of melting ice, similarly, incidentally Nagarjuna's text gradually causes others to lose their theses in that they are not able to maintain them in the light of his thorough analysis. Although this happens there is no fault; it is just like darkness is naturally dispelled when illumination approaches.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is explained:
>
> *If, when thusness is completely examined,*
> *Other texts are destroyed, it is faultless.* [6.118cd]
>
> As taught [in the *Four Hundred Verses*, 12.15]:
>
> This doctrine is not taught
> By the tathagatas for the sake of disputation.
> Nonetheless, it burns counter arguments
> Like fuel by fire.

Just as fire burns fuel without any bad intention, so too do Nagarjuna's explanations, without any bad intention, cause others to naturally give up their positions.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If, unlike that, the doctrine were taught in detail for the purpose of dispute, at that time, without doubt, there would be aversion for the defective position of others and subsequent attachment for one's own reasoned position. Hence, the mere reversal of conceptions is impossible.

If Nagarjuna had composed his text for the sake of dispute this would have brought about negative consequences such as attachment to one's own position and aversion to others' positions. In this case, it would not be possible for this text to overcome bad conceptions, however, this is not the case.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Why? It is like this:
>
> *What is attached to one's own view and likewise*
> *Upset with the view of others, is mere conception.* [6.119ab]
>
> Therefore, by not reversing conception, there will be bondage itself – not liberation.

If the *Treatise* had been composed for the sake of dispute, it would serve to increase attachment to one's own views and aversion for others' views, due to which conceptions would not be eliminated. However, this is not the case.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When this doctrine is not indicated for the purpose of dispute, then:
>
> *Therefore, having completely dispelled attachment and anger,*
> *If completely analyzed, one will be quickly liberated.* [6.119cd]

Attachment and anger are the main factors binding us in cyclic existence. In our own life, we have many different relationships with others, such as that of friendship, that of disciple-teacher, and so forth. At times such relationships become disharmonious, the cause of this is attachment and anger. Since these two afflictions are the main causes of disharmony and so forth, the purpose of Nagarjuna's composing his *Treatise on the Middle Way* was to help sentient beings become liberated from cyclic through eliminating the conception of a self which is the cause of attachment and anger. Thus, Nagarjuna composed his text in order to free sentient beings from ignorance – the conception of true existence and the conception of a self. In fact, the conception of true existence is also called "the door of degeneration."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As said [in the *Sixty Verses of Reasoning*, 50]:[123]
>
> Those with great character have no dispute, they have no position.
> How could another's position exist for those who have no position?

Great beings are free from thinking "This is my position" and "This is others' position." Nagarjuna did not compose his text for the purpose of creating opposing positions. In other words, he did not do so out of partiality for one particular position.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, it is taught [in the *Four Hundred Verses*, 8.10]:
>
> If there is attachment for one's own position and you dislike the position of others,
> One will not progress beyond sorrow. The two behaviors will not exist in peace.

If one has attachment for one's own position and dislike for others' positions, one will not attain nirvana. In other words, if we behave like this, we will not attain peace. We have the tendency to talk about the need for peace but in reality we often create the cause for disharmony. We can see this in regard to the present situation between the Palestinians and Israelis who talk about peace on one hand, but continue to fight amongst themselves on the other hand. With such attachment and aversion one will not pass beyond sorrow.

[123] One can also translate theTibetan: *gzhan.phyogs*; Sanskrit: parapaksha, as "opposing position/thesis" as Lintner does, p. 114-115 [How can there be an opposing thesis to those who have no thesis?], or as "hostile party/enemy" – "How could those who have no position have enemies?"

Thursday afternoon, 25 January 2001

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is also taught in [the *King of Meditative Stabilizations*] *Sutra*:
>
> Whoever gets attached upon hearing this doctrine
> And gets angry upon hearing the non-doctrine,
> The proud turn back, destroyed by haughtiness,
> Later experiencing suffering by the power of pride.

"This doctrine" refers to the virtuous or holy Dharma, whereas "the non-doctrine" is any teaching opposite to it. Or it can be understood to mean that there are people who become happy when the subject of a teaching is what they want to hear and who become angry when the subject of a teaching is what they do not want to hear.

There are many types of pride; three, seven, and nine types are set out in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*. There are excessive pride, pride of inferiority, pride thinking I, and so forth. The view of the transitory collection resembles the pride thinking I. What is pride and what is haughtiness?

Student: Pride is a puffing up of the mind, whereas haughtiness is more specific, for example, walking around with one's nose in the air thinking that one is very beautiful.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Pride is one of the six root afflictions, whereas haughtiness, in the context of the fifty-one mental factors, is one of the secondary afflictions. The exposition of the afflictions in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* is slightly different. The second chapter of *Treasury of Knowledge* (v. 2.33D) says:

> Pride is inflated, haughtiness is the mind attached to one's own qualities.

The sutra says: "The proud turn back, destroyed by haughtiness, later experiencing suffering by the power of pride." We know from our own experience that, if one is proud, one will definitely suffer due to others not thinking that one is quite so beautiful and so forth as oneself thinks. The view of the transitory collection, which is similar to pride, is the source of all suffering. This will be discussed later on in the context of the conception of a self of persons.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 336) says:

> *Ordinary beings are bound by conceptions;*
> *Not conceiving it, yogis are liberated.*
> *Therefore, the wise teach that*
> *Whenever conceptions are eliminated it is the result of thorough analysis.* [6.117]
>
> *Ordinary beings*, who do not understand reality as it was explained before, *are* mainly *bound by conceptions* holding to an extreme. Because of that, when that reality is *not conceived* mistakenly through comprehending it as it is, *yogis*, that is, superiors, *are liberated*. *Therefore*, due to refuting the object of the mode of apprehension without exception of the *conceptions* holding to an extreme, *the wise teach that whenever* conceptions *are eliminated* "This is presented to be *the result of* the *thorough analysis* that is explained in Arya [Nagarjuna's] *Treatise on the Middle Way*."

When one understands the meaning of emptiness well, one will become free from mistaken conceptions, in other words, the object of the mode of apprehension of mistaken conceptions is negated. This is because the realization of emptiness means to realize that the object of the conception

of a self does not exist. Through this realization, one will be liberated from cyclic existence, just like the yogis who do not conceive suchness to exist inherently and thereby achieve liberation from cyclic existence. On the contrary, ordinary beings conceive true existence and are bound by it in cyclic existence. What is it that cuts that which binds us in cyclic existence? It is the realization of suchness. In fact, Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas* says that while ordinary beings usually do not think about emptiness, if they do develop even a doubt regarding it, that doubt shakes the very foundation of cyclic existence.

In short, in order to abandon the conception holding to an extreme, it is necessary to develop a mind that has a mode of apprehension that is opposite to the mode of apprehension of that conception.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 336) says:

> [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas* also says:
>
> If things existed inherently,
> [When] seen to be empty, what excellent qualities would they have?
> Seeing by way of conception is bondage;
> Just that is refuted here.
>
> If phenomena existed inherently, since this itself would be their mode of being, seeing that would be beautiful, whereas seeing them as empty of inherent existence would lack excellent qualities. Therefore, 'seeing by way of conception' is bondage due to conceiving them to be inherently existent. Therefore, the referent object of that [conception] is the object of negation in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*.

If phenomena existed inherently there would not exist the excellent qualities that arise from seeing that they are empty of inherent existence, given that they are not empty of inherent existence. "Seeing by way of conception" means to conceive phenomena to be inherently existent; this is the bondage that binds us in cyclic existence. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The referent object of that [conception] is the object of negation in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*." In this context, one needs to understand:

1. the referent object of the conception of true existence,
2. the object of the mode of apprehension of the conception of true existence,
3. the object of engagement of the conception of true existence, and
4. the appearing object of the conception of true existence.

The first three – the referent object, object of the mode of apprehension, and object of engagement – are the same, whereas the appearing object is different. This is because the referent object, the object of the mode of apprehension, and the object of engagement of the conception of true existence are the object of negation itself, whereas the appearing object of the conception of true existence is not the object of negation. This is because according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system the conception of true existence is a valid cognizer with respect to its appearance.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 336) says:

> The commentary on [Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas*] also says:
>
> Conception superimposes the meaning of inherent existence, which is not reality...
>
> Since this explains that [conception] superimposes existing in reality on what does not exist in reality, do not consider this to refer to all conceptions; instead consider it to refer to conceptions holding to true existence and conceptions holding to an extreme.

The conception discussed in Aryadeva's text saying "Seeing by way of conception is bondage" is not just any conception but is specifically the conception of true existence or the conception holding to an

extreme; this is because there also exist conceptions that accord with reality. For example, the conventional mind of enlightenment is a conception but it accords with a correct meaning.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 337) says:

> Also in regard to conceptions holding to an extreme, even though the term 'extreme' has many meanings, the extreme of "freedom from extremes" is as is taught in [Kamalashila's] *Illumination of the Middle Way*:
>
> > If, for Madhyamika, things which are the nature of the own entity of the mind were to exist as the ultimate, at that time, due to existing as that, how would there be the extremes strongly adhering to them as "permanent" or "impermanent"? Having subsequently become the suchness of things just as they are and having paid proper mental attention to it, it would not be suitable to be called "the abode of downfalls."
>
> Moreover, here an object which exists just as it is apprehended is not an extreme. Since the awareness is also a proper mental attention, it is not a conception of an extreme. Hence, an extreme of this context is an abode of downfalls because – just as in the world an abyss is an extreme and one who has fallen into it is said "to have fallen into an extreme" – an apprehender ruined by conceiving either is said "to have fallen into an extreme."

To fall into an extreme is to either fall into the extreme of permanence or the extreme of annihilation. To fall into the extreme of permanence is to strongly hold to the thesis that things exist truly. For a person to fall into the extreme of permanence he must:
1. mentally accept that phenomena exist truly and
2. verbally assert that phenomena exist truly.

Therefore, if someone merely has the conception of true existence it does not mean that he has fallen into the extreme of permanence. On the other hand, the measure of falling into the extreme of annihilation is – on the basis of an analysis that arrives at the conclusion that because phenomena do not exist inherently they do not exist at all – to mentally accept and verbally assert that phenomena do not exist. We should strive to avoid falling into the extremes of permanence and annihilation but instead find the middle way – the realization that although phenomena do not exist inherently the presentation of agents, actions, and objects is admissible, that is, that the presentations of inherent existence and conventional existence are not contradictory.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 337) says:

> In regard to this, stating "Since that which perfectly exists cannot also exist nominally, that which does not perfectly exist exists nominally, therefore, it does not exist ultimately" is the conception of the extreme of non-existence. Although the refutation stating "It is not like that" does not refute the extreme of non-existence, if one conceives "The non-existence which is the negation of the object of negation perfectly exists," one falls into the extreme of the non-existence of things, whereby refuting that also refutes the extreme of non-existence.

"Perfectly existing" is a synonym of truly existing. Since perfectly existing is not possible, "not existing perfectly" or "not existing truly" is to exist conventionally. Negating that actions and results do not exist ultimately does not negate the extreme of non-existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "If one conceives 'The non-existence which is the negation of the object of negation exists in reality,' one falls into the extreme of the non-existence of things." This means that conceiving the non-affirming negative which is the negation of the object of negation – that is, emptiness – to exist ultimately or perfectly is to fall into the extreme of the non-existence of things. Therefore, refuting that also refutes the extreme of non-existence. In other words, if one holds

emptiness to exist truly one falls into the extreme of non-existence; this is a wrong view that is to be refuted.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 337-8) says:

> The fact that phenomena such as actions, results, and so forth exist conventionally also cannot be harmed by any valid cognizer. Their non-existence, or objects and object-possessors conceived to not exist, are an extreme of non-existence and a conception of an extreme of [non-existence], however, they are not an extreme of non-existence and a conception of an extreme of [non-existence] in regard to the buddhas being called, for example, "faultless." This is an extreme of non-existence which is a deprecation, whereas the former is an extreme of non-existence which is a superimposition.

There are two types of extremes of non-existence:
1. an extreme of non-existence that is a deprecation and
2. an extreme of non-existence that is a superimposition.

For example, thinking that there is no law of actions and their results is a conception holding to an extreme of non-existence, an object-possessor, whereas the non-existence of actions and results, the object, is the extreme of non-existence. In other words, the non-existence of actions and results is the extreme of non-existence, and the conception holding to the non-existence of actions and results is the conception of the extreme of non-existence. On the other hand, conceiving the buddhas to not have any faults is not a conception holding to an extreme of non-existence.

A conception of the extreme of non-existence which is a superimposition is the mind thinking that the non-affirming negative which is the negation of the object of negation is truly existent. A conception of the extreme of non-existence that is a deprecation is the mind thinking that actions and results do not exist. The first is a superimposition because one superimposes existence on what is not existent, that is, one thinks that the non-affirming negative which is the negation of the object of negation exists ultimately or truly.

Thus, there is an extreme of non-existence which is a deprecation and an extreme of non-existence which is a superimposition. The objects of the mode of apprehension of both these conceptions do not exist even conventionally; these objects are themselves an extreme of non-existence. The extreme of existence, the extreme of superimposition, and the extreme of permanence are synonyms, whereas the extreme of non-existence, the extreme of deprecation, and the extreme of annihilation are synonyms. When this is analyzed in depth, one text comes to the conclusion that if it is a deprecation it is also necessarily a superimposition.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 338) says:

> Therefore, phenomena excluded from the refutation explained above – objects and object-possessors that are conceived to exist ultimately or by way of their own character – are an extreme of existence and a conception of an extreme of [existence], whereas statements such as "The buddhas have knowledge and mercy" are not an extreme of existence and a conception of an extreme of [existence]. In some contexts in this text there is also the explanation that everything existing ultimately is the extreme of existence.

What is the conception holding to the extreme of existence? It is the conception that phenomena exist by way of their own character or ultimately. The object – the extreme of existence – is phenomena existing ultimately or phenomena existing by way of their own character. The object-possessor – the conception of an extreme of existence – is the conception that phenomena exist ultimately or that phenomena are established by way of their own character. "The buddhas have knowledge and

mercy" is not an extreme of existence, and conceiving this is not a conception of an extreme of existence because buddhas do have the qualities of knowledge and mercy.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 337) says:

> [Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:]
> *He did not compose the analyses in his* Treatise *out of attachment*
> *To argument. He presented suchness in order to liberate.* [6.118ab]
>
> Because of just that, one should understand the statement by Arya [Nagarjuna] in his *Treatise on the Middle Way* that says "That I *composed* many thorough *analyses* of reasonings *is not out of attachment to argument*, that is, the wish to outshine others." This means that when [Arya Nagarjuna] composed these thorough analyses of reasonings, *he presented suchness* in his *Treatise on the Middle Way*, composing it *in order to liberate* beings thinking "How wonderful it would be if sentient beings, having unmistakenly realized the suchness that is like that, were to attain liberation."

Nagarjuna composed many texts such as the Six Collections of Reasoning, the Six Collections of Praises, and so forth. However, he did not do so out of attachment to argument and a wish to outshine others, instead he did so thinking "How wonderful it would be if sentient beings, having unmistakenly realized the suchness that is like that, were to attain liberation." This is the conclusion of the preceding analysis.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 337) says:

> QUESTION: Did you [Nagarjuna] not set forth in its entirety how to investigate the disputes of the materialists and did you not refute them in your *Treatise*? Therefore, since you engaged in the *Treatise* for the sake of argument, how can you present only the mere elimination of conceptions as the result?
> RESPONSE: Indeed I did not compose these thorough analyses for the sake of argument. Nevertheless, when suchness is precisely indicated, since others' positions are by nature weak, their scriptural systems do not convince themselves and instead destroy themselves, like darkness when illumination approaches. Hence, we have no fault.

Nagarjuna had perfect understanding of the lack of inherent existence of phenomena and taught this again and again in his many texts. For example, the main purpose of all twenty-seven chapters of *Fundamental Wisdom* is to present the lack of inherent existence of compounded phenomena. However, in the meantime he also established the lack of inherent existence of uncompounded phenomena.

Friday morning, 26 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 338) says:

> This is explained [as follows]:
> *If, when suchness is thoroughly explained,*
> *Others' scriptures are destroyed there is no fault.* [6.118cd]
>
> *If, when suchness is thoroughly explained*, that imputed by *others' scriptures is destroyed* we are *faultless*.

Having established the emptiness of phenomena through many reasonings, the opponents gradually come to lose their own positions because what is imputed by their scriptures is not able to withstand the refutations while we ourselves remain faultless, like darkness eliminated by illumination. For

example, it is like if we speak honestly to someone who is lying, gradually it becomes clear that the other person is lying while we ourselves remain faultless.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 338) says:

> [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas* says:
>
> This Dharma is not taught
> By the tathagatas for the sake of argument.
> Nonetheless, it burns counter-dispute
> Like fuel is burned by fire.
>
> Fire is ignited for the sake of boiling beverages; it is not for the sake of [making] ashes and coals; however, those too are taught by the example to arise incidentally.

Nagarjuna and other masters composed their treatises in order to benefit sentient beings, however, incidentally, they also cause the opponents to lose their theses. This is like the fact that although fire is lit for the purpose of cooking food, boiling tea, and so forth, and not for the purpose of making ashes and coals, these still arise incidentally. For example, although we drink tea and eat food for the purpose of nourishing the body, incidentally other products are created, although they are not the purpose of eating and drinking!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 339) says:

> If the Dharma were presented out of attachment to argument, at that time, without doubt, there would be hatred for the faulty position of others and subsequent attachment for one's own position, due to which conceptions of anger and attachment would not be eliminated. Why is that?
>
> *Any attachment to one's own views and, likewise,*
> *Disturbance regarding the views of others are just conceptions.*
> *Therefore, having completely dispelled attachment and anger,*
> *Those who completely analyze will quickly be liberated.* [6.119]
>
> In that case, *any attachment to one's own views and, likewise, a disturbed* continuum *regarding the views of others'* positions *are just conceptions* that are bondage. Thereby, one will be bound by increasing conceptions of anger and attachment without turning them away; this is not liberation.

If the masters of the past had composed texts out of attachment to argument, this would have resulted in anger toward the faulty position of others and attachment for one's own position, due to thinking that what one says is correct. If this were the case, instead of their texts having the result of eliminating attachment and hatred, they would act to increase them. However, that attachment and hatred are bondage is discussed in detail in the *Treasury of Knowledge*. Ordinary beings are bound in cyclic existence by the conceptions of attachment and anger; for example, we have attachment for those who share the same views as ourselves and hatred for those who have different views. However, we should not be like this because it just increases our attachment and hatred more and more, rather than eliminating them. As long as we have attachment and hatred we will remain bound in cyclic existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 339) says:

> At that time, this Dharma is not presented for the sake of argument. *Therefore, having completely dispelled attachment* for one's own position *and anger* for others' positions, those who *completely analyze* by means of reasonings *will quickly be liberated*. [Nagarjuna's] *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* (v. 50) also says:

> Great beings lacking argument,
> They have no position.
> For those who have no position
> How could others' positions exist?

Great beings, lacking argument, do not think "This is my position and this is others' position."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 339) says:

> [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas* (v. 8.10) also says:
> If you have attachment for your own position and
> Dislike for others' positions,
> You will not go to nirvana.
> These two behaviors do not exist in peace.

As long as one continues to takes sides, one will not achieve liberation. In other words, if one has attachment for one's own position and anger toward others' positions it will not be possible to attain peace.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 339) says:

> The *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra* also says:
> Whoever develops attachment upon hearing this Dharma and
> Develops anger upon hearing the non-Dharma,
> These proud ones, overcome by haughtiness, turn away;
> Later, due to the force of pride, they experience suffering.

"Hearing this Dharma" can mean to hear or listen to Dharma that pleases us, whereas "Hearing the non-Dharma" is to hear or listen to Dharma that we do not like. Or it can be understood to mean that we become happy upon hearing teachings on what to practice in order to achieve liberation, while we become upset upon hearing teachings on what it is we need to abandon.

Haughtiness (see *Meditation on Emptiness*) is a puffing up of the mind through taking joy and comfort in observing one's own good health, youth, beauty, power, signs of long life, prosperity, and so forth. Haughtiness is one of the secondary afflictions, these being related to, or close to, the six root afflictions, ignorance, anger, attachment, pride, and so forth. For example, which of the secondary afflictions are close to anger? They are belligerence, resentment, spite, jealousy, and so forth. Haughtiness is close to pride. Pride in the context of this verse is the pride that is an affliction, not the pride of tantric practice.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 339) says:

> It should be understood that the very teaching "If, having given up taking the side of attachment for and anger toward one's own and others' positions, one does not analyze with an honest mind, one will be tightly bound to cyclic existence in dependence on the analytical meditations of tenets" is special advice given to us by the merciful one.

If one does an analytical meditation that concludes one's own position is the best while others' positions are only faulty, this will cause one to become even more tightly bound to cyclic existence. When analyzing the various tenet systems, one should not develop anger toward others' tenets. If

while analyzing them one finds mistakes in others' tenets, one should not develop anger but, instead, should develop compassion for those who have such tenets. This is special advice given for our sake.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 340) says:

> The refutation of production from self up to here is taught as presenting the selflessness of phenomena. The selflessness of phenomena that are things is frequently presented, however, there is also the intention to present the selflessness of phenomena that are non-things from time to time.

Up to here in the text, the self of phenomena has been presented. Although the presentation of the selflessness of phenomena is mainly based on the emptiness of compounded phenomena, from time to time it is based on the emptiness of uncompounded phenomena.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: With regard to the following statements which were included in the Exam 3, are they true or false?

1. The eye consciousness apprehending an inherently existent pot is mistaken with respect to the pot's inherent existence but not with respect to pot. *(exam question #12)*
2. The eye consciousness that apprehended blue and the subsequent memory of blue engage the same object. *(exam question #46)*
3. Manifest phenomena and hidden phenomena are mutually exclusive. *(exam question #50)*

The first is false. There is a difference between "apprehending an inherently existent pot" and "apprehending a pot to exist inherently." According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas there does not exist an eye consciousness apprehending an inherently existent pot because there does not exist an inherently existent pot. In other words, can an eye consciousness apprehend an inherently existent pot? It cannot because an inherently existent pot does not exist. On the other hand, there is an eye consciousness that apprehends a non-inherently existing pot, whereas there is no eye consciousness that apprehends a pot as not existing inherently. If one apprehends a pot, one necessarily apprehends a non-inherently exist pot, but if one apprehends a pot one does not necessarily apprehend the pot as not existing inherently.

The second is true.

The third is true because there is no common locus of the two, manifest phenomena and hidden phenomena. However, there can be discussion about this in regard to the definitions of the various tenet systems. A manifest phenomenon is: a phenomenon that can be realized by the force of experience without depending on a reason. A hidden phenomenon is: a phenomenon that cannot be realized by the force of experience but is realized by depending on a reason. In Sautrantika, a manifest phenomenon is that which is realized by the respective conception apprehending it in a manner of being manifest. On the other hand, a hidden phenomenon is that which is realized by the respective conception apprehending it in a manner of being hidden. *Collected Topics* says that a manifest phenomenon is: that which is realized explicitly by a direct valid cognizer. In this text, a hidden phenomenon is: an object realized in a hidden manner by a thought consciousness apprehending it.

Student: With regard to stating "phenomena are *merely imputed*" and "phenomena are *mere imputations,*" are these two statements equivalent?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are equivalent, it is only a question of how they are expressed.
Student: Is it correct to say "phenomena are mere names"?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is correct.
Student: Some say that names and sounds are form and that if it is a name it is a sound.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If, instead of saying that "Phenomena are mere names," we say "Phenomenon are merely imputed by name," then it is very clear. "Merely posited by conception" and "merely imputed by name" are the same, however, in regard to stating "Phenomena are mere names" their could be debate because according to some tenets if it is a name it is form. That is, for some schools a name or a mere name is form. On the other hand, according to the *Treasury of Knowledge* a name is not form because it is a non-associated compositional factor. In this tenet system, name is not sound but is what brings about understanding of the object, for example, stating "Sixte" brings about the understanding of the person called "Sixte." Are phenomena mere names? We would have to say that they are not due to the various tenet systems. What is the definition of "name"? According to the Sautrantika system it is: an object of hearing that makes one understand the subject matter by the force of a term. There are actual names and imputed names.

Student: For Prasangika, sutras of interpretable meaning are those that take conventionalities as their main indicated subject matter. Yet it seems that some sutras that were intended for Chittamatrins teach the ultimate (such as the sutra passage from the *Descent Into Lanka Sutra* that says all phenomena are mere mind) and yet are of interpretable meaning for Prasangika. Please explain this.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: When the Buddha taught the Chittamatrins in accordance with their desires saying "Phenomena are empty of being external objects" this is not a teaching on the ultimate for the Prasangika Madhyamikas. That a form is empty of being an external object and is the mere nature of mind is not the case for the Prasangika Madhyamikas. However, it can be asked: "Do these words of Buddha take conventionalities as their main subject matter?" If someone says that they do, it can be argued: "Then, what are the conventionalities spoken of here?" When the Buddha said forms are empty of being external objects, what was his intention? The basis of intention is not defined, whereas the purpose is to take care of the Chittamatrins.
Student: Does that statement teach the ultimate?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: From the Prasangika Madhyamikas point of view it does not, whereas from the Chittamatra point of view it does. This is because in the Prasangika Madhyamika system the emptiness of external objects is not ultimate truth, whereas in the Chittamatra system it is ultimate truth. The Buddha said that form is empty of being an external object. What was his basis of intention?
Student: It was to for Buddha to lead those with strong attachment through enabling them to diminish their attachment.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is the *purpose* of his teaching that form is empty of being an external object. Interpretable meaning teachings have a basis of intention, a purpose, and harm to taking them literally. So what is the basis of intention? Think about it.

Student: When the Prasangika Madhyamika debates with Chittamatra, they say it is an interpretable meaning sutra, not a definitive meaning. Does this mean that they do not use their own definition of interpretable meaning to do so, but instead use the definition of the Chittamatrins?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The Buddha said "Form is empty of being an external object." The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is an interpretable meaning sutra because it cannot be accepted literally. The Chittamatrins assert that there are no objects that do not depend on inner consciousness. When the Prasangika Madhyamikas insist that this is an interpretable meaning teaching, the Chittamatrins respond saying that this is true. Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas use the Chittamatrins' own definition of an interpretable meaning sutra, a sutra that cannot be accepted literally. Although the Prasangika Madhyamikas use this definition in their refutation, the Chittamatrins continue to say that this teaching is literally acceptable, however, slowly they are led to change their position. On the other

hand, if the Prasangika Madhyamikas were to use their own definition of interpretable meaning as a reason saying "It is an interpretable meaning sutra because it does not take the ultimate as its main subject matter," the Chittamatrins would say that this is not so because it does take the ultimate as its main subject matter because for them the emptiness of external objects is the ultimate. Therefore, whatever definition the Prasangika Madhyamikas use, the Chittamatra are not convinced, that is, they do not come to accept the thesis of the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Student: Geshe-la previously taught that the latency of an action and the disintegratedness of an action have different functions in that the disintegratedness of an action yields a fruitional result, whereas the latency of an action does not yield a fruitional result because it is an unspecified phenomenon. Would Geshe-la please explain the unique function of a latency of action according to Prasangika?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In general, in the Prasangika Madhyamika system there is no need to posit latencies. In this system, the disintegratedness of an action itself is sufficient to bring about a fruitional result without the need to posit latencies. If pushed, they say that if an action were to deposit a latency, it would deposit it on the mere I. However, there is no need for an action to deposit a latency because the disintegrated action itself is able to remain until it yields its result.

Because the latency of an action is a compounded phenomena, it should have a function. In one text it does say that the latency of an action does have particular attributes.

END

Monday afternoon, 29 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 340) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B Establishing the selflessness of persons through reasoning

1 Indicating that those desiring liberation should initially refute an inherently existent self
2 How to refute the two – an inherently existent self and mine
3 Indicating the analysis of a self and a chariot to be applicable also to other things

3B1C-2B3E-2B1 Indicating that those desiring liberation should initially refute an inherently existent self

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, having thus demonstrated the selflessness of phenomena through scripture and reasoning, after that, in order to demonstrate a self of persons as non-existent, it is explained:
>
> *With intelligence, having seen afflictions and defects without exception*
> *As arisen from the view of the transitory collection and*
> *Having realized the self as its object,*
> *The yogi acts to refute the self.* [6.120]

The phrase "Having thus demonstrated the selflessness of phenomena through scripture and reasoning, after that, in order to demonstrate a self of persons as non-existent" makes a connection between the previous subject, the selflessness of phenomena, and the coming subject, the selflessness of persons. In order to present the selflessness of persons Chandrakirti sets out verse 6.120. All the afflictions, such as attachment, anger, pride, and so forth, and all defects, such as birth, aging, sickness, death, and so forth, without exception, have as their root the view of the transitory collection. This is what is to be understood by the intelligent.

"Having realized the self as its object" (v. 6.120c) refers to the nominally existent self or mere I which is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection. On the other hand, "the yogi acts to refute the self" refers to the self which is the object of negation – a self-sufficient substantially existent self, an inherently existent self, or an established by way of its own character self. In short, the yogi realizes that the mere I, the observed object, is not a self-sufficient substantially existent self and is not an established by way of its own character self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, the view of the transitory collection is an afflicted wisdom engaged in such a way to consider I and mine. Since arisen from that, they are arisen from the view of the transitory collection.

The view of the transitory collection is an afflicted wisdom that takes as its object the I or mine included in one's own continuum and considers it to be self-sufficient substantially existent or established by way of its own character. However, according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, the afflicted wisdom observing the self in one's own continuum and conceiving it to be self-sufficient substantially existent is not the actual view of the transitory collection, but is the view of the transitory collection imputed by the lower schools. This is because the actual view of the transitory collection is an afflicted wisdom conceiving the self included in one's own continuum to be inherently existent or established by way of its own character.

Since they arise from that afflicted wisdom, they arise from the view of the transitory collection. Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: But what are they?
>
> Afflictions and defects[124]. There, the afflictions are attachment and so forth. The defects are birth, aging, sickness, death, misery, and so forth.

The afflictions are attachment, anger, pride, and all the secondary mental afflictions. An affliction (*nyon mongs*) is defined as: a mental factor that acts to render one's continuum unpacified and unsubdued. "The defects" – birth, aging, and so forth – are what arise from the afflictions. Birth is to join again and again due to actions and afflictions. Aging is the continuous changing of the aggregates which are a fruitional result. Sickness is of various types, these being included in mental and physical illness, as well as bodily pain. Death is the giving up of the body of this life. Misery or suffering is of different types: suffering due to not finding an object that one desires even though one makes much effort, suffering due to meeting the unattractive, suffering due to being separated from an attractive object, and so forth. All these sufferings arise from the view of the transitory collection.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> They are, without exception, arisen from the view of the transitory collection [since] all afflictions are taught in sutra to bear the cause of the view of the transitory collection:[125]
>
> > [They] bear the root of the view of the transitory collection, bear the cause of the view of the transitory collection, and bear the origin of the view of the transitory collection.

The view of the transitory collection is the root of all afflictions, the cause of all afflictions, and the origin of all afflictions. "[They] bear the root of the view of the transitory collection" means that the afflictions have as their root the view of the transitory collection. "They bear the cause of the view of the transitory collection" means that the afflictions have as their cause the view of the transitory collection. Because the view of the transitory collection is the origin of all afflictions, it is the origin of all the various types of sufferings.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Because formations strongly manifest and because the suffering of birth and so forth arise in those who did not abandon the view of the transitory collection, they, without exception, bear the cause of the view of the transitory collection.

Due to the view of the transitory collection, actions – that is, karmic formations – are accumulated, whereby birth and so forth arise. However, when this subject is debated a fault is found in the wording. Here it says that as long as one does not repudiate the referent object of the view of the transitory collection, one continues to accumulate actions and therefore to wander in cyclic existence. Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (G. Churinoff's translation) says:

> As long as grasping to the aggregates exists,

[124] Amend Poisson's Tibetan from the Derge: *nyon.mongs.pa rnams.dang skyon.rnams.so*.

[125] Source unidentified.

So long grasping to the I exists, due to it.
When grasping to I exists, [there is] also action;
From that, also, there is rebirth.

Having three paths in mutual causation,
Without a beginning, middle or end –
This wheel of samsara will revolve
Like the wheel of a firebrand."

J. Hopkins' translation in *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* says:

As long as the aggregates are [mis]conceived,
So long is there [mis]conception of an 'I'.
When this conception of an 'I' exists,
There is action which results in birth.

With these three pathways in mutual causation
Without a beginning, middle, or an end
This wheel of cyclic existence
Turns like the 'wheel' of a firebrand.

"They, without exception, bear the cause of the view of the transitory collection" refers to the fact that all defects or faults arise from the view of the transitory collection.

Student: What is the fault in the wording?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: With regard to the first verse above from Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland*, one can debate this statement asking: Do bodhisattvas on the first ground accumulate projecting actions since they still have the view of the transitory collection, the conception of a self of persons, and the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person? What is the scriptural authority for this? The fourth chapter of the *Supplement* (J. Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

There for the sugata child an illumination arises
Produced from a greater cultivation of the harmonies
Of perfect enlightenment, surpassing the copper light.
What is related to the view of a self is extinguished. [4.2]

Until they attain the fourth ground, bodhisattvas still have the conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person. This conception is extinguished on the fourth ground, therefore, it no longer exists on the fifth ground. Through which ground do bodhisattvas have a conception of self of phenomena or of truly existent aggregates? They have it through the seventh ground. This is the reason why the first seven grounds are called impure grounds. On the other hand, the next three grounds are called pure grounds because the afflictions have been abandoned. This is what is asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. Since bodhisattvas have the conception of truly existent aggregates through the seventh ground, it would seem that they still have the view of the transitory collection and, therefore, still accumulate projecting actions and are reborn in cyclic existence. This is the fault in the wording. One text says: "One who sees the truth, is without projecting actions. One who is free from craving is not reborn." This means that one who sees emptiness directly no longer creates projecting actions and one who is free from craving no longer takes birth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The referent of that is only the self, because grasping to I is the object-possessor of the self. There, only the view of the transitory collection is the object to be abandoned by those desiring to fully abandon afflictions and defects without exception.

Those who wish to abandon the afflictions and defects must abandon the view of the transitory collection.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That also will be abandoned through comprehending the selflessness of the self; hence, the yogi initially acts to refute only the self.

When selflessness is realized, the conception of a self is gradually abandoned, therefore, a yogi first refutes, not the conventional self, but the self that is the object of negation,.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If, from refuting that, the view of the transitory collection will be abandoned, if afflictions and defects without exception will be reversed, completely analyzing the self is the means of achieving liberation. Therefore, the yogi for a while initially acts to completely analyze only the self saying, "What is this so-called self like that is the referent of the view of the transitory collection?"

Since by this means the afflictions and defects are also abandoned, the way to achieve liberation is to completely analyze the self. Thus, the yogi initially completely analyzes the self asking himself, for example: "What is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection? What is the object of the mode of apprehension of the view of the transitory collection?" Keep in mind that there are many ways to posit the self that is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection; these ways of positing it will be discussed later on in detail.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 340) says:

> Having, thus, presented the selflessness of phenomena by means of scripture and reasoning, next, in order to present the selflessness of persons, it is explained:
>
> *Having seen with intelligence that afflictions and faults*
> *Without exception arise from the view of the transitory collection and*
> *Having realized that the self is the object of that,*
> *Yogis refute the self.* [6.120]
>
> Here, yogis who desire to engage in suchness and desire to abandon the faults of the afflictions without exception, reflect thinking "What is the root of wandering in cyclic existence like?" When investigating in this way, *they see with intelligence that the afflictions*, attachment and so forth, and the *faults*, birth, aging, sickness, death, and so forth, *without exception*, *arise from the view of the transitory collection* which is an afflicted wisdom conceiving the two – that having the aspect of "I" and "mine" – to be inherently existent. They are, without exception, a result of the view of the transitory collection. When this is seen, there arises a desire to abandon the view of the transitory collection. At that time, if one has wisdom it is abandoned.
>
> Moreover, as cited before from [Nagarjuna's] *Praise of the Sphere of Phenomena* and [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas*, through seeing that a self like that apprehended by the view of the transitory collection does not exist on the object, one sees that it must be abandoned. Then, when one investigates this thinking "What is the observed object of this adherence to a basis by the

> view of the transitory collection?", one *realizes* "The I which is the *self*, that is, the 'I,' is *the object* – the observed object – *of that* view of a self" because that conception of I is the object-possessor of the self.

Having settled the meaning of the selflessness of phenomena, now Lama Tsongkhapa sets out the selflessness of persons. Those who desire to abandon the afflictions and faults should abandon the view of the transitory collection. In order to do this, one has to engage suchness, that is, to realize emptiness. To do so, one must first identify the afflictions and faults, and then the self that is the object of negation. This means that one should first identify the root afflictions, attachment, hatred, and so forth, as well as the secondary afflictions. Having done so, one will come to understand that there origin is the view of the transitory collection. Then one identify the view of the transitory collection – an afflicted wisdom that observing either the I or mine considers it to exist inherently. From this view of the transitory collection arise all afflictions and faults. In other words, the view of the transitory collection is the root or cause from which arise the results that are the afflictions and faults. Through reflecting upon this, one will develop the wish to abandon the view of the transitory collection. Having developed this wish, the intelligent then strive to identify the observed object of the view of the transitory collection. In order to understand this, Lama Tsongkhapa says that one should refer to Nagarjuna's *Praise of the Sphere of Phenomena* and Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas*. One has to investigate what is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection and what is the mode of apprehension of the view of the transitory collection. The I is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection. In order to prove this Lama Tsongkhapa sets out the reason: "because that conception of I is the object-possessor of the self." "I" or "self" are synonymous, they refer to the nominally existent self. *Collected Topics* says that I, self, being, and person are synonyms; they refer respectively to the I and so forth that exist nominally.

Tuesday morning, 30 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 341) says:

> At that time, those desiring to abandon all afflictions and faults without exception should abandon the root – that view of the transitory collection itself. Furthermore, this is abandoned through comprehending the selflessness – that is, the lack of establishment by way of its own entity – of the self, its observed object. Therefore, yogis initially investigate just the self thinking "Is the so-called 'self' – the object of whoever conceives a self – established or not established by way of its own entity?" When *yogis* abandon the view of the transitory collection through *refuting* an inherently existent *self*, they eliminate all afflictions and faults. Hence, this complete analysis in regard to the self is the method to achieve liberation.

When the yogi analyzes whether the self exists inherently or not, he comes to realize that it does not. This analysis is the method for achieving liberation, for abandoning the view of the transitory collection, and for eliminating all afflictions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 341) says:

> As [Shantideva's] *Compendium of Trainings* says:
>
> > When the emptiness of persons is thoroughly achieved in that way, because of that, all the afflictions will never arise since the root has been cut.
>
> As it says in the *Secret Sutra of the Arya Tathagata*:
>
> > It is like this, Shantimati. For example, when the root of a tree is cut, all the branches, leaves, and twigs dry up. Shantimati, similarly, when the view of the transitory collection is pacified, all the afflictions and secondary afflictions are pacified.

Shantideva's *Compendium of Trainings* also says that in dependence on the realization of the lack of an inherently existent self, the root of the afflictions is cut and, therefore, sufferings no longer arise. It is like when, having merely cut the branches and leaves of a tree without cutting its root, the tree will not stop growing but may even grow better, therefore, it is necessary to cut the root of the tree. Likewise, by merely cutting the secondary afflictions the root of cyclic existence is not cut, but when the root, the view of the transitory collection, is cut cyclic existence is destroyed. This is because when the view of the transitory collection is cut all the root afflictions, attachment and so forth, and all the secondary afflictions, belligerence and so forth, also cease. Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas* says:

> Like the body sense power [abides in] the body,
> Confusion abides in all.

When ignorance or the view of the transitory collection is destroyed, all the afflictions are destroyed, likewise, when the body sense power is destroyed so too are all the other physical sense powers, such as the eye sense power and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 341) says:

> Since the lords of the wise accord with teaching in this way, initially one should understand the shortcomings of cyclic existence well and then contemplate them. Then, one should identify its root. Then, if one wishes to abandon it, one should understand that, having gained ascertainment of the view of the selflessness that negates its referent object without lacking the method for abandoning it, it is necessary in both the great and lesser vehicles to accustom oneself to its meaning.

Having identified the shortcomings of cyclic existence, one should identify their root. Having done so, one will develop the wish to abandon it. Then, in order to not mistake the means for abandoning it, one should ascertain the view of selflessness which negates the referent object of the conception of a self. Then, one has to familiarize oneself with that selflessness. In order to do so, one has to engage in the three, hearing, thinking, and meditating, independent of whether one is following the great vehicle or the lesser vehicle.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 342) says:

> OBJECTION: [Nagarjuna's] *Precious Garland* (v. 35) says:
>
> > As long as there is the conception of the aggregates
> > Until then there exists the conception of I.
> > When there exists the conception of I, action also exists.
> > From that action, there is also birth.
>
> This explains the conception of truly existent aggregates – the conception of a self of phenomena – to be the root of cyclic existence, whereas here [in the *Supplement*] the view of the transitory collection is explained to be the root of cyclic existence. These two [explanations] are contradictory because it is not admissible for two discordant [things] to be the root of cyclic existence.
> RESPONSE: There is no fault. The system here distinguishes the two conceptions of a self in terms of their observed objects, whereas the aspects of their modes of apprehension are not different,
>
> - because both have the aspect of also conceiving establishment by way of its own character and
> - because two contradictory roots of cyclic existence refer to positing two discordant modes of apprehension engaging an object as the root of cyclic existence.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, the conception of a self of persons and the conception of a self of phenomena are distinguished from the point of view of their observed objects and not from the point of view of the aspects of their mode of apprehension because they both have the aspect of apprehending their object to be established by way of its own character or inherently existent. What does it mean that the two conceptions of a self are distinguished from the point of view of their observed objects? When a conception observes the person, from among the two, persons and phenomena, and conceives it to be established by way of its own character, this is a conception of a self of persons. On the other hand, when a conception observes a phenomenon, such as the aggregates, from among the two, persons and phenomena, and conceives it to be established by way of its own character, this is a conception of a self of phenomena. Contrarily, in the lower schools these two conceptions are distinguished from the point of view of their modes of apprehension and not their observed objects. For example, in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system, the conception of a self of persons is defined as a conception conceiving either the person or a phenomenon to be self-sufficient substantially existent, whereas the conception of a self of phenomena is a conception conceiving either the person or a phenomenon to be truly existent. The Chittamatra system posits the conception of self of persons in the same way as the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, but posits the conception of a self of phenomena as a conception that conceives any phenomena, from form through the exalted knower of all aspects, to be established by way of its own character as the basis for a term or as the basis for the conception apprehending it. They also say that the conception of a self of phenomena is the conception conceiving apprehendeds, that is, objects, and apprehenders, that is, object-possessors, to be different substances. The Vaibhashika and Sautrantika schools do not assert a conception of a self of phenomena, that is, they assert only a conception of a self of persons, because they assert that there is a self of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 342) says:

> Hence,
> - when the conception of a self of phenomena is presented as the cause of the view of the transitory collection, the two subdivisions of ignorance are presented as cause and result, and
> - when both [conceptions of a self] are presented as the root of the afflictions, they are presented as the root of all other afflictions whose mode of apprehension is discordant with themselves.
>
> Since that mode, furthermore, exists for both [conceptions], they are not contradictory; like both a former and later [moment of] a similar type of ignorance are not contradictory in being the root of cyclic existence.

"The two subdivisions of ignorance are presented as cause and result" means that the conception of a self of phenomena is the cause of the conception of a self of persons, the view of the transitory collection. Hence, there first arises a conception of a self of phenomena and then a conception of a self of persons. For example, when we see someone for the first time, we initially see his aggregates and conceive them to be established by way of their own character, this being a conception of a self of phenomena. Then, when that person introduces himself as Tashi Dorje, we conceive an inherently existent Tashi Dorje, this being a conception of a self of persons. Thus, the conception of a self of persons arises in dependence on the conception of a self of phenomena because in order for there to be the appearance of the person there must first be the appearance of the aggregates. In short, the appearance of the person arises in dependence on the appearance of the aggregates. In conclusion, it is not contradictory to posit both the view of the transitory collection and the conception of truly existent aggregates as the root of cyclic existence.

A former moment of ignorance can be posited as the root of cyclic existence and a later moment of ignorance as the root of cyclic existence. Do they have a common locus? There do not

because former and later are mutually exclusive, yet, since the continuum is one, they can both be the root of cyclic existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 342-3) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2 How to refute the two – an inherently existent self and mine

A Refuting an inherently existent self
B Refuting an inherently existent mine

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A Refuting an inherently existent self

1 Refuting a self that is a different entity from the aggregates, which is imputed by other schools
2 Refuting the assertion that the aggregates themselves are the self, which is imputed by our own schools
3 Refuting the three remaining positions other than those two: support, supported, and so forth
4 Refuting a substantially existent person that does not exist as oneness and as otherness
5 Explaining the self posited as a mere dependent imputation along with an example
6 Indicating the excellent quality of positing in this way of easily abandoning the conceptions holding to an extreme

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-1 Refuting a self that is a different entity from the aggregates, which is imputed by other schools

Here "other schools" includes the Samkhyas, Vaisheshikas, and so forth who have their own particular ways of positing a self. Shantarakshita's *Compendium of Suchness* extensively sets out the other schools' various ways of positing a self.

A Stating their positions
B Refuting that system

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-1A Stating their positions

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If said: What is that self, the referent of the view of the transitory collection? Just that is not known.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 343) says:

QUESTION: What is the self that is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection? Due to not understanding that itself, it is indicated:

1 Stating the Samkhya system
2 Stating the Vaisheshika system and so forth

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-1A1 Stating the Samkhya system

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 146) says:

There, first of all:

The self imputed by the Forders is an enjoyer,
Permanent thing, not creator, without qualities or actions.
The systems of the Forders are differentiated
In dependence on small small divisions of it.[126] [6.121]

The Samkhyas assert twenty-five objects of knowledge for engaging in and becoming free of cyclic existence. These twenty-five objects of knowledge include the self which has five attributes:
1. it is an eater or enjoyer,
2. it is a permanent thing,
3. it is not a creator,
4. it lacks qualities, and
5. it lacks activities.

Because there are different ways of identifying the self, Chandrakirti says: "The systems of the Forders are differentiated in dependence on small small divisions of it." This means that there are different Forder schools in dependence on the slightly different ways in which they identify the self. For example, the Vaisheshikas assert that the self possesses qualities, whereas the Samkhyas say that it lacks qualities.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, the Samkhyas state [in the *Samkhyakarika*]:[127]
>
> > The fundamental nature is not a transformation —
> > The great one, etc., the seven, are natures and transformations and
> > The sixteen indeed are transformations;
> > The being is not a nature, not a transformation.
>
> There, due to thoroughly creating (*prakaranat*), it is a nature (*prakriti*)[128]

That the fundamental nature, or the general principal, is not a transformation means that it is not a result.

"The great one, etc., the seven" refer to:
1. the great one,
2. the I-principle,

and the five subtle objects:
3. forms,
4. sounds,
5. odors,
6. tastes, and
7. tangible objects.

These seven are natures because they are causes, and are transformations because they are results.

"The sixteen indeed are transformations" means that sixteen are only results. These are:
- the five awareness faculties (or five mental faculties, see *Meditation on Emptiness*),
- the five action faculties

[126] See the Sanskrit in Poisson, p. 283. The Tibetan: *za.po* for the Sanskrit *bhokta*, seems to accord either with "utilizer" or "enjoyer."

[127] Poisson, p. 283, note 3.

[128] Poisson, p. 284.

- the mental faculty (or intellectual faculty, see *Meditation on Emptiness*), and
- the five elements.

These are called "the eleven faculties together with the five elements." The five action faculties are:
1. the speech faculty,
2. the arm faculty,
3. the leg faculty,
4. the anus faculty, and
5. the genital faculty.

These are so-called because they perform actions.
The five awareness faculties are:
1. the eye faculty,
2. the ear faculty,
3. the nose faculty,
4. the tongue faculty, and
5. the body faculty.

There is also the mental faculty and, in addition, the five elements:
1. earth,
2. water,
3. fire,
4. wind, and
5. space.

"The being is not a nature, not a transformation" means that the being is neither a cause nor a result. These are the twenty-five objects of knowledge asserted by the Samkhyas. The self asserted by them is also called "consciousness," "cognizer," and "being." Tibetans usually refer to it saying "the being which is the three, self, consciousness, and cognizer."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: In what situation is there creation?
>
> At the time of perceiving the desire of the being. When desire having the aspect to thoroughly enjoy (utilize) the object, sound and so forth, is produced in the being, then the nature, fully knowing the being's desire, conjoins with the being and thereby issues forth sound and so forth.[129]

The Samkhyas say that everything arises from the nature, that is, the general principal is the creator of everything. It creates in response to the desires of beings, meaning that the general principal knows the desire of beings to hear attractive sound and then creates an attractive sound and so forth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> This is the order:
>
> There, the method is this. From the nature, the great one; from that, the I-principle; from that, the group of sixteen. Also, among the sixteen, the five elements are from the five [subtle objects], that is, the five elements arise from sound and so forth.[130]

[129] See *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, pp. 58-62.

[130] Citation uncertain.

What is the great one? The Samkhyas say that it is like a two-sided mirror which reflects everything. From the great one, comes the I-principle; from that, the group of sixteen. Among the sixteen, the five elements arise from the five subtle objects.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> "Is not a transformation" means that, since it is only a thorough producer, it is not also a transformation like the great one and so forth. The great one and so forth are thorough producers and are also transformations, therefore, it is mentioned that "The great one, etc., the seven, are natures and transformations, and…"

The general principal is not a transformation, that is, it is not a result, because it is only a cause due to being the creator. The fundamental nature is not a transformation, whereas the seven, the great one and so forth, are transformation. In fact, the great one and so forth are both thorough producers and transformations. This is Chandrakirti's explanation of the verse in the Samkhya text ""The great one, etc., the seven, are natures and transformations..."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The great one and so forth are also natures through reliance on their own transformations; they are transformations through reliance on the nature.

The seven, the great one and so forth, are called "natures," that is, causes, with respect to their results, and are called "transformations," that is, results, with respect to their causes.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The intellectual facu1ties and so forth – the sixteen – are only transformations. Therefore, it is mentioned that "the sixteen are transformations." The term "indeed" is in order to specify "only transformations."

The sixteen are only transformations, that is, they are only results. This is understood from the term "indeed" of the line "The sixteen indeed are transformations" which specifies that they are only results, that is, transformations.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> To mention that "The being is neither a thorough producer nor a transformation," it is stated "The being is not a nature, not a transformation."

The being is not a nature, that is, a cause, and it is not a transformation, that is, a result. Therefore, among the twenty-five objects of knowledge there are four possibilities:
1. that which is only a cause,
2. that which is only a result,
3. that which is both, and
4. that which is neither.

An example of the first is the general principal or fundamental nature. An example of the second is the sixteen, such as the five mental faculties and so forth. An example of the third is the seven, the great one and so forth. An example of the fourth is the self or the being.

Tuesday afternoon, 30 January 2001

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Since the entire group of transformations are produced in this order, one must tell how the being who produces desire becomes an intimate enjoyer. The intellect grasps to sound and so forth – the objects apprehended by the intellectual faculties of the ear and so forth – due to the blessings (empowerment) by the mentality. Thereby, the being (*parusha*) creates understanding about the objects that the intellect has grasped. Thus, because the being's mind is its own entity that exists, it is said that "The self intimately enjoys objects."

The Samkhyas say that the group of transformations arises in the order set out above: from the nature comes the great one, from that the I-principle, and from that the various transformations. The being is an intimate enjoyer. How does it enjoy? This being desires to enjoy objects, such as forms, sounds, and so forth. The awareness or intellect then adheres to sound and so forth, due to which the being develops and understanding of the object, or it can be said that the awareness adheres to an object and then the being thinks about it. This is explained so because the Samkhyas also call the being "one possessing intention." "The self intimately enjoys objects" refers to the objects of the various faculties.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thus, objects are intimately enjoyed out of desire. And, when the being separates from attachment to objects due to diminishing attachment [for them], at that time, [the being] gradually meditates on the concentrations and by correctly adopting the divine consciousness, views the nature by way of the divine eye. As a result of being viewed by it and becoming ashamed – like the wife of another[131] – [the nature] does not proceed[132] with the self and will separate. Because of thoroughly extinguishing (absorbing) into that itself (the nature) by means of reversing from the order of generating the entire group of transformations, it becomes unclear (invisible) in nature. Then the being abides alone, thereby liberated.

When the being separates from attachment to objects, it meditates on the concentrations and achieves clairvoyance. Then, with the divine eye it looks at the nature due to which the nature becomes embarrassed and withdraws, like another man's wife. The nature slowly disappears while withdrawing all the groups of transformations. Thus, whereas initially the nature expanded everything out from itself, it now absorbs everything back into itself. In this way, the transformations become unclear, that is, they reabsorb into the nature. The nature is also called "the invisible one" because it does not manifest itself as an object of the sense powers. After this reabsorption what remains is only the being, who is also called "self," "consciousness," and "cognizer." In this way the being is said to attain liberation. Chandrakirti says: "Then the being abides alone, thereby liberated."

[131] *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, p. 61: "like a mistress when seen by a wife."

[132] LTK, p. 361, has Tibetan: *bdag.la mi.'gro zhing* – "does not proceed to the self," commenting on the Tibetan translation of Chandrakirti: *bdag.la mi.k'ro zhing*, "not angry with the self." Poisson translates it as "sans sirriter" on p. 285 and in note 2.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That [being or self] is termed "permanent" because of always abiding as a solitary entity since not being crippled even though the transformations were already impaired. Because the nature is a creator and among the transformations some are also creators, since the self is lazy about activity, it is said that "It is not a creator." Intimate enjoyment was already indicated in the manner that was mentioned.

Although the transformations are impaired, the being nevertheless remains. "Among the transformations some are also creators" refers to the seven – the great one, the I-principle, and the five subtle objects. "Since the self is lazy about activity, it is said that "it is not a creator." Although the self is not a creator, it is an enjoyer.

In short, the Samkhyas say that the general principal creates things for beings who then enjoy them. However, when beings become tired of enjoying these objects and look at the general principal it becomes embarrassed and withdraws.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Because without *rajas* (activity), *tamas* (darkness), and *sattva* (lightness), it is just without qualities. Because of pervasiveness, it is without activity. Thus are the attributes of the being.

The being is without qualities because it lacks the three qualities – activity, darkness, and lightness. The being lacks activity because it is pervasive and, therefore, has no need of the activity of going here and there. In short, the being or self is:

1. a consumer,
2. a permanent thing,
3. not a creator,
4. without the qualities of activity, darkness, and lightness, and
5. without activity.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, if asked: In the statement, "The nature itself is a creator and among the transformations some are also creators," which transformations are creators and which ones are not creators?

Here someone asks: "The nature is a creator as are some of the transformations, which transformations are creators and which are not?"

To explain this Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to explain the particulars regarding this, I shall say a little bit. There, *rajas* (activity), *tamas* (darkness), and *sattva* (lightness) are the three qualities. There, *rajas* is movement and has an essence of engagement. *Tamas* is heavy and has an essence of covering. *Sattva* is lightweight and has an essence of extreme clearness. So-called pleasure, pain, and bewilderment are synonyms of only these. The situation of equal parts of these is the principal because in it the qualities are foremost and are extremely pacified. The situation of their not transforming is the nature.

The nature has the three qualities of activity, darkness, and lightness. Which of the three qualities are respectively synonyms of pleasure, pain, and confusion? Activity or motility is a synonym of pain. Darkness, which is heavy and covering or obscuration, is a synonym of bewilderment or confusion. Lightness is a synonym of pleasure. Pleasure is related to attachment, pain to hatred, and bewilderment or confusion to ignorance. It is our own experience that from attachment arises pleasure; from hatred, pain; and from ignorance, obscuration. This is discussed in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Tenets*.

When the three qualities of activity, darkness, and lightness are in equilibrium this is called the general principal "because in it the qualities are foremost and are extremely pacified."

"The situation of their not being manifest is the nature" means that when the three qualities are not manifest this is the nature which is not visible to the sense powers.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *From the nature*, *the great one* – the great one being a synonym of the intellect. *From the great one*, *the I-principle* – that is threefold: transformative, possessing *sattva*, and possessing *tamah*. There, from the transformative I-principle, the five subtle-objects (potencies): form, sound, odor, taste, and tangibility. From the subtle-objects, the elements: earth, water, fire, wind, and space.

The great one is a synonym of awareness or intellect, it is likened to a two-sided mirror in which both outer objects and the inner being are reflected. From the transformative I-principle come the five subtle objects or potencies: forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. From these five subtle objects come the five elements.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> From the I-principle possessing *sattva*, the five action faculties: speech, hand, leg, anus, and genitalia; the five faculties of intellect: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; and the mental faculty which possesses both essences – in this way there are eleven.

From the I-principle possessing lightness come the eleven: the five action faculties (speech, hand, leg, anus, and genitals), the five faculties of intellect, or awareness faculties, (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin), and the mental faculty. "The mental faculty which possesses both essences" means that the mental faculty has the nature of both the action faculties and awareness faculties or faculties of intellect.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The I-principle possessing *tamas* produces engagement of the two I-principles.

The I-principle possessing darkness produces engagement in the transformative I-principle and the I-principle possessing lightness.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, the great one, the I-principle, and the five subtle objects are both natures and transformations; the ten faculties, mentality, and the great elements are only just transformations. The nature is just not a transformation.

The aforesaid is the scriptural tradition.

In short, the Samkhyas assert twenty-five objects of knowledge. In the context of the refutation of production from self Acharya Bhavaviveka sets out a syllogism:

The eye and so forth, as the subject, are not produced from self because they are existents; like one possessing intention.

This is an important reasoning for refuting production from self. Here "the eye and so forth" includes twenty-three of the twenty-five objects of knowledge. One can also say:

The transformations are not produced from self because they are existents; like one possessing intention.

Wednesday morning, 31 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 343) says:

[Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:]

A self that is a consumer, permanent, not a creator,
Lacking qualities and activity is imputed by the Forders. [6.121ab]

For instance, [the *self*] *imputed by the Forders* – the Samkhyas – is:

1. *a consumer*, that is, an enjoyer of happiness, suffering, and so forth,
2. a *permanent* thing, and
3. *not a creator* of transformations, and
4. it *lacks* the *qualities* of motility, darkness, and lightness, and
5. lacks *activity* because of being a pervader.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1A-1A Stating the Enumerators' hypothesis

An experiencing, permanent, non-creative self,
Without qualities or actions, is conceived by some non-Buddhists. [6.121ab]

The non-Buddhist Enumerators (Samkyas) conceive that that self is the experiencer, it is permanent in nature, not a creator of effects, without the [three] qualities, and without activity [since it is all-pervading].

3B1A-6C5A-2B1A-1B Stating the Particularists' view

Depending on diverse definitions of it,
The schools of the non-Buddhists become different. [6.121cd]

Depending on various definitions of that self, the non-Buddhist schools become different. The Particularists (Vaisheshikas) say that that self is the experiencer, is permanent in nature, is a creator, does have qualities, and is without activity.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 343-4) says:

With respect to it, the Samkhyas propound:

The fundamental nature is not a transformation,
The seven – the great one and so forth – are natures and transformations, and
The sixteen are transformations.
The being is not a nature and not a transformation.

> There, due to thoroughly producing a result, it is a nature. On what occasion does it produce? [It does so] when it sees the desire of beings. When the desire that has the aspect of enjoying an object, sound and so forth, is produced, at that time the nature – which thoroughly knows the desire of the being – and the being join together and then the principal issues forth sounds and so forth. The stages are said to be:
>
> > The way this happens is as follows. From the nature, [arises] the great one; also from that, the I-principle; from that, the eleven faculties and the five elements[133] – the collection of sixteen. Also among the sixteen, the five elements [arise] from the five subtle objects, that is, the five elements arise from the five, sound and so forth.
>
> That which "is not a transformation" is only what is a thorough producer of results; that is, it is not also a transformation as are the great one and so forth. The seven, the great one and so forth, are natures in relation to their own transformations and transformations in relation to the fundamental nature. The sixteen – the awareness faculties and so forth – are just transformations. The being is neither a thorough producer nor a transformation.

The seven, the great one and so forth, are both causes and results, that is, both natures and transformations. The sixteen are:

- the five action faculties,
- the five awareness faculties (*blo'i dbang po*),
- the mental faculty (*yid*), and
- the five elements.

These are only transformations. The being is the fourth possibility, that is, neither a nature nor a transformation, as the Samkhya scriptures say: "The being is not a nature and not a transformation."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 344) says:

> The awareness adheres to objects, such as sounds and so forth, which are thoroughly apprehended by the five faculties of the ear and so forth, due to being empowered by mentality. Then, the being thinks about the object which is adhered to by the awareness. In this way, due to desiring to enjoy an object, the object is thoroughly enjoyed. At that time, due to a small level of attachment to the object, the being, through seeing the shortcomings regarding the object, becomes free from attachment and gradually cultivates a concentration. In dependence on that, when he attains the clairvoyance of divine eye he views the principal by means of that eye. Viewed by that, the principal becomes embarrassed, like the wife of another, due to which it does not approach and separates from the self. Because, through reversing the order of their production, all the collections of transformations also fully absorb into the principal itself, they become unclear entities. At that time, the being abides alone, because of which it is called "liberated." The self, because of always abiding as a separate entity, is called "permanent."

Due to the power of thinking about something, the eye begins to see, the ear begins to hear, and so forth. Then, the being thinks about the object apprehended by the awareness, thinking "Is this form beautiful or not?" and so forth. The person then desires to enjoy the object, whereby it is enjoyed. Then, through examining the object, the person comes to see its faults due to which there is a lessening of attachment. Although initially the person sees an object as beautiful, he gradually comes to see it as unattractive. This is true of forms, sounds, and so forth. Thus, although initially there is a liking for an object, this gradually diminishes and transforms into dislike. At that time, the person begins to cultivate a concentration. Through this he attains the clairvoyance of the divine eye with which he looks at the general principal. Previous to this the person did not understand how transformations arise, but then, through the clairvoyance of the divine eye, he sees that the general principal is the emanator of all the transformations. Having identified the general principal as the

[133] The Tibetan mistakenly reads *de tsam* (subtle object), whereas it should read '*byung ba* (element).

creator, the general principal becomes embarrassed, like the wife of another man when observed (this must refer to ancient times when women were more easily embarrassed than they are nowadays!). Due to this the general principal, instead of approaching the self, separates from it and disappears. In this way, all the transformations are absorbed into it and nothing remains except the being who abides alone. At this point, the being is liberated in the sense that it is free from everything.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 344-5) says:

> QUESTION: Which of them is the creator and which are not creators?
> RESPONSE: In regard to that, motility, darkness, and lightness are the three qualities. Motility has the nature of moving and engaging; darkness has the nature of heaviness and covering; lightness has the nature of lightness and great clarity. "Happiness, suffering, and confusion" are synonyms of just these. The occasion of equal parts of these [qualities] is the principal because here these qualities are foremost and thoroughly pacified.

The self is permanent and abides separately. Thus, in response to the question "Which of them is the creator and which are not creators?", the answer should be that the self is not a creator. Then, who is the creator? Here it is explained to be that which possesses the three qualities of motility, darkness, and lightness.

"Motility has the nature of moving and engaging" refers to movement from east to west and so forth. "Darkness has the nature of heaviness and covering" is like the gloom in a dark room. "Lightness has the nature of lightness and great clarity." Lightness is related to pleasure, darkness to ignorance, and motility to suffering. The occasion of equilibrium of the three qualities is called the principal "because here these qualities are foremost and thoroughly pacified." The general principal is foremost and abides thoroughly pacified.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 345) says:

> The occasion of their non-transformation is the nature. From the nature [arises] the great one. The two, the great one and awareness, are synonyms. In it arise both the reflections of outer objects and the inner being. From the great one [arises] the I-principal. The I-principal is of three [types]: (i) that possessing transformation, (ii) that possessing lightness, and (iii) that possessing darkness. From the transformative I-principal [arise] the five subtle objects: forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. From the five subtle objects [arise] the elements, those called "earth, water, fire, wind, and space."
>
> From the I-principal that possesses lightness [arise] the five action faculties – the faculties of speech, arms, legs, anus, and genitals – and the five awareness faculties – the faculties of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin or body – and the mental faculty which has the nature of both; in this way there are eleven. The I-principal that possesses darkness produces the engagement of the two other I-principals.
>
> The great one, the I-principle, and the five subtle objects – the seven – are both natures and transformations. The ten faculties, the mental faculty, and the five elements are only transformations. The fundamental nature, the principal, is only a nature. This is their scriptural system.

Does this mean that each of the five elements arises from its respective subtle object or that all five elements arise from each of the subtle objects? Think about it. In general, Buddhists say that the evolutes (forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects) arise from the elements, whereas the Samkhyas say that the elements arise from the five subtle objects (forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects).

Is the I-principle, literally pride, actually pride or is it something else? The great one or awareness is explained in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition*

saying: "The great one or awareness is like a two-sided mirror." It is likened to a two-sided mirror because it reflects both external objects and the inner being.

As in the Buddhist teachings, the Samkhyas define the subtle object that is form as the main object apprehended by an eye consciousness, the subtle object that is sound as the main object apprehended by an ear consciousness, and so forth.

The five action faculties are the faculties of speech, arms, legs, anus, and genitals. The faculty of speech functions to speak, the faculty of arms functions to move the arms, the faculty of legs functions to walk and so forth, the anus has its particular function, as do the genitals. These faculties or powers are called "action faculties" because they empower particular actions.

"The mental faculty which has the nature of both" means that it has the nature of both the action faculties and the awareness faculties. This is because when the mental faculty thinks about something it influences or empowers the various functions of the action and awareness faculties.

In Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* the general principal is posited as having five attributes:

1. being partless,
2. being pervasive,
3. being invisible,
4. being a creator, and
5. possessing qualities.

Thus, the general principal is without parts, pervades all, is not seen, is a creator, and possesses the three qualities of motility, darkness, and lightness. In his text Dharmakirti first presents the assertions of the Samkhyas and then later refutes them. Also in Shantarakshita's *Compendium of Suchness* there is a chapter that investigates the general principal, one that investigates Ishvara, and so forth. In this way it sets out all the assertions of the non-Buddhist schools. Because this text presents the non-Buddhist schools without refuting them, some non-Buddhists think that it is a presentation of their tenets and include this text among their scriptures.

One text says that because the objects of knowledge are many we cannot come to know them all.

Wednesday afternoon, 31 January 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 345) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-1A2 Stating the Vaisheshika system and so forth

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as the Samkhyas accept an I like that, similarly, [6.121cd] *in dependence on small small divisions of it*, the systems of the Forders become different. Like this, the Vaisheshikas propound nine qualities of a self: awareness, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, dharma, non-dharma, and strength of composition.[134]

These Vaisheshikas present six categories of existents (literally, meanings of words, *tshig don drug*) which are objects of knowledge:

1. generality,
2. quality,
3. activity,

[134] Compare this with the different emphasis in presenting the *Vaiheshika* tenets in *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, p. 56-57.

4. substance,
5. particularity, and
6. compounding.

One text says:

> Generality, quality, activity, substance,
> Particularity and compounding.

A generality is a cause of engaging terms and conceptions. It is of two types: a generality that pervades all and a generality that pervades an occasion. A generality that pervades all is existence-ness. A generality that pervades an occasion refers to the fact that each individual phenomena has its own generality, for example, pot-ness, pillar-ness, Patrick-ness, and so forth. This means that the term 'pot' refers only to pot. The pot is a cause for the term 'pot' that engages pot and a cause for the conception 'pot' that engages pot.

A quality is a phenomenon that depends on a substance. A substance is a phenomenon that is the basis of a quality. An activity is, for example, extending and contracting the legs. A particularity is posited similar to the way in which it is posited by the Buddhist schools; for example, a pot is a particularity of the objects of apprehension of an eye consciousness. Compounding refers to the strong formation of merit.

The Vaisheshikas present twenty-five qualities and nine substances (see J. Hopkins, *Cutting Through Appearances*). Among the twenty-five qualities there are nine related to the self: awareness, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, dharma, non-dharma, and strength of composition.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, awareness is what apprehends an object. Pleasure experiences the object of desire. Pain is the opposite of that. Desire is the hoping for a thing that is desirable. Hatred is the reluctance for an undesirable object. Effort is, with regard to an aim to be accomplished, the skillfulness of mind to finish that. That from which high status and definite goodness are achieved is the Dharma. The opposite of that is non-dharma. Mere production from consciousness and being the cause of consciousness is the strength of composition.

The Vaisheshikas say that "awareness is what apprehends an object," whereas the Buddhists say that an awareness is what cognizes an object, therefore, they posit very similar definitions. "Pleasure experiences the object of desire." "Pain is the opposite of that," that is, it is the experience of an undesirable object. "Desire is the hoping for a thing that is desirable" means the wish to have a desirable object. "Hatred is the reluctance for an undesirable object" means hatred is a turning away from an undesirable object, this being our own experience when we have a bad relationship with someone. "Effort is, with regard to an aim to be accomplished, the skillfulness of mind to finish that." "That from which high status and definite goodness are achieved is the Dharma." Similarly, the Buddhists say that the Dharma enables one to achieve the states of high status and definite goodness. "The opposite of that is non-dharma" refers to what, instead of bringing one closer to high status and definite goodness, takes one away from them. "Mere production from consciousness and being the cause of consciousness is the strength of composition" means what is produced from consciousness and what is the cause of consciousness is the strength of composition.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As long as those nine qualities of the self assemble and exist with the self, for that long there will be cyclic existence, because of establishing virtuous and non-virtuous actions compounded by them. When the qualities of awareness and so forth along with their roots are cut by the consciousness which perfectly realizes the being, then one will abide with one's essential nature and be liberated.

Due to these nine qualities, one continues to circle in cyclic existence. On the other hand, when these nine qualities are annihilated, the being remains alone and liberation is achieved.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That self is also propounded as permanent, creator, consumer, with qualities, and also without activity because of pervading. Some accept it as with activity due to contraction and extension.

The self is:
1. permanent,
2. a creator,
3. a consumer,
4. with qualities,
5. without activity.

Because of pervading all the self is without activity. However, it is not that the self does not have any activity at all since it has such activities as contracting and extending.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Those propounding the Vedas accept that "Like the space of vases and so forth, due to different bodies, the single is the variety itself," and so forth.

There are four types of Vedas. "The space of a vase and so forth" refers to the space of a cup, the space of a meditation hall, and so forth [which are the one] but a variety. Likewise, due to different bodies [a single self appears as various selves].

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thus, in dependence on small small differences of the self, the systems of the Forders become mutually different.

In short, due to very slight differences in the way of asserting a self, there are the different systems of the Forders.

This concludes the exposition of the Vaisheshika system in the autocommentary. In this way, Chandrakirti sets out the systems of the Samkhyas and Vaisheshikas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 345) says:

> [Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:]
> *In dependence on very slight distinctions of that*
> *There are the different systems of the Forders.* [1.121cd]

> Just as the Samkhyas assert a self, likewise, *in dependence on very slight distinctions of that* self *there are the different systems of the Forders*. Thus, the Vaisheshikas proclaim (1) awareness, (2) happiness, (3) suffering, (4) desire, (5) hatred, (6) effort, (7) Dharma, (8) non-dharma, and (9) the strength of activity to be the qualities of a self. In regard to them:
>
> 1. awareness apprehends objects;
> 2. happiness experiences objects of desire;
> 3. suffering is the opposite of that;
> 4. desire formulates hope for desirable things;
> 5. hatred turns away from undesirable objects;
> 6. effort, with respect to what accomplishes one's welfare, is skillfulness of mind in the final [welfare];
> 7. Dharma is that from which high status and definite goodness are accomplished;
> 8. non-dharma is the opposite of that; and
> 9. the strength of formation is that produced from consciousness and that which is a cause of consciousness.
>
> As long as these nine qualities of a self are gathered together and exist in a self, until then, because of accomplishing the virtuous and non-virtuous actions that are connected with them, there will be cyclic existence. When the consciousness that perfectly realizes the being severs the qualities of awareness and so forth along with their roots, at that time one abides in one's own nature and is liberated.
>
> They propound the self, moreover, to be:
>
> - permanent,
> - a creator of results,
> - a consumer which enjoys results,
> - a possessor of qualities, and
> - without activity because of pervading.
>
> However, some Vaisheshikas assert it to have activity due to contracting and extending.

Here Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary is very similar to Chandrakirti's autocommentary. I am not sure what contracting and extending mean in relation to a self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 346) says:

> The Vedantists assert "Like the space of different pots and so forth is one, a single self supported by different bodily supports is the variety itself" and so forth.

The space in pot, the space in a house, and so forth are all the same in being the mere non-affirming negative that is the mere negation of obstructive contact. Likewise, while the bodies that are the support of the self are the variety, the self supported on them is just one.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 346) says:

> The autocommentary says "In dependence on very slight differences of the self, the systems of the Forders become mutually different," therefore, that this scriptural system explains the Forders' systems as divided in dependence on the division of the Samkhyas is a misunderstanding.

In short, the Forders' systems are not divisions of the Samkhyas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 346) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-1B Refuting that system

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The self which is propounded in each scriptural tradition of the Forders:
>
> *Like a barren woman's son, because separated from production,*
> *The self like that does not exist and*
> *It is also improper as the support of I-grasping –*
> *It is not asserted to exist even deceptively.* [6.122]
>
> – because of contradiction with their own inference. The propounded self just does not exist because of not being produced, like the son of a barren woman. It is also unfit as the object of I-grasping because of just not being produced. Not only is it improper as existing in that way and as the very object of I-grasping, it should be known that even deceptively it does not exist as the two.

The self propounded by the Forders is not admissible.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 54), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1A-2 Refuting it

> *Since, like a barren woman's son, it's void*
> *Of birth, a self like that does not exist.* [6.122ab]

A self like that which the non-Buddhists conceive does not exist in absolute reality because it is devoid of birth; for example, it is like a barren woman's son.

> *It can't be the basis of self-grasping either.* [6.122c]

Out of the observed object and the aspect [object] of innate self-grasping, this self which is like that also cannot be the basis or observed object, for it is unborn. [That object is the mere I or person, and is asserted to be a functional thing.]

> *Even conventionally, it can't be held to exist.* [6.122d]

Even conventionally, it is not maintained to exist, for it does not exist validly even conventionally.

> *Since all its attributes non-Buddhists teach*
> *In one or another treatise are refuted*
> *By the reason of non-birth, on their own report,*
> *Therefore not one of its attributes exists.* [6.123]

All the attributes of that self hypothesized by the non-Buddhists are also non-existent, because the attributes of that self which the non-Buddhists teach in the Enumerators' treatises and the treatises of the Particularists and others are contradicted by the reason of non-production, which is reported by the non-Buddhists themselves.

Chandrakirti says:

> *Like a barren woman's son, because separated from production,*
> *The self like that does not exist and...*

This verse sets out the syllogism:

> A self like that, as the subject, does not exist because separated from production, like a barren woman's son.

The *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* sets out this syllogism as:

> A self like that which the non-Buddhists conceive, as the subject, does not exist in absolute

reality because it is devoid of birth; for example, it is like a barren woman's son.

Chandrakirti continues:

It is also improper as the support of I-grasping –
It is not asserted to exist even deceptively. [6.122]

Such a self is also not the support that is the observed object of the conception of I because is it not produced. The self of the Forders also does not exist conventionally because it is not established by a valid cognizer, like the son of a barren woman.

"Because of contradiction with their own inference" refers to the fact that such a self contradicts the inference asserted by the Forders themselves. As the next verse (6.123) says; "Are harmed by the reasoning of not being produced – renowned to themselves."

Chandrakirti himself sets out the syllogism:

The propounded self just does not exist because of not being produced, like the son of a barren woman.

Chandrakirti then says: "Not only is it improper as existing in that way and as the very object of I-grasping, it should be known that even deceptively it does not exist as the two." What are "the two"?
Student: They are "the self as an existent" and "the self as the object of the conception of I."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Not only is it improper as an existent and as the very support of I-grasping, furthermore:

Since all the attributes of that which are
Indicated by the Forders in treatises [and] treatises,
Are harmed by the reasoning of not being produced –
Renowned to themselves – therefore, even its attributes do not exist. [6.123]

There, in the Samkhya's texts, the attributes of the self are asserted as permanence, not being a creator, enjoyer, without qualities, and without activity. There, the self is not permanent and it is also not not a creator through it is also not without activity because it is not produced by itself, like the son of a barren woman. Similarly, "The self is not permanent and also not a creator" and so forth "because it is not produced by itself" should also be expressed in regard to the Vaisheshika texts.

The attributes of the self propounded by the Samkhyas and those propounded by the Vaisheshikas in their treatises do not exist because they are harmed by the reasoning of being unproduced which is renowned even to themselves. The attributes of a self asserted in the treatises of the Samkhyas and Vaisheshikas are not feasible because they are invalidated by the reasoning of being unproduced which is known even to themselves.

Thursday morning, 1 February 2001

The following syllogism is flung at the Vaisheshikas:

The self imputed by the Forders, as the subject, does not exist in that way because it is unproduced; for example, like the son of a barren woman.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

This position should be understood as excluding the self-entity and attributes of theirs in every propounding as a self due to the reasoning of just not generating and the example of the son of a barren woman.

The syllogism above is flung at those who propound a permanent self, whereby the entity and attributes of the self they propound – for example, both the Samkhyas and the Vaisheshikas propound a self with five attributes – are eliminated through the reason and example.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, in that case:
>
> *Therefore, other than the aggregates, the self is non-existent* [6.124a]
>
> Therefore, the self does not exist as different from the aggregates because, apart from them, the self is not apprehended. If existing as different from the aggregates, then it could be apprehended as separately (individually) established. Yet, since it is not like that, therefore, other than the aggregates, the self is non-existent,

The Forders propound a self that is a different entity from the aggregates, however, that self does not exist because without the appearance of the aggregates the self or person cannot be apprehended. In this way the Prasangika Madhyamikas establish that the self and the aggregates are not different entities. Contrarily, if the self and the aggregates were different entities they should be apprehended separately or individually. However, there is no occasion on which one can separately point to the self and the aggregates. For example, in order to say "I saw Cesare" one has to have seen his aggregates. Therefore, without having apprehended Cesare's aggregates one cannot say "I saw Cesare."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Because apart from the aggregates, apprehending that is not established.* [6.124b]

Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, other than the aggregates, the self is non-existent because apart from the aggregates, apprehending that is not established" (v. 6.124ab). Thus, in order for the self to appear to an awareness it is necessary for the aggregates of the person to appear to that awareness. In order to prove this, Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As was taught [in *Fundamental Wisdom*, 27.7]:
>
> The self is not admissible
> As other than the appropriated.
> If it were other, without the appropriated,
> It would exist to apprehension in theory, yet it is non-existent to apprehension.

The two, the appropriated, that is, the aggregates, and the appropriator, that is, the self, do not exist as different entities. If they were different entities the appropriator, the self, would be apprehended without apprehending the appropriated, the aggregates, but this is not the case.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, [in *Fundamental Wisdom*, 18.1cd]:
>
> If other than the aggregates, it would not have the aggregate's characteristics.

What are the characteristics of the aggregates? They are production, abidance, and disintegration. If the self and the aggregates were different entities, then, when the aggregates die, conventionally one would not say "The person has died."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Not only is there no self different from the aggregates, furthermore:
>
> *It is not asserted even as the support of the mundane mind grasping to I,*
> *Because of viewing the self even without knowing that.* [6.124cd]

The self propounded by the Forders is not the support or basis that is the observed object of the awareness conceiving I.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Therefore, there's no self separate from the aggregates,*
> *For apart from the aggregates it isn't proved to be seen.* [6.124ab]

It should be understood that there is no self of separate entity from the aggregates because it is not established that that self is perceived separately, apart from perceptions of the aggregates.

> *Nor is it held to be the base of the world's self-grasping*
> *Mind, for its non-perceivers still see the self.* [124cd]

This self of entity different from the aggregates is also not asserted to be the objective support of the innate self-grasping mind of the world, for even those who do not perceive such a self have the view of the self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Even those who do not grasp that self in such a way will view the self through the attribute of strongly settling saying "self and mine." Therefore, this self is improper as the support of grasping the I as different from the aggregates.

Even those who do not conceive the self possessing five attributes, which is asserted by the Forders, have a view of the self, "therefore, this self is improper as the support of grasping the I as different from the aggregates."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is considered: Whoever does not now understand that qualified with permanence, unproduced, and so forth, they too will have its subject, the view which grasps to an I, due to the power of previous familiarity.

Even those who do not have an acquired conception of an I possessing the five attributes as asserted by the Forders, have an innate conception of I, for example, cats.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

That is also not so. Only some have the view as a self from having familiarized with their treatises. Also those without previous familiarization are seen to employ I-grasping here. It is like this:

Also those who were consigned many eons as animals
Do not perceive this unproduced, permanent [self],
Yet they are seen to employ I-grasping.
Hence, a self other than the aggregates does not exist at all. [6.125]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

Though those plunged[135] *in the animal realm many eons*
Do not perceive this unborn, permanent [self],
Even in them, self-grasping is seen to take place,
Therefore, there's no self separate from the aggregates. [6.125]

There is no self of separate entity from the aggregates, since although those sentient beings who have been plunged in the animal realm for many eons do not see this unborn, permanent self, self-grasping is seen to take place even in them.

Animals do not have a conception of a permanent, unproduced self, yet they do have a conception of I, that is, they do have an innate view of the transitory collection.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Also those sentient beings that as yet have not reversed from the animal rebirth state, although having spent eons, do not refer to that type of self. The term "also" includes those reborn in hell and so forth.

The term "also" in the root verse includes sentient beings born in the hells and so forth. Those who are born in the hell realm also have a conception of I even though they do not have a conception of a permanent, unproduced self. "And so forth" includes those born in the hungry ghost realm. Therefore, it refers to all the beings who are not trained in tenets yet still have a conception of self even though they do not conceive a permanent, unproduced self.

Student: Verse 6.125 says:

Also those who were consigned many eons as animals
Do not perceive this unproduced, permanent [self],
Yet they are seen to employ I-grasping.
Hence, a self other than the aggregates does not exist at all. [6.125]

How does this reasoning conclude that there is no self that is a different entity from the aggregates?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: This verse indicates that even animals do not perceive a self that is a different entity from the aggregates. They also do not see a self that is permanent and not dependent on the aggregates. However, they still have a conception of I because when they perceive their own aggregates they conceive "I." In conclusion "a self other than the aggregates does not exist at all." The

[135] *brkyal: pf. of rkyal*, "to swim" (Goldstein) – *santarana* = crossing over, passing through; *rkyal byed pa – avagahana* = immersion, bathing, being plunged in, being absorbed in.

Samkhyas say that the aggregates and the self are different entities because they assert that the self has the five attributes of being permanent and so forth.
Student: Therefore, when someone perceives an inherently existent self that is different from the aggregates this view is induced by adhering to the views of the Forders, therefore, all other beings who do not adhere to this view would not perceive an inherently existent self in the aggregates?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Even those who have not trained in the tenets or scriptures of the Forders and so forth have a conception of I. This can be understood from the fact that even an insect has a conception of I. This conception is an innate conception of I, it is not an acquired conception of I because none of these beings conceive I due to reasoning. For example, a mouse who gives birth to a baby, even though it has not studied tenets it still has an innate conception of "mine" in regard to that baby. All animals have this innate conception of I and mine which is shown by the fact that they take care of themselves and their babies.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Having seen even those who do not refer to that type of self as employing I-grasping, who with wisdom could conceive that type of self as the support of I-grasping? Therefore, a self different from the aggregates is non-existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 346) says:

> *Like the son of a barren woman, because it is free from production*
> *Such a self does not exist and*
> *Is also not suitable to be a support for the conception of I.*
> *Even conventionally it is not asserted to exist.* [6.122]
>
> The reason "Whatever different *self* is propounded in each of the Forders' scriptural systems, *does not exist like that*, that is, in that way, in the way in which it is imputed by them, *because it is free from production*, that is, because it is unproduced" is the Forders' own inference, that is, assertion; for example, it is *like the son of a barren woman*. That there is no fault, even though the subject expressed by that reason is refuted, is due to the point of it being the mere exclusion of both the reason and the predicate.

The syllogism set out here is:

> The self as asserted by the Forders does not exist in that way because it is free from production, like the son of a barren woman.

However, this reason of it being unproduced or free from production is accepted by the Forders themselves. The Vaisheshikas, for example, accept direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers due to which they posit different types of valid cognizers such as an inferential valid cognizer by the power of the fact, an inferential valid cognizer by the power of renown, and an inferential valid cognizer through a similar example, however, they do not accept an inferential valid cognizer by the power of belief.

"Even though the subject expressed by that reason is refuted" means that, in the syllogism above, the subject –"the self as asserted by the Forders" – does not exist. In other words, the subject expressed – "the self as asserted by the Forders" – by that reason does not exist. What exists is either (i) a subject that is its own support or (ii) a conceived subject, this being the meaning generality of the subject expressed. The predicate here is "does not exist in that way" and the reason is "because it is unproduced." Both of these are non-affirming negatives because they are a mere negation of the object of negation. Therefore, there is no fault of the three modes not being complete.

The subject expressed is unproduced and does not exist in that way. Similarly, the conceived subject is unproduced and does not exist in that way because the meaning generality of that subject

does not exist in that way. Instead of translating *de kho na nyid du yod pa min* as "does not exist in that way" if it were translated as "does not exist in suchness" this could be debated saying, for example: "Does emptiness not exist in suchness because it is unproduced?" This is discussed extensively in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition*, in which the main point is the refutation of the general principal.

Although the subject expressed – "the self asserted by the Forders" – is not an established base, the reason does not have the fault of being an incorrect reason.

For example, there is the syllogism:

> The general principal, as the subject, does not exist as a substantial cause for the varieties of transformations because it is a non-thing.

This is a correct reason. The subject expressed is "the general principal" which does not exist. However, there does exist a meaning generality of the general principal. What is this meaning generality? It is what appears as the general principal. Thus, even if something does not exist, a meaning generality of it does exist.

Thursday afternoon, 1 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 347) says:

> *The* self imputed by others in this way *is also not suitable to be a support for the* innate *conception of I*; the reason and the example being as above. The statement "That called 'the support for the conception of I' – from among the two, the observed object and aspect – is not the object that is the observed object" means that its object is the mere I, the person, and so forth. Moreover, since it is asserted to be a functioning thing, it is contradictory for it to be unproduced. Since the object that is the aspect is a self of persons, it is not established even in mere conventional terms, due to which it is not contradictory for it to be unproduced.

The support of the conception of I must be an existent, therefore, it cannot be the selves with their particular attributes that are posited by the Samkhyas and Vaisheshikas. Therefore, the support of the conception of I or the support of the view of the transitory collection is the conventionally existent self, the mere I. Among the observed object and aspect, the self asserted by the Samkhyas is not the observed support of the conception of I. Since the conception of I observes the person which is a functioning thing, it would be contradictory for it to be unproduced. On the other hand, "since the object that is the aspect is a self of persons, it is not established even in mere conventional terms." Since a self of persons does not exist even in mere conventional terms, it is not contradictory for it to be unproduced.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 347) says:

> Therefore, stating "The self of persons of this system is asserted to exist linguistically" is to talk frivolously without finely distinguishing the difficult points of this tenet [system] and the objects that are the observed object and the aspect of the view of the transitory collection.

Without finely distinguishing the two – the difficult points of these tenets and the observed object and the aspect of the view of the transitory collection – stating "The self of persons of this system is asserted to exist linguistically" would be frivolous talk. Even the horns of a rabbit exist linguistically.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 347) says:

> Hence, refuting that a self exists and that it is the object of the conception of I is from the point of view of affixing the qualification 'ultimate' to the object of negation. Not only that, the two should also

be understood to be refuted *even conventionally*. At that time, "A self *is not asserted to exist*" means that the self is not substantially existent.

In short, a self that exists ultimately and an object of the conception of I that exists ultimately are to be refuted. What are "the two"? The two are the two selves that were identified: the self that does not exist and the self that is not a support for the conception of I. As the root verse says:

Like the son of a barren woman, because it is free from production
Such a self does not exist and
Is also not suitable to be a support for the conception of I.
Even conventionally it is not asserted to exist. [6.122]

However, an easier way of understanding "the two" is that it refers to the self imputed by the Samkhyas and the self imputed by the Vaisheshikas, these two selves do not exist ultimately and also do not exist conventionally. "At that time" refers to the time of refuting the two. "A self is not asserted to exist" means that there is no substantially existent self. This is because according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system there is nothing that is substantially existent because if it is an established base it is imputedly existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 347) says:

Therefore, the attributes of that in the treatises and the treatises,
Whatever are presented by the Forders, all of them,
Are harmed by the reasoning renowned to themselves of it being unproduced.
Therefore, all its attributes do not exist. [6.123]

It is to be cognized that "Not only do the two, the reason and the example, refute the two objects of negation, moreover, *all the attributes* of the self imputed by the Forders *do not exist*."

The reason is "because of being unproduced" and the example is "like the son of a barren woman." By means of this reason and example the self asserted by the Samkhyas and that asserted by the Vaisheshikas along with their attributes are refuted.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 347) says:

For that reason, *therefore*, *in the treatises* of the Samkhyas and *the treatises* of the Vaisheshikas and so forth, the qualities that are the *attributes of that* self, *whatever are presented by the Forders*, *all of them* – that is, every one of them – *are harmed by the reasoning renowned to* the Forders *themselves of it being unproduced*. In addition, all those explained to be the attributes of the self of the Samkhyas and Vaisheshikas, which were explained before, are also to be negated stating "They do not exist."

The selves imputed by the Samkhyas and the Vaisheshikas are harmed by the reasoning of being unproduced which is also renowned to them. Due to this, the attributes of these selves also become non-existent.

Before Lama Tsongkhapa said: "Hence, refuting that a self exists and that it is the object of the conception of I is from the point of view of affixing the qualification 'ultimate' to the object of negation." This refers to the syllogism:

The self asserted by the Forders does not exist in that way because of being unproduced;
like the son of a barren woman.

If the predicate "does not exist in that way" instead were translated "does not exist in suchness" would that be correct? Think about it.

The self asserted by the Samkhyas and the self asserted by the Vaisheshikas are similar in possessing five attributes. However, the Samkhyas say that the self is

1. a consumer,
2. a permanent thing,
3. not a creator,
4. without activities, and
5. without qualities.

The Vaisheshikas say it is:

1. a consumer,
2. a permanent thing,
3. a creator,
4. with qualities, and
5. without activity.

Thus, these two selves have three common qualities and two uncommon qualities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 348) says:

> In regard to all that is propounded as a self by this position, through the reason of it being unproduced and the example of the son of a barren woman, the entity and attributes of the self imputed by them should be clearly understood.

It would seem to be more meaningful if rather than saying "clearly" (*gsal*) the Tibetan were to read "eliminated" (*bsal*) as then it would read "In regard to all that is propounded as a self by this position, through the reason of it being unproduced and the example of the son of a barren woman, the entity and attributes of the self imputed by them should be understood as eliminated." However, we can leave the spelling as it still means that the entity and attributes of the self imputed by them does not exist, like the son of a barren woman.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 348) says:

> *Therefore, a self which is different from the aggregates does not exist*
> *Because, excluding the aggregates, apprehending that is not established.* [6.124ab]
>
> *Therefore, a self which is* a *different* entity *from the aggregates does not exist because, excluding* apprehending *the aggregates*, selectively *apprehending* a self *is not established*. On the other hand, if the self were a different entity from the aggregates, since both [types of] relationships would not exist, they would be unrelated. At that time, without apprehending a pot it would have to be apprehended while selectively apprehending a woolen cloth because otherwise it would not be seen even at times.

The self and the aggregates are one entity because the self cannot appear without the appearance of the aggregates. If the aggregates and self were different entities then both types of relationships, a causal relationship and a relationship of same nature, would not exist between the two. In other words, if the self and the aggregates were different entities it would follow that they would be unrelated because they would not have either a causal relationship nor a relationship of same nature. Since it is not correct to say either that the aggregates are the cause and the self is the result nor that the self is the cause and the aggregates are the result, they do not have a causal relationship. On the other hand, they also do not have a relationship of same nature because they are not one entity. In this way, the self and the aggregates would become like a woolen cloth and a pot which are different entities because in order for one to appear the other does not have to appear. Likewise, the self would appear without the appearance of the aggregates. However, without seeing the Sixte's aggregates one cannot say "There is Sixte." In short, only in dependence on seeing his aggregates can one say "There is Sixte." On the other hand, if Sixte and his aggregates were different entities it would follow that

there would be the appearance of Sixte without the appearance of his aggregates. This is likened to a woolen cloth and pot which are different entities due to which one can apprehend woolen cloth without the appearance of a pot. Likewise, it would follow that one could apprehend the self without the appearance of the aggregates. However, this is not seen at any time.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 348) says:

> Similarly, [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 27.7) also says:
>
> A self is not feasible
> As other than the appropriated.
> If it were other, without the appropriated
> It would be suitable to be apprehended, but it is not apprehended.

A self that is separate from the aggregates is not feasible because if the self were other than the aggregates, it would be apprehended even without apprehending the aggregates, whereas it is not. Therefore, without the appearance of the appropriated, the aggregates, it is not possible for the appropriator, the self, to appear.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 348) says:

> And (v. 18.1cd):
>
> If other than the aggregates,
> It would not have the characteristics of the aggregates.
>
> "The appropriated" is the aggregates.

If the self were other than the aggregates it would not have the characteristics of the aggregates. What are the characteristics of the aggregates? The characteristics of the aggregates are (i) production, (ii) abidance, and (iii) disintegration. If the self were other than the aggregates it would not have these characteristics in common with the aggregates, whereas it is usually said that the self has the three characteristics of compounded phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 348) says:

> There are also other faults:
>
> *It is not asserted even to be the support of a worldly awareness conceiving I*
> *Because even without cognizing it there is a view of a self.* [6.124cd]
>
> A self that is a different entity from the aggregates *is not asserted even to be the support* – that is, the observed object – *of the awareness conceiving I* from the beginningless time *of the world*, i.e., of sentient beings, *because even without cognizing* a self like that imputed by the Forders, that is, even without apprehending its aspect, *there is* the strong adherence – that is, specifically, a *view of a self* stating "I" and "mine."

If the self and the aggregates were other there would be other faults. Another fault is that because the self imputed by others is not the observed object of the conception of I that exists since beginningless time, the self imputed by the Forders is not admissible. In short, there is a conception of I even without apprehending the self imputed by the Forders.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 348) says:

> Saying that "It is not suitable even as the support for an awareness conceiving I" does not repeat the previous refutation because earlier a mere substantially existent self was refuted to be the observed object of the view of a self, whereas here [a self] observed to be a different entity from the aggregates is refuted.
> OBJECTION: Even those persons who do not now understand the self qualified by being permanent, unproduced, and so forth have an object-possessor of that self – a view conceiving I – due to the force of previous familiarization.
> RESPONSE: That is not so because apprehending a self which is a different entity from the aggregates to be the support of the conception of I exists only in those whose minds have been affected by bad tenets. Even those sentient beings who lack familiarity with bad tenets are here seen to engage in conceiving an I. It is like this:
>
> *Also those who have spent many eons as animals*
> *Do not see that which is unproduced and permanent*,
> *Yet they too are seen to engage in conceiving I.*
> *Hence, a self that is different from the aggregates does not exist at all.* [6.125]
>
> *Also those* sentient beings *who have spent many eons as animals*, that is, who have already earlier gone to just that, as well as those who have still not turned away from the animal abode of rebirth, *do not see the unproduced* and *permanent* self imputed by the Forders. Having *seen* – that is, understood – *that they too engage in conceiving I*, who possessing wisdom would adhere to such an aspect of the self imputed by the Forders as the support of the conception of I? *Hence*, *a self that is* a *different* entity *from the aggregates does not exist at all*. The term 'also' (v. 6.125a) includes those born in the hells and so forth.

There is no fault of redundancy here because earlier a self-sufficient substantially existent self that is the support of the view of the transitory collection was refuted. A fault of redundancy means that the words explained are the same without a different subject and different purpose, whereas if they are the same words but with a different subject or different purpose there is no such fault.

All sentient beings have a conception of I even though they do not see the permanent, unproduced self imputed by the Forders. Thus, even though sentient beings do not conceive such a self, they still have a conception of I.

Friday morning, 2 February 2001

To review the Samkhya's assertion, they say that from the sound that is a subtle object comes the space element; from the tangible object that is a subtle object comes the wind element; from the form that is a subtle object comes the fire element, from the taste that is a subtle object comes the water element, and from the odor that is a subtle object comes the earth element. What is the I-principle? They describe it as the I that is characterized by possessing fortune. The great one or awareness is that in which phenomena are reflected. Consciousness and awareness are mutually exclusive according to them because consciousness is the self. The *Illumination* says: "When the desire that has the aspect of enjoying an object, sound and so forth, is produced, at that time the nature – which thoroughly knows the desire of the being – and the being join together and then the principal issues forth sounds and so forth." They say that the general principal and the being are respectively like a blind person with good legs and a lame person with good sight who together function well. Because the being is consciousness and therefore a knower, it is likened to one with good sight. On the other hand, the general principal is partless and permanent but it pervades all.

There is a Indian story about a child of the past whom was both very clever and very good. He would tell the other children that God exists and that they should practice Dharma by creating virtue and not committing non-virtue. He also told them to be honest and to not cheat and was, thus, very well liked by the other children. However, his father, who was a king of that area and also a mara, did not like what his child was teaching and plotted to kill his son. He placed his daughter, who had particular powers, with the son in her lap in the center of a circular area around which a wall was

built and inside of which fire was lit. However, although the daughter was burnt up, the son remained untouched. Another time the father threw his son into the Ganges River but instead of drowning he floated on the water and returned home. The father then said to him, "You say that there are gods, but where are they?" The son said that they are everywhere. The father asked, "Are they in this pillar?" The son said that they are. The father angrily punched the pillar and said "If there is god here, come out!" Out of the pillar came a huge lion with the wings of a garuda and long claws that grabbed the father and killed him. Similar to this god of the Indian child, the general principal is said to exist everywhere in an unmanifest form.

Student: It was said that those who follow the Samkhya doctrine later on easily enter the Madhyamika. Why is that?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: This statement is based on the story of Ashvagosha and Aryadeva. It is said that Ashvagosha was a Samkhya who, having debated with Aryadeva, lost. Unable to accept the defeat, he flew up into the sky but was followed by Aryadeva who warned him not to go too high. To test whether this was in fact dangerous, Ashvagosha threw his long hair up whereupon it was chopped off. He then came down to Nalanda where he was locked in the library and began to read the Buddha's scriptures. He soon came across a predication regarding his debate with Aryadeva and subsequent defeat. Being truly amazed he took ordination as a Buddhist monk and joined the monastery, whereupon he immediately became a Madhyamika and eventually became a great scholar of the Madhyamika system. One of the texts written by Ashvagosha is the *Life Stories of the Buddha*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 349) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2 Refuting the assertion that the aggregates themselves are the self, which is imputed by our own schools

- A Indicating the harm in asserting the aggregates to be the self
- B Indicating the proof that it is unreasonable to assert thus
- C Indicating other harm to propounding the aggregates to be the self
- D Explaining the intention of teaching the aggregates to be the self
- E Indicating others' systems as lacking relationship

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2A Indicating the harm in asserting the aggregates to be the self

1. Actual meaning
2. Refuting the response that abandons faults

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2A1 Actual meaning

- A Stating the previous position
- B Refuting that system

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2A1A Stating the previous position

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Here, some of our sects claim:
>
> *Because an established self other than the aggregates is non-existent,*
> *The referent of viewing the self is only the aggregates.* [6.126ab]
>
> Because, due to the reasoning that was explained, a self different from the aggregates is not established, therefore, because an established self that is other than the aggregates is non-existent, the referent of the view of the transitory collection is only the aggregates. Therefore, the self is only the mere aggregates. This position is that of our own sect, the Sammitiyas.

Within our own Buddhist schools, some say that the aggregates are the observed object of the view of the transitory collection. Chandrakirti quotes them in his root verse saying: "Because an established self other than the aggregates is non-existent, the referent of viewing the self is only the aggregates." These Buddhist schools say that because there is no self that is a different entity from the aggregates, the aggregates themselves are the observed object of the view of the transitory collection. In short, when they are asked to posit the self, they say that it is the aggregates.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also in that:
>
> *Some, as support of viewing the self, assert*
> *Also the five aggregates. Some assert the mind alone.* [6.126cd]
>
> Some [Sammitiyas] mention: Also the five aggregates together, "Form, feeling, discrimination, compositional factors, and consciousness," are asserted as the referent of the view of the transitory collection and this strong settling upon a self is also about that.

There are various assertions regarding the aggregates being the self, for example, the Sammitiyas assert the continuum of all five aggregates to be the self, while the Vatsiputriyas assert the collection of all five aggregates to be the self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> They declare: As was taught by the Tathagata [in sutra]:
>
> > O bhikshus, any trainee in virtue or brahmin who correctly subsequently views the "self," they correctly subsequently view only these five appropriated aggregates.
>
> – therefore, it is in order to clarify the statement:
>
> > This view of yours about them is about the collection which bears a transitory essential-nature, it is not [a view] about the self or the mine.
>
> – that the view that employed the aspects of self and mine is taught as the view of the transitory collection.

The Sammitiyas say that the aggregates are the self and in order to prove this cite the sutra that says: "O bhikshus, any trainee in virtue or brahmin who correctly subsequently views the 'self,' they correctly subsequently view only these five appropriated aggregates."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Others [of the Sammitiyas] assert "Self with mind." They say, in the verse [in the *Collection of Teachings*, 23.14]:
>
> > One self is ones own master.
> > Who else can be master?
> > By well subduing oneself,
> > The wise will attain high status.
>
> – the term self is taught regarding the mind itself.

There are also those who assert the mind to be the self, for example, true aspectarian Chittamatrins assert the mind-basis-of-all to be the self, as do the Sautrantikas, Vaibhashikas, and Svatantrika Madhyamikas. They quote the above verse to prove that the mind is the self in that they say "the term self is taught regarding the mind itself."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: From where is it [known]?
>
> Because a self different from the aggregates is non-existent and because also in other sutras it is taught with regard to subduing the mind, [such as] in [the *Collection of Teachings*, 31.1cd]:
>
> To subdue the mind is excellent;
> To subdue the mind leads to bliss.
>
> Therefore, the "self" is imputed to the basis of I-grasping, the mind.

From this it is to be understood that when the mind is subdued the person is also subdued. This means that the response to the question "What is the illustration of the person?" is "The mind." This mind is specifically the sixth consciousness, the illustrative mental consciousness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 349-50) says:

> HERE, OUR OWN SCHOOLS SAY:
> *"Because there does not exist a self which is different from the aggregates,*
> *The observed object of the view of a self is just the aggregates."* [6.126ab]
>
> *Because there does not exist a self which is* a *different* entity *from the aggregates*, the observed object – from among the two, *the observed object* and aspect *of the view of a self*, that is, the view of the transitory collection – *is just the aggregates*. This is because, through ascertaining there to be two:
>
> 1. positing that which is a different entity from the aggregates and
> 2. positing the inner aggregates
>
> to be the observed object, since the former is unsuitable, [these schools] say that the self is one's own mere aggregates. This position is that of the noble Sammitiya school, the Vatsiputriya school and so forth.
>
> *Some also assert that the support of the view of a self*
> *Is all five aggregates. Some assert mind alone.* [6.126cd]
>
> Apart from them, *some* Sammitiyas *also assert that the support*, that is, the observed object, *of the view of a self is all five* of one's own *aggregates* and that also the strong adherence to a self [arises] from those five aggregates, as the Bhagavan said:
>
> Monks, any trainees in virtue or brahmins who perfectly and subsequently view "I,"
> they perfectly and subsequently view just the five appropriated aggregates.
>
> Because of just that, in order to clarify to them the statement "This view of yours is with regard to a collection that has the nature of being transitory; it is not with regard to the I and mine," it is said "The view that engages the aspects of I and mine is taught to be the view of the transitory collection." However, in dependence on the teaching "It views the five appropriated aggregates," the observed object of the view of a self is asserted to be the five aggregates.
>
> *Some* Sammitiyas *assert* "The *mind alone* is the self," teaching the term 'self' in regard to the mind in the verse:
>
> Just the self is the master of the self;
> Who else is the master?
> By subduing just the self well,
> The wise will attain high status.

> From where does this [come]? Because a self that is a different entity from the aggregates does not exist and because this is also taught in other sutras in regard to subduing the mind stating:
>
> To subdue the mind is excellent;
> To subdue the mind leads to happiness.

Some of our own schools say that observed object of the view of a self is just the aggregates, that is, the observed object of the conception of I or mine is the aggregates. In answer to the question "What is the self?" they say that it is the aggregates. Within the Sammitiya school there are different assertions, some say that all five aggregates are the self, some that the collection of all five aggregates is the self, and some that the mind is the self.

To subdue the mind implicitly means to subdue the self, therefore, in order to subdue the mind one has to subdue the self. Based on the above citation, some Sammitiyas assert the mind to be the self. However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that neither the five aggregates not the mind are not the self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 351) says:

> Therefore, "self" is imputed on the mind, the basis of the conception of I. [Bhavaviveka's] *Blaze of Reasoning* also says:
>
> Thus, we too explicitly impute the term 'self' to the consciousness conventionally.
> Hence, it is said "The consciousness is the self because of appropriating existence."
> This is because of closely imputing it to the collection of body and sense powers.
>
> Moreover, he propounds:
>
> - the scriptural proof to be that in some sutras it is taught that, when the mind is subdued, happiness is attained, whereas in some it is taught that by subduing the self high status is attained; therefore, the mind is posited as the self, and
> - the proof of reasoning to be that the appropriator of the aggregates is the self, and because the consciousness also appropriates existence the consciousness is posited as the self.
>
> Since this master does not assert a basis-of-all, the consciousness which appropriates a body is the mental consciousness. It is the same for others who also do not assert a basis-of-all. Through asserting a basis-of-all, the mind-basis-of-all itself is propounded as the illustration of the person.
>
> Moreover, although these systems assert that hearers and solitary realizers realize that the person does not exist as substantially existent, they do not assert that they realize that the two consciousnesses do not exist as substantially existent. Therefore, propounding that the person is not self-sufficient substantially existent is asserted from the point of view of the person itself; it is not asserted as such with respect to the consciousness, the illustration of the person.

Those who do not posit a mind-basis-of-all assert the person to be the sixth consciousness, the illustrative mental consciousness. They are the Sautrantikas, false aspectarian Chittamatrins, the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamikas, and the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas, as well as some Vaibhashikas.

According to the lower schools, the person itself is not self-sufficient substantially existent because it is imputedly existent. This is based on the definition of the person which is: the I that is imputed in dependence on any of the five aggregates. The person is not substantially existent because in order for the person to appear to an awareness one of the five aggregates has to appear. In other words, the person cannot appear in isolation from the appearance of another phenomenon.

There is no contradiction in positing the mental consciousness to be the illustration of the person even though the mental consciousness is substantially existent. This means that in order for the illustrative mental consciousness to appear to an awareness it is not necessary for a phenomenon other than itself to appear to the awareness. The Prasangika Madhyamikas refute this assertion.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: Is the meaning of *merely* imputed: "existing in no way other than being imputed by conceptuality"? If it is, then does the term 'merely' mean 'no way other than' in this context?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas the word 'merely' eliminates that things exist from their own side, whereas in the Chittamatrin system the word 'merely' it said to eliminate phenomena not being the same entity as the mind. "Merely" can be used in relation to terms saying "phenomena are merely posited by terms" and in relation to conception saying "phenomenon are merely imputed by conception." Everything depends on conception, for example, the mind invents a particular type of car and then it is actualized. In short, "merely imputed" indicates that an object does not exist from its own side.

Student: According to Lati Rinpoche in *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism:* "sense consciousnesses can be trained such that an *eye consciousness* can know not only that a person being seen is a man but also that that person is one's father." Is this statement in accordance with the Prasangika view? If it is, then will Geshe-la please explain how this would work since it seems that in order to know someone as one's father, a meaning generality (and thus a mental consciousness) would necessarily be involved.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: I am not sure in what context Lati Rinpoche taught that. However, when someone sees the body of another person there is both an eye consciousness seeing it and an eye consciousness remembering "This is my father." For example, when someone sees Emily walking and thinks "There is Emily," there is an eye consciousness seeing Emily and based on that there is a mental consciousness thinking "There is Emily." However, different scholars posit the eye consciousness differently. For example, it can be asked: "Is the eye clairvoyance an eye consciousness or not?" The answer is that it is not because an eye clairvoyance has to be a mental consciousness. In addition, it is said that when Emily becomes an enlightened being her eye consciousness will also be able to perceive sounds, odors, and so forth, that is, all phenomena as well as their emptinesses. In other words, her eye consciousness will directly realize all objects of knowledge; it will be omniscient mind. This is one interpretation. Others say that an eye consciousness cannot be omniscient mind, whereby it follows that an omniscient mind is necessarily a mental consciousness.
Student: Is it correct to say that "eye consciousness realizes father," "eye consciousness realizes father as father," both, or neither?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The eye consciousness realizes the form of the father. Conventionally, when the form of the father is seen, one says "There is my father."

Student: All phenomena are merely imputed by conceptuality, i.e., by mental consciousness. Appearances of inherent existence are also phenomena; thus, they are merely imputed by mental consciousness. Since we said that inherent existence appears to a sense consciousness (although it is not apprehended), this seems to imply that mental consciousness imputes the appearance of inherent existence on the object *before* it appears to the sense consciousness, but this is clearly impossible. So, how does it work?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The appearance of inherent existence to an eye consciousness is merely imputed by conception. In regard to "Merely imputed by conception" whose conception is it? For example, when my eye consciousness sees an object, that object appears to exist inherently. However, when that happens, there is no need for me to think "That object is inherently existent." In general it is said that first there arises a conception of a self of phenomena because we first see the aggregates of a person. At that time, by the power of seeing the aggregates, we have an innate conception of a self of the aggregates. After that, we generate a conception of a self of persons. For example, when someone who has never seen Maurizio before sees Maurizio, he immediately has a conception of true existence or a conception of a self of Maurizio's aggregates, that is, a conception of a self of phenomena arises. After

Maurizio introduces himself, this person comes to have a conception of a self of persons. This is what is presented in the teachings on the Stages of the Path by Lama Tsongkhapa.

For example, when I see this eyeglass case, I have an appearance of an inherently existent case. But, whose conception imputes it to be inherently existent? It is imputed by conception to be inherently existent but that conception does not have to be my own conception, it can be anyone's. The appearance of inherent existence to sentient beings is imputed by conception. My conclusion is that the imputing conception does not have to be one's own. Therefore, the appearance of inherent existence which is imputed by a conception can occur before the appearance of inherent existence, but the appearance of inherent existence only occurs at the time of perceiving an object.

Student: Then, the eye consciousness has the appearance of inherent existence because it is imputed by someone else?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is just because we have a conception of a self, it is not because someone else has a conception that imputes inherent existence.

END

Monday afternoon, 5 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 351) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2A1B Refuting that system

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

I shall express a reply to this:

If the aggregates were the self, therefore,
Since they are many, the selves would also be many,
The self would be a substance and to view as that
Would not be mistaken since engaging a substance. [6.127]

There, whoever's position it is that "The aggregates are the self," according to them, because the aggregates are many, the self would also be many. Also, according to those for whom the mind is the self, the self would also be many because of multiplicity due to the divisions of the consciousness of the eye and so forth or due to consciousness being produced and ceasing in each instant. Or, one should express the defects in accordance with what is proper.

If the aggregates were the self it would follow that there would be many selves because there are many aggregates, that is, because there are five aggregates there would be five selves. In addition, it would follow that the self is substantially existent because the aggregates are substantially existent and the aggregates are the self. It would then follow that the awareness conceiving the person to be self-sufficient substantially existent would not be incorrect because the person is, in fact, self-sufficient substantially existent.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 56), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1B-1A2 Refuting it

If the self were the aggregates, then since
They are several, those selves would also be several. [6.127ab]

If the self were the aggregates, it follows, therefore, that those selves would also be multiple: since (a) the self is one with the aggregates and (b) those aggregates are multiple.

The self would be a substance. [6.127c]

It should be understood that it follows that the self would be substantially existent because the self is the aggregates.

The view of them,
Since engaging a substance, would not be incorrect. [6.127cd]

It follows that the view of those aggregates[136] would not be incorrect for it engages a substance, [i.e.,] has an object [which exists substantially].

In short, it would follow that there would be many selves because the aggregates are the self and there are many aggregates.

[136] *'jig.lta*

In the case that the mind is asserted to be the self it follows that there would be six selves because there are six consciousnesses, the eye consciousness and so forth. It would also follow that there are many selves because there are many divisions of former and later moments of consciousness due to which there would be many selves arising and disintegrating momentarily.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thus, this fault should be expressed to those propounding the aggregates and the consciousness to be the self and since also other faults which will be explained only befall them, they are to be expressed also in regard to both positions.

Such faults are to be expressed to those who assert the aggregates to be the self or the mind to be the self. "Both positions" refers to the position holding the five aggregates to be the self and the position holding the mind to be the self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Nor is the self asserted as multiple in the scriptural citation that says:[137]
>
> When the world is born, the person is born alone.

Therefore, the self is not asserted to be many. In general, when someone is born in the world it is said that the person alone is born, not that the aggregates are born.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [If the aggregates were the self] [6.127c] *The self would be a substance and* – because only the substances of form and so forth, differentiated by divisions of past and so forth, would be expressed as the aggregates themselves and because only they are proclaimed to be the self, the self would be substantially existent. Yet, it is not even asserted in these statements [from sutra]:[138]
>
> O bhikshus, these five are mere names, mere designations, mere imputations – those like this are: past, future, space, nirvana, and the person.

If the self were the aggregates, since the form aggregate and so forth are substantially existent, the self would also be substantially existent. If this were the case, the awareness viewing the self to be substantially existent would not be incorrect. "These five" refer to "past, future, space, nirvana, and the person" which are imputedly existent. Because they, including the person, are imputedly existent, they cannot be substantially existent, therefore, the self or person cannot be substantially existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 351-2) says:

> *If the aggregates were the self, because of that,*
> *Since they are many, the selves would also be many.* [6.127ab]
>
> *If* it were according to the position that *the* five *aggregates* of one's own continuum *are the self*, *because of that*, *since* the aggregates *are many*, *the selves would also be many* even in a single person. If it were the case that the mind is the self, because there are many [minds] due to the divisions of eye consciousness and so forth and due to divisions of the many consciousness being

[137] Poisson cites Ang. 1.33.

[138] Poisson notes it is cited in Jaya-ananda's commentary, p. 389.5.

produced and ceasing in each moment, there would also be many selves. Here the autocommentary says:

> The consequence that there would be many selves is flung at the first two of the previous positions, or, alternatively, the other faults are also flung at both of them.

Since it is not suitable to fling this [consequence] at those who merely assert [the self and the aggregates] to be many or to be one entity; it is flung at those who assert the two, the self and the aggregates, to be one [entity] and not at all different. Moreover, since right from the beginning others do not assert in this way, there is no fault in falsities being merely one or different entities. However, with respect to those who assert the two, the self and the aggregates, to be truly existent, having dictated that if they are one entity they are inseparably one, after that the consequence that the many selves and the five aggregates would be one is flung. At that time, in the passage that states: "When the world is born, the person is born alone," the opponents also do not assert the self to be many.

The following consequence can be flung at those who assert that the self and the aggregates are one inseparable unit: it would follow that there are many selves because there are many aggregates. Or it would follow that the five aggregates are one because the self is one. Those who assert the five aggregates to be the self assert them to be a single truly existent entity. If they are a single truly existent entity they would be an inseparable and undifferentiable unit. By debating in this way, the opponents are gradually forced to give up their thesis.

To summarize, to those who hold the first position, which is to assert that the aggregates are the self, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say:

> It would follow that there are many selves because, the self and the aggregates are one truly existent entity, due to which the self would be many because the aggregates are the self.

To those who hold the second position, which is to assert that the mind is the self, they say:

> It would follow that there are many selves because there are many minds, such as the eye consciousness through the mental consciousness, because the mind and the self are one inherently existent entity.

The main point here is to show that if the self and aggregates were an inherently existent entity they would be an inseparable unit. The faults of positing the aggregates or the mind to be the self are:

- there would be many selves because there are many aggregates,
- there would be one aggregate because there is one self,
- there would be many selves because there are many consciousnesses, or
- there would be many selves because there are many moments of consciousness.

The sutra clarifies that this is not the case saying that the person alone is born.

[Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:]

> *The self would be a substance and since the view of them*
> *Engages them to be a substance it would be unmistaken.* [6.127cd]

"*The self would be a substance*" (v. 6.127c) [means that] the self would be self-sufficient substantially existent

- because just those that are different are expressed to be the aggregates themselves and
- because just those are said to be the self,

due to the divisions of the substances that are forms and so forth into past and so forth. However, the opponents also do not assert the self to be a substance through the [following] statements:

> Monks, these five are mere names, mere conventions, mere imputations. What is so is past time, future time, space, nirvana, and the person.

The sutra here shows that the self cannot be substantially existent because the five – past time, future time, space, nirvana, and the person – are mere names and so forth due to which they are imputedly existent and not substantially existent. The main point here is that because the person or the self is imputedly existent it is not substantially existent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly:
>
> Just as chariot is expressed
> In dependence on the collection of limbs,
> Similarly, in dependence on the aggregates,
> Conventionally one says "sentient being."
>
> Therefore, because the self would follow as substantially existent, the aggregates are not the self.

Taking the chariot as an analogy, just as it is imputed in dependence on its parts, also conventionally the sentient being is imputed in dependence on either the collection of the aggregates or any one of the aggregates.

If it is asserted that the aggregates are the self it would follow that the self is substantially existent because the aggregates are substantially existent, therefore, the aggregates are not the self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore, because the view of the transitory collection would be the possessor of an object, a substance, like the consciousnesses of blue, yellow, and so forth, it would not be mistaken. Therefore, the view of the transitory collection would not be abandoned by abandoning [true] origins or would be abandoned by only abandoning aspirational attachment which refers to it like an eye consciousness refers to mere blue, yellow, and so forth.

Because the view of the transitory collection would be an object-possessor of a substance, it would not be a mistaken awareness, just like a consciousness of blue, yellow, and so forth are not mistaken. In this way, the view of the transitory collection would not be an object of abandonment because it is not a mistaken awareness, rather it is an unmistaken awareness.

Stating "[the view of the transitory collection] would be abandoned by only abandoning aspirational attachment which refers to it like an eye consciousness refers to mere blue, yellow, and so forth" is an assertion of the Vaibhashikas, not of the Prasangika Madhyamikas. This is understood from the fact that the Vaibhashikas say that when the aspirational attachment observing an object is abandoned, the object is also abandoned. The Vaibhashikas posit abandonment while possessing. They say, for example, that when attachment to a person is abandoned so too is that person. Therefore, by abandoning aspirational attachment for an object, the object itself, blue, yellow, and so forth, is also abandoned, whereby the eye consciousness observing blue and so forth is also abandoned.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 352) says:

> Similarly:

> Just as in dependence on the collection of components
> It is expressed as a chariot,
> Similarly, in dependence on the aggregates,
> Conventionally one says "sentient being."
>
> Furthermore, *since the view of* the transitory collection, which views the aggregates, *engages them as a substance*, that is, it is an object-possessor of the substantially existent, *it would be* just *unmistaken*, like a consciousness of blue, yellow, and so forth. Because of that, when the view of the transitory collection is abandoned:
> - it is not abandoned in a manner of a similar type not arising uninterruptedly or
> - it is abandoned through only abandoning the aspirational attachment that observes the view of the transitory collection, like a consciousness that observes mere blue, yellow, and so forth.

If the lower schools are asked whether the aggregates are substantially existent, they would say that they are not. However, when the Prasangika Madhyamikas debate with them, they are forced to accept that they are substantially existent because they posit a self that is found among the aggregates when sought. Since they posit a self that is found among the aggregates when sought by thorough analysis, they assert that the aggregates are the self. Because the aggregates are substantially existent, the self would have to be substantially existent since they do not posit a self that is other than the aggregates. In this way, the view of the transitory collection becomes an object-possessor engaging a substance. This brings the absurd consequence that the view of the transitory collection is an unmistaken awareness because it is similar to an eye consciousness apprehending blue, yellow, and so forth.

In general, the way in which to abandon an object of abandonment is in a manner of interrupting the arising of a similar type. However, in this case another absurd consequence is that when the view of the transitory collection is abandoned it would not be abandoned in a manner of a similar type not arising uninterruptedly. This would mean that the view of the transitory collection is abandoned through abandoning attachment to the view of the transitory collection. In this way, it would be said that one has abandoned the view of the transitory collection because one has abandoned attachment to the view of the transitory collection. This is like in the world it is said "I have given up my wife" and so forth in the sense that attachment to her has been abandoned. We, for example, have attachment to someone for a period of time because that particular person makes us happy, but when we no longer experience this happiness we give up our attachment to that object and in this way give up the object. If it were as asserted by the lower schools, the abandonment of the view of the transitory collection would be similar to the abandonment of a wife, whereas it is not.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:
>
> *At the time of nirvana, the self would definitely be annihilated.*
> *In the instants prior to nirvana it would be produced and disintegrate.*
> *Since without agent, its effect would not exist.*
> *[Actions] accumulated by some would be consumed by others.*[139] [6.128]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *When one passed beyond sorrow, the self would really cease.* [6.128a]

[139] See Hopkins, p. 690 for the root verse and for commentary on the individual points. See Hopkins, pp. 183-185, and Cabezon, pp. 187-192.

It follows that at the time of nirvana without remainder, the self would truly be destroyed, for at that time the five aggregates are destroyed. You have accepted this reason.

In the moments before nirvana, it would be born
And perish. [6.128bc]

It follows that the self would be born and destroyed in entitiness (inherently) in [each] moment before nirvana, because (a) the self is one with the aggregates and (b) the aggregates are born and destroyed in entitiness.

As there's no agent, it has no result. [6.128c]

It follows that action would be unconnected with its result, since the self that is the agent (or creator) does not exist (Skt.: has been destroyed).

One would enjoy the karma[140] *another had hoarded.* [6.128d]

You may say, "There is no fault since the result of karma created in an earlier instant is enjoyed in later instants." But then one person would experience the result (or "fruit") heaped up by another, for the ripe result of the karma created by one would be enjoyed by another. If you accept this, karma created would be consumed and you would meet with karma you had not created.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If the self had the nature of the aggregates, at the time of nirvana the self would be annihilated since the continuity of all five aggregates are annihilated. Therefore, [the view of the transitory collection] would follow as an extreme view since it holds to an extreme of annihilation because you present whatever apprehends a self, due to viewing the transitory collection having the aspects of I and mine, as a view holding to an extreme since it holds to permanence and annihilation. Therefore, the self cannot be accepted as annihilated even at the time of nirvana because the view grasping to extremes would follow as a consequence. Therefore, the self does not have the essential nature of the aggregates.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas fling the following consequence at the lower schools:

> It follows that when a person with a nirvana with remainder attains a nirvana without remainder the continuum of the self would be cut because the continuum of the aggregates is cut.

It would also follow that prior to entering nirvana, there would not be a relationship between actions and results. This is because it follows that prior to nirvana, just as the aggregates arise and disintegrate momentarily, so too would the self arise and disintegrate momentarily by way of its own entity. [Because the self arises and disintegrates momentarily by way of its own entity], one would not remember past lives because an action and its result would be unrelated. It would also follow that an action accumulated by someone would be experienced by someone else and that an action created would go to waste. These are the consequences "if the self had the nature of the aggregates."

If it is asserted that the continuity of the self is cut when a nirvana without remainder is attained, this would be a view of annihilation because the self would become non-existent. "Therefore, the self cannot be accepted as annihilated even at the time of nirvana because the view grasping to extremes would follow as a consequence. Therefore, the self does not have the essential nature of the aggregates." In short, the self is not inherently one entity with the aggregates.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

[140] Restore *la* to *las*, after the Skt.

> In the instants prior to entry into nirvana, just as the aggregates are produced and disintegrated in each instant, similarly also the self would have production and disintegration because of the self being the nature of the aggregates.

This consequence is flung at the lower schools who assert

- that a self is found among the aggregates when sought or
- that the self and the aggregates are a single inherently existent entity.

Tuesday morning, 6 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 353) says:

> [Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:]
>
> *At the time of nirvana the self would definitely be annihilated.*
> *In the moments prior to nirvana,*
> *It would be produced and disintegrate.* [6.128abc]
>
> In addition, if one's own aggregates were the self, then, according to you, since *at the time of* a *nirvana* without remainder all five aggregates are annihilated, *the self would definitely be annihilated*. Therefore, that would be a view of annihilation that holds to an extreme because you assert the very apprehension of any self to be a view holding to permanence and annihilation, that is, holding to an extreme.
>
> *In the moments prior to* entering *nirvana*, just as the aggregates are produced and disintegrate in each moment, so too *would* the self *be* individually *produced and disintegrate* by way of its own entity in each moment.

If the aggregates were the self it would follow that upon attaining a nirvana without remainder the continuity of the self would cease because the continuity of the aggregates ceases. In addition, just as prior to nirvana the aggregates are produced and disintegrate in each moment so too would the self be produced and disintegrate by way of its own entity in each moment. If such production and disintegration of a self existed inherently it would not be possible to remember other rebirths.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, just as the statement "This body of mine arose" would not be said, similarly the statement "At that time, on that occasion, I was called King Mandhatri" would not be taught because the self at that time was also destroyed like the body and because of accepting just other as produced at this [time].

If the self were produced and disintegrated momentarily by way of its own entity in the same way as the aggregates, it would follow that one could not remember previous lives due to which one would not say "This body of mine arose in the past." In that case, also it would not be acceptable to say "At that time, on that occasion, I was called King Mandhatri." This particular king was a previous incarnation of Shakyamuni Buddha who reigned over all four human continents, but, dissatisfied, having gained control over the entire desire realm, went to the first level of the form realm, Brahma Realm. However, because of his karma he was unable to gain control over this realm and fell, that is, returned to India, where no one recognized him.

"Because the self at that time was also destroyed like the body" means that the self or person that was King Mandhatri was destroyed when his body was destroyed. "Because of accepting just other as produced at this [time]" means that the person of this life is an inherently existent other than

the person of the previous life. If the self of this life is an inherently existent other, one could not say "I was born as such-and-such before" because the past rebirth and this present rebirth would be unrelated.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is also taught in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, 27.6]:
>
> The appropriated are not the self,
> They arise and disintegrate.
> How could what is appropriated
> Be the appropriator?

Here "the appropriated" are the aggregates; they are not the self. The aggregates arise and disintegrate in each moment, therefore, how could what is appropriated be the appropriator? If the aggregates were the self it would follow that the aggregates are the appropriator because the aggregates are the self. "The appropriator" is what takes rebirth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, [in the *Treatise*, 18.lab]:
>
> If the aggregates were the self,
> It would have production and disintegration.

If the aggregates were the self, just as the aggregates are produced and disintegrate, so too would the self be produced and disintegrate.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, if states of production and disintegration existed, since the agent-self would not exist, its effect would just not exist. If that by which the action was done were just impermanent, the action would not even have a support since the agent would not exist at the time [of the effect]. Therefore, since [the action] would not exist, the relationship between actions and effects would just not exist.

Because the accumulator of actions is impermanent, it would follow that the accumulator of actions is non-existent. If the accumulator of actions does not exist, it follows that the support of actions does not exist, due to which it follows that actions and results would be unrelated.

Others hold the position that the agent, the accumulator of actions, is an inherently existent self. If an inherently existent accumulator of actions performs an action, that action should be inherently existent. If there were an inherently existent agent and an inherently existent action, these two would be unrelated and independent. Just as these two are unrelated, it would follow that the actions and the results that arise later would be unrelated because they are inherently existent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If the effect of the action done in the previous instant were intimately enjoyed in the later instants, because the maturation of the action accumulated by some would be enjoyed by others, the action accumulated by some would be consumed by others. Therefore, that done will be wasted and that not done will be met.

According to the opponents' assertions, former and later moments would be unrelated because they are inherently existent. Due to this, it follows that, because the former moment in which an action is created and the later moment in which the result is experienced are inherently existent and therefore unrelated, an action accumulated by one person would be experienced by someone else. Thus, it would follow that one would experience the result of an action that one did not do. This would contradict one of the four characteristics of actions which is the result of an action not created is not experienced. In addition, it would follow that actions created would be wasted, which also contradicts one of the four characteristics of actions, that is, that actions created are not wasted.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is also taught in the *Treatise* [chapter 27.10-11]:
>
> If this [self] were other, it would arise even without that.
> Similarly, it would abide and would be reborn, not dying there.
>
> Annihilated, actions wasted, actions done by some
> Individually experienced by others – that and so forth would follow.
>
> Therefore, it is improper to say that "The aggregates are the self."

These are the consequences flung at the opponents.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 353) says:

> Therefore, when remembering one's rebirths, just as one would not apprehend them stating "How did this body of mine arise previously?", similarly, one also would not state "At that time, on that occasion, I was called King Mandhatri"
>
> - because also the self of that time, like the body, has been destroyed, whereby it does not exist now, and
> - because it is asserted that in this life another self which is inherently different from the previous self is born.
>
> [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 27.6) also says:
>
> The appropriated themselves are not the self;
> They arise and disintegrate.
> How could what is appropriated
> Become the appropriator?
>
> And [this text (v. 18.1ab)] says:
>
> If the aggregates were the self,
> It would have production and disintegration.
>
> [Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:]
>
> *Since the agent would not exist, their results would not exist.* [6.128c]
>
> If former and later moments were other by way of their own entity, then, *since* the self which is *the agent would not exist*, actions would not have the support of an abode. Because of this, actions also would not exist, due to which actions *would* just *not* have a relationship with their *results*.
> OBJECTION: Since the result of an action which was created by a former moment is enjoyed in later moments there is no fault.
> RESPONSE:
>
> *That accumulated by another would be consumed by someone else.* [6.128d]
>
> At that time, because the ripening of an action which was accumulated by another would be experienced by someone else, a result *accumulated by another* continuum *would be consumed by*

> *someone else*. In that case, actions that were created would go to waste and those not created would be encountered.

These are the consequences flung at those who assert inherent existence or who assert that a self is found among the aggregates when sought. In other words, if there were an established by way of its own entity self it would follow that the self of a former moment and the self of a later moment would be completely unrelated. Thus, in a former moment one would create an action and, then, in a second moment the self of the former moment would become non-existent because it disintegrates by way of its own entity. In this way, the support that is the abode of the action would become non-existent. If there is no abode for the action, also the action would no longer exist. This means that there would be no relationship between an action and a later result.

Here someone makes the objection that there is no fault because an action created in a former moment is experienced in a later moment. The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond saying that this is incorrect because, if that were the case, it would follow that an action accumulated by one person would be consumed by another person of a different continuum because the two, the one who accumulated the action and the one who consumes it, would be different. In this case, it would follow that actions are wasted because the action is accumulated in a former moment by a person who then becomes non-existent. The second consequence is that, because the person of the second moment experiences the result of an action created by the person of the former moment, he would experience the result of an action that he did not create. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "In that case, actions that were created would go to waste and those not created would be encountered."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 354) says:

> [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 27.10-11) also says:
>
> If they were other,
> It would arise even without that.
> Similarly, it would abide and,
> Without dying here, would be reborn.
>
> Annihilation and wasting of actions,
> Actions created by another
> Individually experienced by someone else:
> These and so forth would follow.
>
> [Nagarjuna] says that if former and later were inherently other, since [the later] would be unrelated to the former it would arise even without the existence of the former. Similarly, a self that is former would abide and, without dying here, would be reborn there and so forth.

It would follow that the person of this life, without dying, would be reborn because these two persons are unrelated. In other words, the self of this life and the self of a previous life are unrelated because of existing inherently. If this were the case, that is, if they were inherently existent, then the person of a previous life, without dying, would be reborn in this life. In other words, the person of this life would be reborn without depending on the person of the past life. These are the consequences of asserting an inherently existent self. Although there is no inherently existent self and accumulator of actions, if there were there would be the consequences of the self becoming non-existent and, therefore, actions being created by someone being experienced by another and actions created going to waste.

In short, there is no inherently existent self of a past life and future life, but if there were then many absurd consequences would follow. However, those who assert inherent existence say that the aggregates are the self because when the self is sought it is found among the aggregates. Therefore, there are Buddhist schools who assert the five aggregates to be the self and those who assert one, that is, the mind, to be the self. Both these assertions are negated here.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 354) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2A2 Refuting the response that abandons faults

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

It is mentioned here: Even if former and later instants are other, in that case too, since this continuum is only one, we do not have this fault.

I shall explain:

If there were no fault if the continuum exists in thusness,
The defect about continuum was already explained when analyzed before. [6.129ab]

[That is, it was explained before] in the text [6.61a]: *The qualities supported on Maitreya and Upagupta are…*

The lower schools say that although former and later moments are other, they are still one continuum, due to which there is no fault of actions being wasted and actions not created being consumed.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1B-1B Refuting a denial of the fault

If "With one stream in reality, there's no fault,"
The fault in the stream was explained when we checked before. [6.129ab]

You may say, "There is no fault, since although earlier and later [thought-]moments are other in entitiness, in absolute reality there is one stream of personality." But that too is inadmissible, for we have already explained the fallacy in the inherently different being one continuum, at the time of an earlier analysis. (See 6.61.)

Thus the self can't be the aggregates or the mind. [6.129c]

It follows that the aggregates and the mind cannot be the self, for if they were, then there would be the fallacies of karma not created being met with and that created being consumed.

The faults of former and later moments being other but still being one continuum were already analyzed in relation to verse 6.61:

The qualities based on Maitreya and Upagupta
Are not included in a single continuum because they are otherness.
It is not reasonable for whatever are individually established by way of their own character
To be included in a single continuum. [6.61]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

It is also taught [in *Fundamental Wisdom*, 27.16]:[141]

If the human were other than the deva,
Then it would be non-eternal.
If the human is other than the deva,

[141] See Poisson p. 297, note 1, for the Sanskrit. The Tibetan, here being ambiguous, needs commentary. The Sanskrit is clearer.

The continuum would not be appropriate.

Therefore, since the state of belonging to one continuum is solely unreasonable for such mutually different characteristics, there is no reversing the consequence. Therefore, in order to indicate that the aggregates are not the very self and neither is the mind, it is explained:

Therefore, aggregates and mind are unreasonable as the self, [6.129c]

The meaning of the statement "If the human were other than the deva, then it would be non-eternal" is not very clear (note that 'non-eternal' could also be translated as 'impermanent').

Then, Nagarjuna says: "If the human is other than the deva, the continuum would not be appropriate." A god can transmigrate from a previous life and take rebirth as a human being. If that human being were inherently existent, the human being would be permanent. Also if the human and the god were inherently existent other, they could not be the same continuum. It is generally said that there is (i) a self that came from a past life to this life, (ii) a self that transfers from this life to the next and (iii) a self that is specific to this present life. The self that comes from a past life to this life is of six types because there is:

1. a self that comes from a god,
2. a self that comes from a anti-god,
3. a self that comes from a human being,
4. a self that comes from an animal,
5. a self that comes from a hungry ghost, and
6. a self that comes from a hell being.

Thus, there are six types of selves that come from a past life to the present life because there are six classes of beings. There is also a self that pervades all rebirths and a self specific to this life. For example, in my own case the specific self of this life is the self that is "Geshe Jampa Gyatso."

What is meant by "belonging to, or included in, one continuum"? For example, it can be said that Geshe Jampa Gyatso is included in the same continuum as the six types of migrating beings. This is because he can be reborn in the next life as a god, a human being, and so forth. On the other hand, if the person were inherently existent one could not say "He is included in the same continuum as the six types of migrating beings" because the continuum of the person and the continuum of the six types of migrating beings would be other, that is, different.

Tuesday afternoon, 6 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 354) says:

OBJECTION: Former and later moments are indeed other, however, even though they are such, since they are one continuum, there is no fault.

RESPONSE:

"There is no fault in them existing as a continuum in that way," but
The faults regarding a continuum were already explained when thoroughly analyzed before. [6.129ab]

That *there is no fault* due to those that are different substances having continuity *existing as* one *continuum in that way*, is also not admissible. *The faults* of what is inherently different being one *continuum were already explained when* this was *thoroughly analyzed before*, that is, here [in the *Supplement*], stating "The qualities based on Maitreya and Upagupta..." (v. 6.61).

The lower schools say that although former and later moments are inherently other they are still one continuum, due to which there is no fault. The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond saying that what is

inherently existent and inherently other cannot be one continuum. In fact, the faults regarding this were already explained in the context of verse 6.61:

> *The qualities based on Maitreya and Upagupta*
> *Are not included in a single continuum because they are otherness.*
> *It is not reasonable for whatever are individually established by way of their own character*
> *To be included in a single continuum.* [6.61]

In brief, phenomena that are established by way of their own character cannot be included in the same continuum because they exist independently and unrelatedly.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 354) says:

> [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 27.16) also says:
> If the human is other than the god,
> In that case, it would be impermanent.
> If the human and the god were other,
> Their being a continuum would not be admissible.
>
> Therefore, since those that are inherently different are not suitable to be just one continuum, the consequences that (i) actions which are not created would be met, (ii) those that have been created would be wasted, and so forth would not be averted.
> [Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:]
> *Therefore, the aggregates and the mind are not suitable as the self,* [6.129c]
>
> *Therefore*, it is *not suitable* to assert that one's *aggregates* and one's *mind* are one's *self*.

Gedun Drup's commentary on the twenty-seventh chapter of [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* says:

> When born as a human being from a god, the two, the god and the human, are either inherently one or inherently different. If it were the first:
>
> > That god, as the subject, it follows that it would be permanent because it is inherently one with that human.
>
> If that it accepted:
>
> > That god, as the subject, it follows that it would not be produced.
>
> There is pervasion because production does not exist for the permanent.
> If the human is inherently other than the god, in that case it would follow that that human being would be impermanent and its continuum would be cut. There is pervasion because if the god and the human are inherently other it would not be admissible for them to be one continuum.
> OBJECTION: The unit does not have the fault of being permanent and impermanent because, having given up the body of a human, one takes the body of a god.
> RESPONSE: The person who is born as a god from a human, as the subject, it follows that it is permanent and impermanent because from the side of the self one part is a god, whereas from the side of the body one part is a human. If that is accepted, that too is not suitable.
> The subject, [the person who is born as a god from a human], that is neither permanent nor impermanent follows as not existing inherently because if it were established to be both permanent and impermanent, although suitable to assert what is not permanent as also established to not be impermanent, it is not established to be permanent and impermanent.
> OBJECTION: The self is permanent because it has been circling since beginningless time.
> RESPONSE: It follows that a permanent self does not exist because if a self that comes from

somewhere and goes somewhere existed inherently, there would exist a self that has circled since beginningless time, but that does not exist.
It follows that an impermanent [self] existing inherently does not exist because a permanent [self] does not at all exist inherently. [The self] that is eliminated to be both permanent and impermanent and the two does not exist inherently because what is permanent and what is impermanent individually do not exist inherently.

In short, if the aggregates were the self there would be the consequence that actions would be wasted and the results of actions not created would be consumed.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 354) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2B Indicating the proof that it is unreasonable to assert thus

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 156) says:

Not only are the aggregates and the mind incorrect as the self due to the consequence that the faults explained would logically follow, besides this:

Because the world possessing limit and so forth do not exist. [6.129d]

Because the world just possessing a limit and so forth[142] are expressed as non-existent, therefore, it is unreasonable to say "The aggregates and the mind are the self." These fourteen unpredicted categories were expressed by all sects. Because the Bhagavan taught:

> It is like this. To say "The world is eternal," "The world is not eternal," "The eternal is eternal, the not eternal is not eternal," "Neither eternal nor not eternal," and so forth. These are not to be described.

– they are presented as the unpredicted categories.

Not only are there the above faults regarding the aggregates being the self and the mind being the self, there are also other faults, one being that the fourteen unspecified views would also not exist. These fourteen are divided into four groups, three groups of four and one group of two:
(1-4) the views that the self and the world have an end, do not have an end, have both, and have neither,
(5-8) the views that the self and the world are permanent, impermanent, both, and neither,
(9-12) the views that a tathagata arises after dying, does not arise, both, and neither,
(13-14) the views that the body and the life force are one and that they are other.
These views are called 'unspecified" because when the Buddha was asked, for example, "Do the self and the world have an end, not have an end, both, or neither?" he did not respond. This is because if the Buddha had responded, it would not have benefited the questioners who posed these questions on the basis of accepting a self of persons.

In the context of the fourteen unspecified views the word 'world' refers to the aggregates.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

They are thus prohibited and if a bhikshu were to grasp to the statement that "The world is eternal," it is explained in the scriptures of the Purvashaila sect [of the Vaibhashika tradition] that he is not to be accompanied, saying: "The action of expulsion should also be done for he having a view

[142] "And so forth" – the so-called Fourteen Unpredicted Categories.

> like 'The world is eternal;'" "The action of expulsion should also be done for he having a view like 'The world is not eternal;'" "The action of expulsion should also be done for he having a view like 'The world is eternal [concerning] the eternal; not eternal [concerning] the not eternal,'" and "The action of expulsion should also be done for he having a view like 'The world is neither eternal nor not eternal.'"

In general, according to the monks' rules there are four types of punishment for wrong behavior, the worst of which is expulsion from the monastery. According to the Purvashaila sect if a fully ordained monk holds that the world is permanent, that the world is impermanent, that the world is both permanent and impermanent, or that the world is neither permanent nor impermanent, he should be expelled. In short, it is said that one should not associate with a fully ordained monk who holds the fourteen unspecified views because through doing so oneself may gradually come to develop the same kind of view.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thus, the unpredicted categories are to be expressed as the fourteen. Therefore, if the term 'world' specifies the aggregates, then because the aggregates are not eternal, since they are produced and disintegrate, it would also be predicted that "The world is not eternal." Since the aggregates are non-existent after nirvana, it would also be predicted that "The world possesses a limit." Similarly, it would also be predicted that, "The Tathagata does not exist after passing away." Therefore, because of negating that the world possesses a limit and so forth, to say that "Only the aggregates are the self" is improper.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 354-5) says:

> [Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:]
> *Because the world having an end and so forth do not exist.* [6.129d]
>
> By means of the reasonings explained above, not only are the aggregates and the mind not the self, in addition, *because* it is asserted that the fourteen – the twelve views:
> (1-4) *the world has an end and so forth*, that is, it does not have an end, both, and neither,
> (5-8) the world is permanent, impermanent, both, and neither,
> (9-12) a tathagata arises after dying, does not arise, both, and neither,
> and the two views:
> (13) "What is the body itself is the life force" and
> (14) "The body is also other, the life force is also other" –
> *do not exist* as specified because they are asserted by all schools to be unspecified views, the aggregates are not suitable to be the self.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it is not suitable to assert that the aggregates are the self because then the fourteen unspecified views would not exist. Because all eighteen divisions of the Vaibhashika school accept the fourteen unspecified views, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they cannot assert the aggregates to be the self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 355) says:

> If the term 'world' refers to the aggregates, then, because it is our own system that the aggregates are produced and disintegrate, the world would have to have been specified as impermanent. According to you since the aggregates do not exist after passing beyond sorrow, it would also have had to be specified that "The world has an end" and that "A tathagata does not exist after dying."

> For that reason, because the response to "Does the world have an end?" and so forth is refuted to have been specified, it is not suitable to state "The aggregates are the self."
>
> In regard to that, life force is a synonym of self. The question about the world is asked in reference to the self. Furthermore, when the question is asked thinking about the being who is an inner agent, since the qualified basis is not established, the qualification is unspecified. When specifying that it is from the point of view of a self which is a mere imputation, then that too was not specified due to the questioners not having the fortune to realize such a selflessness.

Why did the Buddha not respond to these questions? He did not respond because the qualified basis of the questions, the being who is an inner agent, does not exist. If the Buddha had said that the world has an end it would have been correct for non-Buddhists, but not for Buddhists, because the questioner asked his question thinking:

- that the self which is the basis of the question is qualified by being permanent, partless, and independent or a self-sufficient substantially existent, and
- that the aggregates are an object of use of such a person.

In one text it is said: "When asked 'Is a limit to the beginning seen?' the Subduer remained without answering." This is because this question was asked by non-Buddhists who were not a proper vessel for the teaching on selflessness. If the Buddha had said that the self and the aggregates were not permanent, this would have been acceptable for the non-Buddhists but not for the Buddhists.

'Unspecified' in this context is not the unspecified discussed in the context of virtue and non-virtue. What does unspecified mean in the context of virtue and non-virtue?

Student: Because the Buddha did not say that it was either virtuous or non-virtuous, it is unspecified.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That means that if the Buddha had said it is virtue it would become virtue and if he said that it is non-virtue it would become non-virtue! What is the definition of unspecified in the context of virtue and non-virtue? Are the first four of the fourteen views – the views of the self and the world being permanent, impermanent, both, and neither – virtuous or non-virtuous?

Student 1: They are neutral or unspecified.

Student 2: They are non-virtuous because in the autocommentary it says that if a fully ordained monk holds these views he is to be expelled from the monastery.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The *Treasury of Knowledge* says:

> All those of the upper realms are unpredicted.
> In the desire realm, they are the view of the transitory collection,
> That holding an extreme, and the ignorance that is simultaneous with them.
> The remaining here are non-virtuous. [5.19]

Therefore, all the remaining views among the fourteen are non-virtuous, acquired, and afflicted.

Wednesday morning, 7 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 355) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2C Indicating other harms to propounding the aggregates to be the self

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:

For you yogi perceiving non-self,
Then, things will certainly not exist.
If a permanent self is rejected, then, therefore,
Your mind or aggregates will not be the self. [6.130]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 57), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1B-3 Another refutation of the hypothesis that the aggregates are the self

According to you, for a yogin seeing non-self,
Functioning things then will certainly not exist. [6.130ab]

It follows that on the view of you Sam□atiyas, when a yogin directly perceives selflessness, he would definitely realize at that time that the functioning things which are the aggregates do not exist, because the self is the aggregates. [This you do not accept.]

If it's a permanent self he rejects, so then
Your mind or aggregates will not be the self. [6.130cd]

If you say, "There is no fault, since when he directly perceives selflessness, he realizes that there is not a permanent, single, independent self," then it follows that the aggregates and mind are not the self, as you asserted, because at that time of directly perceiving selflessness, he abandons, or perceives the non-existence of, a permanent self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If the aggregates or the mind were the self, when, in the period of perceiving the truths, the yogi perceives the truth of suffering in the aspect of non-self saying "All phenomena are selfless," then, perceiving the aggregates as non-existent, he would perceive the self as non-existent. Yet, such is not even asserted, therefore the aggregates are not the self.

If the aggregates or the mind were the self, then, when a yogi realizes selflessness, that is, the non-existence of a self, it would follow that he would realize the aggregates and the mind to be non-existent because they are the self. This is the consequence of applying the term 'self' to the aggregates.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is considered: When the term 'self' is applied at the time of relating actions and effects, it is used for only the aggregates because another self [besides the aggregates] is impossible at that time. When perceiving the self as non-existent, at that time [the term 'self'] is used for the inner creator being imagined by others (i.e., the Forders). Therefore, even at the time of perceiving the self to be non-existent, a mere compositional factor separated from the inner creator being will be perceived, it will not follow as a consequence that functioning things be perceived as non-existent.

The lower schools say that there is no such fault because when a yogi sees selflessness he sees the selflessness that is the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self. They say that the yogi realizes this selflessness, he does not realize the non-existence of compounded phenomena.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Response: *If a permanent self is rejected, then, therefore, your mind or aggregates will not be the self.* If, out of fear – since it would follow as a consequence that functioning things be perceived as non-existent – the term 'self' fully specifies the state of a permanent self and the aggregates and mind are not asserted as the self – in that case, well, the position will degenerate.

"The position will degenerate" means that the position that asserts the aggregates to be a self and the position that asserts the mind to be the self will degenerate.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is considered: This is not asserted as applying to that type of object, therefore [our position is] without fault.

The lower schools respond that they are without fault.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> This too, is not so. To act as one wishes without reason saying "Here the inner creator being is the self, elsewhere the aggregates are," – where do you get that?

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it is not so in that the lower schools do have this fault.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If said: It is because it is impossible.
>
> It was already indicated "There does not exist the possibility for this to apply also to the aggregates." Therefore, if here the term 'self' is not asserted to apply to the aggregates saying "All phenomena are selfless," it must not be asserted elsewhere either. In case it is asserted to apply to the aggregates elsewhere, that must also be asserted here.

That the term 'self' cannot be applied to the aggregates has already been explained. However, according to the lower schools the term 'self' is applied to the aggregates. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that, on the other hand, if they do not apply the term 'self' to the aggregates here, the term 'self' should also not be applied to the aggregates in the context of the relationship of actions and results, whereas it is.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:
>
> *You, yogi, by perceiving non-self,*
> *Will not realize the thusness of forms and so forth.*
> *Because engaging through referring to form, attachment, etc.*
> *Will be produced because without realization of its entity.* [6.131]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *According to you, a yogin who sees non-self*

Would not perceive the reality of form and so on. [6.131ab]

On your view, it follows that the yogin who directly perceives non-self does not realize the reality of forms and so on, for at that time he perceives the non-existence only of a permanent, single, independent self.

Working when form's perceived, attachment and so on
Will arise, for he has not understood its essence. [6.131cd]

It follows that in the person striving to realize non-self perfectly, still more attachment and so on will arise because they operate when he perceives the form as true, since he has no understanding of that form's entity or way of being.

When a yogi perceives selflessness he does not realize the thusness of forms and so forth because at that time he only realizes the selflessness which is imputed by the outsiders, that is, the lack of a permanent, partless, and independent self. In other words, the yogi still observes forms and so forth to be truly existent and, therefore, still generates the attachment observing forms and so forth because he has not realized their mode of abidance. For this reason, the realization of the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self is not sufficient as a realization of the selflessness.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Whoever did not experience the sweetness of the pistil does not observe the sweetness by merely saying "The cuckoo exists on the pistil." Also, while experiencing the taste, the sweetness is not unobserved saying "The cuckoo does not exist there," and the strong settling which is included in that is not abandoned.
>
> Similarly, here also, if the yogi perceives the phenomena of form and so forth like that, separated from a permanent self, then, due to not fully knowing the nature of that, what will arise concerning that? Or, even if attachment and so forth referring to that is abandoned by observing the self-entities of those forms and so forth, what will arise concerning the non-existent property of the self? That by which, out of fully knowing that [permanent self] as non-existent, attachment and so forth to objects will be abandoned, does not cultivate objects of pleasurable experience saying, "May any inner creator being be happy." It also does not abandon meeting with undesirable objects due to fearing it as suffering.
>
> Therefore, having referred to form, attachment and so forth will be produced because of operating. Because the cause of abandoning attachment and so forth does not exist [by] fully knowing the self-entity of that; they should be considered like the outsiders.

A cuckoo takes the nectar from the pistils of a flower, whereas, because we do not do so, we do not perceive the sweetness that is there. However, it cannot be said that a flower does not have sweetness because there is no cuckoo on its pistils. The meaning of this is that by merely refuting a permanent, partless, and independent self, one does not perceive selflessness, that is, such a yogi does not realize the mode of abidance of forms and so forth. Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the mere realization of the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self is not sufficient to overcome attachment because the yogi has not realized the mode of abidance of the object. In other words, this realization is not a cause for overcoming the conception of a self.

In short, the realization of the non-existence of the permanent, partless, and independent self imputed by the Forders does not overcome the attachment observing forms and so forth to be truly existent. Such a yogi would be like an outsider, that is, a Forder, who, because they assert a self, do not posit selflessness. In fact, they affirm that there is a permanent, partless, and independent self.

In short, a yogi who realizes the emptiness of the permanent, partless, and independent self imputed by the Forders does not realize selflessness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 355) says:

> There are also other faults:
> *For you, when yogis see selflessness*
> *Things would definitely become non-existent.* [6.130ab]
>
> According to *you*, when *yogis* directly *see selflessness*, they see true sufferings in the aspect of being selfless thinking "All phenomena are selfless." *At that time*, *they would definitely* see the *things* that are the aggregates *as non-existent*, due to which they would see the self as non-existent because the aggregates and the mind are the self. Since you also do not assert this to be the case, therefore, the aggregates are not the self.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that according to the lower schools when a yogi directly sees the absence of a self, he would see true sufferings in the aspect of being selfless, due to which he would see the aggregates as non-existent because he sees the non-existence of a self. According to the lower schools, the aggregates and the mind are the self, therefore, when the self is seen to not exist, things, such as the aggregates, are seen to not exist. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the lower schools have this fault. However, the lower schools do not accept that when non-existence of the self is realized, the aggregates and the mind are realized to not exist. Because of this, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the lower schools should not assert the aggregates to be the self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 356) says:

> OBJECTION: Also in the system that does not assert the aggregates to be the self, when the selflessness of persons is directly seen, the entire person who is posited as the illustration of the self would have to be seen as non-existent for the same reason.

This is the argument of the lower schools to which the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond as follows:

> RESPONSE: When the subtle reasoning regarding that is not realized, one cannot respond, therefore, it is explained [as follows]. The opponents, who assert the aggregates and the mind to be the self, posit it through seeking the imputed object, without realizing it to be merely posited by the force of conventions. In this case, the aggregates and the mind that are the self are an established by way of its own entity self. When the self is directly seen to not exist, that self must be realized to be non-existent in all ways. Therefore, the opponents, for whom the things that are the aggregates and the mind are the self, acquire the fault of necessarily seeing that all of these do not exist, whereas they are posited through mere nominal imputation. The system that does not assert them to be posited through seeking the imputed object does not have this fault in all ways.

When asserting the aggregates and the mind to be the self, the lower schools posit a self that is not just merely imputed by the force of conventions but posit a self that is findable among the aggregates when sought. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the aggregates and the mind are an established by way of its own entity self, then, when selflessness is realized, the non-existence of such a self should be realized. However, because the lower schools do not accept this, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they have this fault, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas themselves do not have this fault because they do not posit the self as being found when sought. In fact, they are free from this fault because they posit things to be merely imputed by the force of conventions and do not posit them as being findable when sought. On the other hand, the lower schools have such faults because they posit the imputed object to be found when sought. If it were like this, then it would

mean that the self exists inherently, whereby it would be the self that is the object of negation. Then, when selflessness is realized, such a self should be realized to not exist. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not have these faults because they posit the self to be merely imputed by term and conception. Because such a self is not an object of negation, they say that they are free from such faults.

In short, the lower schools posit a self that is found when sought and, therefore, have these faults. Because the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not posit such a self, but instead posit a self that is merely imputed by term and conception, they do not have these faults.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> OBJECTION: When the term 'self' is applied in the context of the relationship between actions and results, because a self that is an object other than the aggregates is impossible, it is applied only to the aggregates. However, when the self is seen to not exist, [the term 'self'] is applied to the being who is an inner agent that is imputed by the others, the Forders. Therefore, even when the self is seen to not exist, one sees a mere compositional factor separate from the being who is an inner agent; there is not the fault of not seeing the things that are the aggregates and so forth.

Here the lower schools say that the term 'self' is applied to the aggregates in the context of the relationship between actions and results. On the other hand, in the context of the realization of selflessness, the term 'self' is applied to the being who is an inner agent imputed by the others. Thus, when selflessness is realized, what is realized is the non-existence of the being who is an inner agent. When such a self is seen to not exist, there is no pervasion that things which are the aggregates and so forth are seen to not exist. For this reason, the lower schools say that they do not have this fault.

Stating that "the term 'self' is applied to the aggregates in the context of the relationship between actions and results" means that for the lower schools this is not the self that is an object of negation. For them, the self that is the object of negation is a permanent, partless, and independent self – the being that is the inner agent imputed by the Forders. According to the lower schools, this is the self that is to be negated. They say that this self, which is the object of negation, is a permanent, partless, and independent self, not the self that exists conventionally.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 356-7) says:

> RESPONSE:
>
> *At that time, if a permanent self is abandoned, because of that,*
> *Your mind or aggregates are not the self.* [6.130cd]
>
> *At that time if* it is asserted that, at the moment selflessness is seen, *a permanent self* – the being who is an inner agent – *is abandoned*, that is, is seen to not exist, it is not suitable to cite another meaning of the term 'self' in other contexts. *Because of that, your aggregates and mind are not the self*; this being the case, your position deteriorates.

In short, the lower schools say:

1. in the context of the relationship of actions and results the term 'self' is applied to the aggregates, and
2. in the context of the realization of selflessness, the term 'self' is applied to the self that is an inner agent imputed by the others.

To this, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the lower schools should not take the term 'self' to mean whatever they like, instead the term 'self' should be taken to mean the same in all contexts. In this way, when the lower schools come to say that the aggregates and the mind are not the self their thesis would deteriorate in that previously they said that the aggregates are the self and that the mind is the self, whereas now they withdraw this assertion.

Wednesday afternoon, 7 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 357) says:

> OBJECTION: In the context of the relationship between actions and results, the Forders' term 'self' is not asserted to be applied to such an object, therefore, there is no fault of our position deteriorating.
> RESPONSE: That too is unsuitable because it is not suitable to behave as you like stating "Here, the being who is an inner agent is the self, whereas elsewhere, in the context of the relationship between actions and results, it is the aggregates."

The lower schools say that in the context of the relationship between actions and results the self is not the self that is the being who is an inner agent. Therefore, they say that there is no fault of their position deteriorating.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 357) says:

> OBJECTION: This is because in the context of actions and results the being who is an inner agent cannot be the agent of actions and the experiencer of results.
> RESPONSE: It was already explained before that "The term 'self' is also not applied to the aggregates." Therefore, if the term 'self' is not asserted to be applied to the aggregates here [in the context of] stating "All phenomena are selfless," it also should not be asserted elsewhere in the context of actions and results. If the term 'self' is asserted to be applied to the aggregates in the context of actions and results, the term 'self' should also be asserted in regard to the aggregates here stating "All phenomena are selfless."

The lower schools assert that the aggregates are the self. In response to this, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it would follow that when yogis realize selflessness they would realize that the aggregates do not exist. This is because the aggregates are the self and the self is the object of negation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 357) says:

> There are also other faults:
> *For you, the yogis who see selflessness*
> *Do not realize the suchness of forms and so forth, and,*
> *Because of engaging through observing forms and so forth,*
> *Attachment and so forth are produced because of not realizing their entity.* [6.131]
>
> According to *you*, *the yogis* who *see selflessness* directly *do not realize the suchness of forms and so forth* because at that time they see that the mere permanent self imputed by the Forders does not exist. Therefore, *because of engaging through observing forms and so forth* to be truly existent, the *attachment and so forth* which are the object-possessors of forms and so forth *are* also still *produced because of not realizing the entity*, that is, the mode of being, *of those* forms and so forth. For example, by merely stating "There is a cuckoo on the stamens of a flower" without experiencing the sweetness of the stamens oneself, one does not observe their sweetness; likewise, although it is permissible for yogis to merely see that the phenomena which are the aggregates are free from a permanent self, without previously knowing the nature of those forms and so forth, the later realization of it is not observed at all.

According to the lower schools, yogis who see selflessness directly would still observe forms and so forth to be truly existent and, therefore, would still generate the attachment that is an object-possessor observing them.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 357) says:

> Also, it is not that, due to the mere non-existence of a cuckoo on the stamens, while experiencing the sweetness of the stamens the taste is not observed. And, due to observing the own entity of forms and so forth to be truly existent while not being able to abandon the strong adherence which is included in that, what kind of cause for abandoning the attachment and so forth observing forms and so forth would arise in those who see a permanent self does not exist? It would not [arise]. Any person who abandons the attachment and so forth that are the object-possessors of forms and so forth through seeing that a permanent self does not exist, does not rely on objects of pleasurable experience thinking "May the being who is an inner agent be happy," nor acts to avoid meeting undesirable objects through fearing that [the being who is an] inner [agent] will suffer.[143] Therefore, think "Since he does not have the causes for abandoning attachment and so forth, he will not become free from cyclic existence; like the non-Buddhists."

In brief, the conception conceiving forms to be inherently existent cannot be harmed by the realization of the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self. In other words, the realization of the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self does not harm the conception of true existence. Therefore, the realization of the emptiness of permanent, partless, and independent self does not become a cause for abandoning the attachment observing forms. The realization of emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self does not harm the conception that forms and so forth are inherently existent. Because this realization does not abandon the conception of true existence, it also cannot abandon the attachment and so forth which engage forms and so forth in a manner that is not different from that of the conception of true existence. Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas*, as cited previously in the *Illumination*, also says:

> Like the body sense power [abides in] the body,
> Confusion abides in all.

The commentary on this says:

> Confusion, because of obscuring to realize them as truths just as they are, thoroughly operates to exaggeratedly superimpose true existence on things as their own entity. Because the two, attachment and so forth, also operate to superimpose the distinctions of attractiveness and unattractiveness and so forth on only the nature of things which are imputed by confusion, they operate not differently from confusion. They are also based on confusion because confusion is the main [affliction].

> When this is explained [it is as follows]. "Confusion, because of obscuring to realize them as truths just as they are, thoroughly operates to exaggeratedly superimpose on things their own entity of truth" indicates that confusion is the conception of true existence. "Attachment and so forth... operate not differently from confusion" [means that] they operate concomitant with confusion and do not operate free from it.

The realization of the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self does not harm the conception of true existence and does not harm the attachment and so forth that operate in a manner that is not different from the conception of true existence. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, because of engaging through observing forms and so forth to be truly existent, the attachment and so forth which are the object-possessors of forms and so forth are also still produced because of not realizing the entity, that is, the mode of being, of those forms and so forth." To clarify this, the example of a cuckoo is set out saying: "For example, by merely stating 'There is a cuckoo on the stamens of a

[143] There appears to be some mistake in the Tibetan which reads *nang rtag bde sdug bsngal bar dogs nas*, but, it is not clear how to correct it. Perhaps *rtag bde* should be omitted. See Chandrakirti's *Supplement* which simply reads "due to fearing it as suffering."

flower' without experiencing the sweetness of the stamens oneself, one does not observe their sweetness." Similarly, by means of the mere realization of the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self, the emptiness of inherent existence of forms and so forth is not realized. Likewise, if one does not experience a particular taste, one does not observe that taste. For example, if someone eating some food says that it is delicious, one does not observe that taste unless that food is placed on one's own tongue. In other words, just through someone describing sweetness as being a lack of sourness, one does not observe that sweetness.

"Also, it is not that, due to the mere non-existence of a cuckoo on the stamens, while experiencing the sweetness of the stamens the taste is not observed" means that if someone says that a particular flower is not sweet because there is no cuckoo on it, there is no pervasion because if that flower is tasted its sweetness can be experienced. The absence of the cuckoo is not a correct reason for saying that the flower is not sweet because there is no pervasion. Similarly, even if someone realizes the absence of a permanent self, that person still adheres to forms and so forth as truly existent. Who would such a person be? He could be a Vaibhashika in that they realize the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self, yet assert the self to be truly existent. Since the Vaibhashikas adhere to forms and so forth as truly existent, they do not have the cause for abandoning the attachment and so forth observing forms and so forth. In brief, the realization of the emptiness of a permanent self does not act to abandon the conception of true existence of forms and so forth and the attachment and so forth to them.

Hence, although someone has the realization of the non-existence of a permanent self, he still conceives a truly existent person. Due to this, he still adheres to forms and so forth as truly existent and makes use of them in order to experience happiness. He conceives happiness and suffering to exist truly. He lacks the cause of abandoning attachment and aversion for such feelings and, therefore, like the non-Buddhists, is unable to become free from cyclic existence.

Thursday morning, 8 February 2001

Because the self imputed by others does not exist, one who realizes this would not act to bring about its happiness and would not fear that it suffers, due to which one would not engage in a method for avoiding that it suffers. In other words, because the self or being imputed by the Forders is seen to not exist, there is no discussion as to its experiencing and not experiencing suffering.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 358) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2D Explaining the intention of teaching the aggregates to be the self

1 Explaining the meaning of teaching that all views of a self are a view of the aggregates alone
2 Explaining, in dependence on other sutras, that the mere collection of the aggregates is not the self
3 Refuting that the structure which is the shape of the mere collection of aggregates is the self
4 Presenting other harm to asserting the mere collection of the aggregates to be the self
5 The Subduer taught the self to be imputed in dependence on the six constituents and so forth

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2D1 Explaining the meaning of teaching that all views of a self are a view of the aggregates alone

A Indicating the intention of the scriptures to be from the negative position of eliminating the object of negation
B Even treated as being from the affirmative position, the aggregates are not indicated to be the self
C Dispelling others' arguments regarding these

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2D1A Indicating the intention of the scriptures to be from the negative position of eliminating the object of negation

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is considered: We, taking the scriptures as valid, are not harmed by the valid cognition of logicians. Scripture also indicates the aggregates alone to be the self. As was taught [in sutra]:
>
> > O bhikshus, any trainee in virtue or brahmin who correctly subsequently views the "self," they correctly subsequently view only these five appropriated aggregates.

Someone says that because they take the scriptures as valid they are not harmed by the logicians, or non-Buddhists, who assert a self that is a different entity from the aggregates. This is because in this sutra citation the Buddha says that the aggregates are the self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is also similar here.
>
> *When, since the teacher said the aggregates are the self,*
> *Therefore, the aggregates are asserted as the self,*
> *That refutes a self other than the aggregates*
> *Because other sutras teach form is not self and so forth.* [6.132]
>
> This sutra, from which it is believed that "The aggregates are the self," just does not clarify the aggregates as the very self.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that although this sutra says that the aggregates are the self, the aggregates are not the self. Then, what was the Buddha's intention in saying this? His intention was to refute a self that is other than the aggregates, that is, a self that is a different entity from the aggregates. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, the aggregates and the self are one entity, not different entities.

In short, the Buddha did say that the aggregates are the self but this is not to be literally accepted in that the intention was to refute a self that is a different entity from the aggregates.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-2B1B-4A1 Showing that the meaning of the teaching is from the point of view of negation
>
> *You may maintain the aggregates are the self*
> *Because Buddha said, "The aggregates are the self."*
> *But this was denying a self apart from the aggregates,*
> *For another sutra says they are not the self.* [6.132]

You may say, "I maintain that the aggregates are the self because the Master taught the aggregates were the self, since he said, '[O bhiks□us,] those shramanas or brahmans who examine "I" in their minds examine only these five constituent aggregates.'" That sutra is denying a self of separate entity from the aggregates, but is not teaching that the aggregates are the self, for in another sutra it is taught "The self is not form" and so on.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Well then, what?

> The intention of the Bhagavan is that "There does not exist any self different from the aggregates" in order to refute the Forders' scriptures through reliance on the deceptive truth and in order to clarify that as mistaken deceptive truth.

In brief, there does not exist any self that is a different entity from the aggregates. "In order to refute the Forders' scriptures through reliance on the deceptive truth" means that the self asserted by the Forders does not exist even conventionally, therefore, it neither exists ultimately nor conventionally. The self posited by the Forders is an object of negation for the Prasangika Madhyamikas, whereas for the Forders themselves it is a conventionally existent self. What is the self posited by the Forders? As was mentioned before it is a consumer, permanent, and so forth. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, a self that possesses the five qualities does not exist. How do Buddhists define the self? They would say that it is a non-associated compositional factor.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, if asked: From where is this statement so ascertained, "This is to refute a self other than the aggregates?"
>
> Because in other sutras, also form and so forth are refuted to be the very self.
>
> If asked: How?

Chandrakirti paraphrases sutra saying:

> *Since form and feeling are not the self, nor is discrimination;*
> *Compositional factors are not, nor is consciousness,*
> *Is taught in other sutras – therefore,*
> *The teaching in the sutra does not assert "The aggregates are the self."* [6.133]
>
> Therefore, in the sutra which states:
>
> > ... correctly subsequently views the "self" in only these five appropriated aggregates…
>
> – it is ascertained to only refute a self that is different from the aggregates.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Because another sutra says that form*
> *And feeling aren't the self, nor is recognition,*
> *And volition and consciousness are not,*
> *The sutra's teaching is not "The self is the aggregates."* [6.133]

This teaching in the sutra, "shramanas or brahmans who, etc.," is not asserting that the aggregates are the self, because in another sutra it is taught that form and feeling are not the self, nor is recognition, volition is not self and consciousness too is not.

This was taught only to refute a self that is a different *entity* from the aggregates.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In that [sutra] in which also form and so forth are refuted to be the very self, it should be known that "The dependently imputed self, the object of the view of the transitory collection, the possessor

of the appropriated aggregates" is refuted because of coming in the context of contemplating suchness. It is appropriate to separate from attachment also to form and so forth saying "When the appropriator is not observed, also its appropriations do not exist."

Since it is taught in other sutras, therefore, the previous [line]: *the teaching in the sutra does not assert "The aggregates are the self."*

In short, the sutra does not assert "The aggregates are the self," rather it refutes a self that is a different entity from the aggregates.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 358) says:

OBJECTION:

"The Teacher taught 'The aggregates are the self.'" [6.132a]

We, who take the scriptures as valid, are not harmed by the valid cognizers of logicians in that the scriptures also present the aggregates alone to be the self. *The Teacher*, by stating [the following], *taught "The aggregates are the self"*:

> Monks, any trainees in virtue or brahmins who perfectly and subsequently view thinking "Self," they perfectly and subsequently view just the five appropriated aggregates.

RESPONSE:

If, because of that, you assert the aggregates to be the self,
This was to refute a self that is different from the aggregates
Because other sutras teach "Form is not the self" and so forth. [6.132bcd]

If, because of that, you assert the aggregates to be the self, it is not that the aggregates are presented in this sutra to be the self. Why is that? The intention of the Teacher is *to refute* the assertion that *a self which is a different* entity *from the aggregates* is the observed object of the view of the self by the delineating term 'just'

- because he refutes the Forder's texts in dependence on the conventional truth and
- because he unmistakenly presents the self that exists as a conventional truth.

When the Buddha taught that the aggregates are the self in this brief presentation in sutra, his intention was that indicate that there does not exist a self that is a different entity from the aggregates. For this reason, the Prasangika Madhyamikas conclude that the aggregates and the self are one entity, however, this does not mean that a self is found when sought among the aggregates, nor does it mean that the aggregates are the self.

What do the Prasangika Madhyamikas posit as the observed object of the view of the transitory collection? They posit the self. This self is not a self that is a different entity from the aggregates, but is a self that is merely imputed. Because the self that is merely imputed in dependence on the aggregates is the observed object of the view of the transitory collection, this presentation refutes the self imputed by the Forders exists conventionally and, simultaneously, presents the self that exists conventionally. What is this self? It is the self that is merely imputed in dependence on any of the five aggregates. This is what is meant by the Buddha saying: "they perfectly and subsequently view just the five appropriated aggregates." The aggregates are the objects of appropriation and the self is the appropriator.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 359) says:

QUESTION: Moreover, from what is it to be understood that a self which is different entity from the aggregates is refuted?

RESPONSE: *It is because* by stating "*Form is not the self*" *and so forth in other sutras* it is *taught* that form and so forth are refuted to be the self.

This is quite clear in itself.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 359) says:

QUESTION: How is this refuted in other sutras?
RESPONSE:

Because in other sutras it is taught that
Forms and feelings are not the self, discriminations are also not,
Compositional factors are also not, consciousnesses are also not,
The brief presentation does not assert "The aggregates are the self." [6.133]

Because in other sutras it is taught that forms and feelings are not the self, discriminations are also not the self, *compositional factors are also not* the self, *consciousnesses are also not the self, the brief presentation* "...who perfectly and subsequently view just the five appropriated aggregates thinking 'self'..." *does not assert "The aggregates are the self,"* whereas the assertion that there is a self which is different entity from the aggregates is ascertained to just be refuted by the word 'just.'

The term 'just' refutes the assertion that there is a self that is a different entity from the aggregates. Who asserts such a self? The Samkhyas, Vaisheshikas, Nirgranthas, Naiyayikas, and so forth assert a self that is a different entity from the aggregates.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 359) says:

OBJECTION: Although this sutra by stating "views just..." indeed refutes a self which is another object, through teaching that one views the five aggregates stating "views just the five aggregates" it clearly presents the aggregates to be the observed object of the view of a self, therefore, the intention of the sutra is that the aggregates are the observed object of the view of a self.

This objection is made by the lower schools.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 359-60) says:

RESPONSE: If that were the case, it would contradict the teachings in other sutras that the five aggregates are not the self because from among the two, (i) the observed object and (ii) the aspect of the conception of I, the innate view of the transitory collection, if it is the observed object it must be the self. There is no harm to the meaning of the latter sutra that teaches this because the harm to the contrary meaning was explained many times before and it will be explained yet again.

If it is said that the aggregates are the self, this would contradict the sutras that say that the aggregates are not a self, in that the observed object of the view of the transitory collection is the conventionally existent self. To summarize, in this context there are two sutra citations:

1. "they perfectly and subsequently view just the five appropriated aggregates" and
2. "Forms and feelings are not the self, discriminations are also not, compositional factors are also not, consciousnesses are also not."

There is no harm to the citation from the latter sutra because the observed object of the view of the transitory collection is posited to be the mere I that is imputed in dependence on any of the five aggregates. "Because the harm to the contrary meaning was explained many times before and it will be explained yet again" means that the harm to the contrary meaning – that is, that forms are the self, feelings are the self, and so forth – has already been explained and will be explained again.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 360) says:

> The previous sutra does not present the aggregates to be the observed object of the view of the transitory collection. Therefore, stating "views the aggregates" clarifies that the self that is imputed in dependence on the aggregates is indicated to be the observed object because it refutes that
> - what is a different entity from the aggregates and
> - the aggregates themselves
>
> are the observed objects of the conception of a self.

That which is a different entity from the aggregates and the aggregates themselves are refuted to be the observed object of the conception of a self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 360) says:

> In any sutra in which forms and so forth are also refuted to be the self, the self that is imputed in dependence – the observed object of the view of the transitory collection – should be understood to refute an inherently existent possessor of the appropriations which are the aggregates that appropriates the aggregates because the teaching that forms and so forth are not the self is in the context of thinking about suchness.

Thursday afternoon, 8 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 360) says:

> Hence, it is appropriate to separate from the attachment that also adheres to forms and so forth as truly existent stating "When an inherently existent appropriator is not observed, also the appropriated objects of that self, the aggregates, do not exist inherently."

Since the appropriator, the self, does not exist inherently, also the objects to be appropriated, the aggregates, do not exist inherently. Therefore, "it is appropriate to separate from the attachment that also adheres to forms and so forth as truly existent."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 360-1) says:

> Having excellently compared the sutra sets to one another, (1) what is a different entity from the aggregates and (2) the aggregates are refuted to be the observed object of the conception of a self. Then, the uncommon way of positing the selflessness of persons, which is a self imputed in dependence on the aggregates that is merely posited by the force of a nominality which is a name – the intention of the sutras which did not[144] clearly emerge in spite of the scholars of our own upper and lower schools exerting themselves well in the many commentaries on the sutras – is extracted by means of unmistaken scriptural authority and reasonings. In dependence on that, also other phenomena are clearly presented as without a self of phenomena which is not a different way of positing that. Then, one should strive to understand well the uncommon assertions of the lord of the wise that nakedly reveal the sources of the extremely subtle intention of the Buddha Bhagavan.

When one investigates the sutras they are found to say that there is no self that is a different entity from the aggregates and that the aggregates are not the observed object of the conception of a self of persons. The uncommon way of positing the self of persons in the Prasangika Madhyamika system is to posit it as merely imputed in dependence on any of the aggregates. Thus, in this school there is no self existing from its own side as a different entity from the aggregates.

[144] The negative particle is missing in the Tibetan.

"The scholars of our own upper and lower schools exerting themselves well in many commentaries on the sutras" refers to the lower schools, the Vaibhashika and Sautrantika, and the upper schools, the Chittamatra and Svatantrika Madhyamika, who are unable extract the meaning of the sutras. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas have an uncommon mode of positing the two selflessness which clearly reveals the subtle intention of the Buddha Bhagavan. The lower schools distinguish the two selflessnesses in terms of the object of negation, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas distinguish them in terms of the basis of negation and not in terms of the object of negation. Thus, they say that the person's emptiness of inherent existence is the selflessness of persons, whereas the aggregates' emptiness of inherent existence is the selflessness of phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 361) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2D1B Even treated as being from the affirmative position, the aggregates are not indicated to be the self

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore, even though this [statement] indicated in the sutra sets is ascertained in the positive mode, it is not able to indicate the aggregates as just being the self.
>
> If asked: Why?
>
> Like this:
>
> *When expressing "The aggregates are the self," it is the*
> *Collection of aggregates, not the entity of the aggregates.* [6.134ab]
>
> For example, when expressing, "The trees are the forest," the collection of trees is the forest; the entity of tree is not because each tree would also follow as the forest. Similarly, the very collection of aggregates is the self.

Even if the sutra citation "Monks, any trainees in virtue or brahmins who perfectly and subsequently view thinking 'Self,' they perfectly and subsequently view just the five appropriated aggregates" is explained from the point of view of the affirmative position, it does not indicate each of the five aggregates to be the self.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1B-4A2 Even put from the point of view of establishment, it does not show that the aggregates are the self

> *When it says, "The aggregates are the self," it is*
> *The group of aggregates, not the aggregates' entities.* [6.134ab]

"Although this sutra, 'The shramanas or brahmans who…', teaches that the aggregates are the self, it is not teaching that the entities of the aggregates individually are the self, for when it says 'The aggregates are the self,' it is teaching that the collection of aggregates is the self. For example, when we say 'The trees are the forest,' the collection of trees is the forest, but we do not say each tree is the forest." – thus the establisher states an example to his opponent.

The sutra that says "views just the five appropriated aggregates" indicates that the collection of the five aggregates is the self, not that each of the aggregates is the self. The analogy set out here is that of a collection of trees which is called a forest, whereas each individual tree is not called a forest. This is

an example that is established for the opponents. "Similarly, the very collection of aggregates is the self."

In short, the collection of aggregates is indicated to be the self, not the individual aggregates. However, if it is said that the collection of aggregates is the self, our own system responds that it is also not that the collection of aggregates are the self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, because the collection of aggregates is just not anything:
>
> *Not protector, nor subduer, nor witness –*
> *Because that is non-existent, that is not the collection.* [6.134cd]
>
> When, it is taught as the very protector and the very witness in that which the Bhagavan said [in sutra]:
>
> Oneself is one's own protector,
> Oneself is also one's own enemy,
> Oneself is one's own witness
> To the good and bad done.
>
> and when taught as the subduer in the statement [in the *Collection of Teachings*, 23.14cd]:
>
> By well subduing oneself,
> The wise will attain high status.
>
> – the mere collection, not being substantially existent, is not even appropriate as the very protector, subduer, or witness. Therefore, the collection is not the self.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *It's not the Protector, the Subduer, nor the Witness,*
> *As it doesn't exist, so the group cannot be it.* [6.134cd]

If you say, "I maintain that the group of aggregates is the self," then just the group of aggregates is not the self, for it is not the Protector, and is also not the Subduer nor the Witness, since it does not exist substantially.

Neither the collection of aggregates nor the individual aggregates are indicated to be the self. In order to prove that the collection is not the self, the Prasangika Madhyamikas cite the sutra that says:

> Oneself is one's own protector,
> Oneself is also one's own enemy,
> Oneself is one's own witness
> To the good and bad done.

On this basis they say that the collection of the aggregates is not the self because the collection of aggregates is not one's own protector, one's own enemy, and one's own witness. Who is one's own protector, one's own enemy, and one's own witness? It is the self.

Sutra also says: "By well subduing oneself, the wise will attain high status." This means that by subduing the self well, one will be reborn as a human being and so forth.

Chandrakirti concludes saying: "The mere collection, not being substantially existent, is not even appropriate as the very protector, subduer, or witness. Therefore, the collection is not the self." This subject is often discussed in the teachings on the stages of the path (lam-rim).

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 361) says:

> Although the statement "views just the five appropriated aggregates" presents the aggregates to be the self from the point of view of the affirmative position, it does not present each aggregate as the self. Why is that?
>
> *When it is stated "The aggregates are the self," it is the collection of*
> *The aggregates; it is not the entity of the aggregates.* [6.134ab]
>
> It is like this. *When it is stated "The aggregates are the self," the collection of the aggregates* are expressed as the self; *the entity*, that is, each, *of the aggregates is not* presented as the self. For example, when it is stated that "The trees are the forest" it is the collection of trees that is the forest; it is not that each entity of a tree is said to be a forest due to the individual trees becoming a forest. This expresses an example that is established for others.

The sutra that says "The aggregates are the self" says that the collection of the aggregates is the self, not that the individual aggregates are the self. In order to explain this the analogy of a forest is set out in that, similarly, the collection of the trees is a forest, not the individual trees. Therefore, even if the sutra citation "views just the five appropriated aggregates" is taken from the affirmative position, the Buddha meant that the collection of the aggregates is the self, not that the individual aggregates are the self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 361) says:

> OBJECTION: The collection is asserted to be the self.
> RESPONSE:
>
> *It is not a protector, neither is it a subduer nor a witness,*
> *Because it does not exist; thus, it is not the mere collection.* [6.134cd]
>
> In that case, the self was taught to be a protector, a subduer, and a witness, however, according to you, a single collection is *not a protector*, *neither is it a subduer nor a witness*, *because it*, a mere collection, *does not exist* substantially; *thus*, the self *is not the mere collection* of the aggregates. The way in which the self was taught to be a protector and so forth is in the sutra that says:
>
> Oneself is one's own protector;
> Oneself is also one's own enemy;
> Oneself is one's own witness
> To the good and bad created.
>
> This [verse] teaches it to be a protector and witness, whereas it [also] says:
>
> By subduing oneself well,
> The wise attain high status.

Someone says that the collection of the aggregates is asserted to be the self because the Buddha said so. Our own system says that too is not correct and to prove this quotes the sutra that says: "Oneself is one's own protector..." This verse shows that one's own protector and so forth is the self, not the collection of the aggregates. Our system then quotes another sutra that says "By subduing oneself well, the wise attain high status," which means that through subduing one's mental continuum, in the future one will take a rebirth of high status. One text says: "Is the mind that is hard and unsubdued not as hard as a diamond?" A diamond is known to for the fact that it cannot be broken by other objects. Also, is the unsubdued mind not like a crazed elephant? Just as a crazed elephant is difficult to control, so too is an unsubdued mind.

"Oneself is one's own protector" means that one has to protect oneself, no one else can do so. How can we protect ourselves? We can do so by taking care of our body and mind through protecting our physical health and protecting our mind from disturbing thoughts. For example, we may drink alcohol or take other substances thinking that they will make us happy, but instead they lead to suffering. In this way oneself becomes one's own enemy. We should also be our own witness in the sense of being honest with ourselves and not deceiving ourselves.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 361) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2D1C Dispelling others' arguments regarding these

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is considered: Because the collection does not exist as a different [entity] from the collection-possessor, the resultant [protector, subduer, etc.] will be realized as being the collection-possessor's. Therefore, it will be appropriate as the very protector, subduer, and the very witness.
>
> That is also not so, because the fault in this was already explained.

The opponents say that the collection of the aggregates is the protector, subduer, and witness because it brings the result of protecting, subduing, and witnessing. Therefore, the collection of the aggregates is the self. Our own system says that this is not the case because the fault in this was already explained just above.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:
>
> *Then, the collection of its components abiding [in one place]*[145]
> *Would be the chariot itself. The chariot and the self are similar.* [6.135ab]
>
> It is also taught in sutra:[146]
>
> O mind of mara saying "Self," you are a [wrong] view.
> This aggregate of compositional factors is empty. In it, there is no sentient being.
>
> Just as the chariot is expressed in dependence on the collection of components,
> Likewise, conventionally, is "sentient being" in dependence on the aggregates.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1B-4A3 Rejecting an opponent's argument against this

You may say, "It is not contrary to the Protector, Subduer, and Witness because the action of protecting is a member of the group. This pervades because the group and the group members are one entity." But this too is inadmissible, for if the word "self" sometimes applies to the group of aggregates and sometimes applies to members of the group, it is illogical.

> *Then, its parts remaining collected would be*
> *The cart itself. The cart and the self are similar.* [6.135ab]

[145] See LTK, p. 379. Compare with verse 6.152ab.

[146] See Poisson, p. 303 for the Sanskrit of a possible source.

Furthermore, you should understand that it follows that when you maintain that the collection of aggregates is the self, the collection of the parts of that cart lying together will be the cart itself, because the cart and the self are both alike in being posited or not upon the collections of their parts; and also because it is taught in a sutra,

> "Just as, dependent on collections
> Of their parts, one speaks of 'carts',
> Likewise, dependent on the aggregates,
> Conventionally, one says 'sentient being'."

Sutra says: "O mind of mara saying 'Self' you are a [wrong] view." This means that always thinking or saying "I, I, I," is the mind of mara. "This aggregate of compositional factors is empty" means that it is empty of inherent existence. Sutra says: "In it, there is no sentient being."

Just as a chariot is imputed in dependence on the collection of its parts, so too is the self imputed in dependence on the collection of the five aggregates. The collection of the five aggregates is not a self, just as the components of a chariot are not a chariot. For example, when one dismantles a chariot and spreads out its parts, the components of the chariot remain there, however, with regard to them one would not say "There is a chariot" because the components that are lying there do not perform the function of a chariot. Another example is in regard to a dismantled watch, the parts of which are laid out on a table, no one would say "There is a watch on the table," even though all its parts are on the table. This is because the components of the watch do not function as a watch.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 361-2) says:

> OBJECTION: Because the collection does not exist as a different entity from the possessor of the collection, the result – protecting and so forth – is realized to be of the possessor of the collection, therefore, [the collection] is suitable to be a protector, subduer, and witness.
> RESPONSE: The term 'self' is sometimes taken to be the collection of aggregates, whereas sometimes it is affixed to the possessor of the collection, the aggregates. In regard to this, the faults were already explained above stating "The term 'self' should not be affixed to them individually as one likes."

Neither each of the five aggregates nor the collection of the five aggregates is the self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 362) says:

> There are also other faults:
> *Then, the collection of components of that abiding*
> *Would be the chariot itself. The chariot and the self are similar.* [6.135ab]
>
> *When* the collection of aggregates is asserted to be the self, there is the fault that *the collection of the components of* a chariot *abiding* in one place *would be the chariot itself* because the two, *the chariot and the self, are similar* in being posited and not being posited in regard to the collection of their components. They are also shown to be similar in sutra stating:
>
> Mind of mara called "the self,"
> You are a view.
> The compositional factors aggregate is empty;
> In regard to it, the sentient being does not exist.
>
> Just as in dependence on a collection of components
> 'Chariot' is expressed;
> Likewise, in dependence on the aggregates
> Conventionally one says "sentient being."

Friday morning, 9 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 362) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2D2 Explaining, in dependence on other sutras, that the mere collection of the aggregates is not the self

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If like that:

It is taught in sutra to be in dependence on the aggregates.
Therefore, the mere assembly of aggregates is not the self. [6.135cd]

Since sutra says that the self is imputed in dependence on the aggregates, the self is not the collection or the assembly of the aggregates.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says::

3B1A-6C5A-2B1B-4B Showing, relying on other sutras, that the self is not the mere group of aggregates

A sutra says, "It depends on the aggregates,"
So the mere assembly of aggregates isn't the self. [6.135cd]

The mere assembly of five aggregates is not the self because it is taught in a sutra that one imputes "sentient being" dependent on a group of aggregates.

The self is imputed in dependence on the aggregates, due to which the collection or group of aggregates is not the self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

That which is imputed in dependence on something is not the mere collection of components which appropriate the imputation because it is dependently imputed, like that arisen from the elements (i.e., the secondary elements).

That arisen from the elements (the secondary elements or the evolutes) are blue and so forth. These arise from the elements, but are not the elements. In short, blue and so forth are not earth, water, fire, wind, or space.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Just as, having taken the elements as a cause, that arisen from the elements – blue and so forth and the eye and so forth – are indeed imputed; the two are not just the mere assembly of the elements. Similarly, having taken the aggregates as a cause, the self also has the nature of imputation – it is not suitable to be the mere collection of the aggregates.

Blue and so forth and the eye and so forth are not an assembly of the elements. The aggregates are the causes for imputing the self, but they themselves are not the self. Here the word "cause" is to be understood in terms of it being a basis of imputation, not in terms of it being an actual cause.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If said: That is uncertain due to vases and so forth.
>
> That is also not so, because even vases and so forth are not established as being just the mere collection of form and so forth and because of similar dispute and investigation.

Vases and so forth are merely imputed on the elements, but the elements of the vase and so forth are not the vase. An assembly of elements cannot be a vase because there are assemblies of elements that are not vases. Thus, the mere assembly of the eight particles is not a vase, that is, when the term 'vase' is imputed on the basis of the eight particles that assembly of eight particles is not necessarily a vase. Likewise, when the self is imputed on the aggregates, that collection of aggregates is not necessarily a self. Thus, while the basis of imputation of the self is the assembly of the aggregates, that basis is not the self.

"Because of similar dispute and investigation" means that this subject can be similarly disputed and investigated in regard to many other things besides vases and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 362) says:

> *In sutra it is taught that it depends on the aggregates,*
> *Therefore, the mere assembly is not the self.* [6.135cd]
>
> As explained above, *in sutra it is taught* "The sentient being is imputed *in dependence on* the collection of *the aggregates*." *Therefore, the mere assembly*, that is, the collection, of aggregates *is not the self*. This is clarified by the speech that proves just this [as follows].
>
> Whatever is imputed in dependence on something is not the mere collection of components that appropriate that imputation because it is imputed in dependence [on that], like the evolutes. Just as, through taking the elements as a cause, the evolutes – such as blue and so forth and the eye and so forth – are indeed imputed, but the two are not the mere assembly of elements; likewise, even though the self has the nature of being imputed through taking the aggregates as a cause, it is not suitable to be the mere collection of aggregates.

In sutra the Buddha said that the self is imputed in dependence on the collection of the aggregates, yet the collection of the aggregates is not the self. Similarly, the evolutes are imputed on the elements, but the evolutes are not the elements. In other words, blue and so forth and the eye sense power and so forth arise from the elements, but blue and so forth and the eye sense power and so forth are not the elements because a mere assembly of elements is not pervaded by being blue and so forth nor the eye sense power and so forth. What is the eye sense power composed of? It is an aggregation of the eight types of particles. If it is an aggregation of the eight types of particles is it pervaded by being matter? Do the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert matter as one of the three types of functioning things? They do. Are form and matter synonymous according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas? If someone says that they are, then it can be asked: "Is the eye sense power of a buddha an assembly of the eight particles? Does the impure exist in a pure realm?" The various tenet systems would answer these questions differently; for example, the Chittamatrins do not accept matter which is an aggregation of the eight particles. Similarly, the Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas do not assert matter because they say that there is nothing that is an aggregation of external particles. However, if they are asked whether form exists, they would accept that it does, therefore, the Chittamatrins and Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas differentiate form and matter. *Collected Topics*, which is according to the Sautrantika system, presents matter, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factors, whereas others posit form, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factors. Thus, according to Sautrantikas form and matter are synonymous.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 362-3) says:

> OBJECTION: When sutra teaches "In dependence on the collection of aggregates," the collection is not suitable to be the person. However, since [this sutra] does not state more than "Likewise, in dependence on the aggregates," it is not the source for positing the collection of aggregates to be the basis of the person.
> RESPONSE: It is not so. In the context of the example, stating "Just as [in dependence on] a collection of components" explains it to be a chariot in dependence on the collection of its components. Therefore, when setting out the chariot and the meaning of the example, although 'collection' is not explicitly expressed in the context of stating "Likewise, in dependence on the aggregates," it is very clear that this must emerge. Therefore, this is the way in which the lord of the wise brings forth the ability to interpret the words of the sutra, thereby, producing delight in the mind when finely understood.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the self is imputed in dependence on the collection of the aggregates, but that the collection of aggregates is not the self. Someone objects to this saying that there is no scriptural source for saying this since the sutra only states "Likewise, in dependence on the aggregates" and does not say the self is imputed in dependence on *the collection* of the aggregates. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it is not so because this is stated through the analogy of the chariot. Lama Tsongkhapa says that when the words of the sutra are interpreted properly, delight is produced in the mind.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 363) says:

> OBJECTION: This is not definite due to pots and so forth.
> RESPONSE: That too is not so
> - because pots and so forth are also not established to be the mere collection of form and so forth and
> - because here there is also the same dispute and investigation as in the case of the self.
>
> Hence, the two are presented as being similar in that just as the self is not suitable to be posited as the collection of its components, so too are pots and so forth not suitable to be posited as the mere collection of their components.

The mere collection of the eight particles, form and so forth, is not the pot. The eight particles refer to visual form particles, odor particles, taste particles, tangible object particles, earth particles, water particles, fire particles, and wind particles. A pot arises from the collection of these eight particles, yet a collection of these eight particles is not necessarily a pot. Thus, the self and a pot are similar in the sense that just as the self is not suitable to be posited as the collection of its components, so too is a pot not suitable to be posited as the collection of its components. Thus, the collection of components is not the pot and the collection of aggregates is not the self, yet the pot is imputed in dependence on the collection of components and the self is imputed in dependence on the collection of aggregates.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 363) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2D3 Refuting that the structure which is the shape of the mere collection of aggregates is the self

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is considered: The mere collection of the wheel and so forth is not the chariot.
>
> If asked: What is?

When the wheels and so forth come to have a special shape, then it will obtain the name chariot. Similarly, the mere structure of the form and so forth is the self.

That is also not so

If asked: Why?

If shape is said, because that exists with the possessor of form,
For you, just those would be the self;
The collection of mind and so forth would not be the very self, [6.136abc]

If asked: Why?

Since those do not have shape. [6.136d]

It is thought that "They are not a possessor of form."

Someone says that the collection of aggregates is not the self and, similarly, the components of a chariot, the wheels and so forth, are not the chariot, but the shape of the chariot is the chariot. They say: "When the wheels and so forth come to have a special shape, then it will obtain the name chariot. Similarly, the mere structure of the form and so forth is the self." In other words, this person says that the arrangement is not the chariot, but its shape is the chariot. To this, the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond that the shape is also not the self and to prove this set out the analogy of a chariot. They say that when the components of a chariot are not assembled they are not called a chariot, and that only when they are assembled together do they come to be called "chariot."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says::

3B1A-6C5A-2B1B-4C The self is not the shape or structure of the group of aggregates

If it's the shape, then that's in what has form,
So according to you, only they would be the self,
While the group of mind and so on would not be the self,
Because in these there is not any shape. [6.136]

If you say, "The shape or structure of the group of aggregates is the self," then it follows that you are saying that, according to you, only those things which have form are the self, but the collection of mind and so on is not the self because shape exists in what has form, and in mind and so on there is no shape.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 363) says:

OBJECTION: The mere collection of the wheels and so forth not being the chariot, well then, what is? If the collection of the wheels and so forth become what possesses the specific shape of a chariot, then it acquires the name 'chariot.' Similarly, the mere structure which is the shape of the aggregates of form and so forth in the continuum of a sentient being is the self.

RESPONSE:

If "It is shape" is said, because it exists in that having form,
For you, they would be called "the self," whereas
The collection of minds and so forth would not be the very self
Because they do not have shape. [6.136]

Because shape *exists in* just *that having form*, when distinguished *for you* – that is, according to you – just *those* having form *would be called "the self*," *whereas the collection of minds and so forth*, that is, the mental factors, *would not be* posited as *the very self because they*, minds and mental factors, *do not have shape*, thinking "Because they do not have form."

In short, when the opponents say that the shape is the self the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it is not so because shape exists only in that which has form, that is, that which is physical, due to which minds and mental factors do not have shape because they are not physical. The lower schools assert that the mind is the self, therefore, the mere collection of the minds and mental factors is the self. This can be debated: "Is there no self in the formless realm because there is no shape in the formless realm?"

In conclusion, the collection is not the self nor is the shape the self.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: In the presentation of the three natures by Prasangika, what is an example of an *existent* imputational factor?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Space.
Student: Why?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is both an existent and an imputational factor!
Student: Is pot an existent imputational factor?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is not an imputational factor, it is an other-powered phenomenon. The three natures are nominally asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas, but their way of defining them is different. They say that an other-powered phenomenon is: that which is produced by its own causes and conditions. A thoroughly established nature is an ultimate truth, that is, it is the final observed object of a path that purifies. Imputational factors are divided into the existent and non-existent due to which their definition becomes more complicated. There is no standard definition given in the texts, however, an imputational factor can be defined as: that which is merely superimposed by the conception apprehending it. This definition can however, be debated.
Student: If it is a superimposing consciousness is it not a wrong consciousness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to *Awarenesses and Knowers* it would be a wrong consciousness but... That is enough about this subject for now.

Student: What is the definition of an imputed existent?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That which is observed by a valid cognizer. For example, this table is an imputed existent. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas imputed existence means: imputed by a valid cognizer on a valid basis.

Student: What is the difference between the appearance of inherent existence and the meaning generality of inherent existence? Is the appearance of inherent existence permanent or impermanent?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The appearance of inherent existence and the meaning generality of inherent existence are different. For example, an ordinary being has the appearance of inherent existence but is not a meaning generality of inherent existence. Ordinary being, as the subject, is not a meaning generality of inherent existence but has an appearance of inherent existence.

The eye consciousness has the appearance of inherent existence, is that appearance permanent or impermanent? In general for the Prasangika Madhyamika the appearance of inherent existence is a knowledge obstruction and, therefore, a functioning thing because it obstructs the attainment of omniscience. However, this question is similar to asking: "Are objects of knowledge permanent or impermanent? In general, they are said to be permanent, but to this someone can say: "Pot, as the subject, is permanent because it is an object of knowledge. There is pervasion because objects of knowledge are permanent." However, there is no pervasion.

Student: Verse 6.106 says: "The statement 'Actions arise in dependence on confusion, they do not arise without ignorance' is certainly realized by only the unwise." To whom does 'unwise' refer?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It refers to us! Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

In the way the power of distorted sight makes someone perceive
Hair falling, two moons, peacock feathers, flies and so on, wrongly,
Like that, by the power of the fault of delusion, the unwise
Perceive with their intelligence the various conditioned things. [6.105]

You should understand that by the power of the fault of delusion[147], the unskillful perceive the various conditioned things with their understanding; for because the world has thick delusion like a layer of cloud, objects therefore appear wrongly. It is just like the way the power of distorted sight makes someone wrongly perceive falling hair, two moons, peacock feathers, flies and so on.

"Karma arises dependent on delusion. Without delusion
It doesn't arise." Certainly only the unskilled have to know this.
Having completely dispelled dense darkness with the sun of good intelligence,
Those who are skillful understand voidness thoroughly, and become free. [6.106]

It is certain that only the unskillful have to understand or be concerned with [the teaching], "If karma arises dependent on delusion[148] [or ignorance[149]], then, without delusion, that karma will not arise." For the skillful, who have completely eliminated the dense darkness [of their ignorance] with the sun of good intelligence that realizes absolute reality, thoroughly understand voidness and become liberated.

We create virtuous and non-virtuous actions out of ignorance. This is due to being unwise or unskillful in the sense of not understanding emptiness. Those who are wise – that is, those who directly realize emptiness – no longer create non-virtuous actions and actions to be reborn in cyclic existence. It can also be said that those who continue to circle in cyclic existence due to actions and afflictions are the unwise. Why do they remain in cyclic existence? It is due to their dense ignorance or confusion, due to which they create non-virtuous actions and continue to circle in cyclic existence.

Student: The definition of consciousness is "that which is clear and knowing." Is 'knowing' the only possible function of a consciousness, or are there also other functions? If it is the only one, how can we explain other functions that the mental consciousness seems to perform, e.g., imputing, retrieving memories, creating mental objects (such as dreams)?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The definition of consciousness as "clear and knowing" indicates the entity of consciousness, just as the definition of fire as "that which is hot and burning" indicates the entity of fire. Is burning the only function of fire? It is not, it also functions to boil tea, cook food, and so forth. Likewise, when consciousness is defined as clear and knowing this is its entity, whereas it has many functions such as imputing, thinking, creating, inventing, and so forth.

END

[147] *gti.mug*

[148] *gti.mug*

[149] *ma.rig.pa*

Monday afternoon, 12 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 364) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2D4 Presenting other harm to asserting the mere collection of the aggregates to be the self

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:
>
> *The taker itself and the appropriated are not reasonable as one thing.* [6.137a]
>
> If asked: Why?
>
> *If like that, the acted upon and the agent would be identical.* [6.137b]
>
> Here, since making appropriation, it is the taker – the agent; [since] to be appropriated it is the appropriated – the acted upon. Here, the appropriator is the self; the appropriated are the five aggregates.
>
> There, if a mere collection of form and so forth were the self, then agent and acted upon would be one. This is also not asserted because the elements and forms that took them as causes, and a vase and the potter, would also follow as identical.

'The appropriator' is the self, whereas 'the appropriated' are the five aggregates. It is not feasible for these two to be one. If the self, the appropriator, and the aggregates, the appropriated, were one, it would follow that agent and acted upon are one. This is because both the appropriator and the appropriated would be the self. Thus, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the appropriator and the appropriated cannot be one.

Other faults are that it would also follow that the elements and the evolutes would be one, a pot and the potter would be one, and so forth. Thus, it would follow that the elements which act as causes – earth, water, fire, and wind – and their results, the evolutes that are what arises from them – form, sounds, and so forth – would be one, likewise, the clay and a clay pot would be one.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As taught [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 10.1ab]:
>
> If that which is fuel is the fire,
> Agent and acted upon would be one.
>
> and [in 10.15]:
>
> By fire and fuel, all stages of
> The self and the appropriated,
> Together with vase, woolen cloth, etc.,
> Without exception, are completely explained.
>
> Here, just as fire and fuel are not asserted as identical, similarly, it is intended to not assert the self and the appropriated either.

There is the fault of the absurd consequence that if fuel and fire were one, agent and acted upon would be one. What is the agent in this case? What is the acted upon? Fire is the agent because it functions to burn, whereas the fuel is the object to be burned, that acted upon. If burner and the object to be burnt were one, it would follow that agent and acted upon would be one.

Nagarjuna says that the explanation of fire and fuel should also be applied to vases, woolen clothes, and so forth. Just as fire and fuel are not asserted to be one, so too the self and the appropriated should not be asserted to be one.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1B-4D Another refutation of the hypothesis that the self is the mere group of aggregates

The grasper itself and the grasped can't be one thing.
If they were, then object and agent would be oneness. [6.137ab]

You should understand that it is impossible that that self, the appropriator, should be a single thing with its own appropriation, the aggregates, for if the self and the aggregates were one like that, the object and agent would be one.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

In case it is thought: Whatever is the very agent – the appropriator – is just not existing at all. It is limited to a mere assembly of the appropriated.

Someone raises the above objection.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

As that also is just unreasonable, it is explained:

If it is thought: "The agent does not exist, that acted upon does,"
It is not so, since without the agent, that acted upon does not exist. [6.137cd]

It is not like that. If the agent is not asserted, that acted upon without cause is not to be asserted either.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

If you think there's no agent, but the object exists,
Not so, for without the agent there's no object. [6.137cd]

If you think that, although the self, the agent, does not exist, the mere assembly of the aggregates, acting as the object, exists inherently, that is also inadmissible, because without the agent, the object does not exist.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if you assert that the agent does not exist, you should not assert the acted upon to exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

It is also taught in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, 8.13]:

Similarly should appropriation be known,
Because of excluding acted upon and agent.
The remaining things should be known by
The agent and that acted upon.

Understanding that the agent and the acted upon are negated to exist inherently, one should also understand that the appropriator and appropriated are also negated to exist inherently. This understanding is to be applied similarly to all remaining things; for example, producer and product are also negated to exist inherently. Likewise, the same is true of the goer and the going; the watcher of TV and the show on TV; the listener and the object of listening, such as guitar music, or the object acted upon, the guitar; the smeller and the perfume; the tongue that tastes and the taste; the body consciousness and a tangible object such as something soft, and so forth. Similarly, one who studies to gain qualities and the qualities to be gained are also negated to exist inherently. Also the meditator and the object of meditation, such as love or compassion, are negated to exist inherently. In this way, the refutation of inherent existence can be applied similarly to all remaining things.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Here, having given the *lut* affix to a thing, since appropriated it is called "the appropriated." Also, since things do not arise without an establisher, its establisher – that to be appropriated and the appropriator – are posited as appropriation. The term 'appropriation,' having given the *lut* affix to the acted upon saying "*krit* and *lut* are mostly," just expresses the acted upon to be the appropriated.

In the context of how the various Sanskrit vowels (one long and one short) are added to a word, a single thing can be indicated to be two things. The *lut* affix refers to the pair of Sanskrit vowels *li* and *lii*. In Sanskrit there are three particles which can, for example, be added to the word 'being' (*parusha*) to indicate a superior being, middling, being, or inferior being, as well as another eight particles. In addition, there are twenty-two affixes (literally, conditions). When the *lut* affix is added to a thing, that word comes to refer to both the appropriator and the appropriated. For example, Nanni is one person but is both father and son because in relation to his father he is a son and in relation to his children he is a father. This affix indicates that Nanni is both father and son, and, similarly, it indicates one thing to be both appropriator and appropriated. Likewise, it can indicate one thing to be both producer and product; for example, fire is a producer because it produces smoke and it is also a product because it is produced from fuel. Thus, by adding this affix, one thing can be indicated to be two things.

The *krit* affix refers to the pair of Sanskrit vowels *ri* and *rii*.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, just as one will impute the acted upon in dependence on the agent, also the agent in dependence on the acted upon, similarly, one will impute appropriator in dependence on the appropriated, the appropriated in dependence on the agent itself.
>
> It is also taught [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 27.8]:
>
> Thus, it is not other than the appropriated,
> Nor is it the appropriated itself.
> The self is not without the appropriated;
> It is also not ascertained as just non-existent.
>
> Therefore, it should be thus understood that "If the agent does not exist, the acted upon also does not exist."

In brief, if the appropriator does not exist, the appropriated does not exist, and, similarly, if the appropriated does not exist, the appropriator does not exist. Thus, "if the agent does not exist, the

acted upon also does not exist." This is to be understood in the sense of existing inherently, however, it can also be asserted in the sense of existing conventionally.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, from that [*Sutra of Ultimate Emptiness*][150] in which it is expressed:
>
> The agent is not observed, yet the acted upon exists, maturation also exists.
>
> – inherently existing agent should be understood to be refuted. It should not be understood that "that which is to be dependently imputed – what has become the limb of convention – is also refuted."

Although the agent is not observed to be inherently existent, maturation still exists conventionally. "The agent is not observed" does not mean that the agent does not exist conventionally; rather, it means that the agent exists conventionally but not ultimately. How is it known that the acted upon exists? This is deduced from the following sutra citation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, as was extensively taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:
>
> This person who subsequently follows ignorance, strongly forms the merit which is to be strongly formed.

This sutra explains the twelve links. Due to ignorance, one creates actions that are meritorious, demeritorious, and immovable, which are deposited on the consciousness, the third link. From this comes a maturation or fruitional result, this being name and form and so forth.

In short, there are no inherently existent agents and objects acted upon. However, if there were it would follow that the agent and the acted upon would be one, whereby, agent and acted upon would not be admissible. However, agent and acted upon do exist conventionally in mutual dependence. Therefore, there is an accumulator of actions and there are actions accumulated, due to which there is the fruition or maturation of actions.

Tuesday morning, 13 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 364) says:

> There are also other faults:
>
> *Oneself, the appropriator, and the appropriated are not suitable to be one thing.*
> *If that were the case, that acted upon and the agent would be oneness.* [6.137ab]
>
> Hence, since acting to appropriate, *oneself* is *the appropriator*, that is, the self is the agent; and, since they are that which is appropriated, the five aggregates are *the appropriated*, that is, that acted upon. These two *not being suitable to be one thing*, the mere collection is not suitable to be posited as the self. *If it were the case* that the mere collection of the aggregates of form and so forth were the self, *that acted upon and the agent would be one*. However, this is also not asserted because the two, an element and the form that is an evolute, as well as a pot and the potter, would be oneness.

[150] Identified by LTK, p. 383.

The lower schools assert that either one of the aggregates is the self or that the collection of the aggregates is the self. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if this were the case it would follow that the appropriator and the appropriated would be one. However, the self, which is the appropriator, and the aggregates, which are the appropriated, cannot be one thing. For this reason the mere collection of the aggregates cannot be posited as the self. Likewise, if the aggregate of form and so forth were the self, it would follow that the agent and that acted upon would be one. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is not correct because an element and the form that is an evolute of it are not one, and a pot and the potter are not one. Therefore, agent and acted upon do not exist inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 364) says:

> [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 10.1ab) also says:
>
> If fuel were fire,
> Agent and the acted upon would be one.
>
> And (v. 10.15):
>
> By fire and fuel, all stages of
> The self and the appropriated,
> Along with pots, woolen clothes, and so forth,
> Without exception, are thoroughly explained.
>
> Here, just as fire and fuel are not asserted to be oneness, likewise, also the self and the appropriated should not be asserted [to be oneness] because these two are taught to be similar.

It would follow that the agent, the fire, and that acted upon, the fuel, would be one, yet they are not one. However, if fuel were fire, then agent and object of the action would be one. Similarly, this fault would also be applicable to other agents and objects such as the appropriator and the appropriated, pots, woolen clothes, and so forth. That is, pot and the clay or the potter would be one, woolen cloth and the thread or the weaver would be one. In short, such things are never one.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 364) says:

> *If it is thought "The agent does not exist, that acted upon exists,"*
> *It is not so because without an agent, the acted upon does not exist.* [6.137cd]
>
> *IF IT IS THOUGHT*: "That which is *the agent*, the appropriator of the collection of aggregates, *does not exist* at all. The agent that *exists* is the mere assembly of the aggregates – the appropriated, *that acted upon*."
> RESPONSE: That *is not* so because when *the agent does not exist*, *the acted upon*, which is without a cause, also *does not exist*.

This is quite clear.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 364) says:

> [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 8.13) also says:
>
> Likewise, appropriation should be understood
> Because the acted upon and the agent are eliminated.
> By means of the agent and the acted upon
> The remaining things should be understood.

(Note that a previous translation (see transcript of week 33) of the same verse quoted earlier in the *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 333) said as follows and that there was some discussion as to the spelling in the Tibetan version as to whether the text should read 'eliminated' or 'clarified:

> Understand appropriation to be similar
> Because that acted upon and agent are clarified.[151]
> By means of that acted upon and the agent,
> The remaining things should be understood.)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 364-5) says:

> By means of the reasoning that refutes the acted upon and agent to exist inherently, also the appropriated and the appropriator should be understood to be refuted to exist inherently. Regarding "the remaining things," [Chandrakirti's] *Clear Words* says:
>
> > Things without exception – that which is produced and the producer, the going and the goer, that which is a view and that which views, the definition and the illustration, that which arises and that which causes arising, the components and the possessor of components, the qualities and the possessor of qualities, valid cognizers and objects of comprehension, and so forth – having been refuted to be established by way of their own entity are to be understood by those with wisdom as just being established in mutual dependence.
>
> The acted upon and the agent in general, and, in particular, the acted upon and the agents that are valid cognizers and objects of comprehension, are not established by way of their own entity and are asserted in a manner of establishment in dependence. In regard to establishment in dependence, it is necessary to understand that both exist for the uncommon mode of positing, which is mutual dependence.

Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* says that definition and illustration are mutually dependent. According to the Sautrantika system, as appears in *Collected Topics*, the <u>definition of definition</u> is: that which fulfills the three qualities of substantial existence. These three qualities are:

1. in general it is a definition,
2. it is established in terms of its own basis of illustration,
3. it is the definition of that which is its own definiendum and not of any other.

In *Collected Topics*, the <u>definition of illustration</u> is: that which is a basis of illustrating the definiendum in the context of the definition. It is also defined as: that which is a basis for ascertaining a definition prior to ascertaining the definiendum.

Thus, it is clear that definition and definiendum are posited in mutual dependence.

Clear Words also says: "The components and the possessor of components." What are they? In regard to a human being, the human being is the possessor of components or limbs, and the arms, legs, and so forth are the components or limbs.

In regard to "The qualities and the possessor of qualities," the possessor of qualities is the person and the qualities are knowledge and so forth. Qualities are of various types, for example, qualities of body, speech, and mind. All such qualities are possessed by the person, therefore, the person is called "the possessor of qualities."

Regarding "valid cognizers and objects of comprehension," it can be said that because there are two valid cognizers there are two objects of comprehension or because there are two objects of comprehension there are two valid cognizers. The two types of objects of comprehension are manifest phenomena and hidden phenomena. A manifest phenomenon is that which is realized by the force of

[151] Note that earlier, on page 333, the Tibetan text of the *Illumination* read *gsal*, clarified, whereas here on page 364 it reads *bsal*, eliminated.

one's own experience without depending on a reason, whereas a hidden phenomenon is that which can be realized only in dependence on a reason.

In short, all these pairs are refuted to be inherently existent because of being mutually dependent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 365) says:

> In regard to stating "appropriation" (*nye bar len pa*) here [in *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 8.13a)], when the *lut* affix is added to the grammatical term "*upatra*" with respect to a thing, due to it being appropriated it is called "the appropriated." However, since things also do not arise without their own establisher, both the appropriated and the appropriator (their respective establisher) are posited as "appropriation."
> QUESTION: Because the *lut* affix expresses that which is merely appropriated, how does it express the action of appropriating?
> RESPONSE: Since in the grammar text it says "mostly *krit* and *lut*,"[152] it is mostly like that. However, when the affix *lut* is given to an action it is not contradictory for it to also express the action of appropriating. [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 27.8) also says:
>
> Thus, it is not other than the appropriated,
> Nor is it the appropriated itself.
> The self is not without the appropriated;
> It is also not ascertained to just not exist.
>
> This [verse] says that:
> - the self is not a different entity from the appropriated,
> - the appropriated are not the self,
> - it is also not that the self does not depend on apprehending the appropriated, and
> - it is not that the self also does not exist,
>
> therefore, also an action does not exist without an agent.

In brief, the agent, that acted upon, and the action are established in mutual dependence, whereby in the absence of one of them the others do not exist. For example, a person typing on a computer is the agent, the action is that of typing, and the object of the action is the computer. Another example is that of a dancer who is the agent, the action which is the movement of dancing, and the object of the action which is the place in which he or she is dancing. Therefore, without the place, for example, the dancer cannot dance. In the context of eating, the eater is the agent, the action is that of eating, and the object of the action is the food. For example, I am drinking tea now, in this case I am the agent, the drinker of the tea, the action is that of drinking tea, and the object of the action is the tea (the Tibetan word *las*, translated in other contexts as action or karma, in this case does not refer to the action but to the object of the action).

In brief, the discussion about the *lut* affix refers to the fact that Sanskrit grammar can indicate one single thing to be both appropriator and appropriated. For example, a human rebirth can be both an appropriator and what is appropriated in dependence on the particular context.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 366) says:

> The *Sutra of Ultimate Emptiness* also says:
>
> The agent is not observed, yet the acted upon exists, ripening also exists.

[152] Note that there is a mistake in the Tibetan text of the *Illumination* which reads *ta* instead of *lut*.

> The sutra that expresses this should be understood to refute an inherently existent agent; it should not be understood to state "What is imputed in dependence, that which is a component conventionally, is also refuted." It also extensively says:
>
> > The person who is subsequently linked to ignorance also strongly composes that which is strongly composed, merit.

"The agent is not observed" means that an inherently existent agent is not observed, it does not mean that a nominally existent agent is not observed. "Yet the acted upon exists, ripening also exists" means that the acted upon and ripening exist conventionally.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 366) says:

> Although [Vasubandhu's] *Suitable Explanations* indeed says "The above sutra does not conform with the proponents of entitilessness, but conforms with the way of the Chittamatrins," the way of positing the person in this supreme system [is as follows].
>
> An agent that is a different entity from the aggregates does not exist even in mere conventions. When asserting the acted upon and ripening conventionally, as is taught by the latter sutra it is necessary to definitely assert an agent of that acted upon, the person. Therefore, moreover, to posit [the agent] as the appropriator of [the aggregates], without positing it amongst what is appropriated, is the very best.

Someone says that the citation "The agent is not observed, yet the acted upon exists, ripening also exists" is acceptable for the Chittamatrins but not for the Prasangika Madhyamikas, but Lama Tsongkhapa says that this not the case.

"The above sutra" refers to the sutra citation: "The agent is not observed, yet the acted upon exists, ripening also exists." "The latter sutra" is that which says: "The person who is subsequently linked to ignorance also strongly composes that which is strongly composed, merit." All schools accept the person, the accumulator of actions. However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say, in particular, that although the person exists it is not posited as findable among the aggregates. Thus, in this school in general when a phenomena is sought within its basis of imputation it is not found. They say that if it were found it would be inherently existent, whereas this is what is to be refuted. Someone can ask: "When someone loses a bicycle cannot it not be found?! However, this way of searching is different. Also when we look for the footprint of a dog can we find the dog? It can be found. However, this way of searching for something is not the same way in which the imputed object is sought within the basis of imputation, that is, analyzing whether or not it exists from its own side.

Tuesday afternoon, 13 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 366) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2D5 The Subduer taught the self to be imputed in dependence on the six constituents and so forth

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:
>
> *Because the Muni finely indicated the self*
> *In dependence on "Earth, water, fire, wind,*
> *Consciousness, and space" – the six elements and*
> *The eye and so forth – the six supports of contact and* [6.138]

Definitely taught it having finely apprehended the phenomena
Of mind and mental factors, therefore, it is not those and
That itself; it is not the mere collection itself.
Therefore, I-apprehending awareness does not [refer] to them. [6.139]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 60), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1B-4E The Sage taught that that self is a mere dependent imputation upon the six elements and so on

Since Buddha taught that that self is dependent on
The six elements, which are called earth and water, fire,
Air, consciousness, and space, and on the six
Bases of sense contact, the eye and so on; [6.138]

And certainly said it's supported on the mind
And mental factor dharmas, therefore, it's not
The same thing as these, nor the same as just the group;
Therefore the self-grasping mind is not on these. [6.139]

You should understand that it follows that the innate self-grasping mind is not based on the individual aggregates and the group, because that self is not identical with those individual aggregates and is not the same as just the group of aggregates; for the Sage taught that that self is dependent on the six elements called earth, water, fire, air, consciousness, and space, and the six bases of sense contact of the eye and so on, and said definitely it was supported on the mind and mental factor dharmas as the base of imputation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

It is taught in the *Sutra* [*of the Meeting of Father and Son*]:

> Great King, the being, this person, is the six elements, the six entrances of contact, and the eighteen proximate mental movements.[153]

There, the six elements are earth, water, fire, wind, consciousness, and space. The self is imputed in dependence on them.

The eye and so forth, the six supports of contact are from the entrance of assembly – contact – of the eye through the entrance of assembly – contact – of the mind. The self is imputed in dependence on them.

The eighteen proximate mental wanderings are the six proximate movements of the happy mind which refers to form, sound, smell, taste, tactility, and phenomena; similarly, the proximate movements of the unhappy mind, and similarly the proximate movements of equanimity. The self is imputed in dependence on them and having finely apprehended the phenomena of mind and mental factors.

Because it is taught:

> ... imputed as the self by way of those elements and so forth,

– therefore, *it is not those and that itself* – meaning, "not just not another." It is also not reasonable as just their mere collection.

[153] See Hopkins, pp. 627-628.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the collection of the aggregates are not the self. On the other hand, if one accepts that the collection of the aggregates is the self there are faults. One fault is that the Buddha taught that the self is not the individual six elements – earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness – nor is it the collection of the six elements. Similarly, the Buddha said that the self is not any of the six bases of contact, the eye constituent and so forth. They are called "the six bases of contact" in the context of the contact that occurs in dependence on the meeting of a sense power, consciousness, and object; for example, an eye sense power, an eye consciousness, and a visual form. In turn, the six bases of contact act as the basis for the three feelings – pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral – in relation to each of the six consciousnesses, for a total of eighteen feelings. All of these are not the self. Likewise, the phenomena that are minds and mental factors are not the self.

In short, none of these – the six elements, the six bases of contact, the eighteen mental movements, and minds and mental factors – are the self, nor is the collection of them the self. Because they are not the self, they are not the object of the conception of I. In other words, they are not the observed object of the conception of I because they are not the self. Is the observed object of the conception of I a different entity from the five aggregates? It is not. The six elements, six spheres, and so forth are not the observed object of the conception of I, yet there is no self that is the object of the conception of I which is a different entity from the six elements and so forth.

Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (J. Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation*) says:

> A person is not earth, not water,
> Not fire, not wind, not space,
> Not consciousness, and not all of them.
> What person is there other than these? [80]

In short, the self is merely imputed on the basis of the six elements.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Because those phenomena which were explained are unsuitable as the very self, therefore, the I-apprehending awareness [referring] to those is unreasonable. When thus, the aggregates are not even the object of I-apprehension, differing from the aggregates does not exist either, therefore, the [referent] object itself of I-apprehension does not [inherently] exist. Hence, the yogi, through not referring to [inherently existent] self, thoroughly knows also mine as just not having essence and having excluded all formations, without appropriation, will pass beyond sorrow. Therefore, this complete analysis is very beautiful.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 366) says:

> There are also other faults in asserting the mere collection of aggregates and so forth to be the self.
> *Therefore, the Subduer finely presented the self*
> *In dependence on the six constituents stating*
> *"Earth, water, fire, wind, consciousness, space" and*
> *The six bases of contact, the eye and so forth, and* [6.138]
>
> *He taught it depends on closely apprehending phenomena,*
> *Minds and mental factors. Therefore, it is not them and*
> *It is not that itself; it is not the mere collection of them.*
> *Therefore, the mind conceiving "I" is not with regard to them.* [6.139]
>
> *For this* reason, *the Subduer*, in the *Sutra of the Meeting of Father and Son*, *finely presented the self*

- *in dependence on the six constituents stating* "The constituents of *earth, water, fire, wind*, the constituent of *consciousness*, the constituent of *space*, the cavities such as the cavities in the nose and so forth" and
- in dependence on *the six* spheres, the sphere *of contact* of *the eye and so forth*, that is, the sphere of contact of mentality, *and*

he definitely, that is, clearly, *taught* "They are imputed to be the self"

- in dependence on *closely apprehending phenomena – minds and* the *mental factors* that are other than those [minds] – as the bases of imputation.

Therefore, *the* self *is not the* single units of the earth constituent and so forth *and it is not that itself*, that is, each of those is not suitable as the self. However, even *the mere collection of them is not* posited as the self. *Therefore*, *the mind that conceives* thinking "*I,*" which has operated since beginningless time, *does not* observe the collection of those phenomena nor the single units.

The individual six elements, or six constituents, and the collection of them are not the self. Instead, the self is merely imputed upon them. Just as the self is imputed in dependence on the collection of the six elements, so too is it imputed in dependence on the six spheres – the eye sphere through the mental sphere – and on the eighteen mental movements. Since individually they are not the self and the collection of them is also not the self, they are not the object of the conception of I. What is the observed object of the conception of I that has operated since beginningless time? It is the mere I.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 367) says:

> The way this is taught in sutra is:
>
> > Great King, the being, the person, is the six constituents, the six spheres of contact, and the eighteen mental movements.
>
> Nagtsho's translation of this is the best:
>
> > ... the assembly of the six constituents, the six bases of contact, and the eighteen mental activities.
>
> With regard to this, the being and the person are synonyms. The three, "the assembly of the six constituents, the six bases, and the eighteen," are phenomena that are possessed, therefore, those phenomena are possessed phenomena. The person is the possessing basis that possesses any of them. [The possessed phenomena] are taught to be the bases of imputing the person in dependence on any of them.

This is very clear in itself.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 367) says:

> The eighteen mental movements are: the six movements of happy feeling toward the six attractive objects, the six movements of suffering feeling toward the six unattractive ones, and the six movements of equanimity feeling toward those that are in-between. Because, by the force of happy, suffering, and equanimity feelings, the mind moves again and again toward forms, sounds, and so forth, they are called "mental movements" (*yid kyi nye bar rgyu ba*).

Because the eye consciousness and so forth go or move toward attractive objects and so forth due to feelings, these feelings are called "mental movements." For example, when an eye consciousness observes an attractive object a happy feeling arises in its retinue, when it observes an unattractive object a suffering feeling arises, and when it observes a neutral object equanimity feeling arises. Likewise, these three types of feelings arise in the retinue of an ear consciousness and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 367-8) says:

> Thus, from among the two, the observed object and the aspect of the innate conception of a self, the aggregates are also not the observed object. However, because there also does not exist an observed object of [the conception of a self] which is a different entity from the aggregates, the observed object of the conception of a self does not exist inherently. Therefore, yogis,
>
> - through not observing an inherently existent self, understand that also the mine just does not have the essence of inherent existence and,
> - through eliminating the bondage of all compounded cyclic existence, also definitely attain nirvana without taking future existences.
>
> Therefore, the single units and the collection of the five aggregates and whatever is a different entity from them are not posited as the observed object of the view of a self. Also in this case, the observed object of the view of a self should be understood to be excellently posited as the person. In dependence on those reasons, the analysis that posits the person to be empty of inherent existence is extremely attractive for the very sharp-facultied who desire liberation because there are no other tenets that captivate the mind like this.

From among the observed object and aspect, the collection of the aggregates is not the observed object of the view of the transitory collection. Nor are the individual aggregates the observed object of the view of the transitory collection. Also a self that is a different entity from the aggregates is not the observed object of the innate conception of I. Thus, the aggregates are not the observed object of the view of the transitory collection, nor is it a self that is a different entity from the aggregates. For this reason, Lama Tsongkhapa says that it is important to know how to posit the observed object and aspect of the view of the transitory collection. The observed object of the view of the transitory collection is the person that is merely imputed in dependence on the five aggregates. Because the person is merely imputed in dependence on the aggregates, it does not exist inherently. Thus, when it is understood how to posit the observed object of the view of the transitory collection as the person lacking inherent existence, one who wishes liberation approaches his or her aim. This is marvelous "because there are no other tenets that captivate the mind like this."

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is there a difference between the earth element and earth?
Student: There is a difference, for example, this wooden table has the water element but it does not have water.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: So it is the same for the remaining elements? For example, the tea in my cup has fire element but does not have fire? If it did have fire, what would happen?! It would follow that it would burn my stomach. However, this can be debated because if I drink hot tea it does burn my stomach. What about space and the space element, are they the same or different?
Student 2: They are not different, the words are different but the meaning is the same.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: So space and space element are the same?
Student 2: Yes.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Then how do you explain the line in the first chapter of *Treasury of Knowledge* that says:

> *Cavities, the so-called space constituent,*
> *Are illumination and darkness, they claim.* [1.25ab]

The Vaibhashikas say that when cavities are illuminated they are illumination, and when they are not they are darkness. Space is imputed on these. Thus, according to the Vaibhashikas, space and the space element, or space constituent, are different.

[The first chapter of Gedun Drup's commentary on the *Treasury of Knowledge* (translated by George Churinoff) says:

> The Vaibhashikas state that the cavities such as the mouth, etc., are the space constituent

and that that (i.e., the space constituent), moreover, is the illumination of day and the darkness of night. Since it is of an obstructive entity and is present in the surroundings of other obstructive [things], it is obstructive-surrounding.
"*They claim*" is a phrase of disagreement with the Vaibhashikas by the Sautrantikas who state that uncompounded space is the space constituent and that since it is of an unobstructive entity and is present in the surroundings of other unobstructive [phenomena], it is an unobstructive-surrounding. Hence, in that case, it is to be included in the phenomena entrance or the phenomena constituent.]

Wednesday morning, 14 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 368) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-2E Indicating others' systems as lacking relationship

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

According to the position that says "The objects of I-grasping are the aggregates and the mind," as long as the aggregates arise, that long I-grasping will operate because the basis, the functioning thing, of I-grasping exists.

The system that asserts all five aggregates to be the self and that which asserts the mind to be the self are incorrect. Because they posit a self that is findable among the aggregates, it follows that the conception of I exists as long as the aggregates exist because the basis of the conception of I exists. In other words, because the self is asserted to exist inherently and because the aggregates are asserted to be the self, as long as the aggregates, the basis of the conception of I, exist, so too will the conception of I exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

It is explained:

At the time of realizing non-self, permanent self is rejected and
It is not even asserted as the support of I-grasping.
Therefore, to propound that knowing non-self removes
Even the final self view is very amazing. [6.140]

If this permanent self were the object of I-grasping, due to its non-existence I-grasping would be abandoned. Saying "The object of I-grasping is other and through seeing the other as a non-existent thing, one overcomes I-grasping," O my, you have done beautifully. In order to clarify this very meaning which lacks mutual relation by way of an example, it is explained:

Seeing a snake dwelling in a hole in one's house's wall,
Dispelling apprehension saying "There is no elephant in here,"
Acting to abandon even fear of the snake –
Oh my, it will just become the jest of others. [6.141]

Whoever, although the condition of fear is already close, does not perceive the fear existing in that, and not producing the remedy, due to stupidity, manifests themselves as just fearless – they will be grasped by the snake since they merely find comfort [in the words of another fool], because the fear due to that snake cannot be dispelled by [saying] an elephant does not exist.

> Similarly, also according to this propounding [of the self] as the aggregates and the consciousness, by the non-existence of the permanent self, the I-grasping which has as its object the aggregates cannot be dispelled. Therefore, definitely his samsara will not degenerate.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-2B1B-5 The opponents' method has no connection
>
> *When non-self's seen, you reject a permanent self;*
> *This is not held to be the base of self-grasping,*
> *Therefore to say that knowing there's no [such] self*
> *Completely drives out the wrong view of the self is amazing.* [6.140]
>
> *It's like seeing a snake in a hole in the wall of your house,*
> *And reassuring yourself, "There's no elephant here,"*
> *Giving up fear even of the snake.*
> *Oh dear, you'll be the laughing-stock of others.* [6.141]

You should understand that to say that the mere knowledge that a permanent, single, independent self does not exist completely expels the wrong view of the self present since beginningless time is most amazing; for when you realize the non-existence of self, you only reject a permanent self, and it is not asserted that this permanent self is either the observed object or the aspect object, or base, of innate self-grasping. For example, it is like [a person who] sees a snake living in a hole in the wall of his house, and is frightened, then when he has been reassured, "There is no elephant in this [house]," gives up his fear even of the snake; oh dear, how other learned men will laugh and smile!

In short, the realization of the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self does not harm the innate conception of I that has operated since beginningless time. This is because a permanent, partless, and independent self is neither the observed object of the innate conception of I or the object-aspect (object that is the aspect) of the innate conception of I. The object-aspect is the object of the mode of apprehension.

In order to explain this, there is the analogy of someone who frightened of a snake in his house is reassured by someone saying "There is no elephant in your house," whereby the learned laugh at and mock him. This example indicates that just as saying there is no elephant in the house does not dispel the fear of the snake in the house because the non-existence of the elephant is not related to the existence of the snake, likewise, the realization of the lack of a permanent, partless, and independent self does not harm the innate conception of I that has operated since beginningless time because the non-existence of a permanent, partless, and independent self is not related to the innate conception of I.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 368) says:

> When seeking the imputed object that is the self, the observed object of the conception thinking "I," some propound "It is all five aggregates" and some propound "It is only the mind." If it accorded with these positions, then as long as the aggregates arise in one's continuum, until then would the conception of a self of persons operate because, when posited through seeking the imputed object that is the I of the thought "I," it would exist as a thing that is an object – the basis, that is, the aspect, conceived to be a self of persons. This is explained [as follows]:
>
> *When selflessness is realized, saying "A permanent self is abandoned," and,*
> *Without asserting that to also be the basis of the conception of I,*
> *Saying "Therefore, through the knowledge of the lack of a self,*
> *The view of a self is also eradicated" is truly amazing!* [6.140]

> *When* it is asserted that the *selflessness* of persons *is* directly *realized*, alas,
> - your *saying* "*A* mere *permanent self is abandoned*, that is, is seen to not exist," and,
> - *without asserting that* permanent self *to also be* an object that is either (i) the basis, that is, the observed object, or (ii) the aspect of *the conception of I* which is the innate view of the transitory collection, saying "*Therefore*, *through* cultivating *the knowledge* seeing *the lack of a* mere permanent *self*, *the view of a self* which has operated since beginningless time *is also eradicated*, that is, uprooted"
>
> *is truly amazing!* The meaning of asserting that "By seeing that a mere permanent self does not exist, the beginningless conception of a self is abandoned" is explained in order to clarify [a mere permanent self and the beginningless conception of a self], by means of an example of worldly beings, as lacking a mutual relationship.
>
> *Like seeing a snake abiding in a hole in the wall of his house,*
> *Having dispelled his anxiety saying "There is no elephant in here,"*
> *If it also acts to give up the fear of the snake,*
> *Alas, he would become the laughing stock of others.* [6.141]
>
> It is *like* some foolish person who, having *seen a snake abiding in a hole in the wall of his house*, becomes frightened. Then, when someone else *dispels his anxiety saying* to him "O you, do not be afraid, *there is no elephant in this* house," if, by understanding that an elephant does not exist in that house, not only is the fear of that averted, but *it also serves to give up the fear of the snake, alas*, *he would become the laughing stock* – that is, the object of laughter – *of others*, the wise. Hence, although the conditions for fearing a snake already abide close by, through not perceiving fear for the snake that exists due to the words of another fool, if without developing a method for averting the fear of that one is completely relaxed, that is, remains still, through understanding that an elephant does not exist, one will be seized by the snake. Similarly, by familiarizing with the perception of the non-existence of a mere permanent self, which is like the elephant, one will be completely relaxed through considering the fear of the conception of the self that has operated since beginningless time – which is like the snake – has been averted. Due to this, because one is unable to eliminate the view of the transitory collection which is the conception of the I that is asserted to be the object-possessor of the aggregates, this person's cyclic existence is definitely not weakened.
>
> This shows that many of [the followers] of our own and other schools who wish to settle the suchness of things, due to not understanding how to repudiate the object apprehended by the innate conception of a self, discard it and then strive wearily in an essenceless point, all the presentations that settle what is other than that. Understanding this is an extremely important point.

If someone, having realized the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self, relaxes even though the conception of I that has operated since beginningless time remains in his continuum, he is like someone who frightened of a snake in his house relaxes due to hearing that there is no elephant in his house. In other words, it is like someone frightened by the existence of a snake in his house who, upon hearing the words of another fool who says that there is no elephant in the house, abides there relaxed but is later seized by the snake. The conception of I that has existed in the continuum since beginningless time is likened to the snake that exists in the house, whereas the non-existence of a permanent, partless, and independent self in the continuum is likened to the non-existence of the elephant in the house. Thus, even though one has realized the emptiness of a permanent, partless, and independent self, one will still be bitten by the snake of the conception of I and will, therefore, create actions and continue to wander in cyclic existence.

Student: Is the refutation of the lack of a permanent, partless, and independent self not a branch of the refutation of an inherently existent self?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is not. It is usually said that the realization of coarse selflessness is the method for the realization of subtle selflessness. However, the refutation of a permanent, partless, and independent self does not assist the refutation of an inherently existent self.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 369) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-3 Refuting the three remaining positions other than those two: support, supported, and so forth

We have concluded the refutation of the first two positions

- 'Refuting a self that is a different entity from the aggregates, which is imputed by other schools' and
- 'Refuting the assertion that the aggregates themselves are the self, which is imputed by our own schools,'

now the three remaining positions 'support, supported, and possession' are refuted. When an inherently existent self is refuted there are two ways to do so:

1. by means of five reasonings and
2. by means of seven reasonings.

Of the five reasonings, we have discussed the first two – the self is not other than aggregates and the self is not the aggregates – and now we will discuss the remaining three:

- 'support,' which refers to the fact that the self is not the support of the aggregates,
- 'supported,' which refers to the fact that the self is not supported on the aggregates, and
- 'possession,' which refers to the fact that the self does not possess the aggregates as, for example, Devadatta possesses cows.

A Refuting the position of support, supported, and possession
B Adding together the meaning of these refutations, then presenting them

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-3A Refuting the position of support, supported, and possession

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, having correctly established the two positions such as "The self does not have the nature of the aggregates, nor is it other than the aggregates," in order to express the very existence of the self as also non-existent as support and supported, it is explained:
>
> *Self does not exist in the aggregates; also in the self*
> *Those aggregates do not exist. Because, if otherness*
> *Existed here, conception would be here, yet*
> *That otherness is non-existent, therefore, it is conception.* [6.142]
>
> If otherness existed, they would be reasonable as the properties of support and supported. For example, like saying, "Yogurt exists in a metal dish." The two, metal dish and yogurt, are just other in the world – hence are seen as the properties of support and supported. The aggregates are not different from the self like that. Since the self is also not different from the aggregates, there does not exist the properties of support and supported for the two.
>
> Although just possessing the aggregates, just as not existing in the self, in order to indicate thus, it is explained:
>
> *Self is not asserted to possess form because self does not exist,*
> *Therefore, the connective meaning of possession does not exist.*
> *If other, possessing cow, [or] not other, possessing form,*
> *Self being just that [or] just other than form is non-existent.* [6.143]
>
> The self being identical to [thatness/sameness] and just other [otherness] than the aggregates was already refuted before. Also, the affix of possession[154] refers to the non-different, "Devadatta possesses form." "He possesses a cow" is when there is difference. Since form and self have no identity or otherness, it is also impossible to say "Self possesses form."

[154] See Hopkins, p. 692.

The positions asserting that the self and the aggregates are a truly existent one and the self and the aggregates are a truly existent other have already been refuted. Now Chandrakirti explains that because the self and the aggregates are support and supported, they are not established by way of their own entity.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1C-1 Refuting the positions of container, contents and possession

The self does not exist in the aggregates
And in the self these aggregates don't exist.
Since if there were otherness here, there'd be this concept,
But there's not that otherness, so it is misconception [6.142]

You should understand that these hypotheses that the self and the aggregates are inherently existing container and contents are posited through wrong conception, for the self does not exist inherently [contained] in the aggregates, and these aggregates also do not exist inherently [contained] in the self. This is because if, in this self and aggregates, otherness inherently existed, there would be this concept of existing inherently as container and contents, but that inherent otherness does not exist in the self and aggregates.

The self's not held to have form, because the self
Does not exist. [6.143ab]

It is not maintained that the self inherently possesses [the aggregate of] form, because the self does not exist inherently.

So there's no relation of having.
If they're other – having cows – or not other – having form –
The self is neither one with nor other than form. [6.143bcd]

No relation inherently exists in the sense of the self's possessing the aggregates; for possessing what is other is like Devadatta's possessing a cow, and possessing what is not other is like Devadatta's possessing a form, but the self does not exist either the same as or other than form.

In short, the following syllogism can be set out:

The being, such as Devadatta, as the subject, does not exist inherently because:

1. he is not an inherently existent one with the aggregates,
2. he is not an inherently existent other that the aggregates,
3. he is not an inherently existent support of the aggregates,
4. he is not inherently supported on the aggregates, and
5. he is not an inherently existent possessor of the aggregates.

Even more briefly put:

Devadatta, as the subject, is not inherently existent because he is not found when sought by means of the five-fold analysis.

In order to condense the seven-fold reasoning, the following syllogism can be set out:

Devadatta, as the subject, is not inherently existent, because:

1. he is not inherently one with the aggregates,
2. he is not inherently other than the aggregates,

3. he is not an inherent existent support of the aggregates,
4. he is not inherently supported on the aggregates,
5. he is not an inherently existent possessor of the aggregates,
6. he is not the collection of the aggregates, and
7. he is not the shape of the aggregates.

This seven-fold reasoning will be discussed later in the context of the analogy of the chariot.

Conventionally the self is supported on the aggregates and conventionally the aggregates are the support of the self. Also, conventionally the aggregates are possessed by the self. However, conventionally the self and the aggregates are not one. Does that mean that the self and the aggregates are different entities? It does not. The self and the aggregates are one entity but are not one. In order to be one, what is necessary? The definition of being one, as found in *Collected Topics*, is: phenomena that are not distinct. Therefore, the self and the aggregates are not one, yet they are one entity. What is the definition of being one entity?
Student: A phenomenon and its parts that arise, abide, and disintegrate simultaneously.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Therefore, permanent and the isolate of permanent, as the subject, it follows that they are produced, abide, and disintegrate simultaneously because they are one entity! That is not correct. What is the definition of being one entity?
Student 2: Phenomena that cannot be distinguished by a direct perceiver.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is that correct?
Student 3: It is just about what is usually said.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: So how would you posit being one entity?
Student 4: Phenomena that do not appear differently to a direct perceiver.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Can two things not exist differently, for example, permanent and the isolate of permanent?
Student: They are different, but they do not appear to be different to a direct perceiver.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It follows that they do not exist because they do not appear distinctly to a valid direct perceiver!

Wednesday afternoon, 14 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 369-70) says:

> Thus, having presented the self and the aggregates to not be established as either inherently one or different, in order to state that the self and the aggregates are also not established by way of their own entity as mutual support and supported, it is explained:
>
> *The self does not exist in the aggregates; also the aggregates*
> *Do not exist in the self. Therefore, if here*
> *They existed as otherness, there would be these conceptions here,*
> *Whereas, because they are not otherness, it is a conception.* [6.142]
>
> *The self does not exist on the aggregates* in a manner of an established by way of its own entity supported, and *also the aggregates do not exist on the self* in a manner of an established by way of its own entity supported. *For that* reason, *if here* the aggregates and the self *existed as* an established by way of their own entity *otherness*, *there would be* the two *conceptions* of inherently existent support and supported *here*, *whereas because they are not* inherent *otherness*, they are merely posited by a mistaken *conception* of establishment by way of its own entity to be support and supported. For example, in the world, the two, a metal dish and yogurt, are seen to be different

> entities, the support and the supported. Since the two, the aggregates and the self, are not seen like that, they do not exist inherently as the entities of support and supported.

The self and aggregates being inherently existent one or being different entities has already been negated, in addition, they are also not inherently existent support and supported. The self is not inherently supported on the aggregates, and the aggregates are not an inherently existent support of the self. It can be said that the self is supported on the aggregates and the aggregates are supported on the self. Although they are mutually dependent, their mode of dependence is not established by way of its own entity.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "For that reason, if here the aggregates and the self existed as an established by way of their own entity otherness, there would be the two conceptions of inherently existent support and supported here, whereas because they are not inherent otherness, they are merely posited by a mistaken conception of establishment by way of its own entity to be support and supported." The example is given of a metal dish and yogurt which are seen to be different entities but are support and supported. Another example is that of a cup and the tea in it, although they are different entities they function respectively as support and supported, in that the cup is the support of the tea and the tea is supported on the cup.

The self and aggregates are support and supported in the context of being one entity, but not in the context of being different entities.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 370) says:

> Even though it possesses the aggregates, in order to show how the self is not established by way of its own entity it is explained:
>
> *The self is not asserted to be a possessor of form. Because of that,*
> *The self does not exist. Therefore, it is not connected with the meaning of possession.*
> *Whether they are other, the possessor of cattle, or not other, the possessor of form,*
> *The self in relation to form is not oneness and not otherness.* [6.143]
>
> *The self is not asserted to be* an established by way of its own entity *possessor* of the *form* aggregate. *For that* reason, since *the self* was already refuted to be inherently one with or different from the aggregates, it *does not exist*. *Therefore*, the self *is not* inherently *connected with* the *possession* of the aggregates. Hence, although there are the conditions for possession,
>
> - *whether they are other*, that is, different entities connected together, like Devadatta is said to be *the possessor of cattle*, that is, cows, or
> - whether they are what are *not other* entities connected together, like Devadatta *possesses form*,
>
> *the self in relation to form is not* (i) *oneness*, i.e., it is not one with it, and (ii) not *otherness*, i.e., it is not different from it. Therefore, the self also cannot be an inherently existent possessor of form. By these [statements], it should be understood that [the self] is also refuted to be an established by way of its own entity possessor of the remaining four aggregates.

The self possesses the aggregates. However, it does not possess them by way of their own entity. This is because the self and the aggregates are not inherently existent one, nor are they inherently existent other. The way in which the self possesses the aggregates is not the way in which Devadatta inherently possesses cattle that are different entities from himself, and it is also not the way in which Devadatta inherently possesses a form aggregate that is one entity with himself.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The self in relation to form is not (i) oneness, i.e., it is not one with it, and (ii) not otherness, i.e., it is not different from it. Therefore, the self also cannot be an inherently existent possessor of form." This can also be applied similarly to the remaining four aggregates; for example, the self possesses the feeling aggregate but it does not inherently possess the feeling aggregate.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 370) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-3B Adding together the meaning of these refutations, then presenting them

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, by indicating the condensed positions already refuted, in order to indicate by way of enumerating the view of the transitory collection as engaging incorrectly [by] referent and aspect, it is explained:
>
> *Form is not the self, the self does not possess form,*
> *The self is non-existent on form, nor does form exist on the self.*
> *Thus in four aspects should all the aggregates be known –*
> *These are asserted as the twenty viewing the self.* [6.144]
>
> When the five aggregates – separated from self – are apprehended as the very self by way of four aspects by the view of the transitory collection, there will be twenty parts of the view of the transitory collection.

Here Chandrakirti presents the twenty types of acquired views of the transitory collection, there being four views of the transitory collection in relation to each of the five aggregates. The first group of four in relation to the form aggregate are set out in the root verse saying:

Form is not the self, the self does not possess form,
The self is non-existent on form, nor does form exist on the self. [6.144ab]

The four refutations are:
1. form is not the self,
2. the self does not inherently possess form,
3. the self does not inherently exist on form, and
4. form does not inherently exist on the self.

Therefore, the four views are (see *Meditation on Emptiness* page 176):
1. viewing form as inherently one with the self
2. viewing the self as inherently possessing form,
3. viewing the self as inherently supported on form,
4. viewing form as an inherently existent support of the self.

In describing these four views, the lower schools would substitute the term 'inherently' with 'substantially.' Similarly, it can be said: "Feeling is not the self, the self does not possess feeling, the self is non-existent on feeling, nor does feeling exist on the self." In the same way, one can substitute the word 'feeling' with 'discrimination,' 'compositional factor,' and 'consciousness.'

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1C-2 Stating in summary the points refuted

The self is not form, the self does not have form,
The self's not in form, and form's not in the self.
Each aggregate is to be known as fourfold thus.
These are asserted as twenty wrong views of the self. [6.144]

You should understand that there are held to be twenty parts of the view of the aggregates as the self. For there are the wrong view of form, which is not the self, as the self; the wrong view of the self which does not inherently possess form as doing so; and the wrong views of the self that does not exist in form, and also form, which does not exist inherently in the self, as doing so; and you should understand that there are wrong views about all five aggregates in the four ways like these.

The vajra of seeing non-self destroys the mountain
Of views of the self. What the self perishes with
Are these high peaks in the range of enormous mountains
Of wrong view of the perishable aggregates. [6.145]

As for these twenty high peaks dwelling in the range of huge mountains of wrong views of the perishable aggregates, amassed by delusiveness; if they are abandoned, the fruit of stream enterer is made manifest. For if the mountains of wrong views about the perishable aggregates are destroyed by the thunderbolt of transcendent knowledge-wisdom which freshly and directly perceives the non-existence of self, these are what the view about the self which is destroyed will perish and be abandoned together with.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If it is said: Coming in the context of five-fold analysis, was it not taught in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, 22.1]:
>
> > Not the aggregates, not other than the aggregates,
> > The aggregates do not exist on him, he does not exist on them,
> > The Tathagata does not possess the aggregates –
> > What is the Tathagata?
>
> – therefore, if it is in twenty-five parts, why was it expressed in twenty parts?

[Note that the Tibetan text we are using says 'five parts' instead of 'twenty-five parts' but this could also be right.]

In short, sutra presents twenty views of the transitory collection, whereas Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* presents twenty-five. Here someone asks why is there this difference. The five views set forth in Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* are:
1. the tathagata is not inherently one entity with the aggregates,
2. the tathagata is not inherently other than the aggregates,
3. the aggregates do not inherently exist on the tathagata,
4. the tathagata does not inherently exist on the aggregates, and
5. the tathagata does not inherently possess the aggregates.

These can also be set forth as:
(1) viewing the self and the aggregates to be inherently one entity
(2) viewing the self and the aggregates to be inherently different entities,
(3-4) viewing the self and aggregates to be inherently support and supported,
(5) viewing the self to inherently possess the aggregates.

Gedun Drup's commentary on Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* says:

> OBJECTION: The continuity of existence exists inherently because the tathagata exists inherently.
>
> RESPONSE: Any tathagata, as the subject, does not exist inherently because:
>
> 1. he is not one with the aggregates,
> 2. he is not inherently other than the aggregates,
> 3. he is not inherently supported on the aggregates,
> 4. the aggregates are not inherently supported on him,

5. he does not inherently possess the aggregates.

The subject, 'the tathagata,' can be substituted by 'the self' or 'the person,' whereas 'the aggregates' can be substituted by the individual aggregates. Thus, there are, for example, the four views in relation to the form aggregate:
(1) the view of the self and the form aggregate as inherently one,
(2) the view of the self and the form aggregate as inherently different,
(3-4) the view of the self and the form aggregate as inherently existent support and supported, or the view of both the self and the form aggregate as inherently existent supported,
(5) the view of the self as inherently possessing the form aggregate.

In conclusion, the five additional views that are added to the twenty in Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* are
1. viewing the self and the form aggregate to be different entities,
2. viewing the self and the feeling aggregate to be different entities,
3. viewing the self and the discrimination aggregate to be different entities,
4. viewing the self and the compositional factors aggregate to be different entities,
5. viewing the self and the consciousness aggregate to be different entities.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Those [twenty] parts of the view of the transitory collection are presented in the sutra sets. Since the [view of the transitory collection] cannot strongly settle on the self, not apprehending the aggregates [beforehand], it refers to the aggregates by way of four aspects and engages [the self].
>
> Like this, since strongly settling on the self never exists except for the aggregates, a fifth aspect of the view of the transitory collection is impossible. Therefore, the view of the transitory collection is only in twenty parts. It should be understood that, "the fifth position of otherness taught in the *Treatise* is in order to refute the system of the Forders."

The reason why twenty views are taught in sutra and twenty-five are taught in Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* is because the presentation of the twenty views in sutra is for the purpose of refuting our own schools, whereas the twenty plus five additional views in *Fundamental Wisdom* are presented for the purpose of also refuting the non-Buddhist schools that assert a self which is a different entity from the aggregates, in that they assert a permanent, partless, and independent self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, "having destroyed the lofty twenty mountain peaks of the view of the transitory collection with the vajra of exalted wisdom, the result of stream enterer is made manifest," which was taught in scripture means:
>
> *The vajra that realizes non-self destroys*
> *The mountainous view. What will disintegrate together with the self*
> *Are the high peaks which dwell on the huge massive mountain*
> *Of the view of the transitory collection – these.* [6.145]
>
> Due to the vajra of the arya's exalted wisdom not descending on the mountain of the view of the transitory collection, the rock of affliction will increase daily. Arisen from beginningless samsara; lofty as the three realms in height; pervading to the edge of all directions; coming forth from the

golden foundation of ignorance – when broken up by the vajra of comprehending non-self, those which will disintegrate together with the very lofty peak are to be known as being peaks.

Thursday morning, 15 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 371) says:

Now, by adding together, that is, presenting, the positions that were already refuted before, in order to indicate the enumeration of mistaken engagements through (i) the observed object and (ii) the aspect due to the view of the transitory collection, it is explained:

Form is not the self, the self is not the possessor of form,
The self does not exist in form, form also does not exist in the self.
All the aggregates should be understood in these four ways.
These are asserted to be the twenty views of a self. [6.144]

There are four:

1. the view of a self with respect to *form not being the self*;
2. the view of that with respect to *the self not being* an established by way of its own entity *possessor of form*; and
3. the view of that with respect to *the self not existing* inherently *on form, and*
4. [the view of that with respect to] *form not existing* inherently *on the self*.

Just as they are explained in regard to the aggregate of form, there *should be understood* to be four views each *in regard to all the* four *aggregates* of feelings and so forth regarding the four aspects – the ways in which they are viewed by the view of the transitory collection. *These are asserted to be the twenty* parts of the *view of a self*, the view of the transitory collection.

QUESTION: Having added the view of the self and the form aggregate as different entities, is it not also taught [as follows] that there occurs an occasion of a five-fold analysis in regard to each of the aggregates? [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 22.1) says:

He is not the aggregates, nor other than the aggregates.
The aggregates do not exist on him, he does not exist on them.
The tathagata is not the possessor of the aggregates.
What is the tathagata?

Therefore, it must be twenty-five parts, so why is it expressed above as twenty parts?

RESPONSE: The twenty parts of the view of the transitory collection are presented in sutra. The reason for positing them like this is that without apprehending the aggregates beforehand the view of the transitory collection cannot strongly adhere to a self. Due to this, it observes the aggregates by means of the four ways each and engages a self. Because of that, since a fifth basis of adherence to an other, excluding the aggregates, as a self does not arise except for the Forders, a fifth part is not taught. It should be understood that "The other position, the fifth, is taught in *Fundamental Wisdom* in order to refute the Forders' system."

It is taught in scripture:

Having destroyed the twenty lofty mountain peaks of the view of the transitory collection with the vajra of exalted wisdom, the result of stream enterer is manifested.

[Chandrakirti's *Supplement* similarly says:]

The mountain of the view is destroyed by the vajra realizing selflessness.
What is destroyed along with a self
Are the lofty peaks abiding on the massive mountain
Of the view of the transitory collection. [6.145]

Through observing the I, the observed object, the vajra of a superior's exalted wisdom does not descend on the *mountain of the view* of the transitory collection conceiving the aspect as inherently existent, whereby the rocky cliff of the afflictions increases daily. When that arisen from beginningless cyclic existence, lofty as the three realms, pervading the edges of the directions without exception, emerging from the golden foundation of ignorance, *is destroyed*, that is, shattered, *by the vajra* of the exalted wisdom directly *realizing selflessness*, *what is destroyed along*

> *with any* of the views *of a self* that are destroyed are the *lofty peaks abiding on the massive mountain of the view of the transitory collection*, the root that was just explained – these being the twenty, *those* explained as four-fold in regard to each of the five aggregates explained before.
>
> Here the translation of the autocommentary says:
>
> > Those destroyed together with any of the great lofty peaks should be understood as being the peaks.
>
> Also according to the translation as 'root,' it should say "together with the view of the transitory collection that is the root." Moreover, since the innate view of the transitory collection, the conception of I, is not any of the twenty explained before, stating "abiding on the massive mountain of the view of the transitory collection" means that the views of the transitory collection that are the twenty peaks abide on the view of the transitory collection that is the root. The twenty along with it are also imputed views of the transitory collection which are the roots abandoned by stream enterers. In addition, not taking it to be the mere conception of establishment by way of its own character, instead the seeds of conceiving its mode of apprehension to be correct in dependence on bad tenets are abandoned by stream enterers.

The explanation here of twenty views of the transitory collection accords with the explanation given in sutra. The view of the transitory collection does not conceive I without the appearance of the aggregates. For example, a person of the desire realm has a view of the transitory collection that conceives I mainly due to the appearance of the form aggregate. Because the beings of the formless realm do not have form, their view of the transitory collection does not depend on the appearance of the form aggregate, but instead depends on the appearance of the discrimination aggregate. Because there is form in the form realm, there the view of the transitory collection can depend on the appearance of the form aggregate but it mainly depends on the appearance of the feeling aggregate.

Are the twenty views of the transitory collection mentioned here actual views of the transitory collection? They are not. They are called "views of the transitory collection," but because they arise due to training in tenets they are only imputed views of the transitory collection. Those who hold to particular tenets conceive:

1. the self and the aggregates to be inherently one entity,
2. the self to inherently possess the aggregates,
3. the aggregates to be an inherently existent support of the self, and
4. the self to be inherently supported on the aggregates.

The four views in relation to the form aggregate can be applied in a similar manner to each of the remaining four aggregates, for a total of twenty views. These twenty views of the transitory collection are likened to high, slippery, steep mountains completely surrounding us and covered in darkness due to which it is difficult to become free from them. In conclusion, all twenty views of the transitory collection are acquired views of the transitory collection. Such mountain-like views are destroyed by the vajra-like wisdom realizing selflessness. What is this "vajra-like wisdom"? It is an uninterrupted path of the path of seeing. By means of the antidote of an uninterrupted path of the path of seeing, in subsequent attainment the view of the transitory collection has been destroyed and one attains the result of stream enterer. Scripture says: "Having destroyed the twenty lofty mountain peaks of the view of the transitory collection with the vajra of exalted wisdom, the result of stream enterer is manifested." Although this explanation is given in the context of the hearers' path, it is similar in regard to the bodhisattvas' path in terms of the twenty exemplary sangha and twenty meaning sangha. According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system even those who are approachers to stream enterer are superior or arya beings, whereas in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system approachers to stream enterer are not necessarily superior beings. The twenty sangha were explained extensively in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*, and were also discussed in the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* in the context of the first mind generation in which the 'eighth' superior being is mentioned saying:

Advancing from ground to ground he ascends,
Now all his paths to bad migrations have ceased,
All the levels of ordinary beings are ended.
He is shown to be like the eighth superior. [1.7]

Here 'the eighth' is in the context of counting the eight sangha beginning from:
(1) abider in the result of foe destroyer,
(2) approacher to the result of foe destroyer,
(3) abider in the result of non-returner,
(4) approacher to the result of non-returner,
(5) abider in the result of once returner,
(6) approacher to the result of once returner,
(7) abider in the result of stream enterer, and
(8) approacher to the result of stream enterer.
In short, by means of the vajra-like wisdom one becomes a stream enterer.

The view of the transitory collection is defined as: an afflicted wisdom that observing I or mine conceives it to exist inherently. In general the word "mine" refers to something that belongs to oneself such as "my leg," "my arm," "my face," and so forth. Is the awareness conceiving "my leg" to be established by way of its own character a view of the transitory collection? It is not because it not a conception of a self of persons. This is because an awareness conceiving "my leg" to be established by way of its own character conceives a phenomenon to be established by way of its own character, not the person. Are there not two types of views of the transitory collection, one conceiving "I" and one conceiving "mine"? There are two. What is the difference between them? The view of the transitory collection conceiving "I" is a view of the transitory collection that observing the mere I conceives it to exist inherently. The view of the transitory collection conceiving "mine" is a view of the transitory collection that observing mine conceives it to be inherently existent. Or it can be said that, taking the mine as an observed object, it conceives an inherently existent I. The mine, without qualifying it by "my leg" and so forth is, according to Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa, the I.
Student: Is the mine, from among persons and phenomena, neither a person nor a phenomenon according to Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: He does not distinguish it. However, conceiving "my eye," "my nose," and so forth is to conceive of a phenomenon.

In the monastic universities it is usually said that 20% of one's understanding comes from one's own personal study, 30% from teachings received from a master, and 50% from debate and discussion with one's classmates. This is because when the wisdom of many people come together it enriches one's own understanding. For example, a single person cannot lift a huge boulder alone, even two or three together would find it difficult, but ten people together can lift it up and even move it. This is due to putting together the strength of many individual persons. Likewise, is it similar in the case of putting our individual wisdoms together.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 373) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-4 Refuting a substantially existent person that does not exist as oneness and as otherness

A Stating the previous position
B Refuting that system

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-4A Stating the previous position

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Now, in order to exclude the person propounded as substantially existent, imagined by the Sammitiyas, it is explained:

> *Some assert the person as substantially existent,*
> *Inexpressible as thatness, otherness, permanent, impermanent, etc.*
> *That is asserted as the object of the six consciousnesses and*
> *That is also asserted as the basis of I-grasping.* [6.146]

There, firstly, because apprehending it is not established except for the aggregates, the person as other than the aggregates does not come about. Nor does it have the nature of the aggregates, because it would follow as possessing production and disintegration. Therefore, when like that, it is inexpressible as thatness and otherness from the aggregates.

Just as not being thatness and otherness, similarly it is also inexpressible as permanent and impermanent. Yet, it is known by the six consciousnesses. The person is also reasonable as just substantially existent because it is expressed as the agent itself and the consumer itself, and because it is the very relation-bearer between samsara and nirvana, and bondage and liberation. It is also asserted as the very object apprehended as the self.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1D-1 Stating the hypothesis

> *Some assert a substantial personality*
> *Indescribable as one or other, permanent or impermanent.*
> *They assert it's the object of the six consciousnesses,*
> *And hold it is also to be the basis of self-grasping.* [6.146]

Some Sammatiyas assert a substantially existent personality which cannot be said to be identical or separate, permanent or impermanent, and so on. They also assert it to be an object of knowledge of the six consciousnesses, and assert too that that personality is the base or object of innate self-grasping.

According to one of the Vaibhashika schools, the Sammitiyas, the person is inexpressible as either one substance or as different substance, and as either permanent or impermanent. Chandrakirti says: "Some assert the person as substantially existent, inexpressible as thatness, otherness, permanent, impermanent, etc." (v. 6.146ab). The Sammitiyas assert the person to be:

- self-sufficient substantially existent,
- an object of the six consciousnesses, and
- the basis of the conception of I.

They say that the person is self-sufficient substantially existent and, therefore, can be expressed to be a consumer, an agent, the one who attains liberation, and the one who is bound in cyclic existence. However, such a person cannot be expressed to be:

- one substantial entity with the aggregates,
- a different substantial entity from the aggregates,
- impermanent, or
- permanent.

This is the way in which the Sammitiyas posit the person. When they say that the person is an agent it is because the person is the accumulator of actions. These actions can be either virtuous or non-virtuous. This person is also an experiencer because he is the one who experiences the result of these actions as happiness or suffering. Due to creating many actions, the person remains bound in cyclic existence. On the other hand, if the person meditates on selflessness – the person's emptiness of being

permanent, partless, and independent – he will attain liberation. Therefore, they say that the person is also the one who attains liberation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 373) says:

> Then, in order to eliminate the propounding of a substantially existent person which is imputed by the noble Sammitiyas, it is explained:
>
> *Some assert a substantially existent person that is inexpressible as*
> *Oneness, otherness, permanent, impermanent, and so forth.*
> *It is asserted to be an object of knowledge of the six consciousnesses and*
> *It is also asserted to be the basis of the conception of I.* [6.146]
>
> *Some* of our schools – the Sammitiyas – due to the reasoning "because, except for the aggregates, apprehending that is not established," [say that] the person is not a different entity from the aggregates, yet it also does not have the nature of the aggregates because, if it did, the self would have production and disintegration. Therefore, the self or the person is *inexpressible as oneness* with or *otherness* from the aggregates. Similarly, the person is also inexpressible as *permanent, impermanent*, *and so forth*. *The person is* also *asserted to be substantially existent*
>
> - because it is said to be the agent of the two actions and the consumer of happiness and suffering, the results of these two, and
> - because on the occasions of bondage to cyclic existence and nirvana it is the one who has become free and the one who is to be liberated.
>
> The self is also *asserted to be an object of knowledge of the six consciousnesses and* the self *is also asserted to be the basis*, that is, the observed object, *of the conception of I*.

The Sammitiyas assert that the self is not a different entity from the aggregates, but it also does not have the nature of the aggregates. They say that if it were the nature of the aggregates, the self would also have the characteristics of production and disintegration. Similarly, when they are asked whether the person is permanent or impermanent, they say that it is inexpressible as either permanent or impermanent. They do not say that the self is permanent nor that it is impermanent. If they were to say that it is permanent, which of their theses would they lose? They would lose the thesis that the person is empty of being permanent, partless, and independent. What would be the fault of their asserting the person to be impermanent? If the person were impermanent it would share the characteristics of the aggregates of being produced and disintegrate, however, they do not accept that. The Sammitiyas assert that the person is not the same as the aggregates because when we die, our aggregates are burned, buried, and so forth.

Thursday afternoon, 15 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 373) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-4B Refuting that system

Here the Prasangika Madhyamikas refute the Sammitiyas' assertion that the person is inexpressible as oneness, otherness, permanent, and impermanent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> To explain also this proposition is just unreasonable:

Since mind is not understood as inexpressible from form,
Existent things are not realized as inexpressible.
If some self were established as a thing,
Established like the mind, it would not be inexpressible. [6.147]

Therefore, this verse, having indicated substantial existence itself as impossible for the inexpressible, in order to indicate [the person] as imputedly existent, it is explained:

Because your vase, an entity not established as a thing,
Is inexpressible from form and so forth – hence,
Whatever is a self would be inexpressible from the aggregates –
It should not be maintained as established as existing by itself. [6.148]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 62), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1D-2 Refuting it

Since the mind, as to form, is not seen as indescribable,
What exist as things likewise aren't seen as indescribable,
So if any self existed as a thing,
Existing like the mind, the thing wouldn't be indescribable. [6.147]

It should be understood that if any self existed as a thing, it would follow that the thing, which exists like the mind, would not be indescribable as identical or separate, because just as mind is not perceived to be indescribable as identical with or separate from form, what exist as things are not perceived to be indescribable as identical or separate.

Since, for you, a pot is an entity not existing
As a thing, not describable relative to form and so on,
The self, which you cannot describe regarding the aggregates,
Is not to be seen as established as self-existent. [6.148]

It should be understood that that self which is indescribable as identical with or separate from the aggregates should not be understood to be established as existing by its own entity, because according to you, a pot is an entity not established as a substantially existing thing, not describable as identical with or separate from [its parts,] form and so on.

The Sammitiyas say that the self is substantially existent and that it is inexpressible. To this, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that that which is inexpressible is not admissible as substantially existent. In brief, they say that if it is substantially existent it is not inexpressible, instead it is expressible as either oneness or otherness and as impermanent or permanent.

One can ask the Sammitiyas: "Is the mind expressible?" The Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "Form, as the subject, it follows that it is not expressible as one with the self or as other than the self." The Sammitiyas would respond that form is expressible as one with or other than the self. To this, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say: "Is that which is substantially existent expressible as oneness with the self or as other than the self? It is expressible as such because form is expressible as oneness with the mind or as other than the mind." The Sammitiyas assert the self to be substantially existent and assert the substantially existent to be inexpressible as either one with or other than the self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

It is thought: "The vase is asserted to be inexpressible as thatness and otherness from form and so forth and is asserted to be imputedly existent. Similarly, also the self, like the vase, is imputedly existent."

The Prasangika Madhyamikas make the above argument. The self, as the subject, it follows that it is imputedly existent because it is similar to a vase which is imputedly existent. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Sammitiyas that there is also an imputed existent that is inexpressible because you say that vase and form are inexpressible as oneness or otherness. Do you accept imputed existents? The Sammitiyas say that they do. Therefore, the self must also be imputedly existent because it is inexpressible as oneness with or other than the aggregates.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Therefore, having thus finely indicated refutation and establishment by two verses, now, having expressed thatness and otherness as the very support of things, to begin refuting the self since it just does not have the support of the property of things:

Your consciousness is not asserted as other than
Its own self: asserted as a thing other than form and so forth and
The two aspects are seen in things.
Therefore, self is non-existent because separated from the properties. [6.149]

If, according to you, self were substantially existent, undoubtedly, like consciousness, it would not be other than its own essential nature (self), and would be an entity different from form and so forth. Yet, this does not even exist. Therefore, because of just not having the support of the properties of things, self does not exist like the vase.

Verse 147 is the refutation and verse 148 is the establishment.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

You don't assert consciousness is separate from its own nature,
But assert it's a thing separate from form and so on.
In things, those two aspects are seen, therefore
There is no self, for it lacks the dharmas of a thing. [6.149]

It follows that that self is not a substantially existent thing, because it is devoid of the qualities of a thing, identity and separateness. This pervades, since you do not assert that consciousness is separate from its own entity[155], but assert that it is a thing separate from form and so on – those two aspects, identical and different, would be seen in [the self likewise, if it were] a thing.

The Sammitiyas say that the consciousness is expressible as not other than its own nature. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the self should be asserted in the same way as expressible as not other than its own nature. The form aggregate being other than the self is not possible. In other words, are the self and the aggregates expressible as one entity or not? The response is that they can be expressed as one entity. Are the aggregates and the self one entity or different entities? If they are said to be different entities, the Sammitiyas say that this is inexpressible. However, this is because they do not want to accept the self as it is asserted by the non-Buddhists. It should be recalled that some lower

[155] *bdag nyid*

Buddhist schools assert all five aggregates to be the self, whereas others assert the mind to be the self. Do the Sammitiyas assert all five aggregates to be the self or do they assert the mind to be the self?
Student: Before it was said that they assert the five aggregates to be the self, but here it seems that they assert neither the five aggregates nor the mind to be the self because they say that the self is inexpressible as one with or other than the aggregates.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They should assert one of the aggregates to be the self. Perhaps this is clarified in Kunkyen Jamyang Shepa's *Great Tenets*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 373) says:

> That it is also unsuitable to propound a substantially existent person is explained:
>
> *Since mind is not realized to be inexpressible in regard to form,*
> *Existent things are not realized to be inexpressible.*
> *If some self were established to be a thing,*
> *The thing established like the mind would not be inexpressible.* [6.147]
>
> *For that* reason, just as *mind is not realized*, that is, not asserted, *to be inexpressible* as either oneness with or other *than form*, so *are existent things* – that is, substantially existents things – *not realized to be inexpressible* as oneness or otherness. Hence, *if some self were established to be a thing*, that is, to be substantially existent, *the thing which is established like the mind would not be inexpressible* in either of the two ways.
>
> Therefore, the above verse (v. 6.147) having indicated that substantial existence is impossible in regard to the inexpressible, in order to show that the person is imputedly existent it is explained:
>
> *Because of that, for you, a pot – an entity that is not established to be a thing –*
> *Is inexpressible in regard to form and so forth.*
> *Since whatever is a self is inexpressible in regard to the aggregates,*
> *You should not realize it to be established as existing by itself.* [6.148]
>
> *For that* reason, according to *you a pot – an entity that is not established to be a* self-sufficient substantial *thing – is* asserted to be *inexpressible* as oneness with – that is, as identical with – or as different *from the form and so forth* that are its components. Therefore, similarly, *whatever is a self* is also an imputed existent which *is inexpressible* as oneness or as an otherness that is a different entity *from the aggregates*. Because of that, *you should not realize*, that is, apprehend, the person *to be established as existing by way of its own* entity.
>
> Thus, these two verses (v. 6.147-8) refute substantial existence and precisely indicate its establishment as an imputed existent. Now, having expressed the two, oneness and otherness, to be the very support of things, [the *Supplement*] next refutes a self-sufficient substantially existent self since it is just not the support.
>
> *You do not assert your consciousness to be other than its own nature, but*
> *Assert it to be a thing which is other than form and so forth.*
> *Since the two aspects are seen in things,*
> *The self does not exist because it is free from the property of things.* [6.149]
>
> If for you the self is substantially existent, just as you *assert your consciousness to not be other than its own nature*, so too you must definitely express the person to be oneness since it is not other than its own nature. Also, just as you *assert* your consciousness *to be a thing which is other than form and so forth*, so too you must express the person to be a different entity from the aggregates. *Since, the two aspects* of one and different *are* definitely *seen in things, the self does not exist* substantially *because it is free from the property of things* – establishment as the two, oneness and other.

The person is expressible as not being different from its own nature because the mind is expressible as not being different from its own nature. Thus, the self is expressible as oneness because the consciousness is expressible as oneness, that is, literally as that itself. Also, just as the consciousness is expressible as other than form and so forth, likewise, the self is expressible as other than form and so forth. Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask: "Do you Sammitiyas not understand that the self is expressible as oneness – as that itself – and is expressible as other?" The self should be expressible

because a single thing is seen to have two aspects: the aspect of being oneness and the aspect of being otherness. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the two aspects of one and different are definitely seen in things."

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "the self does not exist substantially because it is free from the property of things – establishment as the two, oneness and other." Is there a difference between 'substantially existent' or 'existing as a substance' (*rdzad su yod pa*) and 'substantial existent' or 'substantial existence' (*rdzad yod*)? According to the lower schools if something is substantially established or established as a substance (*rdzad su grub pa*) it does not have to be a substantial existent or substantial existence (*rdzad yod*). First one has to differentiate between what is a substance (*rdzad*) and what is a substantial existent or substantial existence (*rdzad yod*). For the lower schools, a substance is that which has the ability to perform a function. However, the non-Buddhists, such as the Vaishashikas, define substance differently.

In conclusion, in the Prasangika Madhyamika system the person is not a substantial existent but is an imputed existent. For them, whatever is an established base is pervaded by being an imputed existent, thus, there is nothing that is a substantial existent. However, they say if it is a substantial existent it would exist self-sufficiently. Do the Prasangika Madhyamikas accept substances? Is there a substance that is renowned to the world? Is there an aggregation of the eight particles? Think about it.

Friday morning, 17 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 375) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-5 Explaining the self posited as a mere dependent imputation along with an example

- A Indicating that the self, although not existing as the seven extremes, is imputed in dependence like a chariot
- B Extensively explaining the two remaining positions that were not explained before
- C Dispelling others' arguments in regard to explaining in that way
- D Indicating other objects that are nominal conventions as also being established

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-5A Indicating that the self, although not existing as the seven extremes, is imputed in dependence like a chariot

The self is not findable in the seven ways, or as the seven extremes. Five of the seven extremes have already been explained, the remaining two have yet to be explained. The seven-fold reasoning refuting them is:
(1) the self and the aggregates are not inherently one,
(2) the self and the aggregates are not inherently different entities,
(3-4) the self and the aggregates are not inherently support and supported,
(5) the self does not inherently possess the aggregates,
(6) the mere collection of the aggregates is not the self, and
(7) the shape of the collection of the aggregates is not the self.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Because, if completely analyzed like that, the person is unreasonable as substantially existent:
>
> *Therefore, the support of I-grasping is not a thing,*
> *[Self] is not other than the aggregates, not the entity of the aggregates,*
> *Not the support of the aggregates; it does not possess them.* [6.150abc]
>
> The object of I-grasping, if definitively inquired into, is unreasonable as substantially existent and unsuitable as different from the aggregates, besides not having the nature of the aggregates, and is also not the support of the aggregates. Or, since it has the aggregates as a support, "supported on

the aggregates" is said. In order to clarify both positions of support and supported, the condensed words relied on both. The self is also unreasonable to possess the aggregates.

Therefore, to explain that "The self is still suitable since asserted as imputed or not observed; the self is not to be accepted in the aspects which were propounded," it is said:

It becomes established dependent on the aggregates. [6.150d]

Just as in accepting merely this much: "in dependence on this, this arises," in order to not eliminate the presentation of the deceptive truth, there is no production from [the four], without cause and so forth, similarly, here also, in correctly relying on dependent imputation, having dispelled the types possessing the faults explained, merely this much, 'imputed in dependence on the aggregates,' is to be accepted in order that the conventions of the world completely abide, because of seeing an imputed convention to be the self.

For the purpose of establishing the self as merely imputed, in order to clarify the very meaning which was explained, an external example is indicated and explained:[156]

The chariot is not asserted as other than its components,
Not none other, does not possess them, and
Is not on the components, the components are not on it,
Is not the mere assembly, is not the shape. Just like that. [6.151]

It is not admissible for the person to be substantially existent. An inherently existent self is not the observed object of the conception of I.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1E-1 The self does not exist in the seven extremes, but is dependently imputed, like a cart

So the basis of self-grasping is not a thing. [6.150a]

The self which is the basis of self-grasping is not an inherently existent functioning thing, for if it is logically analyzed, it does not exist substantially.

It's not separate from the aggregates, isn't their entity,
The aggregates are not contents, it does not possess them;
It is established dependent on the aggregates. [6.150bcd]

It should be understood that this self is established dependent on the aggregates, for while this self is not a separate object from the aggregates, nor is the self the entity of the aggregates, it is not inherently container and contents with the aggregates, and it does not inherently possess those aggregates, we can see nevertheless that the convention of self cannot be denied[157].

A cart's not held to be separate from its own parts,
Is not unseparate, and also does not possess them.
It's not in the parts, the parts are not in it, and
It's not just the assembly, nor the shape – like this. [6.151]

For example, it is like the way a cart is [not] asserted to be a separate object from its own parts, is not one, unseparate, also does not possess those parts, and is not contained in the parts, and the parts are not inherently contained in that cart, the mere assembly of parts is not the cart, and the shape of the parts is not the cart; but it is imputed as a cart dependent on the parts.

[156] See Hopkins, pp. 179-183, and Wilson, pp. 30-49.

[157] *bsngon pa*

The self does not exist inherently because, just like a chariot, it is not found when sought in the seven ways. For example, oneself does not exist independently and unrelatedly, that is, inherently. Is one's form aggregate oneself? It is not. Does oneself exist as separate entity from the aggregates? Oneself does not. Analyzing oneself in this way, one will realize that oneself and one's aggregates exist as support and supported. For example, when we have a headache and say "I am sick," this a sign that there is a relationship between the self and the aggregates.

We possess aggregates, however, they are not inherently possessed. We have a collection of aggregates, but that collection is not the I. Because there is a collection of aggregates, it has a shape, in that each one of us has a particular shape, some of us being tall, some short, some round, and so forth. For example, when offering a mandala, the four continents each have their respective shapes. Why is that? It is said that the shape of the continents corresponds to the shape of the face of the human beings living in that continent, for example, the human beings of Jambudvipa, our world, have a chariot-shaped face. Is that shape the self? It is not.

In brief, when the self is sought in these seven ways, it is not found. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the self were found when sought in any of these seven ways it would exist inherently, however, it is not found. Contrarily, the lower schools say that when the imputed object is sought, it is found. They say that if something exists it exists inherently and is found when sought.

There could be the following debate between a Vaibhashika and a Prasangika Madhyamika. For example, a fully ordained monk of the Vaibhashika system could ask a fully ordained monk of the Prasangika Madhyamika system: "Can something not be found when it is sought? Can you not find your food when you look for it?" The Prasangika Madhyamika monk cannot say that he cannot find his food. Therefore, the Vaibhashika says: "Therefore, you do find your food. You can also find your saffron-colored mantle, can you not?" The Prasangika Madhyamika cannot say that he cannot find it because he does find it. The Vaibhashika monk can then say: "Are there not people who offer you the Dharma robes?" The Vaibhashika monk can also ask: "When you lose your horse, can you not find it?" To these arguments, the Prasangika Madhyamika monk would say: "The way of searching for the self by means of the seven extremes and the way of searching for one's food or one's horse are different." In short, when a horse is sought, it is found. This is a possible debate between a Vaibhashika and Prasangika Madhyamika. The Prasangika Madhyamika says that the way of searching for one's horse and so forth is a way of searching that accords with the worldly conventions of ordinary beings, whereas the way of searching for the self by means of the seven ways is different in that when an object is sought by these reasonings it is not found. In short, when an object is sought by reasoning it is not found, but when it is sought in accordance with worldly conventions it can be found, therefore, these two ways of searching are completely different.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: In verse 6.107, there is the following objection:

> *"If things do not exist in suchness,*
> *Also in conventional terms, like the son of a barren woman,*
> *They would not exist. Therefore,*
> *They are just inherently existent."* [6.107]

What does it mean to 'exist in suchness'?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: "Exist in suchness" means "exist ultimately" or "exist truly" or "exist inherently."

Student: Then, in general, when it is said "do not exist in suchness" it means that?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is the problem that this could also be translated as "exist *as* suchness." Ultimate truth exists *as* suchness, but a pot does not exist *as* suchness. Conventional phenomena do

not exist as suchness, if they existed as suchness they would be inherently existent and independently existent. Inherently existent things do not exist, like the son of a barren woman does not exist.
Student: Who says that "If things do not exist in suchness, they do not exist conventionally, like the son of a barren woman"?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Here someone says that if a pot, for example, does not exist ultimately, it does not exist conventionally. Here someone is posing a hypothetical question.

Student: Tsongkhapa (*Illumination*, Tibetan text page 337-8) posits examples of the two extremes: the extreme of non-existence is emptiness ultimately exists, while the extreme of existence is phenomena ultimately exist. Why is emptiness ultimately existing an extreme of non-existence?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If emptiness existed ultimately it would be non-existent. Viewing emptiness to be non-existent would be an extreme of non-existence. What is the meaning of 'emptiness'? It is the emptiness of existing truly, existing inherently, and so forth. If emptiness existed inherently it would be the opposite, that is, emptiness would be non-existent, that is, non-existent conventionally, because it would exist truly.

Student: When one has a manifest conception of true existence while disbelieving in the referent object of this conception, what does this factor of disbelieving do? Is it possible for this manifest conception to produce other afflictions while one is disbelieving?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: This can be answered by means of our own experience. However, in short, there are those who disbelieve in the referent object of the conception of true existence but still have a manifest conception of true existence. Disbelieving (*sun 'byin pa*) the referent object of the conception of true existence means that the referent object has been opposed or harmed. If someone has a conception of true existence, he does not have to believe in the true existence of the referent object. For example, someone who has realized the table is not truly existent can still have an innate conception of true existence of the table. When the table appears to this person, it appears to be truly existent and inherently existent. Therefore, this person has a conception of true existence. But, if he is asked whether he thinks that the table exists truly, he will say that he does not believe that the table exists truly. However, here a distinction has to be made between the person and the awareness.

A person who has realized emptiness and disbelieves the referent object of the conception of true existence can still generate afflictions such as attachment, anger, and so forth. This is also true in the case of someone who has directly realized emptiness.

END

Monday afternoon, 19 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 375) says:

> For that reason, according to the previous explanation, when thoroughly analyzed in this way a substantially existent person is not justifiable.
>
> *Therefore, the support of the conception of I is not a thing.*
> *It is not other than the aggregates, not the entities of the aggregates,*
> *Not the support of the aggregates, not their possessor.* [6.150abc]
>
> *Therefore*, *the support* – that is, the observed object – *of the conception of I is not a thing*, that is, it is not inherently existent. When thoroughly analyzed,
>
> - the self *is not other than*, that is, a different entity from, *the aggregates*,
> - the self is neither the collection nor the single units of *the entities of the aggregates*,
> - the self *is not the support of the aggregates* and the aggregates also do not exist as a support of the self,
> - the self is also *not an* existing by way of its own entity *possessor of those* aggregates.
>
> Therefore, our schools, due to asserting the statements "The self is imputedly existent" or "The self is not observed ultimately" to also be suitable, should not assert the self by means of the ways propounded above. This is explained stating:
>
> *It is established in dependence on the aggregates.* [6.150d]
>
> The self *is established in dependence on the aggregates*. Just as when asserting merely that "In dependence on this, that arises" in order to not eliminate the presentation of conventional truths, one does not assert production from the four, without causes and so forth; likewise, also in the context of the self, when asserting it to be imputed in dependence on the aggregates, having dispelled the previous positions that possess the faults that were explained above, one should assert merely that "It is imputed in dependence on the aggregates" in order that the conventions of the world completely remain, because of seeing that it is not possible to deny that conventionally imputed as the self.

When the self is analyzed through reasoning, it is not acceptable to say that it is substantially existent. Therefore, such an inherently existent self is not the observed object of the conception of I. When the self is analyzed it not found to be other than, that is, a different entity from, the aggregates. In short,

- the self is not inherently one entity with the aggregates,
- the self and the aggregates are not inherently different entities,
- the self and the aggregates are not inherently existent support and supported, and
- the self does not inherently possess the aggregates.

In this way the self is analyzed in the five ways. These refutations were explained before, now the remaining two positions are refuted:

- the collection of aggregates are the self and
- the shape of the aggregates are the self.

These two positions are asserted by the lower schools. The self exists but does not exist ultimately, it exists nominally. The self is posited in dependence on the aggregates. In fact the <u>definition of the person</u> is: that which is posited in dependence on any of the five aggregates. The self arises dependently and relatedly and is, therefore, a dependent-arising or dependent-relation. In brief, the person is a conventional truth. In the Prasangika Madhyamika system production in general is accepted but production from self, production from other, production from both, and causeless production are not acceptable. The self exists as a mere imputation in dependence on the aggregates and exists to worldly renown. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "one should assert merely that 'It is imputed in dependence on the aggregates' in order that the conventions of the world completely remain, because

of seeing that it is not possible to deny that conventionally imputed as the self." The self exists as a mere imputation and as it is renowned to the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 376) says:

> In order to clarify the meaning explained above as meaning that the self is established as a mere imputation, an external example is presented and explained:
>
> *Just as a chariot is not asserted to be other than its components,*
> *It is not not other, it is also not the possessor of them, and*
> *It is not on its components, the components are not on it,*
> *It is not the mere assembly, and it is not the shape, so is it.* [6.151]
>
> *Just as a chariot*:
> 1. *is not asserted to be* an object *other than its components*,
> 2. *it is not not other*, that is, it is also not established to be one,
> 3. *it is not the possessor of* components,[158]
> 4. *it is not* supported there *on the components*,
> 5. *the components are not* inherently supported *on* the chariot,[159]
> 6. *it is not the mere assembly* of the components, *and*
> 7. *it is not the shape* of the components,
>
> *likewise*, so too should the two, the self and the aggregates, be understood similarly.

The analogy of a chariot is presented in order to clarify the meaning. The additional two refutations here are:

- the mere collection of the components of the chariot is not the chariot and
- the shape of the components is not the chariot.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 376) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-5B Extensively explaining the two remaining positions that were not explained before
>
> 1 Actual meaning
> 2 Changing that reasoning in regard to others
>
> 3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-5B1 Actual meaning
>
> A Refuting the assertion that the collection is the chariot
> B Refuting the assertion that the mere shape is the chariot
>
> 3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-5B1A Refuting the assertion that the collection is the chariot

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Here, the five positions – the position of thatness, the position of otherness, the position of support, the position of supported, and the position of possessing them – were already explained. Since the two – the position of the collection and the position of the shape – are necessarily to be established, I shall begin to indicate them:

[158] . The Tibetan text reads "aggregates" but Geshe Jampa Gyatso says that it should read 'components' in order to correspond with the example of a chariot.

[159] The Tibetan text reads "self" but Geshe Jampa Gyatso says that it should read 'chariot' in order to correspond with the example of a chariot.

If the mere collection were the chariot, the chariot itself
Would exist in [the collection][160] abiding as separate pieces. [6.152ab]

Although already explained before [in 6.135ab], this is finely set out again in order to clarify it by way of expressing other faults.

Therefore:

Because there are no components without a component-possessor,
Hence the mere shape is also not reasonable as the chariot. [6.152cd]

Because components do not exist if the component-possessor is non-existent, therefore, components are just non-existent. Therefore, a collection of what would become the chariot? The term 'also' means inclusion, in order to make known that "neither the mere shape is reasonable as the chariot, nor is the mere collection reasonable."

If asked: From where [is that known]?

Because there are no components if the component-possessor is non-existent, therefore, a mere shape is unsuitable as the chariot. The component-possessor as just non-existent is accepted by those [sects] of ours.

The five positions were explained before:
1. the position of thatness or oneness,
2. the position of otherness,
3. the position of support,
4. the position of supported, and
5. the position of possessing them.

These five positions have been refuted and next the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the collection of components were the chariot it would follow that when the chariot is dismantled and the components are heaped together that this heap of components should be called "chariot" because it is the collection of its components.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1E-2A1 Refuting the hypothesis that the collection is the cart

If just the collection were the cart, then when
It was in fragments, the same cart would exist. [6.152ab]

It should be understood that when the parts of the dismantled cart were in separate pieces, the same cart would exist, because just the collection of parts of the cart are supposed to be the cart.

Since there's no part owner, there are no parts, therefore
Only the shape also cannot be the cart. [6.152cd]

Just the shape of the parts and collection of parts of the cart also cannot be the cart, because the parts of the cart do not exist, since the owner of the parts, the cart, does not exist; for neither the cart's individual parts nor the collection are the cart, and there is no cart which is not them. You have already accepted this last reason.

The collection of the components or parts is not the chariot, also the shape of the components is not the chariot because if there is no possessor of components there are no components. Therefore, not

[160] See LTK, p. 394. Compare with verse 6.135ab.

only is the collection of components not the chariot, also the shape of the components is not the chariot.

In general, if a chariot is dismantled and its components are heaped together it is no longer called a chariot. It is only called a chariot when the components are assembled together and are able to perform the function of a chariot. Such a chariot exists conventionally. A dismantled chariot is, therefore, not a chariot. However, there can be debate about this such as the question: "When the components of a chariot are defective, is it no longer a chariot?" The answer is that although they are defective it is still a chariot. In fact, there was once a debate like this in which the challenger said: "If the components of a chariot are defective is it still called 'chariot'?" The defendant said that is was not, to which the challenger than asked: "Then, is a lame person not 'a human being'?" The defendant was forced to that he is not a human being because he is not a fully-qualified human being. However, the defendant himself had a defective arm!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 376) says:

> Since the five previous positions were already explained, here the refutation of the two – the position of the collection and the position of the shape – being the chariot needs to be proven, therefore, they are indicated next:
>
> *If the mere collection were the chariot,*
> *The chariot itself would exist in the fragmented remains.* [6.152ab]
>
> *If the mere collection* of the components of the chariot *were the chariot*, *the chariot itself would* also *exist in* the collection, *the fragmented remains*, of the components of a broken chariot. Although the refutation of the collection of components being its own possessor of parts was already explained before, it is set out here in order to indicate faults other than those indicated before. There are also other faults:
>
> *Because of that, the possessor of components not existing, the components would not exist.* [6.152c]
>
> *For that* reason, if *the possessor of components does not exist* also *the components would not exist*, because of which the components would become non-existent given that our schools assert there does not exist a possessor of components in regard to the chariot.
>
> OBJECTION: They also assert that the collection of components is the possessor of parts and that the components are the parts. They also assert similarly in regard to the components and the possessor of components. Therefore, they do not assert that a possessor of components does not exist.
>
> RESPONSE: There is no such fault. In our system both the single units and the collection of the aggregates are the appropriated, therefore, they are not asserted to be the appropriator. Similarly, both the individual components and the collection of the chariot are posited as the components; they are not posited as the possessor of the components because these schools also do not assert a possessor of components which is not the collection and because they also refute that.
>
> *Therefore, the mere shape is also not suitable to be the chariot.* [6.152d]
>
> The term 'also' (v. 6.152d) means that the collection which is not explicitly expressed is included because the way in which it is included should be understood to be that "*The mere shape is also not suitable to be the chariot*, the mere collection is also not suitable."

The components and the chariot are

- not inherently one entity,
- not inherently different entities,
- not inherently existent support and supported,
- the chariot does not inherently possess the components,
- the collection of the components is not the chariot, and
- the shape of the components is not the chariot.

This is an analogy set forth to explain the self and the aggregates:

- the self and the aggregates are not inherently one entity, or the self and aggregates are not one,
- the self and the aggregates are not different entities
- the self and the aggregates are not inherently support and supported,
- the self does not inherently possess the aggregates,
- the collection of the aggregates is not the self, and
- the shape of the collection of the aggregates is not the self.

These seven can be summarized in a syllogism:

> Devadatta, as the subject, does not exist inherently because he is not found at the end of the analysis by means of the seven reasonings.

Like the chariot, the self does not exist inherently and is therefore not found when analyzed in the seven ways. The lower schools, on the other hand, say that when the self is sought it is found among the aggregates. Some of them say that it is found because the collection of the aggregates are the self, whereas others say it is found because the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness, is the self, and still others say that it is found because the seventh consciousness, the mind-basis-of-all, is the self. The Prasangika Madhyamikas refute all these assertions and also refute the self as it is asserted by the non-Buddhists, that is, a permanent, partless, and independent self. Both the non-Buddhist schools and the lower Buddhist schools say that the self exists inherently because all internal and external phenomena exist inherently. They say that the self exists inherently because when the self that is a mere nominal imputation is sought it is found. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas the reasoning seeking the imputed object is a reasoning analyzing the ultimate, whereas according to the lower schools is a reasoning analyzing a conventionality.

In short, the collection of the components is not the chariot. If it is asserted to be the chariot, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask: "When the components are heaped up on the ground is there a chariot there?" The lower schools would have to say that there is no chariot there. In that case, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it follows that there are no components of the chariot because there is no chariot, the possessor of the components. This is in fact accepted by the lower schools.

If the lower schools are asked is the collection of the components the chariot, they would not say that it is because they do not accept that the collection of the components is the chariot. Although they accept that the components are there, they would not accept that there is a chariot there.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask the lower schools: "Is the collection of the aggregates not the self? Is an isolated aggregate not the self?" The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they are not the self because they are not the appropriator of the aggregates, but rather are the appropriated and that, therefore, the lower schools should understand that the aggregates cannot be the appropriator, the self. Due to this, the lower schools cannot posit either the collection of the aggregates to be the self nor a single isolated aggregate to be the self, whereby they unable to posit the self. This is the way in which the Prasangika Madhyamikas debate with the lower schools who, in consequence, are forced to gradually give up their tenets and to become Prasangika Madhyamikas. In order to become a buddha one has to enter the Madhyamika, the middle way. Just as one chooses a highway in order to get somewhere faster, one must choose the middle way in order to reach enlightenment faster.

There is a story about two people who ran a race up and down a hill. One of them took the main road which zigzagged up the hill, whereas the other went straight up the side of the hill. However, the one who went straight up continually slipped backward on the muddy ground. Thus, the one who had taken the longer route in the end won the race.

What is the main reasoning proving the selflessness of persons? What is the main reasoning proving the selflessness of phenomena? In the *Supplement* and the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'* the main reasoning establishing the selflessness of phenomena is the diamond sliver reasoning

and the main reasoning proving the selflessness of persons is the seven-fold reasoning. In Shantarakshita's *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras* the main reasoning is that of freedom from one and many. In Jnanagarbha's *Two Truths* the main reasoning is the reasoning refuting production by the four alternatives. In Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way* the main reasoning is that refuting production of an existent and non-existent. These are the five reasonings proving the lack of true existence. If the object established is from the point of view of the Svatantrika Madhyamika it should be understood as lacking true existence, whereas in the Prasangika Madhyamika system it should be understood as lacking inherent existence. The lack of inherent existence is to be realized through the force of reasoning, not through the force of experience. There is a story about one geshe who during pujas would sit in meditation posture without speaking and moving for two to three hours. When his classmates asked him what he was doing, he responded that he was meditating on emptiness. They then asked him what emptiness looks like, to which he responded that emptiness is like a blue haze. The other monks laughed at him and asked him how could that be. The monk said that emptiness was indescribable, but if they wanted an answer it was like a blue haze, like empty space. He came to be called "Blue Emptiness"! However, perhaps he had actually realized emptiness.

Tuesday morning, 20 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 377) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-5B1B Refuting the assertion that the mere shape is the chariot

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore, if a mere shape is asserted as the chariot, is that shape thought to be the components' or the collection's?
>
> There, even if asserted to be the particular shape of the components, it would be deemed to be [a shape] which did not give up the former particular shapes or which did give up the former particular shapes. There, if the former is asserted, it is unreasonable.

When the opponents assert the shape of the components to be the chariot, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask: "Is the shape of the individual components the chariot or is the shape of the collection of components the chariot?" They then say that if it is the shape of the individual components "it would be deemed to be [a shape] which did not give up the former particular shapes or which did give up the former particular shapes." If the former is asserted, that is not correct. Chandrakirti then explains why it is incorrect.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Why?
>
> *For you, just like the shape existed in the past in each component,*
> *It is also like that when included in the chariot.*
> *Just as in those that were separated,*
> *Also now, the chariot does not exist.* [6.153]
>
> If, just as the particular shapes of the wheels and so forth existed prior to the occasion of the chariot, the particular shapes of the wheels and so forth do exist – like only that, also at the time of the chariot, as it was non-existent at the time the components were separated, the chariot is to be ascertained as not existing also at the time of the chariot itself, because the shapes of its components are not different.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 64), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1E-2A2 Refuting the hypothesis that the shape is the cart

If you say that the shape of the parts is the cart, then either the shape of the individual parts is the cart, or the shape of the collection of parts is the cart.

On the first view, either a shape without difference from the shape at the time when the parts were not put together is the cart; or a shape unlike the shape at that time is the cart.

You say the shape of each part is the same
When it belongs to the cart as it was before –
Then, just as in those that were separate,
Still, similarly, the cart does not exist. [6.153]

On the first view, it follows that just as the cart does not exist in the separated parts, so likewise, even when the parts have been put together, there is no cart. For (a) just as the shape existed before, at the time when the parts were not put together, the shape also exists like that when they are included in the cart, and (b) the mere shape of the individual parts is posited as the cart.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

In the case of the second position – only another shape will be called "chariot:"

Now, if at this time of the chariot itself,
The wheels and so forth have different shapes,
This would be apprehended, yet that also does not exist.
Therefore, the mere shape does not exist as the chariot. [6.154]

If solely another particular shape of those [components] from that which existed before – rectangular, long, round, and so forth, the individual particular shapes of the components of the chariot, the wheels, axle, pegs, and so forth – were to be produced at the time of the chariot itself, although it would exist to apprehension, it is not apprehended.

Thus, for the wheel, the possessor of shapes that are different – the spokes, rim, hub, and so forth – its shapes are not perceived to be altered on the occasion of the chariot. Therefore, it is unreasonable to say, "the shape of the parts is the chariot."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

Now if, at this time when it is a cart,
The wheels and so on have a different shape,
This will be perceived; but it is not,
Therefore just the shape is not the cart. [6.154]

On the second view, if you say that now, in this time when it is established as a cart, the wheels and so on have a different shape, unlike before, then the mere shape of the individual parts is not the cart; for if this shape like that existed, it would be perceivable, yet it is not.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask: "Is the shape of the individual components of the chariot the chariot or is the shape of the collection of components the chariot?" If the opponents say that the shape of the individual components is the chariot, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask them whether it

is their shape when the individual components are assembled together or their shape when they are not assembled together. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the chariot is asserted to be the shape of the components when they are not assembled together this is not correct because in that case there would exist a chariot with respect to each of the components, the wheels and so forth. On the other hand, if the chariot is asserted to be the shape when the individual components are assembled together, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask: "Does the shape of the individual components when not assembled still exist or not when they are assembled?" They say that also with respect to the shape of the components when they are assembled together there would be no chariot because when the components are separate there is no chariot.

In short, if the opponents say that the shape of the individual components is the chariot it follows that each of the individual components should be a chariot but they are not. Therefore, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it follows that there would be no difference between when the components are assembled and when they are not assembled because the shape of the components is not different. Thus, it follows that according to the lower schools each of the individual components, the wheels, the nails, the axle, and so forth, should be a chariot, but they are not. In other words, according to the lower schools the shapes of round, long, and so forth should be a chariot, whereas they are not. The conclusion is that the shape of the individual components is not the chariot because if the shape of the individual components were the chariot, the chariot would be apprehended even before the components are assembled, whereas this is not the case.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is considered: The particular shape of the collection of the wheels and so forth is the chariot.
>
> It is explained that "that is also unreasonable:"
>
> *Because your collection does not exist at all,*
> *The shape is not of the collection of components.*
> *In dependence on that which is nothing at all,*
> *How could there be shape here?* [6.155]
>
> If a thing called 'collection' were to exist a little, shape having its support would be imputed, yet the so-called "collection of components" does not exist even a little. How could shape also be imputed having the support of that which does not exist even a little, because [you] accept imputation as only having the support of substance?

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Since your collection does not exist at all,*
> *That shape is not of the collection of parts;*
> *Based on what is nothing whatsoever,*
> *How can there be any shape in this?* [6.155]

If you say that the shape of the collection of parts is the cart, then in this case, dependent on that collection of parts which is not substantially existent at all, how can there be any such shape? It follows that there cannot, because that shape is not a phenomenon imputed with just the collection of parts, since according to you, the collection is by no means a substantial existent. You have already accepted the major premise [that what does not exist substantially cannot be a base of imputation].

The shape of the collection of the components is also not the chariot. If it were, the fault would arise that when the components are not assembled and are heaped together it would follow that that heap is a chariot.

The collection of components does not exist even slightly as the chariot. Chandrakirti says: "How could shape also be imputed having the support of that which does not exist even a little, because [you] accept imputation as only having the support of substance?"

In short, the shape of the individual components is not the chariot nor is the shape of the collection of the components the chariot. Therefore, the chariot does not exist as either of these, nor is it found to be either of these. If the shape of the individual components is asserted to be the chariot, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask whether it is the shape when the components are not assembled or when they are assembled. In conclusion, the chariot is not the shape of the individual components when they are not assembled nor when they are assembled. The shapes of round, long, and so forth are not the chariot.

If the opponents ask the Prasangika Madhyamikas what they posit as the chariot, on what would they say that the chariot is imputed, the shape or something else?

Student: The Prasangika Madhyamikas would say that the chariot is imputed on the basis of the collection of the components.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Therefore, the chariot is imputed in dependence on the collection of the components and is not found when sought. What is posited as a chariot in the perspective of an innate awareness lacking analysis?

Student: It is the shape of the collection of the components.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Do the rest of you agree?

Student: You could carve the shape of a chariot in stone but it would not be a chariot, so perhaps it is what performs the function of a chariot that is posited as a chariot.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If we talk instead about the person, we would not say that the shape of the aggregates is the person. On the other hand, a chariot is probably imputed mainly in dependence on the shape, but also in dependence on being able to perform the function of a chariot. What is the definition of a chariot? Think about it. A drawing of a chariot has the shape of a chariot but, even though it does not perform the function of a chariot, it is still called a chariot. Similarly, a toy that has the shape of a chariot is also called a chariot.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 377) says:

> Furthermore, if you assert the mere shape of the chariot to be the chariot, do you consider that shape to be that of each of the components or to be that of the collection? If it were the first case, it would either be:
>
> - a shape that has not relinquished the particular shape of the previously non-assembled [chariot] or
> - a shape that has relinquished the particular shape of the previously [non-assembled chariot].
>
> Why is it that if the first case is asserted, that too is unsuitable?
>
> *For you, just like the shape that existed earlier in each of the components,*
> *Likewise, it would be similar also when it is realized to be chariot*
> *Just as in those which were separate,*
> *Likewise, also the chariot would not exist.* [6.153]
>
> According to *you*, *just like the shape that existed* in *each of the components* of the chariot, such as the wheels and so forth, *earlier* when it was not assembled, *likewise*, would [the shape] be *similar* to before *also* later when it is assembled – that is, when it is *realized*, that is, established, *to be a chariot*. Then, *just as* the chariot did not exist *in* the components *which were separate*, not yet having been assembled, *likewise*, when the components are assembled together, *also the chariot would not exist*

- because you posit the mere shape of the individual components to be the chariot and
- because the shape of the individual components before and later would not be different.

The second position is:

If now at the time of the chariot itself
The shapes of the wheels and so forth were different,
That would be apprehended but it too is not;
Therefore, the mere shape does not exist as the chariot. [6.154]

If another particular shape, different from the previous, arising later on were the chariot, then, *if now at the time the chariot itself* is established, the individual particular *shapes* of the components of the chariot, *the wheels and so forth* – that is, the axle, the nails, and so forth – and the shapes of being quadrangular, that is, square, as well as long, round, and so forth, *were different*, that is, incongruous with the earlier [shapes] when not assembled, *that* incongruous shape of the individual components *would be apprehended* by the eye consciousness *but it too is not*. *Therefore, the mere shape* of the individual components *does not exist as the chariot*.

OPINION: The particular shape of the collection of the assembled components, the wheels and so forth, is posited as the chariot.

RESPONSE: The explanation that "That too is unsuitable" is:

Because of that, since for you the collection does not exist at all,
That shape is not of the collection of the components. [6.155ab]

If that called "the collection" existed in the slightest bit as a thing, that is, substantially, it would be imputed on the shape which depends on it. However, that called "the collection of components" does not have the slightest substantial existence. *For that* reason, *since* according *to you the collection does not exist at all* – that is, it does not exist substantially even in the slightest – *that shape is not* imputed in dependence on taking *the collection of the components* as the basis of imputation

- because you assert such imputed existents to only take a substantial existent as a basis and
- because you assert the collection of components to also be imputedly existent.

In dependence on that which does not exist at all,
Here how could it be seen to be the shape? [6.155cd]

Therefore, *in dependence on* taking *that which does not exist at all*, i.e., that which does not exist substantially in the slightest, to be the basis of imputation, *here* in the context of a chariot *how could it be seen to be the shape* that is posited as the chariot*?* It could not. Here the opponents assert that imputedly existent things are imputed in dependence on some self-sufficient substantial existents existing as the bases of imputation and they also assert that both the collection and the shape are imputed existents. Therefore, when the collection is asserted to be the basis of imputation of the shape, not only is this contradictory, but, just as the color of a being is not suitable to be posited as the being, also in regard to a chariot neither its color nor its shape are suitable to be posited as the chariot because these two are the objects of appropriation of the chariot. This it to be understood.

Is the chariot the shape of the individual components or the shape of the collection of the components? If it were the first case, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask: "Is the chariot the shape of the individual components at the time when they are not assembled together or is it the shape of the individual components at the time when they are assembled together?" In brief, the shape of the individual components at the time when they are not assembled together is not the chariot. If it were the second case, that is, it is the shape of the individual components at the time when they are assembled together, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask: "Is the shape of the individual components at the time when they are not assembled together given up when they are assembled together?" In other words, when the components are put together does the shape of the individual components change? The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the shape of the individual components at the two times, when they are assembled and when they are not assembled, is not different. Therefore, just as there does not exist a chariot when the components are not assembled there would not exist a chariot when the components are assembled together because the shape of the individual components at both times is

the same. Or they would say that it follows that when the individual components are not assembled together there would still be a chariot because when they are assembled together there is a chariot. This is because the shape of the individual components is the same at both times, that is, when they are assembled together and when they are not assembled together. For example, a round component at the time of non-assemblage is still round when the components are assembled together. This can be confirmed by what is seen in the world without any need to study philosophy.

In conclusion, a chariot does not exist as the shape of the individual components nor as the shape of the collection of the components. The chariot cannot be the shape of the collection of components because this does not exist as a substantially existent basis even slightly. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Here the opponents assert that imputedly existent things are imputed in dependence on some self-sufficient substantial existents existing as the bases of imputation and they also assert that both the collection and the shape are imputed existents." According to the lower schools if something is an imputed existent its basis of imputation is a substantial existent. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that there is nothing that is substantially existent, whereas that there is no basis of imputation that is a substantial existent is the lower schools' own assertion. This is similar to the fact that the color or complexion of a being is not the being. Likewise, the color of the chariot is not the chariot nor is the shape of the chariot the chariot. This is because the shape of the chariot is an object to be appropriated by the chariot. For example, the color and shape of the being is not the being but is that which is appropriated by the being. The person or being is merely imputed by means of a name on the collection of the aggregates. Likewise, a chariot is imputed on a collection of components having the ability to perform the function of a chariot.

The Tibetan word for chariot, *shing rta*, literally 'wood-horse,' was originally given on the basis of a collection of wooden components drawn by a horse. However, there are similar objects pulled by oxen or human beings.

A car is also composed of individual components, wheels, doors, windows, and so forth, which when disassembled and heaped together, even though all the components are there, one would not say that there is a car there. There is only a car when the components are assembled together. This is because prior to their assemblage that collection of components is not able to function as a car. When a heap of individual components of a car is assembled together, the shape of the collection changes but not the shape of the individual components, for example, the shape of the wheels at the time when the car is not assembled and at the time when it is assembled remains the same. The Prasangika Madhyamikas' argument here is that just as the lower schools would say that a car exists subsequent to assembling the components together, so too should they say that a car exists prior to their assemblage. And just as they say that there is no car that is the shape of the individual components prior to their assemblage, there is no car that is the shape of the individual components subsequent to their assemblage.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Where is the I?
Student: Which I? The mere I or the inherently existent I, the substantially existent I, the permanent, partless, and independent I?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Just the usual "I." Does that I exist among the aggregates? Is it the shape of the aggregates or the collection of the aggregates? What is it?
Student: It is not any of those.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: On what is the I imputed?
Student: It is imputed on any of the five aggregates, whichever one I am paying attention to at that time.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Would you call your head "I"?
Student: My head is not the I.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What about when you are paying attention to your head?

Student: Then, it is the basis of imputation of the I.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Then your head is the basis of imputation of I or Jonathan?
Student: The feeling of my head is the basis of imputation of the I.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If someone hits you on the head and you feel pain, is that feeling the basis of imputation of the I?
Student: It is.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: We should all spend some time looking for the I. His Holiness the Dalai Lama, one time when teaching the Great Seal, told everyone to spend the next day looking for the I. So the next day, together with Khensur Lobsang Nyima, we went for a picnic to look for our I. We pointed at each other in order to make a strong I arise. Although this I, the object of negation, appears, it is difficult to recognize. It is also said that when someone becomes very angry there is a brief moment in which the object of negation arises, however, it is still difficult to recognize. It is said that also when happy the I that is the object of negation arises faintly. It is important to recognize this I that is the object of negation. This I, which appears very briefly is a concrete, independent I that arises without depending on anything. When one seeks the I that is the object of negation it is this I that one should identify. When sitting relaxed, the I that is the object of negation is difficult to identify. We should try to recognize this concrete, independent I that is the object of negation, and then negate it. Such an independent I does not exist in reality, yet it appears briefly in particular situations. The advice of the holy masters is to first recognize the I that is the object of negation and then to negate it.

Tuesday afternoon, 20 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 379) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-5B2 Changing that reasoning in regard to others

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In case it is asserted: In dependence on the collection, although specified as untrue, there will be untrue shape.

In dependence on the collection of components which is imputedly existent, there is shape that is imputedly existent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is like that and:
>
> *Just as you assert this, thus,*
> *All kinds of effects having untrue natures*
> *Should also be known to be produced*
> *Having depended on untrue causes.* [6.156]
>
> In dependence on untrue ignorance, [karmic] formations solely having untrue nature are produced. In dependence on a seed having untrue nature, a sprout having untrue nature is produced. Likewise are the entities of cause and effect having untrue nature, without exception also to be realized. Since it is useless to strongly settle on things such as a deer of the shadows, the flesh of which is unable to be consumed even through hundreds of exertions, what is to be done?

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1E-2B Change of that argument for the other

You may say, "The imputedly existent shape is imputed based on the imputedly existent collection." –

Understand that just as you hold this,
Everything is produced having the nature
Of an untrue appearance of result,
Dependent on a cause which is untrue. [6.156]

Then you should understand that everything is to be understood as produced with the nature of the untrue aspect of a result dependent on an untrue cause, for this is admitted in just the way you maintain that an imputedly existent shape is imputed based on an imputedly existent collection.

An untrue cause produces an untrue result or a false cause produces a false result. For example, ignorance which is untrue produces the result of karmic formations which is untrue. Similarly, a barley seed which is untrue produces the result of a barley sprout which is also untrue. Chandrakirti says: "Likewise are the entities of cause and effect having untrue nature, without exception also to be realized." It should be understood that untrue causes produce untrue results. On the other hand, a true cause, that is, an inherently existent cause, cannot produce an inherently existent result. In brief, conceiving an object to be true, although it is not, is meaningless. For example, a hunter who, wishing to eat the flesh of a deer but seeing merely its shadow and settling on that, will not come to eat the flesh of a deer. Likewise strongly settling on things as true, although they are untrue, is useless.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Due, to this, it is also just unreasonable to say "Awareness of vase
Regarding [atoms of] forms and so forth abiding like that." [6.157ab]

There, some [of our own sects] propound "There will be awareness of vases and so forth regarding forms and so forth abiding like that." That also is excluded by the example of the chariot.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

Hence, too, you cannot say the pot's conceived
In form and so on, which remain like that. [6.157ab]

This demonstration that the collection of the cart's parts is not the cart also compels other things, for it shows also that one cannot say there is the idea[161] of a pot in the collection of the eight kinds of atoms of form, etc. of the pot, which remain like that.

Someone thinks that the collection of the eight particles of a pot is the pot, however, this too is not correct. This was already refuted by means of the example of the chariot in which the shape of the individual components of the chariot and the shape of the collection of components of the chariot were refuted to be the chariot.

If it is asked how the eight particles of the pot exist, there are different responses from the various schools. For example, some schools say that the eight particles exist in the pot in a manner of touching or adhering to each other. Others say that they do not touch each other but that there is space between the particles. Still others say that they touch each other but without merging. However, if the particles of a tea cup abide without touching each other there would be the consequence that

[161] *blo*

when it is filled with tea, the tea will leak out between the particles. In order to avoid this consequence, these schools say that the wind energy between the particles prevents the tea from leaking out. On the other hand, if the particles are asserted to adhere to each other, it would follow that the entity of the particles would merge or mix. However, it is said that their entities do not merge.

Thus, either the eight particles of a pot exist in a manner of touching or not touching each other. The conclusion of the argument here is that the shape of the individual eight particles is not the pot and the shape of the collection of the eight particles is not the pot.

Chandrakirti says: "There, some [of our own sects] propound "There will be awareness of vases and so forth regarding forms and so forth abiding like that." This too is excluded by the example of the chariot."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:
>
> *Since without production, form and so forth also do not exist.*
> *Therefore, also their shape is unreasonable.* [6.157cd]
>
> How there is no production for forms and so forth was already explained before. Therefore, because of non-production, forms and so forth do not exist. How could those not existing be reasonable as the very reason of imputing vases and so forth? Therefore, since unreasonable to assert vases and so forth as having appropriation of substance, vases and so forth do not have the essential-nature of the particular shape of the form and so forth.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Since there's no birth, form and so on don't exist,*
> *Therefore it also cannot be their shape.* [6.157cd]
>
> As for the form, etc. of a pot, that pot and so on cannot be their shape for they too do not inherently exist, since there is no inherent production.

Since there is no inherent production, forms and so forth do not exist inherently. "Also their shape is unreasonable" means that inherently existent shape is also unreasonable. "Since without production, form and so forth also do not exist" means that because there is no inherent production, forms and so forth do not inherently exist.

Chandrakirti says: "How could those not existing be reasonable as the very reason of imputing vases and so forth?" This means that since there is no inherently existent vase there is no inherently existent basis of imputation. Is a vase, or a pot, color or shape?

Student: It is shape.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Since it is not color, it is shape. Shape is an object of apprehension of an eye consciousness. "Vase" is imputed on that attribute of shape. A vase is defined as: that which is bulbous, flat bottomed, and capable of holding fluid. Would it be sufficient to say that a vase is that which is bulbous and capable of holding fluid? The stomach is bulbous and capable of holding fluid, but it is not flat-bottomed. Why is a cup not a vase?

Student: Just because of worldly conventions.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is right. The collection of the eight particles is not the vase and the shape of the collection of the eight particles is not the vase, but the term "vase" or "pot" is affixed through worldly renown. Some texts say that what is bulbous-bellied is the definition of a vase or pot without mentioning its other two features of being flat-bottomed and capable of holding fluid. A definition is

that which is posited, therefore, the bulbous-bellied is what is posited as the vase or pot. Is there something that looks like a vase but does not have space into which fluid can be poured? There is. *Collected Topics* says that pot and pillar are contradictory. Therefore, if it is asked whether there is a common locus of pillar and pot, the response is that there is not. Yet if many pots are piled up on top of each other and a beam is placed on top of the pile, would it not function as a pillar, which is that which holds up a beam? The definition of a pillar is that which performs the function of holding up a beam. To this debate one can respond that a pile of pots is not a pot.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 379) says:

> OBJECTION: Although an untrue collection is considered to be imputedly existent, in dependence on it there is a shape that is untrue, that is, imputedly existent.
> RESPONSE:
>
> *Just as you assert that, likewise,*
> *Through depending on untrue causes,*
> *The types of results having an untrue nature –*
> *Everything – should also be understood to be produced.* [6.156]
>
> *Just as you assert that* an imputedly existent shape is posited in dependence on an imputedly existent collection, *likewise*, *through depending on untrue causes* such as ignorance and a seed, you should understand that *the types of results*, such as karmic formations and a sprout, *having an untrue nature* or entity, are produced. Similarly, you should *also* understand the entities of causes and results other than them – *everything* having an untrue nature – *to be produced*.

An untrue shape is imputed in dependence on an untrue collection and from untrue causes come untrue results. It is acceptable that from a false cause comes a false result.

Here it is said that if, through seeing the shadow of a deer, one adheres to it and thinks to kill it in order to eat its meat, all one's actions will be without result. Likewise, conceiving an inherently existent cause to bring an inherently existent result is meaningless. However, this is what is asserted by all the lower schools. In other words, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the lower schools conceiving an inherently existent result to be produced from an inherently existent cause is like a hunter conceiving the shadow of a deer to be an actual deer in that all one's actions become meaningless or useless.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 379) says:

> *Hence, saying "With respect to those abiding such as form and so forth,*
> *There is an awareness of pot" is also just not suitable.*
> *Since there is no production, also forms and so forth do not exist.*
> *Therefore, they too are not suitable to be shape.* [6.157]
>
> Strong adherence to falsities – like shadow deer, the flesh of which cannot be eaten even though one makes hundreds of attempts – as truly existent is meaningless, *hence*, what is to be done? Many of our own schools propound *saying* "Since the collection that *abides* as a combination – *such as* the eight particles, *form and so forth*, of a pot – is the pot, there is an *awareness of pot*." Since that is eliminated by the example of a chariot, it *is also just not suitable*. In addition, *since* it was already explained before that *there is no* inherent *production*, *also forms and so forth do not exist* inherently. *Therefore*, since it is also not suitable to assert pots and so forth to be substantially existent appropriations, *those* pots and so forth are *not suitable* to be the attribute of *shape* of form and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Many of our own schools propound saying 'Since the collection that abides as a combination – such as the eight particles, form and so forth, of a pot – is the pot, there is an

awareness of pot.'" This was refuted previously by means of the example of the chariot in which the collection of the components were refuted to be the chariot and so forth.

There is debate about whether the eight particles of the pot abide combined together. Some of the lower schools say that they abide combined together, others that they abide without being combined together, however, all the lower schools say they abide existing inherently. This is what is refuted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "In addition, since it was already explained before that there is no inherent production, also forms and so forth do not exist inherently."

Lama Tsongkhapa then says: "Therefore, since it is also not suitable to assert pots and so forth to be substantially existent appropriations, those pots and so forth are not suitable to be the attribute of shape of form and so forth." The lower schools posit substantial existents and posit the eight particles as such. In other words, they say that form and so forth are substantial existents. Bhavaviveka in his *Blaze of Reasoning* says that pots and so forth are substantial existents. Likewise, trees, forests, and so forth are not imputed existents, but are substantial existents. Therefore, it would seem that Bhavaviveka says that forms and so forth are substantial existents. In this way, he indirectly says that forms are not imputed existents, whereby pots also cannot be imputed existents.

On the other hand, according to the Prasangika Madhyamika system there are no substantial existents because for them whatever is an established base is an imputed existent in that they say that everything is merely imputed by conception. It can be asked: "Does whatever is imputed by conception necessarily exist?" If someone says that it does, one can ask: "Do the horns of a rabbit exist because there is a conception that imputes the horns of a rabbit?" However, one time someone sent Lama Yeshe a photo of a rabbit with horns! In conclusion, whatever is imputed by conception does not necessarily exist because we impute many things that do not exist, for example, true existence. In order for something to exist, the basis of imputation must be valid. For example, when imputing "pen" it must be imputed on a valid basis – that which has the shape of a pen and functions to write. It is not sufficient just to have the shape of a pen, for example, my little finger. In short, everything imputed by a conception does not necessarily exist.

In conclusion, "pot" is imputed to a special shape. When something is imputed to be a table, it must have particular attributes. If someone were to call a chair "table" this would be harmed by worldly conventions. When a name or term is imputed to something, it must have special attributes, be able to perform a particular function, and not be invalidated by worldly conventions. For example, when "pot" is imputed on a basis, it must have the special attributes of a pot, be able to perform the function of a pot, and the imputation must not be invalidated by worldly conventions. Since a Prasangika Madhyamika is one who accords with worldly conventionalities, he is not invalidated by worldly conventions.

Student: Calling this book "book" cannot be invalidated by worldly conventions because it is a valid basis for imputing book, however, truly existent book is also not invalidated by worldly conventions, therefore, it would seem that it is not sufficient to say that it is not invalidated by worldly conventions.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: To avoid this problem we could also specify "it is also not invalidated by a valid cognizer of the ultimate."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 379) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-5C Dispelling others' arguments in regard to explaining in that way

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is mentioned here: Well then, when sought in seven ways in the manner which was explained, if this chariot does not exist, then since the chariot is non-existent, that which is imputed

conventionally in the world as the chariot would become eliminated. Yet, statements such as "Fetch the chariot, buy the chariot, repair the chariot," and so forth are seen. Therefore, because renowned to the world, chariots and so forth just exist.

Response to this: This fault will [apply] to only you. It is like this. When sought in seven ways in the manner explained before, the chariot is incorrect and yet you, having completely analyzed, do not accept another means of establishment in presenting the thing as established. Therefore how will the conventions of the world which state "Fetch the chariot" and so forth, be established for you? We do not have this fault.

Because:

That indeed will not be established by the seven modes
For the world or in thusness.
Without analysis, here through just the world,
It is imputed in dependence on its components. [6.158]

Indeed, the chariot will not be established ultimately and deceptively when that is sought in seven ways by this manner: "The chariot is not asserted as other than its components" and so forth. Nonetheless, having abandoned analysis, it is imputed in dependence on its components – the wheels and so forth – through the world itself, like blue and so forth and feeling and so forth.

Therefore, because of accepting dependent imputation like accepting dependent arising, the mere state of having this as a condition, the conventions of the world will not follow as cut off for our position. Just this is worthy to be accepted also by the other side.

Just as in the case of the chariot, likewise, also the person is not findable when sought by means of the seven-fold analysis, yet exists as a worldly convention that is found by an innate awareness lacking investigation and analysis. Therefore, the person exists conventionally and is able to perform a function.

Wednesday morning, 21 February 2001

When a chariot is sought by means of the seven ways it is not found. However, the chariot that is accepted in the world saying 'Buy the chariot' and so forth exists, and, therefore, a chariot exists. On the other hand, it is not possible to posit the chariot through seeking the imputed object. This is because if the chariot were posited through seeking the imputed object the faults mentioned before would be accrued. The lower schools have these faults because they do not have any other way of positing the chariot other than as the imputed object that is found when sought by means of thorough analysis. Chandrakirti says: "Therefore how will the conventions of the world which state "Fetch the chariot" and so forth, be established for you? We do not have this fault." The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not have this fault because they do not posit the chariot through seeking the imputed object, but instead posit it in accordance with worldly conventions. Positing it in this way, the chariot exists.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1E-3 Rejecting an opponent's argument against such an explanation

Neither in reality, nor for the world, indeed,
Do the seven ways establish that.
But without analysis, just from the world's viewpoint,
Here it's imputed, dependent on its own parts. [6.158]

It follows that although the cart is not found by seeking in the seven ways, it is not necessary that it does not exist; for seeking in the seven ways does indeed not establish it in absolute reality or for the world, but without analysis which seeks the imputed object, by worldly convention only, it is imputed here depending on its own parts.

The chariot cannot be found when sought by means of the seven-fold analysis, but is posited in accordance with worldly conventions. Thus, it exists in the perspective of an innate awareness lacking investigation and analysis and is posited in dependence on its components. When something is sought by means of the seven ways, it is not found to exist either conventionally or ultimately. Therefore, one should not posit it by seeking it in the seven ways but posit it in accordance with worldly conventions.

The examples of blue, feelings, and so forth are posited in accordance with worldly conventions, they are not posited by thorough analysis. Likewise, a chariot is posited in the same way. A chariot is a dependent-arising, a mere conditionality. Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, because of accepting dependent imputation like accepting dependent arising, the mere state of having this as a condition, the conventions of the world will not follow as cut off for our position." The worldly assert that a sprout is produced from a seed and for this to happen conditions such as water, manure, and so forth are necessary. Just as a sprout is produced from a seed, similarly, a mother gives birth to a child. This is the position of the Prasangika Madhyamikas who, therefore, do not have the aforementioned faults. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the opponents should also accept this. Chandrakirti says: "Just this is worthy to be accepted also by the other side." It would be best if the opponents were to also posit things without thorough analysis but in accordance with worldly conventions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 379) says:

> HERE SOMEONE SAYS: Well then, when the imputed object that is the chariot is sought in the seven ways in the manner explained before, if it does not exist the chariot becomes non-existent, whereby that which is imputed conventionally in the world by 'chariot' would be interrupted; however, that is not admissible. Yet, statements "Get the chariot," "Buy a chariot," "Repair the chariot," and so forth are also necessarily seen. Therefore, because they are renowned to the world, chariots and so forth exist.
>
> RESPONSE: Since this fault, between us and yourselves, applies only to you, we laugh at you! Why is that? Because, having thoroughly analyzed, that is, sought, the imputed object that is the chariot, you posit the chariot and do not assert other means for establishing the imputed object without seeking it. And, when the imputed object is sought in the seven ways, how are worldly conventions such as "Get the chariot" and so forth established for you? They would not [be established]. In regard to such arguments the *Treatise* responds in this way. However, those who assert themselves to be present-day Tibetan Prasangikas propound the argument "If it is not found through seeking it in the seven ways, the chariot cannot be posited" to be the Madhyamika system. Thereby, they pollute the system that is completely pure by exerting themselves in the dirty water of bad conceptions. We do not have the errors of the argument that were explained before.
>
> *That is indeed not established by the seven ways*
> *In thusness or in the world.*
> *However, it is imputed here in the world*
> *In dependence on its components without thorough analysis.* [6.158]
>
> The autocommentary says:
>
> When *that* chariot, the imputed object, is sought *by the seven ways in thusness*, that is, ultimately, *or in* the conventions of *the world*, the chariot *is indeed not established.* Nonetheless, the chariot, like blue, feelings, and so forth, *is imputed here among the* conventions of *the world in dependence on its components*, the wheels and so forth, *without* the *thorough analysis* seeking the imputed object. Therefore, just as seeds, sprouts, and so forth are asserted to be dependent-arisings, mere conditionality,

> because a chariot is also asserted to be imputed in dependence on its components, it is not that the worldly conventions of "Get the chariot" and so forth are unsuitable for our position. This is also worthy of being accepted by our opponents.
>
> Therefore, this indicates that in the Madhyamika system – which does not posit through seeking the imputed object that is the chariot – worldly conventions are asserted and that they must also be asserted by the opponents. When the faults that were flung at them are turned back against us, we should not say "We do not assert that."

In short, although the chariot is not found when sought by means of the seven-fold analysis, it does exist in accordance with worldly conventions. The lower schools argue that if the chariot does not exist inherently it follows that it does not exist at all whereby worldly conventions would be destroyed. However, worldly conventions such as "Buy the chariot" and so forth cannot be destroyed, due to which the chariot exists. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they do not have this fault, but that this fault is accrued by the lower schools. This is because the lower schools posit the chariot through searching for the imputed object and do not have another way of positing the imputed object when it is not found. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that when the imputed object is sought it is not found and therefore posit the imputed object without searching for it.

Here Lama Tsongkhapa scolds the Tibetans saying: "However, those who assert themselves to be present-day Tibetan Prasangikas propound the argument 'If it is not found through seeking it in the seven ways, the chariot cannot be posited' to be the Madhyamika system. Thereby, they pollute the system that is completely pure by exerting themselves in the dirty water of bad conceptions." In short, some people say that they are Prasangika Madhyamikas but posit things through searching for the imputed object.

Lama Tsongkhapa says:" We do not have the errors of the argument that were explained before." This is because when the chariot is sought by means of the seven ways it is not found either conventionally or ultimately. A chariot exists conventionally when not investigated and not analyzed as imputed in dependence on its components, the wheels and so forth. Similarly, blue and so forth are also posited in the same way. The autocommentary says: "Therefore, just as seeds, sprouts, and so forth are asserted to be dependent-arisings, mere conditionality, because a chariot is also asserted to be imputed in dependence on its components, it is not that the worldly conventions of 'Get the chariot' and so forth are unsuitable for our position." When someone says "Get the chariot" and so forth this is a worldly convention; the Prasangika Madhyamikas posit in accordance with such worldly conventions and therefore do not accrue the above mentioned faults. The autocommentary says: "This is also worthy of being accepted by our opponents."

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "When the faults that were flung at them are turned back against us, we should not say 'We do not assert that.'"

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 381) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-5D Indicating other objects that are nominal conventions as also being established

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> For this position, not only is imputing the convention "chariot" by way of renown to the world established very clearly, also those which are different names of it are to be accepted, without analysis, by way of renown to the world.

It is clearly established that the chariot is imputed in terms of what is renowned in the world. Also the different names for it are to be accepted without analysis by means of what is renowned in the world.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Like this:
>
> *"That itself possesses components, that possesses parts,*
> *That chariot itself is the agent," are stated to migrators.*
> *The appropriator itself is also established for beings.* [6.159abc]
>
> There, the chariot is the component-possessor itself through reliance on its components, the wheels and so forth; the part-possessor itself through reliance on its parts, the wheels and so forth; the agent itself through reliance on the action of appropriating that to be appropriated, the wheels and so forth, and the appropriator itself through reliance on its appropriations.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-2B1E-4 Showing, furthermore, that the conventional meaning of names is established
>
> *It is the component-owner and part-owner;*
> *For sentient beings, that cart is called the agent.*
> *For people, one establishes as the appropriator.* [6.159abc]

You should understand that the conventional meaning of the name for the cart is, furthermore, established; for that same cart is established, in relation to its own components, as the owner of the components, and in relation to its parts, as the owner of the parts; and in relation to the [action of appropriating the wheels etc. which are] to be appropriated, that same cart is described for sentient beings as the agent, while in relation to [its basis of imputation,] the appropriation, [– form etc. –] one establishes for people as simply the appropriator[162].

The chariot is a possessor of components and its wheels and so forth are the components. A wheel can also be a possessor of components in which case its parts are the components. In addition, the chariot is the appropriator and the wheels and so forth are its appropriations.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Some, due to mistakenly realizing the meaning of the scriptures, say that the mere collection of components exists, yet the component-possessor does not exist in any way because it is not observed as different from that. Similarly, a mere part exists, the part-possessor is non-existent; only action alone exists, the agent is non-existent. Because it is not observed as different from the appropriations, only the appropriations exist; the appropriator is non-existent.
>
> According to the mistakenly propounded deceptive [truth] of the world which abides in such a way, the mere components and so forth would also follow as non-existent due to that very reasoning. Hence,
>
> *Do not destroy the deceptive that is renowned in the world.* [6.159d]
>
> This is only to be avoided.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Do not destroy the conventional known in the world!* [6.159d]

[162] *len.pa.po*

"Do not destroy the conventionalities well known in the world, carts and so on!" the proponent of real existence[163] is to be dissuaded; for the individual parts of the cart and the collection are not the cart, and he asserts that no cart which is not these exists.

Some say that action exists but not the agent. This is incorrect because if an action exists an agent must exist. Agent and action are mutually dependent and, therefore, both exist. Similarly, it cannot be said parts exist but not the possessor of parts, because if there are parts there is necessarily a possessor of parts. It is also incorrect to say that there is a collection of components but not a possessor of the collection of components because if there is a collection of components there is necessarily a possessor of the collection of components. In short, in the Prasangika Madhyamika system everything that exists is established in dependence, whereas the lower schools do not know how to posit the imputed object without it being found.

If someone says that there are actions but no agents this would be a mistaken engagement of worldly conventions. For example, if there is an object to be appropriated, there must be an appropriator. Someone who says that there are appropriations but no appropriator destroys worldly conventions. Chandrakirti says: "According to the mistakenly propounded deceptive [truth] of the world which abides in such a way, the mere components and so forth would also follow as non-existent due to that very reasoning." The Prasangika Madhyamika system says that one should not destroy the conventionalities renowned to the world. On the other hand, stating that actions exist but no the agent and that appropriations exist but not the appropriator harms worldly conventions and is therefore to be avoided.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 381) says:

> In the Madhyamika position not only is it very clearly established that the convention 'chariot' is imputed in terms of what is renowned in the world, also other particulars of names for chariot should be asserted in terms of what is renowned in the world without thorough analysis in the manner of seeking the imputed object.
>
> *That itself is a possessor of components and a possessor of parts.*
> *A chariot itself is recounted to migrating beings saying "agent."*
> *It is established for beings to be the appropriator itself.* [6.159abc]
>
> A chariot *itself is a possessor of components* in relation to its components, the wheels and so forth, and *it* is also *a possessor of parts* in relation to the parts of the wheels and so forth. *A chariot itself is recounted to migrating beings saying "agent"* in relation to the action of appropriating what is to be appropriated, the wheels and so forth, and *is established for beings to be the appropriator itself* in relation to its bases of imputation which are forms and so forth, its objects of appropriation.
>
> Some who mistakenly realize the meaning of the scriptures [say that] the mere collection of components exists, yet the possessor of the components which is not that mere collection does not exist in all ways because it is not observed to be a different entity from the collection. Applied similarly, according to those who mistakenly propound worldly conventionalities that abide in that aspect stating "The mere collection of parts, that acted upon, and the appropriated exist, yet the possessor of parts, the agent, and the appropriator which are not them do not exist in all ways because they are not observed to be a different entity from them," even the mere components and so forth would become non-existent due to the very reason just explained that the possessor of components does not exist.
>
> *Do not bring to ruin the conventionalities that are renowned in the world.* [6.159d]
>
> Therefore, only turn this back on them stating "*Do not bring to* ruin, that is, destroy, *the conventionalities*, chariots and so forth, *that are renowned in the world*."

[163] *dngos.smra.ba*

> Here, some of our own upper and lower schools who assert the collection of components and so forth to be the possessor of components and so forth, having seen that if they do not posit them to be the possessor of components and so forth a possessor of components that is a different entity from them also would not exist, assert such due to not knowing how to posit a possessor of components and so forth that is able to function. Thus, when they do not find them through seeking the imputed object which is the possessor of components and so forth, they do not know how to posit them. Because of that, since they do not assert chariots and so forth to be mere nominal imputations, they assert chariots and so forth to be established by way of their own character. Therefore, in regard to them the autocommentary says:
>
> They mistakenly realize the meaning of the scriptures.
>
> Although this supreme system does not consider either the mere collection of components nor its single units and so forth to be the illustration of the possessor of components and so forth, since the ability to excellently posit agents and actions with respect to mere nominal conventions, which is explained to be the meaning of the scriptures, is the Subduer's uncommon intention, the analytical should learn this system of commenting on his intention.

What is the chariot? In regard to a possessor of components and the components, the chariot is the possessor of components and the wheels and so forth are the components. In regard to a possessor of parts and the parts, the chariot is the possessor of parts and the parts of the wheels and so forth are the parts. In regard to an appropriator and the appropriated, the chariot is the appropriator and the wheels and so forth are the appropriated. Similarly, in regard to taking rebirth we are the appropriator and our aggregates are the appropriated.

The example of a chariot is set forth here in order to indicate that the self is also not found when sought by means of the seven ways. Although the self is not found to exist when sought in the seven ways, it does exist for an innate awareness lacking investigation and analysis. In fact, everything is posited in the perspective of an innate awareness lacking investigation and analysis. This is the way in which things are renowned in the world, they are not superimpositions of a worldly awareness. When positing something without being polluted by tenets, it accords with worldly conventions. All things exist in mutual dependence. Are the possessor of the components and components one entity or different entities?

Student: They are one entity.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why?
Student: Because they are not perceived distinctly by a valid direct perceiver.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What about their isolates?
Student: For a conceptual consciousness they are different phenomena.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Are the two wheels and the chariot one entity?
Student: I cannot say that they are one entity.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Therefore, they are different entities?
Student: They are.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why are they different entities?
Student: Because you can take a wheel and make something else out of it, for example, a chandelier.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: When the wheels are taken off the chariot, are they still the wheels of a chariot?
Student: Before they were the wheels of a chariot, but now they are not.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: When the wheels are taken off the chariot, are they no longer components of a chariot?
Student: They are components of a chariot even when separated from the chariot but they are not the same entity.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why is a wheel still a component of a chariot when it is separated from the chariot?
Student: It is by definition, for example, I can say "My chandelier is the wheel of a chariot."
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Then my table can be called a chariot?

Student: It cannot be called a chariot because it is not round and so forth.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Think about this. Is your hair a component of your body?
Student: It is.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Then, when you cut your hair is it still a component of your body? Are your arms and your body one entity or different entities?
Student: I cannot say that they are one entity.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Therefore, they are different entities?
Student: I know that I should say that they are one entity but I cannot!
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Think about it. However, the conclusion is that there is no part of the body that is not one entity with the body. Think about the meaning of "possessor of components" and "components" and about the meaning of "appropriator" and "appropriated."

Wednesday afternoon, 21 February 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 383) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-6 Indicating the excellent quality of positing in this way of easily abandoning the conceptions holding to an extreme

A Actual meaning
B Dispelling arguments regarding this
C Connecting the conventions of a chariot and the self to the meaning of the example
D Indicating other excellent qualities of asserting a self that is imputed in dependence
E Identifying the self which is the basis of bondage and freedom of the wise and the foolish

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-6A Actual meaning

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Because if this deceptive [truth] of the world is completely analyzed like that it would not exist, it exists by uninvestigated renown. Therefore, when the yogi completely analyzes about this in this very order, he will only very quickly measure the depth of suchness.

If asked: How?

"How can that which is non-existent in the seven ways
Exist?" Thus, the yogi does not find its existence.
Due to that, thusness will also be easily entered – so,
Here, its establishment is to be asserted likewise. [6.160]

For the yogi who thoroughly investigates thinking, "If there were to exist some inherently established thing called 'chariot,' without doubt, that would be found to essentially exist in one or another way among the seven ways [of analysis], but it is not found. Therefore, the so-called 'chariot' is imagined by solely those [whose eyes of awareness] are impaired by the covering of ignorance. Inherent establishment does not exist," – certainty will be produced and the yogi will also easily engage suchness.

When one posits in accordance with worldly conventions without investigation and analysis, the conception holding to an extreme will be easily removed. In other words, conventionalities or phenomena exist when not investigated and analyzed but do not exist when sought in the seven ways. Understanding that phenomena do not exist when thoroughly analyzed but do exist as worldly conventions, one will easily realize the depth of suchness.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1F-1 The substance

"How can what's seven ways non-existent exist?" –
Thus the yogin does not find its existence.
Since by that one also easily penetrates reality,
One should accept its existence this way here. [6.160]

You should understand that one should suppose this way, in this Madhyamika case, that that cart exists when the manner of its existence is not examined for. By that way of existing, not only is conventional truth acceptable, but one also easily penetrates absolute reality. This is because, if it existed inherently, an imputed object would have to be found when sought, and the yogin, saying "How can an imputed object which does not exist when sought in the seven ways, exist?," does not find this cart's existence.

When a yogi seeks the imputed object by means of the seven ways he does not find it. When he understands that phenomena do not exist inherently but do exist conventionally, it becomes very easy for him to realize the depth of suchness.

When one analyzes the self, one should do so in the same way as in the case of the chariot. When the chariot is sought by means of the seven ways it is not found, therefore, it does not exist inherently. Does this mean that it does not exist in all ways? It does exist but only in the perspective of an innate awareness lacking investigation and analysis. Those who have the cataracts of ignorance, ordinary beings, conceive phenomena to exist inherently. They see a chariot and so forth as existing from their own side. In addition, those who are trained in tenets think that when the chariot is sought it is found within the basis of imputation and, thus, exists inherently. On the other hand, yogis definitely generate an ascertainment of the lack of inherent existence of chariots and so forth and thereby easily engage suchness.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The term 'also' means "will not also degenerate the deceptive." Therefore, it is to be asserted as established without investigation. The wise ones should surely accept this position having considered it "faultless and beneficial."

If someone accepts that phenomena exist inherently, he deviates from conventionalities because for the Prasangika Madhyamika system if something exists ultimately it cannot exist conventionally. According to this system someone viewing phenomena as existing inherently falls into the extreme of permanence. On the other hand, someone who thinks that if phenomena do not exist inherently they do not exist all falls into the extreme of annihilation. The middle way is to understand that phenomena do not exist inherently but still exist conventionally. With this understanding, it becomes easy to realize the meaning of emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 383) says:

> Therefore, when worldly conventionalities are analyzed in the seven ways of seeking the imputed object as explained before, they are not found to exist and, because they do exist by way of renown without investigation, when yogis analyze the self and a chariot as above in the very order that was explained before, they very quickly fathom the depth of suchness. How do they do that?
>
> *How can what does not exist by the seven ways be said to exist?*
> *Yogis not finding the existence of that*
> *Also easily engage suchness. Therefore,*
> *Here its establishment should be similarly asserted.* [6.160]

> If a chariot were inherently existent, when it is sought by the seven ways it would definitely have to be found to be one among the seven, however, *yogis do not find* that very *existence of* the chariot. At that time, *how can what is not* found when sought *by the seven ways be said to exist* inherently*?* It does not. Therefore, that called "an established by way of its own entity chariot" is imagined by only those whose awareness eyes are impaired by the film of ignorance. On the other hand, such thoughts as "Inherent existence does not exist" are definitely produced in yogis and by this means yogis *also easily engage suchness*. The term "also" (v. 6.160c) includes the fact that they also do not damage the presentation of conventionalities. This being so, *here*, in the context of the Madhyamika, the way of *establishing* a chariot is that it *should be similarly asserted* to be established without investigation.
>
> With respect to the Madhyamika system, the autocommentary states "The wise should definitely assert the position explained above thinking 'It is faultless and has beneficial qualities.'" Therefore, one should assert [Chandrakirti's] faultless system as one's own, and not inflict harm on it saying "They do not have a system."

Although a chariot is not found when sought by means of the seven ways, it exists when not investigated and analyzed. A yogi who understands this will quickly realize suchness. On the other hand, if something exists inherently it will be found when sought by means of the seven ways of analysis. However, because a yogi does not find the chariot and so forth by this means, he understands that they do not exist inherently.

Those who assert that a chariot exists by way of its own entity do so because their awareness eyes are impaired by the cataracts of ignorance. Just as someone who has cataracts does not see things clearly, likewise, when one's awareness eye is impaired by ignorance one sees phenomena as though existing inherently even though they do not exist inherently. Yogis understand that this is not correct and thereby are able to quickly realize suchness. In addition, yogis never deviate from the presentation of conventionalities, instead they understand that phenomena do not exist when they are investigated and analyzed but do exist when they are not investigated and analyzed. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "This being so, here, in the context of the Madhyamika, the way of establishing a chariot is that it should be similarly asserted to be established without investigation." For this reason, one should assert the Madhyamika position to be faultless and beneficial. One should also assert such a faultless system and not assert that the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not have a system, that is, a thesis. Nagarjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* (v. 50) says:

> Great beings lacking argument,
> They have no position.
> For those who have no position
> How could others' positions exist?

Some say that the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not have a particular system or assertions, however, this is not correct.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 384) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-6B Dispelling arguments regarding this

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is mentioned here: The yogi indeed does not observe the chariot, yet observing a mere collection of its components it is not non-existent.

When a yogi searches for the chariot, he does not find it.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> I shall explain. You who search for yarn in the ashes of a burned woolen cloth are an object of laughter, [since]:
>
> *If the chariot is not just existent, then*
> *Component-possessor does not exist, nor do its components exist.* [6.161ab]
>
> If it is said: If the chariot is broken, is not the collection of its wheels and so forth indeed observed? Therefore, why say "Without the component-possessor, the components also do not exist?"
>
> It is not like that. Only one who has realized, who [previously] cognized the relation with the chariot, realizes that "These wheels and so forth are the [components of the][164] chariot;" – another will not,[165] for he will realize only the wheels and so forth as themselves component-possessors in reliance on their own parts. Although the wheels and so forth are related to the chariot, they are not realized as components of the chariot at that time due to being only dispelled to a distance.
>
> Furthermore, this meaning should be known via this example:
>
> *If the chariot is burned, the components do not exist, for example, likewise,*
> *Component-possessor burned by the fire of intelligence, the components.*[166] [6.161cd]
>
> For example, if the chariot, the component-possessor, is burned by fire, its components will also definitely be burned. Likewise, if the chariot is burned without remainder by the fire of intelligence, possessing the burner of non-observation, arisen from friction of the fire-stick of complete analysis, the components, which are the fuel-wood of the fire of wisdom, will not create a settled state of self (i.e., cannot inherently endure)[167] because they are definitely burned.

It would be ridiculous to search for yarn in the ashes of a burned woolen cloth. Similarly, if a chariot is burned so too are its components since it is not possible for the chariot to be burned but not its components. Just as a chariot is not established by way of its own entity or does not exist inherently, so too are its components not established by way of their own entity or do not exist inherently.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1F-2 Rejecting counter-argument

You may say, "The cart indeed does not exist, only the collection of the cart's parts exists inherently."

If the cart is non-existent, then
There's no part owner, nor do the parts exist. [6.161ab]

That too is unacceptable, for if the cart is not [inherently] existent, then the owner of the parts does not exist [inherently], and neither do its parts exist [inherently].

If the cart is burnt, there are no parts, for example –
If the mind's fire burns the part owner, there're no parts. [6.161cd]

---

[164] LTK, p. 402.

[165] Compare the following with the different interpretations of Poisson, pp. 322-323, and Huntington, p. 261, note 194. See LTK, p. 402 and *red.mda'.ba*, p. 271.

[166] The Tibetan translation preserved in *red.mda'.ba*, p. 271, reverses the order of the lines to read:
Burning the component-possessor with the fire of intelligence, the components
Will not exist like the components of a burned chariot.

[167] LTK, p. 403.

If the fire of the mind which realizes voidness burns up the inherently existent owner of the parts, then the inherently existent parts cannot remain; for then it is realized there are no inherently existent parts. If the cart is burnt up, there are no parts: it is like this example.

Someone says that although the chariot is not found by means of the seven ways, the mere collection of the components of the chariot exists inherently. Chandrakirti responds (v. 6.161ab): "If the chariot is not just existent, then the component-possessor does not exist, nor do its components exist." This means that if the chariot, the possessor of components, does not exist inherently, also its components do not exist inherently. The analogy set forth here is that when the chariot, the possessor of the components, is burned so too are its components, in that it is not possible for the chariot to be burned but not its components. Chandrakirti says (v. 6.161cd): "If the chariot is burned, the components do not exist, for example, likewise, component-possessor burned by the fire of intelligence, the components." The conception of true existence is like fuel which, when burned by the fire of intelligence, also the inherent existence of phenomena is burned. With this wisdom one realizes all phenomena as selfless.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 384) says:

> HERE SOMEONE SAYS: Yogis, when analyzing as above, indeed do not observe the chariot, yet they observe the mere collection of its components to be inherently existent.
> RESPONSE: You who search for yarn in the ashes of a burnt woolen cloth are an object of laughter!
> *When a chariot just does not exist, then*
> *A possessor of components does not exist; also its components do not exist.*[6.161ab]
>
> *When a chariot just does not exist* inherently, *then a possessor of components does not exist* by way of its own entity, whereby *also its components do not exist* by way of their own entity.

In short, the lower schools say that although the chariot is not found when sought by means of the seven ways, the mere collection of its components exists inherently. They say that although the chariot is not found when sought in the seven ways, the collection of the components of the chariot is the chariot. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if the chariot is not inherently existent also its components do not exist inherently. In other words, if the possessor of components does not exist inherently also the components do not exist inherently.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 384) says:

> QUESTION: When a chariot is broken into bits, is the collection, the wheels and so forth, not observed? Therefore, why is it said "Without the possessor of components, the components also do not exist"?
> RESPONSE: It is not like that. Taking the components which are dispersed separately to be the components of a chariot, it is only through previously cognizing them to have been related to the chariot that one realizes "They, the wheels and so forth, are the components of a chariot." However, without having previously known them to have been such, it is not [known] by another [means].
> The person, in dependence on its parts, the wheels and so forth, realizes only the wheels and so forth to be possessors of components. In the perspective of that person, although the wheels and so forth are related to a chariot, since they have been cast to a distance, at that time they are not realized to be components of a chariot.

The lower schools ask the Prasangika Madhyamikas: "When the chariot is dismantled and its components are spread out, do the components no longer exist because the chariot, the possessor of components, no longer exists?" In this way they say that although the possessor of components no

longer exists it is not necessary that the components no longer exist when they are dismantled. The Prasangika Madhyamikas respond saying that they are only conceived to be components of a chariot based on having previously seen them when assembled together. In other words, if someone only sees the components of a chariot after they have been dispersed, he does not conceive these components to be the components of a chariot. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that according to the lower schools even someone who has not seen the chariot assembled should conceive the components to be the components of a chariot, however, this is not possible. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "In the perspective of that person, although the wheels and so forth are related to a chariot, since they have been cast to a distance, at that time they are not realized to be components of a chariot."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 384) says:

> In addition, the meaning of "When the chariot is not inherently existent, its components are also not inherently existent" should be understood from the example:
>
> *When a chariot is burned by fire, its components no longer exist. Like the example,*
> *When a possessor of components is burned by the fire of intelligence so too are its components.* [6.161cd]
>
> For example, *when a chariot*, a possessor of components, *is burned by fire*, *its components* also *no longer exist*, that is, they too are burned by fire. *Like the example*, *when the possessor of components*, the chariot, *is burned* without any remainder of inherent existence *by the fire of intelligence*, that is, the wisdom, realizing the unobservable, which arises from rubbing together the tinder of thorough analysis, *its components*, the fuel of the fire of wisdom, are unable to endure as a steadfast essence – that is, as inherently existent – because they are definitively burned by the fire of wisdom.

Wisdom is said to burn the conception of true existence in the sense of abandoning or dispelling it. Just as when two sticks are rubbed together, fire arises, likewise, when the wisdom of thorough analysis arises it burns the afflictions. This was mentioned before in the third chapter of the *Supplement* saying:

> *Because the light of the fire wholly consuming*
> *The fuel of objects of knowledge arises,*
> *This third ground is called the Luminous, for a copper*
> *Splendor like the sun appears to the sugata child.* [3.1]

Wisdom consumes all our many types of ignorance. In fact, each time we develop some new wisdom or new knowledge, one particular ignorance is burned. When even a small amount of wisdom is present it illuminates the darkness of our ignorance, just as a small light dispels thick darkness.

(Masters Program Correspondence Course participants please note that there were no teachings 22-23 February 2001 due to the annual break for Losar, Tibetan new year.)

END

Tuesday morning, 13 March 2001

(Masters Program Correspondence Course please note that there were no teachings from 22 February through 12 March due to the Tibetan new year break followed by a period of retreat. There were also no teachings on Friday, 16 March 2001.)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 385) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-6C Connecting the conventions of a chariot and the self to the meaning of the example

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 174) says:

> Just as dependent imputation was presented contemplating the manner of completely analyzing the chariot in order not to eliminate the deceptive truth and in order that yogis easily enter into suchness,
>
> *Similarly, the renown of the world also asserts*
> *The self as the very agent in dependence on*
> *The aggregates, the elements, and, likewise, the six entrances.* [6.162abc]
>
> Just as one imputes a chariot in dependence on the wheels and so forth, and there, the wheels and so forth are the appropriated, the chariot is the appropriator, similarly the self is also asserted to be the appropriator in order not to eliminate it as the deceptive truth in all the conventions of the world.
>
> The five aggregates, six elements, and six entrances are the appropriations of that self, because it is imputed as the self in dependence on the aggregates and so forth. Just as the wheels and so forth are the appropriations of the chariot, similarly, the aggregates are also called "appropriations of the self."
>
> Just as this presentation of appropriations and appropriator is presented as the conventions of the world, similarly, the presentation of its [object] acted upon and agent are also to be accepted like the chariot. To explain the aforesaid:
>
> *The appropriated is the acted upon – it is also the agent.* [6.162d]
>
> The so-called "appropriated" – the aggregates and so forth – are presented as the very [object] acted upon and the self [is presented] as the so-called "agent."

The person does not exist inherently as an ultimate, but does exist as a conventional truth. Yogis engage in the ultimate truth in dependence on the conventional truth. Just as after thorough analysis the chariot is presented to exist in dependence on its components, likewise, the self is established for the world in dependence on the aggregates, constituents, and spheres. The self is the appropriator, in that being what takes rebirth it is, therefore, what appropriates the aggregates, constituents, and spheres, or entrances. As taught in *Collected Topics* the self or the person is the being imputed in dependence on any of the five aggregates. This means that the self does not exist from its own side but exists in dependence on the five aggregates and so forth. The five aggregates are the form aggregate, feeling aggregate, discrimination aggregate, compositional factors aggregate, and consciousness aggregate.

Chandrakirti then mentions the six elements or six constituents which are the earth element, water element, fire element, wind element, space element, and consciousness element. In Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* it says that the person is imputed to the composite of the six elements. Thus, the being is not the elements individually and is not the composite of the six elements but is what is imputed on that composite.

Chandrakirti then mentions the entrances, or spheres, of which are twelve, whereas here only the six internal spheres are mentioned: the eye sphere, ear sphere, nose sphere, tongue sphere, body sphere, and mental sphere. These six are also what is appropriated, whereas the self or being is their appropriator.

It can also be said that the self is the agent, while the aggregates, elements, and spheres are what is acted upon. This is the context of the three factors: the agent, action, and the object, or the acted upon.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 67), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-2B1F-3 Connecting the metaphor of the cart and the meaning, the self
>
> *Like that, through worldly opinion, we hold that the self*
> *Dependent on aggregates, elements, and likewise*
> *The six sense spheres, is also the appropriator.*
> *The appropriation's the object, and this [self]'s the agent.* [6.162]

You should understand that the self is to be understood as corresponding to the cart. For through worldly opinion, we suppose that the self, based on the aggregates, the elements, and likewise the six sensory spheres, is also the appropriator; the "appropriation," the aggregates, is the object, and this self is also the agent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 385) says:

> In order not to eliminate conventional truths and in order for yogis to easily engage suchness, imputation in dependence was presented through considering the way of thoroughly analyzing a chariot.
>
> *Similarly, through worldly renown – in dependence on*
> *The aggregates, constituents, and, likewise, the six spheres –*
> *The self is also asserted to be just an appropriator.*
> *The appropriated are the acted upon. It is also the agent.* [6.162]
>
> *Similarly*, from the point of view of what is *renowned in the world – in dependence on the* five appropriated *aggregates*, the six *constituents*, *and, likewise, the six spheres – the self*, like the chariot, *is also asserted to be just an appropriator* because in dependence on them it is imputed as the self. Likewise, there is the presentation "*The appropriated* aggregates *are that acted upon*, whereas the self *is also the agent*.

What are the aggregates, constituents, and spheres? In order to contemplate this we should take the aggregates and so forth as an object of meditation. For example, when we meditate on the four close placement of mindfulness:

1. the close placement of mindfulness on the body means to observe the form aggregate,
2. the close placement of mindfulness on feelings means to observe the feeling aggregate,
3. the close placement of mindfulness on phenomena means to observe the discrimination aggregate and compositional factors aggregate, and
4. the close placement of mindfulness on the mind means to observe the consciousness aggregate.

We can also place our mindfulness on the form aggregate by meditating on the specific characteristics of the body such as that it is light or heavy, that it is impure, and so forth, or we can do so by meditating on its general characteristics such as that it is impermanent, suffering, empty, and selfless. We should be sure to meditate on these in terms of our own body.

We can also meditate on the different types of feelings and their respective results: the happiness feeling that gives rise to attachment, the unhappy feeling that gives rise to hatred, and the

equanimity feeling that gives rise to ignorance or confusion. We should understand that feelings are the main basis of all our unhappiness. For example, when we meet a particular person an unhappy feeling arises and from this comes anger for that person, whereas when we meet another person a happy feeling arises and from this comes attachment to that person. On the other hand, when we meet a stranger we have neither a happy nor an unhappy feeling but instead a neutral feeling arises from which comes ignorance. By meditating on this process, we will come to understand that we need to abandon these feelings by applying their respective antidotes.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 385) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-6D Indicating other excellent qualities of asserting a self that is imputed in dependence

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When dependent imputation is correctly relied upon, since the self is just not the support of the conceptions of stability, instability, and so forth in any way, the conceptions of permanence, impermanence, and so forth will be easily overcome.

Because the self is imputed in dependence on the aggregates, it is neither inherently stable nor inherently unstable. When this is understood, the view holding to the extreme of permanence and the view holding to the extreme of annihilation will easily be eliminated. Chandrakirti says: "the conceptions of permanence, impermanence, and so forth will be easily overcome." In other words this means that the realization that the self does not exist inherently overcomes the conception that the self is inherently permanent and the conception that it is inherently impermanent.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> To explain the aforesaid:
>
> *Because thing does not exist, it is not stable and*
> *Not just unstable; it is not produced or destroyed;*
> *In it, permanence and so forth also*
> *Do not exist, thatness and otherness are non-existent.* [6.163]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1F-4 Demonstrating other advantages of accepting a dependently imputed self

Because it's not a thing, it is not durable
And not non durable; it is not born or destroyed;
It also has no permanence and so on,
And no identity or separateness. [6.163]

This self is not durable[168], and does not inherently exist as non-durable; it does not take birth or perish inherently, and it also does not inherently have permanence and so on; it is not inherently identical or separate; for it does not exist inherently as a thing.

The self is not inherently stable nor is it inherently unstable. It also is not inherently produced nor does it inherently perish or disintegrate. It is also not oneness (identical) with the aggregates, nor it is

[168] *brtan.pa*

other than the aggregates (separate from the aggregates); that is, the self is not inherently one with the aggregates nor is it inherently a different entity from the aggregates.

The following syllogisms regarding the first statement can be set out:

> The self, as the subject, is not inherently stable because it is imputed in dependence on the aggregates.
>
> The self, as the subject, is not inherently unstable because it is imputed in dependence on the aggregates.

If the self existed inherently:

- it would follow that the being that existed in a previous lifetime and the being of this lifetime would be one, or
- it would follow that the self that is the appropriator of the aggregates of a previous lifetime and the self that is the appropriator of the aggregates of this lifetime would be different entities.

Is the self of this lifetime and the self of a previous lifetime one entity or different entities? For example, are the self that was a donkey previously and the self that is a human being now, one entity? They are not. On the other hand, if the self existed inherently they would be one entity. Since the self does not exist inherently, the donkey of the past and the human being of the present are not one entity in general. There are three types of self:

1. the self that came from a previous life to this life,
2. the self that goes from this life to the next life, and
3. the self that is specific to this life.

What is the difference between these three?

Student: The basis of imputation is different.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What about the selves?

Student: Because the basis is different the selves are different.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What is the difference between the self that came from a previous life to this life and the self that goes from this life to the next life?

Student: Because the first one exists earlier and the second one exists later, they exist at different times and are, therefore, different.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Are the Sze Gee that came from Singapore to Italy, the Sze Gee that is living in Italy now, and the Sze Gee that will return from Italy to Singapore, different? Think about it. It is said that they are different due to their special causes. If that special cause exists, a human rebirth exists, without it this human rebirth would not exist. What is the special cause that brings about this human life? It is a meritorious action qualified by, for example, having observed morality, having been together with good companions who practiced the six perfections, and having made specific prayers for a human rebirth. In short, to create the special cause of a human rebirth is not easy. However, we have presently acquired such a rebirth due to our own positive actions of previous rebirths. In order to obtain such a human rebirth again, we need to create the special causes.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> This self which is imputed in dependence on the aggregates is neither just stable nor just unstable. There, if the self were unstable, then it would contradict the *Treatise* [*on the Middle* Way] that says [in 27.6]:
>
> > The appropriated itself is not the self;
> > They arise and disintegrate.
> > How could what is to be appropriated
> > Be the appropriator?

And similarly [in the *Treatise*, 27.12]:

> It does not arise from the not arisen
> Since there would follow faults in this,
> That the self would be a product and
> Would also possess causeless production.

Therefore, if the aggregates were the self, it would have production and disintegration; yet it is not even asserted as having production and disintegration. Therefore, this consequence which says "The aggregates are not the self" is also feasible. Therefore, it is also unfeasible as just unstable.

The appropriated is not the self, "the appropriated" is the aggregates. If the appropriated were the self it would follow that:

- when the aggregates arise the self would also arise and
- when the aggregates disintegrate the self would also disintegrate.

Thus, there would be the absurd consequence that the self would arise and disintegrate just like the aggregates. This refers to the fact that when we die the aggregates disintegrate, that is, they are left behind. Thus, if the aggregates were the self, when the aggregates are placed in a coffin and buried so too would the self be buried. Likewise, when the body turns to dust so too would the self turn to dust. However, the self is not like the aggregates. In conclusion, the appropriated and the appropriator do not exist inherently since otherwise there would be this absurd consequence. While it is correct to assert that the self is the appropriator and the aggregates are the appropriated, if they existed inherently this would not be feasible.

Does the self arise from a self that did not exist before? A self cannot arise from a self that did not exist before. On the other hand, a mere self did exist before and therefore can be said to exist now. In conclusion, a self does arise in dependence on a previous self. This topic can be debated asking: "Does the self that is specific to this life arise from the self that existed in a previous life? Did the self that is specific to this life exist before in a previous live?" Because it did not, it would seem to imply that the self that exists now did not exist before. In short, there is a self that pervades all lifetimes. That self is the mere self. This mere self existed before and exists now. If it is asked "Does the I specific to this life go to the next life?" If someone says that it does, one can ask: "Does the self that is monk go to the next life as a monk?" On the other hand, if he responds that the monk that is the self specific to this life does not go to the next life, one can ask: "Does the monk of this life not take a future rebirth?" One has to say that he does take a future rebirth, but if it is asked "Does the monk go to a future rebirth?," the response is that he does not. In conclusion, the monk does take rebirth because his mere self which pervades all lives takes rebirth. Is that mere self which pervades all lives a monk? It is not. Are there two selves existing on the basis of the five aggregates of a monk, one that is a monk and one that is not a monk? This kind of debate sharpens our mind. However, if we analyze too much we may fall into nihilism!

Student: Can it be said that the self is imputed on the same continuum but on different aggregates and on different times?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is so in general, for example, the self which is specific to this life is imputed to the aggregates specific to this life.

In short, if a self were to arise from a self that did not exist before there would be faults. One fault would be that the self would be produced from adventitious causes and conditions. The self is not like that, it is produced from its respective causes. Another fault would be that the self would be produced without causes. In short, these two faults are not accrued because the self does not exist inherently

and because the self is imputed in dependence on the aggregates and so forth. Therefore, the self is not produced incidentally and it is not produced without causes.

To summarize, Chandrakirti says: "Therefore, if the aggregates were the self, it would have production and disintegration." The self would be like the aggregates, in that just as the aggregates are produced the self would be produced and just as the aggregates disintegrate the self would disintegrate; however, this is not the case. If the self were the aggregates, there would be these faults but because the self is not the aggregates these faults do not occur. The Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that the self is imputed in dependence on the aggregates and that when sought it is not found within the aggregates. Chandrakirti concludes: "Therefore, it is also unfeasible as just unstable."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Similarly, it is also incorrect as stable. As was taught [in the *Treatise*, 27.3-4]:
>
> It is unfeasible to say
> "It arose in the past."
> What arose in previous lives,
> That itself is not this [life's self].
>
> If considered that, that itself is the self,
> The appropriated are different,
> Your self is something
> Apart from the appropriated.

"Stable" and "unstable" should be understood to mean "inherently stable" and "inherently unstable." Or they can be understood to mean that the aggregates are unstable while the self is stable. The self is stable in the sense of continuing from life to life, whereas the form aggregate in particular does not continue from life to life but ceases. The form aggregate is unstable in that it ceases at the end of a life, due to which the continuity of the form aggregate is unstable. On the other hand, the self or the person is stable in the sense of continuing from life to life and eventually becoming a buddha. In the eight chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* it says that the person is called permanent in the sense of continuing.

The self is not found when sought within the aggregates nor is it one of the five aggregates; it is imputed on the collection of the five aggregates. This self is what performs activities, for example, it is what goes from a higher realm to a lower realm or from a lower realm to a higher realm, or from Tibet to India, from India to America, and so forth. In brief, the self is merely imputed in dependence on the aggregates and does not exist inherently.

Tuesday afternoon, 13 March 2001

When [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* says "It is unfeasible to say it arose in the past," it means that it is not feasible to say "In the past an inherently existent self existed." In other words, an inherently existent self did not arise in the past.

"What arose in previous lives, that itself is not this" refers to the self of this life.

The next verse means that it is incorrect to think that the self that existed before became the self of this life. This is because the aggregates that were appropriated by the self in the past and the aggregates that were appropriated by the self now are different. There is no self that does not depend on the aggregates, the appropriated.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The two qualifications of the statement "It is not produced nor destroyed" are the assertions of the Acharya [Nagarjuna] through this very consequence that was stated [in the *Treatise*, 18.1b – see below]:
>
> > ... it would have production and disintegration.

If the aggregates were the self it would follow that the self would be produced and would disintegrate just like the aggregates. In general the self is produced and does disintegrate.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Nor does this [self] have permanence and so forth, for these [following verses] were taught when the Acharya fully investigated the self with the method of investigating the Tathagata. [In the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 22.12-14]:
>
> > Permanent, impermanent, and so forth, the four, what peace exists in this?
> > Limited, limitless, and so forth, the four, what peace exists in this?
> >
> > He who grasps at solid apprehensions produces conceptualizations saying,
> > "The Tathagata exists," or "does not exist in nirvana."
> >
> > It will not be correct to think, about he who is emptied by self-nature,
> > "The Buddha, having passed beyond sorrow, exists" or "is non-existent."

The first set of four views mentioned in verse 22.12 are:
1. viewing the Tathagata to be permanent,
2. viewing the Tathagata to be impermanent,
3. viewing the Tathagata to be both, and
4. viewing the Tathagata to be neither.

These four views are incorrect. When Nagarjuna says "what peace exists in this?" it means "How can these four exist ultimately?" Because they do not exist ultimately, these four are ultimately pacified. Because they are ultimately pacified, how can they exist ultimately?

The second set of four views are:
1. viewing the Tathagata to have an end,
2. viewing the Tathagata to not have an end,
3. viewing the Tathagata to have both, and
4. viewing the Tathagata to have neither.

These four views are also incorrect because the Tathagata is ultimately pacified.

The second verse (22.13) means that the proponents of true existence, due to their "solid apprehensions" or thick conceptions of true existence, conceive the Tathagata to exist after having passed away, to not exist after having passed away, and so forth.

The third verse indicates that the conception that the Buddha exists after having passed beyond sorrow is not correct because the Buddha is empty of inherent existence, whereas the proponents of true existence assert that the Buddha exists inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Nor does this exist as thatness or otherness from the aggregates. As was taught [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 18.1]:
>
> > If the self were the aggregates,

> It would have production and disintegration;
> If other than the aggregates,
> The character of the aggregates would not exist.

"Nor does this exist as thatness or otherness from the aggregates" can be understood to refer either to the self or to the Tathagata; for example, the Tathagata does not exist as one with his aggregates nor does he exist as other than his aggregates. In order to prove this, Chandrakirti quotes from Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom*. If the aggregates were the self, the self would be produced and would disintegrate like the aggregates; that is, the self would be inherently produced and would inherently disintegrate like the aggregates. However, this is not the case.

If the self were other than the aggregates, it would follow that the self would not have the characteristics of the aggregates, such as production, abidance, disintegration, and impermanence. These are the four characteristics of compounded phenomena. Because the aggregates are compounded phenomena they have these characteristics. If the self were other than the aggregates, it would not have these four characteristics.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> And similarly [in the *Treatise*, 10.4a]:
>
> > Wood itself is not the fire…
>
> – and so forth.

Wood or fuel is not the fire, yet there is no fire without depending on wood or fuel. The existence of fire indicates the existence of the wood or fuel.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, if asked: Why are these conceptions of non-stability and so forth unsuitable for the self?
>
> Having mentioned "Because thing does not exist" [6.163a], if some self-nature of a functioning thing exists, the conceptions of unstable and so forth would exist for it. Yet, the self does not exist at all because that is only non-existent.
>
> As taught in sutra:
>
> > Four inexhaustible phenomena were indicated by the Protector of the World:
> > Sentient beings, space, bodhichitta, likewise, the buddha-dharmas.
> >
> > If they existed substantially, they would be deemed to be fully exhaustible;
> > Non-existent, they are inexhaustible; therefore, they are taught as inexhaustible.

Here the "four inexhaustible phenomena" refer to
1. sentient beings who are inexhaustible,
2. the limits of space which is inexhaustible,
3. the benefits of bodhichitta which are inexhaustible, and, likewise,
4. the Buddha's Dharma which is inexhaustible.

If these four existed substantially, they would be exhaustible. Instead they are inexhaustible, that is, they are not inherently existent. However, they do exist because they exist imputed in dependence, that is, they exist as dependent-arisings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 385) says:

> When positing the self to be imputed in dependence, since it is not the support of the conceptions holding to an extreme of stability, instability, and so forth, it is explained [as follows] that the conceptions apprehending the impermanent and so forth to be established by way of their own character are easily overcome:
>
> *Because the thing does not exist, it is not stable and*
> *It is not just unstable. It is not produced and does not disintegrate.* [6.163ab]
>
> *The* self that is imputed in dependence on the aggregates *does not* inherently exist as *stable and just unstable*. If the self existed by way of its own entity as unstable, the appropriated would be the self since the two – the self and the appropriated – would not be suitable to be different entities. If that were the case, it would not be suitable because
>
> - the self would be individually *produced and disintegrate* in each moment, whereby former and later [moments] would *not* be related and
> - the appropriated would be the appropriator.

The self is a dependent-arising, that is, the self is imputed in dependence and exists in dependence on the aggregates. When this is understood, the conception holding to the extremes of permanence and annihilation will quickly be overcome. For this reason, it is important to understand that the self is a dependent-arising as in this way one will understand that the self does not exist inherently.

The word "stable" refers to the self and "unstable" to the aggregates, this is because the self continues while the aggregates cease. Or the words "stable" and "unstable" can be understood to mean that the self and the aggregates are not inherently stable and not inherently unstable. If the self were inherently unstable, it would follow that the self would be like the aggregates. In addition, because they exist inherently the self, the appropriator, and the aggregates, the appropriated, would not be different entities. In other words, if the self existed inherently it would be one with the aggregates, whereby the appropriator and the appropriated would be one.

If the former and later moments of the self existed inherently, the self of a former moment and the self of a later moment would be completely unrelated because the former self would have disintegrated. They would be unrelated is because the former moment and the later moment of that which is inherently existent are unrelated.

If the self and the aggregates are inherently one, it follows that the appropriator and the appropriated would be one. In this way, the appropriated would be the appropriator, however, this is never the case.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 385-6) says:

> Similarly, it is also not admissible as stable, that is, as permanent. If it were permanent, that very self at the time that it arises in a previous lifetime would be the self that arises here, whereas the appropriated aggregates of the two selves of a past life and this life are different entities. Due to this, it would not be suitable for there to be a single self because a self that is a different entity from the appropriated does not exist. The autocommentary says:
>
> The setting out of the two attributes of "without production and disintegration" is Acharya [Nagarjuna's] assertion in [*Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 18.1)]:
>
> If the self were the aggregates,
> It would have production and disintegration.
>
> This production and disintegration are established by way of their own entity.

That the self is inherently stable is also not feasible for the above reasons. Production and disintegration refer to production and disintegration that are established by way of their own character.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 386) says:

> *Also permanence and so forth in regard to that*
> *Do not exist. It does not exist as oneness or as otherness.* [6.163cd]
>
> *Also* the set of four of *permanence and so forth in regard to the* self *do not exist* inherently because [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 22.12ab), when thoroughly conceptualizing it through the method for investigating the tathagata, says as [follows] and so forth:
>
> How can the four, permanence, impermanence, and so forth,
> Exist in that peace?

There are several sets of four views, one of which is:
1. viewing the world and the self to be permanent,
2. viewing the world and the self to be impermanent,
3. viewing the world and the self to be both, and
4. viewing the world and the self to be neither.

Another set is with regard to the world and the self having an end, not having an end, and so forth.

In the Prasangika Madhyamika system there are no substantial existents. For them, if it is an established base it is pervaded by being an imputed existent. They say that if it is substantially existent it is inherently existent. A substantial existent exists without dependence; according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas there is no such thing. However, according the Svatantrika Madhyamika system "substantial existent" does not mean that which exists without dependence, rather it is a phenomenon that appears to an awareness without the need for something else to appear to that awareness. In other words, for this system a substantial existent is a phenomenon that does not depend on another phenomenon appearing to an awareness in order for it to appear to an awareness, whereas an imputed existent is one that depends on another phenomenon appearing to an awareness in order for it to appear to an awareness. For example, in order for Sixte to appear to an awareness, his aggregates must appear to an awareness. Thus, something else has to appear in order for Sixte to appear.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 386) says:

> The self *does not* inherently *exist as oneness*, that is, as one entity, *or as otherness*. The reason for these is because *the thing* called "self" *does not exist* inherently. As sutra says:
>
> Four inexhaustible phenomena
> Were presented by the Protector of the World:
> Sentient beings, space, the mind of enlightenment,
> Likewise, the Buddha-Dharma.
>
> If they existed substantially,
> They would be deemed thoroughly exhausted.
> Not existing, they are inexhaustible;
> Therefore, they were taught to be inexhaustible.
>
> This is the scriptural source for teaching that since sentient beings lack substantial existence they are inexhaustible

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 386) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2A-6E Identifying the self which is the basis of bondage and freedom of the wise and the foolish

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When something is sought in the seven ways, it is impossible as permanent and impermanent, and those not seeing the very non-existence of something and those who, having settled on it as just existing through the power of ignorance, strongly settle, thinking, "this is the self," will circle [in samsara] due to the view of the transitory collection:
>
> *That self to which all migrators perpetually*
> *Give rise to I-grasping awareness and to that*
> *Which is its, give rise to an awareness grasping to mine,*
> *To uninvestigated renown, is from confusion.* [6.164]

When the self is sought in the seven ways, analyzing whether it is permanent and so forth, it is not found. Due to the power of ignorance or the view of the transitory collection, the self is not realized to not exist inherently. Instead, due to the view of the transitory collection one conceives the I to exist inherently, whereby one remains bound in cyclic existence.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 68), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B1F-5 Recognizing the self which is the basis of binding and liberation

Now you may ask, "What is the self which is the basis of binding and liberation?"

> *That self for which, in beings, self-grasping mind*
> *Is always arising strongly, and for whose*
> *Possessions the mind that grasps at "mine" arises,*
> *In unconsidered opinion, is from delusion.* [6.164]

Although the imputed object, the self, is not found when sought with the seven points, there is not the fault that it does not exist; for that self Ð based on which the self-grasping mind strongly arises and the mind grasping at whatever is of that self as "mine" arises in samsaric beings Ð is established from delusion with respect to unconsidered opinion.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When some [self] is thoroughly sought, the Forders conceive, everything mistakenly, the nature of that [self] as different [in entity] from the aggregates since it is unfeasible [for the aggregates to be the self] by their reasoning. And our own sects too, due to the error in considering "The self is non-existent as different from the aggregates," accept just the mere aggregates as the self.

According to the Forders when the self is sought it is found to be separate from the aggregates, due to which they consider the self and aggregates to be different entities. However, this is not correct.

"Our own sects" refers to the lower schools who assert the aggregates to be the self. They say that there is no self that is a different entity from the aggregates and therefore the aggregates are the self. This position is also incorrect.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Those who unmistakenly realize the detailed teachings by the Tathagata, having understood that "[Those two positions] are just not so," should understand that that to be totally liberated one hundred times is the self, and that, with regard to which the I-grasping awareness always arises for all those dwelling in the migration states of migrating humans, animals, hungry ghosts, and so forth – those subsequently related with unknowing – is the self.
>
> Where this [self] controls or there is some relation [with it], the awareness grasping to mine arises with regard to that having an internal nature, the eyes and so forth, the support of imputing this [self], and [with regard to] the external. That self is established through unknowing, it is not established by its own entity.
>
> Because indeed this does nor exist [inherently] but is imputed conventionally through confusion, therefore yogis do not observe [such a self] in any way. When that is not observed, the eyes and so forth, its appropriations, also will not arise. Thus the yogi does not observe any things whatsoever by entity; therefore he will be completely liberated from samsara.
>
> As was taught [in the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, 18.4]:
>
> > When thinking about I and mine is exhausted for the internal and external themselves,
> > appropriation will be ceased and since that ceases, rebirth ceases.

Human beings, animals, hungry ghosts, and animals, due to not knowing the reality of the self and instead conceiving it to exist inherently, remain bound in cyclic existence. In short, beings circle in cyclic existence due to conceiving the I to exist inherently. On the other hand, when this conception of I is eliminated, they attain liberation. In short, when one realizes that things do not exist inherently, one attains liberation from cyclic existence.

When the conception that internal and external phenomena exist inherently is removed, rebirth ceases and freedom from cyclic existence, liberation, is attained. In order to attain liberation, one must eliminate the strong conception of "I, I, I" and "mine, mine, mine," for example, the conceptions thinking "I am George W. Bush" and "These are my subjects." In order to ensure our own liberation, we must overcome these strong conceptions of I and mine. We can gradually reduce these strong conceptions by accumulating much hearing, thinking, and meditation. Of these three, the main one is meditation. Meditation is of two types: analytical meditation and stabilizing meditation. By means of these two, one will gradually improve. Although there are some people who say that analytical meditation is not real meditation, this is not correct. If meditation means not thinking, then a marmot standing upright on its mound would be meditating! In fact, there is a Tibetan expression that says "Among the marmots there are some who are great meditators"!

Wednesday morning, 14 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 386-7) says:

> Whoever, when searching for the imputed object by means of the seven ways,
> - finds that it cannot be permanent or impermanent,
> - does not see any self that lacks inherent existence, and
> - strongly adheres, due to the view of the transitory collection, to the self as inherently existent through adhering to inherent existence by the force of ignorance,
>
> will circle [in cyclic existence]. When a self is thoroughly sought, it is thought that it must be asserted to be one of the two:
> 1. the Forders, by the reasoning that seeks a self, see that it is inadmissible for the aggregates themselves to be the self, whereby, all who are mistaken with respect to the own entity of that self adhere to it as a different entity from the aggregates, and

2. our own schools, due to the mistake of thinking "A self which is a different entity from the aggregates does not exist," assert just the mere aggregates themselves to be the self.

> *The self that always thoroughly gives rise in migrating beings*
> *To an awareness conceiving I and that gives rise to*
> *An awareness conceiving mine with respect to whatever is of that,*
> *Is through confusion with respect to uninvestigated renown.* [6.164]

Those who unerroneously explain the meaning of the scriptures, thinking "[The self] does not exist as either of the previous two," understand that

- the self that is to be liberated a hundred times, and
- *the self that always thoroughly gives rise*, in all the *migrating beings* dwelling as human beings, hungry ghosts, animals, and so forth, *to an awareness conceiving I* through observing any basis of observation, and
- that is a controller or anything associated with that self *that gives rise to an awareness conceiving mine with respect to what* is the mine *of that* self – internal entities, such as the eye and so forth, that are the basis of imputation of the self and external [things],

is established *through confusion*, that is, unknowing, *in* the perspective of *uninvestigated renown*, and is not established by way of its own entity.

Therefore, because the self indeed does not exist inherently, but nonetheless is conventionally imputed to exist through confusion, or unknowing, yogis do not observe such a self in all ways. When not observing that, they will not observe the appropriations of that inherently existent self, the eyes and so forth. This being the case, yogis do not observe any established by way of their own entity things that are the bases of the self and mine. Because of that, they are liberated from cyclic existence. [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 18.4) says:

> When thoughts of I and mine are extinguished
> With respect to the internal and external,
> Appropriation will cease and,
> This having been extinguished, rebirth is extinguished.

When the self, the imputed object, is sought in the seven ways it is not found. The seven ways in which the self does not exist are:
(1) the self is not oneness with the aggregates,
(2) the self is not inherently other than the aggregates,
(3-4) the self and the aggregates are not inherently support and supported,
(5) the self does not inherently possess the aggregates,
(6) the collection of the aggregates is not the self, and
(7) the shape of the aggregates is not the self.
The concluding syllogism is:

> The self, as the subject, does not exist inherently because it is not found when sought by means of the seven ways.

The self is not inherently stable, it is not inherently unstable, and it is not perceived to exist inherently. Ordinary beings, on the other hand, perceive the self to exist inherently due to which they continue to circle in cyclic existence. In other words, because of conceiving an inherently existent I and mine sentient beings circle in cyclic existence. When positing the conventionally existent I,

- the Forders posit a self that is different entity from the aggregates, whereas
- our own schools assert that, because the self is not a different entity from the aggregates, the aggregates are the self.

Thus, when the lower Buddhist schools search for an illustration of the I among the aggregates, they say that it is found. Some of them posit the person or the self to be the mental consciousness, some posit it to be the mind-basis-of-all, some posit it to be the continuum of the consciousness, and some posit it to be the mere collection of the aggregates. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas all such assertions are mistaken. They say that, when thoroughly sought, the self is not found among the five

aggregates, yet it does exist for a non-investigative and non-analytical awareness. In short, the self is not found when thoroughly sought by means of the seven ways, yet it exists for an innate non-investigative and non-analytical awareness. What is the self? The self is what is sitting on a cushion here in this room! For us the mode of abidance of the self is unclear due to ignorance. On the other hand, yogis do not perceive the I and mine to be established by way of their own entity. Seeing that the I and mine are not established by way of their own entity, they become free from cyclic existence. Thus, by extinguishing the conceptions of I and mine one attains liberation. That is, one no longer circles in cyclic existence by the force of actions and afflictions because one no longer takes rebirth by the force of actions and afflictions. If someone takes rebirth does he necessarily do so by the force of actions and afflictions? That is not the case since there are beings who take rebirth intentionally or by the power of prayer. There are three types of rebirth:

1. rebirth that is taken by the force of actions and afflictions,
2. rebirth that is taken intentionally, and
3. rebirth that is taken by the power of prayer.

There are particular prayers to be reborn, for example, in Sukhavati; by the power of such prayers one takes rebirth there.

In short, we should put an end to taking rebirth by the force of actions and afflictions by eliminating the conception of I through cultivating the realization of the selflessness of persons.

This concludes the discussion refuting an inherently existent self, next is the discussion refuting an inherently existent mine.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 388) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B2B Refuting an inherently existent mine

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, if asked: Why is the mine also non-existent if the self is non-existent?
>
> In order to indicate this, it is explained:
>
> *Because the [object] acted upon having a non-existent agent is non-existent,*
> *Therefore, the self's without the self does not exist.*
> *Therefore, viewing self and self's as empty,*
> *The yogi will be completely released.* [6.165]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 68), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2B2 Refuting inherently existent "mine"

> *Because there's no object which has a non-existent agent,*
> *Therefore without the self, no "mine" exists.* [6.165ab]

You should understand that the self not existing inherently, "mine" does not exist inherently, because there is no object that has a non-existent agent.

> *Thus, when he sees the self and "mine" are empty,*
> *The yogin will be fully liberated.* [6.165cd]

That yogin who sees and meditates on the self and "mine" as empty of inherent existence will be fully liberated, for there are no inherently existent self and "mine."

In brief, because the self does not exist inherently, also the mine does not exist inherently. I and mine are interdependent in that I depends on mine and mine depends on I. When a yogi realizes that the I and mine lack inherent existence, he is liberated from cyclic existence.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as pot is impossible without the potter, similarly, there is also no self's (i.e., no mine) without the self. Therefore, by finely not observing the self and the self's, when samsara is not seen, the yogi will be released.

Chandrakirti sets out the illustration "Just as pot is impossible without the potter" to show that there is no mine without the self. Self and mine do exist, but they do not exist inherently. Not observing an inherently existent self and mine, one will be liberated.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When form and so forth are not observed, since attachment and so forth included in them do not arise, the hearers and solitary realizers are presented as passing beyond sorrow without taking [another existence]; the bodhisattvas, although already having perceived non-self, grasp a continuity of becoming until enlightenment due to the influence of compassion. Hence, the wise should fully seek non-self just as was explained.

"When form and so forth are not observed, since attachment and so forth included in them do not arise" means that when form, for example, is observed attachment and so forth arise, whereas when it is not observed attachment and so forth do not arise. When one has strong attachment to an object and is unable to apply the appropriate antidote, it is important to distance oneself from that object of attachment. Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* says that there are three causes for generating attachment:

1. not having abandoned the afflictions,
2. having improper mental attention, and
3. being close to an object.

Thus, when one is unable to apply the respective antidote to attachment one should at least distance oneself from the object of attachment. For example, if someone is attached to drinking alcohol but stays away or remains far from places where there is alcohol, he will gradually be able to overcome his attachment to alcohol. On the other hand, if that person is close to alcohol, attachment for it will easily arise. The same is true of attachment to smoking cigarettes, listening to music, and so forth.

Hearers and solitary realizers pass beyond sorrow, whereas bodhisattvas, even though they perceive selflessness, continue to take rebirth until enlightenment by the power of their compassion. That they "grasp a continuity of becoming" means that they take rebirth in cyclic existence. Such bodhisattvas know that if they take rebirth in a womb, with a body composed of the six elements, they will be of benefit. Therefore, when it is time to take rebirth they search for a man and women who are having sexual intercourse and take rebirth in that womb. Due to this the craving of this man and woman is said to be a condition for the bodhisattva's rebirth. Bodhisattvas also take spontaneous rebirth. In short, in order to be reborn in cyclic existence one has to depend on attachment or craving. Although bodhisattvas take rebirth by the power of compassion, they do so in dependence on the craving of a man and woman, they do not take rebirth like a flower arising from the ground.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 388) says:

> QUESTION: Moreover, if the self does not exist inherently how does the mine also not exist inherently?
> RESPONSE:
>
> *Because the acted upon having a non-existent agent is non-existent,*
> *The mine does not exist without the self.*
> *Therefore, the self and the mine are viewed as empty and*
> *The yogi will be completely liberated.* [6.165]
>
> Because just as an object acted upon, a clay pot, that has a non-existent agent, the potter, is non-existent, an inherently existent mine does not exist without an inherently existent self. Therefore, the two, the self and the mine, are viewed as empty of inherent existence and, when he familiarizes with the meaning of that, the yogi will be completely liberated from cyclic existence. When forms and so forth are not observed to be inherently existent, the afflictions of attachment and so forth which conceive forms and so forth to be inherently existent will be extinguished, whereby hearers and solitary realizers also pass beyond sorrow without taking existence. However, although bodhisattvas have already seen such selflessness, by another force, compassion, they take rebirth, which is the continuity of existence, until enlightenment. Because this is the supreme point of the paths of both the greater and lesser vehicles, the wise should thoroughly seek the selflessness explained above.

If the self does not exist inherently, how can the mine exist inherently? It cannot. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Because just as an object acted upon, a clay pot, that has a non-existent agent, the potter, is non-existent, an inherently existent mine does not exist without an inherently existent self." If a writer does not exist, a letter does not exist. If a cook does not exist, cooked food does not exist. In conclusion, the mine does not exist inherently. Therefore, both self and mine do not exist inherently. Through meditating on the lack of inherent existence of the I and mine, one will become free from cyclic existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "hearers and solitary realizers also pass beyond sorrow without taking existence." This point about hearers and solitary realizers not taking rebirth in cyclic existence can be debated: "Are there not hearers who are approachers to stream enterer who take seven rebirth existences, that is, who are reborn from a god rebirth to a god rebirth and from a human rebirth to a human rebirth?" However, what is to be understood here is that the main object of abandonment of hearers and solitary realizers is cyclic existence. On the other hand, bodhisattvas continue to take rebirth in cyclic existence in order to benefit other beings. They make specific prayers to do so such as "May I remain in cyclic existence as long as cyclic existence is not exhausted." Thus, bodhisattvas take rebirth under the power of compassion in order to benefit other sentient beings. Since bodhisattvas take rebirth in cyclic existence by the power of compassion is this a rebirth that is taken intentionally? It is.

Lama Tsongkhapa concludes saying: "Because this is the supreme point of the paths of both the greater and lesser vehicles, the wise should thoroughly seek the selflessness explained above."

This concludes the discussions refuting an inherently existent I and an inherently existent mine.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 388) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2B3 Indicating the analysis of a self and a chariot to be applicable also to other things
>
> A Its applicability to things such as pots, woolen blankets, and so forth
> B It applicability to things that are causes and results
> C Dispelling others' arguments regarding this
>
> 3B1C-2B3E-2B3A Its applicability to things such as pots, woolen blankets, and so forth

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as imputing the self and its appropriations is similar to the complete analysis of the chariot, likewise, because it is repeatable saying "[the analysis] of other things is also":
>
> *Vase, woolen cloth, rough cloth, army, forest, rosary, tree,*
> *House, cart, guest house, and so forth; whatever things and* [6.166ab]
>
> are mentioned, adding this [6.167cd]: "these objects do not exist in the seven ways by means of the analysis of the chariot and, other than that, do exist by way of worldly renown."
>
> Other things of such types whatsoever:
>
> *Are likewise to be realized in the ways they are related by these beings,* [6.166c]
>
> – [to exist] only for uninvestigated renown.
>
> If asked: Why:
>
> *Because the Mighty Sage did not dispute with the world.* [6.166d]
>
> [Since taught] in the scriptural citation [from *Indicating the Three Vows*] which says:
>
> The world disputes with me, but I do not dispute with the world.
>
> – one should not harm the renown of the world.

The way in which the self and a chariot were analyzed should also be applied to other things. What should be analyzed? The example given here is that of a vase, woolen cloth, and so forth. A vase or pot is that which is bulbous, flat bottomed, and capable of holding fluid. Woolen cloth refers to cloth made out of wool. Rough cloth is a particular cloth made out of the rough hair that is found on the neck and belly of a yak and is used to make tents and so forth. Also "army, forest, rosary, tree, house, cart, guest house, and so forth" are to be analyzed in the same way as the self and a chariot.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 68), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-6C5A-2C1 Repetition for the functioning things of pots, woolen cloth, etc.
>
> *Pots and woolen cloth, tents of felt, armies, forests and rosaries,*
> *Trees and houses, small carts, hotels, and other things should be*
> *Understood thus, in whatever ways these men speak of them,*
> *Because the King of Sages does not argue with the world.* [6.166]

You should understand that pots, woolen cloth, felt tents, armies, forests, rosaries, trees, houses, small carts, hotels, and other functioning things, in whatever ways these people speak about them, are to be understood as existing like that, without consideration; for the King of Sages does not argue with the world, he accept what exists in the world.

Wednesday afternoon, 14 March 2001

Just as the Bhagavan asserts according to what is accepted in the world without arguing with the world, so too do the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Again, if asked: How does the world impute conventions, due to what properties?

In order to indicate that, it is explained:

Qualities, components, attachment, definition, fuel-wood, and so forth, and
Quality-possessor, component-possessor, desirous, illustration, fire, etc.:
These objects do not exist in the seven ways by means of the analysis of the chariot and,
Other than that, do exist by way of worldly renown. [6.167]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

"How, in what ways, are functioning things spoken of?" you may ask.

Parts and qualities, desire, definitions, fuel, and so on,
And owners of parts and qualities, desires, instances, fire, and so on –
These objects, by the cart analysis, don't exist in the seven ways.
They do exist otherwise than that, by way of the world's opinion. [6.167]

The owner of the parts, the pot, and its parts, the potsherds; the owner of the qualities, the pot, and the qualities, the blue fire design[169], and so on; the desirer, the sentient being desiring an object, and the desire, the craving for a pleasant object; the instance of the definition, the pot, and definition (i.e. defining characteristics), the big belly, [hanging lip, long neck and so on]; and the burning fire and so on, and the fuel which is burnt and so on, are not to be analyzed in absolute reality by analytical logic; for imputed objects do not exist when analyzed by the seven ways as in the metaphor of the cart, they exist otherwise, by way of the world's opinion.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as vase is a component-possessor, baked clay and so forth are its components; and vase is a quality-possessor, a fire design, sky blue, and so forth are its qualities; and vase is the illustration, fat belly, hanging spout, long neck, and so forth is its definition – similarly, it should be applied also to woolen cloth and so forth

A pot is a component-possessor while the baked clay and so forth are its components. Likewise, a gold pot is a component-possessor while gold and so forth are its components. A pot is also a possessor of qualities, while the design on, it such as that of flames of fire, is one of its qualities. Likewise, its color is a quality that is possessed by the pot or vase. A vase or pot is also an illustration, while "fat belly, hanging spout, long neck, and so forth" is its definition.

One can ask: "Are a possessor of components and its components inherently support and supported? Are they oneness or otherness?" In other words, the seven ways of analyzing which were mentioned before can also be applied to a vase and so forth.

Woolen cloth is also a possessor of components while its component are the strands of yarn. It is also a possessor of qualities, these being its color and its tangibility, smoothness, roughness, and so forth. One can analyze the woolen cloth and the strands of yarn as to whether they are inherently support and supported, or oneness, or otherness. Similarly one can ask: "While the woolen cloth possesses strands of yarn, does it inherently possess them? Is the collection of strands of yarn the woolen cloth? Is the shape of the collection of the strands of yarn the woolen cloth?" Conventionally, the woolen cloth cannot be found when analyzed in these seven ways. This is the way in which to apply the analysis by means of the seven ways to other objects, such as rough cloth, army, and so

[169] a glaze?

forth. Rough cloth, as was said earlier, is that made from the neck and belly hair of a yak. An army consists of four types of soldiers: infantry, cavalry, navy, and airforce. These are, therefore, the components of an army.

A forest is composed of many trees, just one or even a few trees are not sufficient for it to be called a forest. A rosary is composed of 108 beads; the rosary is the possessor of components while its components are each of the beads.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Attachment is excessive clinging; the desirous is the support of attachment. Fire is the burner; fuel-wood is that to be burned. There, one imputes as component-possessor having taken the components as the cause; one imputes components through reliance on the component-possessor – hence, similar to the example of the chariot – up to "there is fire through reliance on fuel-wood; there is fuel-wood through reliance on that [fire]."
>
> One should not engage in analysis regarding those that are the conventions of the world.

Is there a difference between attachment and one with attachment (the desirous)? One with attachment is a person, whereas attachment is a mental factor that is excessive clinging thinking "He or she is so beautiful, so beautiful." On the other hand, when we think "He is ugly" and so forth anger arises. We can also analyze whether hatred and the one with hatred are inherently support and supported, whether they are oneness or otherness, whether the one with hatred inherently possess hatred, and so forth.

Fire is what burns, whereas fuel is what is burned. These are also established in mutual dependence and do not exist inherently. It cannot be said "This is inherently what burns and this is what is inherently burned." This statement can be applied to other objects in the same way.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 389) says:

> Just as the imputations which are the self and its appropriations are similar to the analysis of a chariot, in order to indicate "So too is the analysis of other things" [there is the following explanation].
>
> *Whatever things – pots, woolen blankets, canvas, armies, forests,*
> *Rosaries, trees, houses, carts, guest houses, and so forth – and,*
> *From the point of view of whatever else is similar, those spoken of by beings should be realized*
> *Because the Lord of Subduers did not argue with the world.* [6.166]
>
> *Whatever things – pots, woolen blankets, canvas, armies, forests, rosaries, trees, houses, carts, guest houses, and so forth* – when, *by means of the thorough analysis of a chariot*, their respective imputed objects are sought *in the seven ways, they do not exist*. *However*, *they do exist in terms of being renowned in the world as other than that* sought, that is, without analysis.
>
> In regard to carts, some Tibetan lamas say that a *shakakra* is that having wheels, that is, a cart for loading merely three bamboo boxes of tea. In addition, it is also said to be a single house that exists between wheels.
>
> Also, *from the point of view of whatever* other things having *similar*, that is, such, reasonings, *those spoken of* – that is, those imputed conventionally – *by beings should be realized* to exist as just uninvestigated renown *because*, for that reason, *the Lord of Subduers* taught *without arguing with the world* in disagreement with the world. The *Sutra Indicating the Three Vows That Are a Heap of Jewels* says:
>
> The world argues with me, but
> I do not argue with the world.

Since positing them to exist without harming worldly conventions is also accepted by the Subduer, one should not harm worldly renown.
QUESTION: By what properties do worldly beings impute conventions?
RESPONSE: In order to indicate that, there is [the following] explanation:

A component, quality, attachment, definition, fuel, and so forth,
A possessor of qualities, possessor of components, the attached, a illustration, fire, and so forth – these objects,
By means of the thorough analysis of a chariot, do not exist in the seven ways, however,
They do exist in terms of being renowned in the world as other than that. [6.167]

Just as

- *a possessor of components*, a pot, and its *components*, gravel and so forth,
- *a possessor of qualities*, a pot, and its *qualities*, a drawing of flames, clear blue, and so forth,
- *the attached* – a sentient being or person, the basis of attachment, who has attachment to an attractive object – and *attachment*, excessive craving due to observing a contaminated, attractive object,
- *an illustration*, a pot, and its *definition*, that which has a distended belly, an overhanging lip, a long neck, and so forth,
- *fire*, that which burns, and *fuel*, that which is burned,

and so forth are imputed to be a possessor of components in dependence on components and to be a component in dependence on a possessor of components; likewise, through to fire and fuel are they imputed in mutual dependence. When their imputed objects are sought in the seven ways, they do not exist. However, they can be posited to exist, this being by means of worldly conventions, not by employing the analysis of the reasonings for analyzing suchness

In short, any object, such as a table, can be analyzed by means of the seven ways. For example, the table is a possessor of components and its parts are the components.

"The attached" is the person, whereas attachment is craving due to observing a contaminated, attractive object, this being the wish to not be separated from it. There is attachment to different types of objects, such as food, clothes, and so forth. The person who is attached and the attachment can be analyzed in the seven ways as to whether they are inherently support and supported, oneness or otherness, and so forth. However in this particular case, it is difficult to know how to analyze the collection and the shape. Perhaps "shape" can be analyzed in terms of the object of attachment. In fact, the analysis can also be applied to attachment and the object of attachment asking "Are the attachment and the object of attachment oneness or otherness? Are they inherently support and supported? Does the attachment inherently possess the object of attachment? Is the shape of the object of attachment the attachment, and so forth? In short, when the attachment is sought by means of the seven ways it is not found. However, attachment exists for an awareness that is not investigating and not analyzing; it is posited by the force of worldly conventions. Thus, attachment exists in the perspective of a non-investigative and non-analytical awareness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 390) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B3B It applicability to things that are causes and results

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

To explain that "Not only are components and so forth established by mutual reliance, the two – cause and effect – are also mutually reliant," because,

If a cause produces that to be produced, then it is a cause and
If an effect is not produced, without that, it will have no cause.
Also an effect will be produced if a cause exists. Therefore, [6.168abc]

Also these two – cause and effect – are to be known saying, "if one or another exists, the other is existent; cause and effect are not inherently existent."

In case those two are thought to be established by way of their own entity – O dear!

Which would transform from what, which would be prior to which? Explain it. [6.168d]

A cause or an effect transforms from what previously established cause or effect? From the two, does a cause or does an effect transform first? Therefore, it should be understood that they are also imputed as cause and effect, like the chariot, having taken [the other] as cause, they are not transformed from self-nature.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2C2 Repetition for the functioning things of cause and effect

If a cause produces a product, then it is a cause.
If a result is not produced, then without that, it is causeless.
If the cause exists, the effect is also born, therefore. [6.168abc]

It should be understood that cause and effect are established in relation to each other [but do not exist inherently]; for it is if a cause produces a product [or effect], that it is a cause; and if an effect is not produced, since that production does not exist, that effect has non-existent cause; while if the cause exists, the effect also is born.

Tell me, what is born from what? Which is before which? [6.168d]

If cause and effect exist inherently, then tell me – from what cause is what effect born? Which of those two, the cause and the effect, exists earlier than the other? If they exist inherently, the cause cannot come first, for the effect [in relation to which the cause is a cause] must exist in the time of the cause. The effect also cannot, since the effect would then be causeless.

Just as a possessor of components and its components are established in mutual dependence so too are causes and results. The cause, that which produces, and the result, that which is produced, exist in mutual dependence. In short, not only are a possessor of components and its components established in mutual dependence but so too are causes and results. If it produces a result it is a cause, whereas if it is not able to produce a result it is not a cause. Similarly, *Collected Topics* says that the definition of a cause is that which produces, whereas the definition of a result is that which is produced. If there is a cause there will be the production of a result. Therefore, cause and result are established in mutual dependence; they are not inherently other. While not existing inherently, they are established in mutual dependence.

Someone asks: "How do they exist if they do not exist inherently?" They exist for a non-investigative awareness and exist nominally. They exist as does a harvest which is produced in dependence on the sowing of seeds. If causes and results are considered to exist inherently, one can ask: "Which comes first, the cause or the result?" If cause and result were inherently existent, they would be unrelated whereby one would not come first and the other later. *Collected Topics* says that cause, result, and functioning thing are synonyms. Although this is true in general it is not the case when applied to a specific basis. In general if it is a cause it is a result because due to being a cause it must be the result of a previous cause. For example, a mother is pervaded by being a daughter, she arises from her own mother. There is no causeless mother. In short, cause and result are established in mutual dependence.

The analysis by means of the seven ways can also be applied to causes and results asking whether they are oneness or otherness and so forth. The conclusion is that there is no inherently existent cause or result.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore, if an effect were inherently produced by a cause, would it be produced through meeting or not meeting? There, respectively:
>
> *If your cause produces an effect through meeting, then, as*
> *They are one potential, producer and effect would be undifferentiated,*
> *And if separate, this cause would have no distinction from a non-cause.*
> *Having rejected these two, other conceptions will also not exist.* [6.169]
>
> There, if a cause produces an effect through meeting, then there is meeting and, like the undifferentiated meeting of the waters of a river and the ocean, they are one. Hence, because the distinctions "this is a cause" and "this is an effect" do not exist, which was produced from which?
>
> In case it is produced without meeting, then, just as other non-effects are not produced without meeting, similarly an effect will also not be produced without meeting. Yet, if produced while not meeting, everything will be produced.
>
> In propounding cause and effect as inherent[ly existent], also another third conception except for meeting and not meeting is not possible. Hence, an inherently existent cause solely does not produce an effect.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson*,* says:

If you say that the cause and effect exist inherently, then is the effect produced by the cause after meeting, or produced without meeting?

> *If, for you, causes produce effects on meeting, then*
> *Since they are a single potential, the producer and result aren't different.* [6.169ab]

If the former, then it follows that the producer and the result will not be different entities, since the cause and the effect are a single potential. [So what is what?]

> *If they are separate, this cause will be no different from non-causes.* [6.169c]

If the latter, then it follows that that "cause" will be no different from non-causes, because it is inherently distinct from the effect [, i.e. unrelated to it].

> *When we've rejected both of these, there is no other view.* [6.169d]

It follows that the cause does not inherently produce the effect; for it does not produce it by meeting or not meeting with the effect, and when these two, meeting and not meeting, are rejected, there is no other, third concept [for a proponent of cause and effect as inherently existent].

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore:
>
> *As your cause does not produce an effect, therefore*
> *The so-called 'effect' does not exist;...* [6.170ab]
>
> When a cause does not produce an effect, then since an effect does not exist:

... devoid
Of effect, a cause would have no reason. This also does not exist. [6.170b]

The reason of taking a cause as the cause itself is that an effect arises. If even without an effect, a cause became the cause itself, then, the cause-ness of the cause would have no reason. But, this is also not asserted. Therefore, the two – cause and effect – are not inherently existent.

If asked: How is it for you?

Because both these two are also like illusions, therefore
There will be no faults for me. Worldly things also exist. [6.170cd]

The complete analysis occurs here about the very object to be produced and the very producer being [established by] their own characteristics according to some. According to some [others], since things are merely produced by wrong imagination, they are of a non-produced nature, like illusions. And, although without inherent [existence], they become objects of conceptualization, like the falling hair and so forth observed by one with cataracts. [Similar faults] are just unimaginable for that. Therefore, there does not exist an occasion of the explained faults for me; and although the things of the world are established without investigation, they do exist – hence, everything is established.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

But if you say causes don't produce effects, the so-called effect
Therefore exists not. [6.170ab]

You should understand that the so-called effect does not exist inherently, if you say on the other hand that the cause does not inherently produce the effect.

Effectless, the cause has no reason. [6.170b]

It follows that the cause will have no reason to be posited as a cause, since it is devoid of production of an effect.

It too can't exist. [6.170b]

If you accept this, [the cause] also cannot exist, since it is [not] established as being a cause.

Because both these are similar to illusions, therefore for us
No fault arises, though the things of worldly folk exist. [6.170cd]

For us Madhyamikas, the fault of cause and effect conceived as meeting or not meeting does not arise, although the functioning things of worldly folk exist. This is because this cause and effect are both like illusions, not existing inherently, but existing conventionally.

Does a cause produce a result by meeting or not meeting its result? Does a seed produce a sprout through meeting or not meeting the sprout?
Student: They meet because they are a continuity of similar type.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Such a meeting is not like the meeting of a mother and her son. Does a mother produce a son through meeting or not meeting him?
Student: The approaching of the cessation of the cause and the approaching of the production of a result meet.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That is right, they do meet. The approaching of the cessation of the cause and the approaching of the production of a result exist simultaneously, however, the cessation of a cause and the production of a result do not exist simultaneously. The result is produced as the cause ceases.

In conclusion, things do not exist inherently and the imputed object is not found when thoroughly sought. Through reflecting on this, one will develop one's understanding of emptiness and thereby shatter the foundations of cyclic existence.

Thursday morning, 15 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 390) says:

> The explanation of the statement "Not only are components and so forth mutually dependent establishments, also the two, causes and results, are established in mutual dependence" [is as follows]:
>
> *If it is the case that a cause produces a product, it is a cause, and*
> *If a result is not produced, without that, it does not have a cause.*
> *Results too, when their causes exist, are produced. Therefore,* [6.168abc]
>
> Because of that, *if it is the case that a cause produces a product*, a result, *it is* a producer, that is, *a cause, and if a result is not produced,* since it is *without that* production, that result *does not have a cause*. *Results too, when their causes exist, are produced* from them. *Therefore*, also the two, causes and results, exist in mutual dependence; they do not exist inherently.
>
> OBJECTION: Causes and results are established by way of their own entity.
>
> RESPONSE:
>
> *Tell us which comes from what? Among them, which comes first?* [6.168d]
>
> Oh, tell us *which* of the two *comes* in dependence on *what* cause or result? *Among* the two, *which*, cause or result, *comes first?* In regard to their inherently existing like that, the cause coming first is not suitable; at the time of the cause, the result that depends on that cause would necessarily be established. Also the result coming first is not suitable since it would be without causes. Therefore, it should be understood that also those imputed as causes and results, like a chariot, are established in mutual dependence; they do not arise from their nature.
>
> In addition, if causes inherently produce results, they would produce them either through meeting or not meeting their results.
>
> *If, for you, a cause produces a result through meeting, at that time*
> *They would be one potential, whereby producer and result would not be different, and,*
> *If they were distinct, there would be no distinction between causes and non-causes.*
> *Having abandoned those two, another conception also does not exist.* [6.169]
>
> Regarding that, *if*, according *to you*, *a cause produces a result through meeting* the result, *at that time they*, the cause and the result, *would be one potential*; like the meeting of the water of a river and an ocean. If they become one, they could not be distinguished saying "cause and result." Because *producer and result would not be different*, what would produce what?
>
> *If they were* produced *separate*ly, that is, without meeting, *there would be no distinction between those* asserted to be the *causes* of a result and *those that are not* its *causes* and between a producer and a non-producer because inherently existent separate [things] are different unrelated objects. With regard to propounding causes and results to be inherently existent, *having abandoned the two* conceptions of meeting and not meeting in regard to product and producer, since *another* third *conception* aside from them *also does not exist*, inherently existent causes and results are just not produced.
>
> *For you, a cause does not produce a result, therefore, a so-called "result" does not exist.*
> *A cause free from a result, not having a cause, also does not exist.* [6.170ab]
>
> Because of that, according *to you*, an inherently existent *cause does not produce a result, therefore, a so-called "result" does not exist* inherently. The reason for positing a cause as a cause is that there arises a result. On the other hand, if one were able to posit *a cause* – even though it is *free from*, that is, without, *a result* – as a cause, at that time, since the cause *would have no* reason to be posited as a cause, it *also does not exist*. Therefore, the two, causes and results, do not exist inherently.
>
> QUESTION: Well then, according to you how do they exist?
>
> RESPONSE:

Because of that, also both of them are illusion-like. Therefore,
For us the faults do not occur; worldly beings' things also exist. [6.170cd]

According to the opposition, the two, product and producer, are asserted to be established by way of their own character, but, having investigated the meeting and non-meeting of causes and results, there are faults in both positions. However, *because of that*, that is, according to that, because things are produced by the force of mistakenly imputing them and are posited by a conception of a mere conventionality, *also both* causes and results *are*, *like illusions*, not produced inherently, and, although they are not inherently existent, like the falling hair and so forth observed by those with cataracts, they are objects that are posited by a mere conception of conventionalities. In regard to that, faults similar to those of setting forth the assertion of inherently existent causes and results are just unimaginable*. Therefore, for us the faults* of meeting and non-meeting that were explained above *do not occur* and, since *the things* renowned *in the world* that are established without investigation – causes, results, chariots, and so forth – *also exist*, everything is established.

Here, the autocommentary expresses the harm to causes and results that are inherently existent, established by way of their own character, and so forth, the qualification of the object of negation. When propounding the illusion-like lack of inherent existence is turned back against oneself, it is necessary to say "It is not accrued," however, one should not at all give a facsimile of a response which does not distinguish the two, inherent existence and existence.

Because causes and results are established in mutual dependence they do not exist inherently. Just as a possessor of components and its components are established in mutual dependence so too are causes and results. If causes and results existed inherently, one could ask: "Which comes first, the cause or the result?" If they existed inherently it would not be feasible for the cause to exist first and for the result to arise later because to exist inherently means to exist without dependence. On the other hand, if the result existed first then it would arise without a cause. These are the faults of inherently existent causes and results. Such faults are not accrued by the Prasangika Madhyamikas who assert that phenomena do not exist inherently but exist only when not investigated and not analyzed.

Another argument is: "Does a cause produce its result by meeting it or without meeting it?" If a cause produces its result by meeting it, it would follow that the cause and result would be one. It would be like the example of a river becoming one with the ocean when it flows into or meets it, in that one cannot separate them because they have become one entity. This is the fault of a cause producing a result by inherently existent meeting. On the other hand, if a cause produces a result by inherently existent non-meeting, it would follow that a result would arise from both causes and non-causes; that is, anything could arise from anything.

Causes and results are to be understood in terms of the conventions of the world. Through understanding external causes and results, one come to understand that causes and results in general lack true existence. Due to this, one comes to understand that all phenomena lack true existence. When all causes and conditions are complete a result arises, therefore, a result depends on causes and conditions. Even though a cause is present, if the conditions are not complete the result will not arise. For example, when a seed is planted in a dry field, a sprout will not arise. This is because various conditions, such as heat, water, manure, and so forth, are necessary for the production of the sprout.

In the conventions of the world does a cause produce its result through meeting or not meeting? For example, when we are hungry we eat food, due to which we become full. Eating the food is a cause, due to which the stomach becomes full, the result. The condition is the action of eating the food. Do the cause and result meet in this case? What about the case of a mother who gives birth to a child?
Student: What is the definition of meeting?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: That which is suitable to be called meeting and cannot be invalidated by the conventions of the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 392) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B3C Dispelling others' arguments regarding this

1 The argument that there is a similar fault in refuting inherently existent causes and results
2 Indicating the response that there is no similar fault for us

3B1C-2B3E-2B3C-1 The argument that there is a similar fault in refuting inherently existent causes and results

The lower schools say that in refuting inherently existent causes and results a similar fault is accrued by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Here, if someone says in response, whatever was mentioned [by the Madhyamikas] saying, "Does a cause produce an effect through meeting or rather not meeting?" – are here also similar arguments and investigations for you. How?
>
> *"Does this refutation refute that to be refuted through meeting or*
> *Not meeting?" Will not this fault occur also for you?* [6.171ab]
>
> If the refutation refutes that to be refuted through meeting, then this very fault will occur. But if not meeting, also then just that [fault] will occur. Having rejected these two, another conception will not exist. When thus, your refutation does not have the ability to refute that to be refuted, then since your refutation is refuted, indirectly also functioning things of cause and effect are just established. In order to establish the aforesaid it is mentioned:
>
> *When that is mentioned and only one's own position is destroyed,*
> *Then you are unable to refute that to be refuted.* [6.171cd]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2C3A Argument

You may say:

> *"Does not this fault, that this refutation either refutes its object*
> *On meeting it, or without meeting, also arise for you?* [6.171ab]

"The fault of conceiving cause and effect as meeting or not meeting is the same for you too. Is there not this fault for you, that this refutation either refutes the object to be refuted on meeting, or refutes it without meeting? There is, because if it refutes on meeting, then since they are one potential, what is refuted by what? If it refutes without meeting, then all things, equal in not meeting, would refute it. And when these two are rejected, there is no other, third concept.

> *"When, speaking these words, you only destroy your own position,*
> *Then you're not able to refute the object of refutation.* [6.171cd]

"When saying these words of specious refutation destroys only your own position, then you cannot refute the object of refutation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:
>
> *Because spurious arguments that equally follow also for one's own words*
> *Unreasonably deny all things, therefore*
> *The holy beings will not accept you, and because*
> *You, lacking your own position, are also a quibbler.* [6.172]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Since, with self-confuting arguments, following equally for your own words,*
> *Without logic, you are contradicting all things, therefore*
> *Holy beings will not accept you.* [6.172abc]

"Besides, you Madhyamikas will not be accepted by holy beings, for with self-confuting arguments such that the same consequence flung at your opponent also applies to your own words, without logic you contradict all functioning things. [How is this? What logic is there in saying that if it is produced without meeting, then it must be produced by everything that is equal in not meeting, but it is not produced by them? A magnet likewise attracts suitably placed iron, without meeting, but does not attract everything it does not meet; the eye, too, sees a suitably placed form only without meeting, but does not see everything it does not meet. Similarly, although a cause is apprehended to produce without meeting, it will not produce everything it does not meet, but produces only the appropriate effect.]

> *"Because you have no position*
> *Of your own, you are also a disputant who refutes everything."* [6.172cd]

"You are also a disputant refuting whatever you come upon[170], because you have no position of your own to posit, and just set out to refute others' positions."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, the equality in following also for one's own words was already mentioned [in 6.171ab]. The statement "unreasonably deny all things" is to be explained. Whatever was stated [by the Madhyamikas], "[if produced without meeting, it must be produced] by [everything] equal in not meeting, yet, it is not produced [by them],"– what reason exists in this?
>
> Like this. A magnet attracts iron which abides in a suitable place without meeting, [but] does not [attract] everything. Similarly, the eye sees forms abiding in a suitable place only without meeting, it does not [see] all. Similarly, although a cause is held to produce without meeting, it will not produce everything without meeting – it will produce only the appropriate effects.
>
> Because thus, unreasonably all things are denied, therefore the holy beings will not accept you. Furthermore, you are also a mere quibbler since a disputant who is devoid of his own position and engages in merely dispelling the position of others is called a 'quibbler' (or 'sophist'). You do not have any position of your own because your complete analysis is a mere dispelling of other's positions.

The lower schools ask the Prasangika Madhyamikas whether or not a refutation meets that which is to be refuted. If the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they do, the lower schools say that then all the previously mentioned faults that the Prasangika Madhyamikas flung at them would also be accrued by the Prasangika Madhyamikas themselves. There are only two possible types of investigation: as to whether they meet or whether they do not meet. What is that which refutes, the refutation, and what is that which is to be refuted, the object of refutation? The assertion of inherent existence is what is to be refuted; it is the object of refutation. What refutes it, the refutation, are the reasonings refuting inherent existence and the scriptures refuting inherent existence.

What is to be refuted is, for example, the assertion "A cause inherently produces a result." The lower schools ask the Prasangika Madhyamikas: "When you refute what is to be refuted does the

[170] *sun.ci.phyin.du.rgol.ba.po*

refutation occurs through the meeting or the non-meeting of the refutation and the object of refutation?" They say that if the refutation occurs through their meeting, all the faults mentioned previously by the Prasangika Madhyamikas would be accrued by the Prasangika Madhyamikas themselves. On the other hand, if the refutation occurs without their meeting, it would follow that the object of refutation would be refuted by both a refutation and a non-refutation. In this way, all the faults flung at the lower schools are accrued by the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

In short, the argument regarding the meeting and non-meeting of causes and results can be applied similarly to the meeting and non-meeting of the refutation and the object of refutation.

To review, the lower schools say that although the Prasangika Madhyamikas fling the faults at others, they are actually accrued by the Prasangika Madhyamikas themselves, whereas the lower schools do not accrue such faults. The lower schools say that the Prasangika Madhyamikas only refute others meaninglessly since the faults are actually accrued only by them. In this way, the Prasangika Madhyamikas' assertion of the lack of inherent existence actually deprecates the existence of all phenomena. This is because the lower schools assert that it is the Prasangika Madhyamikas who have a view that deprecates or a view of annihilation. They say that according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas nothing would exist. In other words, the lower schools say that the faults of asserting inherent existence flung at them by the Prasangika Madhyamikas are actually accrued by the Prasangika Madhyamikas themselves who do not assert inherent existence.

The subject of "spurious arguments" is discussed in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition*. In this text, someone makes an argument to which someone else flings a consequence without a correct proof, but instead with a facsimile of a proof. In the end, the two parties, the lower schools and the Prasangika Madhyamikas, become like politicians who proclaim that they are the best and that the opposition is full of faults!

In short, the main point here is that the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that causes and results are established in mutual dependence due to which they are empty of inherent existence. They ask: "If causes and results are inherently existent, do causes produce their results by meeting or not meeting their results?" They then point out the faults of both their meeting and non-meeting. To this, the lower schools respond asking them: "What about the case of a refutation and its object of refutation, does the refutation refute the object of refutation by meeting or not meeting?" The lower schools say that if they do meet, the refutation and the object of refutation would become one potential due to which the refutation could not refute the object of refutation. On the other hand, if the refutation refutes the object of refutation without meeting, then both those that are refutations and those that are not refutations could refute the object of refutation. They say that the faults are the same as those flung by the Prasangika Madhyamikas at the lower schools regarding the meeting and non-meeting of causes and results.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 392) says:

> Here, regarding the response that refutes inherently existent causes and results, someone [says]: The investigation of meeting and non-meeting in regard to the production of results by causes as explained above is also similar for you. How is that?
>
> *"Do the faults of 'The refutation either refutes through meeting*
> *The object of refutation or without meeting it' not also occur for you?"* [6.171ab]
>
> *Do the faults* of stating "Your *refutation either refutes through meeting the object of refutation* or refutes *without meeting it*" *not also occur for you?* They do. In that case, if [the refutation] were to refute through meeting [the object of refutation], since they would become one, what would refute what? On the other hand, if [the refutation] were to refute without meeting [the object of refutation], since it would be refuted by everything similar without meeting it, that would not be suitable.

However, there also does not exist a third investigation which is other than these two investigations. When considered in this way, since your refutation does not have the ability to refute the object of refutation, your refutation is refuted, whereby, implicitly, also the things that are causes and results are just inherently existent. In order to indicate this, it is said:

"When that is mentioned and only your own position is completely destroyed,
At that time you are unable to refute the object of refutation." [6.171cd]

When that facsimile of a refutation is *mentioned and only your own position is completely destroyed, at that time you are unable to refute the object of refutation*, others' systems.

"With spurious arguments similar to these consequences even in your own words,
Illogically you deprecate all things. Therefore,
You will not be accepted by the holy beings and, because of that,
Due to lacking your own position, you are also a disputant refuting anything." [6.172]

In addition, because of that, *with spurious arguments*, that is, facsimiles of refutations, *similar to the consequences* flung at other opponents in that they are *even in your own*, the opponent's, *words*, *illogically you deprecate all things*. *Therefore, you will not be accepted by the holy beings*. Why is that? What reasoning is there in stating "If it is produced without meeting, it would necessarily be produced by everything that is similar without meeting, however, it is not produced by them"? Just as a magnet attracts iron which abides in a suitable place without meeting it, but does not attract everything not met, and, also the eyes see forms that abide in a suitable place without meeting them, but everything not met is not seen, similarly, even though a cause has also already produced without meeting, it does not produce everything not met, but produces only suitable results.

Furthermore, *because of that*, you would also become a disputant refuting anything because a disputant who is devoid of positing his *own position* and merely eliminates others' positions is called "*a disputant refuting anything*" and you also abide like that.

The argument flung by the lower schools at the Prasangika Madhyamikas is that the Prasangika Madhyamikas would accrue the same faults and give the example of the meeting and non-meeting of a refutation and its object of refutation. The lower schools say that by this argument the Prasangika Madhyamikas' refutation becomes impotent and that their own position that causes and results exist inherently becomes solidified. They say that the Prasangika Madhyamikas' refutation is only a facsimile of a refutation, whereas their own position is correct, and that the Prasangika Madhyamikas' refute themselves and not others' positions. In this way, they say that the Prasangika Madhyamikas deprecate all phenomena and become unacceptable to holy beings.

To illustrate this Lama Tsongkhapa mentions the example of a magnet saying: "Just as a magnet attracts iron which abides in a suitable place without meeting it, but does not attract everything not met, and, also the eyes see forms that abide in a suitable place without meeting them, but everything not met is not seen, similarly, even though a cause has also already produced without meeting, it does not produce everything not met, but produces only suitable results." A magnet attracts iron without meeting or touching it. Likewise, the eyes see forms in a suitable place without meeting or touching them, but this does not imply that everything that is not met is seen. The lower schools say that just as everything not met is not seen, so too a cause produces a result without meeting the result, but it is not that everything that is not met is a result produced by that cause. Only a suitable result is produced.

In conclusion, the lower schools say that the Prasangika Madhyamikas are disputants who are devoid of positing their own position and merely eliminate others' positions, therefore, their reasoning is only a facsimile of reasoning. In the next section the Prasangika Madhyamikas give their reply to the lower schools' argument.

Thursday afternoon, 15 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 393) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B3C-2 Indicating the response that there is no similar fault for us

A The correct way of refuting and establishing for our own position
B Clearly explaining the reason that it is not similar to others' consequences
C Others are unable to establish the contrary like we are able to establish the lack of inherent existence
D The way of making known additional refutations that are not explained here

3B1C-2B3E-2B3C-2A The correct way of refuting and establishing for our own position

1 The way of asserting the refutation of others' positions in conventional terms
2 The way of asserting the establishment of our own position

3B1C-2B3E-2B3C-2A1 The way of asserting the refutation of others' positions in conventional terms

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

I shall explain about this:

This fault already mentioned "Does a refutation refute
That to be refuted without meeting or else through meeting?" would
Occur for he who has a definite position. Since I do not have
This position, this consequence is not possible. [6.173]

This is the Prasangika Madhyamikas' response to the lower schools' argument about the meeting and non-meeting of the refutation and the object of refutation. "A definite position" refers to the lower schools who hold the position asserting inherent existence. Because the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not hold this position, they say the consequence flung by the lower schools does not apply to them. In brief, these faults are accrued by those who assert inherent existence and not by those who assert the lack of inherent existence.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2C3B-1A How the opponents' position is refuted

This fallacy you have stated, that a refutation either
Refutes its object without meeting or on meeting it,
Occurs for those who have the definite position, but as
We do not have this position, this consequence does not arise for us. [6.173]

For us Madhyamikas, this consequence you just stated, "The refutation either refutes the object of refutation without meeting or, on the other hand, refutes it on meeting," does not arise, since these kinds of fallacy become a problem for those with the definite position, asserting inherent existence, but we do not have this position asserting inherent existence.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

There, what was mentioned saying "The spurious argument which equally follows for one's own words," will not follow equally for our own position. Because for our position, the refutation does not refute through meeting that to be refuted, nor does the refutation refute that to be refuted without meeting, because the two – refutation and that to be refuted – are not established inherently. Therefore, do not make contemplation of meeting and not meeting.

As is extensively taught [in the *Middling Prajñaparamita*, 27]:

> [Shariputra]: Venerable Subhuti, will an unproduced attainment be attained due to a produced quality, or will an unproduced attainment be attained due to an unproduced quality?
> Subhuti: Venerable Shariputra, I do not assert unproduced attainment to be attained due to a produced quality, nor assert attainment of the unproduced due to the unproduced.
> Shariputra: Venerable Subhuti, are there no attainments and no clear realizations?
> Subhuti: Venerable Shariputra, indeed attainments exist and clear realizations exist, however, not in a dual mode. Venerable Shariputra, attainments and clear realizations are in the conventions of the world. Stream enterers, once returners, non-returners, arhats, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas are also in the conventions of the world. Ultimately, there are no attainments and no clear realizations.

Here Chandrakirti quotes from sutra in order to support his position. "Attainment" or "acquisition" is an assertion of the Vaibhashikas. They say that acquisition is of the three times. There is a difference between the acquisition and the phenomenon to be acquired. With respect to an unproduced phenomenon to be acquired what acquisitions are there? Subhuti says: "I do not assert unproduced attainment to be attained due to a produced quality, nor assert attainment of the unproduced due to the unproduced." Acquisition, according to the Vaibhashikas, is a substance that acts to bring about the possession of an object to be acquired. Acquisition is of three times: past acquisition, present acquisition, and future acquisition. Each in turn is of three times: past past acquisition, present past acquisition, future past acquisition, and so forth. This subject is discussed in detail in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*. Acquisition is one of the fourteen non-associated compositional factors posited by the Vaibhashikas. Acquisition can be applied to calm abiding, for example, in which case calm abiding is the phenomenon to be acquired and the acquisition of calm abiding is a substance that acts to bring about the possession of the object to be acquired, calm abiding. For example, there is an acquisition of our evening dinner; this acquisition is only a present acquisition, there is no future and past acquisition of our evening dinner because food is an unpredicted phenomenon and, therefore, has small potential. On the other hand, virtuous phenomena have past, present, and future acquisition as do non-virtuous phenomena.

In short, there is no inherently existent past, present, and future acquisition. Acquisition exists but does not exist ultimately. In the conventions of the world, stream enterers, solitary realizers, and so forth exist. Stream enterers are of two types: an approacher to stream enterer and an abider in the result of stream enterer. What is the result of stream enterer? It is the result that is the abandonment of the three thorough entanglements that are to be abandoned by the path of seeing: (i) the acquired view of the transitory collection, (ii) the view holding bad ethics and conduct as supreme, and (iii) afflicted doubt. These three are the main obstacles to the attainment of liberation. Why? Due to the view of the transitory collection one does not wish to attain liberation, due to the view holding bad ethics and conduct as supreme, even though one wishes to attain liberation, one takes a mistaken path, and due to afflicted doubt even though one has entered a path one doubts how to proceed. For example, someone who does not wish to go from Pomaia to Bologna will not go, someone who wishes to go but takes the wrong road will perhaps end up in Rome, and someone who has entered the road but doubts it is right will have difficulty reaching Bologna.

The <u>definition of an approacher to stream enterer</u> is: one who is striving to abandon the three thorough entanglements that are to be abandoned by the path of seeing.
The <u>definition of an abider in the result of stream enterer</u> is: one who has abandoned the three thorough entanglements that are to be abandoned by the path of seeing.
The <u>definition of an approacher to once returner</u> is: one who is striving to abandon most of the five partial concordances with the lower.
The <u>definition of an abider in the result of once returner</u> is: one who has abandoned most of the five partial concordances with the lower.

The is striving to abandon is: one who is striving to abandon all of the five partial concordances with the lower.
The definition of an abider in the result of non-returner is: one who has abandoned all of the five partial concordances with the lower.
The definition of an approacher to foe destroyer is: one who is striving to abandon the five partial concordances with the upper.
The definition of an abider in the result of foe destroyer is: one who has abandoned the five partial concordances with the upper.

There are two types of solitary realizers: rhinoceros-like solitary realizers and congregating solitary realizers. A bodhisattva is a being who has the heroic mind wishing to attain enlightenment for the welfare of all sentient beings.

These different types of attainments are all conventions of the world, but do not exist ultimately.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Here, just as the attaining of attainments due to produced or unproduced qualities is negated because of the consequence of following as dual – and it is accepted as attained in the conventions of the world without investigation because of not reasoning about non-things although dual – similarly, indeed also that to be refuted and the refutation do not meet nor not meet, however it should be understood that "Conventionally the refutation refutes that to be refuted."

Attainments do not exist inherently. Inherently existent attainments and non-attainments are not feasible, but do exist in the conventions of the world when not analyzed. The refutation and the object of refutation are similar. An inherently existent refutation does not refute its object of refutation by meeting or not meeting, while there is no third possibility. There is no meeting and no non-meeting of an inherently existent refutation and object of refutation, but conventionally a refutation and its object of refutation do exist.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 394) says:

> This is expressed [as follows]:
>
> *The fault already mentioned stating "The refutation either refutes without meeting*
> *The object of refutation or else through meeting it," here*
> *Definitely becomes that for whoever has the position,*
> *Whereas, since we do not have this position, this consequence is not possible.*[6.173]
>
> *The fault already mentioned* above *stating "The refutation either refutes without meeting the object of refutation or else* it refutes *through meeting* it," *here becomes that* fault for any opponent *who has the position*, that is, who formulates an ultimate that is inherent existence, *whereas since we do not have the position* that formulates an ultimate that is inherent existence, *the consequence* that indicates fault in both meeting and not meeting *is not possible* for us because, according to us, both the object of refutation and the refutation are asserted to not exist inherently. In the autocommentary, as the reason with respect to others' position above that the fault of investigating meeting and not meeting in regard to a cause producing a result is not similar for us, we set out the assertion that they are like illusions which are not inherently existent in [response] to the opponents' assertion that causes and results are established by way of their own character. Also in this context, the reason that the fault that is flung at others does not occur for us is the lack of inherent existence. Through stating this, the reason that it is not similar for us is that it should be unquestionably asserted that the two positions are not asserted to exist inherently. Because of this, [Nagarjuna's] *Refutation of Objections* says:

> If by us there are some theses,
> Then that fault would exist for us.
> Since we do not have this thesis,
> The fault just does not exist for us.

As is extensively taught in the *Mother of the Conquerors*:

> [SHARIPUTRA]: Venerable Subhuti, is an unproduced attainment attained due to a produced quality or is an unproduced attainment attained by an unproduced quality?
>
> SUBHUTI: Venerable Shariputra, I do not assert that an unproduced attainment is attained due to a produced quality, nor do I assert an unproduced attainment is attained due to the unproduced.
>
> SHARIPUTRA: Venerable Subhuti, are there also no attainments and no clear realizations?
>
> SUBHUTI: Venerable Shariputra, indeed attainments also exist, clear realizations also exist, however, not in a manner of duality. Venerable Shariputra, attainments and clear realizations are worldly conventions. Stream enterers, once returners, non-returners, foe destroyers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas are also worldly conventions. Ultimately, there are no attainments and no clear realizations.

With respect to this, the statement "Nor do I assert an unproduced attainment is attained..." onward [means that] when the imputed objects – the two, the object of attainment and the attainer – are sought they are not found. Therefore, at the time of analyzing in that way, because from the point of view of both positions

- the attainment of the object of attainment is refuted and
- it is not suitable for the object of attainment which is analyzed dualistically to be a non-existent inherently existent thing,

that they are asserted to be attained in worldly conventions without investigation is indicated by stating "indeed attainments also exist, clear realizations also exist, however, not in a manner of duality." "Attainment" is the attainment of the object of attainment and clear realizations. Just as these two are asserted to be conventions without existing ultimately, so too should it be understood that even though the refutation does not ultimately refute the object of refutation, it does refute it conventionally.

If phenomena existed inherently, a thesis would exist inherently due to which it could not be overcome no matter how much it were debated. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that only the lower schools have the consequence "Does a cause produce a result by meeting or not meeting?" because only they assert that causes and results exist inherently. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not accrue this fault since they do not assert causes and results to exist inherently nor do they assert a refutation and its object of refutation to exist inherently. In other words, the Prasangika Madhyamika system does not analyze whether the refutation refutes its object of refutation by meeting or not meeting. Such analysis is only done when searching for the imputed object. When one searches for the imputed object it cannot be found.

In conclusion, attainments and clear realizations exist in the conventions of the world but do not exist ultimately. What kind of objects of attainment exist in the world? There are many, for example, the states of stream enterer, once returner, non-returner, foe destroyer, and so forth. The different types of clear realizations or paths also exist. These are found when not sought by thorough analysis, whereas they are not found when sought by thorough analysis. For example, a table is an object that is visible but when thoroughly analyzed as to which part of the table is the table and so forth it is not found. Why is the table not found by means of thorough analysis? The non-finding of the table upon searching for it is the ascertainment of emptiness. The mere non-affirming negative which is the negation of the object of negation is its emptiness. Due to lacking this understanding, one can come to

think that nothing exists and thereby fall into the extreme of annihilation. On the other hand, if one finds the imputed object upon searching for it and thinks that it exists truly, one falls into the extreme of permanence. The middle way is to not fall into either of these two extremes. One finds the middle way when one understands that although phenomena do not exist inherently they do exist conventionally.

One can search for an object within the conventions of the world and one can search for the imputed object by means of thorough analysis. If one searches for the table in the manner of the conventions of the world it can be found. If one searches for the table by means of thorough analysis as to which part is the table and so forth, the table is not found.

END

Tuesday morning, 20 March 2001

(Masters Program Correspondence Course please note that there were no teachings Monday afternoon, 19 March 2001)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 395) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B3C-2A2 The way of asserting the establishment of our own position

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 183) says:

Furthermore:

Just as you can see the distinctions the solar disc has
Even in a reflection during an eclipse and so forth, though
The sun and the reflection completely meeting and not meeting are
Indeed unreasonable, a mere convention will arise in dependence and [6.174]

Even while untrue, for that to be established – one's face as pretty –
It exists. Likewise similarly here too, from reasoning
Devoid of correctness, which is perceived able to cleanse the wisdom face,
Also that to be established is known to be realized – should be known. [6.175]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 71), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2C3B-1B How our position is established

Know that just as, in times of eclipses and so on, you can see
The variations in the sun's disk even in a reflection,
And though meeting and not meeting of the reflection with the sun
Are incorrect, it arises dependently, as a mere convention; [6.174]

And as, although it's not true, it exists for what is to be established,
The beauty of one's face; likewise here too, from reasonings which
We see are effective in cleaning the face of wisdom, and are devoid
Of admissibility, what is to be established is also realized. [6.175]

In times of eclipses and so on, you can see the variations there are in the sun's disk even relying on a reflection; if you seek the imputed object, the production of the reflection meeting and not meeting the sun, this production is incorrect, but the reflection arises as a mere convention, dependent on the sun; and although a reflection is not true, that reflection is effective for what is to be established, the beauty of one's face. Likewise also in this case of the exemplified meaning, although it does not exist inherently, establishment of our own system is admissible. For you should know that from the reasonings [such as dependent arising[171] and being neither one nor several[172]], which we see are effective in cleaning the face that is wisdom [of its dirt of ignorance], and are devoid of inherently existent admissibility, what is to be established, non-inherent existence, is also realized. [The word "also" (v. 6.175d) means that a refutation devoid of inherently existent admissibility can also refute an object of refutation.]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

[171] *rten 'brel*

[172] *gcig du bral*

> Just as, because a so-called "reflection" does not exist even a little, all conceptions of so-called "production meeting or not meeting the solar disc" are indeed impossible, but when observing a reflection from proximity with the condition, form, the object desired to be realized is definitely produced; likewise, a refutation emptied by inherent nature refutes the object to be refuted and due to reasoning which is emptied by inherent nature and devoid of correctness, that to be established is established. Since also not following as dual, the similar consequence also for our own words is unreasonable. The aforesaid should be understood.
>
> Since wisdom itself is a face – "wisdom face." To cleanse that means total purification by the abandonment of ignorance. "Which is perceived able" concerning that means "perceived as having the capacity for that." Since this propounding as dual is unreasonable for all imputed existents, therefore, the Madhyamikas do not find the opportunity at any time to propound refutation and response in dependence on the dual.
>
> As taught by Aryadeva [in the *Four Hundred Verses*, 16.25]:
>
> Censure cannot be expressed even over a long time to one
> Who has no positions of "existence, non-existence; existence and non-existence."
>
> and similarly in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, 4.8]:
>
> When dispute was made due to emptiness, whatever response is mentioned,
> All of that was not answered – being similar to the object to be established.
>
> By this causes that produce are also to be thoroughly explained.

In dependence on seeing the reflection of the sun in a mirror one says "I see the sun." Likewise, in dependence upon seeing the reflection of one's face in a mirror one says "I see my face." Similarly, in dependence on seeing the reflection of an eclipse in a mirror one says "There is a solar eclipse." Here the question is asked: "Do the sun and the reflection of the sun meet or not?" When we thoroughly search for the imputed object it cannot be found. Does our face and the reflection of our face in a mirror meet or not? When the imputed object is thoroughly sought it is not feasible to find their meeting and non-meeting. However, in terms of the conventions of the world the face and the reflection of the face are related in that in dependence on seeing the reflection we say "I see my face." However, is there an actual face in the mirror? There is not, yet in dependence on the reflection of one's face in a mirror one can clean one's face of dirt, shave one's beard, put on make-up, and so forth. Thus, when not sought, the reflection exists in terms of conventions.

Here the reflection of a face is an analogy for the cleaning of our wisdom face by freeing ourselves from ignorance. In order to remove the dirt of ignorance we have to remove the conception of true existence in dependence on a reason, or sign. What is that reason? There are many, for example, "because of being a dependent-arising," "because of being free from being one and many," and so forth. In short, in order to abandon the conception of a self of phenomena one relies on the diamond sliver reasoning and in order to abandon the conception of a self of persons one relies on the seven-fold reasoning.

In regard to the position asserting inherent existence there is no acceptable reasoning establishing it, that is, it lacks a correct proof. On the other hand, there is a correct proof establishing the lack of inherent existence. In short, the lower schools are without a correct proof establishing inherent existence, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas have a correct proof establishing the lack of inherent existence. When the lower schools fling their refutations at the Prasangika Madhyamikas they cannot defeat them because the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not hold the position of inherent existence. This is because the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert phenomena to be free from inherent existence. This position is feasible and correct and cannot be defeated by any of the lower schools'

refutations. Although the lower schools argue with the Prasangika Madhyamikas and refute them saying that it is not correct that phenomena do not exist inherently, their assertions are not correct. In short, the Prasangika Madhyamikas cannot be invalidated by the lower schools because the reasonings that the lower schools set out in order to prove their thesis are not correct. The theses of the lower schools are held to inherently exist as are their proofs, yet this is incorrect. For example, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas say "A pot, as a subject, exists inherently because it is a dependent-arising." The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is a contradictory sign. For the Svatantrika Madhyamikas dependent-arising is a sign establishing phenomena to be inherently existent. For them if it is not a dependent-arising it is not existent. While both the Prasangika Madhyamikas and Svatantrika Madhyamikas use the word "dependent-arising" its meaning is different for them.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, someone (Bhavaviveka) says: In this *Treatise on the Middle Way*, it is the occasion of the generating cause, not the clarifying [cause or reason]. Also the debate of meeting and not meeting is about the clarifying cause, not about the generating [cause]. Hence, there is no occasion of a spurious argument about our words.
>
> That which makes the aforesaid statement is not an answer, since if expressing a quality along with the opportunity [of others] (i.e., along with expressing the fault of others), like the producer being true for the insufferable other side, there also exists opportunity regarding the clarifying [reason]. Hence that answer is just improper.

The lower schools say that the discussion about meeting and non-meeting is in the context of a clarifying cause, not in the context of a generating cause. What is a clarifying cause and what is a generating cause? A clarifying cause is a reason clarifying a thesis. Some Madhyamikas, that is, Bhavaviveka in particular, say that the discussion of the meeting and non-meeting of the sun and its reflection is in the context of a clarifying cause, not a generating cause. However, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is not correct.

In short, Bhavaviveka thinks that a clarifying cause is a reason, it is a clarifying cause in that it clarifies the thesis. He says that the meeting or non-meeting of the sun and its reflection and the meeting and non-meeting of a face and its reflection are in terms of a clarifying cause. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that this is not correct because the faults of meeting and non-meeting that apply to a generating cause also apply to a clarifying cause. Thus, if one analyzes them it comes down to the same thing.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore, [Bhavaviveka], in order to establish the asserted meaning of the *Treatise*, acts to propound answers that set forth spurious arguments concerning the refuters of the fully upheld proof. Therefore, this is only an object to be refuted by others – only the response given by us is very beautiful.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that their own responses are the most beautiful.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 395-6) says:

> *It is just how you see the attributes that exist in the sun's orb*
> *At the time of an eclipse and so forth even in a reflection, yet*
> *The thorough meeting and non-meeting of the sun and the reflection being*

Indeed inappropriate, it arises as a mere convention in dependence. [6.174]

Furthermore, *it is just how* – that is, for example – *you see the attributes that exist in the sun's orb* and a face *at the time of* a solar *eclipse and so forth* in dependence *even on* seeing *their reflections*. *Yet*, when they are analyzed in a manner of seeking the imputed object stating "The two – (i) *the sun* and the face and (ii) their *reflections* – are produced through *thoroughly meeting or not meeting*," that production *is indeed inappropriate*. Nonetheless, the reflection *arises* through *mere*ly being posited by the force of *conventions in dependence* on the sun or a face.

And, even while untrue, just as it exists for what is to be established –
One's face as beautiful, similarly, also here it should be understood
"What is to be established is realized even through reasons lacking feasibility
That are seen to be effective in cleaning the face of wisdom,." [6.175]

And, also due to that, *even while* the desired object that is ascertained and the reflection are *untrue*, *just as* a reflection is effective *for what is to be established – one's face as beautiful, similarly, also here it should be understood that what is to be established* – the lack of inherent existence – *is realized through the reasons of* dependent-arising, freedom from being one and many, and so forth, *which are seen to be effective in cleaning* the stains, the ignorance, of the *face*-like *wisdom*. Moreover, they are reasons *lacking the feasibility* of being established as inherently existent. By the term "*even*" (v. 6.175c) it should be understood that even a refutation that lacks inherently existent feasibility is able to refute the object of refutation.

Therefore, because it is not suitable for those who propound the imputed existence of mere nominalities to propound the duality of seeking the imputed object, the Madhyamikas never find the opportunity to express a refutation and response in dependence on duality. [Aryadeva's] *Four Hundred Stanzas* says:

Censure cannot be expressed
Even over a long time to one
Who does not have a position of either
"Existence, non-existence, or existence–non-existence."

[Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 4.8) also says:

When disputing about emptiness,
Whoever gives a response
Does not respond at all,
This being similar to what is to be established.

By means of this presentation of the analysis of whether the refutation and the object of refutation meet or do not meet, it should be understood as also negated through analyzing whether a cause that is a producer and its result meet or do not meet.

The discussion of the meeting and non-meeting of the sun and its reflection is only in terms of the conventions of the world. On the other hand, if the imputed object is thoroughly sought, it is not found. In worldly conventions, in dependence on the reflection of the sun one can say "I see the sun." Likewise, in dependence on the reflection of one's face in a mirror, one can say "My face is dirty" and thereby clean one's face of the dirt. Similarly, in dependence on the reflection of solar eclipse, we can say "There is a solar eclipse." However, do the face and the reflection of the face in the mirror meet or not meet? Do the face and the mirror itself meet or not meet? Does 'meeting' mean touching? In short, when the imputed object is thoroughly sought in this way it is not found. For example, when someone meets the president is their shaking of hands the meaning of 'meeting'? When this meeting is thoroughly sought by this analysis it is not found, yet it is acceptable as a mere worldly convention.

Here there is also a discussion of the refutation and the object of refutation asking whether the refutation and the object of refutation meet or not. Similarly, do the producer and the produced meet or not? The purpose of this analysis is to negate inherent existence. The conclusion is that meeting and non-meeting are acceptable when not investigated and not analyzed.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 397) says:

In regard to this Bhavaviveka says:

> In the *Treatise on the Middle Way* the context is that of a cause that produces, not that of a cause that clarifies. The analysis of meeting and not meeting is also in regard to a cause that clarifies, it is not in regard to a cause that produces; therefore, our words are not the source of spurious argument.

With respect to a cause that produces, [Bhavaviveka's] propounding "Reasons and so forth – causes that clarify or make known – do not withstand the analysis that analyzes meeting and non-meeting" is not a response because, when giving a response that has an occasion for others – that is, that expresses a fault – the opponents cannot bear it. However, just as a fault is accrued when asserting the truth in regard to [a cause] that produces, there is also that fault when asserting inherent existence in regard to a cause that clarifies. Moreover, Bhavaviveka, with respect to the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, as a proof that is set out in order to establish the meaning of the thesis, the lack of inherent existence, gives a response that is a spurious argument in order to abandon the faults of the refutations set out by others, whereby [his response] is only to be refuted by others. Therefore, when inherent existence is asserted, our response alone – "Although the faults of meeting and non-meeting in regard to both causes that produce and those that clarify are similar, because of not asserting [inherent existence] there is no fault" – is the most beautiful.

Bhavaviveka sets out two types of causes: (i) a cause that clarifies and (ii) a cause that produces. He says that the discussion here is in terms of the meeting and non-meeting of a cause that clarifies and the result that is clarified. He says that one should not analyze whether a cause that produces and the result that is produced meet or not as this would be a spurious argument. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas that the faults accrued are the same whether the discussion is in terms of (i) a cause that clarifies and a result that is clarified or (ii) a cause that produces and a result that is produced. That is, asserting either of these sets to be inherently existent has the same harm. Thus, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that their own responses are the best and that asserting (i) a refutation and its object of refutation to be inherently existent, (ii) a cause that produces and its result that is produced to be inherently existent, and (iii) a cause that clarifies and its result that is clarified to be inherently existent, are all incorrect. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the meeting and non-meeting of the refutation and the object of refutation should not be asserted to be inherently existent, nor should the meeting and non-meeting of a cause that produces and the result that is produced, and the meeting and non-meeting of a cause that clarifies and the result that is clarified. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that because they do not assert this they themselves do not have the corresponding faults and that their own response is the best because they do not assert inherent existence.

Student: What is the difference between a cause that clarifies and a cause that produces?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: A cause that clarifies is a reason that clarifies a thesis, whereas a cause that produces is one that produces a result. In this case, the name 'cause" is given to a reason. In general, a cause is a producer. However, a cause that clarifies – a reason – produces understanding in one's continuum, that is, it produces an inference, due to which it is called "a cause that clarifies."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 397) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2B3C-2B Clearly explaining the reason that it is not similar to others' consequences

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:

If the reason making one's object of proof understood existed as a thing,
And the entity of that to be proved: actually understood, also existed,
The reasoning of meeting and so forth would closely apply, yet
Since that too does not exist, it is solely your despair. [6.176]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2C3B-2 Reason that the opponent's consequence is not similar

If the reasoning making understood one's object of proof existed
As a thing, and the entity of the object of proof to be actually grasped
Also existed, the logic of meeting and not meeting would apply.
As that also does not exist, this is only depressing for you. [6.176]

You should understand that this ascription to the pure side of the fault we ascribed to the impure side is only depressing for you proponents of true existence; for if the thing [or entity] of the reasoning which makes one's object of proof understood existed inherently, and the entity of the object of proof which is what is actually to be understood existed inherently also, then the argument of cause and effect meeting, etc., would apply; but that [inherent existence] also does not exist.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Setting the faults of the totally impure position upon the totally pure position, you are realized as being only uselessly frustrated about us.

Whatever reason the proponents of true existence set out regarding their thesis of inherent existence, they say that that reason itself exists inherently. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the lower schools that because the reasons that they set out exist inherently it is only for them to despair. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they are on the pure side, whereas the lower schools are on the impure side.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> For example, refutation of the oneness, many-ness, long-ness, roundness, blackness and so forth, of the falling hairs and so forth observed by one with cataracts, does not harm those without cataracts; similarly, when completely analyzing non-inherently existing cause and effect, you also do no harm by setting forth the refutation through fully upholding the two.

For the Prasangika Madhyamikas causes and results do not exist inherently, whereas for them it is feasible for a non-inherently existent cause to produce a non-inherently existent result. On the other hand, the lower schools hold that an inherently existent cause produces an inherently existent result and set out reasonings to prove this, however, these do not affect the Prasangika Madhyamikas. This is likened to the fact that although those with cataracts see falling hair, this does not harm those without cataracts who do not see falling hair. The Prasangika Madhyamikas are like those without cataracts who are not affected by whatever is said by those with cataracts with respect to falling hairs.

Our eyes see forms without the eyes and the form touching. On the other hand, when form touches our eyes, for example, when an eye medicine is applied to our eyes, that eye medicine is not seen. If the eye medicine is held in front of our eyes it is seen, but it is not seen when actually applied to the

eyes. This show that a form is seen by the eyes without the eyes and the form touching. In this context, "to meet" means "to touch."

In the case of a magnet, it attracts iron just by being close to it, without meeting or touching it. The conclusion is that although there is meeting and non-meeting, there is no inherent meeting and inherent non-meeting.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, even those examples which were presented as one's doing an action without meeting – eye, magnet, and so forth – should be understood as negated, because of the similar consequence also for them. You – who, having forsaken the straight path of non-inherent existence, joined the very twisted path of bad speculation by the bad labor of one's conceptualization – delight in negating the correct path. What will this very great difficulty do for you?

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the lower schools that they should not stubbornly maintain their position. Although the lower schools insist that their position is correct, the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not change their own position.

Tuesday afternoon, 20 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 397) says:

> *If the thingness of the reason – that which causes understanding of one's object to be proved – were established, and*
> *Also the entity of what is to be proved – that which is to be actually understood – existed,*
> *The reasoning of meeting and so forth would be thoroughly applicable.*
> *However, since that too does not exist, it is only to your despair.* [6.176]

If the thingness, that is, the entity, *of the reason – that which causes understanding of one's object to be proved* – and *the entity of what is to be proved – that which is to be actually understood – existed* inherently, *the reasoning* that establishes and repudiates in regard to the *meeting and so forth* – that is, the non-meeting – of what is to be proved and the proof *would be thoroughly applicable*. *However*, *since that too does not exist* inherently, the fault set out regarding the impure position – that set out by you in regard to the pure position – is realized, *only* to [*your*] *despair*, that is, depression, to be meaningless for us. For example, refuting the positions of the one-ness, many-ness, round-ness, black-ness, and so forth of the falling hair and so forth that are observed by those with cataracts does not harm those who do not have cataracts. Similarly, when analyzing non-inherently existent causes and results, you do not harm us by setting out a refutation through taking into consideration the analysis of the two, [the meeting and non-meeting,] which seeks the imputed object. Because of just that, it should be understood that also the examples that you presented regarding the respective activities without meeting – such as an eye, a magnet, and so forth – are refuted, because when inherent existence is asserted also the consequences of meeting and not meeting with regard to them are similar. You who, having forsaken the straight path of the lack of inherent existence, joined the very crooked path of bad logic due to the bad fabrications of your own conceptions delight in refuting the correct path. What does this extremely, that is, very, great difficulty do for you?

The lower schools posit an inherently existent reason to prove an inherently existent thesis. Thus, whatever reason they set out it is inherently existent, as is the thesis. For the lower schools because the thesis is established by a valid cognizer it exists, as does the reason. They accept that, in dependence on a reason, an inference is generated with respect to that thesis and because that reason exists it exists inherently. In this context the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask them whether the refutation and the object of refutation meet or not. Other examples of meeting and not meeting are one who understands

and what is to be understood, the producer and the produced, the clarifier and the clarified, and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "You who, having forsaken the straight path of the lack of inherent existence, joined the very crooked path of bad logic due to the bad fabrications of your own conceptions delight in refuting the correct path." Because the lower schools join a crooked path they experience many obstacles, just as when we take a road that is not straight we may get lost and have difficulty arriving at our destination.

Those with cataracts have the fault of see falling hairs, whereas those without them do not. Those who assert inherently existent causes and results are like those with cataracts who have many faults, whereas those who assert causes and results to not be inherently existent are like those without cataracts who do not have those faults.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 398) says:

3B1C-2B3E-2B3C-2C Others are unable to establish the contrary like we are able to establish the lack of inherent existence

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Furthermore:

Just as the ability to bring about realizing all things as non-things
Is very easy, one is not able to make others comprehend
Inherent existence as easily as that.
Why entrust the world to this with nets of bad speculation? [6.177]

Just as [the Madhyamika] is able to bring about the realization of things of the world as non-inherently existent with only the examples which establish our own position, dreams, illusions, and so forth – it is not as easy as that for someone to bring about the apprehension of things as having inherent nature because there is no example renowned to both. Being thus, all disputes are reversed by us, even a reply cannot be expressed by anyone.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2C3B-3 Non-inherent existence can be established, but its denial cannot be established

Being able to induce the insight that all things don't exist as things
Is very easy, but for others inherent existence is not
Possible to get to understand easily like that. [6.177abc]

You should understand that while it is very easy [for us Madhyamikas] to be able to induce the understanding that no things exist inherently as things, [by examples such as an illusion or a dream, established for both us and the adversary,] it is not readily possible like that to make others – Madhyamikas – understand that they do exist inherently, for there is no example of true existence that both acknowledge.

Why are you made to do this to the world, with the net of an evil system? [6.177d]

As for you proponents of true existence, who made you do this? Why do you bind the world in the net of an evil system? It follows you should not, for this disputation grasping at true existence is to be cast out.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas it is easy to make someone understand the lack of inherent existence of phenomena, whereas the lower schools cannot do the same, that is, they cannot cause someone to understand that phenomena exist inherently because there is no example that

establishes inherent existence. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas can easily posit an example proving the lack of inherent existence, such as dreams, illusions, and so forth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, who urged you on in order to do what is not beneficial for the world? And, in addition to the world being enveloped by the cocoon of its own conceptions like the silk-worm of the afflictions, why did you set for all mothers a very troublesome trap spread with the threads of bad speculation? This dispute must be given up.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas ask the lower schools who urged them to establish that things exist inherently? The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that no matter how much the lower schools strive to establish inherent existence the Prasangika Madhyamikas' position cannot be defeated. While the Prasangika Madhyamikas have correct examples establishing that phenomena do not exist inherently, the lower schools cannot posit correct examples establishing that phenomena exist inherently. Thus, whatever arguments the lower schools fling at the Prasangika Madhyamikas, the Prasangika Madhyamikas are able to respond and thereby defeat the lower schools' arguments. On the other hand, when the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond to the lower schools, the lower schools are left without responses because the Prasangika Madhyamikas respond in accordance with the conventions of the world, while the lower schools do not. For this reason the lower schools are said to be enveloped in the cocoon of their afflictions and wrong conceptions and wrapped in the threads of bad speculation. In short, the lower schools are entrapped by the afflictions as well as by the acquired conceptions. Therefore, the lower schools should give up their argument with the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> All those reflection-like things have no specific characteristics and no general characteristics. What direct perception or even inference is there? Here, that is exhausted in only a single direct perception, the exalted wisdom which knows all [things] whatsoever.

In brief, that which knows the exact mode of abidance of all phenomena is only an exalted knower of all aspects. A direct perceiver knows some phenomena, as does inference but they do not know all things in the same way that an exalted knower of all aspects knows them. In other words, the fact that phenomena are like reflections is known by a direct perceiver and an inferential cognizer, but the very best knower is an exalted knower of modes in that only omniscient mind directly knows the two truths simultaneously and nakedly. Direct perceivers and inferential cognizers do not know the mode of abidance of the two truths directly, only an exalted knower of all aspects knows this. Is there an inferential cognizer that knows the two truths simultaneously? One passage says that such an inferential cognizer is the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise realizing emptiness by way of a meaning generality. Is that exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of the path of preparation an inferential cognizer or a direct perceiver? The response depends on the school; for the Prasangika Madhyamikas a direct perceiver can be conceptual, whereas for the Svatantrika Madhyamikas a direct perceiver is pervaded by being free from conceptuality and unmistaken. The section on the path of preparation in Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *General Meaning* sets out the question: Which of the seven awarenesses is the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of the path of preparation that realizes emptiness by means of a meaning generality? The response is that it is not a wrong consciousness, nor an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained, nor a correct assumption, nor doubt.

Why is it not an inferential cognizer? It is not because it is not a wisdom arisen from hearing nor is it a wisdom arisen from reflection, it is a wisdom arisen from meditation. It is not a wisdom arisen from hearing because this exalted wisdom is not produced in dependence on a correct reason for the purpose of others. It is not a wisdom arisen from thinking because it is not produced in dependence on a correct reason for one's own purpose. Therefore, this exalted wisdom can only be a subsequent cognizer.

In general, a subsequent cognizer is an awareness realizing that which has already been realized. The debate here is that if the exalted wisdom of the path of preparation is a subsequent cognizer what was the previous realizer? Was the subsequent cognizer induced by a direct perceiver or was it induced by an inferential cognizer?

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 398) says:

> *One can easily induce the realization that all things*
> *Do not exist as thingness, but one cannot easily make others*
> *Understand inherent existence in the same way.* [6.177abc]
>
> Furthermore, by means of examples – mirages, dreams, and so forth – which are established for the opponents as well as for our own position, the Madhyamikas *can easily induce the realization that all* the *things* of the opponents' world *do not exist as thingness* – that is, as inherently existent. However, *one cannot easily make* those who are *other* than the opponents, that is, the Madhyamikas, *understand in the same way* that things *inherently exist* because there are no examples of true existence that are renowned to both.

The Prasangika Madhyamikas set out examples proving the lack of inherent existence. It is easy to prove this to an opponent by means of examples such as that of an illusion. On the other hand, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas have difficulty making others understand that phenomena are inherently existent "because there are no examples of true existence that are renowned to both."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 399) says:

> Hence, it is taught that the lack of true existence is not ascertained by a valid cognizer with respect to a subject without ascertaining, in regard to a concordant example, that the reason – such as dependent-arising – in the proof of the lack of true existence is pervaded by the lack of true existence.

For example, the syllogism: sound, as the subject, is impermanent because of being a product, for example, a pot. On the basis of the example "pot" one first realizes that a product is pervaded by impermanence. Then one ascertains the pervasion "product is pervaded by impermanence" on the basis of the subject "sound." It is similar in the case of the syllogism: external and internal phenomena, as the subject, do not exist inherently because they are dependent-arisings, for example, like a reflection. According to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system the pervasion can be ascertained on the basis of a concordant example, meaning that dependent-arisings can be ascertained to be pervaded by being inherently existent on the basis of a concordant example. However, because the Svatantrika Madhyamikas cannot posit a correct example of inherent existence, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that such a pervasion cannot be ascertained on the basis of a concordant example. In the same way, such a pervasion cannot be ascertained with respect to the subject, external and internal phenomena. In other words, when the lower schools set out to prove inherent existence they cannot posit a correct example of true existence that is common to both themselves and the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 399) says:

> Therefore, we eliminate all the arguments of the proponents of true existence, whereas a response with concordant qualities cannot even be expressed by anyone.
>
> *Why are you appointed to do this to the world with the net of bad speculation?*[6.177d]
>
> Because of that, who *appointed* – that is, instigated – you *to that* in order to inflict meaningless harm on *the world*? And, in addition to you worldly beings being enveloped by the cocoon of your own afflictions – your own conceptions – like a silk-worm, *why* did you set the very troublesome *net*, or the trap, of the entwined threads *of bad speculation* for all your mothers? The argument conceiving true existence must be discarded. What inherently existent specific and general characteristics, direct perception or inference, do all the falsities that are reflection-like things have? Here, that is extinguished with respect to just a single direct perceiver of all objects of knowledge – the exalted wisdom of omniscient beings.

When the Prasangika Madhyamikas refute the lower schools, the lower schools cannot give a correct response. In addition, to being enveloped in the afflictions, the lower schools are also entrapped by the acquired conceptions of true existence. Thus, the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that they should give up their argument.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "What inherently existent specific and general characteristics, direct perception or inference, do all the falsities that are reflection-like things have?" There are no inherently existent specific and general characteristics, nor is there inherently existent direct perception or inference. Chandrakirti says: "All those reflection-like things have no specific characteristics and no general characteristics. What direct perception and even inference is there?"

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 399) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-2B3C-2D The way of making known additional refutations that are not explained here

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Furthermore:
>
> *The additional refutation also indicated above, having been known,*
> *Should be given up here for sake of response of the position: meeting, etc.*
> *Also, just as quibblers do not exist,*
> *The additions explained before should be realized by this very position.* [6.178]
>
> Having known the additional refutations from those very explanations which refuted the others' position: the presentation of dependent arising and the presentation of dependent imputation, one should give up the refutation concerning that propounded by some as the response of the refutation which stated: "Does the cause produce an effect through meeting or not meeting?"
>
> [The negations] in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*] are asserted to express the reversal of conceptions. Because that too was already indicated by us, how could there be quibblers? On account of what does this constructed definition become a correct definition? Who posited their own position and overcame the position of others? Therefore, this definition of quibbling is an all ways improper. Like that and so forth, the additional refutations are to be realized by this very position.
>
> There, starting from [verse 6.8a] "That itself does not arise from that," until [verse 6.119d] "If completely analyzed, will be quickly liberated;" by these, the selflessness of phenomena is made highly evident.
>
> From [verse 6.120ab] "Delusions and faults without exception arise from the view of the transitory collection," and below this, the selflessness of persons is made evident.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5A-2C3B-4 How to understand the extra refutations not explained here

You should understand the extra refutation explained above,
And reject what's here as the answer of the position of meeting or otherwise.
We are not disputants who refute everything like that.
By this position, the extra explained before should be understood. [6.178]

You should understand that the extra refutation stated to proponents of true existence [besides dependent arising, e.g. of a sprout, and dependent imputation, e.g. of a person], the refutation of cause and effect meeting or not meeting, explained above, is also to be understood; and the answer not similar to our own in this debate, involving meeting or not meeting as regards the refutation for the sake of [stating] the position refuted in the analysis of the meeting or otherwise of cause and effect, is to be abandoned. For to the position asserting non-inherent existence, analysis seeking imputed objects does not apply.

The Madhyamikas are also not disputants who refute whatever they come upon like that, for we do not accept the assertions either that our own position is not posited conventionally, or that the refutation of the opponent's position is ultimate.

With this same position explained just now there is a point, for it is so that the extra refutation so explained before should be understood.

The selflessness of phenomena and the selflessness of persons have been explained and their meanings have been settled. The meaning of the selflessness of phenomena is settled by verses 6.8 through 6.119, whereas the meaning of the selflessness of persons is settled by verses 6.120 through 6.178.

The analysis of meeting and non-meeting can be applied to any kind of phenomenon. True existence or inherent existence does not exist upon any basis, whether persons or phenomena. The main reason proving the selflessness of phenomena is the diamond slivers reasoning, whereas the main reason establishing the selflessness of persons is the seven-fold reasoning. In the context of establishing the selflessness of persons, there is a section in the text that establishes that the I does not exist inherently and another section that establishes that the mine does not exist inherently.

Wednesday morning, 21 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 399) says:

Having also understood the additional refutation indicated above,
Here give it up for the sake of the response of the position of meeting and so forth. [6.178ab]

In the context of the presentations of

- dependent and related arising, such as a sprout being produced in dependence on a seed, and
- dependent imputation, such as the person being imputed in dependence on the aggregates,

one should also understand the additional refutation explained in regard to the position of the proponents of true existence – the refutation *indicated above* stating "Do causes produce results by their meeting or not meeting?" *Having* done so, *for the sake of* expressing *the response of the position* that investigates, or refutes, this stating "A cause produces a result through *meeting and so forth*, that is, through not meeting," *here*, when arguing with the opponents who propound through investigating meeting and non-meeting in regard to refutations, *one should give up* the refutation which is the response that the investigation of that is not like our own, in that the presentation above is to be understood as a mere illustration.

In brief, the presentation of dependent and related arising presents the selflessness of phenomena and the presentation of dependent imputation presents the selflessness of persons. The presentation of the selflessness of phenomena encompasses the refutation of production from the four extremes: that a sprout arises from self, from other, from both, and without causes. This is discussed in verses 6.8-119. If a sprout were produced from self it would follow that its production would be endless and meaningless. If a sprout were produced from other it would follow that everything would arise from everything, for example, dense darkness would be produced from a fire flame. In short, things would arise from both causes and non-causes. If things were produced from both there would be both the consequences related to production from self and those related to production from other. Production from self is mainly asserted by the Samkhyas, whereas production from other is asserted by the lower schools, from the Svatantrika Madhyamika downward. Production from both is asserted by the Nirgranthas, and causeless production is asserted by the Charvakas.

Thus, a self of phenomena is refuted by means of refuting production from the four extremes, meanwhile a sprout is established to be a dependent-arising.

The selflessness of persons is established by means of the analysis of the self in terms of it being neither one or different from the aggregates, due to which the person is established to be merely imputed upon the aggregates.

When the lower schools assert inherent existence, the Prasangika Madhyamikas ask them: "If they exist inherently do causes produce results through their meeting or non-meeting?" If a cause produces a result through meeting it follows that they would become one. On the other hand, if a cause produces a result without meeting it follows that everything would be produced from everything, that is, it follows that a result would be produced by a non-cause which is not a suitable potential for it. When the imputed object, the relationship between cause and result, is sought by means of thorough analysis there are these faults. On the other hand, the Prasangika Madhyamikas posit the relationship between causes and results without investigation and analysis, but posit it in terms of the conventions of the world.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 400) says:

> The purpose of the negation and presentation in the treatise, *Fundamental Wisdom*, is the desire to express the elimination of the conceptions conceiving true existence. Moreover, because this was already indicated in the context of our stating "Ordinary beings are bound by conception" and so forth, how could the treatise be "a disputant who refutes anything"? This is because a disputant who refutes anything is one who, through fearing the occurrence of faults when presenting his own position, refutes others' positions. Here, also our elimination of others' position does not exist ultimately because nothing whatsoever exists ultimately. Therefore, how can we be disputants who refute anything? For that reason, "one having the characteristic of not having his own position to posit and asserting the elimination of others' positions ultimately" becomes the correct definition of "a disputant refuting anything."
>
> *We are also not like such disputants refuting anything.*
> *The additional, as explained previously, should be realized by means of this very position.*
> [6.178cd]
>
> Since there does not exist a Madhyamika (i) who does not posit our position nominally and (ii) who asserts the elimination of others' positions ultimately, the Madhyamikas *are also not disputants who refute anything*, therefore, this is not suitable in all ways. The *additional* refutation, *as explained previously*, *is to be realized by means of this very position* that was just explained.
>
> [The verses] beginning from "That itself does not arise from that" (v. 6.8a) through "Those who completely analyze will quickly be liberated" (v. 6.119d) clarify the selflessness of phenomena. [The verses] from "Having seen with intelligence that afflictions and faults without exception arise from the view" (v. 6.120ab) onward clarify the selflessness of persons.

The purpose of the presentation in Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* is to eliminate the conception of true existence in the continua of sentient beings. Sentient beings are bound by the conception of true existence due to which they circle cyclic existence, in order to for them to become free Nagarjuna presented emptiness by way of negating others' systems and presenting his own system. Therefore, the reason Nagarjuna presented emptiness was to free sentient beings from the bondage of the conception of true existence; he did not do so for the sake of argument. In brief, Nagarjuna's purpose in presenting emptiness by way of negating others' systems and presenting his own system was to eliminate the conception of true existence and not for the sake of argument. The same is true of Chandrakirti's presentation. Chandrakirti composed his commentary *Clear Words* on Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* as a word commentary (a commentary explaining the words) and composed his *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* as a meaning commentary (a commentary explaining the meaning). Thus, the purpose for us to listen to and reflect on Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* and Chandrakirti's *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* is to become free from the conception of a self. A passage in one text says: "Hearing is a lamp dispelling the darkness of ignorance. Such wealth can never be stolen away by any thief." However, our wealth of hearing can be stolen away by the thief of forgetfulness. It is recounted that when a yeti catches a marmot it sits on it in order to hold on to it, but that when he reaches out to catch another marmot, he rises up slightly whereby the first marmot caught escapes. In this way, even though the yeti may catch as many as ten marmots he is only left with the last one caught. It is said that some people study in the same way in that as they progress from one section of a text to another they forget the previous and therefore only remember the last section studied. In fact, there is the Tibetan expression "Do not study in the way in which a yeti catches marmots."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 400) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3 Explaining the divisions of the emptiness so established

A Brief presentation of the divisions of emptiness
B Extensive explanation of the meanings of the individual divisions

3B1C-2B3E-3A Brief presentation of the divisions of emptiness

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Therefore, through desire to indicate this and express the fine divisions of emptiness, it is explained:

This non-self, in order to completely liberate migrators,
Is taught two ways: by divisions of phenomena and persons. [6.179ab]

This selflessness is taught is two aspects through condensation: the selflessness of phenomena and the selflessness of persons.

Yet if asked: "Why were two kinds of selflessness finely indicated?"

I shall explain. "In order to completely liberate migrators" – this two-fold selflessness was finely indicated by the Bhagavan for the aim of completely liberating migrators. There, the selflessness of persons was indicated in order to completely liberate the solitary realizers and hearers; in order to completely liberate the bodhisattvas, since they attain the exalted knower of all aspects itself, both were indicated. Although hearers and solitary realizers indeed perceive dependent arising of merely this much condition, nonetheless, they have not totally completed meditation on the selflessness of phenomena; they have a mere method to abandon [the seeds of] afflictions experienced in the three realms. They are presented as having meditation on the entire selflessness of persons.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5B-1 The divisions of emptiness, in brief

In order to liberate beings, this non-self is taught in
Two ways, classed as dharmas and the person. [6.179ab]

The teaching of two kinds of this non-self, divided into dharmas (phenomena) and the personality, is necessary, for it is to liberate sentient beings from cyclic existence.

All kinds of emptiness can be condensed into two:
1. the selflessness of persons and
2. the selflessness of phenomena.

The purpose for the Bhagavan to teach these two emptinesses was in order to liberate sentient beings. The Bhagavan taught the selflessness of persons in order to free sentient beings from the conception of a self which is an afflictive obstruction, and taught the selflessness of phenomena in order to free sentient beings from the knowledge obstructions. Thus, the two types of selflessnesses are taught in order to abandon the two types of obstructions. The conception of a self of persons is to conceive the person to exist inherently, whereas the conception of a self of phenomena is to conceive any phenomenon other than the person to exist inherently. These two emptinesses are therefore related to the basis of negation in that the emptiness of the person existing inherently is the selflessness of persons and the emptiness of phenomena existing inherently is the selflessness of phenomena. Which of the two selflessnesses is easiest to realize? It is said to be easier to realize the emptiness of the self of persons due to the difference in the basis of negation. Through realizing that the person depends on the aggregates, one approaches the realization of the selflessness of persons. This is the way in which the realization of the two selflessnesses are presented in terms of experience.

The purpose of presenting the two selflessnesses, in short, is to liberate sentient beings from cyclic existence. The selflessness of persons is presented in order to free hearers and solitary realizers from the afflictive obstructions, while the selflessness of phenomena is presented in order to free bodhisattvas from the knowledge obstructions that prevent the simultaneous cognition of all phenomena.

Hearers and solitary realizers meditate on the selflessness of persons in a complete way but do not meditate on the selflessness of phenomena in a complete way. Why is this? Do they not directly realize the selflessness of phenomena? They do, in that earlier in the *Supplement* it was said that hearers and solitary realizers are also pervaded by having the realization of the selflessness of phenomena. Since hearers and solitary realizers do meditate on and realize the selflessness of phenomena how is it that they do not meditate in a complete way?

Student: It is because they do not meditate by means of many reasonings on the selflessness of phenomena.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What do you think?

Student 2: It was said that hearers and solitary realizers do not have a sufficient collection of merit to complete the meditation on the selflessness of phenomena in that they lack the mind of enlightenment.

Student 3: The motivation would be a factor because they do not have the motivation to teach emptiness and liberate many sentient beings.

Student 4: Hearers and solitary realizers do not have a complete meditation on the selflessness of phenomena because they only want to attain liberation and this is not necessary for that, it is only necessary in order to attain complete enlightenment.

Student 5: Hearers and solitary realizers do not need to abandon the knowledge obstructions therefore they do not have this complete meditation.

In short, the hearers and solitary realizers do not have a complete cultivation of the selflessness of phenomena which is needed to abandon the knowledge obstructions but have a complete cultivation of the selflessness of persons which is needed to abandon the afflictive obstructions.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Thus, the teacher taught this itself yet again,*
> *In many ways, divided for those to be subdued.* [6.179cd]

The second selflessness was again indicated by the Bhagavan as many, due to the various inclinations of those to he subdued. There,

> *With elaboration, having explained sixteen*
> *Emptinesses, yet again condensed,*
> *Explained as four. They are*
> *Also asserted as the great vehicle.* [6.180]

It is taught [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:[173]

Subhuti, moreover, the great vehicle of the bodhisattva is like this:

1. inner emptiness,
2. outer emptiness,
3. outer and inner emptiness,
4. emptiness of emptiness,
5. emptiness of the great,
6. ultimate emptiness,
7. compounded emptiness,
8. uncompounded emptiness,
9. emptiness passed beyond extremes,
10. emptiness without beginning or end,
11. unrejectable emptiness,
12. natural emptiness,
13. emptiness of all phenomena,
14. emptiness of one's definition,
15. emptiness of the not observed,
16. emptiness of the entitiness of non-things.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Likewise, the Master taught the same again,*
> *Divided in many types, for those to be tamed.* [6.179cd]
>
> *In expanded form, he explained*
> *Sixteen emptinesses. Condensed*
> *Into four he explained them again.*
> *Also he stated they were the great vehicle.* [6.180]

[173] See Conze, p. 144

It should be understood that the Master taught the same emptiness like that again to those to be tamed, divided into many types; for in expanded form, he explained sixteen emptinesses, then he explained them again condensed into four emptinesses, and he also stated they were the great vehicle.[174]

The Buddha taught selflessness in many way according to the thoughts of sentient beings. For this reason, he explained sixteen emptinesses and then later on taught four emptinesses, for a total of twenty emptinesses. Here Chandrakirti quotes the Buddha's teaching in the *Middling Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*. In brief, the sixteen emptinesses are:
(1) The emptiness of the internal, 'internal' refers to the sense powers.
(2) The emptiness of the external, 'external' refers to the objects of the sense powers, forms, sounds, and so forth.
(3) The emptiness of the external and internal, 'the external and internal' refers to the five loci of the sense powers, for example, the eye ball which is external relative to the eye sense power and internal relative to external phenomena, or is internal due to being conjoined with feelings.
(4) The emptiness of emptiness, 'emptiness' is the basis of emptiness, it too is empty of inherent existence.
(5) The emptiness of the great, 'the great' refers to the ten directions which are empty of inherent existence.
(6) The emptiness of the ultimate, 'the ultimate' is ultimate truth or the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise.
(7) The emptiness of the compounded, 'the compounded' are phenomena produced from their respective causes and conditions, they are empty of inherent existence.
(8) The emptiness of the uncompounded, 'the uncompounded' are phenomena that are not produced by their respective causes and conditions, these too are empty of inherent existence.
(9) The emptiness of that passed beyond extremes, 'extremes' refers to the extreme of permanence and the extreme of annihilation.
(10) The emptiness of the beginningless and endless, 'the beginningless and endless' is cyclic existence, which is empty of inherent existence.
(11) The emptiness of the undiscardable, 'the undiscardable' is the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, which are empty of inherent existence. They are called undiscardable or unrejectable because they are not to be discarded or rejected.
(12) The emptiness of nature, 'nature' is the nature of any phenomena.
(13) The emptiness of all phenomena, 'all phenomena' are those ranging from form through an exalted knower of all aspects.
(14) The emptiness of its respective definition, 'its respective definition' refers to the respective definitions of form through an exalted knower of all aspects, which are empty of inherent existence.
(15) The emptiness of the unobservable, 'the unobservable' refers to the three times, which are empty of inherent existence.
(16) The emptiness of the entity of non-things, 'non-things' are those that lack the ability to perform a function.
This is very brief presentation of the sixteen emptinesses.

Wednesday afternoon, 21 March 2001

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

[174] See Conze, *The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom*, pp. 144, 148.

Having indicated the sixteen emptinesses, yet again four emptinesses were indicated [in the same sutra] saying:

> Subhuti, moreover,
> 1. things are emptied by things,
> 2. non-things are emptied by non-things,
> 3. self-being is emptied by self-being,
> 4. other-being is emptied by other-being.
>
> These emptinesses are called the great vehicle.

In the context of 'things empty of things' the word 'things' refers to the five aggregates, their emptiness is "the emptiness of things." In the context of "non-things empty of non-things" the word 'non-things' refers to uncompounded phenomena, their emptiness of inherent existence is "the emptiness of non-things." In the context of "nature empty of nature" 'nature' refers to the self, from among the two, self and other. 'Other things empty of other things' means that other things are empty of inherent existence. All phenomena are included in things and non-things and are also included in self and other. These are the four emptinesses mentioned in the root verse saying "yet again condensed, explained as four."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Emptiness or non-emptiness do not exist even a little; they are no more than designated conventionally like forms and so forth, due to the power of the beings to be subdued by such aspects.
>
> Just as is taught in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, 13.7]:
>
> > If the not empty existed a little, the empty would exist a little.
> > If the not empty does not exist a little, how cou1d the empty even exist?
>
> [And in 22.11]:
>
> > [The Tathagata] should neither be expressed saying "empty" nor saying "not empty", and
> > Not both and neither; he should be expressed as the imputed object.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 400-1) says:

> *That selflessness, in order to liberate migrating beings,*
> *Was taught to be of two types by way of the divisions of persons and phenomena.* [6.179ab]
>
> Through desiring to state the fine divisions of emptiness, they are explained [as follows]. *The selflessness* that is the lack of inherent existence of phenomena *was taught* by the Bhagavan to be of *two types: the divisions of* (i) the selflessness of *persons and* (ii) of the selflessness of *phenomena*. The way in which [selflessness] is divided into these two is not, moreover, that it is divided in terms of two different selves which do not exist on the bases, persons and phenomena; rather, the self that does not exist is inherent existence. Therefore, [the two selflessnesses] are distinguished by means of the divisions of the basis or the substratum: (i) phenomena that are the aggregates and so forth and (ii) persons.
> QUESTION: What is the purpose in presenting these two?
> RESPONSE: The selflessness of persons is presented in order to completely liberate the migrating beings who are hearers and solitary realizers from cyclic existence, whereas both selflessnesses are presented *in order to* completely *liberate* the *migrating beings* who are bodhisattvas, through their attaining omniscience. As was explained before, although hearers and solitary realizers do indeed see the suchness that is dependent-arising, mere conditionality, they do not have thorough,

complete meditation on the selflessness of phenomena, like that explained before, from the point of view of kinds and time. Nonetheless, they do have a mere method for abandoning the seeds of the afflictions of the three realms. [On the other hand,] they are presented to have all the meditations, without exception, on the selflessness of the person that is an inherently existent person. Although they do not generate the wisdom of all the kinds of reasonings negating a truly existent person, they do completely cultivate the antidotes to the seeds of the afflictions, but do not completely cultivate the antidotes to the obstructions to knowledge.

Thus, the Teacher once again taught trainees
That itself divided in many ways. [6.179cd]

Having explained sixteen emptinesses
Together with elaboration, once again condensed,
He posited them as four.
They are also said to be the great vehicle. [6.180]

Thus, the Bhagavan *once again taught trainees* the second selflessness *itself divided, together with the elaboration* of *many ways,* for their various thoughts.

QUESTION: How did he do so?

RESPONSE: *Having explained* the division of *sixteen emptinesses* in the *Mother of the Conquerors*, *once again condensed he posited them as four* and *said*, that is, explained, *them to also be the great vehicle*. In this way, [the Bhagavan] taught two condensed divisions, four middling divisions, and sixteen extensive divisions. [Sutra] says:

> Subhuti, moreover, the great vehicle of the bodhisattvas is like this: (1) emptiness of the internal, (2) emptiness of the external, (3) emptiness of the external and internal, (4) emptiness of emptiness, (5) emptiness of the great, (6) emptiness of the ultimate, (7) emptiness of the compounded, (8) emptiness of the uncompounded, (9) emptiness of that passed beyond extremes, (10) emptiness of the beginningless and endless, (11) emptiness of the indestructible, (12) emptiness of nature, (13) emptiness of all phenomena, (14) emptiness of its respective definition, (15) emptiness of the unobservable, and (16) emptiness of the entity of non-things.

Having presented the sixteen emptinesses, once again he presented four emptinesses:

> Subhuti, moreover, (1) things are empty of things, (2) non-things are empty of non-things, (3) natures are empty of natures, and (4) other things are empty of other things.

These emptinesses are called “the great vehicle.” Inherently existent emptiness and non-emptiness do not exist even in the slightest, in that, to those subdued by such individual aspects of emptiness, they are said to exist conventionally. As [Nagarjuna’s] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 13.7 and v. 22.11) also says:

If what is not empty existed slightly,
The empty would exist slightly.
If what is not empty does not exist slightly,
How could the empty even exist?

“Empty” should not be said,
Nor should “Not empty”, and
Not both, and not neither;
They should be said with respect to the imputed object.

The first [verse] means that they should not be said with respect to the side of being established by way of their own entity; the latter that they should be said with respect to the conventionally existent, that is, the imputed object.

All emptinesses are condensed in two: the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. The object of negation of the two types of selflessness is the same, their difference lies in the basis of negation which is the basis qualified by emptiness. The selflessness of persons was taught in order to liberate hearers and solitary realizers from cyclic existence, whereas the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena were taught in order for bodhisattvas to attain enlightenment for the benefit of sentient beings by abandoning the two obstructions.

In short, the condensed presentation of emptinesses is of two emptinesses, the middling presentation is of four emptinesses, and the extensive presentation is of sixteen emptinesses. There is also a presentation of twenty emptinesses in the first chapter of Haribhadra's *Commentary Clarifying the Meaning* in the context of the achieving through the collection of exalted wisdom. This commentary gives examples of these.

The hearers and solitary realizers do not cultivate a complete antidote to the knowledge obstructions, that is, they do not strive in this, but instead strive to attain liberation by abandoning the afflictive obstructions.

Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* says:

> "Empty" should not be said,
> Nor should "Not empty", and
> Not both, and not neither;
> They should be said in regard to the imputed object.

This means that "empty" should not be said in the context of what is inherently existent, but should only be said in the context of what is not inherently existent. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The first [verse] means that they should not be said with respect to the side of being established by way of their own entity; the latter that they should be said with respect to the conventionally existent, that is, the imputed object." This means, in short, that one cannot assert emptiness in the context of inherent existence. In other words, "empty," "not empty," and so forth should not be expressed in regard to what is established by way of its own entity. This is the meaning of the first seven lines of these two verses. The last line says that they should be expressed in regard to the conventionally existent, the imputed object.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 403) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B Extensive explanation of the meanings of the individual divisions

1 Extensive explanation of the division into sixteen emptinesses
2 Extensive explanation of the division into four emptinesses

3B1C-2B3E-3B1 Extensive explanation of the division into sixteen emptinesses

A Explanation of the four: the emptiness of the internal and so forth
B Explanation of the four: the emptiness of the great and so forth
C Explanation of the four: the emptiness of that passed beyond extremes and so forth
D Explanation of the four: the emptiness of all phenomena and so forth

3B1C-2B3E-3B1A Explanation of the four: the emptiness of the internal and so forth

1 Explanation of the emptiness of the internal
2 Explanation of the remaining three emptinesses

3B1C-2B3E-3B1A-1 Explanation of the emptiness of the internal

A Actual meaning
B Ancillarly, a presentation of the way of asserting the nature

3B1C-2B3E-3B1A-1A Actual meaning

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, from the viewpoint of inner emptiness, it is explained:

Because its nature is that,
Therefore, eye is emptied by eye.
Likewise should ear, nose, tongue,
Body, and mind also be described. [6.181]

Because of not abiding unchanged
And not disintegrating,
What is the non-inherent existence
Of the six, eye and so forth,
That is asserted as inner emptiness?[175] [6.182]

Like that extensively taught [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

> Therein, if asked: What are the inner phenomena that have inner emptiness?
> The so-called inner phenomena are eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. Therein, because of just not abiding forever and not disintegrating, the eye is emptied by eye. If asked why, it is because its nature is that.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5B-2A Emptiness divided into sixteen

(1) The emptiness of the internal.

Because that is its essential nature,
The eye is empty of an eye.
The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind
Are also to be described like that, [6.181]

Because they do not unchangeably
Remain, and they do not perish.
The non-inherent existence of
The six sense organs is accepted
As the emptiness of the Internal. [6.182]

That there are no inherently existent [internal dharmas, i.e. the] six sense organs is accepted as the emptiness of the internal, for it is the emptiness[176] of being empty of truly existent internal. This should also be understood in the following. The eye is empty of entitiness of eye, for the essential nature of that eye is to be empty [of existence by its own nature], since ultimately it does not remain unchangeably and it does not perish. The ear, nose, tongue, body and mind are also to be described similarly.

The bases of the emptiness of the internal are the six sense powers, the eye sense power through the mental sense power. "The eye is empty of eye" should not be understood literally but should be understood to mean that "the eye is empty of an inherently existent eye" or "the eye is empty of an established by way of its own entity eye." In the same way, the ear is empty of an inherently existent ear, the nose is empty of an inherently existent nose, and so forth.

Because they are empty, the eye and so forth do not abide or remain constantly, that is, they do not abide ultimately. They also do not disintegrate, that is, they do not inherently disintegrate or ultimately disintegrate. Because of this, the six sense powers, the eye sense power and so forth, are empty of inherent existence.

[175] This verse appears to have five lines in the Tibetan.

[176] *stong cha*

Chandrakirti says: "What is the non-inherent existence of the six, eye and so forth, that is asserted as inner emptiness? (6.182)" The six, the eye and so forth, are the bases of emptiness; because they are internal their emptiness is termed "the emptiness of the internal."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is taught:[177]
>
> Therein, not abiding forever itself should be taken to not discard self-nature. That too, because of having abided a little while, it just does not disintegrate by becoming reversed. This will be indicated, for the functioning thing that is together with a self-nature undoubtedly is not unchanged and must become not reversible.

The six sense powers do not abide inherently and do not disintegrate inherently. "Abiding forever" or "abiding constantly" means to be permanent. If it is permanent it must be irreversible.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As taught in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*, 15.1-2]:
>
> Self nature is not reasonable to arise from causes and conditions.
> Arisen from causes and conditions, self nature would be a product.
>
> In what way would it be suitable to say self nature is a product?
> Self nature itself is not artificial and is without reliance on others.

If "nature" (translated here as "self nature") is taken to be inherent existence, then if inherent existence arose from causes and conditions it would be a product, but this is not possible. Such a nature, inherent existence, is not fabricated or not artificial and does not rely on other. However, "nature" can also be taken to refer to emptiness which is also not artificial, or not fabricated, and does not rely on others.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 403) says:

1. Emptiness of the internal

Because its nature is that,
The eye is empty of eye.
This should also be similarly addressed to
The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mentality. [6.181]

Because not remaining constantly
And not disintegrating,
The lack of inherent existence of any of
The six, the eye and so forth,
Is asserted to be the emptiness of the internal. [6.182]

[177] LTK points out that *pa.tsab*'s translation into Tibetan is mistaken, and it quotes the translation of *nag.tso*:

> It is taught: "Unchanged is expressed for the entitiness of non-degeneration, because, if thus, the permanence of abiding forever is negated, also the eyes and so forth, having themselves abided a little while, in negating degeneration or true disintegration which reverses afterwards, there is just not disintegration." The functioning thing that exists by its own entitiness will remain forever or become degenerated.

> Internal phenomena *are the six, the eye and so forth*. *The lack of inherent existence of any of them is asserted to be the emptiness of the internal*. Moreover, *the eye is empty of* an *eye* established by way of its own entity *because the nature of that* eye *is that* emptiness of establishment by way of its own entity. The explanation of the eye *should also be similarly addressed to the ear, nose, tongue, body, and mentality*. For the reason that they are empty in this way, the eye and so forth ultimately do *not remain constantly and without disintegrating*.
>
> At this point, Patshab's translation [of the autocommentary as follows] is an erroneous translation:
>
> > 'Not remaining constantly' means 'not giving up its nature.' Moreover, since, having remained for a little while, it will also reverse, it is taught "Because... not disintegrating" (v. 6.182b). This is indicated, in that any thing that has inherent existence must certainly not be constant and must be irreversible.
>
> [It is erroneous] because in that case the opposite of the predicate would have to be pervaded by the sign. Hence, Nagtsho's translation, translated [as follows], is best since it clarifies the former as an erroneous system using the negative particle:
>
> > Any thing that exists by way of its own entity would remain constantly or would degenerate.

There are two translations of the autocommentary, one by Patshab and one by Nagtsho. In this context the translation by Nagtsho is more accurate. Patshab was born in the Pembo area Tibet, while Nagtsho was from Upper Tibet. Both are known as great translators.

In short, the six sense powers are internal objects, their emptiness of inherent existence is "the emptiness of the internal." The six sense powers are called "internal" because they are conjoined with feelings. External phenomena, on the other hand, are the six objects, forms and so forth, which are not conjoined with feelings.

The eye is said to be empty of an inherently existent eye. This formula can also be applied similarly to the remaining sense powers. Do the eyes and so forth remain constantly? Do they not disintegrate? They do not remain constantly and do disintegrate. Therefore, the statement that they do not remain constantly and do *not* disintegrate should be understood to mean that the eyes do not remain constantly ultimately and do not disintegrate ultimately.

Patshab's translation "'Not remaining constantly' means 'not giving up its nature'" is incorrect. Likewise his stating "Moreover, since, having remained for a little while, it will also reverse" is also incorrect. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "[It is erroneous] because in that case the opposite of the predicate would have to be pervaded by the sign." The opposite of the predicate of the probandum is the predicate of the negandum, this would have to be pervaded by the sign, but it is not. Therefore, Nagtsho's translation is better: "Any thing that exists by way of its own entity would remain constantly or would degenerate." Lama Tsongkhapa say that this translation is best because "it clarifies the former as an erroneous system using the negative particle."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 404) says:

> Also the [following] explanation in [Jayananda's] *Explanatory Commentary* is not suitable because if it were so there would not exist disintegration, whereas disintegration does exist:
>
> > Having extracted [the lines] "Because remaining constantly and not non-disintegrating...," if the eye and so forth existed inherently, since inherent existence does not have transformation and disintegration, they would not have transformation and disintegration, but because that does not exist they do not exist inherently.
>
> If it were necessarily that, it would contradict the sutra that says:
>
> > Because of just not disintegrating.
>
> Also the statement "not remaining constantly" should be translated as in Nagtso's translation:
>
> > 'Constant' is expressed to be the entity of non-degeneration.

> Therefore, when the permanence that is to remain constantly is negated in this way, in order to cease the thought "After the eye and so forth have remained for a trifling period, is the disintegration which is their reversal truly existent?," it is taught [in sutra] "Because of just not disintegrating." In brief, this means "Because they are not either truly existent permanent nor impermanent." In [Arya Vimuktisena's] *Illuminating the Twenty Thousand* this is also taught in another way. The nature of phenomena is also as taught in [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom* (v. 15.1-2)
>
> The nature is not suitable to arise
> From causes and conditions.
> Arisen from causes and conditions,
> The nature would have production.
>
> How would it be suitable to say
> "The nature is a product"?
> The nature is not fabricated and
> Does not rely on other.

The six sense powers are not truly existent permanent nor truly existent impermanent. "To remain constantly" means to be permanent, whereas "to disintegrate" means to be impermanent.

"In *Illuminating the Twenty Thousand* this is also taught in another way" refers to the fact this text by Arya Vimuktisena explains the lines in sutra that are summarized by Chandrakirti in his root verse as "Because not remaining constantly and not disintegrating" (6.182ab) differently. According to Lama Tsongkhapa, Arya Vimuktisena also explains the meaning of this statement incorrectly.

In short, the emptiness of the internal is the emptiness of inherent existence of the eye sense power and so forth.

Thursday morning, 22 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 404) says:

> 3B1C-2B3E-3B1A-1B Ancillarly, a presentation of the way of asserting the nature

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, if asked: Does the self-nature like that specified by the Acharya [Nagarjuna] in the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*] exist as an assertion of the Acharya?

Acharya Nagarjuna asserts nature in general. This nature is the emptiness of inherent existence. Nagarjuna does not assert phenomena to exist inherently.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> From the viewpoint of which the Bhagavan extensively taught:
>
> Whether the tathagatas arise or do not arise, this dharmata of phenomena just abides.
>
> – the so-called dharmata exists. This so-called dharmata is also whatever is the nature of these eyes and so forth.
>
> If asked: Yet, what are their natures?
>
> These are not artificial and are what are without reliance on others; their own entity which is to be realized by a consciousness devoid of the cataract of ignorance. Was not "whether it exists or does not exist" mentioned? If it does not exist, for what purpose will bodhisattvas meditate on the

> paramita path, because the bodhisattvas thus strive in hundreds of hardships in order to realize that dharmata?

Dharmata, translated as 'reality,' refers to the nature or emptiness. "This dharmata of phenomena" is the final nature of the eyes and so forth. Such a nature is unfabricated and does not rely on other, that is, it is not dependent on causes that produce it. Such a nature is realized only by those who are free from the cataracts of ignorance, that is, it is only directly seen by a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise.

If there is no reality what would be the purpose to meditate for a long period of time? Because reality exists "the bodhisattvas thus strive in hundreds of hardships in order to realize that dharmata," that is, they do so in order to realize reality directly. Bodhisattvas must accumulate the collection for one countless eon in order to realize reality.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As is taught [in the *Cloud of Jewels Sutra*]:
>
> > Son of good lineage, the ultimate (the highest meaning) is without birth, without cessation, without disintegration, without coming, without going, not to be expressed with letters, indescribable with letters, and is not realized by elaboration. Son of good lineage, the ultimate is inexpressible and peace, the object of the arya's personal knowledge.
> >
> > Son of good lineage, the ultimate is: whether the tathagatas arise or do not arise; on account of which the bodhisattvas, having cut their hair and mustaches, don saffron robes, with perfect faith set out homeless from home and, having set out, also in order to attain that dharmata, like setting fire to hair or robes, strive energetically and without completely destroying abidance.
> >
> > Son of good lineage, if the ultimate did not exist, chaste conduct would be meaningless and the arisal of the tathagatas would be meaningless. Because the ultimate exists, therefore the bodhisattvas are called "skilled in the ultimate."

The ultimate, literally the highest meaning, is the nature or emptiness which is without production, without cessation, without disintegration, and so forth. This ultimate or this nature cannot be expressed. How is it realized? It is only realized by a superior's individual cognizer (here translated as 'personal knowledge'). The homage to the perfection of wisdom recited prior to the recitation of the *Heart Sutra* says:

> The perfection of wisdom
> Is indescribable, inconceivable, and inexpressible,
> Unproduced and unceasing, the very nature of space,
> The sphere of the supreme analytical wisdom:
> Homage to the mother of the conquerors of the three times.

Bodhisattvas strive to realize reality just as one would strive to immediately extinguish one's burning clothes or hair without the slightest laziness. A son of the lineage, a bodhisattva, leaves his home, cuts his hair and beard, takes ordination, and so forth all for the purpose of realizing reality. On the other hand, if the ultimate did not exist this would all become meaningless, but, because reality, emptiness, exists it is meaningful.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> It is mentioned here: O my, not asserting things even a little and yet asserting a nature which is adventitiously non-artificial and non-reliant on others, you express mutually contradictory meanings.

"O my" or "how sad" is an expression that shows both amazement and sadness. Some Madhyamikas do not assert things to be even slightly inherently existent and yet assert a nature which is adventitiously unfabricated and without dependence on other. Here someone says that this expresses mutually contradictory meanings. What are these mutually contradictory meanings? Think about it.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Response: You have not understood the intention of the *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way*]. Its intention is: if just this dependently arisen self entity of the eyes and so forth, which is to be apprehended by childish beings, is their self nature, because that is also realized by [a mind] which is mistaken, chaste conduct would be meaningless. Yet, since just this is not the self nature, therefore, chaste conduct has meaning for the sake of viewing that.

If the nature of the eyes and so forth were realized by childish beings it would follow that the nature of phenomena would be realized by a mistaken awareness. In this case, chaste conduct would become meaningless. Thus, the nature that is apprehended by the eye consciousness of childish beings is not the nature that is emptiness. The nature that refers to emptiness is not fabricated (not artificial) and is ultimate truth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> I express that too as just not artificial and just not reliant on others through reliance on the deceptive truth. That itself which is not to be viewed by childish beings is proper as the self nature, yet due to merely that, the ultimate is not a thing nor a non-thing, that is "because pacified by nature."

Such a nature, emptiness, is the pacification of the object of negation which is inherent existence. In short, there exists a nature that cannot be realized by the awarenesses of childish beings, this nature is emptiness. "The ultimate is not a thing nor a non-thing" means that both things and non-things have the nature of not existing inherently and therefore being pacified.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> This self nature is not only asserted by the Acharya – since others can also be converted to accept this meaning, this self nature is also presented as established for the two. [To assert] like those who mention the self natures of fire and so forth as being hot and so forth, is completely unsuitable, because of being just artificial due to dependent arising and because of having reliance.

Acharya Nagarjuna asserts the nature. "Since others can also be converted to accept this meaning, this nature is also presented as established for the two" means that this nature is established for both oneself and others or for both the first party and the second party.

If someone were to say that "nature" refers to, for example, the nature of the elements – the nature of fire being hot and burning, the nature of water being wet, the nature of earth being solidity,

and the nature of wind being movement – this would be incorrect. This "is completely unsuitable, because of being just artificial due to dependent arising and because of having reliance." The nature of fire and so forth are fabricated and dependent upon other since they depend on causes and conditions. Thus, the natures of the elements, fire and so forth, do not possess the three attributes of the nature that is emptiness:

1. being unfabricated,
2. not relying on other, and
3. not being realized by those with the cataracts of ignorance.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Because of existence itself, it is even improper to express it as "Therein, the artificial does not exist and there exists no reliance on others," because, due to this statement about it there does not exist a thing apprehended as supreme because of indicating the meaning of that type conventionally. Enough extensiveness; the ordinary should be explained.

The nature of fire and so forth should not be asserted to be unfabricated and without dependence on other. Their nature does depend on other because the nature of hot and burning, for example, does depend on causes and conditions. Because of this these natures cannot be said to be unfabricated and not dependent on other. The nature that is emptiness is not the nature of fire and so forth but is a supreme nature. In brief, the nature of this context is the supreme nature, not the ordinary nature of things.

Chandrakirti says: "Enough extensiveness; the ordinary should be explained." Chandrakirti says that this is enough detail and that this has been a supplementary or ancillary discussion. He will now continue the discussion of the main topic, the sixteen emptinesses.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therein, by mentioning the eyes and so forth as emptied by the eyes and so forth themselves, the self-nature emptiness (or: emptiness of self-nature) is fully clarified. It is not the emptiness of the lack of one in one (other) saying "The eye is empty because devoid of an inner creator and emptied by the very self of apprehended and apprehender."

The nature is also not the lack of one in another. In short, the nature that is emptiness is not the emptiness of the apprehender and apprehended being different substances. This type of non-duality is not the nature of this context.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 404-5) says:

> [The autocommentary] says:
>
> > QUESTION: Does the nature – like that qualified in the *Treatise* by the Acharya stating "The nature that is not produced from causes and conditions" and that is asserted by the Acharya – exist?
> >
> > RESPONSE: From any point of view, that called "reality" – which was taught by the Bhagavan saying "Whether the tathagatas arise or do not arise, the reality of phenomena just abides" – exists. Whatever is so-called "reality" is also the nature of the eyes and so forth. What is their nature? The eyes and so forth are unfabricated and their production does not depend on other, for they are entities that are objects to be realized by a consciousness free from the cataracts of ignorance.

Each and every phenomena has two types of natures: (i) an ultimate or final nature and (ii) a conventional or individual nature. For example, the individual nature of fire is hot and burning. In this context "nature" is not the conventional nature of fire which is hot and burning, but is the final nature of fire, its emptiness of inherent existence. This ultimate nature is asserted by Acharya Nagarjuna and should also be asserted by both oneself and others. The nature of this context is therefore the final nature which is the emptiness of inherent existence. This final nature has three attributes: (i) being unfabricated, (ii) not depending on other, and (iii) not being realized by other than the exalted wisdom which is free from the cataracts of ignorance. Such a nature abides or exists. It is free from the eight – production, cessation, and so forth. The final nature of the eyes and so forth, their emptiness of inherent existence, is called "the emptiness of the internal." Such a nature is what is asserted by Acharya Nagarjuna.

Thursday afternoon, 22 March 2001

The nature asserted by Acharya Nagarjuna is their final or ultimate nature, their emptiness of inherent existence. Thus, the nature of the eye is the eye's emptiness of inherent existence. This final nature possesses three attributes:
1. being unfabricated
2. not relying on other, and
3. not being realized by other than the exalted wisdom which is free from the cataracts of ignorance.

Acharya Nagarjuna does not say that there is no reality or final nature or ultimate truth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 405) says:

> These [passages] excellently refute those who say that "The Acharya does not assert ultimate truths and reality to exist," and those who propound that when the pollution of ignorance is eliminated the consciousness becomes non-existent.
>
> Is reality propounded to exist or to not exist? If it does not exist, for what purpose would the bodhisattvas meditate on the path of the perfections? They would not. If ultimate truth did not exist, they would not progress in the culmination of its realization, and, if that [progress] did not exist, meditation on the path would be meaningless, but, because there is the realization of reality and progress in its culmination, bodhisattvas strive in hundreds of hardships. This indicates that those who strive in many hardships on the path, while asserting the ultimate truth that is called "reality" to not be the object of any awareness, are the extremely dull facultied.

Nagarjuna does assert ultimate truth and reality to exist. If ultimate truth did not exist the bodhisattvas would not strive in cultivating the path. On the other hand, because it exists they meditate and bear hardships in order to cultivate the path.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 405-6) says:

> As is also clearly taught in the *Cloud of Jewels Sutra*:
>
> > Son of the lineage, the ultimate is without production, without cessation, without disintegration, without coming, without going, not to be expressed by letters, thoroughly indescribable by letters, and is not realized by elaboration.
> >
> > Son of the lineage, the ultimate is inexpressible and peace is to be individually cognized by superiors.
> >
> > Son of the lineage, the ultimate [exists] whether the tathagatas arise or do not arise, on account of which the bodhisattvas, having cut their hair and beards, don saffron robes. With perfect faith, leaving their homes they take ordination as a homeless one. Having

> taken ordination, also in order to attain that reality they strive with effort, as though their hair or robes were set on fire, and do not completely destroy abidance.
>
> Son of the lineage, if the ultimate did not exist, pure conduct would be meaningless and the arisal of the tathagatas would be meaningless. Therefore, because the ultimate exists, the bodhisattvas are called "Those skilled in the ultimate."

The ultimate truth cannot be expressed by words. It is only perceived by the individual cognizer, the exalted wisdom, of superiors. In order to cultivate the wisdom realizing the ultimate, bodhisattvas bear such hardships as leaving their homes, cutting their hair and beards, and so forth. Their effort is like that of someone putting out the fire burning his hair or clothes. On the other hand, if the ultimate did not exist "pure conduct would be meaningless and the arisal of the tathagatas would be meaningless." Therefore, because ultimate truth does exist the bodhisattvas are called "those skilled in the ultimate."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 406) says:

> That it is "inexpressible" and "not realized by elaboration" means that terms and conceptions cannot take it as an object as does the non-conceptual exalted wisdom seeing the ultimate; it does not mean that it cannot be realized in general. [The ultimate] is taught to exist also when presenting the harm to the ultimate truth not being an existent and when presenting the opposite of that, and also previously it was presented to exist. Therefore, distinguishing it to be non-existent and to not exist is merely presented for those of extremely inferior intelligence.

The final nature is inexpressible by means of words and cannot be conceived.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 406) says:

> In many texts translated by Patshab, it says "[Whether the tathagatas] arise or do not arise, on account of which...," however, Nagtsho's translation says "Although they do not arise, since the ultimate is without degeneration..." Since this accords with the statement in the sutra cited in the autocommentary above, "Although they do not arise, the reality of phenomena still abides," it is the best [translation].
> The autocommentary says:
>
> > OBJECTION: How sad, your not asserting things to be even slightly inherently existent, yet asserting their nature to also be adventitiously unfabricated and without dependence on other, is to express mutually contradictory meanings.
> >
> > RESPONSE: You have not understood the intention of the *Treatise on the Middle Way*. Its intention is [as follows]. If that own entity of the eyes and so forth – dependent and related arising – which is what is apprehended by childish beings were the nature that is the mode of being of those eyes and so forth, pure conduct would be meaningless because that nature is also directly realized by a mistaken awareness. Yet, since the eyes and so forth being dependent-arisings is not the nature that is their mode of being, pure conduct has the meaning of being for the purpose of viewing that.

The nature of this context is not that directly realized by the awareness of childish beings. If it were, then the pure conduct of a bodhisattva would be meaningless, whereas the purpose of bodhisattvas in maintaining pure conduct is to attain a direct realization of emptiness. In other words, the nature of the eye sense powers is not directly realized by the awareness of childish beings. The final nature of things is emptiness, such a nature is never directly realized by the awareness of childish beings. Here "directly" is mentioned because ordinary beings do have a realization of emptiness, for example, the bodhisattvas on the path of accumulation and on the path of preparation have a realization of

emptiness by way of a meaning generality. In other words, hearers on their path of accumulation and path of preparation and solitary realizers on their path of accumulation and path of preparation do realize emptiness but do not realize it directly. Here "childish beings" refers to these hearers and solitary realizers.

Nagarjuna never asserts that the reality of the eye sense power and so forth does not exist. The eye sense power and so forth themselves are not the final nature. The final nature asserted by Nagarjuna is only the reality that is the negation of the inherent existence of the eye. Thus, the reality of the eye sense power and so forth is the nature.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 407) says:

> Therefore, refuting the nature is to refute that the eyes and so forth are the mode of being (*bshis lugs*), whereas refuting the assertion of a nature is to assert a nature that is "the reality of the eyes and so forth." Therefore, refuting things to exist inherently and asserting a nature that is the reality of things is without even the slightest contradiction.

It is not contradictory to negate the inherent existence of things and to assert the reality, or nature, of things. In other words, asserting that there is a reality or final nature of things does not contradict the negation of their inherent existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 407) says:

> Such a reality is, moreover, expressed by us to be unfabricated and without dependence on other in dependence on being established to be a conventional truth, that is, a mere nominality.

Reality or nature exists conventionally. Is it a conventional truth? It is not because it is an ultimate truth. An ultimate truth cannot be a conventional truth because they are mutually exclusive. However, reality exists as a mere nominality or as a mere conventionality.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 407) says:

> The reality which is not an object to be viewed by ordinary childish beings is suitable to be the nature, yet due to merely asserting it to be conventionally existent, it also does not inherently exist as a thing or non-thing, that is, ultimately, because inherent existence is just pacified.
>
> The [following] statement [in the autocommentary] must be ascertained in particular:
>
> > Not only is this nature – reality – asserted by the acharya, Arya [Nagarjuna], but, since others, the opponents, can also be brought to assert this meaning, at the end of the argument this nature is also presented to be established for both ourselves and others.

Nature is a synonym of reality. It is not only asserted by Nagarjuna but others can also be brought to assert it, in that the opponents, for example, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, can also be brought to accept this final nature of phenomena at the end of the argument as do the Prasangika Madhyamikas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 408) says:

> When asserted to accord with those who propound the nature that is the mode of being of fire and so forth to be hot and so forth, this is unsuitable in all ways
>
> - because heat and so forth are fabricated due to being produced in dependence and
> - because they are existents that are produced in dependence on causes and conditions.

It is not suitable to assert the nature of fire and so forth to be hot and burning since this nature of hot and burning is produced in dependence on causes and conditions and therefore cannot be the final nature which is unfabricated and does not rely on other.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page) says:

> It is also not suitable to say "The eye and so forth are unfabricated and do not depend on other – causes and conditions," "because," as Patshab's translation says, "due to this statement there would be nothing that is apprehended as the supreme and because it indicates the objects which are such aspects to be conventionalities." On the other hand, Nagtsho's translation says "because according to that there would not exist apprehension of the supreme and because it establishes objects just as they are as conventionalities." Stating "According to that" is the best, whereas the meaning of the rest is "because the thing that is the referent object of the conception of true existence does not exist and because it indicates the meaning of such attributes of being conventionally fabricated and dependent on other." Since it is indicated that the acharya, Arya [Nagarjuna], asserts the nature in this way, the *Praise of the Sphere of Phenomena* says:
>
> The sutras that present emptiness,
> All the Conqueror's teachings on the varieties –
> All of these eliminate the afflictions;
> They do not act to degenerate his constituents.

The referent object of the conception of true existence does not exist. To assert the nature in this way means to assert reality.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 408) says:

> This should also be understood to mean that "The sutra sets that present emptiness destroy the reference point (*dmigs gtad*) of the affliction that is the conception of true existence, but do not present the emptiness that is the refutation of its reference point to be the degeneration, that is, the annihilation, of the Tathagata's constituents."

The Buddha taught emptiness in order to destroy the reference point of the conception of true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 408) says:

> Regarding that, by teaching that the eyes and so forth are empty of eyes and so forth, it clarifies that the eyes and so forth are empty of inherent existence. It is not like the assertion of the hearer schools who state "The eye is empty, that is, it is free from a self that is an inner creator," and not like the assertion of the Chittamatrins who state "The eye, the apprehended, and the apprehender are empty of being mere different substances" as an emptiness which is the non-existence of one with respect to another, which is not the eye and so forth being empty of being established by way of their own entity.

"The eyes and so forth are empty of eyes and so forth" means that the eyes are empty of inherently existent eyes and so forth. The nature refers to their final mode of being, the lack of inherent existence. The nature must be the emptiness of inherent existence of the eyes and so forth, it is not the emptiness of one not existing with respect to another. It is not the emptiness of apprehended and apprehender being different substances.

There are different types of emptiness according to the different schools. The emptiness asserted by the Vaibhashikas and Svatantrika Madhyamikas are not the final nature. Only that asserted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas, the emptiness of inherent existence of the eyes and so forth,

is the final nature. The nature asserted by Arya Nagarjuna is not that asserted by the Vaibhashikas nor is it that asserted by the Chittamatrins. The Vaibhashikas posit the emptiness of the person as being the person's lack of being permanent, partless, and independent, while the Chittamatrins posit emptiness as the emptiness of the apprehended and apprehender being different substances.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 409) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B1A-2 Explanation of the remaining three emptinesses

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

There, outer emptiness is:

Because its nature is that,
Therefore, form is emptied by form.
Sound, smell, taste, touch, and
Phenomena themselves are also likewise. [6.183]

The non-entitiness of form and so forth
Is asserted as the external emptiness. [6.184ab]

As was taught before [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

Therein, if asked: What is outer emptiness?
Those to be known as outer phenomena are form and so forth. Therein, because of not abiding forever and because of not disintegrating, form is emptied by form; because its nature is that.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(2) The emptiness of the external.

Because that is its essential nature,
Visible form is empty of form.
Sounds and smells, tastes, tangibles
And mental objects are also so. [6.183]

The non-inherent existence of objects
Is held to be emptiness of the external. [6.184ab]

It should be understood that an [external] visible form is empty of entitiness of visible form, because the essential nature of that visible form is that emptiness. Sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, and mental objects are also like that. That there are no inherently existent [six objects not included in the person,] such as visible forms, is accepted as the emptiness of the external, similarly. [In this and the remaining cases, what is taught in the sutra, "because they do not remain unchangeably and do not perish," is to be understood, in accord with the explanation about emptiness of the internal above.

In the context of the emptiness of the external, "the external" are the six objects of the six sense powers: forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena. They are called external because they are not included in the continuum. If it is included in the continuum is it necessarily conjoined with feeling? Think about it. The emptiness of these external objects is the emptiness of the external. If it is form is it pervaded by not being included in the continuum? There is no pervasion, for example, the hand is form and is included in the continuum. A form not included in the continuum is, for example, the shape and color of a table.

"Abiding forever" or "remaining constantly" means to be permanent. Forms and so forth do not remain constantly because they are empty of inherent existence and are not established by way of their own entity. Do forms remain constantly? Do sounds remain constantly? They do not, therefore, they are said to not abide forever. It is difficult to understand why the sutra says "because of not disintegrating" but this can be resolved by saying "because of not disintegrating ultimately."

"Form is emptied by form" or "form is empty of form" means that, as before in the case of "the eye is empty of eye," form is empty of inherently existent form. This formula is to be applied similarly to sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena. They too are empty of inherent existence.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *The non-inherent existence of both*
> *Is outer and inner emptiness.* [6.184cd]
>
> As was taught before [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:
>
> > Outer and inner phenomena just lacking an inherent nature of outer and inner phenomena is outer and inner emptiness.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(3) The emptiness of the both.

> *That the both lacks inherent existence*
> *Is external-internal emptiness.* [6.184cd]

The non-inherent existence of that both external and internal, [such as the physical bases of the six senses, which are both included in the continuum of consciousness and not included in the sense organs,] is the emptiness of the external and internal, similarly.[178]

The external are the six objects of the six sense powers, forms and so forth, whereas the internal are the six sense powers. The emptiness of the six objects, forms and so forth, is the emptiness of the external. The emptiness of the six sense powers is the emptiness of the internal. Here it seems that the emptiness of these two is the emptiness of both the internal and external. However, in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* it says that the bases of the emptiness of the internal and external must be included in the continuum, thus it is the loci of the sense powers. They are considered to be external with respect to the sense powers, and internal with respect to external forms. In Haribhadra's *Commentary Clarifying the Meaning* it says that the emptiness of inherent existence of the six loci of the sense powers is the emptiness of both.

"Outer and inner phenomena are empty of outer and inner phenomena" means "outer and inner phenomena are empty of inherently existent outer and inner phenomena." As was mentioned before, the reason in this case is also "because they do not remain constantly and do not ultimately disintegrate."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

[178] The *Sutra* describes this emptiness as the internal dharmas being empty of the external. Chandrakirti quotes a version of the *Sutra* rewritten after his interpretation.

All phenomena just lacking an inherent nature,
The wise describe saying "emptiness."
That emptiness is also asserted as
Emptied by the entity of emptiness. [6.185]

The emptiness of so-called emptiness,
That which is asserted as emptiness of emptiness,
Is taught in order to overcome the grasping
Of those thinking emptiness a thing. [6.186]

As is taught [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

> Therein, if asked: "What is the emptiness of emptiness?"
> This emptiness emptied by the emptiness that is the emptiness of all phenomena is called 'the emptiness of emptiness.'

It is finely indicated for the sake of overcoming the grasping to emptiness as a thing of those who strongly settle even upon emptiness as a thing.

As taught [in the *Praise of the Supramundane*, 23]:[179]

> In order to destroy all imaginations, the nectar of emptiness was indicated. Whoever has grasping even for that, they are reviled by you.

The lack of inherent existence of phenomena is called "emptiness," this emptiness is also empty of inherent existence. The *Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* says: "This emptiness empty of the emptiness which is the emptiness of all phenomena is called 'the emptiness of emptiness.'" Emptiness is also empty of inherent existence. The Buddha taught the emptiness of emptiness in order to overcome the conception of the true existence of emptiness or the conception of the inherent existence of emptiness. In short, the Buddha taught the emptiness of emptiness in order to overcome the thought that emptiness exist inherently. Emptiness's emptiness of inherent existence is the "emptiness of emptiness." This was taught in order to overcome the thought that emptiness exists inherently.

The Buddha taught the nectar of emptiness in order to overcome all conceptions.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why were these four emptiness taught in the order of (i) the emptiness of the internal, (ii) the emptiness of the external, (iii) the emptiness of both, and (iv) the emptiness of emptiness?
Student: The *Ornament for Clear Realizations* says that the emptiness of the internal is realized first, so perhaps they were taught in this order in terms of their ease of realization.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Why is it easier to realize the emptiness of the internal than the emptiness of the external? Think about it.

Friday morning, 23 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 409) says:

2. Emptiness of the external

Because their nature is that,
Forms are empty of forms.
Also sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and

[179] See Lindtner, pp. 136-137.

Phenomena are like that. [6.183]

The very lack of nature of forms and so forth
Is asserted to be the emptiness of the external. [6.184ab]

The very lack of nature – which is the emptiness of inherent existence of the six objects, *forms and so forth*, which are not included in the continuum – *is asserted to be the emptiness of the external*. External *forms are empty* of being established as the very entity *of forms because the nature of those* forms *is that*. *Also* the way in which *sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena are* empty is to be understood *like that*. The teaching regarding these and the remaining, in short, "because they do not remain constantly and they do not disintegrate," is to be understood as it was explained in the context of the emptiness of the internal.

The six objects are the forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena that are not included in the continuum. These six are also called "external spheres." Their lack of inherent existence is the emptiness of the external. Forms and so forth do not remain constantly and do not ultimately or inherently disintegrate. To "remain constantly" means to abide forever or always. Forms and so forth do not remain constantly because they disintegrate momentarily, although forms and so forth disintegrate they do not disintegrate ultimately. Can it be said that the phenomena sphere disintegrates? It cannot because the phenomena sphere is said to be permanent. There are different kinds of permanence such as occasional permanence; for example, the space in a cup which is permanent but, when the cup is broken, ceases.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 409) says:

3. Emptiness of the external and internal

The very lack of nature of both
Is the emptiness of the external and internal. [6.184cd]

For example, the loci that are the supports of the sense powers, which are included in the continuum of consciousness, are *both* due to being included in the continuum of consciousness and not being included in the sense powers. Their *very lack of the nature* of being established by way of their own entity *is the emptiness of the external and internal*. The remaining is as above.

"The external and internal" are the loci or organs that are the supports of the sense powers. The loci are not the sense powers which are lucid matter; relative to the sense powers they are external.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 409) says:

4. Emptiness of emptiness

The very lack of nature of phenomena
Is described by the wise to be "emptiness."
Also that emptiness is asserted
To be empty of the entity of emptiness. [6.185]

Any emptiness of what is called "emptiness"
Is asserted to be the emptiness of emptiness.
It was taught in order to overcome
The conception of an awareness of emptiness as a thing. [6.186]

The very lack of establishment by *nature of phenomena* that are external and internal, as explained before, *is described by those who are wise* in just that *to be* "The nature, *emptiness*." *Also that*

> *emptiness*, the nature of external and internal phenomena, *is asserted to be the empty of* being established as *the entity of emptiness* or of true existence. That being the case, *any emptiness of what is called "emptiness,"* the basis of emptiness, *is asserted to be the emptiness of emptiness*. Teaching emptiness to be empty of true existence *was taught* in the *Mother of the Conquerors in order to overcome the conception* of true existence *of an awareness* conceiving *emptiness* or reality *to be a thing*, that is, to be truly existent. Also in regard to it being so, [Nagarjuna's] *Praise of the Supramundane* clearly says:
>
> In order to eliminate all conceptions,
> When teaching the nectar of emptiness
> You thoroughly reproached
> Whoever adheres to it.
>
> By these [lines], the Conqueror is said to thoroughly reproach both those who propound [emptiness] to be truly established stating "Ultimately it is true" due to considering it to be the mere elimination of true existence, and others who assert it to be true due to considering it to be an affirmative phenomenon that is an independent reality, like blue and yellow which are not the mere elimination of the object of negation,.

Emptiness itself is empty of inherent existence. The Buddha taught this in order to eliminate the conception that emptiness exists inherently. There are some who say that ultimate truth is truly existent, for example, Jampa Chogyi Sengge. On the other hand, there are others, such as Kunkyen Jonangba, who assert ultimate truth to be an affirmative phenomenon that is an independent reality. Both Jampa Chokyi Sengge and Kunkyen Jonangba were famous scholars.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: When the imputed object is sought in the seven ways, it is not found. What is the imputed object in this context:

a) the inherently existent self,
b) the conventionally existent self, or
c) the self not qualified by either inherent existence or conventional existence?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: To search for the self means to analyze asking "What is the self?" For example, when one searches for the fist, one asks "Is it the thumb? Is it the index finger?" and so forth. In this way, none of the fingers are found to individually be the fist. When one finger, for example, the index finger is bent, is this index finger a fist? When one finger alone is bent, it is not a fist. Only when the collection of fingers are bent inward is it called a fist. When the fist is thoroughly sought, it is not found from the side of the basis of imputation. Likewise, when the self is thoroughly sought among the aggregates it is not found from the side of the aggregates. What is this imputed object that is sought? It is the I. We search for the I that is the imputed object.

Student: In the four point analysis, one first has to ascertain what is the inherently existent I and then determine whether that I is one with or different from the aggregates. That I is the object of negation.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The four point analysis is related to the reasoning of freedom from being a truly existent one and a truly existent many. There are nine points:

(1) ascertaining the object of negation,
(2) ascertaining the pervasion; for example, the person, as the subject, is not inherently existent because it is not found when sought by means of the seven ways,
(3) ascertaining that the self is not one with the aggregates,
(4) ascertaining that the self is not a different entity from the aggregates,
(5-6) ascertaining that the self and the aggregates are not inherently existent support and supported,
(7) ascertaining that the aggregates are not possessed by the self,
(8) ascertaining that the collection of the aggregates is not the self, and
(9) ascertaining that the shape of the aggregates is not the self.

These can be synthesized into four points:
1. ascertaining the object of negation,
2. ascertaining the pervasion,
3. ascertaining the object of negation,
4. ascertaining the property of the subject.

In regard to the analysis of freedom from one and many having four points, for example, the person, as the subject, does not exist truly because
1. it does not exist as a truly exist one,
2. it does not exist as a truly existent many,
3. it does not exist as both, and
4. it does not exist as either.

In this way there is the ascertainment of the object of negation, the ascertainment of the pervasion, and ascertainment that if it does not exist as a truly existent one or many it does not exist truly. In this way the third and fourth points are to ascertain that the person is not at truly existent one and a truly existent many.

Student: Then the third point is whether the object of negation, the inherently existent self, is the same as the aggregates or different from the aggregates?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The thesis is that the self does not exist inherently, whereas the reason is that the self is not inherently one with the aggregates and the self is not inherently different from the aggregates. In this case the object of negation is "the self that is an inherently existent one" or "an inherently existent self that is not one."

Student: Sutra says (*Illumination,* Tibetan text page 361):

> Oneself is one's own protector;
> Oneself is also one's own enemy;
> Oneself is one's own witness
> To the good and bad created.

How does this sutra passage prove that the self must be substantially existent? The lower schools cite this verse in order to prove that the self is substantially existent, whereas the Prasangika Madhyamikas cite it in order to negate the self being substantially existent.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to the lower schools, for example, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, the self is not a substantial existent but is an imputed existent. The Vaibhashikas would also say that the self is an imputed existent because all the lower schools define the person as "the I that is imputed on any of the five aggregates." Bhavaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* says that although the person in terms of the isolate of the self is not a substantial existent, there is no contradiction that the base of the isolate of the self, the illustrative mental consciousness, is a substantial existent. Thus, in short, the illustrative mental consciousness is a substantial existent. Previously Lama Tsongkhapa (*Illumination*, Tibetan text page 351) said:

> Moreover, although these systems assert that hearers and solitary realizers realize that the person does not exist as substantially existent, they do not assert that they realize that the two consciousnesses do not exist as substantially existent. Therefore, propounding that the person is not self-sufficient substantially existent is asserted from the point of view of the person itself; it is not asserted as such with respect to the consciousness, the illustration of the person.

Student: Is there an actual view of the transitory collection that is intellectually acquired according to Prasangika?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is an acquired view of the transitory collection and an innate view of the transitory collection. The acquired view of the transitory collection is an object of abandonment of the path of seeing. In other words, the view of the transitory collection that is to be abandoned by the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing is the acquired view of the transitory collection. The view of the transitory collection that is to be abandoned by the uninterrupted path of the path of meditation is the innate view of the transitory collection.

The conception of a self-sufficient substantially existent person is not an acquired conception, it is an innate conception.

Student: If it is an acquired view of the transitory collection, is it pervaded by being one of the twenty views of the transitory collection?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is no pervasion, for example, a view of the transitory collection that is not any of the twenty such as the afflicted wisdom thinking "I exist inherently" or "I exist by way of its own character." This is not any of the twenty views but is an acquired view of the transitory collection.
Student: Why is it an acquired view of the transitory collection?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Because it is conception conceiving the acceptability of this. This conception is a reasoning based on tenets. Because of this it is an acquired conception, an acquired conception being a conception that arises in dependence on reasonings. On the other hand, an innate conception arises naturally.

By meditating on this subject the foundations of cyclic existence will be shattered, therefore, we have a fortunate opportunity.

END

Monday afternoon, 26 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 410) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B1B Explanation of the four: the emptiness of the great and so forth

The four emptinesses discussed under this outline are:

- the emptiness of the great,
- the emptiness of the ultimate,
- the emptiness of the compounded, and
- the emptiness of the uncompounded.

5. Emptiness of the great

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Because of pervading without exception*
> *Sentient beings and the vessel world and*
> *Because the immeasurables are, by example,*
> *Boundless, the directions are immense.* [6.187]

Apart from the directions, there is no world of sentient beings and no vessel world. Hence, due to just pervading migrators without exception, the directions are immense. Because meditation on love and so forth is taught with the example of the immeasurable directions due to meditating through fully discerning the directions; therefore it is also immense since without boundary.

> *That which is just emptied*
> *By these ten directions*
> *Is the great emptiness,*
> *Taught to overcome grasping to the great.* [6.188]

As was extensively taught [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

> If asked: What is great emptiness?
> The southern direction is emptied by the southern direction.

The great emptiness is indicated in order to overcome the grasping of those grasping to the directions as great thinking, "The directions are immeasurable." Like this, the Vaisheshikas understand the directions as substantial.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(5) The emptiness of the immensity

> *Because they embrace every world*
> *Of sentient beings and physical objects,*
> *And by their example the immeasurables*
> *Are boundless, the directions are "the immensity."* [6.187]
>
> *The emptiness of all these ten*
> *Of any directions is the emptiness*
> *Of immensity. This is taught*
> *In order to stop grasping at the immensity.* [6.188]

The ten directions are the immensity, because they pervade all the worlds of sentient beings and inanimate objects [as there is no being or physical object outside these directions], and because by the example of their immeasurability, the loving kindness and so on that perceive the sentient beings of the ten directions are taught to be boundless or immeasurable. That all these ten directions are empty of inherent nature of directions is the emptiness of the immensity; this teaching is necessary, for it is in order to prevent the immensity's being grasped as truly existent.

"The great" refers to the ten directions, they are the basis of emptiness of "the emptiness of the great." The ten directions are called "great" because they pervade all the worlds of the inhabitants – sentient beings – and the environment. Thus, the ten directions are "the great" and their emptiness is "the emptiness of the great." Just as the ten directions are called "great" because they pervade all, similarly, the four immeasurables, for example, immeasurable love, are so called because they observe immeasurable sentient beings. This love is also called "great love" because it pervades all sentient beings.

Why did the Buddha teach the emptiness of the great? He did so in order for the sentient beings of the ten directions to abandon the conception of true existence. The ten directions are the four cardinal directions, the four intermediate directions, and up and down.

Chandrakirti says: "Like this, the Vaisheshikas understand the directions as substantial." The Vaisheshikas assert the ten directions to be a substance. The Vaisheshikas classify objects of knowledge in six categories of meanings: generalities, particularities, substances, qualities, activities, and assemblages. Substances are of nine types composed of two types: substances that extend to all and substances that do not extend to all. Qualities are of twenty-five types. The Vaisheshikas say that the directions are a substance that extends to all.

6. Emptiness of the ultimate

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Since it is the supreme purpose,*
> *Nirvana is the ultimate (highest meaning* or *highest aim).*
> *That which is emptied by that itself*
> *Is ultimate emptiness.* [6.189]
>
> *In order to overcome the grasping*
> *Of those thinking nirvana a thing,*
> *The knower of the ultimate indicated*
> *Ultimate emptiness.* [6.190]

As extensively set forth [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

> Therein, if asked: What is ultimate emptiness?
> The "ultimate' is nirvana. Because of not abiding eternally and just not disintegrating, nirvana is emptied by nirvana.

That too is taught in order to overcome the grasping as a thing of those strongly settling upon nirvana as a thing.

The term "meaning"[180] is a word of purpose or a word of that to be known.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

[180] Sanskrit: *artha*; Tibetan: *don* – of the Sanskrit: parama-artha; Tibetan: *don.dam* – literally, highest meaning/object – rendered here as "ultimate."

(6) The emptiness of the ultimate goal

Because it is the supreme purpose,
Nirvana is the ultimate goal.
That it is empty of being that
Is the emptiness of the ultimate goal. [6.189]

In order to stop the grasping of those
Who believe nirvana is real,
He who knows the ultimate goal
Taught the emptiness of the ultimate goal. [6.190]

Nirvana, [here the dharmakaya,] is the ultimate goal since it is the supreme purpose. That that ultimate goal is empty of entitiness of that is the emptiness of the ultimate goal. The teaching of the emptiness of the ultimate goal, by the knower of the ultimate goal, [the Buddha,] is necessary, for it is in order to prevent the grasping of those whose mind grasps nirvana as real, or truly existent.

The ultimate is nirvana, the state of having passed beyond sorrow or having passed beyond the obstructions. The emptiness of this is called "the emptiness of the ultimate." According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, nirvana is a true cessation and an ultimate truth, whereby it is also an emptiness. According to the lower school, nirvana is not an ultimate truth. The Svatantrika Madhyamika school asserts nirvana to be a conventional truth, but, when they set out various types of ultimate – ultimate attainment, ultimate object, and ultimate achieving or practice – they consider nirvana to be the ultimate attainment. They posit ultimate achieving as a true path, that is, a superior's exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise, and posit the ultimate object as ultimate truth or emptiness. In the Svatantrika Madhyamika system an emptiness is an ultimate object in the sense of being an observed object.

The Chittamatrins also consider nirvana to be an ultimate truth and to exist truly because it is a thoroughly established phenomenon.

As in the case of the other emptinesses, stating "nirvana is empty of nirvana" means that "nirvana is empty of an inherently existent nirvana." Similarly, nirvana is also to be understood as "not remaining constantly and not disintegrating" in that it does not inherently remain constantly and does not inherently disintegrate. The Buddha taught the emptiness of nirvana "in order to overcome the grasping as a thing of those strongly settling upon nirvana as a thing." In short, why did he teach the emptiness of the ultimate? He taught it in order to eliminate the conception of true existence of the nirvana that is to be attained.

Chandrakirti says: "The term 'meaning' is a word of purpose or a word of that to be known." This refers to the fact that the word Tibetan translated as "ultimate" is composed of two syllables that literally mean "highest meaning" (*don dam*). Nirvana is said to be the highest meaning because it is the highest purpose.

7. Emptiness of the compounded

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Because arising from conditions, the three realms
Are definitely described as being compounded.
That which is emptied by that itself
Is taught as compounded emptiness. [6.191]

As extensively taught [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

> Therein, if asked: What is compounded emptiness?
> The "compounded" is the three realms. Therein, the desire realm is emptied by the desire realm.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(7) The emptiness of the conditioned

> *Because the three realms arise from conditions,*
> *They are truly described as "the conditioned".*
> *That they are empty of that is taught*
> *As the emptiness of the conditioned.* [6.191]

The three realms are truly described as "the conditioned," because they arise from [causes and] conditions. That those three realms are empty of entitiness of that is taught as the emptiness of the conditioned, similarly.

The three realms are the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm. These three realms are called "the compounded" because they arise from their respective causes and conditions. How many subdivisions does the desire realm have?
Student: It has six subdivisions.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Do you mean the six migrations? Does the term "desire realm" refer to the migrating beings in the desire realm or to the place?
Student: It refers to the sentient beings.

The emptiness of the compounded is extensively taught in the *Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*. The desire realm is composed of:

- the human beings of the four main continents and eight sub-continents,
- the six abodes of the gods,
- the abode of the antigods,
- the abodes of the eight hot hells, eight cold hells, and so forth,
- the abode of the hungry ghosts, and
- the abode of animals.

The third chapter of Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* says:

> Hell beings, hungry ghosts, animals,
> Human beings, and the six gods
> Are the desire realm. The hells and
> The divisions of the continents make twenty.

Gedun Drup's commentary on the *Treasury of Knowledge* (translated by David Patt) says:

> There is also a division of the desire realm into twenty parts: By dividing the hells into eight hot hells [plus the hungry ghosts and the animals] there are ten bad migrations; and by dividing the humans into the four continents [plus the six types of gods] there are ten abodes of good migration.

In short, the three realms are called "the compounded," while their emptiness of inherent existence is "the emptiness of the compounded." The Buddha taught this emptiness in order to overcome the strong adherence to compounded phenomena that arise from causes and conditions as truly existent. Because the three realms do not remain constantly and do not disintegrate, they are empty of inherent existence.

8. Emptiness of the uncompounded

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Whatever does not have production,*
> *Abidance, and impermanence is the uncompounded.*
> *That which is emptied by that itself*
> *Is uncompounded emptiness.* [6.192]
>
> "By that" means "by the uncompounded."
>
> As taught before [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:
>
> > Therein, if asked: What is uncompounded emptiness?
> > The "uncompounded" is whatever does not have production, does not have cessation, does not have disintegration, and does not have transformation from abidance. Therein, the uncompounded is emptied by the uncompounded.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(8) The emptiness of the unconditioned

> *What lacks birth, duration, and*
> *Impermanence is unconditioned.*
> *That it is empty of being that*
> *Is the emptiness of the unconditioned.* [6.192]

Space is unconditioned because it is something that lacks birth, [alteration of] duration, and impermanence, [i.e., cessation or perishing].[181] That this unconditioned is empty of entitiness of that is taught as the emptiness of the unconditioned, similarly.

"The uncompounded" are phenomena that are without production, abidance, and impermanence; their emptiness of inherent existence is called "the emptiness of the uncompounded." Gedun Drup's commentary mentions space as an example of uncompounded phenomenon because it is without production, transformation from abidance, and disintegration.

If it is uncompounded it is not pervaded by being an uncompounded phenomenon, for example, the horns of a rabbit, the tail of a human being, a sky-flower, and the son of a barren woman. These are uncompounded but are not uncompounded phenomena. According to Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* there are three types of uncompoundeds: space, analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations. The Prasangika Madhyamikas set out more types of uncompounded, including emptinesses, the selflessness of persons, the selflessness of phenomena, and true cessations. If it is an uncompounded phenomenon it is pervaded by being a permanent phenomenon.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 410) says:

> **5. Emptiness of the great**
>
> *Because they pervade the worlds of sentient beings and*

[181] Production, "alteration of duration," and perishing are the three marks of the conditioned taught in the *Tri-lakshana-sutra*, as quoted and discussed at length in *Abhidharmakosha* (ADK) II, pp. 222ff, and *Prasanna-pada* VII (see Murti, *Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 191). There is little agreement on the interpretation of the second mark, which is often abbreviated, as here, to "duration, remaining." It may well be simply equivalent to "aging," as the Vaibhashika in ADK asserts.

The environment without exception, and
Because, by the example of the immeasurables,
They are limitless, the directions are great. [6.187]

- *Because they pervade the worlds of sentient beings and the environment without exception* since the two, the environment and the inhabitants, do not exist apart from the directions, east and so forth, and
- because they are posited as immeasurable from the point of view of the observed object since, when meditating on the four immeasurables, love and so forth, one meditates on all sentient beings who pervade the directions,

just as the directions are immeasurable, *by the example of the immeasurables*, in regard to meditating in this way, *because they* also *are* posited as *limitless*, that is, immeasurable, *the* ten *directions are the great*.

That which is the emptiness
Of those of all ten directions
Is the emptiness of the great.
It was taught in order to overcome conceiving them as great. [6.188]

That which is the emptiness of those, east and so forth, of establishment by way of the entity *of all ten directions is the emptiness of the great*. *It was taught in order to overcome the conception* of the directions *as* inherently existent *great*. A mistaken conception regarding the directions is, for example, the Forder Vaisheshikas' conception that the directions are a permanent substance.

The directions pervade the worlds of sentient beings and the environment. For this reason, the directions are called "the great" and "the pervading." Just as the directions are great because they pervade all, so too are love and so forth immeasurable in that their objects, sentient beings, are immeasurable. In other words, because the observed object is immeasurable it is called "immeasurable love" and so forth. We should cultivate the four immeasurables thinking respectively:

- May all sentient beings have happiness and the cause of happiness.
- May all sentient beings be free from suffering and the cause of suffering.
- May all sentient beings never be parted from the happiness that is without suffering.
- May all sentient beings abide in equanimity, free from attachment and hatred, holding some close and others distant.

We should mix these words with our continuum. In other words, while reciting them, the immeasurables and our mind should become a single entity.

In short, the directions are called "the great" because of pervading all the worlds of sentient beings and the environment. The emptiness of the directions of inherent existence is called "the emptiness of the great." The Buddha taught the emptiness of the great in order to overcome strong adherence to the ten directions as inherently existent. For example, the Vaisheshikas assert the directions to be a permanent substance. Are the directions a substance for our own school? They are a substance but not a substantial existent.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 410) says:

6. Emptiness of the ultimate

Since it is the supreme purpose,
The ultimate is nirvana.
That which is its emptiness is
The emptiness of the ultimate. [6.189]

In order to overcome the conception of
An awareness of nirvana as a thing,

The Knower of the Ultimate taught
The emptiness of the ultimate. [6.190]

The term "meaning" of "*ultimate*" (literally, highest meaning – Tib*. don dam*), from among the two:

- taking it to mean "purpose," such as "It has a purpose," and
- taking it to mean "object," what is to be known such as "The five objects,"

here *is nirvana*, the truth body, *since that*, nirvana, *is the supreme purpose* to be attained. *That* which is the truth body's *emptiness* of establishment by way of its own entity *is the emptiness of the ultimate*. Moreover, *in order to overcome the conception* of true existence *of an awareness* conceiving *nirvana*, the truth body, *to be a thing*, that is, to be truly existent, *the Knower of the Ultimate*, the Buddha, *taught the emptiness of the ultimate*.

The truth body to be attained is empty of inherent existence, its emptiness is called "the emptiness of the ultimate." The Buddha taught this emptiness in order to overcome the conception of true existence of nirvana, the truth body.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 410) says:

7. Emptiness of the compounded

Because of arising from conditions, the three realms
Are definitely described as compounded.
That which is their emptiness
Is taught to be the emptiness of the compounded. [6.191]

Because of arising, that is, being produced, *from* causes and *conditions*, *the three realms are definitely described as compounded*. *That which is* the three realm's *emptiness* of inherent existence *is taught to be the emptiness of the compounded*.

The basis of "the emptiness of the compounded" is the three realms, which are compounded because they arise from their respective causes and conditions. The emptiness of the three realms of inherent existence is called "the emptiness of the compounded."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 411) says:

8. Emptiness of the uncompounded

Whatever lacks these – production,
Abidance, impermanence – is the uncompounded.
That which is their emptiness
Is the emptiness of the uncompounded. [6.192]

Whatever phenomenon lacks these – (i) *production*, (ii) *impermanence*, that is, cessation or disintegration, and (iii) transformation into other through *abidance – is the uncompounded*. *That which is* their *emptiness* of inherent existence *is* taught to be *the emptiness of the uncompounded*.

The uncompounded is what lacks production, cessation, and disintegration. The emptiness of inherent existence of the uncompounded is called "the emptiness of the uncompounded."

Tuesday morning, 27 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 193) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B1C Explanation of the four: the emptiness of that passed beyond extremes and so forth

The four emptinesses discussed here are:

- the emptiness of that passed beyond extremes,
- the emptiness of the beginningless and endless,
- the emptiness of what is not to be discarded, and
- the emptiness of nature.

9. Emptiness of that passed beyond extremes

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *That which does not have an extreme,*
> *Is expressed as passed beyond extremes.*
> *That just emptied by only that,*
> *Is described as emptiness of the passed beyond extremes.* [6.193]

As extensively taught [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

> Therein, if asked: What is the emptiness passed beyond extremes?
> "Extremes" are the extreme of permanence and the extreme of nihilism; that which does not have an extreme is passed beyond extremes. That passed beyond extremes is emptied by the passed beyond extremes.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(9) The emptiness of that beyond extremes

> *What does not have the extremes*
> *Is called "that beyond extremes."*
> *Its emptiness of this same is described*
> *As the emptiness of that beyond extremes.* [6.193]

Interdependent origination is called "that beyond extremes," because it lacks the extremes of eternalism[182] and nihilism.[183] [The extremes are the eternalism and nihilism through holding to which one falls into the abyss of heresy, and not, for example, holding that the unconditioned is permanent,[184] or that for an arhat the series of births and deaths governed by karma has ended.[185]] That that beyond extremes is empty of entitiness of just that is described as the emptiness of that beyond extremes, similarly.

[It is taught in order to stop the grasping at true existence that thinks, "Is not the middle, avoiding the extremes, true?" For example, the Chittamatrins assert that mind, the middle free of such extremes as eternalism or nihilism according to their system, is truly existent.]

In the context of the emptiness of that passed beyond extremes, "the extremes" are the extreme of permanence, which is inherent existence, and the extreme of annihilation, which is not existing conventionally. All phenomena have passed beyond these extremes; their emptiness is "the emptiness of that passed beyond extremes." To fall into an extreme of permanence means to think and assert that

[182] *rtag.pa*

[183] *chad.pa*

[184] *rtag.pa*

[185] *chad.pa*

phenomena exist truly, whereas to fall into an extreme of annihilation is to think and assert that if phenomena do not exist inherently they do not exist at all. There are three sets of extremes:
1. the extreme of permanence and the extreme of annihilation,
2. the extreme of existence and the extreme of non-existence, and
3. the extreme of superimposition and the extreme of deprecation.

All phenomena have passed beyond these extremes.

The *Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* says: "that which does not have an extreme is passed beyond extremes. That passed beyond extremes is emptied by the passed beyond extremes." What has passed beyond extremes is empty of an inherently existent passed beyond extremes.

10. Emptiness of the beginningless and endless

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *An initial beginning and final end –*
> *Since without those, samsara is*
> *Expressed as without beginning or end.*
> *Because free of going and coming, this is a* [6.194]
>
> *Dream-like existence; that which is*
> *Isolated of that is called*
> *"Emptiness without beginning and end" –*
> *Certainly described in the treatise.* [6.195]

As was taught [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

> If asked: What is that without beginning and end?
> That in which a beginning and end is not observed, does not have a middle and that in which a beginning, end, and middle are not observed, does not have coming and going. Therein, because of not abiding forever and because of just not disintegrating, beginning, end, and middle are emptied by beginning, end, and middle...

"Beginning" applies to the initial, "end" to the final.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(10) The emptiness of that without beginning or end

> *Lacking a first beginning and*
> *A final end, samsara is*
> *Called "without beginning or end".*
> *As it is free of going and coming,* [6.194]
>
> *This samsara is like a dream;*
> *That it's without that is the emptiness*
> *Of that without beginning or end,*
> *It is truly related in the treatise.* [6.195]

Samsara is called "that without beginning or end," since it does not have a beginning or origin, [such that up to there it had not arisen and from there on it has arisen,] or an end which is a finish, [such that thereafter it does not arise]. That this samsara, which is like a dream because it is devoid of inherently existing going and coming, is without entitiness of that [samsara], is truly described in the [great] shastra[186] [after the *Prajnaparamita Sutra*] as the emptiness of that without beginning or end, similarly.

[186] cf. *Mula-madhyamaka-karika* XI.1:

That which is beginningless and endless is cyclic existence, or samsara. In general, the beginning of cyclic existence cannot be pointed out nor can its end. However, with respect to a specific person although cyclic existence is beginningless it does have an end because when that person realizes the selflessness of persons his cyclic existence comes to an end. In other words, at that time this person is liberated from cyclic existence whereby *his* cyclic existence has an end.

What is cyclic existence? Is this table a cyclic existence? Is this room a cyclic existence? Is my head a cyclic existence? Is my fist a cyclic existence? The usual definition of cyclic existence is: the factor of continuous joining due to the force of actions and afflictions. If one were to say that cyclic existence is the "continuous joining *from life to life* due to the force of actions and afflictions" there would be debate, for example, the case of someone who has become a foe destroyer in this life and therefore no longer will be reborn in cyclic existence by the force of actions and afflictions. Also my fist is a cyclic existence even though it does not join from life to life.

The subject of whether or not cyclic existence has a beginning and end is discussed in the second chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. This text says that a general cyclic existence has no beginning and no end, whereas a specific cyclic existence does not have a beginning but does have an end. A specific cyclic existence has an end because when someone realizes the selflessness of persons his cyclic existence ceases. Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas* says: "By seeing selflessness, a future end is seen."

11. Emptiness of what is not to be discarded

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *"Rejection" is definitively expressed*
> *For casting away and forsaking.*
> *Non-rejection is what is not given up,*
> *Never rejected at all.* [6.196]
>
> *That which is the emptiness of that itself,*
> *Non-rejection by that itself,*
> *Is therefore expressed as the*
> *"Emptiness of non-rejection."* [6.197]
>
> As extensively taught [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:
>
> > Therein, if asked: What is the emptiness of non-rejection?
> > Rejection is casting away, forsaking, and giving up. Therein, non-rejection is emptied by non-rejection.
>
> To reject is to give up. Non-rejection means "never giving something up."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(11) The emptiness of non-rejection

> *So-called "rejection" is truly explained*
> *As scattering and forsaking.*
> *"Non-rejection" is that which one*

> "When asked, 'Can you see a beginning?'
> The great ascetic answered 'No.'
> Samsara is without beginning or end
> Has no before and has no after.

Does not give up or reject at all. [6.196]

Simply that this non-rejection
Is empty of being just that
Is therefore stated to be called
"The emptiness of non-rejection". [6.197]

The so-called "rejection" is truly explained as scattering and forsaking; non-rejection is that not given up, [the unrejectable], the great vehicle[187] is non-rejection, because none of its essence is to be rejected at any time. [The emptiness which is] simply that non-rejection is empty of entitiness of this very [non-rejection] is stated to be called the emptiness of non-rejection, because it is the emptiness which is non-rejection's being empty of true existence, [since the essential nature of non-rejection is to be empty.]

The *Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* says: "Rejection is casting away, forsaking, and giving up." Chandrakirti does not explain the basis of the emptiness of the unrejectable, that which is not to be discarded, however, it is the mahayana Dharma. In addition, some texts take the basis of this emptiness to be the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment which are what are to be adopted and not to be rejected or discarded. In short, whatever is a mahayana Dharma is not to be discarded.

It is said that there were once two well-known Amdo teachers from Tashi Kyil Monastery, one of whom said that a pot is a cyclic existence, whereas the other said that it is not. The one who asserted that a pot is a cyclic existence composed a text on this subject of about 600 pages. The other also composed a text based on his own reasonings that a pot is not a cyclic existence because it not a factor of continuous joining by the force of actions and afflictions and because it is not conjoined with feelings.

12. Emptiness of nature

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Because the entitiness of the compounded
And so forth, is not made by the disciples,
Solitary realizers, Conqueror's children, and tathagatas,
Therefore, the entitiness of [6.198]

The compounded and so forth
Is described as the very nature.
That which is the emptiness of that
By that itself is natural emptiness. [6.199]

As was extensively taught [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

> Therein, if asked: What is natural emptiness?
> That which is the unmade and manifestly uncompounded nature of phenomena is not made by the hearers...

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(12) The emptiness of essence

Because the entitiness of conditioned
Things and so on is not made

[187] According to Conze (p. 145 n.11), the *dharma* that is not rejected is nirvana, "because in regard to it absolutely nothing needs removing."

By disciples, pratyekabuddhas,
Buddha-sons, or tathagatas, [6.198]

Therefore, the entitiness of conditioned
Things and so on is called "the essence."
That it is empty of just that
Is the emptiness of essence. [6.199]

The entitiness or very nature of conditioned things and so on is described as the essence, because this entity or very nature of conditioned things and so on is their natural disposition from the beginning, not made by disciples or hearers, solitary realizers, the conquerors' sons, or tathagatas. That the essence is empty of entitiness of that is the emptiness of essence, similarly.

[Was not this meaning also discussed under emptiness of emptiness? Yes, but it is not a repetition. That was to dispel the thought that maybe the emptiness of external and internal dharmas is truly existent, since it is established by a correct consciousness pondering suchness. But here it is taught to dispel the thought that if it is an essence existing naturally, unmade by anyone, then maybe it is truly existent.]

The nature or entity of compounded phenomena is not made by disciples, solitary realizers, bodhisattvas, or buddhas, but instead has always existed. The nature of compounded phenomena is of two types:
1. ultimate nature and
2. conventional nature.

Both these natures of compounded phenomena arise when the basis itself arises. Thus, their nature can be understood to refer either to their ultimate nature or to their conventional nature, which in either case are empty of inherent existence. Such a nature arises simultaneously with the basis, it is not made by anyone. For a similar reason the Charvakas say that, for example, the roundness of peas, the sharpness of thorns, and so forth arise without causes, that is, they arise naturally, because they are not made by anyone. How would Buddhists explain the roundness of peas? Perhaps they would say that round peas arise from a seed of a plant that produces round peas in the presence of the necessary causes and conditions, water, sunshine, and so forth.

What is the substantial cause of a precious human rebirth?

Student: It is the sperm and egg of the parents.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What is the projecting cause of a precious human rebirth?
Student: It is the practice of morality.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Is this human rebirth this human body composed of flesh and bones?
Student: A human rebirth is not this body but is this experience.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: What is it that is taken in taking rebirth? Is the rebirth the person or the body?
Student: The rebirth is the body, whereas the experiencer is the person.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: You are saying that the taker is the person, while the taken is the aggregates. If you go to the kitchen and take some food, you, Cristiana, are the one who takes the food, whereas the food is what is taken. Therefore, you say that the rebirth is the object taken and the taker is the person.

In short, the nature is not made by hearers and so forth.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 411) says:

9. Emptiness of that passed beyond extremes

Whatever does not have an extreme

Is expressed as passed beyond extremes.
The emptiness of that of just that
Is described as the emptiness of that passed beyond extremes. [6.193]

When holding to an extreme, whether permanence or annihilation, one falls into the abyss of error. This is not like holding the uncompounded to be permanent and a foe destroyer's birth and death by the power of actions to be interrupted. Therefore, one should differentiate:

- the permanence and annihilation that make one fall into the abyss of the discordant class when holding either of them and
- mere permanence and annihilation.

Whatever basis *does not have an extreme* of permanence or annihilation, which is the falling into holding an extreme, *is* here *expressed as "passed beyond extremes*." *The emptiness of that* freedom from extremes *of just* an inherently existent freedom from extremes *is described to be the emptiness of that passed beyond extremes*. As the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra* says:

> Having abandoned the two extremes of existence and non-existence and clean and non-clean, also do not consider that abiding in the middle.

This was taught in order to eliminate the conception of true existence that thinks "Perhaps the middle that is the abandonment of the extremes exist truly"; for example, the Chittamatrins assert that their own system's middle which is free from the extremes of permanence, annihilation, and so forth is a truly existent mind.

In the context of the two extremes, permanent is not to be understood as being phenomena that are non-momentary and annihilation as being the severance of a foe destroyer's rebirths taken by the force of actions and afflictions. Rather, if one holds phenomena to exist inherently one falls into the extreme of permanence and if one holds phenomena to not exist at all because of not existing inherently one falls into the extreme of annihilation. Thus, by holding the impermanent to be permanent one does not fall into the extreme of permanence and by holding that the continuity of rebirths of a foe destroyer is severed one does not fall into the extreme of annihilation.

The *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra* says: "Having abandoned the two extremes of existence and non-existence and clean and non-clean, also do not consider that abiding in the middle." Having abandoned the two extremes, one may hold the middle to exist inherently, this conception is also to be abandoned. This is in reference to the fact that the Chittamatrins, for example, consider their own middle, which is free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation, to be truly existent. What do they assert to be the extreme of permanence and the extreme of annihilation?

Student: They would say that to deny that things inherently exist is to fall into the extreme of annihilation, and to hold that external objects exist is to fall into the extreme of permanence.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Would the Chittamatrins say that glorious Chandrakirti has fallen into both extremes?

Student: They would.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Therefore, they would say that only they themselves have not fallen into the extremes? In this way, all the schools hold themselves to not have fallen into the extremes and to have found the middle way.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 411-12) says:

10. Emptiness of the beginningless and endless

Due to lacking them – an initial beginning and
A final end – cyclic existence is expressed
As beginningless and endless.
Because of being free from coming and going, [6.194]

This existence which is like a dream
Is what is just devoid of that.
This is definitively described in the treatise
Stating "That is the emptiness of the beginningless and endless." [6.195]

Due to lacking them – an initial beginning which is "That which has not arisen until now but arises hereafter" *and a final end* which is "That which will not arise henceforth" – *cyclic existence is expressed as beginningless and endless. This existence which is like a dream because of being free from* inherently existent *coming and going is what is just devoid* of the inherent existence *of that* existence. *This is definitively described in the* great *treatise*, the *Mother of the Conquerors*, *stating "That is the emptiness of the beginningless and endless*."

Can it be said that "this moment is the beginning of cyclic existence" and "that moment is the end of cyclic existence"? Lama Tsongkhapa says that an initial beginning is "That which has not arisen until now but arises hereafter" and a final end is "That which will not arise henceforth." There is no moment in which there was no cyclic existence and no moment in which there was no world. There are four types of eons: an empty eon, an eon of formation, an eon of abidance, and an eon of destruction. Prior to the formation of the world there was empty space. In that empty eon did cyclic existence exist? This is one way of debating this subject.

The basis of the emptiness of what is beginningless and endless is cyclic existence which is beginningless and endless.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 412) says:

11. Emptiness of what is not to be discarded

"The discarded" is definitely expressed
As the cast away and forsaken.
That not to be discarded or given up
Is what is not to be discarded at any time. [6.196]

Whatever is the emptiness of that itself
Of that not to be discarded,
Because that is that, is expressed as
"The emptiness of what is not to be discarded." [6.197]

"The discarded" is definitely expressed as the cast away and forsaken. *That not to be discarded or given up is what is not to be discarded*, or what is not suitable to be discarded, whatever its entity and *at any time* – the great vehicle. *Whatever is the emptiness of that itself*, the not to be discarded – the emptiness of inherent existence *of that not to be discarded – is expressed as "The emptiness of what is not to be discarded" because that* emptiness is the nature *of that* not to be discarded.

Any Dharma included in the path is not to be discarded. Are some paths to be discarded or rejected? In relation to the mahayana path is the hinayana path not to be discarded? In general it is not to be discarded but it is to be discarded in relation to the mahayana path. In other words, an awareness striving for solitary peace is to be discarded with respect to a mahayana awareness, but in general it is not to be discarded. Some might debate that it is to be discarded because it is to be discarded with respect to a mahayana awareness, however, the response is that there is no pervasion.

This subject can also be discussed with respect to the basis, path, and result. There are phenomena included in the basis that are to be discarded, whereas phenomena included in the path and phenomena included in the result are not to be discarded. This is because all paths are to be adopted.

Tuesday afternoon, 27 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 412) says:

12. Emptiness of nature

Because the entity of compounded phenomena
And so forth, is not made by
Disciples, solitary realizers,
The conquerors' children, and the tathagatas, [6.198]

The entity of compounded phenomena and so forth
Is described as the nature.
Whatever is the emptiness of that itself
Is the emptiness of nature. [6.199]

The entity – the reality – *of compounded phenomena and so forth is described as their nature* for the reason that *the entity*, the reality, *of compounded phenomena and so forth is not made by disciples*, or hearers, *solitary realizers, the conquerors' children*, or bodhisattvas, *and the tathagatas* and it is clear that this is their natural state primordially. *Whatever is the emptiness of that* nature *itself* of establishment by way of its own entity *is the emptiness of nature*.
QUESTION: Was this meaning not expressed also in the context of the emptiness of emptiness?
RESPONSE: That is indeed true. Nevertheless in the first context, [the emptiness of emptiness] was taught in order to dispel the thought "Since the emptiness of internal and external phenomena is established by a consciousness of [an ultimate] type comprehending suchness, perhaps it is truly existent," whereas here there is no repetition since [the emptiness of nature] is taught in order to dispel the thought "If it is a nature that is naturally established without being made by anyone perhaps it is truly existent." When it is understood that, even though both of these reasons for doubt exist regarding reality, there is no contradiction that true existence can be negated, the erroneous conception holding that ultimate truth is not realized by any awareness is eliminated.

Someone thinks that the emptiness of emptiness and the emptiness of nature are the same. With regard to the emptiness of nature, the emptiness of compounded phenomena is taken as the basis, its emptiness is the emptiness of nature. On the other hand, in the case of the emptiness of emptiness, emptiness itself is the basis which is empty of inherent existence. The Buddha taught the emptiness of emptiness in order to overcome the conception of true existence thinking that because the emptiness of internal and external phenomena appears to a consciousness of an ultimate type this emptiness exists truly. The Buddha taught the emptiness of nature in order to overcome the thought "If it is a nature that is naturally established without being made by anyone perhaps it is truly existent."

Some say that ultimate truth is not an object of any awareness, these emptinesses were taught in order to overcome this mistaken awareness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 413) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B1D Explanation of the four: the emptiness of all phenomena and so forth

1 Explaining the emptiness of all phenomena
2 Explaining the emptiness of its respective definition
3 Explaining the emptiness of the unobservable and the entity of non-things

3B1C-2B3E-3B1D-1 Explaining the emptiness of all phenomena

13. Emptiness of all phenomena

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

The eighteen elements, six contacts,
Six feelings arisen from them,
That having form and not having form; likewise
Compounded and uncompounded phenomena: [6.200]

Of all those phenomena,
Whatever emptiness is devoid of them – [6.201ab]

– this is the emptiness of all phenomena.

As taught [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

Therein, if asked: What is the emptiness of all phenomena?
"All phenomena" are the compounded, the non-compounded... and so forth.
Therein, the eighteen elements are:

- the six inner entrances,
- the six outer entrances, and
- the six collections of consciousness.

The six contacts are: from "contact united with the eye," till "contact united with the mind." Also, the six feelings have contact as a cause. Therein, all phenomena are emptied by all phenomena.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(13) The emptiness of all dharmas

The eighteen elements, the six contacts,
And the six feelings arising from them,
And the formed and the formless, likewise,
Conditioned and unconditioned dharmas – [6.200]

These are all dharmas. Their emptiness,
Which is that they're devoid of these,
[Is the emptiness of all dharmas.][188] [6.201ab]

As for the eighteen elements, [viz. six sense faculty elements, six sense consciousness elements, and six object elements,] the six contacts [from visual contact to mental contact], the six feelings which arise from these, that which has form and that which does not have form, and likewise conditioned and unconditioned dharmas: the devoidness of entitiness of all these dharmas is the emptiness of all dharmas, similarly.

In the context of the emptiness of all phenomena, the basis of this emptiness, "all phenomena," are the eighteen constituents, the six contacts, and the six feelings. All phenomena are included in these three. The eighteen constituents are: the six external spheres, the six internal spheres, and the six consciousness constituents. The six external constituents are the form, sound, odor, taste, tangible object, and phenomena constituents. The six internal constituents are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental constituents. The six consciousness constituents are the eye consciousness constituent, ear consciousness constituent, nose consciousness constituent, tongue consciousness constituent, body consciousness constituent, and mental consciousness constituent.

Contact occurs when the three, (i) sense power, (ii) object, and (iii) consciousness – for example, the eye sense power, a form, and the eye consciousness – come together. In this way there

[188] Chandrakirti completes the sentence thus in his commentary.

are six contacts related respectively to the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mentality. When the eye sense power, a form, and eye consciousness come together, contact occurs. In dependence on this contact, a feeling, either pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral, arises in the retinue of the eye consciousness. This feeling then induces a feeling in the retinue of the mental consciousness. Just as the feeling in the retinue of the eye consciousness can be either pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, so too are there these three types of feelings in the retinue of the ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses, for a total of eighteen feelings.

"All phenomena," in the context of being the basis of this emptiness, are also those that have form and those that do not have form. Chandrakirti says: "That having form and not having form." These two groups include all phenomena, as do the two groups, compounded phenomena and uncompounded phenomena.

What is included in phenomena having form? They include forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and non-revelatory forms. Phenomena not having form include all types of consciousnesses, non-associated compositional factors, and uncompounded phenomena. What category includes horses, cows, and so forth as well as ourselves? They are all non-associated compositional factors because the definition of a non-associated compositional factor is: a compositional factor that is neither form nor consciousness.

Compounded phenomena are phenomena produced from their respective causes and conditions. Uncompounded phenomena are phenomena not produced from causes and conditions.

Chandrakirti says: "Therein, all phenomena are emptied by all phenomena." This means that all phenomena are empty of inherently existent phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 413) says:

13. Emptiness of all phenomena

The eighteen constituents, the six contacts,
The six feelings that arise from them,
That possessing form and that not possessing form, similarly,
Phenomena that are compounded and uncompounded: [6.200]

It is whatever is the emptiness that is the voidness of them
Of all these phenomena. [6.201ab]

All phenomena are:

- *the eighteen constituents* – (1-6) the six constituents that are the supporting sense powers, the eye and so forth, (7-12) the six constituents that are the supported consciousnesses, the eye consciousness and so forth, and (13-18) the six constituents that are the observed objects, forms and so forth,
- *the six contacts*, from the coming together, or the contact, of the eye through the coming together, or the contact, of the mental,
- *the six feelings that arise from those* six contacts,
- *that possessing form and that not possessing form*, and *similarly*,
- *phenomena that are compounded and uncompounded*.

Whatever is the emptiness of all these phenomena that is the voidness of their establishment by way of their own entity is the emptiness of all phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 413) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B1D-2 Explaining the emptiness of its respective definition

A Brief presentation

B Extensive explanation
C Summarized meaning

3B1C-2B3E-3B1D-2A Brief presentation

14. Emptiness of its respective definition

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *That which is the non-thing of "suitable as form etc.,"*
> *Is the emptiness of specific definitions.* [6.201cd]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson*,* says:

3B1A-6C5B-2A1A Brief exposition

> *That "formly" and so on are not real*
> *Is the emptiness of own marks.* [6.201cd]

That "formly" and so on do not exist as true things is the emptiness of own marks, similarly.

"Suitable as form" and so forth refers to the first of the 108 phenomena ranging from form through the exalted knower of all aspects. The definitions of all 108 phenomena are empty of inherent existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 413) says:

14. Emptiness of its respective definition

> *Whatever is the lack of thingness of that suitable to be form and so forth*
> *Is the emptiness of its respective definition.* [6.201cd]

Whatever is the lack of thingness – that is, the lack of establishment by way of its own entity – *of* the definition of the form aggregate, *that suitable to be form*, and that included in "*and so forth*" – the specific definition of completely pure phenomena through the exalted knower of all aspects – *is the emptiness of its respective definition*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 413) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B1D-2B Extensive explanation

1 The respective definitions of phenomena that are bases
2 The respective definitions of phenomena that are paths
3 The respective definitions of phenomena that are results

3B1C-2B3E-3B1D-2B1 The respective definitions of phenomena that are bases

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Also, if asked: What are the specific definitions of form and so forth?
>
> In order to indicate extensively, it is explained:

Form has the definition: suitable as form.
Feeling has the nature of experience.
Discrimination apprehends signs.
Compositional factors strongly compose. [6.202]

Individually cognizing objects
Is the specific definition of consciousness.
The specific definition of the aggregates is suffering.
The nature of the elements is asserted as poisonous snakes. [6.203]

To say, "the elements have the defining characteristics of poisonous snakes," means by way of qualitative similarity in grasping.[189]

The Buddha taught the entrances
As just being the doors of production, [6.204ab]

because of just being the doors of arisal and production of suffering.

The definition of that which is
Dependent arising is proper assemblage. [6.204cd]

Dependent arising has the definition, proper assemblage, because of finely classifying dependent arising by the proper assemblage [of causes and conditions].

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5B-2A1B-1 Own marks of dharmas of the base

Form has the mark of "formly." Feelings
Have the nature of experience,
Recognition is apprehending signs,
Volition is that which brings about. [6.202]

Understanding their separate objects
Is the own mark of consciousnesses. [6.203ab]

The specific own mark of form, "formly"[190] does not exist inherently, for it is free of inherently existent oneness or plurality. The following also should be understood similarly.

Feelings have the nature of experience [of happiness, suffering, or equanimity], the mark of recognition is apprehending signs [i.e. distinguishing external signs such as blue or yellow], the mark of volition is "mind which brings about [conditioned things]." The own mark of consciousnesses is understanding separately their [respective] objects, [visible forms, sounds, etc.].

The aggregates' own mark is suffering. The elements'
Nature is held to be poisonous snakes. [6.203cd]

Buddha said that the sensory spheres
Are of the nature of doors of arising.
Interdependent arising has
The mark of coming together and meeting. [6.204]

[189] LTK, p. 433 – The nature, i.e., the definition, of the elements is poisonous snakes. As others are held by them and brought to harm, sentient beings grasp to *samsara* [and hence, are harmed].

[190] *rupana*, here interpreted by the Tibetan translators (as at *Mahavyutpatti* 7546 and *Prasannapada* 456.9) as "suitable to be form" (from the root rup); but in the source Sutra (Lamotte p. 2035), as at *Prasannapada* 544.3, it is interpreted as "breakable," "destructible" (from the root *rup*). See ADK I, pp. 24-25.

The own mark of the aggregates is suffering. The nature of the elements is asserted to be holding sentient beings in samsara as poisonous snakes [grasping others and harming them]. The Buddha said that the own mark of the sensory spheres is to be the doors of arising [of suffering. These three mean samsaric aggregates, elements, and sensory spheres].

The own mark of interdependent arising is "that which is the coming together and meeting of cause and conditions."

Here Chandrakirti sets out the respective definitions of the five aggregates, for example, the definition of form is "that suitable to be form." That definition is also the definition given in *Collected Topics*. "Respective definition" refers to the fact that each phenomenon has its own respective definition. The definition of definition is: that which enables one to ascertain a definiendum upon a basis of illustration. *Collected Topics* gives the definition of definition as: that which fulfills the three qualities of a substantial existent. The definition of a definiendum is: that which fulfills the three qualities of an imputed existent. The three qualities of a substantial existent are:
1. in general, it is a definition,
2. it is established in terms of its own basis of illustration, and
3. it is the definition of that which is its own definiendum and not of any other.

The three qualities of an imputed existent are:
1. in general it is a definiendum,
2. it is established in terms of its own basis of illustration, and
3. it is not the definiendum of any definition other than its own.

For example, form is the definiendum, "suitable to be form" is the definition. There is no other definition of form other than this, and the definiendum of the definition "suitable to be form" is only form.

Chandrakirti says: "Feeling has the nature of experience." Feeling is, in general, a cognizer that experiences. This can be debated: "If it is a cognizer that experiences is it pervaded by being a feeling?" What does it experience? There are three objects of experience: happy feeling, unhappy feeling, and neutral feeling. Experience is, for example, happiness, suffering, and the neutral. This is the meaning of saying that feeling has the nature of experience.

"Discrimination apprehends signs" means that it apprehends the distinctive characteristics of an object, for example, blue instead of yellow. It also apprehends signs that are happiness, suffering, and so forth. In short, discrimination is what apprehends distinctive characteristics.

Chandrakirti says: "Compositional factors strongly compose" (6.202d). Compositional factors include many things, for example, all forty-nine mental factors as well as non-associated compositional factors. Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* says: "The aggregate of compositional factors is any aggregate other than the four."

Chandrakirti says: "Individually cognizing objects is the specific definition of consciousness" (6.203ab). This means that each of the six consciousnesses cognizes its respective object, for example, eye consciousness cognizes forms.

Chandrakirti says: "The specific definition of the aggregates is suffering" (6.203c). This means that the aggregates are the nature of suffering, therefore, as long as we have these aggregates we will suffer.

Chandrakirti then says: "The nature of the elements is asserted as poisonous snakes" (6.203d). When caught by a poisonous snake one experiences suffering, similarly, the elements hold us in cyclic existence.

Chandrakirti says: "The Buddha taught the entrances as just being the doors of production" (6.204ab). The entrances or spheres are the door through which all our sufferings arise.

Chandrakirti says: "The definition of that which is dependent arising is proper assemblage" (6.204cd). That which is a dependent-arising is defined as the coming together of causes and conditions. In this context the meaning of dependent-arising is limited to that of the twelve links, not dependent-arising in general. Similarly, in this context the elements or constituents are to be understood in terms of the beings of cyclic existence. Thus, in this context the aggregates, constituents (elements), and spheres (entrances), and dependent-arising refer to those included in cyclic existence, which are the class of thoroughly afflicted phenomena.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 413-4) says:

> *Form has the definition: that suitable to be form.*
> *Feeling has the nature of experience.*
> *Discrimination apprehends signs.*
> *Compositional factors strongly compose.* [6.202]
>
> *What individually cognizes objects*
> *Is the respective definition of consciousness.*
> *The respective definition of the aggregates is suffering.*
> *The nature of the elements is asserted to be a poisonous snake.* [6.203]
>
> *The Buddha taught the spheres*
> *To be the very door of production.*
> *Whatever is a dependent and related arising*
> *Is defined as a coming together and meeting.* [6.204]

Form has the definition: that suitable to be form. Moreover, sutra says:

> Monks, because existing as form and suitable to be form it is called "the appropriated form aggregate."

Those respective definitions mentioned are the main ones that illustrate the specific nature without ascertaining what is the meaning isolate (*don ldog*).

One commentary says that the respective definition does not necessarily refer to a meaning isolate. There are four types of isolates:

1. self isolate,
2. general isolate,
3. meaning isolate, and
4. illustration isolate.

The self isolate and the general isolate are mutually inclusive. The meaning isolate is the definition. The illustration isolate is the basis of illustration. For example, the general isolate of form is form itself; the meaning isolate of form is that suitable to be form; and an illustration isolate of form is the color white.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 414) says:

> *Feeling has the nature of experience* of happiness, suffering, and equanimity. *Discrimination apprehends* the particularities of outer *signs*, blue, yellow, and so forth and of inner signs, happiness, suffering, and so forth. A sign is a distinct feature of an object. *Compositional factors strongly compose* the compounded; they are that which is other than the other four aggregates. *What individually cognizes* individual *objects*, form, sounds, and so forth, *is the respective definition of consciousness*. *The respective definition of the aggregates is suffering*. *The nature*, that is, the respective definition, *of the constituents is* that they hold sentient beings in cyclic existence, like *a poisonous snake* that, having caught hold of others, inflicts harm on them. *The Buddha taught the spheres to be the very door of* the arisal and *production* of suffering. These three are to be understood as being the aggregates, constituents, and spheres of cyclic existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "These three are to be understood as being the aggregates, constituents, and spheres of cyclic existence." This is because an aggregate in general is not necessarily suffering, a sphere is not necessarily a door for the arisal of suffering, and a constituent is not necessarily like a poisonous snake holding sentient beings in cyclic existence. For example, the crown protuberance of a buddha is an aggregate, a constituent, and a sphere. Thus, the aggregates, constituents, and spheres existing in the continuum of a buddha are not suffering, a door of suffering, and do not hold sentient beings in cyclic existence. For example, the aggregates, constituents, and spheres existing in Sukhavati are pure in the sense of being free from true sufferings, phenomena that are produced by the force of actions and afflictions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 414) says:

> The respective definition of that which is a dependent and related arising is distinguished by the coming together and meeting of causes and conditions.

This refers only to the dependent-arisings that are compounded phenomena, not to the dependent-arisings that are uncompounded phenomena because, for example, the dependent-arising that is space is not distinguished by the coming together and meeting of causes and conditions. Thus, in this context dependent-arisings must refer only to the twelve links.

This concludes the discussion of the respective definitions of phenomena that are bases.

We are extremely fortunate to have this opportunity to hear so many teachings on emptiness, and to reflect and meditate on them. It is said that emptiness is the best protection. This is because when we meditate on emptiness we are protected from the harms of humans and non-humans. When one practices the yoga without sign in tantra one absorbs into emptiness prior to falling asleep. In this way, even our sleep becomes a practice for the realization of emptiness.

Wednesday morning, 28 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 414) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B1D-2B2 The respective definitions of phenomena that are paths

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

To give away is generosity gone beyond;
The definition of morality is without torment; patience's
Definition is non-anger; enthusiastic perseverance's
Is non-reproachfulness. [6.205]

– because perseverance has the definition of totally upholding virtue.

Concentration has the definition of gathering. [6.206a]

– because of acting to gather all virtuous phenomena.

The definition of wisdom is non-attachment. [6.206b]

– because without attachment to anything, in order to progress to nirvana.

These are expressed as being the definitions
Of the six paramitas. [6.206cd]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5B-2A1B-2 Dharmas of the path

The perfection of generosity's giving;
The mark of morality's not having pain;
The mark of patience is not having anger;
Perseverance's, no non-virtues. [6.205]

Concentration has the mark of collecting;
Wisdom's mark is non-attachment.
These are said to be the marks
Of the six transcendent actions. [6.206]

The own mark of the transcendent action of giving is the will to give [completely one's body, enjoyments, and roots of virtue]. The mark of morality is [attaining coolness], without the pain of the defilements. The mark of patience is being without anger. The mark of perseverance is being without non-virtue, but delighting in virtues. The mark of meditative concentration is the mind single-pointed[ly abiding on a positive object in order] to collect all the virtuous dharmas. The mark of wisdom is non-attachment, [because in order to go to nirvana, one is without, or makes cease, attachment, or grasping at true existence, towards any dharma whatsoever]. It is stated in the sutras that these are the marks of the six transcendent actions.

Generosity is the mind of giving. It is of three types:
1. the generosity of giving material things,
2. the generosity of giving protection, and
3. the generosity of giving the Dharma.

In the tantra texts a fourth is mentioned, the generosity of giving love.

The definition of morality is a lack of torment. It is of three types:
1. the morality of abstaining from non-virtue,
2. the morality of gathering virtue, and
3. the morality of benefiting sentient beings.

Patience is an undisturbed mind, a mind able to bear or endure. There are three types:
1. the patience of non-retaliation,
2. the patience of voluntarily bearing suffering, and
3. the patience of definitely thinking about Dharma.

These were discussed in the third chapter of the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'*.

Effort is to lack misdeeds. Chandrakirti says: "because perseverance has the definition of totally upholding virtue." Effort is to delight in virtue. In fact, the definition of this mental factor is the delight in virtuous activities. To delight in negative actions such as killing and so forth is not effort, it is a type of laziness, the laziness of adherence to trivial or bad actions. The *Ornament for Clear Realizations* mentions three types of effort which are the antidotes to the three types of laziness:
1. the laziness of adherence to bad activities,
2. the laziness of lethargy or indolence, and
3. the laziness of discouragement or inadequacy.

Their antidotes are:
1. courageous effort or effort lacking cowardice,
2. tireless effort, and

3. effort thoroughly upholding the path.

There are also:

1. the effort of abiding in the conventional,
2. the effort of abiding in the ultimate, and
3. the effort of enacting the welfare of sentient beings.

There are also (see *Meditation on Emptiness* page 251):

1. the effort of armoring,
2. the effort of application,
3. the effort of non-inferiority,
4. the effort of irreversibility, and
5. the effort of non-satisfaction.

Just as one puts on metal armor to protect oneself from harm in a battle, one puts on the armor of effort to protect oneself from the afflictions. The effort of application is to apply oneself continuously without interruption. One text says: "Effort should be maintained like the flow of a river." The effort of non-inferiority is to not put oneself down thinking that one is unable to do something, instead one should think "I can practice the path," "I can achieve buddhahood," and so forth. The effort of irreversibility is to continually progress on the path. Some people meditate for some years in a cave on a mountain but then give up everything, in this way they turn away from the path. The effort of non-satisfaction is to not be satisfied with one's meditation, one's study, and so forth but to strive instead to improve them. On the other hand, to not be satisfied with one's wealth, one's friends, and so forth only brings problems.

The definition of concentration is gathering because it acts to gather all virtuous qualities. Gathering is also in the sense of gathering or focusing one's mind on a virtuous object.

The definition of wisdom is non-attachment, meaning the non-adherence to true existence.

These are the definitions of the six perfections.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *The concentrations, immeasurables, and*
> *Likewise the others which are formless,*
> *The perfect knower taught as*
> *Having the definition, imperturbable.* [6.207]
>
> They were taught by the Bhagavan as having the definition of non-anger, because they are attained by abandoning anger.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *The dhyanas and the immeasurables,*
> *And likewise the others which are formless –*
> *These are said by the All-Knowing*
> *To have the mark of non-agitation.* [6.207]

The [four] meditative concentrations, [the first dhyana, etc.,] the [four] immeasurables [immeasurable loving kindness, etc.,] and likewise, besides these, the [four] formless [absorptions, infinite space, etc.,] were said by the All-Knowing to have the mark of non-agitation, [because they are attained by abandoning anger;] this is not inherently existent, similarly.

"Imperturbable" or "non-agitation" means to have a clear mind.

The concentrations, immeasurables, and formless absorptions are each of four types. The four actual absorptions of the concentrations are: the first concentration, second concentration, third concentration, and fourth concentration. The four immeasurables are: immeasurable love, immeasurable compassion, immeasurable joy, and immeasurable equanimity. The four formless absorptions are: Infinite Space, Infinite Consciousness, Nothingness, and the Peak of Cyclic Existence. The Peak of Cyclic Existence is also called "Without Discrimination Not Without Discrimination." "Without discrimination" means that it is without coarse discrimination, whereas "not without discrimination" means it that it has subtle discrimination.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *The thirty-seven practices favorable to enlightenment*
> *Are defined as producing definite emergence.* [6.208ab]

Definite emergence means the so-called "definite emergence, liberation." Because of being causes of passing from samsara, they are able to produce liberation. Hence, the meaning of saying, "have the definition of producing definite emergence, producing the attainment of liberation."

The concentrations and so forth were already explained before.

> *The definition of emptiness is*
> *Total isolation due to non-observation.* [6.208cd]

Because not defiled by the stains of conceptions due to not observing things, the emptiness door of complete liberation has the definition of total isolation.

> *The signless is pacification.*
> *The definition of the third is suffering and*
> *Non-confusion. …* [6.209abc]

The signless door of complete liberation has the definition of peace by way of not observing signs. "The third" means "the wishless door of complete liberation." As this wishless door of complete liberation has the definition of suffering and non-confusion because of not producing wishes when correctly reviewing compounded phenomena having suffering nature and when viewing the nature of the compounded with wisdom, the third door of complete liberation has the definition of suffering and non-confusion.

> *… The definition of the*
> *Complete liberations is producing deliverance.* [6.209cd]

The eight complete liberations are like this:

1. The possessor of form viewing forms is the first complete liberation.
2. Viewing external forms with the discrimination that there is no internal form is the second.
3. The attractive liberations having the nature of the four concentrations are the third.

4-7. The four formless [absorptions] as already explained.

8. The cessation of discrimination and feeling is the eighth.

These complete liberations have the definition of producing deliverance because of producing deliverance from the obscurations of the absorptions.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *The thirty-seven aids to enlightenment*
> *Have the own mark of making go forth.*
> *The mark of emptiness is separation*

Through not having objective support. [6.208]

Signlessness is pacification.
The mark of the third is suffering and
Non-delusion. The mark of the
Deliverances is liberating. [6.209]

The own mark of the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment is making one go forth [to liberation].

The mark of the emptiness door to deliverance is separation from grasping at true existence, because of not having, [or being unpolluted by, the stains of conceptualizations which are] the mental objective support for grasping at true existence. The own mark of the signlessness door to deliverance is pacification of signs[191] [through not perceiving them]. The marks of the third door to deliverance, [wishlessness,] are suffering and non-delusion, [because if one correctly views products, which have the nature of suffering, as suffering, and examines the mode of being of products with the wisdom realizing suchness, then one does not wish for samsaric perfection, and also has no wishing in relation to the supramundane level by way of grasping at true existence].[192]

The own mark of the [eight] deliverances[193] is liberating from the various obstructions of meditation.[194]

The thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are:
- the four close placements of mindfulness,
- the four thorough abandonings,
- the four legs of magical manifestation,
- the five powers,
- the five forces,
- the seven branches of enlightenment, and
- the eightfold path of superiors.

The thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment are defined as that "producing definite emergence." The place to which one emerges is liberation, whereas the means to definitely emerge to it are the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment. In other words, they are the means to become free from cyclic existence.

Chandrakirti says: "The concentrations and so forth were already explained before." "And so forth" includes the four immeasurables and four formless absorptions. Where were these three explained before in the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'*?

Chandrakirti says: "The definition of emptiness is total isolation due to non-observation." (6.208cd). It is isolated or devoid of the object of the conception of true existence. That isolation from the non-

[191] According to ADK VIII p.185, there are ten signs: the five sense objects, male and female, and the three marks of the conditioned (see. n. 5).

[192] These *samadhis*, the doors to deliverance, include the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths (ADK VIII.24, Abhidharma-samuchchaya p. 135); however, the allocations differ.

[193] Chandrakirti lists the eight deliverances as follows (additions from Lama Tsongkhapa): (1) viewing [external] forms [without destroying the recognition that internally] one has form; (2) viewing external forms with the recognition that one has no internal form; (3) the deliverance of the fair, having the nature of the fourth dhyana; (4) to (7) the four formless absorptions, Infinite Space, etc.; (8) [the absorption of] cessation of perception and feeling). (Skt. from ADK VIII pp. 204-7).

[194] (ADK VIII p. 207). The first two, according to Master Vasubandhu, liberate from attachment to color in the realms of desire and form; and according to Lama Tsongkhapa, from obscurations hindering emanation. The third, says Lama Tsongkhapa, is the antidote to the corruption of delighting in the manifestation of fair forms and not delighting in the manifestation of foul forms. Lama Tsongkhapa is apparently following ADS (pp. 164, 171).

existent object of the conception of true existence is the door of liberation of emptiness. Chandrakirti says: "Because not defiled by the stains of conceptions due to not observing things, the emptiness door of complete liberation has the definition of total isolation." What is the emptiness that is a door of liberation? It is that which destroys the reference point of the conception of true existence.

Chandrakirti says: "The signless is pacification." This refers to the pacification of the referent object of the conception of true existence.

Chandrakirti says: "The definition of the third is suffering and non-confusion." He says: "'The third' means 'the wishless door of complete liberation.' As this wishless door of complete liberation has the definition of suffering and non-confusion because of not producing wishes when correctly reviewing compounded phenomena having suffering nature and when viewing the nature of the compounded with wisdom, the third door of complete liberation has the definition of suffering and non-confusion." Chandrakirti's definitions of the three doors of liberation are different from the usual. The usual definitions are:

1. the door of liberation of emptiness is the entity of phenomena being empty of true existence,
2. the door of liberation of signlessness is all the phenomena included in causes lacking the sign of true existence, and
3. the door of liberation of wishlessness is not inherently wishing for all phenomena included in results.

How are these three doors of liberation related to the attributes of the four noble truths? The third and fourth attributes of true sufferings, empty and selflessness, are included in the door of liberation of emptiness. The four attributes of true cessations (cessation, pacification, auspicious highness, and definite emergence) and the four attributes of true paths (path, suitability, achievement, and deliverance) are included in the door of liberation of signlessness. The first two attributes of true sufferings (impermanence and suffering) and the four attributes of true origins (cause, origin, strong production, and condition) are included in the door of liberation of wishlessness.

Chandrakirti says: "The definition of the complete liberations is producing deliverance." The eight complete liberations are explained in terms of the three paths of manifestation and five paths for abiding in happiness in this life. The eight complete liberations are:

1. the complete liberation of the embodied looking at form,
2. the complete liberation of the formless looking at a form,
3. the liberation of a beautiful form for dispelling obstacles,
4. the complete liberation of infinite space,
5. the complete liberation of infinite consciousness,
6. the complete liberation of nothingness,
7. the complete liberation of peak of cyclic existence,
8. the complete liberation of the absorption of cessation.

What is the difference between the complete liberation of the absorption of cessation and the absorption of cessation? The sixth chapter of the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* sets out two types of absorptions of cessation, the common and uncommon. The complete liberation of the absorption of cessation is not either of these two types. When these two are explained by the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*, that is, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, the absorption of cessation is a non-associated compositional factor, whereas the complete liberation of the absorption of cessation is a path.

What is the definition of a complete liberation? It is: an exalted knower that is not polluted by the afflictions of its own level. Chandrakirti says: "These complete liberations have the definition of producing deliverance because of producing deliverance from the obscurations of the absorptions."

This can be discussed in the context of the Sangha Jewel which has two types of qualities: qualities of knowledge and qualities of freedom. These are further divided into three each, plus the generalities that are the quality of knowledge and the quality of freedom themselves, for a total of eight qualities.
The three qualities of knowledge are:

- knowledge of varieties,
- knowledge of modes, and
- knowledge of inner sciences.

The three qualities of freedom are:

- freedom from the obscurations of attachment,
- freedom from the obstructive obscurations, and
- freedom from the obscuration of the inferior.

"Freedom from the obscurations of attachment" refers to freedom from the afflictive obstructions and knowledge obstructions, "freedom from obstructive obscurations" refers to freedom from the obscuration to absorption, "freedom from the obscuration of the inferior" means freedom from the mind seeking solitary peace.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 414) says:

> *The perfection of generosity is to give away.*
> *The definition of ethics is to be without torment.*
> *The definition of patience is a lack of anger.*
> *That of effort is to lack misdeeds.* [6.205]
>
> *Concentration has the characteristic of gathering.*
> *The definition of wisdom is a lack of attachment.*
> *The definitions of the six perfections*
> *Are expressed as being these.* [6.206]

The definition of *the perfection of generosity is* the mind of completely *giving away* one's body, enjoyments, and roots of virtue. *The definition of ethics is* the attainment of the coolness that has passed beyond, that is, which *is without*, the *torment* of the afflictions. *The definition of patience is a lack of anger*, that is, mental endurance. The definition of *effort* is to delight in thoroughly upholding the virtue that *is without misdeeds*. The definition of *concentration has the characteristic of* the mind abiding single pointedly on a virtuous observed object for the purpose of *gathering* all virtuous qualities. *The definition of wisdom is a lack of attachment* because without – that is, because of ceasing – adherence to true existence. In this way, *the definitions of the six perfections are expressed* in sutra *as being those* explained previously.

> *The concentrations, the immeasurables, and*
> *Similarly, the others, the formless –*
> *These, the Perfect Knower*
> *Taught as having the characteristic of imperturbability.* [6.207]

- *The* four *concentrations*, the first concentration and so forth,
- *the* four *immeasurables*, immeasurable love and so forth, *and similarly,*
- *those other* than the previous two, *the* four *formless* absorptions, infinite space and so forth –

these, the Buddha who is *the perfect knower taught as having the characteristic of imperturbability*, non-belligerence, because they are attained by abandoning belligerence.

> *The respective definition of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment is*
> *That which brings about definite emergence.*
> *The definition of emptiness is*
> *Complete isolation due to lacking the referent object.* [6.208]

The respective definition of the thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment is that which brings about definite emergence to liberation, the place to which one definitely emerges.

The definition of emptiness, a door of liberation, has the characteristic of *complete isolation* because of not being polluted by the stains of conceiving the *referent* object of the conception of true existence.

Signlessness is pacification.
The definition of the third is lacking suffering
And ignorance. The definition of the complete liberations
Is what brings about complete freedom. [6.209]

Signlessness, a door of liberation, has the characteristic of *pacification* from the point of view of not observing signs. *The definition of the third* door of liberation, wishlessness, has the characteristic of *lacking suffering and ignorance* because,

- when correctly and subsequently viewing those having the nature of the compounded – suffering – as suffering, and
- when viewing the mode of being of the compounded with the exalted wisdom realizing suchness,

one does not wish for the perfections of existence and (ii) one also does not wish for the supramundane state in terms of conceiving it to be truly existent.

The definition of the eight *complete liberations is what brings about complete freedom* from the obstructions of absorption. The eight complete liberations [are as follows]. The two complete liberations:

- viewing external form without destroying discrimination regarding the inner, the embodied being, and
- viewing external form having destroyed discrimination regarding the inner,

are the antidotes to the obstructions that hinder emanation. Many commentarial texts, in regard to the second, say "discrimination regarding inner form" but this is a corruption.

The third, the complete liberation of attractiveness which has the characteristic of the four concentrations, is the antidote of the thoroughly afflicted that is a liking for emanations that are attractive forms and a dislike for emanations that are unattractive.

The path for abiding in happiness in this life is of two [types]. Among them, the path for abiding in harmony with liberation is the complete liberations of the four formless absorptions. The path for abiding in peace is the single complete liberation of the absorption of cessation, the cessation of discriminations and feelings.

Lama Tsongkhapa defines the complete liberation of the absorption of cessation as the cessation of discriminations and feelings, otherwise his definitions are similar to those given in the autocommentary.

While all of us have generosity we but do not have the perfection of generosity. Thus, if it is generosity it is not pervaded by being a perfection of generosity. What is a perfection of generosity? According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system there are two types of perfection of generosity: a mundane perfection of generosity and a supramundane perfection of generosity. The *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* (J. Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Giving void of gift, giver, and receiver
Is called a supramundane perfection.
When attachment to these three is produced,
It is called a mundane perfection. [1.16]

Thus, the difference between mundane and supramundane perfection of generosity is whether or not there is attachment. "These three" are the gift, giver, and recipient. In the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*, that is, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, there is no division of the perfection of generosity into mundane and supramundane. The Svatantrika Madhyamikas say that if it is a perfection of generosity it is pervaded by being a supramundane perfection of generosity and therefore omniscient mind. Hence, it exists only in the continua of buddha superiors. For them, the ten

perfections exist only in the continua of buddha superiors. They say that a first ground bodhisattva has a surpassing practice of the perfection of generosity but does not have a perfection of generosity. Likewise, a second ground bodhisattva has a surpassing practice of the perfection of morality but does not have a perfection of morality, and so forth. What is the meaning of having a surpassing practice of the perfection of generosity? It means that the bodhisattva does not have any stains of miserliness. The surpassing practice of the perfection of morality means that the bodhisattva does not have the stains of broken morality even in a dream. Chandrakirti (J. Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> *Because his ethics are sublime and have pure qualities,*
> *He forsakes the stains of faulty ethics even while he dreams.*
> *Because his movements of body, speech, and mind are pure,*
> *He accumulates all ten paths of excellent deeds.* [2.1]

Wednesday afternoon, 28 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 416) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B1D-2B3 The respective definitions of phenomena that are results

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *The strengths are taught to have*
> *The nature of absolutely deciding.* [6.210ab]

The ten strengths, which will be explained, should be understood to have the definition of absolutely deciding. They are called "the strengths" because of being characterized by non-obstruction due to absolute determination.

> *The fearlessnesses of the Protector*
> *Are the entity of utter stability.* [6.210cd]

There are four fearlessnesses. As is extensively found [in the *Shravaka Sutras*]:

1. It is like this: when I claim "I am perfectly and completely awakened!" – although a shramana, brahmin, deva, mara, Brahma or whoever says, 'O, about that, you are not manifestly and completely awakened regarding these phenomena," a legitimate reason thought to dispute me is not subsequently correctly seen in the world.

And it is said that:

2. When I claim "O, I exhausted the contaminations!" [although] a shramana, etc. [says] to me, "O, about that, you have not exhausted these contamination..." etc.

As before, it is said:

3. If one cultivates those that were taught by me as interrupting practices, there is no situation such that they will not become interrupting practices.

As is extensively found:

4. If endeavor is made in those paths also taught by me – the deliverances (definite removals) of the arya – definite emergence will perfectly exhaust the suffering of one who produces it, there is no situation such that "definitely not emerging will perfectly exhaust suffering."

These have the character of utter stability, because no one is able to make them otherwise.

The individual perfect knowledges,
Confident speech etc., have an unceasing character. [6.211ab]

The individual perfect knowledges will be explained [in a later section]. They have an unceasing (unending) character.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5B-2A1B-3 Dharmas of the result

The nature of the powers is said
To be completely ascertaining.
The fearlessnesses of the Protector
Are of the nature of being most firm. [6.210]

The discriminating knowledges' marks
Are ceaseless confident speech and so on. [6.211ab]

The [ten] powers[195] are said to have the nature [or mark] of being completely ascertaining. [They are called powers because since they completely ascertain objects, they have the mark of being unobstructed in the perception of objects.[196]]

The [four] fearlessnesses of the Protector [are that when he pronounces the four theses, "I am enlightened with respect to, or comprehend, all dharmas, correctly, non-erroneously, and completely or wholly," "I have exhausted the contaminations and their imprints," "I say attachment, etc. are dharmas hindering liberation," and "If you earnestly practice these stages and paths you will be liberated," no disputant can be found who can realistically say it is not so. Since no disputant whatever can change them, they] are of the nature of being most firm.

The [four] discriminating knowledges [of dharmas, meanings, words, and confident speech] have the marks of ceaseless [or inexhaustible] confident speech and so on.[197]

The strengths will be explained separately later. They are called "strength" or "power" (*stobs*) because they cannot be oppressed by their respective adversary. Chandrakirti says: "They are called 'the strengths' because of being characterized by non-obstruction due to absolute determination."

The four fearlessnesses are explained in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. There are two related to one's own and two related to others' welfare. These fearlessnesses are proclamations made by the Buddha which no one can prove wrong. The two related to one's own welfare are:

- "I am an enlightened being."
- "I have extinguished all contaminations."

The two related to others' welfare are:

- "This is an interference for you."
- "If you earnestly practice these stages and paths you will be liberated."

[195] These are cognitive powers, explained in detail below (XI B.19-31).

[196] cf. ADK VII.30cd. The commentary to ADK points out that this is a unique characteristic of the Buddha's cognition – anyone else's cognition is obstructed and cannot be called a "power."

[197] These are the knowledges that enable a buddha to teach perfectly. The description as "ceaseless" or "uninterrupted" is applied to them in the *Dasha-bhumi-sutra* (9th *bhumi*), which says they arise in the bodhisattva "always, uninterruptedly and not mixed up." The *Sutra* then lists ten sets of functions of the four, of which the first set is quoted by Chandrakirti in his commentary to Chapter 9, drawing the comment from Je Tsongkhapa that other texts describe them quite differently. (Certainly ADK, ADS and MSA do not describe any of them as "uninterrupted," though "unobstructed" occurs.) In this first set of functions, the same word "uninterrupted" is again applied to the discriminating knowledge of confident speech.

Those training in virtue, brahmins, devas, maras, and Brahma cannot prove the Buddha's statement wrong. Chandrakirti says: "the fearlessnesses of the Protector are the entity of utter stability."

The four individual correct knowledges are:

1. the individual correct knowledge of phenomena,
2. the individual correct knowledge of meanings,
3. the individual correct knowledge definitive words, and
4. the individual correct knowledge of self-assurance.

"Phenomena" are the 108 phenomena ranging from form through the exalted knower of all aspects.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Bestowing benefit upon migrators*
> *Is called great love.* [6.211cd]
>
> Great love has the character of bestowing benefit.
>
> *Fully protecting those with suffering*
> *Is great compassion. …* [6.212ab]
>
> Great compassion has the character of fully protecting sentient beings that are suffering.
>
> *… Joy is*
> *Characterized by extreme joy. …* [6.212bc]
>
> Great joy has the character of the extremely joyful.
>
> *… Equanimity*
> *Is said to have an unmixed character.* [6.212cd]
>
> Great equanimity has the character of being unmixed because of freedom from subsequent attachment, anger, and so forth.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Accomplishing the benefit*
> *Of sentient beings is called "great love."* [6.211cd]
>
> *Fully protecting those who have suffering*
> *Is great compassion. Joy has the mark*
> *Of greatly joyful. equanimity*
> *Has the mark of "unmixed," it is said.* [6.212]

Accomplishing the benefit of sentient beings is [the mark of that] called "great loving kindness"; fully protecting those who have suffering is [the mark of] great compassion; [great] joy should be understood as having the mark of "greatly [or supremely] joyful," and [great] equanimity as having the mark of being unmixed with, [or free of,] attachment and hatred.

Chandrakirti says: "Great love has the character of bestowing benefit." And "Great compassion has the character of fully protecting sentient beings that are suffering." There is compassion that protects sentient beings and compassion that wishes other sentient beings to be free from their suffering. Which is stronger? The first is stronger. Love also has two aspects: that wishing others' to have happiness and that engaging in enacting others' happiness. "Great joy has the character of the extremely joyful." Joy is a happiness that is free from suffering.

"Great equanimity has the character of being unmixed because of freedom from subsequent attachment, anger, and so forth." Due to being from subsequent attachment for sentient beings and hatred for them, one's mind is said to not be mixed with them.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *What are asserted as the eighteen*
> *Unshared qualities of a buddha,*
> *As the teacher is not deprived of them,*
> *Thus are self-characterized as undeprivable.* [6.213]

There, there are eighteen unshared qualities of a buddha [as explained in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

> Subhuti, between the time when the Tathagata manifestly and completely awakens to the highest, perfect and complete enlightenment and the time when he will pass beyond sorrow not having appropriation, the Tathagata:
> 1. has no mistakes,
> 2. has no chatter,
> 3. has no forgetfulness,
> 4. has no unequipoised mind.
>
> Likewise, he has no
> 5. recognition of difference,
> 6. indifference of not investigating individually,
> 7. loss of aspiration,
> 8. loss of enthusiastic – perseverance,
> 9. loss of mindfulness,
> 10. loss of concentration,
> 11. loss of wisdom,
> 12. loss of complete liberation.
> 13. Exalted wisdom precedes and exalted wisdom follows through all actions of body.
> 14. Exalted wisdom precedes and exalted wisdom follows through all actions of speech.
> 15. Exalted wisdom precedes and exalted wisdom follows through all actions of mind.
> 16. Unimpeded, unobstructed exalted wisdom vision penetrates into the past.
> 17. It is also to be thus expressed about the future and
> 18. present.

In the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* the eighteen unshared qualities of a buddha are divided into four groups:

- six unshared behaviors,
- six unshared realizations,
- three unshared activities, and
- three unshared exalted wisdoms.

The six unshared behaviors are:
1. not having errors of body,
2. not having chattering speech,
3. not having a lessening of mindfulness,
4. not having a non-equipoised mind,
5. not having discriminations of different minds,
6. not having the indifference of a non-individually analytical mind.

The six unshared realizations are:
1. not having a loss of aspiration,
2. not having a loss of enthusiastic perseverance,
3. not having a loss of mindfulness,
4. not having a loss of meditative stabilization,
5. not having a loss of wisdom,
6. not having a loss of complete liberation.

The three unshared activities are:
1. Exalted wisdom precedes and exalted wisdom follows all actions of body.
2. Exalted wisdom precedes and exalted wisdom follows all actions of speech.
3. Exalted wisdom precedes and exalted wisdom follows all actions of mind.

The three unshared exalted wisdoms are:
1. Unimpeded, unobstructed exalted wisdom vision penetrating into the past.
2. Unimpeded, unobstructed exalted wisdom vision penetrating into the future.
3. Unimpeded, unobstructed exalted wisdom vision penetrating into the present.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Those which are the eighteen unshared qualities of a buddha like that have the character of being undeprivable because, as mistakes and so forth are not possessed, they are just without occasion and hence, are just unable to assail.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *What are held to be the eighteen*
> *Special* dharmas *of a buddha,*
> *Because the Master's not robbed of them,*
> *Have the own mark of "unrobbable."* [6.213]

What are held to be the eighteen special dharmas of a buddha have the own mark of unrobbable"[198], because the Master, the Buddha, cannot be robbed of them by their adversaries [since he does not have their adversaries.[199] They are special in that they exist only in a buddha and not in anyone else.

[198] Also from *Dasha-bhumika-sutra*, *9th bhumi* (Tog Palace ed., p. 339.2).

[199] Chandrakirti here devotes fourteen pages to an eloquent description of the eighteen special dharmas from the *Dharanshishvara-raja-pariprccha-sutra*. He lists them as follows. The Tathagata does not trip up, makes no noises or exclamations, is never forgetful, never has an unconcentrated mind, recognizes no difference [between *samsara* and *nirvana*], and is never thoughtlessly indifferent. He has no failing of his desire [to help sentient beings], enthusiastic perseverance, mindfulness, concentrate, wisdom or state of deliverance. All deeds of his body are preceded by wisdom-knowledge and conform to wisdom-

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

An explanation of these can be known from the *Questions of King Dharanishvara* [*Sutra*]:[200]

[1. Has no mistakes]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, how [can the Tathagata be criticized] due to his physical mistakes [when] the Tathagata has no mistakes which can be legitimately criticized by either the foolish or the wise?

Why? The buddha bhagavans have unmistaken physical actions. In looking around, looking intently, bending, stretching, and holding the Dharma robe, lower garment, begging bowl, and upper robe; the activities are beautiful, he has the four activities. When entering and leaving a village, town, or city, the soles of his feet do not touch the ground; a thousand-spoke wheel arises from the ground and an alluringly fragrant lotus appears upon which the Tathagata's foot alights. There, those sentient beings that have gone to the state of rebirth of whatever beasts that touch the Tathagata's foot will have extreme happiness for seven days. Even having died and transferred [consciousness], they will be reborn amongst the gods. Although robes do not contact the Tathagata's body by even four finger widths, even a violent cyclonic wind cannot disturb them. Body radiance gladdens sentient beings to the Avichi [hell]. Therefore, the Tathagata's body is called unmistaken.

The Tathagata has no verbal mistakes, which can be legitimately criticized by either the foolish or the wise.

Why? Son of good lineage, the Tathagata speaks punctually, speaks relevantly, speaks correctly, speaks truly,[201] acts in accordance with what he says. He has very grammatically precise language, has language which satisfies all sentient beings, has non-repetitive language, has language adorned with meaning and words. By expressing one statement, he satisfies the thoughts of all sentient beings. Therefore, the Tathagata's speech is called unmistaken.

How [can the Tathagata be criticized] due to his mental mistakes [when] the Tathagata has no mental mistakes which can be legitimately criticized by the foolish or the wise?

Why? Like this, he does not relinquish the state of meditative equipoise; although performing all the activities of a buddha, does not send the mind there and the unimpeded exalted wisdom vision penetrates all phenomena. Therefore, the Tathagata's mind is called unmistaken.

Just as his mind is unmistaken, he teaches the Dharma likewise to sentient beings in order to eliminate all mistakes.

This is the fifteenth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

This is the first unshared quality of a buddha.

[2. Has no chatter]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, out of what chatter of his [can the Tathagata be found vulnerable when] the Tathagata has no chatter that can be found vulnerable by mara, gods of mara's class, or other Forders?

---

knowledge. Likewise those of his speech and mind. The vision of his wisdom-knowledge proceeds without attachment or obstruction into the past, future and present.

[200] Also called the *Sutra Showing the Great Compassion of the Tathagata*.

[201] Lacking in Poisson's edition.

Why? The Tathagata has no chatter or subsequent chatter. Why? The Tathagata is free of subsequent attachment and anger. Even though worshipped by all sentient beings he will not become high-minded. Even though not worshipped by all sentient beings he will not become disheartened. The Tathagata also does not have even a little bit of an action difficult to do or uncompleted, because of which subsequent chatter would arise due to regretting that.

The Tathagata does not dispute whatsoever with the world. Therefore, the Tathagata does not have chatter. The Tathagata abides in non-affliction: without "mine," without fully grasping, without appropriating, free of all knots. Therefore, the Tathagata does not have chatter.

Just as he has no chatter, he teaches the Dharma likewise in order to eliminate all the chatter of all sentient beings.

This is the sixteenth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

This is the second unshared quality of a buddha.

[3. Has no forgetfulness]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, what forgetfulness [will give rise to confusion when] the Tathagata has no forgetfulness which gives rise to confusion about any phenomena?

Why? The Tathagata is not forgetful about all concentrations, complete liberations, meditative stabilizations, and meditative absorptions. The Tathagata is not forgetful about intently viewing the activities and movements of the minds of all sentient beings and about teaching the Dharma to an appropriate individual. The Tathagata is not forgetful about the individual perfect knowledges – meaning, phenomena, grammatical precision, and confident speech. The Tathagata is not forgetful about the unimpeded exalted wisdom seeing into the past, future, and present.

Just as the Tathagata himself has no forgetfulness, likewise he reaches sentient beings the unforgettable Dharma.

This is the seventeenth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

This is the third unshared quality of a buddha.

[4. Has no unequipoised mind]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, the Tathagata does not have unequipoised mind. [Whether] the Tathagata is, walking...

– is found at length [in the Sutra, e.g. Whether walking, standing, sitting, lying down, eating, speaking or keeping silent, the Tathagata is]

Constantly concentrating on the unobstructed concentration attaining the most profound equipoised meditative stabilization. Other than the blessing of the Tathagata, no sentient being in the class of sentient beings whatsoever, whether in meditative equipoise or not in meditative equipoise, can view the Tathagata's mind.

Just as the Tathagata is constantly in a state of meditative equipoise, he teaches the Dharma likewise to sentient beings.[202]

This is the eighteenth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

This is the fourth unshared quality of a buddha.

[5. Recognition of difference]

[202] Or as in the Lhasa edition of the *Sutra*: "Just as the Tathagata is constantly meditatively equipoised, the Tathagata teaches the Dharma likewise in order that sentient beings not mentally wander from meditative stabilization."

Son of good lineage, furthermore, due to what discrimination of difference will he abide in unequal mind, the Tathagata has no discrimination of difference?

Why? Because fields are inexhaustible like space, the Tathagata does not make discrimination of difference about sentient beings. Because of knowing the sphere of Dharma as unmixed and just equal, the Tathagata does not make discrimination of difference about buddhas.[203] Because of the natural character free of attachment, the Tathagata does not make discrimination of difference about phenomena.

The Tathagata is not favorable to those with morality or adverse to those with faulty morality; does not return benefit to those who benefited or return harm to those who harmed; is not reverential to[204] those worthy to subdue, and is not critical to those fixed in falsity. The Tathagata abides in equality towards all phenomena. Therefore...

– and so forth.[205]

This is the fifth unshared quality of a buddha.

[6. Indifference of not investigating individually]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, the Tathagata does not have equanimity that does not investigate individually.

Why? The equanimity of the Tathagata is meditation on the path, not non-meditation on the path.[206] Similarly, the equanimity of the Tathagata is meditation on wisdom, not non-meditation. The equanimity of the Tathagata is endowed with exalted wisdom and is supramundane, not fallen into the mundane.

From the aforesaid[207] until...

The Tathagata teaches the Dharma with a perfection such as great equanimity, in order to fully complete such equanimity in [all] sentient beings.

This is the twentieth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

This is the sixth unshared quality of a buddha.

[7. Loss of aspiration]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, the aspiration of the Tathagata does not decrease.

Therein, what aspiration? Like this: the aspiration for virtuous qualities.

But what is that? The aspiration of the Tathagata for great love does not decrease. Similarly, his aspiration for great compassion, teaching Dharma, subduing sentient beings, sentient beings to be fully ripened, total isolation and inducing sentient beings to perfectly

[203] Or as in the Lhasa edition, "about Buddha fields."

[204] Lhasa edition: "is not equal to."

[205] From the Lhasa edition: "It is said that the Tathagata does not have discrimination of difference. Just as the Tathagata has no discrimination of difference. He teaches Dharma likewise in order to eliminate the discrimination of difference of all sentient beings. This is the nineteenth tathagata activity of the Tathagata."

[206] Add from the Lhasa edition, "It is meditation on the body, meditation on the mind, meditation on morality."

[207] From the Lhasa edition, "The equanimity of the Tathagata is endowed with exalted wisdom, not endowed with confusion. The equanimity of the Tathagata is supramundane, not fallen into the mundane. The equanimity of the Tathagata is exalted definite emergence, not unexalted indefinite emergence. The equanimity of the Tathagata turns the wheel of Dharma since it is not separated from great compassion for sentient beings. The equanimity of the Tathagata accomplishes in its own way. It is not the follower of an antidote. It is not high minded, not low minded; it does not fluctuate its state. It is free of any observation, utterly passed beyond conception and elimination. It views the time, does not pass beyond the time. It is unmoving, unintentional, non-conceptual, non-discursive, completely unestablished, unshowable, perfect, thus, suchness, not-another-suchness."

uphold enlightenment, does not decrease. His aspiration for not interrupting the lineage of the Three Rare Supremes (i.e., the Three Jewels) does not decrease. The Tathagata does not proceed by aspiration; the aspiration of the Tathagata is preceded by exalted wisdom.

Therefore...

is found at length.[208]

This is the seventh unshared quality of a buddha.

[8. Loss of enthusiastic-perseverance]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, the joyous effort of the Tathagata does not decrease. With regard to that, the joyous effort of the Tathagata is this. It is like this. The joyous effort which is not uncaring of sentient beings being subdued and the joyous effort which does not put off listeners of the Dharma. If the Tathagata finds any vessel of the Dharma, listener of the Dharma, who is not troubled by listening to the Dharma even for an eon, the Tathagata will teach the Dharma and also not get up for an eon though [his physical] continuum lacks food. Where the Tathagata as much as looks at a sentient being, even for the sake of a single sentient being subdued by Buddha wherever, he will pass and travel to as many buddha fields as there are sand grains of the Ganges River – the Tathagata has no physical fatigue, verbal fatigue, or mental fatigue.

The Tathagata – pliant in mind, commenced in joyous effort – speaks eulogy of joyous effort. Whatever correctly applied joyous effort by sentient beings will attain the complete liberation of an arya, that joyous effort is eulogized to sentient beings.

and so forth is set forth.[209]

This is the eighth unshared quality of a buddha.

[9. Loss of mindfulness]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, the mindfulness of the Tathagata is in the most complete way always without decrease.

Why? The Tathagata has no forgetfulness. Son of good lineage, as soon as the Tathagata manifestly and completely awakens to the highest perfect and complete enlightenment, he thoroughly sees into the [mental] continua of the past, future, and present sentient beings, but the Tathagata is utterly without forgetfulness about them. He knows, just as they are, the activities of sentient beings, but the Tathagata also does not forsake exalted wisdom there. The Tathagata is without a decrease of mindfulness due to setting forth in three aggregates, entering the faculties of sentient beings, entering the thoughts of sentient beings, and thoroughly seeing into the activities of sentient beings. The Tathagata does not teach the Dharma to sentient beings having been mindful, considering, or investigating. Although teaching, there is no decrease.

Why? The mindfulness of the Tathagata does not somehow decrease. Just as he himself…

– comes at length.[210]

This is the ninth unshared quality of a buddha.

[10. Loss of concentration]

[208] From the Lhasa edition, “Therefore, it is said that the aspiration of the Tathagata does not decrease. He teaches the Dharma in order to fully complete the highest aspiration in sentient beings. This is the twenty-first tathagata activity of the Tathagata.”

[209] From the Lhasa edition of the *Sutra*, “This is the twenty-second tathagata activity of the Tathagata.”

[210] From the Lhasa edition of the *Sutra*, "Just as he himself is mindful and without forgetfulness, he teaches the Dharma likewise to sentient beings. This is the twenty-third tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

> Son of good lineage, furthermore, the meditative stabilization of the Tathagata does not decrease. That which is the meditative stabilization of the Tathagata just equalizes all phenomena, does not unequalize, and is just as it is.
>
> Why does the meditative stabilization of the Tathagata not decrease? Meditative stabilization is equal to that which is equal to thusness. The Tathagata is equal to that which is equal to meditative stabilization. Therefore, it is called meditative equipoise.

From the aforesaid[211] until...

> Because of also not abiding in the threefold realms, it does not decrease. Therefore, it is said that the meditative stabilization of the Tathagata does not decrease. The Tathagata, in order that all sentient beings also attain meditative stabilization...

and so forth.[212]

This is the tenth unshared quality of a buddha.

[11. Loss of wisdom]

> Son of good lineage, furthermore, the wisdom of the Tathagata does not decrease.
>
> What wisdom? Whatever thoroughly knows all phenomena, knowledge that does not place reliance on others. Knowledge that perfectly teaches the Dharma to other sentient beings and to other persons. Knowing the subtle categories of words through skill in the individual perfect knowledges. Knowledge abiding and teaching for one hundred thousand eons through engaging one word. Knowledge that eliminates doubt however asked. Knowledge that is everywhere unimpeded. Knowing the doctrine setting forth the three vehicles. Knowledge that fully knows the eighty-four thousand activities of the minds of sentient beings. Knowledge demonstrating any of the individual eighty-four thousand bundles of Dharma. This was indicated: the wisdom of the Tathagata is infinite, endless, inexhaustible, and immeasurable.
>
> Just as the Tathagata has no decrease [in wisdom], he teaches the Dharma likewise in order that all sentient beings also not exhaust wisdom.
>
> This is the twenty-fifth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

This is the eleventh unshared quality of a buddha.

[12. Loss of complete liberation]

> Son of good lineage, furthermore, the complete liberation of the Tathagata does not decrease. There, complete liberation is called complete liberation since the complete liberation of hearers follows the word, the complete liberation of solitary realizers comprehends conditions, and the complete liberation of buddhas is free from all clinging and

[211] From the Lhasa edition: It is equal to the limit of the freedom from attachment that is also equal to the limit of attachment. It is equal to the limit of the freedom from hatred that is also equal to the limit of hatred. It is equal to the limit of the freedom from confusion also, which is also equal to the limit of confusion. It is equal to the limit of the uncompounded, which is also equal to the limit of the compounded. It is equal to the limit of *nirvana* which is also equal to the limit of *samsara*, since it is equipoised on those equalities. Therefore, it is called meditative equipoise. Therefore, it is said that the meditative equipoise of the Tathagata does not decrease. Why? The equality does not decrease regarding that; it is totally non-decreasing. The meditative stabilization of the Tathagata also does not possess the eye, nor indeed does it possess the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind; yet the Tathagata is also not deficient in faculties. The meditative stabilization of the Tathagata does not abide in the earth element (*dhatu*). It does not abide in the water element, not in the fire element nor in the wind element. It does not abide in the desire realm (*dhatu*), does not abide in the form realm, does not abide in the formless realm, does not abide in this world, does not abide beyond the world. Because of not abiding, it does not decrease.

[212] From the Lhasa edition, "The Tathagata teaches the Dharma in order that all sentient beings attain meditative stabilization. This is the twenty-fourth tathagata activity of the Tathagata."

grasping. It is neither bound to the beginning, transferred to the future, nor abiding in the present.

It is complete liberation from grasping the eye and visible form as dual. It is complete liberation from grasping as dual: the ear and so forth,[213] mind and phenomena. It is complete liberation from the state of strongly holding on to grasping.

It knows similarly the mind to be naturally clear light, therefore, it is called manifestly and completely awakened to the highest perfect and complete enlightenment due to wisdom endowed with a singe mental instant.

From the aforesaid until: "teaches the Dharma..." is set forth.[214]

This is the twelfth unshared quality of a buddha.

[13. Exalted wisdom precedes and exalted wisdom follows through all actions of body]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, all physical actions [of the Tathagata] are preceded by exalted wisdom and followed through with exalted wisdom. Sentient beings are subdued by the physical activity of the Tathagata endowed with that, by looking. Sentient beings are subdued by speaking, by silence, by eating, by activities, by the [major] signs...

– is set forth at length[215] and

That activity of the buddha bhagavans that will not subdue sentient beings does not exist at all.

– is set forth at length.[216]

This is the thirteenth unshared quality of a buddha.

[14. Exalted wisdom precedes and exalted wisdom follows through all actions of speech]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, all verbal actions of the Tathagata are preceded by exalted wisdom and followed through with exalted wisdom.

Why? The Tathagata teaches fruitful Dharma, makes factual (or continual) predictions, speaks very definite words.

The speech of the Tathagata also makes everything known; makes to completely know; is not high; is nor low; does not deceive; does not stutter...

and so forth, until

... continues to the extent of space; is endowed with the supreme of all aspects...

which explains it as being endowed with the sixty branches [of melodious speech],[217] and

[213] From the Lhasa edition: "the ear and sound, nose and smell, tongue and taste, body and tangible object and"

[214] From the Lhasa edition of the Sutra, "Just as the Tathagata is the manifestly and completely awakened one, the Tathagata teaches the Dharma to other sentient beings and to other persons. This is the twenty-sixth tathagata activity of the Tathagata."

[215] From the Lhasa edition, "by the (minor) excellent exemplifications, by the crown of the head not appearing to sight, by a mere look, by giving off light, by taking strides and also by entering and leaving cities."

[216] From the Lhasa edition, "Therefore it is said that all physical actions of the Tathagata are preceded by exalted wisdom and followed through with exalted wisdom. This is the twenty-seventh tathagata activity of the Tathagata."

[217] From the Lhasa edition of the *Sutra*, "The speech of the Tathagata also makes everything known, makes to completely know, is not high, not low, does not deceive, does not stutter, does not dissimulate, is not cruel, dot rough, not incoherent, smooth, gentle, effective, not boisterous, not nonsensical, not hasty, not quick, not rapid, differentiating, very explanatory, utterly generates joy, is very pleasing, very melodious, very clear, uninterrupted, complete, pleasing, relevant, famous, worshipped, beautiful, without dust, free of dust, not hard-hearted, stainless, free of stain, without confusion, grammatically correct, not corrupt, liberated, clear-light, sincere, not inferior, not inflated, does not stammer, generates bliss, soothes the body, generates joyous mind, pacifies

Son of good lineage, the speech of the Tathagata is like that, therefore, etc.

is set forth.[218]

This is the fourteenth unshared quality of a buddha.

[15. Exalted wisdom precedes and exalted wisdom follows through all actions of mind]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, all mental actions of the Tathagata are preceded by exalted wisdom and followed through with exalted wisdom.

Why? The Tathagata is not to be expressed by mind, not by mentality, not by consciousness. [The Tathagata], differentiated by exalted wisdom, is the owner of exalted wisdom. The exalted wisdom of the Tathagata: has followed [the minds of] all sentient beings…

– from the aforesaid[219] until...

... definitely thinks about all phenomena, utterly and fully meditates on the branches of the path,[220] does not depend on others for all meditative stabilizations, is utterly passed beyond referents, is free from birth through conditions, has cleared away the three existences,[221] is completely liberated from all actions of Mara…

– and [from there][222] until...

... is inseparable from the sphere of Dharma. The mental actions of the Tathagata are thus preceded by exalted wisdom.

This is the twenty-ninth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

This is the fifteenth unshared quality of a buddha.

[16. Unimpeded, unobstructed exalted wisdom vision penetrates into the past]

Son of good lineage, furthermore, the exalted wisdom vision [of the Tathagata] unimpededly and unobstructedly penetrates the past. However many buddha fields of the past

---

attachment, subdues hatred, clears away ignorance, defeats the Maras, clears away defilements, subdues adversaries, completely instructs, has the sound of the (battle) drum, pleases the wise, has the melodious sound of the Kalavingka (bird), the sound of Indra, the sound of Brahma, the sound of an ocean wave, the sound of a cloud, the melodious sound of earth, the sound of the crane, the cry of the peacock, the sound of the cuckoo, the sound of the Jivanjiva (bird with two heads), the sound of the king of geese, the sound of the king of hoofed animals, the sound of the lute, the three stringed lute, the gong, the flute, the conch, and cymbals, is to be known totally, is to be completely known, is charming, worth hearing, profound, not false, makes the ear blissful, generates roots of virtue, does not impair words and letters, completely explains words and letters, has meaning, has phenomena, has time, has all periods, does not vacillate from the time, indicates to know which are and are not the best faculties, is adorned by generosity, purified by morality, perfectly practiced through patience, utterly trained by joyous effort, made effective by concentration, has definitively investigated with wisdom, is very enterprising due to love, immovable due to compassion, joyous, clear light, has definitely investigated with equanimity, thoroughly presents the three vehicles, does not break the continuity of the lineage of the Three Supreme Rare Ones (the three jewels), differentiates the three aggregates, is completely purified by the three doors of complete liberation, fully stained with truth, fully stained by exalted wisdom, not maligned by the wise, praised by *aryas*, continues to the extent of space, is endowed with the supreme of all aspects.

[218] From the Lhasa edition, "Therefore it is said that all verbal actions of the Tathagata are preceded by exalted wisdom and followed through with exalted wisdom. This is the twenty-eighth tathagata activity of the Tathagata."

[219] From the Lhasa edition, "has entered the mentalities of all sentient beings, has known the consciousnesses of all sentient beings…"

[220] Found at a later point in the Lhasa edition.

[221] Lhasa edition also has, "utterly passed beyond all levels of pride."

[222] From the Lhasa edition, "is free of all dissimulation and deceit, has abandoned the grasping to I and the grasping to mine, free of the dark and unclear cataract of ignorance and close-mindedness, utterly and fully meditates on the branches of the path, is completely non-conceptual like space."

> arose and disintegrated; it thoroughly knows them all through the mode of enumeration. It also thoroughly knows all grasses, trees (bushes?), medicinal [plants], and forests that were in those [buddha fields]. However many groups of sentient beings were imputed as sentient beings in those [buddha fields, it also thoroughly knows them all. However many were the various activities of those sentient beings, it also thoroughly knows them all]. However many buddhas arose [in those buddha fields, however many doctrines were taught and explained by each of the buddhas], however many [sentient beings] were subdued in the hearers' vehicle, however many [sentient beings] were subdued in the solitary realizers' vehicle, however many [sentient beings] were subdued in the mahayana; it thoroughly knows them all.

The aforesaid is set out at length [in the Sutra].[223]

> It also thoroughly knows the continuity of mind. Whatever minds arose after whatever [other] minds, those are also thoroughly known in the mode of enumeration, and furthermore, [realized] with the consciousness of direct perception and the consciousness which subsequently follows. Furthermore, it also observes the elapsed mental continua of the tathagatas.
>
> The Tathagata, due to having exalted wisdom like that, teaches the Dharma to sentient beings continually [according to their wishes].

and so forth.[224]

This is the sixteenth unshared quality of a buddha.

[17. It is also to be thus expressed about the future]

> Son of good lineage, furthermore, the exalted wisdom-vision of the tathagatas unimpededly and unobstructedly penetrates the future.
>
> [How does it penetrate?] Whatever sentient beings, dharmas, or fields [arise or cease or] will arise or will disintegrate in some future time, the tathagatas thoroughly knows them all.

– is set forth at length.[225]

> ... future mental continuum will not yet exist for eons, he teaches the Dharma to sentient beings by looking into the future.
>
> [This is the thirty-first tathagata activity of the tathagatas.]

This is the seventeenth unshared quality of a buddha.

[18. It is also to be thus expressed about the present]

---

[223] From the Lhasa edition of the *Sutra*, "It also thoroughly knows all the classifications of Buddha fields; thoroughly knows all the classifications of the Bhikshu Sangha, thoroughly knows all the classifications of life spans, thoroughly knows all the classifications of the abidance of the Dharma. It also thoroughly knows the inhalation and exhalation of breath and also thoroughly knows the enjoyment of the best food. It also thoroughly knows the past aspects, death and transference (of consciousness) and rebirth as migrators of all sentient beings. It also thoroughly knows their various faculties, various behaviors and various thoughts."

[224] From the Lhasa edition, "This is the thirtieth tathagata activity of the tathagatas."

[225] From the Lhasa edition, "However much will be burned by the eon of fire, however much will he destroyed by water, how many Buddha fields will abide, how much earth element there will be in those Buddha fields, how many smallest atoms there will be, how many grasses, trees (bushes?), medicinal plants and forests there will be, how many bodies of stars there will be, how many buddhas will arise in each of the infinite fields, how many hearers will arise, how many solitary realizers will arise, how many bodhisattvas will arise, how much enjoyment of the best food, inhalation, exhalation, walking, sitting and activities there will be, how many sentient beings each of the infinite tathagatas will liberate through the hearers' vehicle, the solitary realizers' vehicle and the Great Vehicle (mahayana) – the Tathagata thoroughly knows all those. How many rebirth states of sentient beings there will be in each of the infinite fields and how many minds and mental factors will be purified – the Tathagata thoroughly knows all those; yet while the Tathagata's...

> Son of good lineage, furthermore, the exalted wisdom-vision of the tathagatas unimpededly and unobstructedly penetrates the present.
>
> [How does it penetrate?] The Tathagata thoroughly knows through the [threefold] mode of enumeration of all present buddha fields in the ten directions. He thoroughly knows all present buddhas. Likewise, he thoroughly knows all [the present] bodhisattvas, hearers, and solitary realizers...

– from the aforesaid[226] until

> … He thoroughly knows all functioning things[227] and all the present earth element in the ten directions through the mode of enumerating it all smashed into atomic constituents.
>
> Similarly, he thoroughly knows the water element [of the ten directions] through the mode of enumerating [all the drops] carried with the tip of a hair, the fire element [of the ten directions] through the mode of enumerating [all] its production and cessation, all the wind element [of the ten directions] through the mode of its falling upon forms, all the space element [of the ten directions] through the mode of its being extensively filled with the tips of hairs.
>
> Similarly, [he knows the threefold sphere of sentient beings], he thoroughly knows the present sphere of sentient beings who have taken rebirth as migrators of hell and so forth,[228] and similarly knows the sphere of celestial sentient beings.

The aforesaid is to be extensively augmented.[229]

> ... because the Tathagata does not possess thorough knowing which is followed through with duality and [because he] apprehended non-duality, he teaches the Dharma to sentient beings.
>
> This is the thirty-second tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

This is the eighteenth unshared quality of a buddha.

The exalted wisdom of omniscience is
Accepted as having the character of direct perception.
Others, since of limited extent, are
Not accepted to be called direct perception. [6.214]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

The wisdom-knowledge of omniscience

[226] From the Lhasa edition of the *Sutra*, "He thoroughly knows all the present bodies of stars. He thoroughly knows the present grasses, trees (bushes?), medicinal plants and forests."

[227] Not in the Lhasa edition.

[228] Lhasa edition, "He knows their causes and cause of liberation."

[229] From the Lhasa edition of the *Sutra*, "He also thoroughly knows the present threefold sphere of sentient beings. He thoroughly knows the present sphere of sentient beings that are hell sentient beings, thoroughly knows their causes of rebirth and causes of liberation. He thoroughly knows the present sphere of sentient beings that have migrated to an animal rebirth, thoroughly knows their causes of rebirth and causes of liberation. He thoroughly knows the present sphere of sentient beings of the world of Yama, thoroughly knows their causes of rebirth and causes of liberation. He thoroughly knows the present sphere of sentient beings that are humans, thoroughly knows their causes of rebirth and causes of liberation. He thoroughly knows the present sphere of celestial sentient beings, thoroughly knows their causes of rebirth and causes of liberation. He also thoroughly knows the present mental continua of sentient beings, thoroughly knows those with delusion and free of delusion. He also thoroughly knows the faculties of present sentient beings worthy to be subdued, thoroughly knows the faculties of those unworthy to be subdued. Besides thoroughly knowing thus,...

Is held to have the mark of "open".
Others, because of their limitedness,
Are not held to be called "open". [6.214]

While the wisdom-knowledge of omniscience is asserted to have the mark of "openly (or directly) knowing all knowables," other knowledge, since it perceives only limited objects, is not held to be called "openly (or directly) knowing all knowables."

Chandrakirti sets out the eighteen unshared qualities by citing extensively from sutra.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 416) says:

The powers are taught to be
The nature of very thorough settling. [6.210ab]

The ten *powers,* which will be explained, should be understood as having *the nature* or the characteristic *of very thorough settling*. They are called "powers" because of having the characteristic of engaging objects without impediment due to having settled objects.

The four fearlessnesses of the Protector
Are the entity of utter stability. [6.210cd]

The four fearlessnesses of the Protector regarding the [following] four declarations to which no opponents of corresponding qualities are seen to say "It is not like that" are:

1. the assertion "I am perfectly, unmistakenly, and completely, that is, without exception, awakened with respect to, that is, comprehend, all phenomena,"
2. the statement "I have extinguished the contaminations together with their latencies,"
3. the statement "I... phenomena that interfere with liberation, attachment and so forth," and
4. the statement "Through preserving in these grounds and paths, suffering will be extinguished,"

They have *the entity* or characteristic *of utter stability* because they cannot be modified by any opponent.

The individual correct knowledges,
Self-assurance and so forth – have the characteristic of not terminating.
That finely accomplishing the benefit of migrating beings
Is what is called "great love." [6.211]

That which thoroughly protects those possessing suffering
Is great compassion. Joy has
The characteristic of extreme joy. Equanimity
Is said to have the characteristic of being unmixed. [6.212]

The individual correct knowledges of phenomena, meanings, definitive words, and self-assurance – the four *self-assurance and so forth – have the characteristic of not terminating*, or not coming to an end. *That finely accomplishing the benefit* and happiness *of migrating beings is* the definition of *that called "great love*." *That which thoroughly protects* sentient beings *possessing suffering is* the definition of *great compassion*. Great *joy has the characteristic of extreme*, or supreme, *joy*. Great *equanimity* should be understood *to have the characteristic of being unmixed* with, or free from, subsequent attachment to some, anger toward others, and so forth.

Those asserted to be the eighteen
Unshared qualities of a buddha,
Because they cannot be taken away from the Teacher,
Have the respective characteristic of not being taken away. [6.213]

Those asserted to be the eighteen unshared qualities of a buddha have the respective characteristic of not being taken away by other. For the reason that the Teacher does not possess the discordant class of the unshared [qualities], mistakes and so forth, they *cannot be taken away* since lacking the opportunity because no one is able to do so.

The eighteen unshared qualities consist of three sets of six. The first set is that [a buddha] does not possess the six:

1. regarding his body, mistakes,
2. regarding his speech, chatter,
3. regarding his mind, forgetfulness,
4. unequipoised [mind],
5. conceptions apprehending cyclic existence and nirvana to be different, and
6. the equanimity that does not individually investigate.

The second [set is that a buddha] does not possess:

7. a loss of aspiration,
8. a loss of effort,
9. a loss of mindfulness,
10. a loss of meditative stabilization,
11. a loss of wisdom, and
12. a loss of the complete liberations.

The third [set] is:

13. exalted wisdom preceding and exalted wisdom following all actions of body,
14. exalted wisdom preceding and exalted wisdom following all actions of speech,
15. exalted wisdom preceding and exalted wisdom following all actions of mind,
16. a seer that is unobstructed and unimpeded exalted wisdom engaging the past,
17. a seer that is unobstructed and unimpeded exalted wisdom engaging the future, and
18. a seer that is unobstructed and unimpeded exalted wisdom engaging the present.

The explanation of the word "unshared" is that these qualities exist in the basis of only buddhas; since they do not exist in other bases, they are unshared bases. The explanation of these [qualities] should be understood from the *Questions of King Dharanishvara Sutra* cited in the autocommentary.

The exalted wisdom of an exalted knower of all aspects
is asserted to have the characteristic of being direct.
Others are not asserted to be "direct"
Due to being limited. [6.214]

The exalted wisdom of an exalted knower of all aspects is asserted to have the characteristic of directly knowing all objects of knowledge. All knowers other than an exalted knower of all aspects are not asserted to "directly know all objects of knowledge" due to engaging only limited objects.

In this way, the definitions of form through the exalted knower of all aspects are the mere respective entities illustrating them. Therefore, [the respective definition (*rang gi mtshan nyid*)] is very different from the establishment by way of its own characteristic (also *rang gi mtshan nyid*) that is the object of negation of the sign.

Thursday morning, 29 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 418) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B1D-2C Summarized meaning

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Whatever defines the compounded and
Whatever is the definition of the uncompounded,
They are indeed emptied by just that.
That is the emptiness of specific definitions. [6.215]

The explanation of the emptiness of specific definitions is finished.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5B-2A1C Summary

That what are marks of conditioned things
Or marks of the unconditioned
Are empty of being just that
Is the emptiness of own marks. [6.215]

That whatever are marks of conditioned [dharmas] or marks of unconditioned [dharmas] are empty of entitiness of just that is the emptiness of own marks, similarly.

All phenomena can be included in the compounded and the uncompounded, both are empty of inherent existence. Their emptiness of inherent existence is the emptiness of their respective definitions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 418) says:

The emptiness of just that of them –
Whatever is a definition of the compounded and
A definition of the uncompounded –
Is the emptiness of its respective definition. [6.215]

The emptiness of just that, inherent existence, *of them – whatever is a definition of compounded* phenomena *and* whatever is *a definition* illustrating *uncompounded* phenomena – *is the emptiness of its respective definition*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 418) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B1D-3 Explaining the emptiness of the unobservable and the entity of non-things

15. Emptiness of the unobservable

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

This present does not abide and
The past and future do not exist.
Where they are not observed,
That is expressed as "the unobservable." [6.216]

That which is just isolated from the
Self entity of the unobservable,
Since not uniformly abiding nor disintegrating,
Is the emptiness called "the unobservable." [6.217]

Because the past and the future have disintegrated and not yet been produced, because the present does not abide, the three times do not exist together. That called 'the unobservable' is where the three times are not observed.

As is taught [in the *Prajñaparamita Sutra*]:

> Because of just not uniformly abiding in it and not disintegrating, the unobservable is emptied by the unobservable. Why? Because that is its nature. It is called "the unobservable emptiness."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(15) The emptiness of the unperceived

This present time does not remain,
And the past and future do not exist.
That in which these are not perceived
Is described as "the unperceived." [6.216]

That this unperceived is void
Of self-nature, since it's neither
Unchangeable nor perishing,
Is the emptiness called "the unperceived." [6.217]

It should be understood that time, in which these three times are not mutually perceptible, is described as "the unperceived," because the present does not remain a second moment, and since the past is destroyed and the future is unborn, they do not exist in the present. That this unperceived is devoid of own-entitiness as that is the emptiness called "the unperceived," because it is empty of a truly existent unperceived, since the unperceived ultimately does not remain unchangeably and does not perish.

The basis of "the emptiness of the unobservable" is the three times, whereby the lack of inherent existence of the three times is the emptiness of the unobservable. The past has already disintegrated, the future has not yet been produced, and the present is that which has been produced and has not yet ceased. Because they do not exist simultaneously, they are called "unobservable." The three times are to be posited with respect to a specific basis, for example, a pot. A pot that has been produced and has disintegrated is the past, a pot that has been produced but has not yet ceased is the present, and a pot that, due to a lack of complete causes and conditions, has not yet been produced is the future.

The sutra says: "Because of just not uniformly abiding in it and not disintegrating." This means because they do not ultimately remain constantly and do not ultimately disintegrate.

16. Emptiness of the entity of non-things

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Because arisen from conditions, things
Do not have the entity of the assembled.
The assembled, just emptied by that itself,
Is the emptiness of non-things. [6.218]

The assembled arises through assembly. Because arisen from causes and conditions, the assembled does not exist. Entitiness is just a non-thing. Its emptiness is the emptiness of the entitiness of non-things.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

(16) The emptiness of unreal nature

Because they arise from conditions, things
Have no nature of an assemblage.
Emptiness of really being assemblages
Is the emptiness of the unreal. [6.218]

Effective things[230] do not have the inherently existing nature of being an assemblage, [or having arisen from a coming together of causes and conditions,] because they arise from [causes and] conditions; [therefore they are called "unreal"].[231] That they are empty of the entitiness of a real assemblage is the emptiness of unreal [nature], similarly.[232]

A thing, an assemblage, that arises through the coming together of causes and conditions does not exist by way of its own entity; its lack of inherent existence is the emptiness of the entity of non-things.

Chandrakirti says:

> The sixteen emptinesses, along with elaboration, have been explained.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 418) says:

15. Emptiness of the unobservable

The present does not abide, and
The past and the future do not exist.
Those, not being observed anywhere,
Are called "the unobservable." [6.216]

Whatever is the absence of
Its own entity of the unobservable,
Due to not remaining constantly and not disintegrating,
Is the emptiness of that called "the unobservable." [6.217]

That which arises in *the present does not abide* after its establishment; that already arisen, that which arose in *the past*, has disintegrated; and that which will arise, *the future*, will arise because it is not produced in the present. These three *do not exist*. *Those* – the already arisen, that which will arise, and the present – are respectively (i-ii) the two times of the disintegrated and the unproduced and (iii) after its establishment. *Not being observed anywhere*, they *are called "the unobservable."*

Whatever is the absence of establishment by way of *its own entity of the unobservable*, *due to not remaining constantly and not disintegrating, is the emptiness of that called "the unobservable."*

The three times are not observed to be inherently existent; their emptiness is the emptiness of the unobservable.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 418) says:

16. Emptiness of the entity of non-things

Because of arising from conditions,
Things do not have the entity of the assembled.
The emptiness of the assembled
Is the emptiness of non-things. [6.218]

[230] *dngos.po*

[231] Chandrakirti: "their nature is unreality."

[232] Very different interpretation of this emptiness in Mpps (Lamotte, pp. 2149-51).

> *Because of arising from* causes and *conditions, things do not have the entity*, the inherent existence, *of the assembled* – that is, what arises from the assembling of causes and conditions. Therefore, they are called 'non-things. *The emptiness of* establishment by way of its own entity of what arises from *assembling is the emptiness of* the entity of *non-things*.

This is similar to what is said in the autocommentary.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 418-9) says:

> In this way, those explained as the sixteen are not from the point of view of different reasonings negating true existence because all of them are also proven by the reasoning of not remaining constantly and not disintegrating. They are also not proven to lack true existence in general for one person because, when the lack of true existence is established by a valid cognizer in regard to a basis, an inner phenomenon such as the eye and so forth, when one directs one's awareness to another basis one's doubt will be resolved in dependence on a sign without depending on others setting out a proof. Therefore, they should be understood both
> - from the point of view of a single person and
> - from the point of view of an individual person whose adherence to an individual basis as truly existent is very strong.

The reasonings establishing each of the sixteen emptiness are the same: because of not remaining constantly and not disintegrating.

"They are also not proven to lack true existence in general for one person" means that it is not necessary to prove to a single person that each of the sixteen bases of emptiness do not exist inherently. This is because when a person understands one basis as lacking inherent existence, he also understands that all the remaining bases of emptiness lack inherent existence. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "when the lack of true existence is established by a valid cognizer in regard to a basis, an inner phenomenon such as the eye and so forth, when one directs one's awareness to another basis one's doubt will be resolved in dependence on a sign without depending on others setting out a proof."

Lama Tsongkhapa says that these sixteen are also to be understood "from the point of view of an individual person whose adherence to an individual basis as truly existent is very strong." This is because a particular person may have strong adherence to a particular basis as inherently existent but not have it regarding others. For example, when one has strong attachment to a specific basis, one also has a strong conception of the true existence of that object.

Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas* says:

> Like the body sense power [abides in] the body,
> Confusion abides in all.

Ignorance and attachment operate concomitantly in regard to an object. Thus, there is a correspondence between the strength of attachment to an object and the strength of the conception of the true existence of that object. The fourth chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* says:

> With respect to causes and paths, sufferings and
> Cessations, "Respectively
> There are eight, seven,
> Five, and sixteen" is declared. [*4.3*]

Thus, with respect to cessations there are these sixteen emptinesses.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 419) says:

3B1C-2B3E-3B2 Extensive explanation of the division into four emptinesses

This outline is in relation to the previous root verse:

Having explained sixteen emptinesses
Together with elaboration, once again condensed,
He posited them as four.
They are also said to be the great vehicle. [6.180]

The sixteen emptinesses have already been explained, now Chandrakirti will explain the four emptinesses.

1. Emptiness of things

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Those that are the four others are to be expressed:

By the term things, in summary,
The five aggregates are expressed.
That which is just emptied of those
Is explained as the emptiness of things. [6.219]

"Functioning things" are the five aggregates. To say "functioning things are emptied by functioning things" is like the above. This is called the emptiness of things.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6C5B-2B Emptiness divided into four

By the word "things," in summary,
The five aggregates are described.
That they are empty of being that
Is explained as the emptiness of things. [6.219]

The word "things" describes, in summary, [not divided individually,] the five aggregates. That they are empty of entitiness of that is explained to be the emptiness of things, similarly.

"Things" or "functioning things" refers to the five aggregates because all functioning things are included in the five aggregates. Hence, the lack of inherent existence of the five aggregates is "the emptiness of things."

2. Emptiness of non-things

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

In summary, non-things
Is expressed for uncompounded phenomena.
That itself just emptied by non-things
Is the emptiness of non-things. [6.220]

"Non-things" are uncompounded phenomena such as space, nirvana and so forth. There, non-things are emptied by non-things; this is called the emptiness of non-things.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *In summary, "non-things" describes*
> *The dharmas that are unconditioned.*
> *Their being empty of that non-thing*
> *Is the emptiness of non-things.* [6.220]

"Non-things" describes, in summary, unconditioned dharmas, [such as space and nirvan□]. Their being empty of that entitiness of non-things is the emptiness of non-things, similarly.

"Non-things" are uncompounded phenomena, such as space, which are not produced by causes and conditions. Their lack of inherent existence is "the emptiness of non-things."

3. Emptiness of natures

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *The non-entitiness of self-nature is*
> *The emptiness of "self-nature."*
> *Since self-nature like this is not made,*
> *It is described as "self-nature."* [6.221]
>
> The expression, "self-nature," is applied to the self-nature [of phenomena] because it was not produced by the hearers and so forth. Self-nature is emptied of self-nature; this is the "emptiness of self-nature."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Own-being's lack of, entitiness*
> *Is the emptiness called "own-being."*
> *Because this own-being is not made thus,*
> *It is said to be called "own-being."* [6.221]

That own-being does not exist by entitiness (or inherently) is the emptiness called "of own-being",[233] similarly own-being, or true nature (dharmata), is described as "own-being" because it is the natural mode of being of things, not made, thus by the hearers and so on.

"The nature" (self-nature or own-being) refers to the nature that exists in all phenomena without depending on whether a tathagata arises or not. The lack of inherent existence of the nature is "the emptiness of nature."

4. Emptiness of the thingness of other

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Whether the buddhas arise or*
> *Do not manifestly arise,*
> *The emptiness of all things*
> *Is proclaimed as the other thing.* [6.222]

[233] This is so similar to No. 12, emptiness of essence, that their Tibetan names are identical.

The true end and suchness,
They are the other thing emptiness. [6.223ab]

The other thing is suchness that has arisen supremely. Its supremely arisen state is the state of permanent existence. In one way, the other thing is the thing to be realized by perfect exalted wisdom. That is emptied by that itself.

Furthermore, existence on the farther side is the other thing. Because passed beyond cyclic existence, "the other thing" is the true end; since not changing into [another] aspect, it means suchness.

The emptiness that has the characteristic of emptiness is the emptiness of the other thing.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson*,* says:

Whether buddhas appear bodily,
Or whether they do not appear,
The emptiness of all things
Is proclaimed as other-being.[234] [6.222]

The true end and suchness, they
Are emptiness or other-being. [6.223ab]

Whether buddhas appear bodily [in the world] or do not appear, the emptiness [of essence] of all things is proclaimed other-being or entity. [*Para* can mean "supreme," "other," or "beyond." In the first case, *para-bhava* is suchness, which is "supreme being" – i.e. it exists permanently, without abandoning the characteristics of suchness. In the second case, the *para* is "other than worldly" – perfect supramundane wisdom-knowledge, non-conceptual wisdom-knowledge and the *bhava* is the object realized by that wisdom-knowledge. In the third case, *para-bhava* is "existing beyond." Because it transcends samsara, the true end is beyond samsara – "end" is here nirvana, which is the ending of samsara.] The non-inherent existence of (= which is) the true end and suchness is the emptiness of other-being, since it is the emptiness of truly existent other-entity.[235]

The emptiness of any entity other than the nature is "the emptiness of the thingness of other" (other thing emptiness or emptiness of other-being). "Other" is explained in different ways.

These are four additional types of emptiness, thus when added to the sixteen there are a total of twenty emptinesses which are explained in Haribhadra's *Commentary Clarifying the Meaning*. This text sets out seventeen "achievings through collection," one of which is the collection of exalted wisdom. The collection of exalted wisdom refers to the twenty types of exalted wisdoms realizing the twenty

[234] *Nag-tso* translation, if the lines not quoted by Je Tsongkhapa are the same as Patshab's, reads:

"Whether buddhas appear, or whether
They do not appear, that all
Things are empty of own-being
Is proclaimed 'empty of other-being'."

[235] The *Sutra* (Lamotte p. 2036) reads:

"What is emptiness of other-being? Whether tathagatas appear of do not appear, this state of dharmas, the true nature, the dharma-element, the law of dharmas, suchness, non-fallacious suchness, unaltered suchness, the true end, is established. That these dharmas are thus empty of other is called emptiness of other-being.

Conze points out (p.148 n.19) that, as explained in *Mula-madhyamaka-karika* XV, own-being in relation to something else is called other-being; for example, warmth, the "own-being" of fire, is other-being in relation to fluidity, the "own-being" of water. Hence suchness and its synonyms are also emptiness of other-being. The Patsab translation of verse 222, suggesting that emptiness of other-being is a kind of emptiness of emptiness (inconsistent with the next verse, let alone the *Sutra*), is no doubt incorrect.

emptinesses. The collection of exalted wisdom is spread out over the five paths. For example, the first three exalted wisdoms – the exalted wisdom realizing the emptiness of the internal, the exalted wisdom realizing the emptiness of the external, and the exalted wisdom realizing the emptiness of both – are posited in relation to the small, middling, and great levels of the path of accumulation.

Why are they explained in this order, first the emptiness of the internal, then the emptiness of the external, and so forth? It is said that the emptiness of the internal is explained first because we have greater familiarity with the basis of this emptiness.

Aryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas* says that when one realizes the emptiness of one of the twenty emptinesses, one also indirectly realizes the remaining without need to depend on a reason.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Those were proclaimed thus*
> *Through the manner of the wisdom gone beyond.* [6.223cd]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *These explanations were proclaimed*
> *In the* Prajnaparamita Sutras. [6.223cd]

These emptinesses are explained in the Sutras, for they are proclaimed just as explained above in the Sutras about the transcendent action of wisdom.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 419) says:

1. Emptiness of things

> *The term "thing" refers in brief*
> *To the five aggregates.*
> *Whatever is their emptiness*
> *Is explained to be the emptiness of things.* [6.219]

The term "thing" of "the emptiness of things" *refers to the five aggregates*. Moreover, it refers to them *in brief*, or in general, without distinguishing them. *Whatever is the emptiness of* inherent existence of *those* five aggregates, *is explained* in brief *to be the emptiness of things*.

2. Emptiness of non-things

> *In brief, non-things*
> *Are said to be uncompounded phenomena.*
> *The emptiness of non-things, they themselves,*
> *Is the emptiness of non-things.* [6.220]

In brief, without distinguishing them, *non-things are said to be the uncompounded*, space and so forth and nirvana. *The emptiness of* inherent existence of those *non-things*, the uncompounded, *is* called "*The emptiness of non-things*."

While Chandrakirti says "space, nirvana, and so forth," Lama Tsongkhapa says "space and so forth and nirvana." How many nirvanas are there? There are three types: nirvana with remainder, nirvana without remainder, and non-abiding nirvana. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that a nirvana with remainder is a nirvana that has the remainder of the appearance of true existence, whereas a nirvana

without remainder is nirvana without the remainder of the appearance of true existence. On the other hand, the lower schools say that a nirvana with remainder is a nirvana that has the remainder of the suffering aggregates, whereas a nirvana without remainder is a nirvana that does not have the remainder of the suffering aggregates.

Space and nirvana are examples of uncompounded phenomena.

A distinction has to be made between "non-things that are phenomena" and "non-things." Non-things that are phenomena are space, true cessations, and so forth. Non-things are those that are empty of being able to perform a function. Non-things are of two types: those that exist and those that do not exist. Those that exist are space, true cessations, and emptiness. Those that do not exist are the son of a barren woman, inherent existence, a sky-flower, and the horns of a rabbit.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 419) says:

3. Emptiness of natures

The lack of entity of the nature,
Is the emptiness of that called "nature."
It is referred to as "nature"
Since such a nature is not made. [6.221]

The nature is the nature that is reality because *such a nature* abides as the mode of being of things *without being made* by hearers and so forth. That nature, or reality, *is called the* emptiness of *nature* – the lack of inherent existence.

4. Emptiness of the thingness of other

Whether buddhas actually
Arise or do not arise,
The emptiness of all things
Is thoroughly proclaimed to be the thingness of other. [6.222]

The perfect end and thusness
Is the emptiness of the thingness of other. [6.223ab]

Whether buddhas arise – that is, arise in the world – *or do not arise, the emptiness* of inherent existence *of all things is thoroughly proclaimed to be the thingness*, or entity, *of other*. Here, Nagtsho's translation is best:

Whether buddhas arise or
Do not arise, the very nature –
The emptiness of all things –
Is proclaimed to be the emptiness of the entity of other. [6.222]

An equivalent term for "entity of other" (*gzhan gyi ngo bo*) since it encompass the three – supreme (*mchog*), other (*gzhan*), and beyond (*pha rol*) – is, in the first case, "the suchness that arises as supreme." The meaning of "arises as supreme" is to exist without passing beyond the definition of suchness. In the second case, "other" is the highest exalted wisdom which is other than the mundane, that is, the supramundane – a non-conceptual exalted wisdom. Thingness or entity is what is realized by that exalted wisdom. In the third case, what exists on the far shore is the entity of other. Moreover, the far shore of cyclic existence, because of having passed beyond cyclic existence, is *the perfect end*; the end being the nirvana that is the extinguishment of cyclic existence. Since it does not transform into another aspect other than the characteristic of suchness, it is *thusness*. The emptiness that has the characteristic of being empty of the inherent existence of that itself *is* called "*the emptiness of the thingness*, or the entity, *of other*."

Although the emptiness of nature and so forth were explained previously, here the explanation is not a repetition in that here it is from the point of view of the middling division. When asserting that which occurs repeatedly in the context of both the latter two explanations – the extensive and

middling – to be (i) reality, that is, the [mode of] being of things, (ii) existing always, and (iii) existing as the object of comprehension of non-conceptual exalted wisdom, the aim is to eliminate the qualm thinking "It is truly existent." Therefore, they should be understood to not be contradictory.

These are thoroughly proclaimed according
To the manner of the Perfection of Wisdom*.* [6.223cd]

The explanation here of the emptinesses which are like that *is thoroughly proclaimed*, that is, explained, *according to the manner of the Perfection of Wisdom* – the way in which they are divided and the way in which they are empty in the *Mother of Conquerors*.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that here Nagtsho's translation of Chandrakirti's autocommentary is better than Patshab's translation. Patshab was the first to translate this text from Sanskrit into Tibetan, allowing Nagtsho to improve it in his own translation.

There is an emptiness of nature included among both the sixteen emptinesses and the four emptinesses, however, there is no redundancy in also including it in the four emptinesses because previously it was set forth in the context of the extensive division of emptiness, whereas here it is set forth in the context of the middling division. The small division of emptiness, the division of emptiness into two types – the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena – was mentioned previously.

Thursday afternoon, 29 March 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 420) says:

3B1C-2B4 Final summary in terms of expressing the qualities of the ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Now, in order to fully complete the chapter of wisdom by way of expressing the perfect uncommon qualities of the bodhisattvas with superior appreciation for the wisdom gone beyond, it is explained:

He who produced the brilliance with rays of intellect like that,
Realizing, like a myrobalan fruit resting in his hand,
These three existences without exception as unborn from the beginning,
Proceeds to cessation by the strength of the nominal truth. [6.224]

There, the term "like that" is for the purpose of closely indicating the complete analysis that was explained. He who produced the brilliance that destroyed the darkness preventing seeing suchness with light rays of intellect arisen from the complete analysis that was explained is said thus about the bodhisattva that has it. He will absorb in cessation by the strength of the conventional truth.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-6D Conclusion, describing the qualities of the stage

Having created clear light with rays of wisdom thus,
He perceives, like an olive resting in his hand, all these
Three realms as without production from the beginning,
And, by the power of conventional truth, goes to cessation. [6.224]

The bodhisattva abiding in the sixth stage, who with light rays of wisdom [arisen from analysis] in the way explained above, makes clear light [which dispels the darkness of obstructions to seeing suchness], by the power of conventional truth (or conventionally) goes to the absorption on cessation; for he directly perceives all these

three realms, like an olive (or literally, probably a fruit of *Emblic Myrobalan*) resting in his hand, as without [inherent] production from the beginning.

On the sixth ground, the bodhisattvas attains a surpassing perfection of wisdom. This bodhisattva possesses qualities that are uncommon to the bodhisattvas on the lower grounds: he has the wisdom realizing the coarse and subtle twelve links and realizing the lack of inherent existence since the beginning of the three existences (the three existences are either above, on, and below the ground or the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm). Chandrakirti says: "Realizing, like a myrobalan fruit resting in his hand, these three existences without exception as unborn from the beginning." Sixth ground bodhisattvas see the reality of the three existences as clearly as one sees an olive (or a myrobalan fruit) in the palm of one's hand.

"[He] proceeds to cessation by the strength of the nominal truth" means that conventionally he proceeds to cessation in the sense of absorbing into it. This "cessation" is not a true cessation, it is the absorption of cessation. There are two types of absorptions of cessation, a common and an uncommon. This was mentioned earlier in the *Supplement* saying:

> *Approaching the qualities of a perfect buddha*
> *And seeing the suchness of arising-dependent-upon-this*[i]
> *Due to which they abide in wisdom, [bodhisattvas]*
> *On the Manifest, abiding in equipoise, attain cessation.* [6.1]

Thus, this cessation is not that in the context of the four noble truths, rather it is the absorption of cessation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> "Nor does he discard the thought of fully protecting migrators due to the entity of cessation," is explained:
>
> *Though always possessing thought pertaining to cessation,*
> *He still produces compassion for protectorless migrators.* [6.225ab]
>
> Since his behavior pertains to samsara and his higher thought pertains to nirvana, his compassion for protectorless migrators will very greatly increase.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Always, although he has the thought belonging to cessation*
> *Still he generates compassion for protectorless sentient beings.* [6.225ab]

Although he is absorbed in cessation, he does not abandon the thought of protecting sentient beings, for always, although he has the thought belonging to cessation, or clear light, still he generates compassion for protectorless sentient beings. [Therefore, his action belongs to samsara and his thought to nirvan□.]

Although this bodhisattva absorbs into cessation, he does not give up the welfare of sentient beings who lack a protector. In other words, he does not lessen his compassion for sentient beings, instead it increases through his absorbing into cessation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Above that, he will also defeat by mind those born from
The Sugata's speech along with the middling buddhas, without exception. [6.225cd]

Those who are together with intermediate buddhas are those along with the middling buddhas. Who are they? They are those born from the speech of the Sugata, meaning "the hearers." Further above the sixth bodhisattva ground, on the seventh and so forth, he will also defeat all those with his wisdom.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

Above this, he also mentally outshines all those
Born from the Sugata's speech, besides the intermediate buddhas. [6.225cd]

He, above this sixth stage, in the seventh stage, surpasses [or outshines] all the hearers born from the teaching of the sugatas, and the "intermediate buddhas" or solitary realizers, mentally also; for on the seventh stage he can enter and leave the absorption of cessation in every instant.

When the sixth grounder achieves the seventh ground he defeats or outshines the hearers, solitary realizers, and the bodhisattvas on the sixth ground and below by way of his intelligence. That is, the seventh grounder outshines them due to his capacity to enter into and arise from cessation in the shortest moment of an action, the duration of a fingersnap.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Spreading vast white wings of the conventional and thusness,
The king of swans, having advanced in front of the swans of beings,
Proceeds to the supreme further shore of the ocean of the conqueror's
Qualities with the powerful strength of the wind of virtue. [6.226]

His conventional qualities will also blaze exceedingly. Due to what? He, together with the swans of beings who produce perfection, will proceed to the further shore of the ocean of the qualities of the conqueror. The two truths are the two vast wings.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

Spreading his broad, white wings of the conventional and the real,
That king of geese leads the geese of ordinary beings,
And by the power of the strength of the wind of virtues, he goes
To the supreme far shore of the ocean, the qualities of the conquerors. [6.226]

He goes to buddhahood by the path of pure method and wisdom, for he is the king of geese who, stretching out his broad, white, right and left wings of the conventional, the vast stage of the path, and the profound stage of the path, realizing suchness, leads the geese who are the people to be tamed, and by the power of the great strength of the wind of [previously accumulated] virtues, goes to the supreme far shore of the ocean, the qualities of the conquerors.

The king of swans, this sixth grounder, advances to the fore of other swans, that is, ordinary beings, by spreading his right and left wings, the conventional truth and ultimate truth, whereby he achieves the buddha ground.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

The explanation of the sixth mind generation is finished, the sixth mind generation from the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way."'*

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 420) says:

In order to complete the chapter on the perfection of wisdom in terms of expressing the uncommon qualities of bodhisattvas who strongly believe in the perfection of wisdom it is explained:

Those who illuminate with the rays of intelligence like that,
Realizing, like an olive resting in their hand,
That from the start the three existences without exception are not produced,
Go to cessation by the force of nominal truth. [6.224]

The bodhisattvas *who illuminate* the darkness preventing the seeing of suchness *with the* light *rays of intelligence* arising from thorough analysis *like* that of the aspects of the previous explanation, directly *realizing, like* the fruit of a fresh *olive resting in their hand, that from the start the three existences without exception are not produced* inherently, also *go to cessation* – that is, absorb into it – *by the force of nominal*, or conventional, *truth*, i.e., conventionally.

The statement "Although gone to the entity of cessation, they do not give up the thought of protecting migrating beings" is explained:

Though they indeed always have the thought pertaining to cessation,
Still they also generate compassion for protectorless migrating beings. [6.225ab]

Though sixth ground bodhisattvas *indeed always have the thought pertaining to cessation*, or clear light, *still they also generate*, develop, their *compassion for protectorless migrating beings*. Because of that, their actions pertain to cyclic existence and their thought to nirvana.

Above that, they also overcome all those born from the Sugata's speech
Along with the middling buddhas without exception by their intelligence. [6.225cd]

Sixth-grounders *above* – that is, after – the sixth ground *also overwhelm*, or surpass, *all those born from the Sugata's speech* (the hearers) *along with the middling buddhas* (the solitary realizers) *without exception by* the strength of *their intelligence*.

The king of swans spreading his broad, white wings of the conventional and suchness,
Having advanced to the fore of the swans of ordinary beings,
Proceeds to the supreme shore of the ocean of qualities of a conqueror
By the force of the strength of the wind of virtue. [6.226]

The sixth-grounder, *the king of swans spreading his broad, white wings*, the right and left, *of* the stages of the vast path, *the conventional*, *and* of the stages of the profound path, *suchness*, *having advanced to the fore of the* outstanding *swans of ordinary beings* who are to be subdued, *proceeds to the supreme shore of the* great *ocean of qualities of a conqueror*, a buddha, *by the force of the* great *strength of the wind of virtue* accumulated in many previous lives. Therefore, those wishing to subsequently train in this must progress with the wings of both stages of the path, yet they should progress to the buddha ground by means of a path complete in both method and wisdom without being satisfied by not having one of the two wings or by having one broken wing, a partial path.

This is the explanation of the sixth ultimate mind generation in the *Illumination of the Thought, An Extensive Explanation of [Chandrakirti's] 'Supplement to the Middle Way.'*

We too need the understanding of the conventional truth and ultimate truth, the two aspects of the path, the vast and the profound, in order to proceed to buddhahood. Only by means of these two wings can be fly to buddhahood. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "they should progress to the buddha ground by means of a path complete in both method and wisdom without being satisfied by not having one of the two wings or by having one broken wing, a partial path." If one has only one wing

or a broken wing, one will not be able to proceed to buddhahood. In the second chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* Maitreya says:

> *Through knowledge, not abiding in existence;*
> *Through compassion, not abiding in peace;* [*1.10]*

Due to the wisdom realizing the selflessness of persons one is liberated from cyclic existence, and due to compassion one does not abide in solitary peace. Therefore, one needs to develop both wisdom, the wisdom realizing selflessness, and method, compassion for sentient beings.

It is said that when one studies or reads the *Middle Way*, one should not do so in a dry way, that is, like reading a newspaper. Instead it should be applied to one's own mind in order to overcome the afflictions, it should become a means to subdue and improve one's own mind. Therefore, we should make sure that our study of this text acts to pacify our mind. On the other hand, sometimes it happens that due to studying the great texts, instead of one's mind becoming pacified, the afflictions actually become stronger. There is a story about a monk who studied all the great texts in their entirety but, unable to use this study as a means to subdue his mind, was reborn as a human being with the ears of a donkey. Thus, whatever listening or studying we do, we should make sure that we use it to subdue our own mind.

In conclusion, we should understand that all phenomena do not exist inherently but are merely imputed by conception. Because of this, the presentation of the relationship of causes and results and agents and actions is feasible. We should make sure that our understanding of one truth helps improve our understanding of the other truth.

Although there are many things that Chandrakirti could have taken as his object of worship at the beginning of the *Supplement*, he pays homage to compassion. This shows that compassion is the necessary foundation for proceeding to buddhahood, that is, it is the substantial cause for the mahayana conventional mind of enlightenment. In order to understand the importance of generating compassion, one should meditate on the verse from the *Supplement* (J. Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*):

> *Homage to that compassion for migrators who are*
> *Powerless like a bucket traveling in a well*
> *Through initially adhering to a self, an 'I',*
> *And then generating attachment for things, 'This is mine.'* [1.3]

We wander in cyclic existence because of first conceiving "I" and then "mine." Due to this condition, we accumulate actions and circle in cyclic existence. In order to destroy these two conceptions, we need to cultivate the realizations of the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. In other words, we have to realize selflessness and come under the influence of compassion. We need to transform our mind into the aspect of love and compassion.

Friday morning, 30 March 2001

THE SEVENTH MIND GENERATION

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 422) says:

3B1C-2C Explaining the four grounds, the Gone Afar and so forth

1 Explaining the seventh ground
2 Explaining the eighth ground
3 Explaining the ninth ground
4 Explaining the tenth ground

3B1C-2C1 Explaining the seventh ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Now, to explain from the point of view of the seventh mind generation:

On this, the Gone Afar, instant by
Instant he will enter cessation and
The method gone beyond will also blaze well. [7.1abc]

The absorption on cessation is the absorption on the true end. Hence, it is called "cessation in suchness," because all elaborations are ceased in it. Here on the seventh ground, Gone Afar, the bodhisattva will absorb instant by instant in that cessation attained on the sixth ground.

As is extensively taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:

> O children of the Conqueror, on the sixth ground of the bodhisattva and below, the bodhisattva absorbs in cessation. The bodhisattva abiding on this seventh ground of the bodhisattva, also absorbs in cessation and arises mental-instant by mental-instant. He does not manifest cessation.

He will also fully purify greatly the skill in means gone beyond.

Method, prayer, strength and exalted wisdom are to be known to operate on special aspects of the wisdom [gone beyond][236] itself. "Wisdom gone beyond" is expressed only in the context of thorough discrimination; not in others.

The Seventh Mind Generation from the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way."'*

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-7 Explanation of the seventh stage, Gone Far

In this one, Gone Far, he can, in every
Instant, enter cessation, and
The transcendent action of means attains full bloom. [7.1abc]

This bodhisattva, dwelling in this seventh stage, Gone Far, attains qualities which are superior to those of the sixth stage; for in each instant, he can enter meditation on cessation, and also he attains the full blossoming of the transcendent action of means.

[236] LTK, p. 442.

When the sixth ground bodhisattva attains the seventh ground, he has the capacity to enter into and arise from the absorption of cessation, the perfect end, in the shortest moment of a complete action. On the seventh ground, he outshines the hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers due to his intelligence, whereas on the first ground he outshone them due to his lineage. The hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers lack the ability to enter into and arise from the absorption of cessation in the shortest moment of a complete action. However, does the seventh ground bodhisattva actualize cessation, the perfect end? He does not because he does not enter the perfect end in a manner of not arising again. To actualize the perfect end or cessation means to enter into it in a manner of not arising again, that is to not arise from meditative equipoise into subsequent attainment. For a buddha, meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment are not contradictory. For this reason, a buddha, while in meditative equipoise, is still able to perform the activities of subsequent attainment. Therefore, a tathagata enters cessation – the perfect end or reality – in a manner of not arising again.

In short, on the sixth ground the bodhisattva attains the surpassing perfection of wisdom, on the seventh ground he attains the surpassing perfection of method, on the eight ground he attains the surpassing perfection of prayer, on the ninth ground he attains the surpassing perfection of power, and on the tenth ground he attains the surpassing perfection of exalted wisdom. Chandrakirti says: "Method, prayer, strength and exalted wisdom are to be known to operate on special aspects of the wisdom [gone beyond] itself. 'Wisdom gone beyond' is expressed only in the context of thorough discrimination; not in others." This means that the name "wisdom gone beyond" or the "perfection of wisdom" does not apply to the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds.

"Method" or "means" in the context of the perfection of method can be subdivided into two groups: the six internal methods and the six external methods.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 422) says:

> *Here, on the Gone Afar, he enters*
> *Into cessation instant by instant and also*
> *Attains an excellently blazing perfection of means.* [7.1abc]

Here, *on* the seventh ground, *the Gone Afar*, the bodhisattva *absorbs into* the *cessation* that was attained on the sixth ground *instant by instant*, that is, in each instant. To enter into cessation is to absorb in the perfect end due to which thusness is called "cessation" because on the occasion of a superior's meditative equipoise all elaborations which are dualistic appearances cease in thusness. As the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* extensively says:

> O children of the Conqueror, those on the sixth ground of a bodhisattva and below absorb into the cessation of absorption . The bodhisattvas abiding on this seventh ground of a bodhisattva absorb into and arise from cessation also mental-instant by mental-instant. They do not manifest cessation.

On this ground, *the perfection of* skill in *means also excellently blazes*, that is, it is greatly and completely purified. The way in which it is purified should be understood from the reasonings which were indicated previously in regard to the other grounds. Engaging in the special features of the perfection of wisdom is posited as the latter four perfections. The occasion of thoroughly distinguishing phenomena is called "the perfection of wisdom," other aspects are not.

"Cessation" in this context is a true cessation. According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system, a true cessation is an emptiness because it is the emptiness of a mind free from adventitious stains. This is an emptiness, a thusness, a cessation, a true cessation, and a perfect end. A tathagata enters into meditative equipoise on this forever. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "To enter into cessation is to absorb in the perfect end due to which thusness is called 'cessation.'" The reason that it is called "cessation" is "because on the occasion of a superior's meditative equipoise all elaborations which are dualistic appearances cease in thusness."

The last four perfections are a part or a subdivision of the perfection of wisdom.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 422-3) says:

> The skill in means that is posited as the perfection of skill in means [is as follows]. The *Bodhisattva Grounds* says:
>
> > The first of the two groups of six that were taught, the six internal skill in means that begin to accomplish the qualities of a buddha, are that the bodhisattvas:
> >
> > 1. view all sentient beings while possessing compassion,
> > 2. know the correct nature of all compounded phenomena just as it is,
> > 3. desire the unsurpassed exalted wisdom of enlightenment,
> > 4. do not forsake cyclic existence in dependence on viewing all sentient beings,
> > 5. circle in cyclic existence with an unafflicted mind in dependence on knowing compounded phenomena just as they are, and
> > 6. blaze with effort in dependence on desiring enlightenment.
> >
> > The six external skill in means that begin to ripen sentient beings are that the bodhisattvas:
> >
> > 1. transform the small roots of virtue of sentient beings into immeasurable results, and similarly,
> > 2. accomplish great roots of virtue by means of little hardship,
> > 3. eliminate the anger of those who hate the teachings,
> > 4. lead those who abide with a neutral mind regarding the teachings,
> > 5. ripen those who are engaging in [the teachings], and
> > 6. liberate those who have been ripened.
> >
> > These are the twelve skill in means.

The perfection of skill in means is further divided into twelve. Seventh ground bodhisattvas
1. look at sentient beings with compassion,
2. know the correct nature of all phenomena just as it is,
3. wish to attain the exalted wisdom of complete enlightenment,
4. remain in cyclic existence in order to lead sentient beings as it says in the lam-rim section of the *Lama Chopa*:

> Even if I must remain in the fires of Avichi
> For an ocean of eons for the sake of each sentient being,
> Inspire me to complete the perfection of joyous effort,
> And through compassion to strive for supreme enlightenment.

These bodhisattvas strive for sentient beings without discouragement, unlike ourselves. We should strive to develop effort like that of these bodhisattvas.
5. These bodhisattvas also take rebirth in cyclic existence, not by the force of actions and afflictions, but, through knowing reality, they do so for the welfare of other sentient beings, that is, by the force of compassion.
6. They also have blazing effort due to wishing for enlightenment.

These are the six internal skill in means. The six external skill in means are for the purpose of ripening other sentient beings. How do these bodhisattvas transform small roots of virtue into immeasurable results? They do so through teachings various methods to sentient beings. For example, the bodhisattva teaches sentient beings to give a little bit of food to some ants and to dedicate the roots of

virtue accumulated to complete enlightenment due to which there will be immeasurable results. This bodhisattva also teaches others to create great roots of virtue without much hardship. For example, he teaches others to rejoice, for example, to rejoice in all the study others are doing. By merely rejoicing in the good actions of others, one can create great roots of virtue.

The bodhisattva also eliminates the anger of those who disparage the Dharma and those who generate anger upon hearing religious teachings. The bodhisattva teaches them not to generate such anger telling them that, even if they do not want to listen to or practice the Dharma themselves, they should not become angry as otherwise they will experience problems of body and mind and be without mental peace due to this anger.

The bodhisattva causes those who have a neutral mind regarding the teachings, that is, who have neither liking or dislike for the teachings, to engage in the teachings. He also ripens those who are already engaging in the teachings and liberates those who have already been ripened.

These are the twelve types of skill in means mentioned in Asanga's *Bodhisattva Grounds*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 423) says:

> This is the explanation of the seventh ultimate mind generation in the *Illumination of the Thought, An Extensive Explanation of [Chandrakirti's] 'Supplement to the Middle Way.'*

There are two types of mind generation: the conventional mind generation and the ultimate mind generation. The ultimate mind generation is divided into the ten mind generations of the ten grounds. The conventional mind generation is divided into two: the aspirational mind generation and the practical or engaging mind generation. It is also divided into four in the *Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras* in terms of boundaries: the mind generation using belief, the extraordinary pure mind generation, the fully ripened mind generation, and the mind generation that has abandoned the obstructions. The mind generation using belief is posited on the path of accumulation and path of preparation, the extraordinary pure mind generation is posited on the first through the seventh grounds, the fully ripened mind generation is posited on the three pure grounds, and the mind generation that has abandoned the obstructions is posited on the buddha ground.

We too should try to generate the mind of enlightenment beginning right from the moment we awake each day, thinking "I must attain enlightenment for the welfare of all sentient beings." We should think that all phenomena are like illusions and dreams, they are just imputed and exist only in dependence. If we think like this in the morning it becomes a brief meditation on both the conventional and ultimate mind generations and will bring a great result. In short, if we can integrate all the topics of the *Ornament* and the *Middle Way* it becomes equivalent to meditating on the lam-rim. If we do not do this, although we sit in meditation posture with our eyes closed it is not sure that we are actually meditating. There was a monk from Drepung Oseling who was known to be a great scholar. Although he had many students, one day he disappeared leaving them very worried as to what had happened. One year later they heard from some monk meditators that he was living in an isolated place. This scholar had asked one of the meditators to teach him lam-rim. However, this meditator was unable to teach the lam-rim in much detail, whereas the scholar had much knowledge of scriptures. Yet even though the scholar knew more than the meditator, he generated great respect for him and took him as his teacher. Later the Dalai Lama hearing about the scholar called him and told him to return to Drepung and to teach the monks and become a geshe.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: What is the definition of a "perfection" according to Prasangika?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If we were to say a "perfection" means a perfection of wisdom it is defined as: an exalted knower that is conjoined with a union of calm abiding and special insight that serves as the means for proceeding to or remaining in a non-abiding nirvana.

Student: According to Prasangika, can an actual fully-qualified perfection exist prior to the buddha ground?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Yes, it can. According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system there is a mundane perfection and a supramundane perfection. Among these two, a supramundane perfection is an actual fully-qualified perfection. This exists even on the first ground. Therefore, without achieving the buddha ground one has a fully-qualified perfection. A mundane perfection is posited on the path of accumulation and the path of preparation.

Student: In verse 6.209b of the *Supplement*, what is the correct translation: "The definition of the third is lacking suffering and confusion…" or "The definition of the third is suffering and non-confusion…"?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: "The third" is the door of complete liberation of wishlessness, which is with respect to results. The results, the lack of suffering and the lack of confusion, are not conceived to exist truly. We wish for such results, a lack of suffering and a lack of ignorance. In conclusion, the lack of suffering and lack of ignorance are to be wished for but are not to be conceived to exist truly.

Student: Will Geshe-la please explain what is the observed object condition for a dream? I don't understand how the object can exist prior to the dream consciousness apprehending it.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According the Chittamatra system the observed object condition is of two types: one that is an appearance and one that is a potential. The observed object condition for a dream consciousness is an observed object condition that is a potential because things are perceived in a dream due to the activation of a latency. They say that the observed object condition that is an appearance is not a fully-qualified observed object condition, whereas the observed object condition that is a potential is a fully-qualified observed object condition. This is discussed in Khedrup Je's *Dose of Emptiness*.

The Prasangika Madhyamika system also accepts an observed object condition that is an appearance. This is, for example, the form appearing to an eye consciousness. For a dream consciousness the observed object conditions that are an appearance are the objects that appear to it. When they appear, they do so mainly due to latencies.

Student: Do all the appearances of a dream depend on the ripening of potentials?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They do depend on latencies. The Prasangika Madhyamikas also assert an appearance due to familiarity but this also arises due to latencies.
Student: What about dreams that are premonitions of what will happen in the future?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: All dreams are due to the mind. There are cases that dreams correspond to future events. That is also due to latencies, it is not a type of clairvoyance.

Student: The dream object arises from a latency as does the dream consciousness. Is it possible to say that for the Prasangika Madhyamikas the dream object and dream consciousness are different entities?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: They are not one entity but are different.
Student: So they arise from different latencies?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The appearing object of a dream is due to latencies. A dream object appears due to conditions. This is a complex subject. It is hard to say what a dream object is, although it is said that

it is form because it is an appearance of form to a dream consciousness. According to the Prasangika Madhyamikas that appearance of form is the observed object condition of the dream.
Student: Does that appearance arise from latencies?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: I think that in the Prasangika Madhyamika system the appearance of form is an observed object condition. There is debate about this, such as: "Are the dream object and the dream consciousness cause and result? For example, is the appearance of the pleasant park of a dream the cause of the dream consciousness? Do the appearance of form that is the cause and the dream consciousness that is the result exist simultaneously?" The Prasangika Madhyamikas would specify that when they say that a cause and result do not exist simultaneously they are referring to a substantial cause and its result. However, there are phenomena that are causes and phenomena that are results that do exist simultaneously. In general, cause and result exist simultaneously but a substantial cause and its result are not established simultaneously. An example is a mother and her daughter, they exist simultaneously but they are not established simultaneously.

Student: Do we generate joyous effort prior to engaging in a virtuous action or is it something that is maintained manifest during a virtuous action, such as when reciting a sadhana, doing stabilizing meditation, and so forth?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: During stabilizing meditation there is effort but it is not manifest. Prior to single-pointed equipoise there is effort, but it is not manifest when the mind is focused single-pointedly. Effort is not omnipresent in the mind. When you meditate single-pointed on the tip of your nose do you experience delight?!

END

Monday afternoon, 2 April 2001

THE EIGHTH MIND GENERATION

3B1C-2C2 Explaining the eighth ground

A Surpassing prayer on this ground and the way of arising from cessation
B Indicating that all afflictions are extinguished
C Indicating that the ten controls are attained

3B1C-2C2A Surpassing prayer on this ground and the way of arising from cessation

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Now, to explain from the point of view of the eighth mind generation:

In order to attain higher and higher virtue than before, [8.ld]

The great being enters Immovable,
Where he becomes irreversible. [8.2ab]

The bodhisattva, for the purpose of attaining higher and higher virtue than before, will enter the eighth ground of the bodhisattva, Immovable, where he becomes irreversible.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-8A How on this stage resolution is outstanding, and he rises out of cessation

To gain merit higher and higher than before, [8.1d]

The magnanimous enters the stage at which he becomes
A never-returner, the Immovable. [8.2ab]

That magnanimous bodhisattva dwelling in the seventh stage has reason to enter this stage at which he becomes a never-returner, the Immovable; for he enters it in order to attain higher and higher virtue than before, in the seventh stage and below.

When a bodhisattva, even one of dull faculties, attains the eighth ground he attains a sign of irreversibility. This is also taught in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. This ground is called "Immovable" because the eighth grounder having abandoned the stains of self-cherishing, an awareness striving for solitary peace, his mind is not moved by this. Although the bodhisattvas had already abandoned self-cherishing, now its stains or latencies are also abandoned. This ground is also called "Immovable" because this bodhisattva has abandoned the afflictions.

Chandrakirti says: "In order to attain higher and higher virtue than before." The bodhisattva, as he progresses from the first to the seventh grounds, accumulates higher and higher virtue than on each of the previous grounds.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

There, attaining higher and higher virtue than before is as explained [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:

O children of the Conqueror, it is like this: for example, a great ocean-going ship is to be specially transported and is to proceed until it reaches the ocean. As soon as it has reached the ocean, it travels moved by the wind mandala, not needing to be specially transported. The

> [distance] covered in one day on the ocean due to that could not be traveled limitlessly, even during a hundred years, by the previous special transportation and travel.
>
> O children of the Conqueror, similarly, although a bodhisattva has intensely accumulated the collection of roots of virtue and practiced the mahayana, having reached the ocean of the bodhisattva's activities, the amount that the exalted wisdom of omniscience dominates in a mere moment with spontaneous exalted wisdom, that much is incomparable, it cannot be dominated without measure by the actions that were specially performed before, even in a hundred thousand eons.

The sutra sets out the analogy of a ship which when set afloat on the ocean moves very easily and without much effort. Similarly, the bodhisattva easily accumulates powerful waves of virtue because he has already completed the collection of one great countless eon of merit while on the paths of accumulation and preparation and the collection of a second great countless eon of merit while on the seven impure grounds. In this way he accumulated higher and higher roots of virtue as he progressed through the grounds. Why is such a great collection of merit needed? It is needed in order to attain buddhahood.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *His prayers become very pure and*
> *The Conquerors make him rise from cessation.* [8.2cd]
>
> Those ten countless hundred thousand prayers, such as the ten great prayers and so forth, which were strongly planted when he generated the first mind, will become fully purified. Hence, his practice of prayer gone beyond will become exceeding.
>
> This Immovable Ground of the bodhisattvas is presented as the ground of youth. On the ninth, he will attain regency. On the tenth, he is empowered by the conquerors like a chakravartin.
>
> If the bodhisattva on this Immovable Ground has absorbed in cessation, the buddha bhagavans also make him arise from cessation.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *His prayer attains the greatest purity.* [8.2c]

This bodhisattva dwelling on the eighth stage has offered countless hundreds of thousands of prayers, which become very pure, because he completes the transcendent action of prayer [or resolution].

> *The conquerors make him rise out of cessation.* [8.2d]

Regarding him, there is reason for the conquerors to make him rise out of cessation, for they make him rise out of it in order to avoid falling to the extreme of nihilism.

The bodhisattva, having made prayers beginning from the first ground, completes the perfection of prayer when he attains the eighth ground, that is, he attains a surpassing perfection of prayer on this ground. Chandrakirti says: "Those ten countless hundred thousand prayers, such as the ten great prayers and so forth, which were strongly planted when he generated the first mind, will become fully purified." Having made prayers beginning from the first ground, on the eighth ground they are purified and he attains a surpassing perfection of prayer. This means that whenever the eighth ground bodhisattva makes a prayer it is realized. This, however, can be debated saying: "If so, why are

sentient beings not yet free from cyclic existence in that the bodhisattvas pray 'May all sentient beings be free from cyclic existence'?" Thus, instead of saying that all his prayers are realized, it is better to says that the aim or scope of his prayers is realized. According to Kunu Lama Rinpoche bodhisattvas make many prayers that cannot be realized but the very fact that they make these prayers indicates the power of their mind. The fruition of a prayer depends on the way in which the prayer is made. There is a story of a Tibetan nomad who visited the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa. In front of the statue of Shakyamuni Buddha he found himself unable to verbalize a prayer, whereas he was surrounded by women who were reciting the words of many prayers. Therefore, he just made a prayer that all the women's prayers be quickly fulfilled! We can make prayers in the same way as did Samantabhadra in the *King of Prayers*:

> Just as the hero Manjushri realizes and, likewise, Samantabhadra, I too totally dedicate all these virtues that I may follow them in their training.
> With the dedication praised as supreme by all the conquerors who come in the three times, I too totally dedicate my roots of virtue for the sake of pure conduct.

What is the difference between a dedication and a prayer? It is said that a dedication is pervaded by being a prayer, whereas a prayer is not pervaded by being a dedication. If one has not created particular roots of virtue but makes a wish, it is a prayer but not a dedication, for example, "May all sentient beings be reborn in Amitabha's pure land." Another example is the prayer "May there never be wars, famines, or calamities in all the worlds." On the other hand, if one does a practice such as reciting a sadhana and then says "Due to these roots of virtue may there never be wars, famines, or calamities in all the worlds," it becomes a dedication.

Chandrakirti says: "The Conquerors make him rise from cessation" (8.2d). In this context "cessation" is the absorption of cessation. Since a bodhisattva on the eighth ground has abandoned all the afflictions, he is able to remain in the absorption of cessation for many eons, but the conquerors instead cause him to arise from this. How do they do this? They do not do so by knocking on the door! Rather, they send out light rays that cause the bodhisattva to arise from the absorption. For example, it is like falling asleep in the sun and being awakened by a cool breeze.

Chandrakirti says: "This Immovable Ground of the bodhisattvas is presented as the ground of youth. On the ninth, he will attain regency. On the tenth, he is empowered by the conquerors like a chakravartin." This bodhisattva is empowered or initiated by the conquerors, not in the sense of a tantric empowerment, but in the sense of receiving the empowerment of great light rays.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As is taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:
>
> > O children of the Conqueror, thus the bodhisattva abiding on this Immovable Ground of the bodhisattva generated the strength of previous prayers and the buddha bhagavans make him who abides on the stream of the door of dharma to nearly accomplish the exalted wisdom of the Tathagata.
>
> [The Buddha] also spoke thus about that:
>
> > Son of good lineage, excellent, excellent. The qualities of a buddha are to be subsequently realized. If this is also the ultimate patience, then, son of good lineage, you do not have the perfect unshared qualities of a buddha such as the ten strengths and four fearlessnesses and so forth that are mine. In order to fully seek the perfect qualities of a buddha, make preparation, produce effort, yet do not forsake this very door of patience.

> Son of good lineage, although you attain abidance in such complete liberation of peace, ordinary childish beings are unpacified, extremely unpacified. Various delusions continually arise, various types of conceptions shame the mind. Think about these!
>
> Furthermore, son of good lineage, remember previous prayer,...

and so forth, is extensively set forth[237] until...

> If those buddha bhagavans had not made the bodhisattva enter in the doors of strongly practicing the exalted wisdom of omniscience, he would have passed beyond sorrow completely at that very time.[238]

The Buddha says to the bodhisattvas that although they have many qualities there are still many others to be attained. There are three levels of forbearance: the bodhisattva attains the first forbearance on the path of preparation, the second on the path of seeing, and the third on the eighth ground. This third is called "ultimate patience" or "ultimate forbearance" or "forbearance with respect to thusness." The bodhisattvas have not yet attained the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the eighteen unshared qualities of a buddha and so forth. Although the eighth ground bodhisattva has attained peace, the absorption of cessation, sentient beings are still experiencing suffering. The buddhas exhort him to remember the welfare of these sentient beings. They also exhort him to be mindful of his previous prayers, such as the prayers to benefit sentient beings and to realize their welfare. In this way the buddhas exhort them to arise from peace.

The Buddha says that by entering cessation prior to attaining omniscience the bodhisattva interrupts his work for the welfare of sentient beings and therefore the buddhas exhort him to continue to enact the benefit of sentient beings by arising from cessation. It is recounted that in the past there were some sages who sat absorbed in cessation in a forest, their bodies as unmoving as a rock. When they were later arisen by the light rays of a buddha, they looked for the Buddha but were told that he had already passed beyond sorrow. Flying up into the sky, their bodies fell to the ground. For this reason, this forest is called the "Forest of the Fallen Sages."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 423-4) says:

> *In order to attain higher and higher virtue surpassing the previous,* [8.1d]
>
> *Becoming irreversible on this,*
> *The great being enters the Immovable.* [8.2ab}

The seventh ground bodhisattva, *in order to attain higher and higher virtue surpassing the previous*, *becomes irreversible on this* ground, whereby he, the bodhisattva, *the great being, enters* the eighth, *Immovable*. The way of attaining higher and higher virtue surpassing the previous – the virtue on the seventh ground and below – is as taught in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*:

> O children of the Conqueror, it is like this. For example, a great ocean-going ship is to be specially transported and to proceed until it reaches the ocean. As soon as it reaches the ocean, it travels moved by the wind mandala without need to be specially transported. Due to that, the distance covered in one day on the ocean could not be

[237] From the *Sutra*: Furthermore, son of good lineage, remember previous prayers, the benefit of sentient beings to be attained and the unimaginable door of exalted wisdom. Further, son of good lineage, this is the nature (*dharmata*) of phenomena.

Whether the tathagatas arise or do not arise, this sphere of dharma (*dharmadhatu*) just remains. Thus, all phenomena are just empty and all phenomena are unobservable. The *tathagatas* are not to be differentiated simply by this. All hearers and solitary realizers also will attain this non-conceptual *dharmata*.

[238] From the *Sutra*: The benefit of all sentient beings to he done would he interrupted.

> traveled without limit, even in as much as a hundred years, by the previous special transportation and travel.
>
> O children of the Conqueror, similarly, although a bodhisattva has thoroughly accumulated the collection of roots of virtue and perfectly practiced the mahayana, having traveled in the ocean of a bodhisattva's activities, however much his spontaneous exalted wisdom suppresses the exalted wisdom of omniscient beings in a mere moment, it cannot be suppressed without measure by the actions that were specially done before, even in a hundred thousand eons.

Until it reaches the ocean is an analogy for the seventh ground and below. The travel after having entered the ocean is an analogy for the progress on the path after having attained the eighth ground.

His prayers are thoroughly purified and [8.2c]

The prayers of the eighth grounder, a million countless (10^{65}) prayers, such as the ten great prayers and so forth, that were planted before when he generated the first supramundane mind, *are thoroughly purified* on this ground, that is, the perfection of prayer becomes surpassing on this ground.

This ground is posited as the ground of a youth since on the ninth regency is attained, whereas on the tenth he is empowered by the conquerors, as is a universal king.

The roots of virtue of a bodhisattva on the eighth ground are greater than those of the bodhisattvas on the lower grounds, the seventh and below. The eighth ground is called "Immovable" in that the bodhisattva is pervaded by having achieved a sign of irreversibility and is definite to attain peerless enlightenment.

In the sutra the effort in accumulating roots of virtue of a bodhisattva on the first to the seventh grounds is likened to the transportation of a ship from the place where it was made up to the ocean. This is because there is need of great effort to transport a ship that is not yet set afloat. Likewise, a bodhisattva on the first through the seventh grounds must put effort into creating the roots of virtue of two countless great eons. On the other hand, the effort in accumulating roots of virtue of an eighth ground bodhisattva is likened to setting a ship afloat on the ocean in that once a ship is set afloat it is moves effortlessly, blown by the wind and carried along by the waves and, similarly, an eighth ground bodhisattva no longer needs to make much effort in order to progress on the path. This is because when the bodhisattva was on the previous seven grounds he made many prayers which are now purified on the eighth ground, in this way this bodhisattva attains the surpassing practice of the perfection of prayer.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 424-5) says:

The conquerors make him arise from cessation. [8.2d]

If he enters into cessation, or reality, on the Immovable Ground, *the conquerors* also *make him arise from* that absorption in *cessation*. The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says:

> O children of the Conqueror, thus the bodhisattva abiding on the bodhisattva's Immovable Ground generates the power of previous prayers. The buddha bhagavans make the one abiding in the stream of the door to qualities finely accomplish the exalted wisdom of a tathagata.
>
> [The Buddha] also spoke thus about this: Son of the lineage, excellent, excellent. This is also the ultimate forbearance with respect to the qualities of a buddha that are to be subsequently realized. Nonetheless, son of the lineage, you do not have the perfect unshared qualities of a buddha such as the ten powers, four fearlessnesses, and so forth that are mine. Yet, for the sake of thoroughly seeking the perfect qualities of a buddha, make preparation! Cultivate effort! Also do not forsake this very door of forbearance!

> Son of the lineage, although you attain abidance in such a complete liberation of peace, ordinary childish beings are unpacified, extremely unpacified. Diverse afflictions continually arise. Diverse conceptions degrade the mind. Think about them!
>
> Furthermore, son of the lineage, remember previous prayers, the welfare of sentient beings that is to be attained, and the inconceivable door of exalted wisdom.
>
> Moreover, son of the lineage, this is the reality of phenomena. Whether the tathagatas arise or do not arise, this sphere of phenomena just abides. Thus, all phenomena are just empty and all phenomena are unobservable. Hence, the tathagatas are not to be differentiated simply by this. All hearers and solitary realizers also attain this non-conceptual reality.

And:

> If the buddha bhagavans did not make this bodhisattva enter the doors of manifestly accomplishing the exalted wisdom of omniscient beings, he would thoroughly pass beyond sorrow at that very time, whereby the welfare to be enacted of all sentient beings would also be interrupted.

These [passages mean that] having attained empowerment in non-conceptual exalted wisdom on the eighth ground, when [the bodhisattva] absorbs into merely that, having arisen from it, in subsequent attainment he is exhorted to accumulate the collections as a cause of attaining the powers and so forth of a buddha. Since it is taught that the non-conceptual exalted wisdom directly realizing reality is also attained by hearers, saying "When the realization of suchness exists it is not necessary to strive in accumulating the other collections in that meditating on that is sufficient" is the babble of the unskilled.

How do the buddhas make the bodhisattvas arise from cessation? This question is answered above in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*. The buddhas remind the bodhisattvas of their previous prayers and the need to actualize their aims. They also remind the bodhisattvas that sentient beings are suffering saying: "Ordinary childish beings are unpacified, extremely unpacified. Diverse afflictions continually arise. Diverse conceptions degrade the mind. Think about them!" Because the hearers and solitary realizers also realize reality, the buddhas say to the bodhisattva that he should not abide alone in this realization as do the hearers and solitary realizers. Instead they remind the bodhisattva that if he does not enter the door of enlightenment but instead remains absorbed in peace, the welfare of sentient beings will be interrupted. For this reason, they should accumulate the collections by alternating meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment.

Tuesday morning, 3 April 2001

There are those who say that when emptiness is realized it is no longer necessary to continue to accumulate merit, however, this is just frivolous talk or babble.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 426) says:

3B1C-2C2B Indicating that all afflictions are extinguished

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Because he is thus merely arisen from cessation, therefore here:
>
> *Because the non-clinging mind does not abide together with faults,*
> *Those stains, with roots, are extinguished on the eighth ground,*
> *Delusions are exhausted and he is the, three realm's guru; yet buddhas'*
> *Endowments, endless like space, cannot be entirely attained.* [8.3]

> Due to the rising sun of non-conceptual exalted wisdom, the darkness-like delusions that were the cause of rebirth in all those previously arisen cyclic existences experienced in the three realms, together also with their roots, are only pacified. By abandoning them, although he has become the very guru of the three realms, in that context this bodhisattva is unable to attain the endowments of the buddha bhagavans. In order to attain that, it is necessary that he make effort.
>
> Because it is set forth [in the *Sutra on the Ten Ground*]:
>
> > He will pass beyond sorrow completely at that very time, he has a mere separation of attachment from the three realms because without being separated from attachment it is impossible to attain nirvana.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-8B All defilements are exhausted
>
> *As his mind without attachment does not remain together with faults,*
> *On the eighth stage those stains, together with their roots, are allayed.* [8.3ab]

For the bodhisattva dwelling on the eighth stage, the stains of the defilements together with their roots, are allayed; for not remaining together with the faults of the defilements, he attains mastery over the mind without attachment, non-conceptual wisdom-knowledge.

> *Although his defilements are finished, and he is guru to the three realms, he cannot*
> *Attain all the riches of the buddhas, limitless like space.* [8.3cd]

Although his defilements are finished, and he has become the guru of the three realms, he must still make effort in order to attain the perfect dharmas of the buddhas. For although he is like that, since he is unable to obtain all the riches of the buddhas, free of limit, like space, he must strive to obtain them.

One will not attain nirvana until one abandons the afflictions completely. Once the bodhisattva has completely exhausted all afflictions he enters the absorption of cessation, however, the buddhas, knowing this, cause him to arise from it. The buddhas say to the bodhisattva: "You have exhaustively abandoned the afflictions, but still you must strive to attain the endowments of a buddha." On the eighth ground the darkness of the afflictions is eliminated, like the rising sun illuminating the darkness the exalted wisdom of the bodhisattva illuminates the three realms.

This bodhisattva has abandoned the seed for taking rebirth in cyclic existence and because he has abandoned the afflictions he is called "the lama of the three existences." The three existences are above, on, and below the ground. Although this bodhisattva has become the lama of the three existences, he has not completed the qualities of a buddha and must therefore strive to attain them. Chandrakirti says: "In order to attain that, it is necessary that he make effort."

The eighth ground bodhisattva has abandoned the afflictions and has therefore attained the nirvana that is the abandonment of the afflictions. The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says: "he has a mere separation of attachment from the three realms because without being separated from attachment it is impossible to attain nirvana." This shows that this bodhisattva is separated from the attachment of the three realms, that is, the afflictions of the three realms, which is necessary in order to attain nirvana. This bodhisattva has therefore destroyed the foes that are the afflictions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 426) says:

> *Because the mind without attachment does not abide together with faults,*
> *On the eighth ground, the stains, together with their roots, are thoroughly pacified,*
> *The afflictions are extinguished, and he becomes a lama of the three levels, yet*

He is unable to attain all the endowments, as limitless as space, of the buddhas. [8.3]

Therefore, on the eighth ground he is risen by the conquerors from cessation. *Because* on this ground *the mind that is without attachment*, that is, exalted wisdom, *does not abide together with the faults* of the afflictions, attachment and so forth, *on the eighth ground* all the darkness-like *stains*, the previously arisen afflictions, that are the cause of rebirth in cyclic existence as well as the experiences in the three realms, *together with their roots*, that is, their seeds, *are thoroughly pacified*, that is abandoned, by the rising sun of non-conceptual exalted wisdom. Thus, all *afflictions are extinguished and* [the bodhisattva] *becomes a lama of the three levels*, or the three realms. However, on this occasion of having extinguished the afflictions, this bodhisattva *is unable to attain all the endowments, as limitless as space,* that are the qualities *of the buddhas*. Therefore, the eight grounder must strive in order to attain them.

QUESTION: How is it known that all the afflictions have been extinguished on this ground?

RESPONSE: Because the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says:

He will thoroughly pass beyond sorrow completely at that very time...

On this ground he is free from the mind of attachment of the three realms because without the freedom from attachment that is the severance of the afflictions he cannot actualize passing beyond sorrow.

This bodhisattva has abandoned the afflictions along with their seeds. There is a difference between a seed and a latency. If it is a latency of an affliction it is not pervaded by being a seed of an affliction. The seed of an affliction is a latency implanted by a previous affliction which is a potency producing a later affliction of similar type. A latency is not pervaded by producing a later affliction, for example, the conception of true existence deposits a latency in the continuum of the bodhisattvas on the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds but this latency is not a seed because it does not have the potential to produce a later affliction of similar type. However, these bodhisattvas have the appearance of true existence and, therefore, still have knowledge obstructions. What is a knowledge obstruction? It is a potency deposited by the conception of true existence, due to which they still have dualistic appearance. They have not abandoned dualistic appearance and the appearance of true existence. This will be explained later. In short, the eighth ground bodhisattva has abandoned the seeds of the afflictions but not their latencies.

This bodhisattva is called "a lama of the three realms" because his knowledge is the highest in the three realms. Although this bodhisattva has exhausted all the afflictions he has not yet achieved the realizations of a buddha, such as the ten powers, four fearlessnesses, the eighteen unshared qualities, and so forth. Therefore, this bodhisattva must put effort into attaining them. How is it known that an eighth ground bodhisattva has exhausted all the afflictions? The *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* says: "He will thoroughly pass beyond sorrow completely at that very time..." Since without exhausting all the afflictions it is not possible to pass beyond sorrow, that is, to attain nirvana, this sutra clearly indicates that this bodhisattva has exhausted the afflictions in that he has passed beyond sorrow.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 427) says:

3B1C-2C2C Indicating that the ten controls are attained

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If there is separation from the attachment of the three realms there, due to it, cyclic existence will cease at that time. Hence, how will he fully complete the entire qualities of a buddha?

It is explained,

Although circling is ceased, ten powers will be attained and with these,
His essence will be shown manifold to the migrators of existence. [8.4ab]

His circling is indeed ceased, yet like that, the ten powers are about to be produced in him. With these, he will show various things of self-essence by way of the body of the nature of mind. Therefore, it does not contradict fully completing his entire collection.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-8C He attains the ten powers

Although he has stopped cycling, he is attaining the ten powers. By this
He will naturally show himself variously to samsaric beings. [8.4ab]

Although he has stopped cycling [in samsara] under the control of karma and defilements, it is not contradictory that he is completing the accumulations; for he will attain the ten powers[239], and by these powers he will naturally show himself in various bodies to samsaric beings.

Although the eighth ground bodhisattva has exhausted all the afflictions, he still needs to accumulate the collections in order to attain the ten controls or powers. These eight controls are also discussed in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. The bodhisattva has still to attain these ten controls or ten powers in order to enact the welfare of disciples.

The eighth ground bodhisattva no longer takes rebirth in cyclic existence by the force of actions and afflictions but instead takes a body of the nature of mind which completes the collections in order to enact the welfare of sentient beings. How does he attain a body of the nature of mind? What is its cause? It is an uncontaminated action and the level of the latency of ignorance. The contaminated, or a contamination, is an affliction. An action that is not motivated by an affliction is an uncontaminated action. Is an action necessary to take rebirth in cyclic existence? An action is necessary but it does not have to be an action motivated by an affliction, that is, it can be an uncontaminated action. This is asserted by the Svatantrika Madhyamikas, it will be discussed later on in the *Supplement*.

The body of an intermediate state being is similar to, but not the same as, a body of the nature of mind. Intermediate state beings have a body that is not visible to our eyes and is not coarse. Vasubandhu says that an intermediate state being has all the sense powers complete and is not obstructed by objects. Similarly, someone who has attained a body of the nature of mind can pass through walls and so forth. The bodhisattva takes a body of the nature of mind in order to enact the welfare of sentient beings.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

There, the ten powers are, as extensively taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:

1. By blessing the life span for inexpressibly inexpressible eons, he attains power over the life span.
2. By the operation of unfathomable exalted wisdom definitely taking meditative stabilization to mind, he attains power over the mind.
3. By always displaying the blessing of fully adorning all the realms of the world with many arrangements of ornaments, he attains power over necessities.
4. By showing the exact time by blessing the maturation of actions, he attains power over actions.
5. By always showing rebirths in all realms of the world, he attains power over rebirth.
6. By always showing manifest complete enlightenment however he likes, at whatever buddha field and time, he attains power over prayer.

[239] *dbang.bcu*, not the powers of a tathagata, *stobs.bcu*

7. By always showing all the realms of the world completely filled with buddhas, he attains power over aspiration wishes.
8. By always showing complete manifestations of magical creations in all buddha fields, he attains power over magical emanations.
9. By always showing the Tathagata's strengths, fearlessnesses, unshared buddha qualities, marks, excellent exemplifications, and complete enlightenment, he attains power over exalted wisdom
10. By always showing the illuminated door of the dharma with non-existent ends and middle, he attains power over the dharma.

"Power over the life span" means that the bodhisattva can live as long as he likes. "Power over the mind" means that he can abide in meditative stabilization on an object as long as he likes. "Power over necessities" means that he no longer needs to put effort in acquiring necessities, they are acquired without effort. When Geshe Ben Kun Gyel was young he was a bandit and put great effort into stealing things from others. Later on his life, he engaged in meditation and strongly regretted his previous actions. He said: "When I was young I had a rifle on my shoulder, a sword on my waist, and a knife on my leg, yet I went through great hardships in order to find food for my mouth. Since I began to meditate and gave up these things, now the food does not find my mouth," meaning that he received so much food as offerings that he could not eat it all.

"Actions" can be understood to be either actions in general or the mental factor intention. "Power over actions" means that this bodhisattva experiences the ripening of his actions as he likes. "Power over rebirth" means that the bodhisattva can be reborn wherever he likes, for example, in the USA and so forth. "Power over prayer" means that he can show enlightenment wherever and whenever likes.

"Power over aspiration" means that when the bodhisattva wishes to fill the worlds with buddhas, all the worlds appear filled with buddhas. For example, the *King of Prayers* says: "On each atom are myriad buddhas surrounded by countless bodhisattvas."

"Power over magical emanations" means that the bodhisattva can manifest emanations in all the buddha lands. "Power over exalted wisdom" is attained due to showing the Tathagata's strengths, fearlessnesses, unshared buddha qualities, marks, excellent exemplifications, and complete enlightenment. "Power over the Dharma" means that he shows the illuminated door of the Dharma.

The eighth ground bodhisattva having completed the collections *will* attain these eight powers or controls, that is, he does not yet have them. These ten controls are included in the twenty-one sets of exalted wisdom, which are discussed in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. We too should strive to attain them by accumulating merit and purifying negativities, that is, by accumulating the two collections, the collection of merit and the collection of exalted wisdom. It is very important to unify the two collections. Each day we should study the *Middle Way*, listen to the teachings, think about them, and then meditate on them, either by doing stabilizing meditation or analytical meditation. Together with this, we should try to practice the perfections by engaging in giving, safeguarding morality, and so forth. In particular, we need to practice patience as Shantideva says: "There is no fortitude like patience, and there is no negativity as great as anger."

Tuesday afternoon, 3 April 2001

The first three controls, control over the lifespan, control over the mind, and the control over necessities are the result of generosity. The fourth and fifth, control over actions and control over rebirth, are the result of morality. The sixth, control over prayer, is the result of patience. The seventh, control over aspiration, is the result of effort. The eighth, control over magical emanations, is the result

of meditative stabilization. The ninth and tenth, control over exalted wisdom and control over Dharma, are the result of wisdom.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The explanation of the eighth mind generation is finished. The Eighth Mind Generation from the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way."'*

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 427) says:

> QUESTION: Since, if free from the attachment of the three realms on this ground, [the bodhisattva's] rebirths in cyclic existence will cease, how does he thoroughly complete all the qualities without exception that are the causes of a buddha?
>
> *Although he ceases circling, he will attain the ten controls and, by means of these,*
> *He causes varieties of his own nature to be displayed to the migrating beings of existence.*
> [8.4ab]
>
> *Although* the eighth grounder indeed *ceases circling* in cyclic existence by the power of actions and afflictions, when this ground is attained *he will attain the ten* types of *controls*, such as control over exalted wisdom and so forth. *By means of these* ten controls, this bodhisattva, as is explained in the *Lion's Roar of Shrimaladevi Sutra,* through the body that is the nature of mind *causes various* bodies *of his own nature to be displayed to the migrating beings of existence*. Therefore, it is not contradictory that he thoroughly completes his collections.
>
> As is extensively taught in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* the ten controls are:
>
> 1. By blessing the life span, even of inexpressible eons, to be inexpressible, he will attain control over his life span.
> 2. By the engagement of unfathomable exalted wisdom definitely thinking about meditative stabilization, he will attain control over the mind.
> 3. By always displaying the blessings of fully adorning all the realms of the world with many arrays of ornaments, he will attain control over necessities.
> 4. By displaying himself at the proper time by blessing the ripening of actions, he will attain control over actions.
> 5. By always displaying rebirths in all realms of the world, he will attain control over rebirth.
> 6. By always displaying manifest complete enlightenment as he likes in whatever buddha field and at whatever time, he will attain control over prayer.
> 7. By always displaying all the realms of the world completely filled with buddhas, he will attain control over aspiration.
> 8. By always displaying complete emanations of magical emanations in all the buddha fields, he will attain control over magical emanations.
> 9. By always displaying the powers, fearlessnesses, unshared buddha qualities, excellent marks and signs, and manifest complete enlightenment of a tathagata, he will attain control over exalted wisdom
> 10. By always displaying the illuminating door of the Dharma that is without an end and a middle, he will attain control over the Dharma.

Since the bodhisattva on the eighth ground has exhausted the afflictions, he will no longer take rebirth in cyclic existence by the force of actions and afflictions. How does he take rebirth? He does so by means of taking a body of the nature of mind in order to enact the welfare of sentient beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 428) says:

This is the explanation of the eighth ultimate mind generation in the *Illumination of the Thought, An Extensive Explanation of [Chandrakirti's] 'Supplement to the Middle Way.'*

THE NINTH MIND GENERATION

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 428) says:

3B1C-2C3 Explaining the ninth ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Now, to explain from the point of view of the ninth mind generation:

On the ninth, all his various strengths become completely pure and likewise,
The perfect knowledges' specific qualities also attain full purity. [9.1cd]

On the ninth ground of the bodhisattva, the bodhisattva's surpassing strength gone beyond will become fully purified and the four fully purified specific qualities of the individual perfect knowledges will also be attained: the individual perfect knowledge of phenomena, the individual perfect knowledge of meaning, the individual perfect knowledge of definite words, and the individual perfect knowledge of confidence.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1A-9 Explanation of the ninth stage, Good Intelligence

On the ninth, all the aspects of his power become completely pure.
He likewise attains too the fully pure dharmas of the discriminating knowledges. [9.1cd]

The bodhisattva dwelling on the ninth stage attains qualities superior to those of the eighth stage, for all the aspects of the transcendent action of power become completely pure, and likewise he also attains full purity of the own qualities of the dharmas of the discriminating knowledges.

On the ninth ground the bodhisattva attains the surpassing perfection of power. "Power" includes the ten powers, although more are listed in the *Ornament for the Subduer's Intention*. This bodhisattva also attains the four fully purified specific qualities of the four individual correct knowledges which are explained in different ways in different texts.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

There,

1. The individual perfect knowledge of phenomena thoroughly knows the specific characteristics of all phenomena.
2. The individual perfect knowledge of meaning thoroughly knows the divisions of the aspects of all phenomena
3. The individual perfect knowledge of definite words thoroughly knows to show phenomena as unmixed.
4. The individual perfect knowledge of confidence thoroughly knows, uninterruptedly, the concordant causes of phenomena.

The individual correct knowledge of phenomena knows the specific definitions of all phenomena, however, since all phenomena do not have definitions, the bodhisattva understands that which induces understanding of them.

Does the bodhisattva on the ninth ground possess the four individual correct knowledges? If someone says that he does, one asks: "Are the four individual correct knowledges not unique to the exalted knower of all aspects of a buddha? Are they not part of the thirty-nine aspects of an exalted knower of all aspects which include the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the four individual correct knowledges, the eighteen unshared qualities of a buddha, and the three aspects of suchness, the self-arisen, and the mental aspect?"
Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The explanation of the ninth mind generation is finished. The Ninth Mind Generation from the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way."'*

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 428) says:

> *On the ninth, all his powers are completely purified.*
> *Likewise, he also attains the completely pure specific qualities of the correct knowledges.* [9.1ab]

On the ninth ground, *all powers* – that is, the perfection of power – of the bodhisattva *are completely purified*. The explanation of the ten powers is as taught in the *Ornament for the Subduer's Intention*:

The powers that are presented in the sutra sets are:

- The power of thought because of never experiencing afflictions.
- The power of superior thought because of thoroughly training in the exalted wisdom of the grounds.
- The power of retention because of not forgetting the Dharma.
- The power of meditative stabilization because of never being distracted.
- The power of perfect endowments because of being skilled in distinguishing the conduct in the infinite and endless realms of the world.
- The power of control because of attaining the thorough completion of all hopes.
- The power of self-confidence because of being skilled in distinguishing the practice of all the Buddha's Dharma.
- The power of prayer because of not giving up application in the conduct of all the buddhas.
- The power of perfection because of thoroughly ripening the Buddha's Dharma, thoroughly ripening sentient beings, and not giving up the conduct of benefiting sentient beings by himself.
- The power of great love because of not giving up supreme application in protecting all sentient beings.
- The power of great compassion because of eliminating all the suffering of all sentient beings.
- The power of reality because of actualizing the reality that is like an illusion and so forth.
- The power of the blessings of all the tathagatas because of approaching the exalted wisdom of an exalted knower of all aspects.

The *Ornament for the Subduer's Intention* seems to set out thirteen powers, although Lama Tsongkhapa says that there are ten. Perhaps some of them are to be combined into one.

The power of thought refers to the fact that the ninth ground bodhisattva does not have any afflictions because he has abandoned all of them. The power of superior thought is to thoroughly train

in the exalted wisdom of the grounds. The power of retention is to not forget what one has learned or memorized. The power of meditative stabilization is to never be distracted, that is, distraction has been completely forsaken. The power of perfect endowments refers to the fact that this bodhisattva knows the conduct in the various worlds. The power of control is the completion of all hopes, that is, all the bodhisattva's hopes are fulfilled. This can be debated asking: "Does this mean that this bodhisattva has attained omniscience in that he hopes for it?"

The power of self-confidence is to be skilled in distinguishing the practice of all the Buddha's Dharma. The power of prayer is to not give up application in the conduct of all the buddhas. The power of perfection is to thoroughly ripen the Buddha's Dharma, thoroughly ripen sentient beings, and to not give up the conduct of benefiting sentient beings by himself. What do these mean? Does "to thoroughly ripen sentient beings" refer to ripening all sentient beings? Before actualizing the perfect end there are certain conditions that a bodhisattva has to meet, thus, he does not do so until all sentient beings have been ripened, until he has purified his buddha land, and until he has completed all prayers. In regard to the first, each line of Dharma that he teaches is said to ripen sentient beings and set them in the state of a superior.

The power of great love is to protect all sentient beings without bias. The power of great compassion is to eliminate all the sufferings of all sentient beings. When great love is manifest, compassion is not manifest, and vice versa.

The power of reality is to actualize the reality that is illusion-like and so forth. The power of the blessings of all the tathagatas is to approach the exalted wisdom of an exalted knower of all aspects.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 429) says:

> He completes the perfection of power and, *likewise*, *also attains the* four *completely pure specific qualities of the* individual *correct knowledges*:
> 1. individual correct knowledge of phenomena,
> 2. individual correct knowledge of meanings,
> 3. individual correct knowledge of definitive words, and
> 4. individual correct knowledge of self-assurance.
>
> With respect to them, it is taught in the autocommentary that by means of the first, he fully knows the individual characteristics of each and every phenomenon; by means of the second, he knows the divisions of the aspects of all phenomena; by means of the third, he knows the individual presentations of phenomena without mixing them; and, by means of the fourth he fully knows, without interruption, the concordant causes of phenomena.
>
> In other texts they are explained as the knowledge of phenomena, the knowledge of meanings to be expressed, the knowledge of definitive words that are terms, and the knowledge of the non-exhaustion of self-assurance, these being synonyms.

There can be debate about the statement "he knows the divisions of the aspects of all phenomena," asking: "Is there a division of each and every phenomenon? For example, is there a division of Sherab's nose?"
Student: There is, it is divided into two nostrils!
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It follows that Sherab has two noses because he has two nostrils!

The individual correct knowledge of self-confidence is to fully know, without interruption, the concordant causes of phenomena.

The Tibetan word for "synonym" literally means a list of names for the same thing. For example, the sun has many different names in Hindi.

If it is a name it is not pervaded by being a definitive word that is a term. A name is not a word. If it is a word or phrase it is an object of hearing that indicates something by connecting a basis of qualities and a quality. For example, "table" is merely a name, but when "the square table" is said the basis of qualities and the quality are connected. There are names, words or phrases, and letters. Their definitions are given in *Awarenesses and Knowers* as:

- The definition of a name is: an object of hearing that causes understanding of its own meaning.
- The definition of a word or phrase is: an object of hearing which indicates [meaning] by joining substratum and attribute.
- The definition of a letter is: a vocalization which is a basis of forming the two, names and phrases.

Self-assurance is confidence that comes from knowledge. However, some people have knowledge but no self-assurance and others have self-assurance but no knowledge!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 429) says:

> This is the explanation of the ninth ultimate mind generation in the *Illumination of the Thought, An Extensive Explanation of [Chandrakirti's] 'Supplement to the Middle Way.'*

Wednesday morning, 4 April 2001

THE TENTH MIND GENERATION

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 430) says:

> 3B1C-2C4 Explaining the tenth ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 216) says:

> Now, to explain from the point of view of the tenth mind generation:
>
> *On the tenth ground he obtains pure empowerment from buddhas everywhere*
> *And exalted wisdom will also arise as exceedingly supreme.*
> *Just as rainwater falls from rain clouds, Dharma rain also falls spontaneously*
> *From the Conquerors' children for the sake of the migrators' crop of virtue.*[10.1]
>
> The buddha bhagavans empower the bodhisattva who abides on the tenth bodhisattva ground.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B1A-10 Explanation of the tenth stage, the Cloud of Doctrine
>
> *On the tenth stage, he receives holy empowerments from the buddhas*
> *Everywhere, and also wisdom-knowledge grows exceedingly great.* [10.1ab]

The bodhisattva dwelling on the tenth stage attains qualities superior to those below on the ninth stage; for he receives holy empowerments of great light rays from the buddhas of all the directions, and also his transcendent action of wisdom-knowledge[240] grows exceedingly great.

> *Just as rain falls from rain clouds, so from this buddha-son also a rain*

[240] *jñana, ye.shes*

Of Dharma spontaneously falls, for the sake of the crop of sentient beings' virtues. [10.1cd]

It should be understood that there is reason why the tenth stage is named "Cloud of Doctrine," for just as rain falls from rain clouds, so too for the sake of the crops of sentient beings' virtues, a rain of the excellent doctrine spontaneously falls from the conquerors' son dwelling on the tenth stage.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As is taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:
>
> > There, at the end of many ten hundred thousand countless meditative stabilizations, the bodhisattva meditative stabilization called "having empowerment not different than the omniscient exalted wisdom," will be manifested. As soon as it is manifested, a lotus of a huge jewel equal in size to ten hundred thousand billion [world systems], adorned with jewels having the best of all types...
>
> From the aforesaid, until:
>
> > ... extensively, will arise having a circumference of lotuses amounting to the atomic particles complete in ten hundred thousand billion [world systems]. The body of that bodhisattva also [will be] appropriate for that and alighting on its condition, will abide. As soon as attaining this meditative stabilization, sitting on that lotus, he will illuminate everywhere. He sits there and from the brow curl of the buddha bhagavans assembled from all buddha fields, rays of light will arise, giving empowerment to that bodhisattva.
>
> His exalted wisdom gone beyond will also become exceedingly pure. Like a great cloud, a rain of holy Dharma will also spontaneously descend in order to greatly increase the crop of virtue of the world.

The tenth ground bodhisattva attains the surpassing practice of the perfection of exalted wisdom. At this point, the bodhisattva is *almost* a buddha. This bodhisattva, abiding on a lotus cushion, receives the empowerment of great light rays from the treasure hair or brow curl of all the buddha bhagavans. This is an empowerment of exalted wisdom, although it is not related to the tantric empowerments. The bodhisattva progresses upward on the sutra path from the first to the tenth ground at which point, according to the tantra teachings, he enters the tantra path. When this bodhisattva enters the tantra path he finds himself on the fourth stage of the five stages of the completion stage, the meaning clear light. Perhaps this is what is meant here by the "the empowerment of great light rays." In brief, the tenth ground bodhisattva generates the meaning clear light in his continuum.

The tenth ground is called the "Cloud of Doctrine" or "Cloud of Dharma" because, just as rain falls causing crops to grow, this bodhisattva sends down a rain of Dharma causing the virtues of migrating beings to increase. The main way in which buddhas and bodhisattvas ripen sentient beings is by giving them Dharma teachings. They are not able to transfer their realizations to sentient beings, nor are they able to wash away the non-virtues, obstructions, and afflictions of sentient beings with their hands. They are also not able to take away the sufferings of sentient beings like pulling a thorn out of a foot. In this context, suffering refers mainly to mental suffering, in that physical suffering can be alleviated with the hands, for example, a surgeon can cut out a part of the body that is causing pain. In short, the buddhas and bodhisattvas can only alleviate the mental pain of sentient beings by giving them teachings. In order to do this the tenth ground bodhisattvas cause a rain of Dharma to fall. One text says that among all the activities of a buddha that of his holy speech is supreme. In other words, the enlightened activity of a buddha is of many types but the most excellent is the enlightened activity of his speech. Lama Tsongkhapa mentions this in his *Praise to Dependent-Arising*. Even in daily life when we have problems they can be alleviated to some degree by hearing the soothing speech of

others. Similarly, a bodhisattva can mentally think of many good things and physically can do many activities, but the main way in which he can be of benefit to sentient beings is by verbally giving them advice and teachings. This action of speech is also important as a means of gathering disciples in that the first way to do so is to give presents to them, while the second is to speak nicely to them. These are activities of a bodhisattva, and are also engaged in by Christians in order to convert others to Christianity. For example, they give material help to the needy, then talk to them nicely, then give them advice, and so forth. We should rejoice in such actions as by doing so we will create a great amount of merit. Lama Tsongkhapa says that rejoicing in others' good actions is the best way of creating merit. For example, we can rejoice in others who are studying well, have good conduct, and have a subdued mind. We should not be jealous of others but instead rejoice in their qualities and aspire to become like them.

> The explanation of the tenth mind generation is finished. The Tenth Mind Generation from the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way."'*

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 430) says:

> *On the tenth ground, he attains the highest empowerment from the buddhas everywhere*
> *And the surpassing exalted wisdom will also arise as supreme.*
> *Just as rainwater falls from rainclouds, likewise, so too does a rain of Dharma*
> *Fall spontaneously from the conquerors' child for the sake of the crop of virtue of migrating beings.* [10.1]

> The bodhisattva abiding *on the tenth ground attains the highest*, that is, supreme, *empowerment* of the great light rays *from the buddhas in all* ten directions. The way in which this is attained is as taught in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* from:
>
> > This bodhisattva, at the end of a million countless meditative stabilizations attained, actualizes the meditative stabilization called "possessing empowerment not different from the exalted wisdom of omniscient beings." Then immediately, a lotus of huge jewels equal in size to a million billion [world systems], adorned with jewels having the best of all types...
>
> Through:
>
> > ... extensively, will arise having a circle of lotuses equaling the particles that are the entirety of the subtle particles in the million billion [world systems]. The bodies of that bodhisattva also abide in conformity with them. As soon as he attains this meditative stabilization, he always appears sitting on that lotus. He sits there and from the treasure hair of the buddha bhagavans, assembled from all the buddha fields, rays of light will arise, conferring empowerment on that bodhisattva.
>
> In that bodhisattva, from among the ten perfections, *the surpassing* perfection of *exalted wisdom will also arise as supreme* – that is, will be purified.

When the bodhisattva attains the tenth ground, he abides on a lotus and the buddhas of the ten direction send forth great light rays which confer the empowerment of great light rays upon him. Unlike us, he receives this empowerment without even the need to request the buddhas for it! Instead, the buddhas, knowing that it is the appropriate time, gather around the bodhisattva in order to confer this empowerment upon him. As it says in a prayer that Lama Tsongkhapa wrote in praise of Shakyamuni Buddha: "Just like the waves of the ocean arise at the exact time..." These waves arise naturally and cannot be stopped by anyone, likewise, when the buddhas know that the time has come they perform their activities at the appropriate time.

There is a story about a family in the past. The husband had gone away and meanwhile the woman called her tailor to the home and they enjoyed themselves together. However, in the

meantime they saw the husband arriving in the distance so the woman hid the tailor in a big box and put it in a corner. When night fell, thieves broke into house and found the heavy box and carried it away. The tailor, out of fright, urinated in the box. The thieves seeing this liquid come from the box thought that there must be a special gem, a moon crystal, inside that creates a particular liquid. However, upon opening the box they found the tailor. They thought to sacrifice him and offer him to Ishvara. While talking about this, Ishvara appeared in front of them and said "Today instead of making this sacrifice just offer me this man alive." The thieves were very happy to have had this vision of Ishvara and gave the man to Ishvara and went away. Ishvara then showed himself to actually be the Buddha who gave teachings to the tailor whereby he became a foe destroyer. Thus, the buddhas' enlightened activity is fixed and appropriate to the occasion.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 430) says:

> The difference between the identification of exalted wisdom and the perfection of wisdom is taught in [Asanga's] *Bodhisattva Grounds*:
>
> > That knowing the presentation of all phenomena as they are is the perfection of exalted wisdom. The wisdom that engages in apprehending the ultimate is the perfection of wisdom. That engaging in apprehending the conventional is the perfection of exalted wisdom. These are the particularities of the two.

The *Bodhisattva Grounds* clearly says: "That knowing the presentation of all phenomena as they are is the perfection of exalted wisdom." In the phrase "The wisdom that engages in apprehending the ultimate is the perfection of wisdom," "the ultimate" is emptiness and the "wisdom that engages in apprehending the ultimate" is the wisdom of meditative equipoise absorbed on emptiness or the ultimate truth. In the phrase "That engaging in apprehending the conventional is the perfection of exalted wisdom," "the conventional" is the method or the vast.

The ten perfections are said to be equally pervasive. However, are generosity and morality equally pervasive? They are not, because generosity and morality are contradictory, that is, there is no common locus of the two. Generosity and so forth are not mutually and equally pervasive, whereas the ten perfections are equally pervasive in that if it is perfection of generosity it is pervaded by being a perfection of morality. On the other hand, if it is a perfection of generosity it is not pervaded by being generosity. What is generosity? Generosity is a mental factor, the definition of generosity being "the intention to give." This subject requires reflection. Along with the intention to give there is a concomitant main mind having five similarities. Is this main mind generosity? It is not. However, a main mind in the continuum of a buddha that has in its retinue the intention to give is a perfection of generosity but is not generosity.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 431) says:

> *Just as rainwater falls from rainclouds* for the sake of increasing the crops of worldly beings, *likewise*, *so too does a rain of* holy *Dharma* manifestly *fall*, that is, descend, *spontaneously from the conquerors' child*, the tenth grounder, *for the sake of* increasing *the crop of virtue of* the *migrating beings* who are to be subdued. For this reason, this ground is called "Cloud of Dharma."

The Tibetan nomads say that whether one puts a piece of gold or a piece of stone in the ear of donkey there is no difference for that donkey. The meaning of this is that when Dharma is given to the ear of someone who is not interested it makes no difference. The Dharma in general is a cause for the ripening of the mind but in this case there is no ripening. This is mentioned in the eighth chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* (translated by George Churinoff) saying:

Although the god of rain sends rain down,
As an impotent seed does not grow,
Although the buddhas appear,
The unfortunate do not experience excellence. [8.10]

When a rain of Dharma falls, the person for whom it is made must be a proper vessel otherwise it will have no effect. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "For this reason, this ground is called 'Cloud of Dharma.'"

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 431) says:

> This is the explanation of the tenth ultimate mind generation in the *Illumination of the Thought, An Extensive Explanation of [Chandrakirti's] 'Supplement to the Middle Way.'*

Lama Tsongkhapa says "tenth ultimate mind generation" in that ultimate mind generation has ten divisions that correspond with the ten grounds. Is the ultimate mind generation a realization of emptiness alone or is it something more? If it is an exalted knower in the continuum of a bodhisattva directly realizing emptiness is it pervaded by being an ultimate mind generation? A conventional mind generation has to be a main mind. Here the point is whether an ultimate mind generation is necessarily a main mind. This can be discussed at length. The definition of an ultimate mind generation in the first chapter of the Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport* (Tibetan text vol. I, page 154) is:

> The <u>definition of an ultimate mind generation</u> is: a mahayana superior's main mental knower abiding in a type of realization that is a special wisdom [for which] dualistic appearances with respect to the mode of abidance of complete enlightenment have vanished, and that is either a conventional or ultimate mind generation.

All ten grounds have now been explained. On the first ground the bodhisattva attains a surpassing perfection of generosity, on the second he attains a surpassing perfection of morality, on the third he attains a surpassing perfection of patience, and so forth. According to the Svatantrika Madhyamika system, a bodhisattva attains a surpassing practice of the perfection of generosity but not a perfection of generosity because if he has attained a perfection of generosity he has definitely attained omniscience. The Prasangika Madhyamikas do not posit this in the same way, rather they say that there are two types of perfection of generosity, a mundane and a supramundane perfection of generosity. What is to be understood is that when a surpassing perfection of generosity is attained the bodhisattva does not have even a stain of miserliness. Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says that when a surpassing perfection of morality is attained the bodhisattva is completely free, even in a dream, from the stains of broken morality. This means that the bodhisattva does not break his morality, that is, he does not engage in non-virtue, even in a dream. With respect to the third mind generation, Chandrakirti says that when a surpassing perfection of patience is attained the bodhisattva does not become angry even if his body is cut into pieces, but instead his patience increases. We should make prayers and train to become like these bodhisattvas.

When the bodhisattva attains a surpassing perfection of effort he is completely without laziness. Likewise, when he attains a surpassing perfection of concentration, the bodhisattva is completely without distraction. When he attains a surpassing perfection of wisdom, there is no longer the arisal of faulty wisdom. When he attains a surpassing perfection of method he has the twelve types of skill in means, the six internal and six external. When the bodhisattva attains a surpassing perfection of prayer, all his prayers, such as the ten great prayers, are actualized. When he attains a surpassing perfection of power, he attains the ten powers. On the tenth ground he attains a surpassing perfection of exalted wisdom.

In this way the ten grounds have been discussed, next Chandrakirti sets out the qualities of these ten grounds.

Wednesday afternoon, 4 April 2001

THE QUALITIES OF THE TEN GROUNDS

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 431) says:

3B1C-3 Presentation of the qualities of the ten grounds

A Explaining the qualities of the first ground
B Explaining the qualities of the second through the seventh ground
C Explaining the qualities of the three pure grounds

3B1C-3A Explaining the qualities of the first ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Now, the explanation in terms of attaining the quantity of their qualities, beginning from the first mind generation:

At that time he perceives a hundred buddhas and
He also realizes their blessings,
Remains for a hundred eons in that very life and
Perfectly engages the limits of past and future. [11.1]

The intelligent one absorbs and gives up a hundred meditative stabilizations.
He shakes around and can illuminate a hundred world systems.
Likewise he ripens a hundred sentient beings with magical powers and
Goes to realms corresponding to the number one hundred. [11.2]

He perfectly opens the doors of the Dharma; the Child of the Mighty Sage,
In his own body,[241] *also displays bodies all around.*
The bodies, beautified and equipped by having their own retinue, each also
Displays children of the Conqueror corresponding to one hundred. [11.3]

As is taught [in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*]:

Having thoroughly come forth, he also utterly attains a hundred meditative stabilizations in a single instant, moment, and period, and also enters absorption in them; he perceives a hundred buddhas and also perfectly knows their blessings; moves a hundred world systems; goes also to a hundred realms; illuminates a hundred world systems; matures a hundred sentient beings; remains for a hundred eons; reaches the limits of the past and future up to a hundred eons; completely opens a hundred doors of the Dharma; everywhere displays a hundred bodies and also everywhere displays each body as having a retinue of a hundred bodhisattvas.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1B-1 Qualities of the first stage

[241] All the Tibetan texts have "in his own body" rather than "from his own body."

At that time, he sees a hundred buddhas,
And from them also realizes blessings.
He can stay in the same life for a hundred eons,
And clearly perceive to those limits of past and future. [11.1]

The intelligent can enter and leave a hundred concentrations.
He can shake a hundred worlds around, and can illuminate them.
Likewise, by magical powers, he ripens a hundred sentient beings,
And also goes to pure realms to the number of a hundred. [11.2]

He can fully open doors of the Dharma. This son of the King of Sages
Can also, from his own body, manifest bodies everywhere,
Each body also, beautified and made ready with its own entourage,
Appears in company with a hundred sons of the conquerors. [11.3]

It should be understood that on the first stage, twelve hundred qualities are attained; for when he attains the first stage, that bodhisattva can see a hundred buddhas [in a very short space of time], also this bodhisattva can realize blessings from those hundred, he can remain in the same life for a hundred eons, and can clearly perceive the past and the future also to the limit of a hundred eons; this intelligent one can enter one hundred samadhi concentrations and leave them; this bodhisattva can shake around a hundred worlds and illuminate them; likewise, by miraculous powers, he can ripen a hundred sentient beings, and also go to pure lands [of the buddhas] having the number of a hundred; that bodhisattva can fully open a hundred doors of the Dharma; this son of the King of Sages can also manifest completely a hundred bodies from his own body, and each of the [hundred] bodies also appearing in company with a hundred buddha sons, is beautified and made ready by having its own entourage.

On the first ground the bodhisattva attains twelve sets of a hundred qualities:
1. He can see 100 buddhas in an instant.
2. He knows that he is blessed by those 100 buddhas.
3. He lives for 100 eons.
4. He engages the limits of the past to 100 eons and the limits of the future to 100 eons.
5. He can enter and rise from 100 meditative stabilizations.
6. He can shake 100 world systems.
7. He can illuminate 100 world systems.
8. He can ripen 100 sentient beings by means of magical emanations.
9. He can go to 100 buddha lands.
10. He opens 100 doors of Dharma, meaning that he can give many types of teachings in accordance with the needs of those to be subdued.
11. He can create 100 bodies in or from his body.
12. He also makes each of these 100 bodies have a retinue of 100 bodhisattvas.

The number of each of these twelve qualities increases on each subsequent ground. These are also mentioned in Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *Grounds and Paths*. If one understands how many qualities a first ground bodhisattva has, what need is there to mention how many a buddha has?

As was said before, an ultimate mind generation is: a mahayana superior's main mental knower abiding in a type of realization that is a special wisdom [for which] dualistic appearances with respect to the mode of abidance of complete enlightenment have vanished, and that is either a conventional or ultimate mind generation. Therefore, that it is a wisdom directly realizing emptiness alone is not sufficient for it to be an ultimate mind generation; it must be a main mental knower of a mahayana superior sustained by the wisdom directly realizing emptiness. What is the measure abiding in a type of realization that is a special wisdom and abiding in the type of realization that is a special method? This is discussed in the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. If it is a wisdom directly

realizing emptiness is it pervaded by abiding in a type of realization that is a special wisdom? There is no pervasion. Posit! The uninterrupted path of a hearer path of seeing, this being a the wisdom directly realizing emptiness but not abiding in a type of realization that is a special wisdom. Why not? Because the wisdom directly realizing emptiness in the continuum of a hearer is not a special wisdom because it is not conjoined with a special method, the mahayana mind generation. If it abides in a type of realization that is a special wisdom it must be conjoined with a special method, the mahayana mind generation.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 431) says:

> *At the time he sees a hundred buddhas and*
> *Also realizes that he is blessed by them.*
> *In that lifetime he lives for a hundred eons and*
> *Also perfectly engages the limits of the past and future.* [11.1]
>
> *The intelligent one absorbs in and relinquishes a hundred meditative stabilizations.*
> *He shakes and is able to illuminate a hundred world systems.*
> *Similarly, he ripens a hundred sentient beings with magical emanations and*
> *Also goes to pure lands corresponding to the number hundred.* [11.2]
>
> *He perfectly opens the doors of Dharma. This child of the Powerful Subduer*
> *Also thoroughly displays bodies in his own body.*
> *Each of these bodies, beautified and endowed with its own retinue*
> *Is also displayed with a corresponding hundred conquerors' children.* [11.3]

At the time when the first ground, the ultimate mind generation, is attained:
(1) *this* first grounder *sees a hundred buddhas* in a brief instant.

(2) He is *also blessed by those* hundred buddhas, that is, this bodhisattva also *realizes* their blessings.

(3) *In that* very *lifetime* of abiding on that first ground, he *lives for a hundred eons*.

(4) He *also perfectly engages the limits of the past and future* for a hundred eons. This means that his seer that is an exalted wisdom also engages in the hundred eons that are the limits of the past and future.
(5) *The intelligent one*, that is, this bodhisattva, *absorbs in and* also *relinquishes*, that is, arises from, *a hundred meditative stabilizations*.
(6) This bodhisattva *shakes* a hundred world systems *and*

(7) *is able to illuminate a hundred world systems*.

(8) *Similarly*, this bodhisattva *ripens a hundred sentient beings with magical emanations* and

(9) *also goes to* the *pure lands* of a buddha *corresponding to the number*, that is having the number, *hundred*.

(10) This bodhisattva *perfectly opens* a hundred *doors of Dharma*.

(11) *This child of the Powerful Subduer also thoroughly displays* a hundred *bodies in his own body*.

(12) Also *each of these* hundred *bodies, also displayed with a corresponding hundred conquerors' children* each, is *beautified and endowed with its own retinue*.

Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary here is very similar to Chandrakirti's autocommentary. One difference is Lama Tsongkhapa's statement regarding the bodhisattva engaging the limits of the past and future for a hundred eons: "This means that his seer that is an exalted wisdom also engages in the hundred eons that are the limits of the past and future."

Is the way in which a bodhisattva shakes one hundred world systems like an earthquake? It is not. However, in the world it is sometimes said that when there is an earthquake it is because a bodhisattva has attained the first ground. In fact, when the Buddha was asked why there was an

earthquake he answered that it was because at such-and-such a place such-and-such a bodhisattva had attained the first ground.

Magical emanations are displayed by a bodhisattva in order to develop belief in sentient beings and make them ready for ripening. However, one needs to be careful about what one believes. For example, there is a story about a man in Dharamsala who, it was said, could diagnose people's illness by merely looking at their face. He was once invited by the head of the Tibetan hospital to visit the hospital. There he was taken to see some patients and was asked what illness they had. Each time he correctly gave the diagnosis, much to the surprise of the head of the hospital. However, after the clairvoyant had left, the head of the hospital asked the patients what they had thought of this man, whereupon they told him that this man had come to the hospital very early that morning and had read each of their charts!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 432) says:

3B1C-3B Explaining the qualities of the second through the seventh ground

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says::

The intelligent one, having attained those qualities by abiding on
Extremely Joyous, will, just like that, perfectly attain those in
Thousands by abiding on Stainless – [11.4abc]

Only those [twelve] qualities corresponding to the number one hundred that are attained by this bodhisattva who generates the first mind are to be enumerated greater, saying, 'the bodhisattva who generates the second mind will attain one thousand."

Those very qualities on the third mind generation and so forth,

on these
Five grounds the bodhisattva will attain a hundred thousand, [11.4cd]

A billion, and he will attain ten billion.
Then, he will also attain a thousand billion; a billion
Billion multiplied completely by a hundred and again
Perfectly multiplied by a thousand, will all be fully attained. [11.5]

It should be understood that the bodhisattva who generates the third mind will attain a hundred thousand of the qualities that were explained. The bodhisattva who generates the fourth mind will attain a billion. The bodhisattva who generates the fifth mind will attain ten billion. The bodhisattva who generates the sixth mind will attain a thousand billion. The bodhisattva who generates the seventh mind will attain a hundred thousand billion billion.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1B-2 Qualities of the second to seventh stages

When the intelligent, dwelling in the Joyful, has received
These qualities, just like this the dweller on the Stainless Stage
Receives them actually in thousands. [11.4abc]

When the intelligent one dwelling on the Joyful Stage has attained these twelve hundred qualities, just like this the bodhisattva dwelling in the second stage, the Stainless, attains twelve thousand of these qualities for he attains the qualities of seeing a thousand buddhas in one instant, etc., up to manifesting as a thousand of his own body, each one being surrounded by an entourage of a thousand bodhisattvas each.

On these five stages,
The bodhisattva receives them by the hundred thousand, and [11.4cd]

The thousand million; he receives ten thousand million;
Then he receives a million million; then a thousand thousand
Million million, multiplied completely by a hundred,
And all again multiplied by a thousand, he fully attains. [11.5]

The bodhisattvas dwelling on the five stages from the third to the seventh attain the twelve categories of qualities, for on the third stage one attains twelve hundred thousand qualities, and on the fourth, twelve hundred times ten million; the fifth-stager attains twelve thousand times ten million qualities, then on the sixth stage one attains twelve hundred thousand times ten million, and on the seventh stage, one attains to the full limit twelve multiplied completely by a hundred times a hundred thousand million[242] times ten million qualities, multiplied completely again by a thousand (=$12x10^{23}$).

On each of the grounds the bodhisattva has twelve sets of qualities:
1. he sees buddhas,
2. he knows that he is blessed by these buddhas,
3. he lives for eons,
4. he engages the limits of the past and the future,
5. he enters and rises from meditative stabilization,
6. he shakes the world systems,
7. he illuminates the world systems,
8. he ripens sentient beings by means of magical emanations,
9. he goes to the buddha lands,
10. he opens doors of Dharma,
11. he displays bodies, and
12. he also displays each of these bodies with a retinue of bodhisattvas.

On the first ground the bodhisattva's twelve sets of qualities are multiplied by 100, on the second ground they are multiplied by 1000, and so forth. Note that Tibetan numbers have particular names through 10^{59}, this being called "countless."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 432) says:

The intelligent one abiding on the Extremely Joyous,
Having attained them, abiding on the Stainless, just like that
Perfectly attains one thousand of them. The bodhisattvas
on the five grounds fully attain a hundred thousand, [11.4]

Attain a billion, attain ten billion,
Also attain a thousand billion, and
Fully attain a billion billion multiplied completely by one hundred,
All again perfectly multiplied by a thousand. [11.5]

The intelligent one abiding on the Extremely Joyous ground, *having attained* the twelve hundred qualities, transfers to the second ground. *Just as* was explained in regard to the first, *one abiding on the Stainless perfectly attains* the set of twelve qualities in terms of *one thousand*. Regarding those very sets of twelve qualities, *the* five *bodhisattvas on the five grounds* – the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh – respectively *fully attain*

- twelve by *a hundred thousand*,

[242] *khrag.khrig* is variously defined as 10^6, 10^8, 10^{10} or 10^{11}.

- twelve by *a billion*,
- twelve by *ten billion* (10^{10}),
- twelve by *a thousand billion* (10^{12}),
- twelve by *a billion billion* (10^{18}) *multiplied completely by one hundred* – that is, a hundred billion billion (10^{20}) – and *all again perfectly multiplied by a thousand*; that is, twelve by a hundred thousand billion billion (10^{23}).

In short, these bodhisattvas have many qualities! In fact, their qualities are inexpressible. Their qualities increase on the grounds as the potential of their realizations increases. For example, due to an increase in the qualities of the mind, one attains such physical powers as being able to emanate bodies. When one sees a person with these external signs, such as his being able to create magical emanations, one can infer from this that he has inner realizations.

When I was about 16 years old, I had a classmate who was about 12 years old. When we were studying the subject of the qualities of the ten grounds in the text *Grounds and Paths*, he asked our teacher what was the point of counting these qualities since it seemed to him to be enough to know that the bodhisattvas have them, without it being necessary to know exactly how many they have. This young monk thought that it was sufficient to say that the bodhisattva have lots of qualities!

Thursday morning, 5 April 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 432) says:

3B1C-3C Explaining the qualities of the three pure grounds

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Above that since it is not possible to fully specify the qualities through numbers, they are fully specified through smallest atoms:
>
> *The one abiding on Immovable Ground without conceptualization*
> *Will attain qualities equal in number to*
> *However many atoms there are*
> *In world systems totaling a hundred thousand billion.* [11.6]
>
> By generating the eighth mind of the bodhisattva, the qualities that were shown will be attained as many as the particles of smallest atoms of a hundred thousand billion world systems.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B1B-3 Qualities of the three pure stages

The dweller in the Immovable Stage, without
Conceptualization, gains qualities whose number
Equals the atoms there are in a hundred thousand
Thrice-thousandfold world systems added together. [11.6]

The bodhisattva dwelling on the eighth stage, the Immovable Stage, who has no conceptualization grasping at true existence, attains superior qualities; for he attains qualities equal in number with how many atoms there are in a hundred thousand thrice-thousandfold world systems combined.

The qualities of an eighth ground bodhisattva total a hundred thousand billion. The world systems are classified in terms of a small thousand (1000), a middling thousand (1000^2 or a million), and a great

thousand (1000^3 or a billion). The third chapter of Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* says that there are nine bases – Mount Meru, the four continents, the sun, moon, the desire realm gods, and the Brahma Realm – which are multiplied by a first 1000 for a total of 1000; multiplied by a second thousand for a total of 1,000,000; and multiplied by a third thousand for a total of 1,000,000,000. On the eighth ground the twelve qualities of a bodhisattva are multiplied by a hundred thousand billion.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *The bodhisattva who abides on the ground of*
> *Excellent Intelligence will attain the qualities shown before*
> *To the extent of atoms of ten times the perfect*
> *Total of a countless hundred thousand.* [11.7]
>
> The bodhisattva who has generated the ninth mind will attain the qualities that were shown before equal to the atoms of ten times a hundred thousand countless billion world systems.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *The bodhisattva dwelling on the stage*
> *Of Good Intelligence obtains the qualities*
> *Explained above to the measure of the atoms*
> *Of countless millions all added together.* [11.7]

The bodhisattva dwelling on the stage of Good Intelligence attains superior virtuous dharmas for he attains qualities equal to the number of the atoms in ten countless hundreds of thousands [of thrice-thousandfold world systems] of the previously explained qualities, added together.

The ninth ground bodhisattva has "the qualities that were shown before equal to the atoms of ten times a hundred thousand countless billion world systems."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *To some extent, on this tenth, his qualities*
> *Will greatly surpass the sphere of those and*
> *Will be as many as the amount of atoms existing*
> *In the total of what are not the sphere of speech.* [11.8]
>
> By generating the tenth mind of the bodhisattva, the qualities that were shown will be attained as many as the particles of smallest atoms of inexpressibly inexpressible buddha realms.

For the tenth ground bodhisattva "the qualities that were shown will be attained as many as the particles of smallest atoms of inexpressibly inexpressible buddha realms."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The term "to some extent," of "to some extent, on this tenth, his..." indicates progression regarding the qualities to be expressed, i.e., "they are not exhausted in only merely that."
>
> Furthermore, this bodhisattva,

He is able to show instant by instant
Completed buddha bodies passed beyond number together
With bodhisattvas in the hair pores and
Likewise also gods, demigods, and humans. [11.9]

This bodhisattva who generated the tenth mind, without motivational thought, is able to show buddha bhagavans passed beyond number in each of the hair pores of his body and a sovereign retinue of immeasurable bodhisattvas in one and yet another aspect instant by instant. In addition to those he is able to show, in each hair pore in each instant, the cyclic existence of the five migrators without even mixing up the differences due to the divisions of humans and so forth.

The tenth ground bodhisattva is able to display numberless buddhas and bodhisattvas in a single pore of his body. These qualities show that such a bodhisattva has attained extremely high realizations.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

The term 'also' is for the purpose of summarizing the unmentioned. That is, it summarizes the meaning up through:

> [He is] able to teach the Dharma spontaneously to sentient beings who are subdued by Indra, Brahma, mundane protectors, human kings, hearers, solitary realizers, and tathagatas, having taken the form of Indra...

– and so forth.

Extensive distinctions of the qualities should be clarified from the *Sutra [of the Ten Grounds]* itself.

The tenth ground bodhisattva is also able to display the bodies of Indra, Brahma, and so forth. In short, he can take on any form that will benefit sentient beings.

In the past in Tibet there was a lama, perhaps the Ganden throne holder, who, when he was dying, was asked by his disciples to return quickly to them. However, he refused, saying that he would not return as there was no benefit in his taking rebirth again in Tibet. His disciples insisted that he return but the lama said that if he took rebirth he would not do so in Tibet and told his disciples not to look for his reincarnation. This is also true of another famous lama who, when he was dying was asked to return. Such highly realized beings are able to see that it would be of more benefit to take rebirth even in another world system.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

Something of the tenth: his qualities
Here go far beyond verbal description;
They are as many as the atoms in
All non-objects of speech added together. [11.8]

In his pores, together with bodhisattvas,
Bodies of perfect buddhas beyond number,
And likewise devas, asuras, and humans also,
In every instant, he is able to show. [11.9]

Something of the bodhisattva dwelling on this tenth stage: he attains qualities greatly exceeding those on the ninth stage and below; for his qualities are far beyond the realm of speech, he attains qualities equal in number to as many atoms as there are in all the non-objects of speech, i.e. the buddha fields, added together; and in every

pore, he is able to show bodhisattvas and, together with them, the bodies of perfect buddhas, beyond computation, and likewise devas, asuras, and human beings too, [changing their form] from instant to instant.

The tenth ground bodhisattva's qualities are inexpressible by means of terms. This is the meaning of saying that his qualities have gone beyond the sphere of activity of speech.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The explanation demonstrating the qualities of the bodhisattvas is finished.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 432) says:

> *Since one abiding on the Immovable ground lacks conceptions*
> *He will attain qualities equal in number*
> *To however many particles exist in worlds*
> *Totaling a hundred thousand billion.* [11.6]

Since from the eighth ground one cannot count the qualities in terms of a basis of numbers, they are explained to be completely counted in terms of subtle particles. *Since one abiding on* the eighth ground, *the Immovable ground*, *lacks conceptions* conceiving true existence in regard to persons and phenomena, he *will attain* sets of *qualities equal in number to however many* – that is, the number of – *particles existing in worlds totaling a hundred thousand billion*, that is, the three world systems of a billion.

> *The bodhisattva abiding on the ground of*
> *Good Intelligence, attains the qualities indicated previously*
> *To extent of the particles of ten times*
> *The perfect total of a hundred thousand countless.* [11.7]

The bodhisattva abiding on the ninth ground, *the ground of Good Intelligence*, *attains* the twelve sets of *qualities indicated previously* equal in *extent* to the number of subtle *particles of ten times the perfect total of a hundred thousand* countless – that is, a million countless world systems of a billion (10^{74}).

> *For the time being, on the tenth his qualities*
> *Greatly surpass the sphere of activity of speech and*
> *Are however many particles there are*
> *Totaling what is not the sphere of activity of speech.* [11.8]

On the tenth ground, *the qualities of this* ground, the twelve sets explained before, *greatly surpass the sphere of activity of speech and* are attained equal to the number of *however many* numbers of *particles there are totaling what is not the sphere of activity of speech*, that is, that are more inexpressible than the inexpressible buddha lands. The term "for the time being" (v. 11.8a) says that "The qualities on the tenth ground are not at all exhausted in merely what is expressed here." Stating "That expressed for the time being, or previously" expresses the order in which other qualities are indicated below.

> *He is able to display within each instant*
> *The bodies of complete buddhas together with bodhisattvas,*
> *Passed beyond counting, in his pores, and,*
> *Similarly, also gods, antigods, and humans.*

Moreover, this bodhisattva, without the motivation thinking to display emanations, *is able to display the bodies of bodhisattvas and complete buddhas*, each *passed beyond counting*, *in* each of *the pores* of his body *together* with their retinues of inestimable bodhisattvas, also in a different order, *within each instant*. *Similarly*, aside from them, he is also able to display, without mixing, the different divisions of the cyclic existence of the five migrating beings, *gods, antigods, humans*, and so forth, in each of his pores in each instant.

> The term "also" is for the purpose of condensing that not mentioned, that is, when gathering together those not mentioned it is the summarized meaning of stating:
>
> > He is able to teach the Dharma spontaneously to the sentient beings who are subdued by Indra, Brahma, worldly protectors, the kings of human beings, the hearers, solitary realizers, and the tathagatas through taking the form of Indra and so forth.
>
> This should be understood from the extensive [explanation] in the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*.

The qualities of a bodhisattva on the three pure grounds are beyond conception. Therefore, we need faith in the validity of these scriptures, on the basis of which we can pray to become like these bodhisattvas and determine to put effort into attaining their qualities. We should make a promise to attain the qualities of the seven impure grounds, followed by those of three pure grounds, up to the buddha ground. When wishing to attain these qualities, we should be confident that we can actually attain them as in this way we will increase our courage and our determination to engage in the bodhisattva path. Even though we are not able to achieve these qualities presently, we should try to develop the mind of enlightenment thinking "I will attain enlightenment for the benefit of sentient beings." We should think "Even if I cannot help others, at the very least I will not harm them." Each morning when we wake up we should develop these positive thoughts. When we think "I will not harm others" we should think "I will not harm them with my body, speech, and mind." This is because we harm others with our body and speech directly and harm them indirectly with our mind. We should pray that our body will not become a cause for generating attachment and hatred in the minds of others. We should also pray that our speech does not become a cause for generating attachment and hatred in others' minds. Hence, we should pray that our body and speech do not become a cause for others to generate afflictions. Making such prayers and resolutions helps us accumulate the collections and makes our day more meaningful. During the day, we should be mindful of the promise that we made that same morning. In this way our human life will become meaningful. We should also rejoice in the deeds of bodhisattvas and make their achievement our own goal.

In short, how do such bodhisattvas benefit sentient beings? They do so by displaying various types of emanations even in their own body pores.

This concludes the discussion of the qualities of the ten grounds, the causal grounds.

THE RESULTANT GROUND

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 434) says:

3B2 The explanation of the resultant ground

- A The way of initially becoming a buddha
- B Presenting the bodies and qualities
- C Indicating the emanation body
- D Proving there is a single vehicle
- E Explanation of the duration of manifest enlightenment and remaining

3B2A The way of initially becoming a buddha

1. Actual meaning
2. Dispelling arguments

3B2A-1 Actual meaning

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Desiring to express just slightly the qualities of the buddha ground after that, it is explained in terms of the Buddha Bhagavan by way of actualizing praise:

Because moonlight in a stainless sky illuminates, therefore the aim
For which you strove again on the ground previous to generating
The ten strengths and strove in Akanishtha, the supreme state, peace,
The finality of all qualities, the matchless, was acquired by you. [12.1]

For example, the moon is able to illuminate the entirety of migrators in only a stainless sky. Likewise, the Bhagavan, having understood the potential for himself to gain the buddha qualities by gaining the tenth mind generation that cleanses the darkness that hinders attaining the buddha qualities, begins to strive for the latter buddha ground. The aim for which this striving was begun – the highest exalted wisdom – was acquired in only the abode of Akanishtha of the Bhagavan.

It is the finality of qualities because here qualities reach their limit and are perfected. It is also matchless because there is nothing similar to that and because there is nothing higher.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B2A-1 Substance

Because, for the light of the moon in an immaculate sky to be bright,
Earlier, on the stage of developing the ten powers, you strove again,
The aim for which you strove in Not Low, being the highest degree, cessation,
Reaching the limit of all qualities, without match: this you attained. [12.1]

The purpose for which the Buddha, the Blessed One, made effort in the [pure land] of Not Low (Akanishtha) [i.e., only in that place], was the highest degree, cessation, the matchless, unexcelled wisdom knowledge which reaches the limit of all qualities. He received this [wisdom knowledge] because, as the light of the moon in an immaculate sky makes forms [or all sentient beings] clear, at a previous time, on the tenth stage, where one develops the ten powers, [i.e., buddhahood,] he again made an effort and received the final result.

On the tenth ground the bodhisattva again puts effort into actualizing buddhahood. In this way, all the powers for which the bodhisattvas strove on the tenth ground are actualized on the buddha ground. He attains enlightenment in the form of an enjoyment body on the basis, or body, of a being of Not Low (Akanishta). Hence, the bodhisattva actually attains buddhahood in Not Low.

Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport* quotes from the sutra that says: "A perfect buddha there, the emanation becomes a buddha here." "A perfect buddha there" refers to the tenth ground bodhisattva who takes rebirth in Not Low and attains enlightenment there. Simultaneously his emanation takes rebirth in the desire realm and attains enlightenment here. This is debated at length asking, for example: "If it is one who attains enlightenment for the first time is his body pervaded by being a body of a being of Not Low?" Some say that it is, whereas others say that it is not. In short, the tenth ground bodhisattva attains enlightenment in Not Low and simultaneously all his emanations in the desire realm also attain enlightenment. Where does a bodhisattva attain enlightenment in the form of an enjoyment body? That place is Not Low.

The qualities on the resultant ground are matchless, such as the four close placements of mindfulness and so forth which at this point are culminated. Although the four close placements of mindfulness exist in all those who have entered a path, the difference is that those of a buddha are culminated. Thus, when the bodhisattva attains the resultant ground, he attains the qualities of a buddha that are the culmination of the four close placements of mindfulness and so forth.

The enjoyment body has five certainties:

1. certainty of abode, abiding only in Not Low,
2. certainty of body,
3. certainty of retinue,
4. certainty of doctrine,
5. certainty of time.

The etymology of the word 'enjoyment' of enjoyment body indicates that he enjoys only the mahayana Dharma. The enjoyment body abides in Not Low as long as cyclic existence is not empty and emanates many emanations to all the various world for the benefit of sentient beings.

With respect to the resultant ground, Chandrakirti says: "It is the finality of qualities because here qualities reach their limit and are perfected. It is also matchless because there is nothing similar to that and because there is nothing higher." When buddhahood is attained, all qualities are matchless and the highest.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to show that "There, when manifestly and completely enlightened, the Bhagavan instantly acquires omniscient exalted wisdom," it is explained:
>
> *Just as space has no divisions by the divisions of vessels, like that,*
> *Thusness has no divisions at all made by things; therefore,*
> *Having created correct comprehension about the equality of taste,*
> *You, excellent knower, instantaneously comprehend objects of knowledge.* [12.2]
>
> For example, although vases, metal bowls, and so forth are different, because of the similarity in merely lacking obstruction, the space belonging to them has no difference. Likewise, although functioning things – form, feeling, and so forth – are different, since the suchness belonging to them has no difference in having the characteristic of non-production, suchness is to be understood as of only one taste.
>
> Moreover, since only one instant of exalted knower comprehends [that equality of taste], the Bhagavan gained omniscient exalted wisdom in only one instant of exalted knower.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Just as space lacks classification by the classes of its vessels,*
> *So reality has no classes made by its matters, therefore,*
> *Understanding perfectly that there is just one same flavor,*
> *You, good knower, understand knowables in an instant.* [12.2]

This good knower instantly fully understands all knowables, because he perfectly knows absolute reality to the limit as of just [one] same flavor, for just as the space [contained in or filling different vessels, pots, bowls, etc.,] is [the same,] merely the negation of obstructive contact, and has no separate classes by the classes of the vessels, so the absolute reality [of forms, feelings, etc.], which does not have any different classes made by the matters [or own causes and conditions of the forms, feelings, etc.], is the same by way of not arising again.

Space itself is one, it has no divisions. However, in dependence on a particular basis, a pot, a bowl, and so forth, one can distinguish the space in a pot, the space in a bowl, and so forth. Likewise, suchness is one, it can be distinguished in terms of the basis of the attribute, although not in terms of the attribute itself. For example, if there are five pots made of the same substance which fired in the same oven and so forth, each one is the same in being a pot but one in dependence on their contents, such as chili, salt, sugar, honey, and soya sauce, they come to be called "chili pot," "salt pot," and so

forth. Similarly, space, in dependence on the vessel in which it is found, is called "the space of a pot," the space of a bowl," and so forth. Likewise, emptiness has no divisions, but can be differentiated in terms of its basis.

Thursday afternoon, 5 April 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 434) says:

> *Because moonlight in a stainless sky illuminates,*
> *Earlier, on the ground on which the ten powers are generated, you strove again, and*
> *In Not Low, striving for that purpose, you gained*
> *The supreme state, peace, the culmination of all qualities, the matchless.* [12.1]

> Just as, for example, *moonlight in a stainless sky* is able to *illuminate* all migrating beings without exception, similarly, having understood that he is able to gain a buddha's qualities by gaining the tenth mind generation that purifies the darkness hindering the attainment of a buddha's qualities, *again on the tenth ground before* generating the ten powers – the buddha ground – he *strives* or puts effort into attaining the buddha ground. Moreover, the supreme state, peace – unsurpassed exalted wisdom – *the purpose of that striving*, *is gained by you*, the bhagavan, *in Not Low* (Akanishta), that is, in only that place. This exalted wisdom is the culmination of all qualities because here *all* the *qualities* that are the close placements of mindfulness and so forth *are culminated* and perfected. *They are* also *matchless* because there are none similar and because there are none that are higher.

Moonlight in a cloudless sky is able to illuminate all forms, likewise, the bodhisattva on the tenth ground has dispelled every type of obstacle to attaining the qualities of a buddha. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "having understood that he is able to gain a buddha's qualities by gaining the tenth mind generation that purifies the darkness hindering the attainment of a buddha's qualities." Having become a buddha he will not longer need to strive, whereas prior that the bodhisattva must still strive to attain the supreme state of buddhahood.

Where does the bodhisattva attain the exalted wisdom knowing all phenomena in each instant? He attains it in Not Low. The exalted wisdom of the tenth ground is not culminated exalted wisdom, it is only culminated on the buddha ground. What are the qualities of a bodhisattva that are culminated on the buddha ground? They are the four close placements of mindfulness and so forth. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "This exalted wisdom is the culmination of all qualities because here all the qualities that are the close placements of mindfulness and so forth are culminated and perfected. They are also matchless because there are none similar and because there are none that are higher."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 434) says:

> The translation of the first line in accordance with the autocommentary must come as was explained previously. Nagtsho's translation of the second line as "Again he strives in that by first generating the ten powers" is best.

Patsab translates the second line of verse 12.1 as "Earlier, on the ground on which the ten powers are generated, you strove again," whereas Nagtsho translates it as "Again he strives in that by first generating the ten powers." Lama Tsongkhapa says that Nagtsho's translation is best, however, he only quotes fourteen syllables in the Tibetan here, whereas the verse in the *Supplement* has fifteen syllables.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 434-5) says:

> Stating "only in Not Low" indicates that, for one who has not previously become a buddha, the basis for newly becoming a buddha must be a being of Not Low, whereas one who has already become a buddha before displays the manner of newly becoming a buddha in the desire realm. This is the system of the perfection vehicle.
>
> When he first becomes a buddha in Not Low, the bhagavan displays the gaining of the exalted wisdom of an omniscient being in each instant.

The basis or support of attaining buddhahood newly must be the body of a being of Not Low. On the other hand, someone who has already attained buddhahood shows the aspect of attaining buddhahood newly in the desire realm. This is the system of the perfection vehicle, whereas in the tantra vehicle the basis of attaining buddhahood newly is not necessarily the body of a being of Not Low, which is the body of a god. Instead, according to tantra, the best basis for attaining buddhahood newly is a human body and not a god body. This is because a human body or basis is the most suitable basis because it is born from a womb and composed of the six constituents. These six constituents are the three substances obtained from the father and the three substances obtained from the mother.

The *Ornament for Clear Realizations* says: "A perfect buddha there, the emanation becomes a buddha here." There is debate about this: "When someone becomes enlightened in the desire realm with the body of a fully ordained monk, is his body in the desire realm a body emanated by one in Not Low?" In short, according to the perfection vehicle the basis of one who attains enlightenment newly is necessarily the body of a being of Not Low. On the other hand, one who has already attained enlightenment can manifest the attainment of buddhahood newly in the desire realm, for example, Shakyamuni Buddha who took a supreme emanation body and showed the aspect of attaining buddhahood in this world. Who is the emanator of the emanation body? Usually it is said that if it is an emanator of a supreme emanation body it is pervaded by being a being of Not Low. How many types of emanation body are there? There are three: a supreme emanation body, an incarnate emanation body (emanation body of rebirth), and the emanation body of an artisan. If it is a tulku (literally "an emanation body" but also another title for a rinpoche) it is not pervaded by being the emanation body of a buddha.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 435) says:

> *Just as space does not have divisions in terms of the divisions of vessels, similarly,*
> *Because suchness does not have any of the divisions of produced things,*
> *It is just the same taste. When this is perfectly comprehended,*
> *You who possess excellent knowledge, comprehend objects of knowledge in an instant.* [12.2]
>
> *Just as*, for example, even though there are many *divisions* of different *vessels*, such as pots, metal bowls, and so forth, because the *space* belonging to these vessels, that is, which pervades them, is the same in being a mere negation of all that is obstructive, it *does not have divisions* other than that *in terms of* the different divisions. *Similarly*, even though there are many different divisions of things, such as forms, feelings, and so forth – that *produced* by their respective causes and conditions, *the suchness* lacking inherent production that belongs to them, *because of not having any divisions of production by things* at all, should be understood as being *the same taste*, that is, as being just one taste. *Since* that same taste, moreover, *is perfectly comprehended* by just one instant of an exalted knower, *you who possess excellent knowledge*, gain the exalted wisdom *comprehending* all *objects of knowledge in an instant*.

Emptiness cannot be divided, it is just one, however, there is the emptiness of a gold pot, the emptiness of a brass pot, the emptiness of a copper pot, and so forth. Thus, while emptiness cannot be divided, the basis of emptiness can be divided. If emptiness could be divided it would also be possible to divide the object of negation but this is not possible. There is debate: "Is there not a difference

between the emptiness of a sentient being and the emptiness of a buddha?" The non-affirming negative that is the mere negation of the object of negation in regard to a sentient being and in regard to a buddha are the same. Is the emptiness of true existence of the mind of a sentient being and the emptiness of true existence of the mind of a buddha not different? The non-affirming negative that is the mere negation of the object of negation is the same in both cases. On the other hand, if this is discussed in terms of the factor that is a freedom from adventitious stains there is a difference because the reality of the mind of a buddha is free from adventitious stains, whereas the reality of the mind of a sentient being is together with the adventitious stains. The first mind generation of the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'* (J. Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

> *Even those abiding in the first mind of complete enlightenment*
> *Overcome those born from the speech of the Subduer Kings*
> *And solitary realizers through their own merit's increase.*
> *On the Gone Afar he surpasses them with his intelligence.* [1.8]

One commentary on this verse says that there is a difference in their seeing of the truth body but there is no difference in their seeing of reality.

The "many different divisions of things, such as forms, feelings, and so forth" refers to the five aggregates. These are different but their emptinesses – the non-affirming negative that is the mere negation of the object of negation, true existence – is of one taste.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 435) says:

3B2A-2 Dispelling arguments

A Setting out the former position
B Refuting that system

3B2A-2A Setting out the former position

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> [An objection] is mentioned about that:
>
> *If, when pacification is thusness, awareness would not engage it, and without*
> *Engagement, it is also unreasonable for awareness to ascertain the object to be known,*
> *Entirely unknowing, how would it know? It would be contradictory. Without*
> *The knower, who would teach others [to be subdued] by you, saying, "Like this?"* [12.3]
>
> In presenting, "non-production is the suchness of forms and so forth," and positing that "that too is understood [by an awareness]," when presenting that "pacification [of inherent production] is suchness," one must then accept awareness as not engaging that in any way. Like this: if awareness engages suchness having the nature of non-production, having what aspect would it arise in? Therefore, since there is no aspect, awareness just does not engage suchness.
>
> If awareness does not engage, in that case, since it is also unreasonable for the subject to ascertain the object to be known, therefore, how is it worthy to be thorough knowledge? To say, "suchness is thoroughly known just without thoroughly knowing," is also unreasonable.
>
> If asked: Why?
>
> It was mentioned: Entirely unknowing, how would it know? It would be contradictory. To say, "entirely not knowing, it knows," this is a mutual contradiction. If entirely not knowing, how does it know? If the mind is unproduced, without an exalted knower, who makes others [to be subdued] by

you realize it saying, "I comprehended suchness having the characteristic like this?" Therefore, it is unreasonable.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B2A-2A Argument

It may be asked:

If reality were absence, intelligence would not perceive it.
The mind not perceiving surely cannot possess the object of knowables –
Without knowing anywhere, how could it be consciousness? That would be contradictory.
When there is no knower, how can you teach others 'It is like this'? [12.3]

"If the absolute reality [of form, etc.] were absence of inherent existence, intelligence [or wisdom] would not perceive it. The mind, not perceiving, surely cannot be a possessor of a knowable object. Without knowing an object anywhere, how could it be consciousness? It would be contradictory to consciousness. When there is no knower of such an absolute reality, how can you teach others 'The understanding of absolute reality is like this'? It is impossible."

This argument is flung by the lower schools at the Prasangika Madhyamikas. Their argument is that if the Prasangika Madhyamikas assert that the lack of inherent production of form is the emptiness of form it follows that this is known by an awareness. The lower schools say that the lack of inherent production of form cannot be posited by an awareness and cannot be engaged by an awareness. If an awareness cannot engage an object, how can an awareness know it? It follows that it is not an object of knowledge because it is not known. The lower schools say this because, for them, if it does not exist inherently it does not exist at all. They say that it is inappropriate to say that an awareness engages that which does not exist. If it does not exist inherently it cannot be an object of an awareness, and if it is not an object of an awareness how can it be said that an awareness knows it? If there is no knower there is no object of knowledge. In this way, the Prasangika Madhyamikas' assertion is contradictory and there is no knower of the lack of inherent existence. Chandrakirti says: "If, when pacification is thusness, awareness would not engage it, and without engagement, it is also unreasonable for awareness to ascertain the object to be known, entirely unknowing, how would it know? It would be contradictory."

To summarize, the lower schools say that if the lack of inherent production of form and so forth is suchness, form and so forth would be non-existent. Therefore, it is not an object of knowledge and without an object of knowledge there is no knower of it. So how can the Prasangika Madhyamika system teach "I have realized the lack of inherent production of form and so forth?" This is incorrect because it cannot be known because the object, the lack of inherent production, does not exist and therefore there is no knower of it.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 435) says:

OBJECTION:

"When pacification is suchness, the intellect does not engage it.
Without an awareness engaging it, the object-possessor of that object of knowledge is also not suitable to be ascertained.
Without being fully known, how can it be known? That would be contradictory.
In the absence of an exalted knower, how can you teach others saying 'It is like that'?" [12.3]

> If it is posited that "The lack of inherent production is the suchness of forms and so forth" and "That too is known by an awareness," *when* positing "The *pacification* of inherent production *is suchness*," one must assert that the *intellect*, that is, wisdom, *does not engage that* object in any way. In that case, when an awareness engages the suchness that is the lack of inherent production, the awareness would have the aspect of what object? It would not [have the aspect of any object]. Therefore, since there is no arisal whatsoever of an aspect of the object, an awareness does not engage suchness. *Without an awareness*, which is an object-possessor, *engaging* an object, since *the object that is an object of knowledge is also not suitable to be ascertained* by a mind, how is the meaning of suchness deemed to be thoroughly known? Because it is not suitable to say "*Without being* thoroughly *known*, suchness is known," *how can* an object that is not thoroughly known *be known*? *That would be contradictory*. Also when the mind that engages suchness is not produced, that is, does not arise, *in the absence of an exalted knower* of suchness *how* is it suitable for *you to teach others* – those to be subdued – stating "I comprehend the suchness that has *such* characteristics"? It is not suitable.

This is the thesis of the lower schools. The Prasangika Madhyamikas posit the pacification of inherent existence regarding forms and so forth as being an object of knowledge. The lower schools, on the other hand, say that it is incorrect that forms and so forth lack inherent existence because if they do not exist inherently they cannot be engaged by any awareness. They say that the assertion of the Prasangika Madhyamikas is incorrect because the lack of inherent production is not an object engaged by an awareness. This argument is based on the lower schools' assertion that if things do not exist inherently they do not exist at all. If things do not exist at all, then how can an awareness engage them? For this reason they say that the Prasangika Madhyamikas' statement "I realize reality" is mistaken.

Friday morning, 6 April 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 436) says:

3B2A-2B Refuting that system

1 Dispelling arguments that realizing suchness is unacceptable
2 Dispelling arguments that an exalted knower is unacceptable

3B2A-2B1 Dispelling arguments that realizing suchness is unacceptable

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Responding to this [the Prasangika says],
>
> *When non-production is thusness and awareness is also free of production,*
> *Then, through relying on that aspect, thusness is [as if] realized.*
> *Just as whatever aspect mind will have, it totally knows that object,*
> *Likewise, there is cognition through close dependence on the conventional.* [12.4]
>
> In this [world], it is said that "Consciousness cognizes the object if it apprehends the mere resemblance of its aspect." For example, it is said that "Blue is known if consciousness approaches production maintaining the aspect of blue." Likewise, it is finely designated that "Suchness is known if a knower [having] the resemblance of the aspect of suchness is produced."
>
> In order to indicate the state of resemblance of the aspect of that knower, mentioning that "When non-production is thusness and awareness is also free of production, then, through relying on that aspect, thusness is [as if] realized," it was presented by way of relying on its aspect.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B2A-2B1 Rejecting the argument of the impossibility of perceiving absolute reality

When reality is non-production, and the mind also is freedom from birth,
Then, depending on that aspect, it is as if it perceives reality.
Just as, when the mind has the aspect of anything, it comprehends
That object, so, depending on the conventional level, he cognizes. [12.4]

Although he has no conceptualization exhorting the teaching of the Dharma dependent on conventional truth, [one says that] he cognizes absolute reality, because from depending on or holding the aspect of that absolute reality, it is posited that he perceives absolute reality; for when [the object,] absolute reality, is absence of inherent production, [the subject,] the mind, too, is born having the aspect of freedom from inherent production, [like water dropped into water]. As, [for example,] a mind grasping blue is posited as comprehending that blue object whose aspect it possesses.

Objects, such as form, are not inherently produced, because of which the object-possessors realizing them are also not inherently produced. An awareness realizes suchness, the lack of inherent existence, in dependence on them. Chandrakirti says: "Then, through relying on that aspect, thusness is [as if] realized." When blue appears to an awareness, that awareness is said to apprehend blue. That awareness apprehending blue knows blue. Likewise, when the object that is the lack of inherent existence appears to an awareness, that awareness realizes that lack of inherent existence due to which it is said that that awareness realizes that object, like the awareness of blue realizes blue. If the aspect of the object appears there is an awareness apprehending that object. For example, if the aspect of yellow appears there is an awareness apprehending yellow and so forth. An object is spoken of in terms of an aspect appearing and a consciousness is spoken of in terms of apprehending an object.

"Likewise, there is cognition through close dependence on the conventional" means that suchness is realized in dependence on a conventionality or a nominality. Earlier the *Supplement* said:

Conventional truth is the method,
Ultimate truth arises from the method.
Whoever does not know the distinctions of these two
Enters an inferior path due to mistaken conceptions. [6.80]

The realization of conventional truth is the means for realizing the ultimate truth. It is necessary to rely on the realization of a nominal truth in order to gain the realization of ultimate truth. In other words, in order to realize the lack of inherent existence of form it is necessary to first ascertain form, the basis of emptiness. Without realizing the form itself one cannot realize emptiness in terms of that form.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> "Just as whatever aspect mind..." and so forth mentions the very famous example; that too was already explained. Therefore, it is presented that "Suchness is realized through designation;" it is not that something is actually known by some [knower], because both the knower and the object known are also just unproduced.

Emptiness is only realized by means of realizing a conventional truth. That is, only by ascertaining a nominal truth is one able to realize emptiness, ultimate truth. "Suchness is realized through designation" means that suchness is realized by means of a nominality. "Both the knower and the

object known are also just unproduced" means that they are both not produced inherently. Although all knowers are produced, there are objects of knowledge that are not produced.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 436) says:

RESPONSE:

At that time, when the lack of production is suchness and the awareness is also free from production,
Then, through relying on its aspect, it is as though it realizes suchness.
Just as the mind, having the aspect of whatever, thoroughly knows
That object, similarly, it is known in close dependence on a nominality. [12.4]

In this world, when considering that the consciousness subsequently takes on the aspect of the object, it is said that that object is known by a consciousness. *Just as*, for example, when a *mind* is produced *having the aspect* of blue it is said "*That* mind *thoroughly knows that object* blue," *similarly*, when a consciousness, an object-possessor, is produced having an aspect that is the likeness of the object suchness, it is finely imputed stating "Suchness *is known in dependence on* a *nominal* truth."

The way in which the consciousness subsequently takes on the aspect of suchness [is as follows]. *At that time*, *the lack of* inherent *production being the suchness* of the object, *and* – that is, while – the *awareness* that is its object-possessor *also* engaging having the aspect of being *free from* inherent *production*, like water poured into water, *then through relying on the aspect* of that object – that is, through apprehending it – *suchness is* posited as *realized*. Therefore, there is not the fault of the previous argument.

Nagtso's translation as "Then, to realize its suchness is to apprehend its aspect" (12.4b) is without [the words] "as though."

Here, the autocommentary says:

> Therefore, it is presented that "Suchness is realized through imputation." It is not that something is actually known by something because both the knower and the object known are also just unproduced.

The meaning of "through imputation," which is like saying "It is known in dependence on a nominality," means that it is posited as known through mere imputation without being known by means of its own entity; it is not posited that the knowledge of suchness is imputed. The meaning of stating "actually" and so forth is that it is not known through the arising of an aspect similar to blue, yellow, and so forth without being known through the mere arisal of the aspect of freedom from elaboration, in that, while the object suchness is unproduced, the object-possessor also has the aspect of not being inherently produced. In this case, when for those who propound the former position there does not arise the aspect of the object which is propounded stating:

- "There is no arising of the aspect of suchness to an awareness,
- when there is no arisal of the aspect of that object, the awareness does not engage the object,
- when it does not engage it, that object is not known, and
- when it is not known, it is contradictory for that object-possessor to be a knower,"

we too assert like that – that the awareness does not engage it and so forth. Therefore, since there is no response to that, it is taught that "Through refuting that there is no arising of the aspect of ultimate truth to an awareness, the aspect of that arises to an awareness and, through it arising, the object is posited as realized," along with examples. Due to this, those who propound that there is no non-conceptual exalted wisdom realizing ultimate truth in this system deprecate the supreme realization of a superior. Here, stating that "They instantaneously comprehend objects of knowledge" teaches that the exalted wisdom of an omniscient being is gained in just one instant and that the exalted wisdom of an exalted knower of modes does not know in terms of the object known and the knower appearing in the manner of being explicitly different. Since it seems that the way a buddha knows the modes and varieties must be understood well, it is expressed in brief [as follows].

With respect to that, since, until buddhahood is attained, a single awareness does not come to directly know both the individual appearance of a substratum and reality in a single instant, these two are posited by a knower alternately. Having become a buddha, the exhaustion without

exception of the latencies of the conception of true existence, he enters into the meditative equipoise directly realizing ultimate truth at all times, whereby

- because the meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment that is the arisal from that are not posited as alternating and
- because there is no exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment knowing the varieties that is a different entity from the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise – as taught in the autocommentary on the *Two Truths* "Each instant of exalted knowledge pervades all the mandalas of objects of knowledge" – it must be asserted that a single exalted wisdom knows all the objects of knowledge that are the two truths.

At the time of having become an exalted wisdom that is a knower of modes in dependence on reality, since in the perspective of that awareness all dualistic appearances have been thoroughly pacified, that exalted wisdom engages as one taste, like water poured into water. At the time of having become an exalted knower of varieties in dependence on a substratum, although there is the dualistic appearance that is the individual appearance of object and object-possessor, since the latencies of mistaken dualistic appearance have been obliterated it is a dualistic appearance that is not mistaken with respect to its appearing object; it is not a mistaken dualistic appearance that is dualistic appearance. The way it is unmistaken has already been excellently explained in other [texts].

With respect to the existence of both the exalted wisdoms of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment on the buddha ground, [Maitreya's] *Sublime Continuum* says:

> Wisdom, exalted wisdom, and complete liberation,
> Because of being clear, radiant, and pure, and
> Because of not being different from light and rays,
> Are similar to a sun disc.

The commentary to that says:

> The supramundane non-conceptual wisdom that is possessed in the continuum of a buddha, because of closely abiding to dispel the darkness to highest suchness which is an object of knowledge, is likened to clear light. The exalted wisdom of all objects of knowledge attained subsequent to that, due to engaging things – objects of knowledge – without exception in all ways, is likened to a radiant lattice of light rays.

The "supramundane non-conceptual" is meditative equipoise. Moreover, positing it in dependence on suchness is the meaning of stating "highest suchness" and so forth. The meaning of "subsequent" in "attained subsequent to" is not the subsequent of former and later times stating "subsequent to arisal from meditative equipoise," instead it refers to what is attained or arises by the force of that meditative equipoise. The meaning of "objects of knowledge" and so forth is that the exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment is posited in terms of engaging all objects of knowledge that are varieties. Hence, a knower of modes does not depend on a substratum, while a knower of varieties does not depend on reality. When this meaning is excellently understood, *Two Truths* says:

> All that is dependently produced,
> Just those appearing as they are
> Due to being devoid of the entity of investigation,
> Are directly seen by the omniscient.

And:

> When knowers, objects of knowledge,
> And their nature are not subsequently seen,
> They do not arise because signs do not arise,
> And because they abide firmly.

A buddha directly knows all appearances, or varieties, yet it is taught that he does not see either knowers or objects of knowledge in a manner of dualistic appearance. Other great beings also taught similarly. From these teachings, it is to be understood that there is not even the slightest contradiction in a single exalted wisdom coming to be two different ways of knowing in relation to two objects without the need to say: "The fact that a buddha does not see either knowers or objects of knowledge is from the point of view of his own appearance and that he sees all objects of

knowledge directly is the manner of knowing that appears to others, those to be subdued. Therefore, there is no exalted wisdom included in the buddha ground."

OBJECTION: Then the two, (1) the definition of the two truths indicated by

All things – things found by perfect
And false perception – possess two entities.
Any object of correct perception is thusness,
That of false perception is said to be conventional truth. [6.23]

and (2) this presentation are contradictory.

RESPONSE: They are not contradictory. The definitions of the two truths explained before is intended in general in that the way of knowing of the exalted wisdom of a buddha is from the point of view it being peculiar or uncommon to the tenth ground and below. Therefore, when it is from the point of view of also comprising the way of knowing of a buddha, that found by a valid cognizer that is a knower of [an ultimate] type seeing the perfect and is a valid cognizer that is a knower of [an ultimate] type regarding that object is the definition of an ultimate truth. By that, the definition of a conventional truth should also be understood. Likewise, the way of knowing the conventional and ultimate in relation to an individual object should also be understood in terms of:

- that found by an exalted wisdom that is a knower of modes and that which has become an exalted wisdom of a knower of modes with respect to that object, and
- that found by an exalted wisdom that is a knower of varieties and that which has become a knower of modes with respect to that object.

Here, it should also be remembered that our own system previously analyzed the feasibility and non-feasibility of a self-cognizer.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system there is no fault of suchness not being realized. Thus, the lower schools' assertion "If it is not inherently existent it does not exist at all" is incorrect. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say to the lower schools: "Just as you say that an awareness having the appearance of blue is an awareness apprehending blue, likewise, an awareness having the appearance of emptiness is an awareness apprehending or realizing emptiness."

A buddha is in meditative equipoise at all times, hence, he is absorbed in meditative equipoise in a manner of not arising from it again. On the buddha ground, meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment are one entity. However, the awareness of a buddha is called "an exalted knower knowing modes" in dependence on realizing the emptiness of, for example, form, and is called "an exalted knower knowing varieties" in dependence on knowing a basis, for example, form. A buddha's awareness is absorbed on emptiness like water poured into water. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "as is taught in the autocommentary on the *Two Truths* 'Each instant of exalted knowledge pervades all the mandalas of objects of knowledge' – it must be asserted that a single exalted wisdom knows all the objects of knowledge that are the two truths."

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: What is the difference between a) searching for pot and not finding it and b) searching for the imputed object pot and not finding it?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If you look for a pot that exists and do not find it, it means that the pot is lost! If the pot did not exist in the first place, then there is no need to look for it! However, seriously speaking, there are two ways of searching for a pot. One way, the way of worldly people, is to look for a pot in the cupboards of one's house. If one searches for the pot and so forth according to the way of the world it can be found.

On the other hand, when one searches for the pot that is the imputed object on the basis of its parts, in this case it cannot be found. In this case to not find the pot means that we cannot say "such-and-such a part is the pot." This is the meaning of not finding the imputed object pot.

Student: Is looking for the pot among its parts and not finding it, the realization of the emptiness of the pot?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is similar to that.
Student: Then one does not have to first identify the inherently existent pot?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Analyzing in this way one realizes that there is nothing that exists from the side of the basis of imputation. In other words, without saying "an inherently existent pot," from the non-finding of the basis of imputation, pot, one understands that the pot does not exist inherently.

Student: With regard to the following pairs
a) substantially existent and imputedly existent,
b) substantial existent and imputed existent, and
c) substantially established and imputedly established,
will Geshe-la please explain these according to the lower schools and Prasangika?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: While "substantially existent" and "substantially established" are commonly said, "imputedly existent" and "imputedly established" are not.
For the lower schools if it is substantially existent it is not pervaded by being a substantial existent, for example, the person. The person is not a substantial existent, but is substantially existent and substantially established. The person is a substance, but is not a substantial existent. If it is a substance it is not pervaded by being a substantial existent. If it is a substantially established it is not pervaded by being a substantial existent. For the Prasangika Madhyamikas there is nothing that is a substantial existent. This is because if it is a substantial existent it is a phenomenon that exists without dependence on anything. Yet do substances exist? They do. What is the definition of substance? Think about it. An example of a substance is that which is composed of particles. A consciousness is also a substance because it is composed of a collection of parts and arises due to the coming together of causes and conditions. Therefore, for the Prasangika Madhyamikas a consciousness is a substance but not a substantial existent. For them there is not even the term "substantial existent."

Although we could say that something is imputedly existent and imputedly established, there is no such usage in the Tibetan. Only the term "imputed existent" is used in the sense that everything is an imputed existent.

The difference between substantial existent and imputed existent in the lower schools is that an imputed existent is a phenomenon that in order to appear to an awareness must depend on the appearance of another phenomenon. On the other hand, a substantial existent is a phenomenon that does not need to depend on the appearance of another phenomenon in order to appear to an awareness.

Student: In view of the fact that asserting emptiness as inherently existent is a conception of the extreme of *non-existence*, likewise is asserting table as inherently existent also a conception of the extreme of non-existence? If not, why?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Asserting emptiness to be inherently existent is not a conception of the extreme of non-existence. For the Prasangika Madhyamika system it is a conception of an extreme of existence. Also asserting a table to be inherently existent is not a conception of the extreme of non-existence. For example, someone who says "A table exists inherently" does not have the conception of the extreme of non-existence.
Student: Earlier in the *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 337) two types of extremes of non-existence were set out, that which is a deprecation and that which is a superimposition saying:

> In regard to this, saying "Since that which exists in reality cannot also exist in conventional terms, that which does not exist in reality exists in conventional terms, therefore, it does not exist ultimately" is the conception of the extreme of non-existence. Although the refutation stating "It is

> not like that" does not refute the extreme of non-existence, if one conceives "The non-existence which is the negation of the object of negation exists in reality," one falls into the extreme of the non-existence of things, due to which refuting that is also a refutation of the extreme of non-existence.
>
> That phenomena such as actions, results, and so forth exist conventionally also cannot be harmed by any valid cognizer. Their not existing or the objects and object-possessors that are conceived to not exist are an extreme of non-existence and a conception of an extreme of [non-existence]. They are not an extreme of non-existence and the conception of an extreme of [non-existence] for those such as the buddhas who are called "faultless." This is an extreme of non-existence which is a deprecation, whereas the former is an extreme of non-existence which is a superimposition.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: This passage is not very clear, like things are obscured at dusk. I need to think about it.

Student: Geshe-la said that falling into the extremes means not only conceiving, but explicitly asserting permanence or annihilation. Nonetheless, I think that there is a difference between 1) the simple verbal accepting of the hypothesis of permanence/annihilation, just as a consequence of having already accepted the inherent existence of phenomena, and 2) the actual falling into an extreme, which presupposes the creation of a very negative karma because it is a firm decision to cultivate and propound such doctrines, as some philosophers and religious people do. Will Geshe-la please give his view about this?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: To fall into an extreme, for example, the extreme of permanence is to say "Such-and-such exists inherently and I firmly believe in this." If someone has a conception of true existence of a pot in his continuum there is no pervasion that he conceives the pot to exist inherently. If a person has a conception of the inherent existence of pot in his continuum there is no pervasion that he has fallen into the extreme of permanence, for example, a bodhisattva on the subsequent attainment of the path of preparation through a bodhisattva on the seventh ground. The hinayana path says that such a person having the conception of inherent existence in his continuum exists through to the vajra-like meditative stabilization. Having trained in the Buddha's doctrine none of us would say "This table exists truly," instead we would say "The table does not exist truly." Therefore, we assert or accept that the table does not exist truly, even though we still have an innate conception of the true existence of the table. Do we have an acquired conception of the true existence of the table? We do not because we do not assert that it exists truly.

Student: What is the pervasion between ultimate mind generation and supramundane perfection?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: There is a difference. For example, the great love and great compassion in the continuum of a buddha superior is a supramundane perfection but is not an ultimate mind generation. Why is it not an ultimate mind generation? Because a conventional mind generation in the continuum of a buddha superior is not an ultimate mind generation, but is a conventional mind generation. Likewise, great compassion is not an ultimate mind generation because if it is an ultimate mind generation it has to fulfill the definition of an ultimate mind generation which was mentioned previously. However, we can say that an ultimate mind generation is pervaded by being a supramundane perfection, one being a generality and one being a particularity.

Student: Geshe-la said that the ten perfections are equally pervasive – is this assertion according to Prasangika? If yes, please explain.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is my own system! It is not according to Prasangika.

Student: Are the contaminated aggregates an illustration of cyclic existence?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it is a contaminated aggregate it is not pervaded by being an illustration of cyclic existence, for example, the mahayana path of preparation existing in the continuum of an

ordinary being. That mahayana path of preparation is contaminated and is an aggregate, therefore, it is a contaminated aggregate. Is it an illustration of cyclic existence? It is not, that is, it is not a cyclic existence. Why? Because it is not a true suffering. It is not the factor that is the continuous joining by the force of actions and afflictions. Think about this.

Student: Does projecting karma exist in the continuum of a first ground bodhisattva?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: No, it does not, however, this subject can be debated. For example, when someone accumulates a projecting action and then, before actualizing the projected result, attains the first ground, does he have a projecting action? He does not. This is then debated asking whether it has been abandoned. The answer is that that projecting action has passed or has disintegrated, that is, it no longer exists. This is because the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not assert latencies. In brief, if it is a projecting action it is pervaded by being a newly accumulated action. On the first ground there are no newly accumulated actions. It is said "One who sees the truth, has no projecting. One who is free from existence, has no rebirth."

END

Tuesday morning, 1 May 2001

(No teachings Monday, 30 April 2001)

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 440) says:

3B2A-2B2 Dispelling arguments that an exalted knower is unacceptable

A Actual meaning
B Actual presentation of the acceptability of [an exalted knower]

3B2A-2B2A Actual meaning

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

To whomever mentioned "Without a knower who would teach others [to be subdued] by you, saying 'It is like this?'" it is also to be said that it is indeed true that this knower is only unproduced, yet it is not impossible to teach thusness in the world.

If asked: How?

It is said:

Whatever sounds teaching the thusness of phenomena arise
From his body of complete enjoyment, completed by merits,
Emanations, space, and others due to its magic power,
From these too, the world cognizes thusness. [12.5]

That form body residing, in which the tathagatas manifest the sphere of phenomena, the body completed by hundreds of merits, possessing unimaginable and various bodies, is totally transformed into the very cause of the bodhisattvas' complete enjoyment of the Dharma in whatever nature. Whatever sounds arise, due to the blessings of the tathagatas, from that [body] produced from hundreds of merits, from which, even at present, the variety of terminology of the scriptures can be realized – such as [from a mahayana sutra]:

Manjushri, "non-produced and non-ceasing" is the epithet of the tathagatas...

and so forth – from that the worldly become vessels to be finely taught such Dharma. Hence, they will faultlessly ascertain suchness.

Let alone [the sounds] arising from the holy body composed due to merit, whatever sounds arise, due to its blessings, from emanations that clarify the suchness of phenomena, from these too the worldly will ascertain suchness.

Not only [the sounds] arising from emanations, furthermore, although mind and mental factors are already inoperative due to its power, whatever sounds arise due to its magic powers from space and others – plants, trees, walls, rocks, and so forth – from these too the worldly cognize thusness.

This is a response to the question "If there is no exalted knower how can one teach others saying 'It is like this'?" This knower – an exalted knower – is unproduced and is absorbed on the ultimate as one taste, yet it can teach suchness to the world because the meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment of a buddha are not contradictory. Thus, while a tathagata is absorbed in meditative equipoise on suchness or the ultimate, he is still able to teach the Dharma to others without any conceptual thought as a motivation.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 88), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B2A-2B2 Rejecting the argument of the impossibility of a knower
>
> *His complete enjoyment body, complete in merit,*
> *Manifestations, and sounds coming by their power*
> *From space and elsewhere, which teach the Dharma – reality –*
> *From these, even the world understands reality.* [12.5]

Although he has no conceptualization exciting it, this is not contradictory with his teaching the Dharma; for from the complete enjoyment body (sambhogakaya) and manifestations of that buddha, who is completed by the accumulation of merits, and the sounds arising from space, trees, and so on by the power of these manifestations, which teach the Dharma, absolute reality – from these, even the world knows absolute reality.

Because a buddha has completed the accumulation of the two collections of merit and wisdom, he can cause sounds teaching Dharma to arise from bridges, rocks, rivers, and so forth, as well as from space itself. Thus, although a buddha is absorbed in meditative equipoise on reality, he is still able to teach because he can do so in many ways, even from his crown protuberance. A buddha can also teach Dharma by means of the sound of the fluttering of the leaves of trees giving teachings on, for example, the four seals of Dharma,. The four seals are:

1. all compounded phenomena are impermanent,
2. all contaminated phenomena are suffering,
3. all phenomena are empty and selfless, and
4. nirvana is peace.

Also by the power of his blessings, a buddha can also teach through his disciples, such as in the case of Shariputra and Avalokiteshvara in the *Heart Sutra*. This occurs due to the power of a buddha's mind.

In short, buddhahood is attained in the aspect of the enjoyment body, and, while absorbed in meditative equipoise on emptiness in a manner of not arising again, a buddha simultaneously manifests emanation bodies that teach the Dharma. When sentient beings become appropriate vessels, a buddha teaches them in many ways, such as through the fluttering of the leaves of trees, and in this way gradually leads them to an understanding of emptiness. Because the complete enjoyment body cannot be seen by ordinary beings, the buddhas manifest in the form of a supreme emanation body, a creation emanation body, and an artisan emanation body. A buddha can also emanate as space, grass, trees, rocks, and so forth and from these can give Dharma teachings. Why is a buddha able to do this? It is due to his having completed the two collections. Thus, a buddha attains a complete enjoyment body which manifests emanation bodies that can also create other emanations. In short, a buddha is able to give teachings in whatever way accords with the needs of sentient beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 440) says:

> However, the response [to the question] according to your system "Who would teach suchness to others to be subdued saying 'It is like this' without knowing it?" [is as follows]. Even though it is indeed true that the consciousness comprehending suchness of the buddha ground engages its object – the ultimate that is the lack of inherent production – as one taste, it is not that it is also impossible for suchness to be realized in the world. Why is that? The meaning of this argument is that:
>
> - if [that consciousness] were to always abide on suchness in a manner of one taste, there would not exist a teacher having the conception that is a motivation to teach Dharma, and
> - if there does not exist [a teacher], there would not exist the teaching of the Dharma.

This is because after that the response given is "It is feasible to teach Dharma even without conception." The response to that argument is:

From whatever sounds teaching the suchness of phenomena
Arise from their complete enjoyment body sustained by merit and,
By the force of that, from what is emanated, space, and other,
Even the worldly cognize suchness. [12.5]

The buddhas abide in a form body. The form body of a buddha manifesting the truth body – the sphere of phenomena – and possessing an inconceivable variety of forms *sustained*, that is, strongly composed, *by* many hundreds of collections of *merit*, is *the complete enjoyment body* which becomes the cause for the enjoyment of the Dharma *of* the bodhisattvas. Thereby, from whatever sounds arise *from that* body which teach the suchness of phenomena, *even the worldly* – that is, those to be subdued – become a vessel for hearing such Dharma, *whereby they* come to unmistakenly *cognize suchness*. Leaving aside [the sounds that] arise like that from the body produced by hundreds of merit, also from *whatever sounds teaching the suchness of phenomena*

- *arise from what is emanated* by the blessings of the enjoyment body *and*, not only that but in addition,
- arise *by the force of those* emanations *from space and other* inanimate [things], plants, trees, walls, rocks, and so forth,

those to be subdued come to cognize suchness.

The argument here is that someone abiding single-pointedly on suchness is unable to give Dharma teachings because he lacks a motivation to do so, and that, if there is no motivation or conception to teach Dharma, there would be no Dharma teachings. The response is that even though a buddha abides on suchness in a manner of one taste he does not need to have a conceptual motivation to teach the Dharma due to his possessing the excellent quality of giving the Dharma effortlessly.

A buddha has a form body and a truth body. The form body consists of an enjoyment body and an emanation body, whereas the truth body consists of a wisdom truth body and a nature truth body. The complete enjoyment body is a result of having completed the collection of merit. The complete enjoyment body manifests emanation bodies which in turn can create emanations such as rocks, bridges, and trees that can give Dharma teachings. Or it can be said that by the power of the emanation body, the sound of Dharma teachings arises from space, from the fluttering of the leaves of trees, and so forth. Through hearing these teachings, sentient beings come to realize reality.

In conclusion, although a tathagata lacks the conception that is a motivation to teach Dharma, he still teaches Dharma in many ways. That he teaches without motivation and without effort can be likened to a computer which does many things without any motivation and without any effort, but just because it has been created to perform specific functions. It can also be likened to a tape recorder that produces the sound of Dharma teachings without any motivation or effort on its part, but just because that is its function. Nowadays it is easy for us to understand things due to such modern technology. While we have computers and tape recorders, in the past teachings arose from rocks, the movement of leaves, and so forth!

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 441) says:

3B2A-2B2B Actual presentation of the acceptability of [an exalted knower]

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Again, if it is asked: How do mind and mental factors, having a nature of non-existence, without conceptuality, become the very cause of the arising of the explained activity, even though present activity [of conceptual motivation] is impossible?

In order to show that, an external example is set forth:

Just as, here a wheel turned a long time with great exertion
By a potter having great strength
Turns and is seen as the cause of pots and so forth
Even though his effort is not now being produced, thus [12.6]

Likewise, without effort now being produced,
The engagement of he who dwells in possession
Of the essence of the dharmakaya from being impelled by
The virtues of beings and special prayers, is very unimaginable. [12.7]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

Just as, here, a potter, with great strength,
Makes much effort for a long time turning the wheel,
Then, though his effort is not now being produced,
It turns and is seen to be cause of the pot and so on; [12.6]

So like that, without effort now being produced,
His actions, who lives in the body with Dharma nature,
Propelled by the people's virtues and the excellence
Of his prayers, are greatly beyond thought. [12.7]

The same predicate (that his teaching the Dharma is not contradictory with lack of motivating conceptualization) is so because without the conceptual activity of effort being produced in the present, the entering activity of [the buddha] who abides in possession of the nature of the dharmakaya, [since it is] propelled by the virtues of the ordinary beings to be tamed, [which ripened from hearing the Dharma thus from the buddha], and by the excellence of his own previous prayers [when he was a bodhisattva], is very much beyond the reach of thought.

It is like the way that, in this world, a wheel is turned by a potter with great strength, making much effort for a long time, and then turning without the potter's effort being produced in the present, it is seen to be the cause of pots and so on.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Because of the force of the prayers previously petitioned by the bodhisattvas saying:

> Just as the buddha bhagavans do not possess conceptuality now and are like wish-fulfilling jewels and wish-granting trees, by whom will the aims of the infinite dispositions of sentient beings be enacted by appropriately engaging those to be subdued even though already without conceptuality, in earnestly endeavoring to appropriately fulfill the aims of sentient beings and not moving from the sphere of phenomena for even an instant, may I too, like that, not pass beyond the time of subduing sentient beings.

– and because of producing actions maturing the karma of listening to the Dharma of such kinds of disciples, [actions of teaching the Dharma] like those will be manifested.

Thus should it be understood that "not exerting effort produced now, suchness is finely demonstrated and actions for the benefit of sentient beings are also accomplished."

A tathagata does not have the conceptions that are minds and mental factors yet he is able to teach the Dharma. To illustrate this Chandrakirti sets out the external example of a potter who initially has to turn his wheel with great effort but afterward continues to turn without need for effort. Another example is a large prayer wheel which initially has to be turned with great strength but then continues

to turn by itself. Just as that later turning does not depend on the effort of a being, similarly, a buddha does not need to be motivated by minds and mental factors in order to teach the Dharma because previously he completed the prayers and the collections.

There is a story about two monks who traveled from Nepal to Tibet to visit the king, Songtsen Gampo, who was considered to be an emanation of Chenrezig. However, when they arrived at his palace he appeared to them to be an executioner as he was surrounded by many corpses and was in the process of punishing others by executing them. These two men were shocked but decided to still meet the king. When the king asked them what they wanted, they said that, although they had come to meet him for Dharma reasons, having seen what was going on all they wanted was to be assured of a safe return home. The king gave them his assurance, a meal, and a place to stay for the night as well as a handful of sand each. They slept soundly and, when they woke up the next morning, found themselves in their own beds in Nepal. By the power of his mind, Chenrezig had transported them home. Thus, the buddhas can teach and benefit sentient beings in a great variety of amazing ways. There are many more examples of the enlightened activities of the buddhas. It is said, for example, that someone who has realizations can travel long distances on a sun ray. In fact it is recounted that the disciples of Gomo Tulku in one of his previous lives were able to travel in this way. The story is that Gomo Tulku was sick and unable to travel and told his disciples that in order to recover he needed to eat some fresh myrobalan fruit. One of his disciples offered to get this fruit, which is found only in Assam, and traveled there on a sun ray. He then returned to Tibet riding on a sun ray with the fruit in his hand. However, when he arrived, due to the heat of his hand, the fruit was spoiled and Gomo Tulku said that it was of no benefit to him. Gomo Tulku's cook then volunteered to go get another myrobalan fruit. He too traveled to Assam on a sun ray, where he picked up a piece of this fruit and threw it from Assam to Tibet where it landed in Gomo Tulku's lap. He ate it and was cured. If one has realizations, such things are possible.

The point here is that the buddhas, without need for effort in the present, are able to give teachings to sentient beings according to their needs. However, a doubt can arise thinking that if this is the case why does it not happen to us? The answer is that it is because we are not yet proper vessels for this to happen. When we are ready, the enlightened activities of the buddhas cannot be turned back. This is similar to the karma of sentient beings which, when it has ripened, cannot be turned back. For example, sometimes when an airplane crashes although many die there are a few survivors, this is because they did not have the karma to die. Some time ago in Brescia, Italy, there was a man who had never flown before whose friend had bought a ticket for Zurich and was unable to go. This friend offered him his ticket and he accepted it, but on the way to Zurich the plane crashed and he died. The man who has originally bought the ticket did not have the karma to die in the plane crash, whereas the other did.

We have created many actions in the past which, when the conditions arise, will bring about a result. For example, the fact that you now have the opportunity to study the Dharma is due to the ripening of actions you created in the past. In other words, that you are able to listen to, reflect on, and meditate on the vast and profound teachings of the Buddha is due to your own past actions. If you develop this hearing and thinking, you will definitely achieve realizations.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 341) says:

> QUESTION: In addition, even though without the conceptions that are minds and mental factors it is not possible for there to be a motivated activity in the present for teaching in that way, what becomes the cause for the arisal of the activity of teaching Dharma?
> RESPONSE: [The following] example is set out in order to show that.
>
> *Just as here a wheel spun with much effort for a long time*
> *By a potter possessing great strength,*
> *Without his generating effort in the present*

Spins and is seen to be the cause of pots and so forth, [12.6]

Similarly, without effort being produced now,
The engagement of one abiding in the possession of the nature of the truth body
Is extremely inconceivable through being propelled
By the virtue of beings and special prayer. [12.7]

Just as, for example, *here* in the world *a wheel spun with much effort by a potter possessing great strength*, even *without* the potter *generating* the *effort* to spin the wheel *in the present* since it keeps going for *long time* after that, is seen to *spin and to be the cause of* clay *pots and so forth*, *similarly*, in the lifetime of becoming a buddha, *without the* conception which is *effort being produced now*, *the engagement* in the enlightened activities of a buddha *abiding in possession of the nature of the truth body*, due to being *propelled by* the force of – that is, through the strength of –

- *the beings* who are to be subdued having accumulated the *virtue* of the thoroughly ripened action of listening to such Dharma from the buddhas who are like wish-fulfilling gems and wish-granting trees, *and*
- the buddha having made *special prayers* while a bodhisattva before,

is extremely inconceivable. What is that prayer? It is "Earnestly endeavoring to accomplish the welfare of sentient beings accordingly and not moving from the sphere of phenomena for even an instant, may I too, like that, act at the right time for subduing sentient beings."

Here the sutra citation that makes this known occurs in Nagtsho's translation.

The buddhas, by the power of their previous prayers and the completion of the collections, are able to perform enlightened activities for sentient beings. The buddhas are like wish-fulfilling gems and wish-granting trees because they give us so much. If we had a wish-fulfilling gem or a wish-granting tree it would provide all our material necessities, similarly, although the buddhas abide in the sphere of reality, they are able fulfill the wishes of sentient beings by performing the enlightened activity of giving teachings to them. That they are able to do so is because when they were bodhisattvas on the learner path they made many prayers and completed the collections of merit and wisdom. Due to this, they perform the enlightened activities at the right time in a manner of not being turned back. "Not passing beyond time" refers to, for example, the fact that the moon arises at the right time without being able to be turned back. Similarly, the sun rises without the effort of sentient beings.

Tuesday afternoon, 1 May 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 442) says:

3B2B Presenting the bodies and qualities

1 Presentation of the bodies
2 Presentation of the qualities of the powers

3B2B-1 Presentation of the bodies

A Truth body
B Complete enjoyment body
C Explanation of the body of similar cause

3B2B-1A Truth body

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Now to explain in terms of the dharmakaya:

The pacification due to burning the entirety of dry firewood
Of objects to be known is the dharmakaya of the conquerors.
Then, non-produced and non-ceasing,
By stopping the mind, it is manifested by the body. [12.8]

Due to the holy body having the nature of exalted wisdom [engaging] objects of knowledge as non-produced, from burning the entirety of dry firewood of the objects to be known, this, which comes to be endowed with non-production, is the dharmakaya of the buddhas.

The *Ornament for Clear Realizations* says that "truth body" or "dharmakaya" refers to the resultant truth body – the final result attained by the force of cultivating the mahayana achieving that is the means for achieving it. In this context, Chandrakirti does not distinguish whether truth body refers to the wisdom truth body or to the nature truth body.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B2B-1A Explanation of the truth body

When all the dry fuel of cognitive obscurations
Is burnt, that cessation is the conquerors' dharmakaya. [12.8ab]

This cessation or absolute reality, freed of all stains through all the dry fuel of objects of knowledge of dualistic appearance having been burnt up, is the truth body (dharmakaya) of the conquerors, for it is like that free of all stains.

It then has no birth and has no stopping.
As mind stops, the body actualizes it. [12.8cd]

The complete enjoyment body actualizes [or receives] the truth body, which has no birth and no stopping; for by way of the stopping of the conceptual activity of mind and mental factors, it contemplates absolute reality in the manner of not arising again, [its non-conceptual wisdom-knowledge having become inseparable from absolute reality like water dropped into water].

There are two types of truth body: a wisdom truth body and a nature truth body. The wisdom truth body is the uncontaminated exalted wisdom that is a buddha's mind. The nature truth body is the reality of that mind or a true cessation existing in the continuum of a buddha superior. The nature truth body is called "the body of pacification" because it is the pacification of all conceptions of dualistic appearance. As long as the reality of the mind is together with stains it is a lineage, whereas when it becomes free of stains it is a nature truth body. When it is said that all sentient beings have the buddha lineage or buddha nature this refers to the reality of the mind of a sentient being. The main point here is that the truth body is called "the body of pacification" because the dry firewood-like knowledge obstructions have been pacified. This body of pacification that is without production and cessation is the truth body of the conquerors.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

From just this point of view, it is taught [in the *Vajrachedika Sutra*]:

The buddhas view reality (dharmata), the guides are the dharmakaya.
Reality is not even an object of knowledge; it is unable to be known.

This means that the mind of a buddha is always in meditative equipoise on reality. This mind is the truth body of the buddhas. "It is unable to be known" means that such a reality cannot be known in a dualistic manner. Since a mind with dualistic appearance cannot know reality, it is only known by a mind that is free from dualistic appearance.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> This dharmakaya is "then, non-produced and non-ceasing." From just this point of view, it is taught [in a mahayana sutra]:
>
> > Manjushri, "non-produced and non-ceasing,' this is the epithet of the tathagatas.
>
> Hence, since the mind and mental factors that are its subjects do not operate [conceptually] in any way on suchness, the object of exalted wisdom, just the [enjoyment] body is conventionally presented as making [the dharmakaya] manifest.

Buddhas are called "tathagata" or "thus-gone" because they have gone beyond to thusness, which is what is unproduced and unceasing. Suchness is only known by non-conceptual exalted wisdom.

Chandrakirti says: "By stopping the mind, it is manifested by the body." Based on this line some scholars, in particular some Sakya masters, understand that the buddhas do not have minds and mental factors. They say that a buddha no longer has minds and mental factors, meaning that he no longer has conceptual minds and mental factors. Thus, they also hold that a buddha has overcome all conceptualizations. They assert this thinking that if having minds and mental factors implies having conceptual thought, whereas buddhas do not have this.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 442) says:

> Here the explanation from the point of view of the truth body is:
>
> *That pacification, through having burned without exception*
> *The dry firewood-like objects of knowledge, is the truth body of the conquerors.*
> *Then, unproduced and unceasing,*
> *Due to minds having ceased, it is actualized by the body.* [12.8]
>
> The body having the nature, or the essence, of the object-possessor, exalted wisdom – *that pacification*, the suchness that comes to have the aspect of an unproduced knower due to engaging in that having the aspect of an unproduced object of knowledge just as it is *through* the fire-like exalted wisdom *having burned without exception the dry firewood-like* objects that are *objects of knowledge* that appear dualistically – *is the truth body of the conquerors*. From the point of view of just that the *Diamond Cutter Sutra* says:
>
> The buddhas view reality,
> The guides are the truth body.
> Reality is not an object of knowledge
> In that it cannot be known.
>
> This teaches that:
>
> - the buddhas view reality at all times, that is, they are meditatively equipoised on it;
> - the ultimate body of the guides is the truth body; and also,
> - when that reality is known, it is not known in a manner of dualistic appearance.
>
> The truth body that is suchness *is then unproduced and unceasing*. From that point of view, it is taught in a sutra set:
>
> Manjushri, saying "unproduced and unceasing" is an epithet of the tathagatas.
>
> Hence, with respect to the object of exalted wisdom – the meaning of suchness – on the buddha ground, since the conceptions that are *minds* and mental factors, the object-possessors of that

> [suchness], *have ceased* and do not engage it in all ways, the two – the non-conceptual exalted wisdom and suchness – are engaged in inseparably, like water poured into water. Because of that, this state is presented conventionally as being initially *actualized*, that is, achieved, *by* the complete enjoyment *body*.
>
> Nagtsho's translation says:
>
> It seems that the *Irreversible Wheel Sutra* is cited to make that known.
>
> The meaning of saying "minds having ceased" (v. 12.8d) is taught in *Clear Words* to be the lack of movement of the mind, that is, the lack of conceptions, saying:
>
> Sutra says:
>
> > What is ultimate truth? If even that does not have movement of the mind, what need is there to even mention letters? Hence, it lacks conceptions.
>
> Here also the autocommentary, having explained the meaning of "pacification" to be freedom from minds and mental factors, after setting out the example that clarifies the ability to enact the welfare of sentient beings even though it is pacification – a wish-granting tree and a wish-fulfilling gem – clearly says that it is freedom from the minds and mental factors that are conceptualizations:
>
> Even though that is already non-conceptual, like a wish-granting tree and a wish-fulfilling gem...
>
> Therefore, to quote that as the source for a buddha not having exalted wisdom is a great deprecation that does not realize the meaning of the text.

The conceptual minds and mental factors of a buddha have ceased, whereas other minds and mental factors have not. What actualizes the wisdom truth body? It is the complete enjoyment body. One initially attains enlightenment in the entity of the enjoyment body, but simultaneously also attains the other three bodies. On the occasion of the meditative equipoise on reality in a manner of not arising again, the wisdom truth body is actualized; the entity that is said to actualize it is the complete enjoyment body. Conventionally a buddha performs actions for the sake of sentient beings. The fact of being simultaneously absorbed in meditative equipoise on reality and able to perform activities is a unique characteristic of the buddhas. This is because when other beings are absorbed in meditative equipoise, they are unable to perform the activities of subsequent attainment. Likewise, in order to perform the activities of subsequent attainment, they must rise from meditative equipoise. Thus, for ordinary beings the activities of meditative equipoise and the activities of subsequent attainment are contradictory or incompatible. This is true even of highly realized bodhisattvas.

For a buddha the flow of conceptual thought has completely stopped. It can also be said that all minds and mental factors of a buddha are completely free of conception. To illustrate this Chandrakirti gives the example of a wish-granting tree and a wish-fulfilling gem which are able to fulfill all mundane wishes even though they are without minds. For example, there is the story of a very poor man who only had a small fireplace made of three stones in his small hut. One day a visitor came to his hut and asked him why he was living in such a miserable situation. The poor man responded that it was because he did not own anything. The visitor asked if he would give him one of the three stones and the poor man said that he could as it was no problem to find another stone. However, the stone was in fact a wish-fulfilling gem. To the surprise of the poor man, his visitor gave him much money and told him that he would give him even more. Like this poor man, we too need to first recognize that within us is the wish-fulfilling gem of the buddha lineage and then to strive to make use of it so as to attain enlightenment.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 444) says:

> 3B2B-1B Complete enjoyment body

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

This [enjoyment body]:

The pacification body is clear like the wish-granting tree and
Non-conceptual just as the wish-fulfilling gem.
Constant until migrators are liberated in order to enrich the world,
It will appear to those devoid of elaborations. [12.9]

The holy body that is explained as making this suchness manifest is asserted as having a nature of pacification because it is free of [conceptual] mind and mental factors. "Is clear like the wish-granting tree and non-conceptual just as the wish-fulfilling gem," elucidates the conduct (ability) to enact the welfare of sentient beings even though it has the nature of pacification. It means that "Although it is already just non-conceptual, like the wish-granting tree and wish-fulfilling gem, it is the very cause of accomplishing whatever aims are actually desired."

This holy body also abides as long as cyclic existence for the sake of endowing the world. "Constant" signifies just that this abides for a long time. Therefore, it should be understood that "As long as the world and as long as space, that long the buddhas, in this manner, enact only the welfare of sentient beings and completely reside."

This holy body that is adorned by marks of hundreds of merits appears to exist to only those bodhisattvas free of elaborations – those who attained the mirror of stainless wisdom through their own accumulation of merit and exalted wisdom – it does not [appear] to those having elaborations.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought* (Tibetan text page 89), as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B2B-1B The complete enjoyment body

The cessation body is clear, like a wish-granting tree,
Or a wish-fulfilling jewel, without conception.
Till beings are freed, for the sake of the world's preparation,
It always appears to those free of elaborations. [12.9]

Although this [enjoyment body] is the body of cessation of elaborations [since it is free of conceptual activity of mind and mental factors,] it is the clear ability of benefiting sentient beings; for like a wish-granting tree and like a wish-fulfilling jewel, without conceptual activity, by appearing to bodhisattvas free of elaborations of dualistic appearance, [i.e. who have, from their own two accumulations, reached the stage of attaining the mirror of stainless wisdom,] in contemplation, it remains always until all sentient beings are liberated, for the sake of the preparation of the world.

The definition of the complete enjoyment body according to the *Ornament* is: a final form body possessing the five certainties. These five are:
1. the certainty of abode,
2. the certainty of time,
3. the certainty of body,
4. the certainty of retinue, and
5. the certainty of Dharma.

The certainty of abode refers to the certainty that the enjoyment body definitely abides in Akanishta (Not Low) in the form realm. Although the enjoyment body does not move from Akanishta, it manifests forms in many places in order to teach sentient beings in many diverse ways. The certainty of time refers to the fact that the enjoyment body abides until the end of cyclic existence, that is, until all sentient beings attain enlightenment; this is indicated by the word "constant" (verse 12.9c). The

certainty of body is that the enjoyment body is definitely adorned with the thirty-two major marks and eighty minor marks, all complete. The certainty of retinue is that the enjoyment body definitely teaches a retinue of bodhisattva superiors. Chandrakirti indicates this saying "It will appear to those devoid of elaborations" (v. 12.9d), in that those without elaborations are the bodhisattva superiors. The certainty of Dharma, which is that the enjoyment body definitely teaches the mahayana Dharma, is not mentioned here.

There is a story about one of the Ganden throne-holders who when he was about to pass away was exhorted by his disciples to return to them, however, he told them that he did not see any benefit to returning to Tibet and that there was more benefit to his being reborn as a minister in another country, therefore his disciples should not look for his incarnation. Thus, when high lamas see that there is benefit, they can take rebirth in many forms such as that of a universal emperor, a minister, and so forth. Also when Langtok Lama Rinpoche was dying his disciples asked him to return to them but he responded saying that he would not return to Tibet but would be reborn as a king in Shambala. This shows that high lamas or buddhas examine what type of rebirth will be of most benefit for sentient beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 444) says:

> *The pacified body is clear like a wish-fulfilling tree and*
> *Non-conceptual like a wish-granting gem.*
> *Constant for the sake of the wealth of the world until all migrating beings are liberated,*
> *It appears to those free from elaboration.* [12.9]

The enjoyment body, by which body the truth body is manifested, is a *pacified body* due to being free from the conceptions that are minds and mental factors. Hence, even though it is non-conceptual, being *clearly* able to enact the welfare of sentient beings *like a wish-fulfilling tree* and as *non-conceptual as a wish-granting gem*, it becomes the very cause for accomplishing the desired aims of those to be subdued. This body remains *constantly* for a long time – *until* all *migrating beings are liberated – for the sake of the wealth of the world*. Therefore, as long as there are worlds and as long as there is space, for that long the buddhas, in this way, enact just the welfare of sentient beings and thoroughly abide. The enjoyment body *appears to* bodhisattvas *free from elaborations*, that is, to just those who have attained the level of the attainment of the mirror of stainless wisdom through their own two collections; it does not appear directly to ordinary beings who are together with elaboration. [Chandrakirti's] *Seventy Stanzas on Refuge* says:

> A buddha's form body
> Blazes with the major and minor marks.
>
> By the force of the belief of migrating beings
> It takes various bodies.
> Through an immeasurable collection of merit,
> It is born as the son of a king.
>
> When seen by those abiding
> On the ten grounds,
> The complete enjoyment of the Dharma by that body
> Is the activity of the conquerors.

All four bodies of a buddha are achieved simultaneously, thus, one who achieves the truth body also achieves the form body, and one who achieves the form body also achieves the truth body. The complete enjoyment body is also called "the pacified body" due to the conceptions that are minds and mental factors having been pacified. Although lacking conception, the enjoyment body enacts the welfare of sentient beings, just as a wish-granting gem and a wish-fulfilling tree, without conception, enact the welfare of sentient beings. The enjoyment body performs its activities until all sentient beings are liberated. The enjoyment body appears only to bodhisattva superiors, those without

elaborations, it does not appear directly to ordinary beings. What body appears to ordinary beings? The emanation body appears to them. There are three types of emanation bodies: a supreme emanation body, a creation emanation body, and an artisan emanation body. How do a supreme emanation body and a creation emanation body appear?

1. A creation emanation body is born in the Joyous Land as a king who is an upholder of the Dharma and descends to the realm of human beings,
2. is conceived in the womb of a mother,
3. takes birth,
4. sports with the retinue,
5. rules the kingdom,
6. takes ordination through the cutting of his hair,
7. engages in an ascetic life,
8. strives to attain enlightenment under a bodhi tree,
9. overcomes the maras,
10. shows the aspect of attaining enlightenment in the form of a supreme emanation body,
11. turns the wheel of Dharma, and
12. passes beyond sorrow.

These are the twelve deeds of a buddha who is a supreme emanation body. There is debate about this because although it is said that a complete enjoyment body does not appear to sentient beings these twelve deeds do appear to them. Also, some say that the first nine of the twelve deeds are the deeds of a bodhisattva, whereas the last three, attaining enlightenment, turning the wheel of Dharma, and passing away, are the deeds of a buddha. In short, these are the twelve deeds of an emanation body and this emanation body is emanated by a complete enjoyment body.

Wednesday morning, 2 May 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 445) says:

3B2B-1C Explanation of the body of similar cause

1 The way of displaying all one's own activities in one body and one pore
2 The way of displaying others' activities in that place
3 Explaining the perfect mastery of wishes

3B2B-1C1 The way of displaying all one's own activities in one body and one pore

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 225) says:

> Whether arisen from the dharmakaya or arisen from the strength of the holy body of form, the holy body [that is the effect] of similar cause is other than the holy body already explained. In order to express also those [holy bodies] that [are effects] arisen due to the cause of subduing sentient beings as possessing unimaginable features of strength, it is explained:
>
> *The Mighty Sage, at just one time, in one form body*
> *Similar to its cause, shows the history of conditions*
> *Of his rebirths concluded in the past, clear and undistorted,*
> *In every detail due to completeness.* [12.10]

That being discussed here is the emanation body. "Whether arisen from the dharmakaya or arisen from the strength of the holy body of form" indicates that the emanation body can be said to arise either from the truth body or from the complete enjoyment body, however, what is being considered here is the emanation body that arises from the complete enjoyment body. "The holy body [that is the

effect] of similar cause is other than the holy body already explained" refers to the fact that the enjoyment body was already explained, while the emanation body is the holy body that is an effect similar to its cause, the enjoyment body. The complete enjoyment body displays aspects of emanation bodies for the purpose of subduing sentient beings.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> In order to show the entire extent of the situations of his own rebirths – already concluded – that occurred during the beginningless cyclic existence before the state of omniscient exalted wisdom, at the very same time, all those details due to many clear and undistorted histories, not mixed together, are spontaneously shown in just a single body of similar cause, like the reflection of a face in the orb of an extremely clean mirror.
>
> In order to express that he practices to show spontaneously in just a single holy body also all those histories of practicing the deeds of the bodhisattva – arisen wherever, however, and for whoever's welfare – it is explained:
>
> *What the buddha fields were like; what the mighty sages in them*
> *And the force and strength of their bodies and deeds were like;*
> *How many hearer sangha, what they were like, and*
> *What the forms of the bodhisattvas there were like;* [12.11]
>
> *What kind of Dharma and what the selves of that were like;*
> *The Dharma heard, what practices were practiced;*
> *What and how much generosity was presented to them;*
> *That entirely is shown in one holy body.* [12.12]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B2B-1C1 How he shows all his own actions in a single pore of his body
>
> *The Sage, at just one time, in one form body*
> *Corresponding to that cause, shows all*
> *That happened in his past rebirths, now finished,*
> *Clear, unconfused, vivid, and complete.* [12.10]
>
> *What the buddha lands were like, their buddhas*
> *And what the powers of their bodies and actions were like,*
> *How many their assemblies of hearers and what they were like,*
> *What were the forms of the bodhisattvas there,* [12.11]
>
> *What sort of Dharma, what the people there were like,*
> *What deeds they used to do after hearing the Dharma,*
> *And what generosity he offered them, and how much –*
> *All this he can show in a single body.* [12.12]
>
> *Likewise, the past lifetimes when he practiced morality,*
> *Patience, perseverance, concentration, and wisdom,*
> *With nothing left out, and all his own activities,*
> *He can show clearly in even a pore of his body.* [12.13]

The Lord Buddha can show in every pore of his body all his own ways of acting; for at just the one time, in the one form body (rupakaya) corresponding to [or resulting from] the cause of the Sage's complete enjoyment body, [i.e. the manifestation body (nirmanakaya),] he can show everything that happened previously [from beginningless samsara] in his own rebirths, now finished, clear and unconfused, [not mixed together,] vivid and

complete, [like reflections in a very clean mirror]. He also shows in the one body what the buddhas' pure lands were like [in which he practiced the transcendent action of generosity – their jewel nature of lapis lazuli, etc.], [the births and so on of] those sages and what the powers of the bodies and actions of those buddhas were like, how many were their surrounding sangha of disciples and what they were like, [i.e. how they got there by their efforts in the Dharma,] what the forms of the bodhisattvas there were like, [their marks and signs, robes, food, etc.,] what sort of Dharma was taught, what sort of people there were in those realms, [their caste, and whether lay or sangha, etc.,] what deeds [of the bodhisattva] they used to do after hearing the Dharma, and what generosity he offered those buddhas and bodhisattvas, and how much. Besides all this, he shows clearly in but a pore of his body the previous times when he practiced morality, patience, perseverance, concentration, and wisdom, with nothing left out, and all his own past actions.

A buddha is able to display all his activities in all his previous rebirths, which have already ceased, "clear and undistorted, in every detail due to completeness." Among all the actions that he performed in those lives, here the text specifically mentions the practices of generosity, morality, and so forth, all of which he displays in a single pore of his body. A buddha also remembers the retinues of bodhisattvas, solitary realizers, and so forth that he had in the past and is able to display them in a single pore.

When a buddha was on the learner path he performed many activities, for example, practicing generosity and making offerings, as well as the other perfections. He made offerings to beings superior to himself and practiced generosity toward beings inferior to himself. Both of these are considered to be the practice of generosity but in this context they are differentiated.

Without mentioning the remaining perfections, just with respect to generosity the Buddha performed many activities as a bodhisattva, such as giving away material things and even his own body, these being recounted in the *Life Stories*. For example, during one the previous lives of the Buddha, there was a tigress with four cubs who was unable to find food to feed her cubs. The Buddha pierced his flesh with a thorn and offered his blood to the tigress who instead killed and ate him. Having make this karmic connection with the tigress and her four cubs, in the lifetime in which the Buddha attained enlightenment they, having been reborn as human beings, became his five main disciples. Similarly, when we eat food we should think that we do so in order to nourish the thousands of microorganisms in our body so as to create a connection with them and in this way, while practicing the generosity of giving material things in this life, to be able to give them the generosity of Dharma teachings in the future.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> When the Bhagavan practiced generosity gone beyond before, whatever things were like – the buddha bhagavans to whom veneration was made; the buddha fields having the nature of lapis lazuli, ruby, sapphire, and crystal; the length, breadth, and circumference beautified by precious trees and so forth; and finely beautified by the differences of sentient beings who were supported there; showing the births and so forth of the buddha bhagavans – the totality of that is shown in one holy body.

The Bhagavan is also able to display the buddha bhagavans he venerated in his previous lives. Are there actually lapis lazuli, ruby, sapphire, and crystal in the buddha lands? If someone says that there are, one asks: "Are they true sufferings? Are they not matter?" In conclusion, there is the appearance of lapis lazuli, ruby, sapphire, and crystal in the buddha lands but they are not the actual nature of those objects, instead they are the nature of the wisdom truth body. Where are the buddha lands of the complete enjoyment bodies? They are in Akanishta. Why are we unable to see the buddha lands? Because we do not have the karmic potential to see them. This is the same reason for which Asanga

was unable to see Maitreya other than as a female dog covered with maggots. However, Asanga generated intense compassion for the dog and, wishing to relieve her suffering, cut a piece of flesh from his thigh on which to place the maggots. Then, in order not to harm the maggots, he closed his eyes and attempted to pick them up with his tongue but was unable to do so. Upon opening his eyes, he saw Maitreya before him. He then asked Maitreya why he had not appeared to him before and Maitreya explained that, although he had always been there, Asanga had not seen him due to his karmic obscurations. To prove this, Maitreya showed Asanga the saliva that Asanga had unknowingly spit on his robes. Thus, as long as we have karmic obscurations we will be unable to see the buddhas even though they are always present.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> What perfection of force there was of the holy bodies and activities of those buddha bhagavans; how many sangha of their hearers were assembled or "what they were like and" due to what kind of Dharma exertion concordant with the Dharma did they become the sangha of hearers; what the things that were fully usable, possessed of utility, were like in the buddha realms of those buddha bhagavans – the bodies of the bodhisattvas adorned with signs and exemplifications, shapely Dharma robes, food, dwellings, and so forth; "what kind of Dharma and" doctrine having the support of one and three vehicles – all those are shown in one holy body.

The buddhas are skilled in teaching the Dharma, due to which they teach three final vehicles to some and one final vehicle to others. For this reason, the Buddha taught three final vehicles to the Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, and true aspectarian Chittamatrins, but taught only one final vehicle to the false aspectarian Chittamatrins, Svatantrika Madhyamikas, and Prasangika Madhyamikas. In this way, he taught in accordance with the dispositions of various disciples.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> "What the selves of that were like," birth in the caste of brahmins and so forth, endowed with form and intelligence, being householders and renunciates; having heard the Dharma and assumed trainings with remainder and without remainder, what practices were practiced; "what and how much generosity was presented to them," what food and so forth and Dharma robes, precious ornaments and so forth were presented to the buddha bhagavans along with the sangha of hearers and bodhisattvas – and "how much," how many occasions and how much quantity was presented – entirely are shown in one holy body.

The Buddha is also able to show the rebirths he took in the brahmin, royal, merchant, and warrior castes. He took these rebirths in order to teach different disciples. He also took rebirths as householders and renunciates in order to benefit sentient beings by giving them teachings in various aspects. Thus, the Buddha is able to manifest as necessary in order to subdue different types of sentient beings. The Buddha is able to take these different aspects due to having completed the two collections and having abandoned the two obscurations. In conclusion, the Buddha is able to give teachings by manifesting in whatever form is necessary in order to subdue sentient beings.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Just as this extent of the arising of the practice of generosity gone beyond was shown:

Similarly, the lives practicing morality, patience, perseverance,
Concentration, and wisdom – those previous situations
Without omission – [12.13abc]

"Entirely are shown in one holy body," should be joined to the above.

Besides showing all situations together in one holy body, moreover:

– all [those past] activities
Are also shown clearly in one hair pore of the holy body. [12.13cd]

The Buddha is able to display all the buddha lands in a single pore of his body. Therefore, what need is there to mention that he can show much more? For example, he is able to display all his practices of the perfections of generosity, morality, and so forth in his past lives in a single pore.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 445) says:

> Whether arising through the force of the truth body or the form body that was explained previously, that other than the enjoyment body explained before – the entity of the emanation body, the body that is a result of similar cause to the truth body and enjoyment body – is explained [as follows] in order to express the inconceivable attributes of strength also with respect to those arisen by means of the cause of subduing sentient beings.

The emanator of the emanation body is the truth body and the complete enjoyment body. What is an emanation body? Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport* defines it as: a final truth body distinguished by not possessing the five certainties. The emanation body does not have the certainty of place because it does not abide in Akanishta, it does not have the certainty of retinue because it is not definitely surrounded by bodhisattva superiors, it does not have the certainty of teaching mahayana Dharma because it does not teach just this, and it does not have the certainty of time because it does not remain as long as cyclic existence is not emptied in that an emanation body passes away upon completing the deeds with respect to particular disciples. On the other hand, is the emanation body certain to have the major and minor marks? It does in that a buddha definitely has these marks, however, sentient beings due to their impure karma are not able to perceive them.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 445) says:

The Lord of Subduers, at just one time, in one form body
Of similar cause to them, displays the way
That the circumstances of his own rebirths, ceased before, happened,
Clearly and without confusion, all vividly and in their entirety. [12.10]

The Lord of Subduers, in order to display *in one form body of similar cause to* the truth and enjoyment bodies the extent without exception of the now already *ceased circumstances of his own rebirths* from beginningless cyclic existence that happened in the past, spontaneously *displays*, *at just one time*, like a reflection in an extremely clear mirror, *the way they happened* in the past, *clearly and without confusion* – that is, without mixing them with each other – *all vividly and in their entirety*.

The emanation body is able to remember and display all the previous circumstances of his past lives, clearly and without confusion, all vividly and in their entirety, in a single pore. For example, a buddha is able to display his practice of generosity to sentient beings and the offerings he made and veneration he paid to the buddhas and bodhisattvas in the past.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 445-6) says:

> *What the buddha lands were like, the lords of subduers in them,*
> *What the strength and force of their bodies and conduct were like,*
> *How many were the hearer sangha and what they were like, and*
> *What the forms of the bodhisattvas were like there,* [12.11]
>
> *What the Dharma was like, what he himself was like there,*
> *Hearing the Dharma, whatever conduct he practiced,*
> *Whatever generosity and how much he offered to them –*
> *This he entirely displays in one body.* [12.12]

The Bhagavan displays, when he practiced the perfection of generosity in the past,

- whatever offerings and veneration he made to whatever buddhas and
- *what the buddha lands* – the circumference having the nature of jewels, such as lapis lazuli and so forth, and beautified by the sentient beings who are the inhabitants supported on it – *were like* in which *the lords of subduers* were born and so forth,

and *entirely displays in one body*

- *what the* amazing *strength and force of the bodies and conduct of those* buddhas *were like*,
- *how many* were their retinues – the assembly of *hearer sangha* – and how they became that sangha by whatever exertion in Dharma, that is, *what they were like*,
- *what the forms of the bodhisattvas* adorned with the major and minor marks and what the fully usable, such as Dharma robes, food, and dwellings, in the buddha lands *were like*,
- *what the Dharma* taught in the one and the three vehicles *was like*,
- *what he himself in those* lands *was like* – birth in the brahmin caste and so forth, having intelligence, lay or ordained,
- having *heard the Dharma*, *whatever* bodhisattva *conduct he practiced* having taken the trainings of incomplete and complete bases of trainings,
- *whatever generosity* of food, Dharma robes, jewel ornaments, and so forth, for how long and of *how much*, *he offered* to the buddhas, bodhisattvas, and hearers.

"In which the lords of subduers were born and so forth" refers to the fact that he is able to show all his previous rebirths and the twelve deeds of an emanation body. He remembers the retinues he had as well as the teachings he gave to bodhisattvas, solitary realizers, and so forth. Within the retinue of a supreme emanation body there can be hearer, solitary realizer, and bodhisattva disciples, as well as those who have not yet entered either of the three vehicles. For this reason, he taught three final vehicles and one final vehicle in accordance with the needs of these different disciples.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "having heard the Dharma, whatever bodhisattva conduct he practiced having taken the trainings of incomplete and complete bases of trainings." Chandrakirti says this somewhat differently: "having heard the Dharma and assumed trainings with remainder and without remainder, what practices were practiced." In general, there are seven bases of trainings. Thus, a complete base of trainings is to make a promise to refrain from all three negative actions of body and all four negative actions of speech. On the other hand, an incomplete base of training is to take the vows of a lay person or the vows of a novice monk or nun. In these cases, the base of trainings is not complete because novice monks and nuns mainly take the four root vows that are related to the three negative actions of the body – to abstain from killing, stealing, and sexual conduct – and one negative action of speech – to abstain from lying. Similarly, the vows of a lay person are not to kill, steal, engage in sexual misconduct, and lie.

"Whatever generosity of food, Dharma robes, jewel ornaments, and so forth, for how long and of how much, he offered to the buddhas, bodhisattvas, and hearers" are displayed in a single pore of his body.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 446) says:

> *Similarly, any previous circumstances of lives of practicing morality,*
> *Patience, effort, concentration, and wisdom,*
> *With nothing omitted – all his own conduct –*
> *He also clearly displays in but a pore of his body.* [12.13]

One should apply the explanation regarding generosity above stating "Just as he displays the extent of the occurrence of undertaking generosity, *similarly*, he displays in one body *any previous circumstances of lives of practicing* the perfections of *morality, patience, effort*, the *meditative stabilization* of the concentrations, and *wisdom* before, *with nothing omitted*." He display all these circumstances simultaneously in one body, and, in addition, *also clearly displays all his own* previous *conduct in but a pore of his body*.

Wednesday afternoon, 2 May 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 446) says:

3B2B-1C2 The way of displaying others' activities in that place

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 228) says:

Not solely showing just his own activities, furthermore:

> *Those past, present, and future buddhas who,*
> *Reaching the limits of space, teach the Dharma in exalted tones*
> *By which migrators who are gripped by suffering*
> *Take breadth and who dwell in the world;* [12.14]

> *From the first mind until the essence of enlightenment,*
> *All their activities – having understood things as*
> *The nature of illusions – like his own, are clearly shown*
> *In one hair pore, at one time.* [12.15]

If, for a while, even ordinary illusionists are able to show various kinds of things as abiding in their bodies due a mere thing like the force of mantra, would not the Lords of Whatever Moves, the buddhas, and the bodhisattvas enact them having understood the nature of things as not different from such illusory nature? Therefore, what wise ones would doubt whether it is not realized? Therefore, the wise should specially appreciate this clearly via this example.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B2B-1C2 How he shows all the actions of others there

> *The buddhas who are past, those who will come,*
> *And those of the present, to the ends of space,*
> *Teaching Dharma with loud voice, so sentient beings*
> *Gripped by suffering take breath; living in the world;* [12.14]

> *And all their actions, from the first thought until*
> *The supreme point of enlightenment – knowing these things*
> *Are as of the nature of illusions, lie shows them clearly,*
> *Just like his own, at one time, in a pore.* [12.15]

> *Likewise, the actions of all the bodhisattvas*
> *Of the three times and the arya pratyekas*

And the shravakas, and, besides these, all the existences
Of ordinary beings, he shows at one time in a pore. [12.16]

He can show in every pore of his body all the actions of others; for the buddhas who are past, those who will come, and those of the present, as far as the limits of space, by their teaching the Dharma with the loud music of their voices, letting the sentient beings gripped (or pressed) by suffering recover their breath; living in the world; and all the actions of those buddhas from the first generation of bodhichitta to the supreme point of enlightenment – knowing that all things are as if of the nature of illusions, he shows all these at the one time in a [single] pore of his body, just as he showed his own actions. Likewise too he shows at the one time in a [single] pore all the actions of the bodhisattvas of the three times, and the arya pratyekabuddhas and the shravakas, and besides these, all the existences of ordinary beings.

A buddha can display all the buddhas of the past, present, and future in a single pore of his body. Or it can be said that just as all the buddhas of the past, present, and future give teachings so too is a single pore of a buddha's body able to teach sentient beings. A buddha gives teachings in exalted tones, whereby sentient beings gripped by suffering are given breath. In addition, a buddha is able to display the activities of bodhisattvas, solitary realizers, hearers, and ordinary beings in a single pore of his body.

If an ordinary magician is able to manifest many forms, there is no need to mention that a buddha has the ability to display the actions of all beings in a single pore. Thus, the qualities of a buddha are unimaginable, even the qualities of a single poor of his body are inconceivable. It is recounted that during a hailstorm Milarepa took shelter inside the horn of an animal, however, it seemed that Milarepa had not become small and that the horn had not become big. We limited beings cannot even begin to imagine a buddha's qualities.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Just as his own activities and the activities of other tathagatas are shown at one time in his hair pore,

Similarly, the entirety of activities of the three time
Bodhisattvas, arya solitary realizers, and hearers, and,
Beyond that, the situations of ordinary beings are
All shown in a hair pore at one time. [12.16]

Just as a buddha can display the activities of other buddhas in a single pore, so too can he display the activities of the three times of bodhisattvas, solitary realizers, hearers, and ordinary beings in a single pore.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 446) says:

The past buddhas, those who will arise, and
Those of the present who teach the Dharma with exalted tones
To the limits of space, whereby the migrating beings gripped by suffering
Take breath, and those who dwell in the world, and [12.14]

All their conduct from the first mind generation through
The essence of enlightenment, having understood things
To be the nature of illusions, he clearly displays them,
Like his own, at one time in a pore. [12.15]

He is able to *clearly display at one time in* one *pore the* previous *buddhas of the past, those who will arise* in the future, and the *present* buddhas

- *who teach the Dharma with exalted tones* that resound *to the limits of space*, *whereby the migrating beings gripped* – that is, afflicted – *by suffering take breath*, and
- *those who dwell in the world*, *and*
- *all the conduct of those* conquerors of the three times *from the first mind* generation *through the essence of enlightenment*,

like he displays all *his own* mode of conduct. If some ordinary illusionists are able to display various types of environments and inhabitants in their own bodies even by the mere force of mantras and substance, since the buddhas and bodhisattvas who, *having understood* that there is no difference in truth and falsity between the nature of *things* and *the nature of illusions*, meditate on this for many eons, are they not able to create those illusions? They are not [unable]. Therefore, what wise ones do not conceive them to be like that and, although realized, would doubt it? They would not, therefore, they should especially believe it by means of this example.

Likewise, he displays the conduct of all the bodhisattvas,
The solitary realizer superiors, and the hearers of the three times
Without exception and, beside these, all the situations of ordinary beings
At one time in a pore. [12.16]

Just as he displays his own conduct and the conduct of other buddhas in a pore at one time, *likewise*, can *he display the conduct of all the bodhisattvas of the three times*, *the solitary realizer superiors* of the three times, and *the hearers without exception and, beside these*, *all* the conduct of *the situations of ordinary beings at one time in* one *pore*.

In short, just as a buddha is able to show his own activities of the three times in a single pore, so too is he able to show the activities of other buddhas, bodhisattvas, solitary realizers, hearers, and ordinary beings of the three times in a single pore. The place in which the buddha is able to show his own and others' activities is a single pore of his body.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Therefore, what wise ones do not conceive them to be like that and, although realized, would doubt it? They would not, therefore, they should especially believe it by means of this example." In order to develop belief in the qualities of a buddha, it would be helpful to see magicians who are able to manifest horses and so forth, however, perhaps such magic can only be seen in India now. When I was in hospital in India, a magic show was arranged for the patients. The magicians, who were from Sikkim, set up a tent on the grounds and put on a show for two hours which the patients really enjoyed. One trick they did was to appear to eat playing cards, much to the surprise of the patients. They then rubbed their stomachs and Indian rupee notes came out of their mouths! They then called a patient to come on the stage and from his elbow were able to draw milk which poured down into a bucket and then suddenly turned into flowers, which the magician scattered on the audience.

How do magicians make their manifestations? They do so by means of mantras and substances. Since these ordinary beings are able to do such things, their is no need to mention that the buddhas who have inconceivable qualities are able to display the activities of others in their pores.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 447) says:

3B2B-1C3 Explaining the perfect mastery of wishes

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 228) says:

Having expressed the perfect holy bodies, in order to show the perfect mastery over desires even though not possessing conceptions, it is explained:

This pure one, by entertaining a wish, indeed shows
Worlds reaching [throughout] space in the sphere of one particle and
The particle pervading the directions of infinite space, yet
The particle does not become gross, the worlds do not become subtle. [12.17]

The buddha bhagavans, by way of desire, show the worlds reached by the limits of space in the sphere of a single atom, yet, neither do the worlds become subtle nor does the atom become gross. By way of mere desire, they perfectly show how their own entities abide.

Although the particle is shown to pervade the directions of infinite space, the buddha bhagavans, by way of a mere desire, show also infinite directions, the worlds of the totality of worlds, as pervaded by a single atom.

Similarly:

Not possessing conceptions, you show in each instant
Till the end of existence as many varieties of activities
As there are particles in the entirety of Jambudvipa –
The [particles] of which are countless. [12.18]

"Not possessing conceptions, the number of the variety of activities you show instant by instant until [the end of] cyclic existence is not possessed by the amount of atoms existing in the entirety of Jambudvipa." This is a praise to the Bhagavan by way of expressing the perfection of uncommon qualities.

The buddhas not only possess a perfect holy body but also possess perfect mastery over wishes.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B2B-1C3 Explanation of his perfect control over wishes

You pure ones, by making the wish for this, can show
In the space of one atom, the worlds to the ends of space,
And the atom filling all parts of the infinite worlds,
Yet the atom gets no bigger, the worlds no smaller. [12.17]

Having no conceptualization, you can show,
In every instant till samsara's end,
Different actions as many as the atoms
In all the Jambudvipas, which cannot be counted. [12.18]

He has perfect control over wish; for merely by wishing this action, the buddha, pure [of all stains], can show in the place of the [smallest] single atom the worlds as far as the limits of space, and although he shows [all] the parts of the infinite worlds filled by the single atom, that one atom does not get bigger and the worlds do not get smaller. Also, without conceptual activity, in every instant until the end of samsara, he shows different actions as many as the atoms in all the Jambudvipas, whose number cannot be counted.

A buddha is able to show all the worlds on a subtle particle. Does this mean that the subtle particle becomes very big or that the worlds become very small? This does not happen. A buddha has the ability to display them due to having completed the two collections and abandoned all stains. Due to merely having the wish to show this, a buddha is able to do so. In addition, to the ability to show all the worlds on a subtle particle he is also able to show all the numberless buddha lands on a single subtle particle. This ability is a quality unique to buddhas alone. However, if we accumulate merit and purify negativities we will become enlightened and attain these very same qualities. Therefore, these inconceivable qualities can be realized by us, although it may take longer for some than for others.

There is a story about a Mongolian who said that if one has money one can do whatever one wants, not only can one create an emanation body but also an enjoyment body! He was referring ironically to the fact that it is possible to be recognized as a reincarnate lama, a tulku (literally, an emanation body), if one has enough money.

In short, the qualities of a buddha are beyond the realm of thought.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 447-8) says:

> Having expressed the three perfect bodies, there is [the following] explanation in order to indicate the perfect mastery or dominion over wishes even though not possessing conceptions:
>
> *The purified one, by making a wish,*
> *Displays the worlds reaching throughout space on the area of a single particle and*
> *A particle pervading the directions of the infinite worlds, yet*
> *That particle does not become gross, and the worlds do not become subtle.*[12.17]
>
> One who performs the deeds of a buddha who is *purified* of all stains, *by* – that is, through – *making a* mere *wish*, is able to display *the worlds reaching* to the ends of *space on* the size of *the area of a single* subtle *particle*. When the extent of the base of *the infinite* – that is, of all – *worlds is* also *displayed* as *pervaded* by a single subtle *particle*, *that* one *particle neither becomes gross*, that is, bigger, nor do *the worlds become subtle*, that is, smaller.
>
> *You who do not possess conception display as many*
> *Varieties of activities in each instant until the end of existence*
> *As there are particles in all the Jambudvipas,*
> *There being no number for that amount.* [12.18]
>
> Similarly, *you who do not possess conception display as many varieties of activities in each instant until the end of existence*, that is, cyclic existence, *as are the* number of subtle *particles* existing *in all the Jambudvipas*, *there being no number for that amount*.
>
> The former is from the point of view of place, this is from the point of view of time.

"From the point of view of place" refers to the fact that a buddha can display infinite worlds on a single particle, whereas "from the point of view of time" refers to the fact that he can do this in each instant. In short, the qualities of a buddha are inexpressible. The *King of Prayers* says:

> As many buddhas as there are atoms are seated amidst the children of the buddhas on a single atom: thus, I visualize all spheres of phenomena, without exception, as filled with conquerors.

When this subject is debated, the conclusion is that a buddha can show the infinite worlds and all the buddha lands on a single particle. We need to generate faith that this is possible. From the point of view of tantra, it is said that when someone who is intelligent and examines well is compared to someone who is not so intelligent but has good visualization, it can happen that the duller person attains enlightenment more quickly because the person with sharp faculties can be distracted by his analysis and conceptualizations. In fact, all the world religions say that from faith comes many miracles. This is likened to the fact that although the sun is very hot it cannot burn a piece of paper, whereas when a magnifying glass is placed between the sun and the paper it is able to burn the paper. Here the magnifying glass is an analogy for faith, whereas the sun is an analogy for the buddhas' enlightened activities in that when we have faith we receive the benefit of the enlightened activities of the buddhas. In conclusion, the enlightened activities reach us in dependence on our faith. Although the buddhas' enlightened activities are always ready to ripen sentient beings, sentient beings need to be ready to receive these enlightened activities. The eighth chapter of the *Ornament* says:

> *Although the god of rain sends rain down,*
> *As an impotent seed does not grow,*
> *Although the buddhas appear,*

The unfortunate do not experience excellence. [8.10]

Lama Zopa Rinpoche has said that the Masters Program students need to examine whether there is anger in their mind, as well as attachment, jealousy, and so forth – all twenty-six afflictions. When any of them arise, one should immediately apply an appropriate antidote to reduce and eliminate it. Lama Zopa Rinpoche mentioned anger specifically because it is the most dangerous of afflictions because it destroys our merit. As Shantideva says in the third chapter of the *Bodhisattvacharyavatara*, there is no greater harm than anger. Similarly, Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:

One moment of hating a conqueror child destroys
The virtues arising from giving and ethics'
Accumulated for a hundred eons.
Thus there can be no [worse] sin than impatience. [3.6]

It creates an ugly form, leads to the unholy,
And robs discrimination that knows right and wrong.
Through impatience one is quickly cast into a bad migration.
Patience creates qualities opposite to those [3.7]

Explained above. Through patience comes beauty, dearness
To the holy, skill in discriminating between
The right and wrong, birth afterwards as a human
Or god, and the extinguishment of non-virtues. [3.8]

Because anger is very destructive Lama Zopa Rinpoche asks that you constantly check your mind for its arisal and apply the appropriate antidote. Although attachment is harmful it does not destroy our merit, it may even bring benefit, for example, thinking "It would be wonderful to become enlightened, therefore, I will practice the Dharma." Attachment also becomes a branch of benefit in the case of bodhisattvas who use it to give birth to a universal king.

Thursday morning, 3 May 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 448) says:

3B2B-2 Presentation of the qualities of the powers

A Brief presentation of the ten powers
B Extensive explanation of [the ten powers]
C The way in which all the qualities cannot be expressed
D Presenting the benefits of understanding the two qualities

3B2B-2A Brief presentation of the ten powers

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Because the buddha's ground is thoroughly specified by ten strengths, in order to show a mere part of its divisions, it is explained:

The strength knowing sources and non-sources,
Likewise, the awareness of the maturation of karma,
The comprehension of the various interests,
The strength knowing the various constituents, and, [12.19]

Likewise, the knowledge of superior and inferior
Faculties, [the paths] leading everywhere, and
The strength knowing the concentrations, complete liberations,
Meditative stabilizations, absorptions, and so forth, [12.20]

The knowledge recalling former states, and,
Likewise, the awareness of death, transference and rebirth, and
The strength knowing the exhaustion of contaminations:
These are the ten strengths. [12.21]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B2B-2A Brief exposition of the ten powers

The power of knowing place and non-place,
Likewise, the awareness of karmic results,
Understanding the various wishes,
The power of knowing the various elements, [12.19]

Also, knowing the higher and lower
Faculties, the way to everywhere,
The power aware of the absorptions, deliverances,
Concentrations, contemplations, and so on; [12.20]

The knowledge remembering previous lives,
Likewise, the awareness of death and rebirth,
And the power of knowing the ending of
Contaminations – these are the ten powers. [12.21]

If the powers of the Buddha are divided, there are ten of them; for there are: (1) the power of knowing the place and what is not the place, (2) likewise, the power or awareness knowing the ripening of karma, (3) the power of understanding the various wishes, (4) the power of knowing the various elements, (5) likewise, the power of knowing the higher and lower faculties, (6) the power of knowing the paths which lead everywhere, (7) the power or awareness knowing the absorptions, the deliverances, the concentrations, the contemplations, and so on, (8) the power of knowing the recollection of previous lives, (9) likewise, the power or awareness knowing death and rebirth, and (10) the power of knowing the ending of contaminations.

The first of the ten powers is the power knowing sources and non-sources. A source is, for example, that from virtue comes happiness and a non-source is that from virtue comes suffering. The discussion of sources and non-sources can be applied to all causes and results, for example, that from a grain of rice comes a rice plant is a source and that from a grain of rice comes a pea plant is a non-source. This can be debated saying: "Do non-sources exist? Does the non-source that is virtue bringing suffering exist? Does the non-source that is a rice seed bringing about a pea plant exist?"

The second power, the power knowing the fruition of actions, knows that from virtuous actions comes the fruitional result of rebirth in the higher realms as a god or human being, whereas from non-virtuous actions comes the fruitional result of rebirth in the three lower realms. For example, if someone stumbles on a rock and falls is that a result of his karma? It is. In the *Supplement*, in the context of discussing the fact that a human being sees a river as water, a god sees it is as nectar, and a hungry ghost sees it is pus and blood, it is said that this is due to karma. This is known by buddhas alone.

The third power, the power knowing the varieties of dispositions, knows that in dependence on their dispositions different beings enter different vehicles, engage in different practices, and

achieve different results. For example, different people are disposed toward different types of food in that some like fatty foods and some do not and so forth. A buddha knows the likes and dislikes of sentient beings.

The fourth power is the power knowing the varieties of constituents. This word "constituents" (*khams*) is explained differently in different contexts. In general, there are eighteen types of constituents: a group of six objects – forms, sounds, and so forth; a group of six supporting sense powers; and a group of six supported consciousnesses. These are discussed in the context of the five aggregates, twelve spheres, and eighteen constituents. Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* elaborates even more than eighteen constituents. A buddha knows all these constituents.

The fifth power, the power knowing superior and inferior faculties, knows the five faculties of faith and so forth. A buddha knows who has superior faculties of faith and so forth, who has middling faculties of faith and so forth, and who has inferior faculties of faith and so forth. The etymology of the word "faculty" or "power" (*dbang po*) is that they are so-called because they have the power to produced their own result, a superior's path.

The sixth, the power knowing the paths that proceed everywhere, knows the fifteen paths – the five paths of hearers, the five paths of solitary realizers, and the five paths of bodhisattvas – that lead respectively to the results of hearer foe destroyer, solitary realizer foe destroyer, and buddha. In addition, the paths that proceed everywhere also refer to the paths of action that lead to the hell realm, to the hungry ghost realm, to the animal realm, to the human realm, and to the god realm. Is there a difference between an action and a path of action? Think about it. Thus, there are paths that lead upward and paths that lead downward.

The seventh power is the power knowing the concentrations, complete liberations, meditative stabilizations, meditative absorptions, and so forth. There are four concentrations and eight complete liberations. Meditative stabilizations are of different types, for example, the meditative stabilization that is calm abiding and the meditative stabilization that is special insight. The absorptions are the nine absorptions of serial abiding: the four concentrations, the four formless absorptions, and the absorption of cessation.

The eighth power, the power mindful former states, knows the former states of sentient beings. Due to it, a buddha can say where other sentient beings were born in their past lives.

The ninth power, the power knowing death and rebirth, knows when someone will die and where they will be reborn.

The tenth power, the power knowing the exhaustion of contaminations, knows the exhaustion of the contaminations that are the afflictions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 448) says:

> Because the buddha ground is distinguished by the ten powers, there is the [following] explanation in order to present a mere part of its divisions:
>
> *The power of exalted knowledge of sources and non-sources,*
> *Similarly, the awareness of the fruition of actions,*
> *The comprehension of the varieties of dispositions,*
> *The power of exalted knowledge of the varieties of constituents,* [12.19]
>
> *Similarly, the exalted knowledge of superior and*
> *Inferior faculties, those proceeding everywhere,*
> *The power of awareness of the concentrations, complete liberations,*
> *Meditative stabilizations, meditative absorptions, and so forth,* [12.20]
>
> *The exalted knowledge mindful of former states,*
> *Similarly, the awareness, of death and rebirth,*
> *The power of exalted knowledge of the extinction of contaminations –*
> *These are the ten powers.* [12.21]

A subduer's powers are:
1. *the power of exalted knowledge of sources and non-sources,*
2. *similarly*, the power of *awareness*, that is, exalted knowledge, *of the fruition of actions*,
3. the power of *comprehension of the varieties of dispositions*,
4. *the power of exalted knowledge of the varieties of constituents,*
5. *similarly*, the power of *exalted knowledge of superior and inferior faculties*,
6. the power of exalted knowledge of paths that *proceed everywhere*,
7. the *power of awareness*, that is, exalted knowledge, *of the concentrations, complete liberations, meditative stabilizations, meditative absorptions, and so forth*,
8. the power of *exalted knowledge mindful of former states*,
9. *similarly*, the power of *awareness*, that is, exalted knowledge, *of death, rebirth*, and abidance,
10. *the power of exalted knowledge of the extinction of contaminations*;

these are the ten powers.

This is the brief presentation of the ten powers.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 448) says:

3B2B-2B Extensive explanation of [the ten powers]

1 Explanation of the five powers: the exalted knowledge of sources and non-sources and so forth
2 Explanation of the five powers: the exalted knowledge of paths that proceed everywhere

3B2B-2B1 Explanation of the five powers: the exalted knowledge of sources and non-sources and so forth

1. The power of exalted knowledge of sources and non-sources

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

There, in terms of the strength that knows sources and non-sources it is explained:

From which cause something will be definitely produced,
That is taught by those who know it as the source of that.
Non-sources conflict with explanation. The knower of the infinite
To be known, obstruction abandoned, is explained as a strength. [12.22]

The statement "From which cause something…" is an illustration. Therefore, the statement "From which cause something is produced, it is like this: from non-virtues the unattractive matures. From which something is obtained, it is like this: from the arya path, nirvana," and so forth, is properly summarized. The statement "from which cause something definitely produces, that is the source (or abode) of that having the production since the source is in it (or since it abides in it)," expresses the cause by the term source (or abode) through the mode of designation.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B2B-2B Extensive explanation

Whatever cause something is sure to be produced from
Is taught by Those Who Know it as the latter's place.
The reverse of this explanation is "not the place." Unhindered
Knowledge of these boundless knowables is explained as a power. [12.22]

He has what is explained as the power of knowing the place and what is not the place; for [the buddhas] who know this have taught that from whatever cause some result will certainly arise, that cause is the "place" of that result, [– for example, from non-virtue, an unpleasant ripe karmic result arises, and from the path of the aryas'

training, nirvana is received, etc. –] while that contrary to this explanation is [called] "not the place" [e.g., an unpleasant ripe karmic result arising from virtue] – about these infinite knowables he has received knowledge which has abandoned obstruction [or is unobstructed].

A buddha knows what is a cause that brings about a certain result and what is not a cause that brings about that result. For example, he knows that a virtuous action brings the result of happiness, that is, he knows that that virtuous actions is a source of happiness. On the other hand, he knows that a virtuous action does not bring the result of suffering, that is, he knows that that virtuous action is a non-source of suffering. Similarly, he knows that a non-virtuous actions brings the result of suffering, that is, he know that that non-virtuous action is a source of suffering. A "source" is thus the source of a result.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That which contradicts what was explained is not the source. That from which something does not arise is not the source of that. For example, like unattractive effects do not arise from virtue and the manifestation of the eighth existence does not arise upon attaining the path of seeing. Therefore, this knower, free from the discordant class, is presented as the strength of the Buddha Bhagavan.

What is "the eighth existence"? If we take the spelling in the Tibetan text to be correct (*srid pa*) it would seem to mean that one does not take an eighth rebirth upon attaining the path of seeing. However, perhaps this is misspelled and instead should read "the eighth craving" (*sred pa*), in this case it would mean that the cause for cyclic existence, craving, no longer arises upon attaining the path of seeing.

The Buddha explains sources and non-sources in the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*. Chandrakirti cites this sutra:

> As is taught in the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:
>
> > [Then, the Bhagavan again said to the bodhisattva King Dharanishvara: Son of good lineage, there, what are the actions of the Tathagata? Son of good lineage, the actions of the Tathagata are these thirty-two. What are the thirty-two? (They are the ten strengths, the four fearlessnesses, and the eighteen unshared qualities of a buddha.)]
> >
> > Son of good lineage, here, the Tathagata thoroughly knows the source as the source, exactly as it is, with the unexcelled exalted wisdom of the Tathagata. He also thoroughly knows the non-source as the non-source, exactly as it is.
> >
> > Son of good lineage, there, what is the source and what is the non-source? Son of good lineage, this is not the source and is without occasion: whatever maturation of an evil action by body, evil action by speech, and evil action by mind is desirable, pleasant, joyful, and attractive – this is the non-source. This is the source and has occasion: whatever maturation of an excellent action by body, excellent action by speech, and excellent action by mind is desirable, pleasant, joyful, and attractive – this is the source.

Evil actions of body, speech, and mind refer to the three negative actions of body – killing, stealing, sexual misconduct; the four of speech – lying, divisive talk, harsh speech, and idle talk; and the three of mind – covetousness, malice, and wrong views. A pleasant result does not arise from these negative actions. Similarly, an unpleasant result does not arise from the ten excellent actions of body, speech, and mind, only pleasant results arise from them.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Son of good lineage, this is not the source and is without occasion: whatever miserliness makes great resources manifest, faulty morality brings about rebirth as a god and human, harmful mind brings about beauty, laziness attains clear realization, mental distraction enters into the faultless (or: into certainty), and whatever faulty wisdom well destroys all transmission of imprints.

The Buddha then discusses source and non-source in terms of resources: miserliness is a non-source of great resources, whereas generosity is a source of great resources. Similarly, faulty morality is a non-source of rebirth as a god and human being, harmful mind is a non-source of beauty, laziness is a non-source of clear realizations, mental distraction is a non-source of faultless meditative stabilization, and faulty wisdom is a non-source of the destruction of the continuity of latencies.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Whatever action of immediate [retribution] brings about mental abiding, whatever possessor of an observation attains concordant patience, whatever thorough dwelling in repentance the mind becomes serviceable – this is the non-source. Not the source and without occasion: whatever body of a woman itself [arises in the world as] a universal monarch, Indra, Brahma [or the buddha – this is without source]...

– and so forth.

An action of immediate retribution is a non-source for the abiding of the mind. Having the observed object of true existence is a non-source of concordant forbearance, that is, forbearance with regard to the meaning of emptiness. A mind abiding in regret is a non-source of a serviceable or pliant mind. The body of woman is a non-source of a universal monarch, Indra, and Brahma.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> "This is the source and has occasion: whatever generosity makes great resources manifest and..."

– should be added having reversed all the statements.

> [Whatever morality brings about rebirth as a god and human…, patience brings about beauty..., perseverance attains clear realization..., concentration enters into certainty..., whatever wisdom well destroys all transmission of imprints – this is the source and has occasion.
>
> Whatever immaculate morality brings about mental abiding..., whatever interest in emptiness attains patience..., through whatever utter non-arising the mind becomes serviceable – this is the source and has occasion... This is the source and has occasion: whatever replacement of the body of a woman arises in the world as a universal monarch or Indra or Brahma or buddha – this is the source.]
>
> This is the first tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

Generosity is a source of great resources. Similarly, morality is a source of rebirth as a human being or god; the abandonment of a harmful mind, that is, patience, is a source of beauty; effort is a source of clear realizations; concentration is a source of abiding single-pointedly in a faultless meditative stabilization; and wisdom is a source for the destruction of the continuity of latencies.

Thursday afternoon, 3 May 2001

2. The power of exalted knowledge of the fruition of actions

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, in terms of the strength that knows karma and maturation, it is explained:
>
> *Also to know the karma that is desired, undesired, opposite from that,*
> *And an exhausting thing – and its extremely varied maturations –*
> *The powerful ability to individually engage without obstruction,*
> *Pervading all to be known of the three times: that is asserted as a strength.* [12.23]
>
> By fully knowing the self entities and thorough classifications and so forth, also regarding attractive karma, unattractive karma, attractive and unattractive karma, the uncontaminated cause of exhausting and the maturation of the three aspects, extremely varied like karma, pervading the entirety of worlds included in the three times, the knower that pervades the entirety of objects to be known, not having obstruction toward anything to be known – that is presented as the Bhagavan's strength that knows karma and maturation.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Desired, undesired, their contrary and consuming cause,*
> *The knowledge of these karmas and their very varied*
> *Results, an unhindered power, perceiving individually,*
> *Embracing the knowables of the three times, is held as a power.* [12.23]

He receives what is held to be the power of knowing the ripe result of karma; for of desired, or positive, and undesired, or negative [karma], [in unmixed karma,] the reverse of these two, or mixed ("gray") karma, and karma of [uncontaminated] nature which consumes evil [or contaminated[243]] karma, and also of the very varied ripe results of these, he has received knowledge, a power or ability without obstruction, understanding them individually, and pervading all the knowables [of karmas and their results] of the three times.

A buddha knows the fruition of actions without impediment. An attractive or pleasant action is a virtuous actions, whereas an unattractive or unpleasant action is a non-virtuous action. They are so-called because virtuous actions give rise to attractive or pleasant results, whereas non-virtuous actions give rise to unattractive or unpleasant results.

This passage mentions three types of actions: (i) white actions which are virtuous actions, (ii) black actions which are non-virtuous actions, and (ii) actions that extinguish the contaminated. Contaminated actions are consumed by uncontaminated actions. In addition, a contaminated non-virtuous action is also consumed by a contaminated virtuous action. Thus, a contaminated antidote overcomes a contaminated non-virtuous action. Non-virtuous actions and contaminated virtuous actions both bring about a fruitional result, but does an uncontaminated action bring about a fruitional

[243] *zag.bcas*

result? Think about it because if it is said that an uncontaminated action brings about a fruitional result, then one asks: "Is an uncontaminated action also a fruitional cause?" If someone says that it is, one can quote the *Treasury of Knowledge* which says that a fruitional cause is a non-virtuous action or a contaminated virtuous action. According to this text a fruitional cause is pervaded by being either non-virtue or contaminated virtue. If the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that a fruitional cause is not pervaded by being one of these two, what would you say? Posit! The uncontaminated that is a cause that exhausts the black.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As is taught [in the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*]:
>
> > [Son of good lineage], furthermore, the Tathagata thoroughly knows just exactly as they are, the karmas and perfectly adopted karmas that arise in the past, present, and future – skilled in abode, cause, functioning thing, and maturation.
> >
> > How are they thoroughly known? Son of good lineage, here, the Tathagata thoroughly knows whatever perfectly adopted karma of the past arose from the cause of virtue, devoid of non-virtue, which in the future will issue forth [an effect] arisen from the virtuous cause. Whatever perfectly adopted karma arose from the cause of non-virtue, devoid of virtue, which in the future will issue forth [an effect] arisen from the non-virtuous cause – that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows.

The Buddha knows all the diverse actions of the past, present, and future. What are "perfectly adopted karmas"? These karmas are vows which are a source, cause, functioning thing, and maturation or fruition. When a vow is taken, because it is virtuous, it becomes a source of happiness. On the other hand, "whatever perfectly adopted karma arose from the cause of non-virtue, devoid of virtue" refers to a non-vow. Both vows and non-vows are perfectly adopted by means of a ritual.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara* which says:

> > Similarly, whatever perfectly adopted karma will in the future become concordant with degeneration (or dependent on the inferior) and will become concordant with enhancement (or dependent on the exceptional) – he thoroughly knows that too. Similarly, concordant with degeneration in the present becoming concordant with enhancement in the future, concordant with enhancement in the present becoming concordant with degeneration in the future – he thoroughly knows that too. Similarly, each and the similar class, he will thoroughly know too.

There is perfectly adopted karma that is concordant with degeneration in the future and perfectly adopted karma that is concordant with enhancement in the future. Similarly, the *Ornament* in the context of the four concentrations and four formless absorptions set out the four concordancies: those concordant with degeneration, those concordant with abiding, those concordant with enhancement, and those concordant with definite differentiation (see *Meditative States*, page 159).

"Concordant with degeneration in the present becoming concordant with enhancement in the future" refers to karmas that have degenerated in the present but will be enhanced in the future. "Concordant with enhancement in the present becoming concordant with degeneration in the future" refers to karmas that are enhanced in the present but will degenerate in the future. For example, having taken a vow, although presently we have degenerated it, we can enhance it in the future by

retaking it. Similarly, we may have weak virtue presently but in the future it can become strong, likewise, weak non-virtue presently can become strong in the future. On the other hand, now we may have strong virtue that in the future will become very weak. For example, there are people who practice Dharma strongly now but in the future may abandon it completely.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara* which says:

> Similarly, that perfectly adopted karma that was a small application in the past becoming extensive and an extensive application in the future; similarly, a small undertaking becoming a great distinction; a great undertaking becoming a small distinction; whatever perfectly adopted karma issuing forth the cause of the hearer state, whatever [issues forth] the solitary realizer state, and whatever issues forth the cause of the buddha's enlightenment – that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows.

A perfectly adopted karma that was a small application or commission can become extensive in the future. For example, one may apply oneself very little at the beginning of an activity and then gradually increase one's application. "Small undertaking becoming a great distinction; a great undertaking becoming a small distinction" means that at times the effort is great but the result is small, whereas at other times the effort is very small but the result is very great. In short, a great karma can bring about a small result and a small karma can bring about a great result.

"Whatever perfectly adopted karma issuing forth the cause of the hearer state, whatever [issues forth] the solitary realizer state, and whatever issues forth the cause of the buddha's enlightenment" means that from some perfectly adopted karma there is the attainment of a hearer's enlightenment, from other the attainment of a solitary realizer's enlightenment, and from other the attainment of a buddha's enlightenment.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara* which says:

> Similarly, whatever perfectly adopted karma, suffering in the present becoming a blissful maturation in the future; blissful in the present becoming a suffering maturation in the future – that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows.

For example, there are times when we experience many problems and suffering but later on we can experience great happiness. It can also happen that while we are very happy and relaxed in the present we may experience much suffering in the future.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara* which says:

> [Son of good lineage], thus, whatever is the karma of sentient beings of the past, present, and future, whatever is the cause and whatever is the maturation – the Tathagata, depending on only that and not others, thoroughly knows just exactly as it is. Having known, he also teaches the Dharma similarly.
>
> This is the second tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

Thus, a buddha knows all phenomena. It is recounted that someone accused the Buddha of being a liar and trickster because to those who treated him well he predicted that they would have happiness in the future, whereas to those who treated him badly he predicted that they would have suffering in the future. The Buddha responded that he was not lying and that he could in fact prove that he was not lying. He told all of the farmers in the area to bring him a small cloth bag containing some grain from their various fields. The farmers did this and the next day brought their bags, each marked in a way so that they themselves were able to identify them, and placed them in a pile. The Buddha then picked them up one by one and said "This grain is from such-and-such a field belonging to such-and-such a farmer" and handed it to the right owner. In this way, their disbelief was dispelled and they asked the Buddha's forgiveness.

3. The power of exalted knowledge of the varieties of dispositions

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, in terms of the strength that knows the varieties of interests, it is explained:
>
> *Desires due to the strength of the sources of attachment and so forth*
> *Are very diverse. Knowing the inferior, middling, and distinguished desires,*
> *As well as the interests covered over by others besides those,*
> *Pervading the entirety of the three time migrators, is called a strength.* [12.24]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *The knowledge of wishes due to the sources of attachment*
> *And so on, the low, the middling, and also those held superior,*
> *And also of wishes covered by the other than those,*
> *Embracing all beings of the three times, is called a power.* [12.24]

He receives the so-called "power of understanding the various wishes," for his knowledge about the very varied desires from the power of the origin [or seed] of attachment, [hatred, and other defilements] and so on [i.e., positive dharmas, faith, etc.] – the low, the medium, and also those which are held to be superior – and also wishes covered [or obscured] by action different from these, embraces all the sentient beings of the three times.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Here, because the term 'attachment' is an illustration of delusion, it also holds for hatred and so forth. The term "and so forth" is for the purpose of fully including the virtuous qualities of faith and so forth. The term "source" is because of saying "It is called the seed of attachment and so forth since attachment and so forth emerge from it."

From the seed of attachment there arises attachment, and from the seed of faith there arises faith.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thus, thoughts that are fully embraced by the seeds of attachment and so forth and faith and so forth are expressed as "special interest, special attitude, desire, and interest." Therefore, "the occurrence of the omniscient mind that acts to fully determine the differences of the specific entities regarding [those thoughts], as well as the [interests] obscuring [the seeds of the previously explained interests] due to the comprehensive use of dharmas other than those, is presented as the Buddha Bhagavan's strength of knowing the varieties of interests.

The seeds of attachment and so forth are called "special interest, special attitude, desire, and interest." Here the word "interest" or "disposition" means to aspire for something.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As is taught [in the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*]:
>
> > Son of good lineage, furthermore, the Tathagata thoroughly knows just exactly as they are, the many interests and varied interests of other sentient beings and other persons. Son of good lineage, how does the Tathagata thoroughly know just exactly as they are, the many interests and varied interests of other sentient beings and other persons? Whatever person abiding in attachment is interested in hatred, whatever person abiding in hatred is interested in attachment, whatever person abiding in bewilderment is interested in attachment, hatred, and bewilderment – that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows.

While abiding in attachment, one is interested in or generates hatred. Due to the condition of attachment, hatred arises. "Whatever person abiding in attachment is interested in hatred" means "Whatever person abiding in attachment is interested in the object of hatred" and "whatever person abiding in hatred is interested in attachment" means "whatever person abiding in hatred is interested in the object of attachment." "Whatever person abiding in bewilderment is interested in attachment, hatred, and bewilderment" means whatever person is interested in the object of attachment, the object of hatred, and the object of confusion. Someone can abide, for example, in virtue and be interested in non-virtue. Although someone abides in virtue he may have the tendency to lie or to steal.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Whatever person abiding in virtue is interested in non-virtue, that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows. Whatever persons of small application are interested in the extensive attitude..., whatever of extensive application are interested in the small attitude – those too the Tathagata thoroughly knows.

What do "application" or "commission" and "attitude" or "thought" refer to? For example, we can do something that is a small application of body and speech with the extensive thought or attitude of the mind of enlightenment. On the other hand, we can do something that is an extensive application of body and speech, such as doing prostrations and reciting prayers, with the small thought or attitude thinking only of one's own welfare or happiness.

Friday morning, 4 May 2001

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Due to what interest regarding small application will there be abidance in the distinguished..., regarding the distinguished will there be abidance in the small..., regarding the definite to perfection will there be placement in the constituent definite to the faulty..., regarding the definite to the faulty will there be placement in the constituent definite to perfection..., regarding the indefinite will there be placement in the constituent definite to perfection...,

The Buddha knows those who are interested in the perfect, those who are interested in the faulty, and those who are interested in both. There are those who determine to act in a perfect or correct way but when they perform the action it is faulty. Contrarily, there are those who determine to act in a faulty way but when they perform the action it is perfect or correct. There are also those whose motivation is indefinite but when they perform the action the motivation becomes definite. In other words, although the motivation was not firm the action becomes correct.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Due to what interest will there be utter passing beyond the desire realm..., due to what, the form realm..., due to what, the formless realm, and due to what [interest] will there be utter passing beyond the three realms – that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows. Having known, he also teaches the Dharma similarly.
>
> This is the third tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

The Tathagata knows who is interested in becoming free from attachment to the desire realm, who is interested in becoming free from attachment to the form realm, who is interested in becoming free from attachment to the formless realm, and who is interested in becoming free from attachment to the three realms. Since the Buddha knows the interests of sentient beings he teaches in accordance with this.

4. The power of exalted knowledge of the varieties of constituents

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, in terms of the strength that knows the variety of constituents, it is explained:
>
> *The buddhas, skilled in the classifications of constituents, teach*
> *The eyes etc. and that which is their nature as the constituents.*
> *The boundless exalted knower of the consummate buddhas engaging*
> *The distinctions of all types of constituents are asserted as a strength.* [12.25]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *The buddhas, wise about the divisions of the elements,*
> *Say the natures of the eye and so on are elements.*
> *The perfect buddhas' knowledge, boundless and perceiving*
> *The distinctions of elements of all kinds is held to be a power.* [12.25]

He receives what is maintained to be the power of knowing the various elements; for the buddhas, wise about the divisions of the elements, have taught that the eye and so on, [form and so on, and eye consciousness, etc. up to mind consciousness, and their] natures, [voidness of the internal and so forth,] are elements, and, of the distinctions of these elements of all kinds, the knowledge of these perfect buddhas is infinite.

The *Treasury of Knowledge* defines an aggregate as a heap, a sphere as the door of generation and propagation of consciousness, and a constituent as a type saying:

> *Aggregate, sphere, and constituent mean*
> *Heap, door of generation, and type.* [1.17ab]

The eighteen constituents are the six objects, form and so forth; the six supporting sense powers, the eye sense power and so forth; and the six supported consciousnesses, the eye consciousness and so forth.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> 'Nature,' 'entity' and 'emptiness' are equivalents. The exalted knower of the buddhas, those who are skilled in the classifications of all constituents, which does not have obstruction to the natures of the constituents – the eye and so forth – which are the many classifications having the characteristics of internal emptiness and so forth, is presented as the strength that knows the variety of constituents.

A buddha knows all the types of constituents.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> As is taught [in the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*]:
>
> > Son of good lineage, furthermore, the Tathagata thoroughly knows the eye constituent, the visual form constituent, and the visual consciousness constituent. [How are they thoroughly known?] The internal emptiness, external emptiness, and internal and external emptiness are thoroughly known...,
>
> The three emptinesses are also to be conjoined with all eighteen constituents.

In this context, the emptiness of the internal is the emptiness of the six consciousnesses: the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses. These are the six bases of the emptiness of the internal. The emptiness of the external is the emptiness of the six objects: forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena. The emptiness of the internal and external is the emptiness of the organs, the loci of the sense powers. The eighteen constituents, which are condensed into three groups of six, are the bases of the three emptinesses: the emptiness of the internal, the emptiness of the external, and the emptiness of the internal and external.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> He also thoroughly knows the earth constituent and so forth (i.e., water, fire, and air constituents).

The six elements – earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness – are those included in the continuum of a sentient being.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> How are they thoroughly known? However the constituent of space exists, like that, it is thoroughly known. The desire realm (or constituent), the form realm, and the formless realm [are thoroughly known. How are they thoroughly known?] They are thoroughly known as rightly arising from complete imputation (or from total conceptualization).

According to the *Treasury of Knowledge* the space element is defined as a cavity. The earth element is that which is hard and obstructive. The water element is that which is wet and moistening. The fire element is that which is hot and burning. The wind element is that which is light and moving. The consciousness element is the thorough knowledge of individual objects.

How is the desire realm posited? The etymology of "desire realm" is that the beings of the desire realm are those who make use of objects of desire. The desire realm has six divisions or classes: three lower realms and three upper realms. Each of these realms is also further subdivided. For example, the hell realm is divided into the hot hells, cold hells, occasional hells, and neighboring hells. The hungry ghost realm is divided into hungry ghosts with internal obstacles, hungry ghosts with external obstacles, and hungry ghosts with both internal and external obstacles. The animal realm is divided into those animals are dispersed and animals that live together. Each of these beings have their respective sufferings which are explained in detail in the teachings on the Stages of the Path.

The upper realms consist of the human, anti-god, and god realms. The human realm is divided into the human beings of the four main continents and the human beings of the eight sub-continents. They too experience specific sufferings. The anti-gods are divided into thirty-six abodes. The gods of the desire realm are divided into six types, one higher than the other. The three types of beings of the lower realms and the three types of beings of the upper realms are all included in the desire realm. There are also gods of the form realm and gods of the formless realm which are included in the upper realms.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Compounded constituents [are thoroughly known] as characterized by strong composition..., uncompounded constituents as characterized by non-strong composition..., the constituents of the thoroughly afflicted as characterized by adventitious delusions..., the constituents of the totally purifying as characterized by clear light by nature..., the constituent of cyclic existence as characterized by inappropriate ignorance…, the constituent of the sphere of nirvana as characterized by appropriate cognition.

Compounded constituents are those that are produced in dependence on their respective causes and conditions. Uncompounded constituents are those that are not produced in dependence on their respective causes and conditions. The thoroughly afflicted constituents are the afflicted. The completely pure constituents are clear light in nature. The constituents of cyclic existence are those fabricated by improper ignorance. The constituents of the sphere of nirvana are true cessations which are freedoms from afflictions.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Whatever are constituents of the worldly abode, whatever are constituents of thoroughly abiding, whatever are constituents that subsequently lead, whatever are obstructed constituents, [whatever are constituents of application], whatever are constituents of thought, [whatever are definitely intended constituents], whatever are constituents of the supported (or the support) – the Tathagata thoroughly knows them just exactly as they are. Having known, he also teaches the Dharma similarly.
>
> This is the fourth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

The "constituents of the worldly abode" or "the constituents of the transitory basis" refers both to the inhabitants and the environment. "The transitory basis" was discussed in the *Ornament* in the context of the observed object of a mahayana achieving.

"Obstructed constituents" refers to those that are obstructive such as a table.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 448-9) says:

1. The power of exalted knowledge of sources and non-sources

That definitely producing something from whatever cause
Was taught by those who know that to be the source of that.
The opposite to that explanation is a non-source. That abandonment of impediment
With respect to knowing all objects of knowledge is explained to be a power. [12.22]

A cause *definitely producing some* result *from whatever cause was taught by* the buddhas *who know that to be the source of that* result. For example, from non-virtue arises an unattractive fruition; from the learning path of a superior, nirvana is attained, and so forth. *The opposite to that explanation is* called *a "non-source*," for example, from virtue there arises an attractive fruition and by attaining the path of seeing the eighth existence is accomplished by the force of actions: these being non-sources and without an occasion. *That abandonment of impediment* – that is, that absence of impediment – *with respect to knowing all objects of knowledge* that are such sources and non-sources *is explained to be the power* of the exalted knowledge of sources and non-sources.

The power knowing sources and non-sources is a buddha's exalted knowledge that virtue is a source of happiness and non-virtue is a source of suffering, while, on the other hand, virtue is a non-source of suffering and non-virtue is a non-source of happiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 449) says:

2. The power of exalted knowledge of the fruition of actions

The exalted knowledge that individually engages with unimpeded ability and strength
The desirable and the undesirable, their opposite,
The actions that are things that exhaust, and also the great variety of their fruitions,
Pervading the objects of knowledge of the three times, is asserted to be a power. [12.23]

The exalted knowledge that individually engages with unimpeded ability and strength

- the *desirable* – virtuous – *and the undesirable* – non-virtuous actions, these two unmixed [actions],
- *the opposite of these* two, mixed actions,
- *actions that are* uncontaminated *things that exhaust* bad contaminated actions,
- *also the very* different *varieties of fruitions of those* actions,

pervading all *objects of knowledge* that are actions included in *the three times* and their results, *is asserted to be the power* of the exalted knowledge of the results of actions.

Due to the afflictions, attachment, hatred, and ignorance, one engages in non-virtuous actions; a buddha knows the fruition of these actions. Also due to the completely pure class, faith and so forth, one engages in virtuous actions; a buddha also knows the fruition of these actions. For example, when it is hot and we experience a cool breeze that breeze arises due to the ripening of a virtuous action

created in the past. In this way, all our pleasant and unpleasant experiences are due to previous actions.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 449) says:

3. The power of exalted knowledge of the varieties of dispositions

The exalted knowledge pervading all without exception by going to the three times
With respect to desires, due to the power of the origin of attachment and so forth –
The great variety of inferior, middling, and especially superior desires – and
Also the dispositions that cover other than those, is called "a power." [12.24]

The exalted knowledge pervading all objects of knowledge that are dispositions *without exception with respect to*

- *the desires* that are produced *by the power of the origin* – that is, the seeds – of the afflictions of *attachment* and those illustrated by [the word "attachment"], hatred and so forth, and of those included in "*and so forth*" (v. 12.24b), faith and so forth, the *very* different *varieties – inferior, middling, and especially superior desires* – and
- *also the dispositions that cover*, or obscure, the seeds of the dispositions explained before due to Dharma conduct that is *other than those* dispositions,

by *going to*, that is, engaging, *the three times is called "the power* of exalted knowledge of the varieties of dispositions."

A buddha knows the different dispositions of sentient beings. That is, he knows who aspires for objects of hatred, who aspires for objects of attachment, and who aspires for objects of ignorance. Similarly, he also knows who aspires to objects of non-hatred, who aspires to objects of non-attachment, and who aspires to objects of non-ignorance.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 449-50) says:

4. The power of exalted knowledge of the varieties of constituents

The buddhas who are skilled in the divisions of constituents
Taught that which is the nature of the eye and so forth to be the constituents.
The infinite exalted knowledge of the complete buddhas and
That engaging the distinctions of all the types of constituents is asserted to be a power. [12.25]

The buddhas *who are skilled in the divisions of* all *constituents taught the eye* and those included in "*and so forth*" (v. 12.25b) – the six from the ear through the mental, the six from form through phenomena, the six from the eye consciousness through the mental consciousness, and *that which is their nature*, the emptiness of the internal and so forth – *to be the constituents*. *That infinite exalted knowledge of the complete buddhas regarding the distinctions of all the types*, or divisions, of constituents *is asserted to be the power* of exalted knowledge of the varieties of constituents.

A buddha knows the six object constituents, the six supporting constituents, and the six supported consciousness constituents. When the constituents are explained extensively there are sixty-two.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: Earlier Geshe-la said that our faith is like a magnifying glass and that the buddhas' enlightened activities are like sunshine. How can we develop the magnifying glass of our faith?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Faith is of three types: desiring faith, faith of conviction, and clear faith. Faith of conviction is based on analysis and investigation of an object, due to which there arises a faith free from doubt. Desiring faith is a faith aspiring to understand the four noble truths correctly; that is, to understand that the first two truths are to be discarded and that the latter two truths are to be adopted. We also need to gain conviction in the law of actions and results. Clear or admiring faith is based on understanding the qualities of the Buddha and so forth.

Faith, simply put, is a liking for something. For example, some Tibetans say "He has faith in alcohol," meaning that that he likes alcohol. Thus, there is a relationship between liking something and having faith in it. To develop faith it is necessary to first see the qualities of an object, in this way faith in it will naturally arise.

Student: It seems that regarding some topics, such as emptiness and impermanence, it is easier to gain some understanding and some experience of them, and therefore faith in them, but that it is more difficult to have faith in the inconceivable powers of a buddha. How do we develop faith in them?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is true that some things are very difficult to understand. There are some things that we can understand through reasoning, but other things, such as the qualities of a buddha, cannot be understood through reasoning. Presently we do not have the fortune to see a buddha complete with the thirty-two major and eighty minor marks, however, like a follower of faith, we can accept or believe that such a body does exist. Sometimes this is the best thing to do. In tantra it is said that it can be better to be a follower of faith rather than a stubborn logician full of skepticism. Years ago, when Geshe Jampa Tegchok was teaching at Manjushri Institute, he was invited to come to the Institute and one day went to see Volterra with Luca Corona. There Luca bought an alabaster sculpture of a human head and brought it back to Pomaia. Luca said to Geshe-la, "This is like the hard head of a geshe." Geshe-la responded, "It is like the hard heads of those living in Pomaia who, although they have been living near a Dharma center for years, have never come to a Dharma teaching." In fact, there is a Tibetan expression that says one should have neither a hard head nor a soft head. This is because if one is too soft, one will change religions and ideas constantly. The Tibetan nomads say, "If compassion is produced too easily, the continuity of anger will not be cut." For example, if someone asks us for help and one instantly thinks "O, that poor person!" and tries to help by taking care of him, then when that person starts to behave strangely anger will easily arise.

A disciple also needs faith in his teacher or lama, but this faith should be based on analysis. Therefore, it is necessary to take time to analyze whether that person is worthy of one's faith. In this way, one's faith will be steadfast and long-lasting. As long as one is not sure, one should not consider that person to be one's lama. The lama should also consider whether or not it is beneficial to take that person as his disciple. For example, when there is someone who goes to visit a monastery and immediately wants to become a monk, the abbot should ask him to stay and watch how he behaves over a period of several months in order to see whether or not he is a proper vessel for the vows. This is what is usually done in the Catholic monasteries in that aspiring priests or monks are given some work to do for the community for a trial period.

In sutra it says that faith is the forerunner of all excellent qualities. While we need both a father and mother, faith is like a mother. Just as a mother takes care of her child when he is small and as he grows, likewise, faith nourishes all our excellent qualities. Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* says that someone having virtue but no faith is like a burned seed yielding fruit. Therefore, faith is necessary, especially the faith of conviction with respect to the law of actions and results. If we develop this, it is easy to generate other types of faith.

END

Tuesday morning, 8 May 2001

(There were no teachings Monday, 7 May 2001)

5. The power of exalted knowledge of superior and inferior faculties

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, in terms of the strength that knows superior and inferior faculties, it is explained:
>
> *Regarding the illusory and so forth – the very sharp are asserted*
> *As superior, occasions of middling and dull explained as inferior, and*
> *Regarding the eye and so forth, and mutual abilities to achieve – assimilate –*
> *Unimpeded knowing of all aspects is taught as a strength.* [12.26]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Very sharp delusiveness and so on, held to be high,*
> *And mediocrity and dullness of them, explained as not high,*
> *The eye and so on, and their cooperative perception –*
> *Unbroken knowledge of these, in all ways, is taught as a power.* [12.26]

He receives what is taught to be the power of knowing higher and lower faculties; for the knowledge about delusiveness[244] and so on, great sharpness of the faculties of faith and so on, which is maintained to be higher, the case of mediocrity and dullness, which are explained as lower, the twenty-two faculties of the eye and so on, and the faculties' ability function cooperatively, perceiving [each other's results] – [this knowledge of every aspect, understands without interruption.

The exalted knower of a buddha knows the superior and inferior faculties of sentient beings.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The illusory is what is not correct – the highly superimposed. The illusory are just the faculties because of dwelling in sovereignty over generating attachment and so forth. The term "and so forth" (v. 12.26c) should be realized as including faith and so forth, having virtuous causes. Therefore, the term 'superior' expresses what is fully developed; occasions of the small and middling are expressed by the term 'inferior.' "The eye and so on" identifies the twenty-two faculties of the eye and so forth. Therefore, here, this exalted knower that does not have obstruction to comprehending the specific entities of the faculties and comprehending the specific entities that are able to achieve mutual effects, is presented as the strength knowing superior and inferior faculties.

The word "Illusory," also translated as "delusiveness" or "conceptualizations" or "indicative conceptions" (*kun tu rtog pa*), are the afflictions. They are what exaggerates or superimposes. Chandrakirti says "The illusory is what is not correct – the highly superimposed." These conceptualizations are faculties (literally, powers) because they have power or control over the production of attachment and so forth, that is, "because of dwelling in sovereignty over generating attachment and so forth."

[244] *kun.tu.rtog.pa*

A superior faculty or power is a faculty that is sharp, whereas here middling and dull faculties are considered to be inferior faculties. The eye and so forth are the twenty-two faculties that are also discussed in the fourth chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. The twenty-two faculties are:
(1-6) the six sense powers, the eye and so forth,
(7-8) the male and female genitals,
(14) life,
(9-13) the five feelings, pleasure, suffering, mental pleasure, mental suffering, and equanimity;
– these fourteen are phenomena of the thoroughly afflicted class –
(14-19) the five, faith, effort, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom,
(20-22) that making the unknown fully known, that fully knowing, and that possessing full knowledge
– these eight are phenomena of the completely pure class. The last three faculties are uncontaminated.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As is taught [in the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*]:
>
> > Son of good lineage, furthermore, the Tathagata thoroughly knows just exactly as they are the levels of the faculties of other sentient beings and other persons. Son of good lineage, how does the Tathagata thoroughly know just exactly as they are, the levels of the faculties of other sentient beings and other persons? Son of good lineage, here, the Tathagata also thoroughly knows just exactly as they are dull-faculty sentient beings as dull-faculty sentient beings. Similarly, he also thoroughly knows the middling-faculty and also thoroughly knows the sharp-faculty. What kind of faculty of illusion produces completed attachment, produces completed hatred, and completed bewilderment – that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows.
>
> The "completed" is the thoroughly transformed.
>
> > What kind of faculty of illusion produces artificial attachment, hatred, and bewilderment – that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows. What faculty of illusion produces inverted (or perverted) attachment, hatred, and bewilderment; what faculty of illusion produces attachment, hatred, and bewilderment that annihilate (or rebuke) – that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows.
> >
> > What faculties arise from virtuous causes, [what faculties arise from non-virtuous causes, what faculties arise from immovable causes,] and what faculties arise from the cause of renunciation – all those too the Tathagata thoroughly knows.
> >
> > [Son of good lineage], furthermore, the Tathagata thoroughly knows the eye faculty..." until... "thoroughly knows the faculty possessing full knowledge (i.e., the twenty-two faculties: six senses; male and female; life; pleasure, suffering, mental pleasure, mental suffering, and equanimity; faith, perseverance, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom; making the unknown fully known, fully knowing, and possessing full knowledge).
> >
> > Whatever faculty, arisen from the cause of the eye faculty, is placed (or comes to reside) in the ear faculty, [not being in the nose, tongue, and body faculties] – that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows.
>
> The ear faculty and so forth should also be understood similarly.

A buddha knows which faculties function as a cause for the production of afflictions. What is the measure of sharp, middling, and dull faculties? They are posited in terms of their ability to analyze an object, thus, superior intelligence in analyzing an object is a sharp faculty, middling intelligence in analyzing an object is a middling faculty, and inferior intelligence in analyzing an object is a dull

faculty. Thus, an inferior faculty is unable to realize its object quickly and is unable to discriminates its object well.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> To the sentient being who possesses the faculty of generosity yet applies in morality, the Tathagata, knowing superior and inferior faculties, makes talk of generosity. Similarly, to the [sentient being who] possesses the faculties of morality, patience, perseverance, concentration, and wisdom, yet applies in generosity and so forth, [the Tathagata, knowing superior and inferior faculties], makes discourse of morality and so forth.
>
> Similarly, [one should also understand extensively with regard to all the [thirty-seven] practices harmonious with enlightenment]

There are some sentient beings whose faculties are more developed in generosity, the buddha knowing this teaches them morality and so forth. In order that they take up the remaining perfections, the buddhas say, for example, that the practice of morality is superior to the practice of generosity.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> [To the] sentient being who possesses the faculty of the hearers' vehicle yet applies himself in the solitary realizers' vehicle, [the Tathagata makes discourse of the hearers' vehicle]...,
>
> should similarly be applied:

To those whose faculty concords with the hearers' vehicle the buddhas say that the solitary realizers' vehicle is superior and in this way the buddhas gradually lead them to the great vehicle.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> [Those sentient beings having faculties that lack good fortune, appearing as without good fortune, the Tathagata, having cognized them as not being vessels, places in equanimity. sentient beings having faculties of good fortune, appearing as fortunate, the Tathagata, having cognized them as fortunate, pays respect and teaches the Dharma.]
>
> Son of good lineage, hence, the Tathagata thoroughly knows the fully ripened faculties of all sentient beings as "the fully ripened faculties," just exactly as they are...; thoroughly knows the not fully ripened as "the not fully ripened," just exactly as they are...; thoroughly knows those not definitely emerged as "those not definitely emerged," just exactly as they are...; also thoroughly knows those with definite emergence as "those with definite emergence," just exactly as they are.

To those sentient beings who have not yet generated the mind of definite emergence the buddhas praise definite emergence. In the Vinaya there is a discussion of the six topics in this regard: who definitely emerges, to what one definitely emerges, how one definitely emerges, and so forth. In short, to what one definitely emerges is liberation and from what one definitely emerges is cyclic existence.

One has to definitely emerge from cyclic existence because it is only a net of faults; through understanding this one generates a strong determination to definitely emerge from it. For example, if there are two friends who initially have a good relationship but later on one of them begins to find fault with the other, to criticize him, and to trick him, then the second person will leave him behind.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary continues to quote the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Whatever type of faculty of sentient beings there is, whatever application there is, whatever attitude there is, arisen from whatever cause, whatever condition there is, whatever referent there is, whatever finality there is, whatever limit there is – all these the Tathagata thoroughly knows just exactly as they are.
>
> This is the fifth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

In short, a buddha knows the various kinds of faculties of sentient beings. "Whatever type of faculty of sentient beings there is" refers to the fact that a buddha knows the eye sense power and so forth of sentient beings. "Whatever application there is" or "whatever commission there is" refers to the fact that, due to a faculty, one engages an object, for example, due to the eye sense power one engages a form; this seeing of form is an application or a commission of an action. In order to look at a form, for example, a movie, there must first be the thought or attitude wishing to see the movie, due to which one then actually goes to the cinema, sits down, and directs one's eyes to the screen. There are also causes and conditions for seeing a form, for example, the conditions for seeing a movie include the equipment and the people who work in the cinema, whereas the cause for the movie includes the producer and so forth. The object or referent is the movie. "Whatever finality there is," or whatever conclusion there is, is to, for example, enjoy the movie.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 450) says:

5. The power of exalted knowledge of superior and inferior faculties

> *Unobstructed exalted knowledge of all aspects with respect to comprehending*
> *Conceptualizations and so forth, the very sharp, asserted to be the superior and*
> *The occasions of the middling and dull explained to be the inferior,*
> *The eye and so forth, and the ability to mutual establish each other, is taught to be a power.*
> [12.26]

The *conceptualizations* that are incorrect excessive elaborations, since they exert power over the production of attachment and so forth, are faculties (powers). *Unobstructed*, or unimpeded, *exalted knowledge of all aspects with respect to* each of the respective entities of:

- *the very sharp*, the faculty of faith and so forth included in "*and so forth*" (v. 12.26b), which are *asserted to be the superior*, and the *occasions of middling* faculty *and* occasions of *dull* or lesser faculty which are *explained to be the inferior*,
- the twenty-two faculties of *the eye and so forth*,
- *the ability to* accomplish, or *establish*, *mutual* results of the faculties,

is *taught to be the power* of exalted knowledge of superior and inferior faculties.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 450) says:

3B2B-2B2 Explanation of the five powers: the exalted knowledge of paths that proceed everywhere

6. The power of exalted knowledge of paths that proceed everywhere

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, in terms of the strength that knows the paths leading everywhere, it is explained:
>
> *Some paths lead to conquest, some to the solitary realizer's*
> *Enlightenment, the hearer's enlightenment, the hungry ghosts, animal,*
> *God, human, hell, and so forth. Knowledge about those –*
> *Unimpeded and boundless – is asserted as a strength.* [12.27]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Knowledge of any path that leads to buddhahood, any*
> *To a pratyeka's awakening, or shravaka's awakening,*
> *Or to ghost or animal, divine or human, hell and other*
> *Realms, unbroken and boundless, is held to be a power.* [12.27]

He receives what is maintained to be the power of knowing the paths which lead everywhere; for he enters uninterrupted, boundless knowledge about any paths that lead to the state of a conqueror, any to the enlightenment of a solitary realizer or to the enlightenment of a hearer, or to the preta, animal, deva, human, and hell realms and so on, [the various right and wrong paths, etc.].

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, the term 'path' expresses the route. The path having the character of leading to every path is the path leading everywhere. Some paths are asserted to buddhahood; some to the enlightenment of the solitary realizer; some to the enlightenment of the hearer; some are to the gods up to the hells. The term "and so forth" means illustrated in various aspects.
>
> There, the Tathagata thoroughly knows whatever path leads somewhere, exactly as it is: "that path leads there." Therefore, this unobstructed exalted knower of the Bhagavan, the subject of every path, is presented as the strength that knows the paths leading everywhere.

Here a 'path' is not a physical path or route but is an inner path of action, there being actions and paths of action. Chandrakirti says: "The path having the character of leading to every path is the path leading everywhere." In general, a path to enlightenment or buddhahood is: an exalted knower conjoined with an uncontrived thought of definite emergence. An uncontrived thought of definite emergence is a path because it is a path leading to enlightenment. There are paths that lead to the hearers' enlightenment, to the solitary realizers' enlightenment, and to the bodhisattvas' enlightenment.

"Some are to the gods up to the hells" means that there are also paths that lead to the god realm, to the human realm, to the animal realm, to the hungry ghost realm, and to the hell realm. Chandrakirti says: "Some paths lead to conquest, some to the solitary realizer's enlightenment, the hearer's enlightenment, the hungry ghosts, animal, god, human, hell, and so forth" (v. 12.27abc). What produces these is a path. A virtuous action is a virtuous path of action that leads to the upper realms and a non-virtuous action is a non-virtuous path of action that leads to the lower realms. Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* says that the seven non-virtues of body and speech are actions and paths of actions, whereas the three non-virtues of mind are only paths of actions. The avoidance of the ten non-virtues is a path leading to high status, the god and human realms, and to definite

goodness, enlightenment. On the other hand, the ten non-virtues are a path leading to the three lower realms.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As is taught [in the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*]:
>
> > Son of good lineage, furthermore, the Tathagata thoroughly knows just exactly as they are, [the knowers of] the paths leading everywhere. How does he thoroughly know? He thoroughly knows just exactly as they are also the constituents of sentient beings who are destined to perfection, thoroughly knows also the constituents of sentient beings who are not destined and who are destined to corruption.

There are three types of actions: actions that are definite to the perfect, actions that are not definite to the perfect, and actions that are definite to the wrong. Chandrakirti says: "destined to perfection..." "not destined..." and "destined to corruption." Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* instead discusses aggregates definite to the perfect, aggregates not definite to the perfect, and aggregates definite to the wrong.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> The constituents of sentient beings with destiny are thoroughly known like this: those sentient beings who have the strength of the cause, excellence of former application, understanding through a mere portion, having minds of sharp faculty, those having the good fortune of complete liberation whether the Tathagata shows the Dharma or whether he does not show it, the Tathagata, having understood the previous causal strength, shows the Dharma [through which they will be completely quickly liberated].

Some sentient beings, due to their former application or commission, do not need an extensive explanation, but are able to understand through receiving a mere portion of a teaching. This section of the sutra discusses actions definite to the perfect.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> The constituents of sentient beings without destiny are [thoroughly] known like this: those sentient beings who have the strength of the condition, who have the characteristic of those to be fully matured, also to those who will be completely liberated if they meet with concordant advice and subsequent teaching, who will not be completely liberated if they do not meet with it, the Tathagata perfectly speaks such and such discourse having cause and condition. Because, having heard such Dharma from the Tathagata, they will attain the effect through appropriate thorough application, the buddha bhagavans arise for their benefit.

This section of the sutra discusses actions not definite to the perfect. For example, when these sentient beings meet a proper teacher they are lead to liberation and so forth, whereas if they do not meet such a teacher they will not attain liberation.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> The constituents of sentient beings who are destined to corruption are thoroughly known like this: whether the Tathagata shows the Dharma or does not show it to those sentient beings who did not make extensive training, are of little understanding and hope, are dull-witted [and] are not vessels [of the teaching], they lack the good fortune of complete liberation. Hence, having cognized them as not being vessels, the Tathagata is impartial; for their sake the bodhisattvas put on armor.

This section discussions actions that are definite to the wrong. The buddhas are unable to help when the "constituents of sentient beings are destined to corruption," therefore, they remain impartial without giving teachings to such beings.

Tuesday afternoon, 7 May 2001

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Furthermore, the Tathagata thoroughly knows the threefold path of attachment. What are the three? Whatever path of attachment exists produced from the aspect of beauty; also whatever path of attachment exists produced from the aspect of subsequent attachment, also whatever path of attachment exists produced from the cause of previous predispositions.
>
> He also thoroughly knows the threefold path of hatred. Whatever path of hatred exists produced from the cause of anger, also whatever path of hatred exists produced from a not fully completed attitude, also whatever path of hatred exists produced from previous predispositions.
>
> He also thoroughly knows the threefold path of bewilderment. Whatever path of bewilderment exists produced from the cause of ignorance, also whatever path of bewilderment exists produced from the cause of the view of the transitory collection, also whatever path of bewilderment exists produced from the cause of doubt.
>
> – comes extensively.

There are three types of paths produced from attachment, three types of paths produced from hatred, and three types of paths produced from confusion or bewilderment. A path of attachment is a cause producing attachment. Attachment is produced from an attractive object. Attachment is also produced from another attachment, that is, due to thinking that something is beautiful there arises attachment then later, due to habituation, attachment is subsequently produced again. Attachment is also produced from a past dormant cause.

There are also three paths of hatred. "Whatever path of hatred exists produced from the cause of anger" means that anger is the cause of hatred. In general, anger and hatred are considered to be synonymous but here they are differentiated in that anger arises first and then hatred. "Whatever path of hatred exists produced from a not fully completed attitude" means that, one's wish not having been fulfilled, hatred is produced. There is also "whatever path of hatred exists produced from previous predispositions."

There are also three paths of confusion or bewilderment which are produced from ignorance, the view of the transitory collection, and doubt. We can all understand how confusion comes from doubt. Confusion is a synonym of ignorance. Doubt is an obscuration with respect to an object. For example, if one thinks that perhaps Dharma practice does not bring about a result one becomes confused and then gives it up. Three types of doubt are set out in *Awarenesses and Knowers*: doubt concordant with the fact, doubt that does not concord with the fact, and equal doubt.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Thus, however many paths there are of all sentient beings that arise from the cause of engaging and the cause of avoiding, the exalted wisdom sight of the Tathagata engages all of them without obstruction.
>
> This is the sixth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 450) says:

6. The power of exalted knowledge of paths that proceed everywhere

> *Unobstructed exalted knowledge with respect to those paths proceeding*
> *To the state of a conqueror, those to the enlightenment of solitary realizers and*
> *To the enlightenment of hearers, to the hungry ghosts, animals, gods, humans,*
> *And hell beings, and so forth, is asserted to be the power of the infinite.* [12.27]

Unobstructed and unimpeded *exalted knowledge with respect to*

- *those paths* proceeding *to the state of a conqueror*,
- *those* paths proceeding to *the enlightenment of solitary realizers*,
- those proceeding *to the enlightenment of hearers*,
- those *proceeding to the hungry ghosts, animals, gods, humans, and hell beings*, and
- the various types presented by "*and so forth*" (v. 12.27d) – those paths that are definite to the perfect and to the wrong and so forth –

is asserted to be the power of exalted knowledge of paths that proceed to *infinity*, or everywhere.

Paths that proceed everywhere include those that proceed to the thoroughly afflicted and those that lead to the completely pure. Those that proceed to the completely pure are those that lead to the enlightenment of the three vehicles:

- those paths proceeding to the state of a conqueror,
- those paths proceeding to the enlightenment of solitary realizers, and
- those paths proceeding to the enlightenment of hearers.

Those paths proceeding to the thoroughly afflicted are those proceeding to the hell, hungry ghost, animal, human, and god realms.

Here the words "and so forth" (v. 12.27d) refers to the paths that are definite to the perfect, the paths that are not definite to the perfect, and the paths that are definite to the wrong.

7. The power of exalted knowledge of the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure

Chandrakirti's autocommentary (Tibetan text page 239) says:

> Now, in terms of the strength that knows the concentrations, the complete liberations, the absorptions, and the rising of the fully deluded and the completely purifying, it is explained:
>
> *The differences in particular yogins in the infinite worlds,*
> *What are the concentrations and eight complete liberations, what are the*
> *Tranquil abiding and what are the different absorptions, the one and the eight:*
> *Unobstructed knowledge regarding them; this is explained as a strength.* [12.28]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *The various yogins in the infinite worlds have different*
> *Absorptions, eight deliverances, those in calm abiding,*
> *And the kinds of contemplations, of which there are one and eight;*
> *Unhindered knowledge of these is explained to be a power.* [12.28]

He receives what is explained as the power of knowing the absorptions, deliverances, and so on; for he enters unimpeded knowledge of the [infinitely] different [divisions] of the varieties of meditators in the infinite worlds, the [four] absorptions, the eight deliverances, those who dwell in calm abiding, and the kinds of contemplation, of which there are one and eight [i.e., the "nine attainments of successive stations" – the four dhyanas, the four formless absorptions, and cessation of perception and feeling].

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, there are infinite classifications of the differences of yogins in the infinite worlds. The concentrations are four. The complete liberations are eight. Tranquil abiding is meditative stabilization having the characteristic of one-pointed mind concerning virtue. The absorptions of successive occupation are nine: the four concentrations, the four formless absorptions, and the cessation of discrimination and feeling. The causes of the fully deluded are ignorance and inappropriate attention and so forth. The causes of the completely purifying are such things as terms concordant with others and appropriate specific individual attention and so forth. Therefore, the exalted knower having no obstruction regarding the concentrations and so forth, there being infinite individual classifications due to the divisions of yogins, is presented as the strength knowing the rising of the concentrations, complete liberations, meditative stabilizations, absorptions, the fully deluded and completely purifying.

The concentrations are the four concentrations of the form realm. The eight complete liberations are:
1. the complete liberation of the embodied looking at a form,
2. the complete liberation of the formless looking at a form,
3. the complete liberation of the beautiful,

– these three are included in the form realm –

4. the complete liberation of infinite space,
5. the complete liberation of infinite consciousness,
6. the complete liberation of nothingness,
7. the complete liberation of the peak of cyclic existence,

– these four are included in the formless realm –

8. the complete liberation of the absorption of cessation.

Meditative stabilizations are calm abiding and special insight. The word "calm abiding" which in the Tibetan text is in the dual plural tense also implies special insight. The absorptions are the nine serially abiding absorptions:
(1-4) the four concentrations,
(5-8) the four formless absorptions, and
(9) the absorption of cessation.
In addition, there are the 55 thoroughly afflicted phenomena and the 53 completely pure phenomena, for a total of 108 phenomena which are known by a buddha.

Chandrakirti says: "Tranquil abiding is meditative stabilization having the characteristic of one-pointed mind concerning virtue." The absorption of cessation refers to the cessation of coarse discriminations and feelings, which are what produce conceptions and afflictions. They are ceased in order to abide in peace.

Chandrakirti says: "The causes of the fully deluded are ignorance and inappropriate attention and so forth." Inappropriate attention is a condition for the arisal of the thoroughly afflicted or fully deluded.

Chandrakirti says: "The causes of the completely purifying are such things as terms concordant with others and appropriate specific individual attention and so forth."

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> As is taught [in the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*]:
>
> > Son of good lineage, furthermore, the Tathagata thoroughly knows all consciousnesses just exactly as they are: the rising of the concentrations, complete liberations, meditative stabilizations, absorptions, the fully deluded and the completely purifying. How are they thoroughly known? The Tathagata thoroughly knows that which is the cause and that which is the condition of sentient beings' generation of the fully deluded. The Tathagata also thoroughly knows that which is the cause and that which is the condition of becoming completely pure.
> >
> > There, what is the cause and what is the condition? The cause of the fully deluded of sentient beings is inappropriate attention. The condition of the fully deluded of sentient beings is ignorance. Ignorance is the cause. [Karmic] formations are the condition. [Karmic] formations are the cause. Consciousness is the condition...,
>
> – until,
>
> > Delusions are the cause; karma is the condition. View is the cause; craving is the condition. Predispositions are the cause; fully rising is the condition.
> >
> > There, what is the cause and what is the condition of the completely purifying [factors] of sentient beings? Two causes and two conditions. What are the two? Terms concordant with others and appropriate individual specific attention. Furthermore, two: skill in single-pointedness regarding tranquil abiding and penetrative insight...,
>
> – is found extensively.

Here the following questions are posed: "What are the causes and conditions of the thoroughly afflicted? What are the causes and conditions for the completely pure?" The sutra then answers these questions. The cause of the thoroughly afflicted is improper mental attention and the conditions are karmic formations. Due to improper mental attention, the cause, one superimposes attractiveness on an object and then, due to ignorance acting as a condition, attachment is generated. Similarly, due to improper mental attention, the cause, one superimposes repulsiveness on an object, and then, due to ignorance acting as a condition, hatred is generated. However, since the main cause binding us in cyclic existence is ignorance, it is ignorance that has to be abandoned. How is it abandoned? It is cut by the ax of the wisdom realizing selflessness.

Chandrakirti says: "Predispositions are the cause; fully rising is the condition." This means that when the dormant afflictions arise afflictions are generated.

"Terms concordant with others" refers to the names of phenomena which concord with their respective objects or meanings. "Appropriate individual specific attention" refers to hearing a term and reflecting on its meaning. These two are causes of the completely pure. "Skill in single-pointedness regarding tranquil abiding and penetrative insight" are conditions for the completely pure.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> This is the cause of complete purity of sentient beings; this is the condition – that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows. Similarly, son of good lineage, since the tathagatas are endowed with exalted wisdom, they are isolated from desire; isolated from evil non-virtuous practices; having joy and bliss produced from isolating investigation and analysis; absorbed in the first concentration – risen from cessation. Absorbed in cessation – arisen from concentration. They also absorb in the eight complete liberations in the forward order, reverse order, and unordered.

Here the Buddha lists the five branches of the first concentration which are condensed under the three: the antidote branch, benefit branch and basis branch. The antidote branch includes the branches of (i) investigation and (ii) analysis, the benefit branch includes the branches of (iii) joy and (iv) bliss, and the basis branch is the branch of (v) meditative stabilization. "Absorbed in the first concentration – risen from cessation. Absorbed in cessation – arisen from concentration" refers to alternating cessation with the four concentrations and four formless absorptions. The basis of alternation is the four actual absorptions of the concentrations and the four actual absorptions of the formless absorptions. That which is alternated is, for example, the mind of the desire realm or the nine serially abiding absorptions.

The sutra says: "They also absorb in the eight complete liberations in the forward order, reverse order, and unordered." A buddha absorbs in the eight complete liberations in the forward order, the first to the eighth, and in the reverse order, the eighth to the first. He also absorbs in them without any particular order.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Meditative stabilization is shown as absorption; absorption is shown as meditative stabilization, yet the meditative stabilization of the Tathagata has no mixture of all and the Tathagata has no meditative stabilization to be absorbed in with the referential. One meditative stabilization of the Tathagata manifests all meditative stabilizations. The Tathagata, without rising from a single meditative stabilization, absorbs in all meditative stabilizations, yet the Tathagata does not have engagement in one mind from another. Non-equipoise is not observed with the Tathagata.
>
> The meditative stabilization of the Tathagata is unable to be viewed by anyone; the meditative stabilization of the hearers is outshone by the meditative stabilization of the solitary realizers. The meditative stabilization of the solitary realizers is outshone by the meditative stabilization of the bodhisattvas. The meditative stabilization of the bodhisattvas is outshone by the meditative stabilization of the Tathagata. The meditative stabilization of the Tathagata is not outshone; the exalted wisdom of the Tathagata engages it without being outshone.
>
> Due to what instructions and what subsequent teachings the meditative stabilizations of the hearers are produced, that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows. Due to what [instructions and what subsequent teachings] the meditative stabilizations of the solitary realizers and due to what [instructions and what subsequent teachings] those of the bodhisattvas are produced, that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows. Having known, he also similarly instructs and similarly subsequently teaches.
>
> This is the seventh tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

Instructions are of two types: exhortations and subsequent teachings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 450) says:

7. The power of exalted knowledge of the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure

Unimpeded exalted knowledge with respect to the differences
Regarding particular yogis in the infinite worlds –
Those having the concentrations, eight complete liberations, whatever calm abiding,
Any kind of meditative absorption, the one and the eight – is explained to be a power. [12.28]

Unimpeded exalted knowledge with respect to the infinite *different* divisions in terms of the *particular*, or specific, *yogis* existing *in the infinite worlds* – the four *concentrations*, *the eight complete liberations*, *whatever calm abiding* or meditative stabilization, *any kind of meditative absorption, the one and the eight* – that is, the nine meditative absorptions of serial abiding – *those* that are thoroughly afflicted and completely pure, *is explained to be the power* of exalted knowledge of the thoroughly afflicted and completely pure.

The meditative stabilizations of yogis are infinite but include the four concentrations, the eight complete liberations, calm abiding and special insight, the nine serial abiding absorptions, and so forth.

Wednesday morning, 9 May 2001

8. The power of exalted knowledge mindful of former states

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Now, in terms of the strength knowing the recollections of former states, it is explained:

Abiding in cyclic existence as long as bewilderment has existed, the beings
Who evolved from each former self and from other sentient beings,
However infinite, with bases, together with the place and aspect;
Knowing whatever there were is explained as a strength. [12.29]

"As long as bewilderment," this statement explains the very object of the exalted knower recalling former states, the beginningless continuum of rebirths, one after another. "Sentient beings, however," this statement is expressed to include the endless realms of sentient beings. Mentioning, "with bases," summarizes that, explained from the viewpoint of just having causes. "From such and such [a place], my color [or caste] was such, [my] aspect was like this..." and so forth is just like the sutra. There, by recalling that "[my] color was such," one recollects together with aspect. By recalling that "there I dwelled, and then, having died and transferred, I was reborn in such and such [a place]; then having died and transferred, I was born here," one recollects together with place. The rest is recollection together with causes.

Thus, whatever exalted knower of the Buddha Bhagavan is without obstruction regarding previous existences together with bases, together with places, and together with aspects is the strength that knows the recollection of former states. With this strength, the buddha bhagavans comprehend just exactly as they are each and every past movement of the mind and mental factors. It is presented that "due to merely knowing the modes of being endowed with good fortune and not endowed with good fortune, they teach the Dharma having effects."

The buddhas know the former states of themselves and other sentient beings, that is, they know what rebirths there were, where they were taken, and how many there were.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *The past samsaric lives, as long as there's been delusion,*
> *Of himself and other beings, every samsaric being,*
> *Limitless as they are, with their bases and with their countries;*
> *The awareness of whatever these were is explained as a power.* [12.29]

He receives what is explained as the power of knowing recollection of previous lives; for his mind knowing about his own past lives in samsara, as long as delusion existed, and those of other sentient beings, every one of the infinite samsaric beings, as many as there have been, with their bases [or substance,[245] with their appearances, "I and others were this color,"] and with their countries, ["After that he was born in such and such a place,"] understands whatever these were without hindrance.

The buddhas know and are able to say in what state we were born before, where, with what complexion, and so forth. They are also able to say due to what actions we took such-and-such a rebirth.

It is also said that due to the presence of a buddha other sentient beings are also able to remember where they were reborn before. However, in general, sentient beings do not know their former states due to their past lives being innumerable, whereas a buddha is able to know this because he has abandoned all obstructions along with their seeds. For this reason, the buddhas are able to say that first one was born in this place, next one was born in that place, and so forth.

Chandrakirti says: "Abiding in cyclic existence as long as bewilderment has existed." This means that as long as there is ignorance there is cyclic existence. This ignorance or confusion is the first of the twelve links of dependent-arising. Due to beginningless ignorance as a cause one creates karmic formations which deposit latencies on the mind. The potency of an action deposited on the mind increases just like the interest on money deposited in a bank increases. The consciousness can also be likened to a field and the latency deposited on the consciousness by ignorance can be likened to a seed planted in a field by a farmer. The eighth link of craving is then likened to water and manure and the ninth link of grasping to heat. Due to these two conditions, the seed becomes ready to give rise to a sprout, this state being likened to the ninth link of existence or becoming. The arisal of a sprout from the seed is likened to the fourth link of name and form. The growth of the sprout into a pea plant with leaves is likened to the fifth link of the six spheres. The arisal of flowers on the plant is likened to the sixth link of contact. The arisal of peas on the plant is likened to the seventh link of feelings. The eleventh link of birth is likened to the production and ripening of the sprout and the twelve link of aging and death is likened to the growth and withering of the plant and then the cutting of the plant by the farmer.

In short, sentient beings are reborn in cyclic existence due to ignorance. A buddha knows the former states of all sentient beings.

The burning of grass and trees by fire is like the destruction of cyclic existence together with its causes by the wisdom realizing selflessness. Just as fire can burn an entire forest so too can the wisdom realizing selflessness burn all of cyclic existence together with its causes.

If while walking we were to fall and hurt ourselves, some would say that this is due to karma and some would say that it is due to the condition of stepping on a loose stone. We have created infinite actions in our lives in beginningless cyclic existence. Some sentient beings are fortunate and some are unfortunate, why is this? A fortunate sentient being is someone who has created merit in the past, whereas an unfortunate sentient being is someone who has not created merit in the past. Even

[245] *rgyu*

commonly speaking, we say that someone who has much wealth and many belongings is someone who is fortunate due to having a lot of merit and someone who is poor and destitute is someone who is unfortunate due to not having created merit in the past. In this way we judge the past by what we see in the present.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As is taught [in the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*]:
>
> > He recalls the previous state of that sentient being. What the previous causes were like and due to what causes, whatever sentient beings totally arose, the Tathagata, having thoroughly known the previous cause of' that, also teaches the Dharma similarly. The Tathagata also thoroughly knows the past movements of the minds of all sentient beings. After the mind having observation of something, the mind having observation of something [else] was produced; due to what observation was it produced and due to separating from what observation did it cease – that too the Tathagata thoroughly knows.

"The mind having observation" refers to the mind having the observed object that is true existence. Due to this, one is reborn and, in that rebirth, one again has the observed object that is true existence, that is, one has the conception of true existence. The Tathagata also knows "due to what observation was it produced and due to separating from what observation did it cease." Due to what does the conception of true existence cease? It ceases due to separating from the observed object that is true existence.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Thus, however much the mind of one sentient being operates, continuing from one [mind] to another, after a mind like that, a mind like this arises; also after that one like this arises – that is difficult to show even by showing in words for as many eons as the grains of sand of the River Ganges. Similarly, the Tathagata thoroughly knows the continuity from one individual mind to another like that, even of all sentient beings. To take an imaginary case, even if the Tathagata showed it reaching the end of the future, it would not reach the limit of his exalted wisdom. This knowledge of the Tathagata recollecting former states is inconceivable and unparalleled. Immeasurable, its limits are not easy to show.

The exalted knowledge of the tathagatas of former states is inconceivable and unparalleled or unmatched. It is not easy to demonstrate its limits.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> Since the Buddha is the best of the herd, the Tathagata recollects about those sentient beings, "O, remember thus, those sentient beings produced roots of virtue in relation to a buddha or produced them in relation to the hearers or produced them in relation to the solitary realizers. It is like this: due to the strength of a buddha, those sentient beings will also recollect. The Tathagata observes the roots of virtue in relation to those [and] – since due to this and that at any rate they will become irreversible to complete liberation due to the vehicle – teach such and such Dharma.
>
> This is the eighth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

The tathagatas remember and remind sentient beings that they produced roots of virtue in relation to buddhas, in relation to solitary realizers, or in relation to hearers. "It is like this: due to the strength of a buddha, those sentient beings will also recollect." The buddhas then teach the Dharma to sentient beings accordingly.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 451) says:

8. The power of exalted knowledge mindful of former states

Any unimpeded awareness regarding the sentient beings of existence
Who are oneself and every other sentient being of the past,
Who as long as there is confusion abide in existence, however many infinite there are,
Together with bases and together with places, is explained to be a power. [12.29]

Any unimpeded *awareness regarding the sentient beings of existence who are oneself and every other sentient being* at the time of the *past*, *who as long as there is confusion abide in* the *existence* that is a beginningless continuum from one [life] to another – *however many infinite* sentient beings *there are* –

1. the mindfulness that they are *together with bases*, that is, causes,
2. the mindfulness that they are together with aspects, remembering "I and others had such-and-such a color,"
3. the mindfulness that they are *together with places*, that is, remembered places, remembering "They were born in such-and-such a location like that,"

is explained to be the *power* of exalted knowledge mindful of former states.

The buddhas remember (i) the causes of the rebirths, (ii) the aspects of the rebirths, that is, the shapes and colors of the bodies, and (iii) the place of rebirth of themselves and all sentient beings.

9. The power of exalted knowledge of death and rebirth

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Now, in terms of the strength that knows death-transference and rebirth, it is explained:

Knowing the infinite death-transferences and rebirths of each sentient being
Of the sentient beings who abide in the worlds reaching the limits of space,
In many details; at that time, since engaging unimpeded – all aspects
Completely purified – is asserted as a strength. [12.30]

Death-transference is the disintegration of the aggregates. Rebirth is the rejoining with the aggregates. Those death-transferences and rebirths of the entirety of the worlds reached by the extent of the space element that are joined due to the work of a great variety of karmas are thoroughly known exactly as they are by the Tathagata, spontaneously in a single instant. His exalted wisdom having no impediment to any object, not having obstruction due to purifying all aspects – this is presented as the Tathagata's strength that knows death-transference and rebirth. The Bhagavan not only knows the death-transference and rebirth of sentient beings, it is presented that "He also thoroughly knows, without being incomplete, all the many varieties of evolution, disintegration, and so forth with the divine eye."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

Knowing the death and rebirth of every sentient being

Of the beings which are in the worlds as far as the ends
Of space, many and varied, perceiving at that time,
Without break, in all ways, purely and boundlessly, is held a power. [12.30]

He receives what is maintained to be the power of knowing death and rebirth; for his knowledge about the deaths and rebirths of every sentient being of the sentient beings which there are in the worlds as far as the limits of space, made varied by karma, and manifold, perceives at that time uninterruptedly and in every way, and is quite pure and without limit.

This ninth power knows when sentient beings will die and where they will be reborn, whereas the eighth power knows where sentient beings were born in former lives. "Knowing the infinite death-transferences and rebirths of each sentient being" means that the buddhas know exactly when each and every sentient being will die and where they will be reborn, in whose womb they will be conceived, and so forth. The buddhas know this due to possessing the divine eye.

"All the many varieties of evolution, disintegration, and so forth" refers to the evolution and the disintegration of the world systems. This is mentioned here because when sentient beings take rebirth, except for those of the formless realm, they do so in a particular place or world. Although those in the formless realm have subtle form, they do not have coarse form. Thus, the buddhas know the vessel worlds and their inhabitants. The evolution and the disintegration of the world systems is discussed in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge* in terms of the four types of eons: the eon of formation, the eon of abidance, the eon of disintegration, and the empty eon, the latter being the eon in which there is nothing left except space in that the world system has been destroyed and the sentient beings have been reborn elsewhere. The vessel world consists of a billion world systems, due to which there are a billion Jambudvipas and so forth.

In short, we do not know where we will be reborn upon dying. On the other hand, the buddhas know this and, if we have the fortune to meet them, can tell us this. It is also possible to know when we ourselves will die and where we will be reborn up to as many as a hundred lives through attaining clairvoyance. For example, as they approach death the gods of the form realm and formless realm with their clairvoyance see that they will be reborn in the lower realms due to which they experience great suffering. In fact, there are people who, having attained an actual absorption, think that they have attained liberation but then, as they approach death, see with their clairvoyance that they will be reborn in the lower realms and, therefore, come to think that liberation does not exist. In this way, they generate the wrong view thinking that liberation does not exist. Thus, although an actual absorption is attained one can degenerate from that level.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As is taught [in the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*]:
>
> > There, the divine eye of the Tathagata is this: that eye sees in the buddha fields of the ten directions – deep due to the sphere of Dharma, reached by the extent of the space element, immeasurable, utterly passed beyond enumeration – those disintegrations and evolutions subsequently beheld by some sentient beings to appear as fields. Whoever appears as some sentient being, he sees all the death-transferences and rebirths, the happy migrations and bad migrations and the detailed migrations exactly in accordance with karma. Whoever appears as some bodhisattva, he sees all the death-transferences, entries into the womb, and arisings. Whoever appears as some buddha, he sees all the manifest complete awakenings, the turnings of the wheel of Dharma, the giving up of the compositional factors of life, and the total passing away from sorrow (parinirvana). Whoever appears as some hearer, he sees all the complete liberations and the total passing away from sorrow. Whoever appears as some solitary realizer, he sees all the exhibitions of magical powers and purification's of gifts.

> Whatever sentient beings do [not] appear and whatever are not paths of the eyes of the five clairvoyances of the outsiders, not of the hearers, not of the solitary realizers, and not of the bodhisattvas – those too appear to the divine eye of the Tathagata. Further, those sentient beings who are invisible within the area of circumference of a chariot wheel, appearing to the Tathagata are very many; the gods and humans of a great thousand billion world systems are not like that. Similarly, the realms of sentient beings that are invisible are immeasurable. Thus, the divine eye of the Tathagata completely views the realms of sentient beings in all the buddha fields called "the sentient beings that are to be subdued by the Buddha." However many are the classes of sentient beings to be subdued by the Buddha, that amount of tathagatas arrive before them and subdue those sentient beings – yet this is not understood by others, the sentient beings who are not [buddhas].
>
> This is the ninth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

If a sentient being has the karma and the time is appropriate, the buddhas appear in front of him and subdue him.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 451) says:

9. The power of exalted knowledge of death and rebirth

> *The exalted knower that is unobstructed, completely pure in all ways, infinite,*
> *Due to engaging, at this time, in the deaths and rebirths of each sentient being*
> *Of all the sentient beings abiding in the worlds extending to the limits of space,*
> *Many and varied, is asserted to be a power.* [12.30]

The exalted knower of *infinite* objects, *due to engaging unobstructedly*, that is unimpededly, *at this time by means of an exalted knower completely pure in all ways in the deaths and rebirths*, the joining with aggregates, *of each sentient being of all the sentient beings* in the *many abodes in the worlds extending to the limits of space*, made *varied* through the fabrication of the varieties of actions, *is asserted to be the power* of exalted knowledge of death and rebirth.

In daily life we should meditate when it is time to meditate, practice when it is time to practice, study when it is time to study, and relax when it is time to relax. Practicing Dharma does not imply living in isolation, it is said that one can attain liberation even while living as a lay person in a family. Thus, it all depends on our own mind. Having listened to teachings, we should reflect and meditate on them.

Wednesday afternoon, 9 May 2001

10. The power of exalted knowledge of the extinction of contaminations

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, in terms of the strength that know the exhaustion of contaminations, it is explained:
>
> *Knowing the afflictions along with imprints of the conquerors that*
> *Will perish quickly due to the strength of knowing all aspects and*
> *The afflictions of the learners and so forth that are ceased by awareness –*
> *Unimpeded and infinite – is asserted as a strength.* [12.31]
>
> There, the afflictions are ignorance, attachment, and so forth because of afflicting the three worldly realms. That which subsequently proceeds to defile and stain the mind is an imprint. "Reaching the border of afflictions," "familiarity," "root," and "imprint" are equivalent. Even

> though the uncontaminated path has already abandoned the afflictions, all hearers and solitary realizers are unable to abandon them (i.e., imprints). Like, even though sesame oil, flowers, and so forth have already been removed, one observes subtle qualities by meeting with them in pots, woolen cloths, and so forth. Thus, since imprints exist although the afflictions are abandoned, even though arhats have already overcome the behavior of proceeding by jumping around, having been monkeys before arhats, and speaking to female servants, having been brahmins in the past, the opposite is also observed.
>
> There, the imprint of ignorance becomes an obstacle to fully distinguishing the objects of knowledge. The existence of the imprints of attachment and so forth are also causes of such kinds of operation of body and speech. Furthermore, the imprints of ignorance, attachment, and so forth are overcome only in the omniscient mind and buddha; they are not in others.
>
> Therefore, the omniscient mind of the buddhas with regard to totally abandoning the remaining imprints of afflictions and abandoning the afflictions that are propagated by them, which does not have obstruction regarding anything, is presented as the strength that knows the exhaustion of contaminations.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *The power of omniscience quickly destroys the defilements of*
> *The victorious ones, together with their imprints, and*
> *Awareness stops the defilements of disciples and so on.*
> *Unbroken, infinite knowledge of this is held as a power.* [12.31]

He receives what is maintained to be the power of knowing the ending of contaminations; for he enters the uninterrupted, infinite knowledge of the power of knowing in every way quickly destroying or abandoning the defilements of the victorious ones, together with their imprints, and the disciples or hearers, and so on, [which includes the solitary realizers,] stopping defilements by uncontaminated awareness [or wisdom].

What are the contaminations? They are the afflictions. Chandrakirti says: "There, the afflictions are ignorance, attachment, and so forth because of afflicting the three worldly realms." An affliction is a mental factor that functions to make the mind unpacified and unruly. Even though foe destroyers have abandoned the root and secondary afflictions, their latencies remain.

Chandrakirti says: "Like, even though sesame oil, flowers, and so forth have already been removed, one observes subtle qualities by meeting with them in pots, woolen cloths, and so forth." Even after sesame oil has been removed from a bottle its odor remains, and even after flowers have been removed from a woolen cloth their fragrance remains. Another example is having poured coffee into a cup, even after it has been consumed, if we sniff the cup, the odor of coffee remains; this odor is likened to latencies or imprints. Another example is the smell of cooking food in a kitchen that remains even after the food has been eaten. Similarly, after having eaten a clove of garlic, the taste remains in one's mouth. Likewise, even though attachment has been abandoned its stains still remain. Thus, although hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers have abandoned the afflictions, they still have their latencies. Due to these latencies, they engage in such behaviors as jumping from tree to tree like monkeys, because in the past they were born as monkeys and therefore have the latencies for such behavior. Foe destroyers also engage in such verbal activity as cursing others, such as saying "May Sherab immediately become ill," due to having been brahmins in the past. Such behaviors are unfortunate states of body and speech of foe destroyers.

As well as having latencies of non-virtuous behavior, we also have latencies of virtuous behavior which can be likened to a fragrant ointment applied to the body, the pleasant scent of which remains even after the ointment has been absorbed into the skin. Because latencies are developed over

a long period of familiarity, they are also only removed over a long period of application of the antidote. For example, someone who is habituated to drinking may be able to stop for a few days but then easily returns to this habit because it is difficult to give up this habit due to the previous strong familiarity with it.

Who free of latencies? Only buddha superiors are free from or have abandoned all the latencies of the afflictions. According to the Prasangika Madhyamika system the afflictions are afflictive obstructions, whereas their latencies are knowledge obstructions. Is there a common locus of an afflictive obstruction and a knowledge obstruction? There is not because if it is a consciousness it is not a knowledge obstruction. Is ignorance not a knowledge obstruction? Is there not an unafflicted ignorance? Although unafflicted ignorance is presented by the term "ignorance," it is not ignorance because it is not a mental factor. Is there not a knowledge obstruction that is an unafflicted ignorance? Why is it called "ignorance"? It is so-called because it is an obscuration that obscures with respect to the subtle secret point, the specific inconceivable knowledge of the buddhas.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> As is taught [in the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*]:
>
> > Son of good lineage, furthermore, since the Tathagata has exhausted all contaminations, his rebirths are exhausted. "Pure behavior was adhered to; what was to be done was done; another existence beyond this will not be known." Without contaminations, the mind completely liberated, wisdom completely liberated, having manifested his clairvoyance, accomplished – he abides.
> >
> > There, the knowledge of the exhaustion of contaminations of the Tathagata is completely purified, stainless, totally pure, clear light; all propagation due to imprints is well destroyed. The exhaustion of contaminations of the hearers is measurable; the imprints are not well destroyed. The exhaustion of contaminations of the solitary realizers is measurable; devoid of great compassion, they are devoid of courage. The exhaustion of contaminations of the Tathagata is endowed with the best of all aspects; all propagation due to imprints is well destroyed. Always upheld by great compassion, fearless, not devoid of courage, not outshone by all the worlds; endowed with one instant of mind. Why? The Tathagata has no imprints of karma; has no imprints of afflictions; has no imprints of faulty behavior.

Sentient beings have the latencies of actions, the latencies of afflictions, and the latencies of faulty behavior, whereas buddhas do not. Think about what these three types of latencies are. For example, the latencies of anger are the latencies of afflictions. These latencies are present in our mind and, when the right conditions are met, they are activated and anger is produced. We should examine our own mind for attachment and anger throughout an entire day or an entire week to see which is more prevalent. We will probably find that attachment is present more often than anger. There are some weeks when there are no occasions of anger, whereas attachment arises continuously due to being close to objects of desire. We can check our own experience to see whether or not this is true. Even when we fall asleep, attachment is manifest in that we have a liking for sleep. Also when we eat, attachment is present. Thus, if we compare attachment and anger we will see a difference in the frequency of their arisal. Due to the presence of attachment we have a pleasant appearance, whereas due to the presence of anger we have an unpleasant appearance. However, although anger rises less often it is very dangerous in that it destroys our roots of virtue, whereas attachment does not. When anger arises it disturbs our body and mind and destroys our mental peace. Yet, since attachment is an affliction, in the long term it only has disadvantages and shortcomings.

The word "contamination" (*zag pa*) in colloquial Tibetan means to fall down. Also in Dharma a contamination or an affliction is what causes one to fall into and remain stuck in the mire of cyclic existence.

In conclusion, a latency is a knowledge obstruction. The latency of an affliction is of two types: one that is an afflictive obstruction and one that is a knowledge obstruction. The potential of a previous attachment to bring about a subsequent attachment is a latency and a seed of an affliction. There is also a latency of an affliction that is unable to bring about a future affliction, this is only a latency, it is not a seed. Why is it not a seed? It is not a seed because it is unable to bring about a result even though the conditions are encountered. In general, a seed is that which is able to bring about a result when its respective conditions are encountered.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary quotes the *Sutra of the Questions of Arya King Dharanishvara*:

> It is like this: for example, the sky is totally pure by nature, not abiding together with dust and smoke. Likewise, the Tathagata's knowledge of the exhaustion of contaminations does not abide together with the imprints of karma and afflictions. Immediately upon thoroughly abiding in such exhaustion of contaminations, he teaches the Dharma in order for sentient beings with contaminations and with appropriation to exhaust the contaminations and abandon appropriation.
>
> Saying "O sentient beings, arisen from constantly conceptualizing the imperfect, you should realize individually just exactly as they are the contaminations and appropriations" to them, the Tathagata teaches the Dharma with examples that set out this and that, [so that] they will, by all means, thoroughly know just exactly as they are the contaminations as imperfect and having thoroughly known, by not appropriating any phenomena whatsoever, will also totally pass beyond sorrow.
>
> Son of good lineage, this is the tenth tathagata activity of the Tathagata.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 451-2) says:

10. The power of exalted knowledge of the extinction of contaminations

> *Unobstructed exalted knowledge regarding the quick disintegration*
> *Of the afflictions, along with their latencies, of the conquerors*
> *By the power of an exalted knower of all aspects, and the cessation of the afflictions*
> *Of learners and so forth by an awareness, is asserted to be an infinite power.*[12.31]

Unobstructed, that is, unimpeded, *exalted knowledge regarding the disintegration*, that is, destruction, *of* all *the afflictions*, attachment and so forth, *along with their latencies by the power of the conquerors who are exalted knowers of all aspects and the cessation*, that is, abandonment, *of the afflictions of learners* – the hearers – and the solitary realizers, who are included in "*and so forth*," *by an awareness*, that is, an uncontaminated wisdom, *is asserted to be the infinite power of the* exalted knowledge of the extinction of contaminations. Stating "*quick*" (v. 12.31a) indicates that the remaining extremely subtle latencies are instantaneously abandoned by the exalted wisdom of a buddha.

Here, regarding the latencies of the afflictions the autocommentary says:

> That which subsequently proceeds to defile and stain the mental continuum is a latency. "The end of afflictions," "familiarity," "root," and "latency" are synonyms.

It also says that although hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers have abandoned the afflictions they are not able to abandon the latencies. In addition, the knowledge obstructions are also taught stating:

> With respect to that, the latencies of ignorance become a hindrance to fully distinguishing objects of knowledge.
>
> Since in this system the conception of a self of phenomena is asserted to be an affliction, the main knowledge obstructions must be the latencies of mistaken dualistic appearance. That identification of the knowledge obstructions is not clearly taught in other [texts] by the father Arya [Nagarjuna] and his son, therefore, it is consolidated in this very teaching here.

The presentation of the knowledge obstructions is not clearly taught by Arya Nagarjuna and his son Aryadeva, nor is it by Buddhapalita. On the other hand, Chandrakirti's autocommentary indicates that the latencies of ignorance are the knowledge obstructions. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "the main knowledge obstructions must be the latencies of mistaken dualistic appearance." There is a difference between mistaken dualistic appearance and the factor of mistaken dualistic appearance. Is dualistic appearance a knowledge obstruction? Some say that it is and others say that it is not. Those who say that it is not specify that it is "the factor of dualistic appearance" that is a knowledge obstruction. Is the appearance of true existence a knowledge obstruction? Is it an object of abandonment? It is an object of abandonment, in that it is abandoned when one becomes a buddha. If the appearance of true existence is an obstruction, which of the two obstructions is it? It is a knowledge obstruction. Is the true existence which appears to the eye consciousness of an ordinary sentient being a knowledge obstruction? Is the appearance of a truly existent pot to an eye consciousness a knowledge obstruction? The appearance of true existence is an object of abandonment. Since it is an object of abandonment is it impermanent? Is the appearance of true existence to an eye consciousness of an ordinary being impermanent? If someone says that it is not, one says that it is impermanent because it is a knowledge obstruction. If someone says that it is impermanent, then one says that it is not impermanent because it is permanent, because if it is an established base it is pervaded by being it. Whatever appears to the eye consciousness of an ordinary being is pervaded by appearing to truly exist. If being an established base it is pervaded by being it, then it is pervaded by being permanent.

Thursday morning, 10 May 2001

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thus, the Tathagata, possessing inconceivable objects of exalted wisdom besides what was fully culminated in all aspects, is endowed with all qualities other than those. He remains indistinguishable from the dharmakaya. Each of the extensive qualities is comprehensible solely by the example of the sky. These ten strengths of the buddha bhagavans, the protectors of protectorless migrators who have entered into the four great rivers called "desire," "becoming," "view," and "ignorance," will be fully purified in all aspects on the buddha ground of Perpetual Light.
>
> Enough amplification.

The buddhas abide single-pointedly absorbed in meditative equipoise on reality. Chandrakirti says: "He remains indistinguishable from the dharmakaya." The buddhas are the protectors of protectorless migrators who have fallen into the four rivers of desire, existence, view, and ignorance. "Desire" can be, for example, the desire to go somewhere such as Bologna, Palermo, and so forth. However, here it specifically means desire for the five desirable objects. We have fallen into the river of desire for these five objects. These four rivers can be discussed in terms of cause and result. The four rivers that are causes are (i) desire, (ii) existence, (iii) the view of the transitory collection, and (iv) ignorance. The four rivers that are results are (i) rebirth, (ii) aging, (iii) sickness, and (iv) death. This is taught in Lama Tsongkhapa's *Three Principal Aspects*. Having fallen into these rivers, the best of refuges is the Buddha.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 452) says:

> The autocommentary also says:
>
> > The latencies of ignorance, attachment, and so forth are, moreover, overcome only in omniscient beings and buddhas; they are not in others.
>
> Therefore, the seeds of the afflictions which are taught in regard to the extinction of the seeds of the afflictions in hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers and from the eighth ground onward are not the same as the latencies of afflictions explained here. The path of release that initially abandons the very subtle latencies simultaneous with the two – one approaching the generation of the last uninterrupted path in the continuum of the tenth grounder and one approaching the cessation of the very subtle – is the first instant of a buddha's exalted wisdom. Because of that, they are said to disintegrate by the power of an exalted knower of all aspects.
>
> In this way, all the objects of knowledge taught to be known by this power are manifest, whereas, since it is not suitable for them to be indirectly realized, they must be known by means of appearing to the direct perceiver of a buddha. Furthermore, it is clearly explained in the commentary on [Nagarjuna's] *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* that this is not a system [positing that objects of knowledge] are known without the arising of their aspect. Therefore, it is also not that present [phenomena] are directly comprehended, whereas the two, past and future [phenomena], are indirectly comprehended. Moreover, at the present time – for example, today – the two, past and future which are relative to that, do not exist, whereby these two are not comprehended at this time, however, it is not contradictory that today's exalted wisdom of an exalted knower knows all the past and future. For example, although the sprout at the time of the seed is not produced by the seed, it is not contradictory that a seed produces a sprout.

An exalted knower of all aspects does not realize anything indirectly, but realizes all things directly. For example, it is now 11:30 AM, a buddha directly knows the phenomena of this time and also directly knows the phenomena of 12 AM, 1 PM, and so forth and also directly knows the phenomena of earlier this morning at 9 AM, 10 AM, and so forth. Although the phenomena of this morning no longer exist, for example, he knows, for example, that Sherab this morning at 9 AM did such-and-such activity. He also directly knows, as do we, that Sherab is presently translating. In addition, a buddha also knows what Sherab will do later this afternoon and evening. Thus, omniscient mind knows all phenomena directly.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 453) says:

> 3B2B-2C The way in which all the qualities cannot be expressed

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Thoroughly determining the distinctions of the qualities, such as each of the hair pores of the holy body of form of the buddha bhagavans, the signs and exemplifications of the great being, the strengths, fearlessnesses, and unshared qualities of a buddha, and so forth, is experienced by only the Buddha. If, when he speaks them, blessing the extent of the holy life span to inconceivable countless eons that are the object of his own exalted wisdom and not having other activities – even if thus spoken very quickly, the qualities will not be fully completed; then why mention by the bodhisattva? What need is there to mention the solitary realizers and hearers being unable to know or express the completed qualities of the buddha?

The qualities of the buddhas are inexpressible in that we cannot even express a portion of them. However, there is no need to mention that they cannot be expressed by us ordinary beings since they cannot even be expressed by tenth ground bodhisattvas. Those who are not buddhas cannot ascertain "the distinctions of the qualities, such as each of the hair pores of the holy body of form of the buddha

bhagavans, the signs and exemplifications of the great being, the strengths, fearlessnesses, and unshared qualities of a buddha, and so forth." These qualities were explained previously. Even if the buddhas themselves were to live for countless eons and were to express their own qualities very quickly, their expression could not be completed. If the buddhas themselves cannot complete the expression of their qualities, what need to mention that the bodhisattvas cannot do this? Chandrakirti also says: "What need is there to mention the solitary realizers and hearers being unable to know or express the completed qualities of the buddha?"

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> This very meaning is explained by way of an example:
>
> *The winged do not return out of lack of space,*
> *They return back due to exhausting their own strength. Likewise,*
> *Learners together and Buddha's children will return,*
> *Not expressing the qualities of the buddha, limitless like space.* [12.32]
>
> Like this: although the garuda gains headway by the strength of the wind of broad wings, it does not turn back in space due to completely exhausting space, yet it does due to lack of its own strength and headway. Likewise, to some degree, since even those bodhisattvas who acquire unimaginable complete liberation thoroughly abiding on the tenth ground are unable to express the qualities of the Tathagata, they return from the limitless space-like qualities not due to fully completing the qualities, they return due to fully depleting the strength of their minds. If so, why mention solitary realizers or hearers realizing the final qualities?
>
> When this is their situation about fully knowing or expressing the qualities of buddha, therefore, for the likes of us blinded by the cataract of ignorance, for whom perfect reality is hidden, how could there be the opportunity to express the qualities of the Tathagata? Therefore, it is explained that "this is just not the case."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B2B-2C How all the qualities cannot be described
>
> *Just as a bird will not return for lack of space,*
> *But will return hither because his own strength fails,*
> *So disciples and also buddha-sons will turn back*
> *Without describing the buddhas' qualities, endless like space.* [12.32]

It should be understood that the failure of the shravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas to describe all the qualities of the Buddha is not from exhaustion of the buddha's qualities; for by the exhaustion of the mental abilities of the disciples or shravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and sons of the buddhas, they turn back without describing the qualities of the buddha, which are infinite like space. For example, if the garuda bird flies in the sky, this lord of birds does not turn back because of lack [or exhaustion] of space, but returns here because some time his own strength is exhausted; it is like this.

The qualities of the buddhas are as limitless space, just as there is no exhaustion of space there is no exhaustion of the qualities of a buddhas. Even garudas, the kings of birds, who are extremely strong do not return due to having exhausted space but return due to having exhausted their ability to fly. Similarly, even the tenth ground bodhisattvas are unable to express the qualities, not due to exhausting the qualities of a buddha, but due to exhausting the strength of their intellect. Since this is the case for bodhisattvas, there is no need to mention that hearers and solitary realizers are unable to express the qualities of buddhas, let alone mention that ordinary beings cannot express these qualities.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Therefore, how could one such as I be able*
> *To know and to express these qualities of yours?*
> *Yet, since Arya Nagarjuna explained them,*
> *Giving up qualms, I mentioned just a little.* [12.33]

> Thus, indeed I do not have full knowledge of a mere portion of the qualities of the Tathagata. Although that is the case, my discussing a mere part of one class of qualities without hesitation is through dependence on another. Just that was mentioned saying "since Arya Nagarjuna explained them."

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *How, therefore, could anyone like me*
> *Understand and describe your qualities?*
> *But abandoning fears, I have said just a little about them,*
> *After Arya Nagarjuna's explanation.* [12.33]

How, Buddha, could someone like me, the author of the bhashya, be able understand and describe all these qualities of yours? He could not. However there is reason why, casting aside misgivings, I have said just a little of these qualities; it is because, since Arya Nagarjuna has explained those qualities, I have taught following him.

In this way, Chandrakirti diminishes his pride saying that he has described the qualities of the buddhas, not out of his own understanding of them, but in dependence on Nagarjuna's explanation of them.

A buddha's qualities can be condensed into:

1. the qualities of a buddha's body,
2. the qualities of a buddha's speech,
3. the qualities of a buddha's mind, and
4. the qualities of a buddha's enlightened activities.

What are the qualities of a buddha's body? They are the thirty-two major and eighty minor marks (or the thirty-two signs and eighty exemplifications). The qualities of a buddha's speech are the sixty-four melodious qualities. The qualities of a buddha's mind are the twenty-one sets of uncontaminated exalted wisdom. Then, there are the twenty-seven enlightened activities of a buddha. These qualities, excluding those of his speech, are discussed in the eighth chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*. In conclusion, the qualities of a buddha are inexpressible, yet we need faith that they are possible to achieve.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 453) says:

> All the qualities of a buddha [are as follows]. If the [expression of] the qualities is not completed even though the buddhas themselves bless their lifespan to countless eons and mention them extremely quickly without passing beyond other enlightened activities, why mention [that their expression cannot be completed] by the bodhisattvas? Hence, what need is there to also mention whether the solitary realizers and hearers can know or express the culminated qualities? The meaning of this is explained by means of an example:
>
> *Just as the lord of the birds does not return due to a lack of space,*
> *But returns here due to exhausting its own strength, similarly,*
> *The buddhas' children along with the learners return*

Without expressing the infinite space-like qualities of the buddhas. [12.32]

Like this, just as a garuda due to the strength of the wind of his broad wings, even though he is a suppresser of adversaries, when flying in the sky, *the lord of the birds does not return due to a lack of*, that is, due to exhausting, *space*, but eventually, by flying on and on, *returns here due to exhausting his own strength* and force, *similarly*, that *the buddhas' children* abiding on the great ground and the solitary realizers *along with the learners*, the hearers, *return without expressing the infinite space-like qualities of the buddhas* is not due to their completing the qualities but is due to the power of their own minds having been depleted.

Therefore, how can one such as myself
Know and express your qualities?
Nonetheless, abandoning qualms, I have mentioned them just a little
Since they were explained by Arya Nagarjuna. [12.33]

Because they are unable to completely express the qualities of the buddhas, *how can one such as myself*, the author of the autocommentary, *know and express the qualities of you* buddhas? We are not able. *Nonetheless*, without understanding even a mere part of the qualities of a buddha by my own power, *abandoning qualms*, that is, without hesitation, I have *mentioned* the qualities *just a little* in dependence on *Arya Nagarjuna's explanation of these* qualities.

Here there is nothing more to add to the explanation already given.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 454) says:

3B2B-2D Presenting the benefits of understanding the two qualities

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

In summary, in this treatise the qualities of the buddha – the profound, the dharmata, and the extensive – are finely indicated. There:

The profound is emptiness.
The other qualities are the extensive.
By knowing the mode of the profound and extensive,
These qualities will be attained. [12.34]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson*,* says:

3B2B-2D Advantages of knowing the two qualities

The profound is voidness, and
The other qualities are the vast. [12.34ab]

The kinds of the buddha's qualities consist of two, for they are the profound qualities, voidness, the cause and effect of the truth body (dharmakaya), and the other qualities, the vast.

By knowing the way of the vast and profound,
These qualities will be attained. [12.34cd]

Understanding the way of the profound and the vast and practicing it is necessary because these two qualities of the Buddha will be attained.

All the qualities of a buddha can be condensed into the two: (i) the quality of the profound and (ii) the quality of the vast. Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum* also sets out the eight qualities of the Buddha Jewel which are condensed into the last two of the eight: the quality of one's own welfare and the quality of others' welfare. When these two sets are correlated*,* the quality of one's own welfare corresponds to

the quality of the profound, that is, the truth body, and the quality of others' welfare corresponds to the quality of the vast.

The first three of the eight qualities of the Buddha Jewel listed in *Sublime Continuum* are:

- the truth body is uncompounded in that it is not compounded by causes and conditions,
- the truth body spontaneously and effortlessly accomplishes all, and
- the truth body is inconceivable and inexpressible.

These three are the quality that fulfill one's own welfare, the seventh quality of the Buddha Jewel, or, according to the *Supplement*, the quality of the profound. In addition, the Buddha Jewel has the three qualities of:

- exalted knowledge,
- mercy, and
- ability.

These three are the quality that fulfill others' welfare, the eighth quality of the Buddha Jewel, or, according to the *Supplement*, the quality of the vast. Due to possessing exalted knowledge, mercy, and ability, a buddha has the capacity to bring about the welfare of trainees. For example, if the child of an armless mother were to fall into a river and be swept away, although the mother would know this and would have mercy for her child, she would lack the capacity to save her child. On the other hand, if she had arms she would also have the capacity to save her child. Similarly, a buddha needs all three qualities of exalted knowledge, mercy, and ability in order to enact the welfare of others.

How are these qualities attained? Chandrakirti says: "By knowing the mode of the profound and extensive, these qualities will be attained" (v. 12.34cd). It is usually said that the bodies of a buddha are attained by completing the two collections of merit and wisdom, however, this means the same as knowing the mode of the profound and vast.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 454) says:

> *The profound is emptiness,*
> *Other qualities are the vast.*
> *By understanding the mode of the profound and vast,*
> *One will attain these qualities.* [12.34]

> In brief, this treatise presents the two qualities of a buddha, the profound and vast. *The profound is emptiness* – the truth body – and the emptinesses of the base and path. Those that were explained that are *other* than that, the *qualities* of the eleven grounds, the powers, and so forth *are* the qualities that are *the vast*. *By understanding* well *the mode* of the qualities of such *profound and vast*, *one will attain these* two *qualities* of a buddha by meditating, having understood the two meanings.

Lama Tsongkhapa's explanation is slightly different from that of Chandrakirti in that he says "The profound is emptiness – the truth body – and the emptinesses of the base and path." Thus, there is the emptiness of the base, emptiness of the path, and emptiness of the result. What is the emptiness of the base? It is the reality of a mind that is suitable to transform into a nature body. The emptiness of the path is the reality of a mind that has become path. The emptiness of the result is the emptiness of the mind that has become a wisdom truth body – this being the nature body.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "Those that were explained that are other than that, the qualities of the eleven grounds, the powers, and so forth are the qualities that are the vast." The first to the tenth grounds are the causal grounds, whereas the eleventh, the buddha ground, is the resultant ground, the Ground of Perpetual Light.

"The two meanings" are the profound and the vast.

In this way, Lama Tsongkhapa sets out the stages of hearing, thinking, and meditating. First one should listen to teachings, then reflect on them, and then meditate on them by means of both

stabilizing meditation and analytical meditation. The word "meditation" means to familiarize oneself with an object. There are different objects of meditation such as compassion, emptiness, and so forth. How should one meditate on compassion? How should one meditate on emptiness? Meditation on compassion is to transform one's mind into the entity of compassion. Meditation on emptiness, on the other hand, is to take emptiness as one's object of the mode of apprehension and to familiarize with it. Also when meditating on a buddha's image, one takes that image as one's object of the mode of apprehension. Like compassion, meditation on love is to transform the mind into the entity or nature of love.

Thursday afternoon, 10 May 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 454) says:

3B2C Indicating the emanation body

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, the emanation body is explained in terms of definitely arising spontaneously, achieving happy migrations, and so forth for the emergence of the common aims and common methods of all the hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas, besides the emergence of any aims of ordinary beings:
>
> *Again, with the unshakable body, having come to the three existences, you display*
> *Descent, rebirth, enlightenment, and also the wheel of pacification with emanations.*
> *Thus, with compassion, you lead the world of those with deceitful and conscientious*
> *Behavior, bound by many nooses of hope, without exception to nirvana.* [12.35]
>
> Although the Bhagavan has already passed from the three realms, the emanation body displays the relationship with father, mother, son, and so forth and accords with the world. Having descended into the three realms, by way of teaching the Dharma that is appropriate, he sets those having the various kinds of behavior and constituents of sentient beings into nirvana, out of compassion; not due to wishing fame and compensation.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B2C Exposition of the manifestation body

> *You Who have the unshakable body appear again in the three worlds –*
> *Your emanations descend, take birth, are enlightened, and turn the wheel of peace.*
> *Thus, with compassion, you lead beyond sorrow worldly beings without exception,*
> *Agitated with all sorts of actions and bound by many nooses of wishing.* [12.35]

The Buddha, the Blessed One, has the perfect manifestation body because, having the unshakable body, from the truth body he again appears in the three worlds, [below, on, and above the earth,] his manifestation bodies descending from Tus□ita, taking birth, being enlightened, and also turning the wheel of the Dharma of peace [or nirvana]: thus, with compassion, he leads into nirvana all the world [or sentient beings], who have fear and agitation,[246] i.e., all sorts of actions, and are bound by many noose of wishing [or craving].

The emanation body is seen by ordinary beings, hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas, as well as by the buddhas themselves. The buddhas, by means of emanation bodies, enact the common and

[246] *gyo.bag*

uncommon aims of these individuals, thereby leading beings to the happy migrations. The buddhas, who remain unmoving from the truth body, display the aspects of descending from the Joyous Land to Jambudvipa, taking birth in the womb of a mother, attaining enlightenment, turning the wheel of Dharma or the wheel of pacification, and so forth.

"Bound by many nooses of hope" refers to sentient beings who are bound by nooses of hope. The buddhas untie these nooses and lead sentient beings to nirvana.

Although the buddhas have attained enlightenment, they descend to this world and are conceived in a womb as a child having a father and mother. Or it can be said that a buddha appears as a man who takes a wife who gives birth to a child. For example, Shakyamuni Buddha was born to King Shuddhodana and Queen Maya, and later took Yashodhara as his wife who gave birth to their son Rahula.

Chandrakirti says: "he sets those having the various kinds of behavior and constituents of sentient beings into nirvana, out of compassion, not due to wishing fame and compensation." From the point of view of tenets, the first turning of the wheel of Dharma was mainly for the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas, the second turning of the wheel of Dharma was for the Madhyamikas, and the third turning of the wheel of Dharma was for the Chittamatrins. From the point of view of vehicle, the first wheel of Dharma was turned mainly for the followers of the hinayana, the second for the followers of the uncommon mahayana, and the third for the followers of the common mahayana. In short, the Buddha turned these wheels of Dharma in accordance with the dispositions of various types of trainees.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 454) says:

> Now, the emanation body, which arises for the common welfare and means of hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas and also arises in whatever way is suitable for the aims of ordinary beings, is explained from the point of view of acting to achieve the happy migrations and so forth:
>
> *Once again you, who possess an unmoving body, having come to the three existences,*
> *Display, by way of emanations, descent and birth, as well as the wheel of enlightenment and peace.*
> *Thus, you, with compassion, lead all the world having deceitful and conscientious behavior,*
> *Bound by many nooses of hope, to nirvana.* [12.35]

The definition of an emanation body in *Seventy Topics* is: a final form body not possessing the five certainties. The emanation body of this context is a supreme emanation body which shows the twelve deeds. A supreme emanation body is seen by hearers, solitary realizers, and ordinary beings and enacts the common and uncommon aims of these beings.

Lama Tsongkhapa says: "is explained from the point of view of acting to achieve the happy migrations and so forth." This means that the emanation body is a cause for beings to achieve the happy migrations. The emanation body is also called "the body for others' welfare." Who are "others" and what is their "welfare"? "Others" are the gods and human beings, that is, the beings of the happy migrations. Their "welfare" is nirvana. Thus, a supreme emanation body is the cause for these beings to achieve nirvana. In other words, a supreme emanation body leads beings who are not in the happy migrations to the happy migrations and leads those who are in the happy migrations to nirvana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 454) says:

> Even though you have already gained the truth body, *once again you, who possess a body unmoving* from meditative equipoise on suchness, *having come to the three existences* – below the ground, on the ground, and above the ground – *display by way of emanation* bodies the relationships of a son with a father and mother through *descending* from the Joyful Land to the

> place of human beings, *taking birth*, and so forth, and *also* display, in accordance with their faculties, *the wheel* of Dharma for entering the city of *enlightenment and peace*, nirvana. *Thus, you, with* great *compassion* that does not depend on a wish for fame and compensation, *lead* or place *all the world* – those possessing the various constituents and behaviors of sentient beings – *bound by many nooses of hope*, that is, craving, *to nirvana*. In regard to "*having deceitful and conscientious behavior*" (v. 12.35c), the translation in [Jayananda's] *Explanatory Commentary* accords with the commentary that says "having various behaviors."

The buddhas descend from the Joyful land to Jambudvipa and lead the beings bound by wishes and craving to liberation from this bondage. There is a Tibetan expression that says "The Tibetans are impoverished by hope, and the Chinese are impoverished by doubt." This means that the Tibetans continuously hope and therefore achieve nothing, while the Chinese are overcome by suspicion and therefore achieve nothing. For example, some people have great hope that things will just drop into their lap and others have great suspicion.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 455) says:

> 3B2D Proving there is a single vehicle

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, having thus made a presentation of the holy body of the Tathagata, indicating three vehicles for the single vehicle is explained as indeed having an intention:
>
> *Because here, apart from knowing thusness there is no other fundamental eliminating*
> *All stains; divisions of transformations of phenomena's thusness are also not relied on*
> *And also this subjective intelligence of thusness does not become diverse.*
> *Therefore, you showed migrators an unequaled, inseparable vehicle.* [12.36]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B2D Establishing that there is one vehicle
>
> *Because apart from knowledge of reality there's no effective*
> *Remover of all stains, also the reality of dharmas not depending*
> *On classes of aspects, the wisdom whose object is voidness also does not differ:*
> *Therefore, you taught to sentient beings an unequal, undivided vehicle.* [12.36]

He taught to the sentient beings to be tamed a single, undivided vehicle not equal with other vehicles, because of this: that since the absolute reality of phenomena does not depend on classes of dissimilar appearance, the intelligence [or wisdom-knowledge] which has absolute reality as its object, also has no different ways of apprehending, and there is no effortfull [or principal] remover of all stains apart from direct knowledge of absolute reality.

There is only one final vehicle, not three. Thus, the teachings on three vehicles are interpretable meaning teachings. The intention of teaching three vehicles was in order to lead those of the hearer and solitary realizer vehicles for the time being. In the first chapter of the *Ornament for Clear Realizations*, in the context of lineage, four types of ulterior intentions are discussed. The first, a sutra having an ulterior intention regarding engaging, is "The five aggregates are the load, the person is the bearer." Here the ulterior intention is to cause non-Buddhists to engage in the Buddhist teachings, in that this statement is similar to their own doctrine.

The second, a sutra having an ulterior intention regarding characteristics or natures, is "Other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are established by way of their own

character; imputational factors are not established by way of their own character." This sutra was taught in order to guide the Chittamatrins.

The third, a sutra having an ulterior intention regarding antidote, is that which recounts the story of King Bimbisara who was put in prison by his son who made a plot together with Devadatta – the prince planning to kill his father to become king and Devadatta planning to kill Shakyamuni Buddha in order to become the principal teacher. However, the prince, having come to regret having put his father in prison, promised half his kingdom to the person who could tell him that his father had not died there. Hearing this, people stampeded toward the prison, but the noise and commotion frightened the king who died of a heart attack. The prince experienced intense regret for his action and sank into depression, but the Buddha, knowing the time was right, appeared before him and said: "Father and mother are to be killed. One who kills a brahma and his retinue will be purified." Hearing this, the prince emerged from his regret and thought about what the Buddha had said to him, and thereby came to realize that the Buddha's statement did not refer to the father and mother who had given him his body but referred to the father-like afflictions and mother-like actions who bring about rebirth. He also understood that by killing the afflictions and actions rebirth would come to an end. In this way, this teaching acted an antidote.

The fourth type is a sutra having an ulterior intention regarding transformation. This means that by means of false letters or words, a true meaning is conveyed.

In addition, there are also four types of intentions: an intention regarding equality, an intention regarding time, an intention regarding meaning, and an intention regarding the thought of persons. For example, a sutra having an intention regarding equality is "One time I was born as Buddha Vibhashumi." This means that no matter what aspect is taken, all buddhas are equal. This is discussed in Gyeltshap Je's *Ornament For the Essential Explanation* and in Haribhadra's *Clear Meaning Commentary*, the latter saying that the teaching on three final vehicles requires interpretation, has an intention, and is not a definitive meaning teaching.

The autocommentary says that the sutra that teaches three final vehicles has a specific intention. The word "vehicle" usually refers to a path, this being the great vehicle and the lesser vehicle. Defined roughly, a vehicle is the thought, or the exalted wisdom, that carries the load of either one's own or others' welfare. The lesser vehicle mainly carries the load of one's own welfare, whereas the great vehicle mainly carries the load of others' welfare. The great vehicle is an exalted knower distinguished by possessing the six greatnesses. In general, the great vehicle is the thought able to carry the load of others' welfare. There is only one final vehicle for the attainment of enlightenment and thus there is only one final result, enlightenment or buddhahood. Therefore, no matter what vehicle one follows for the time being, in the end one must attain the buddha ground. The true aspectarian Chittamatrins, however, maintain that there are three final vehicles that lead to their three respective results that are nirvanas without remainder. Thus, according to them the purpose of following a vehicle is to attain a nirvana without remainder. They say that having followed the hearer vehicle and attained the nirvana without remainder of a hearer, there is no need to progress to another vehicle. They also say that, when a nirvana without remainder is attained, the continuum of compounded phenomena ceases and all that remains is a mere sphere, a true cessation, a nirvana. At that time, do the knowledge obstructions become non-existent by means of an antidote? They do not, they become non-existent due to their basis or support having become non-existent. Here the basis or support is the person. Since the person becomes non-existent, that supported on it become non-existent. When a nirvana without remainder is attained, a mere sphere remains. The Prasangika Madhyamika school debates this saying:

> *At the time of nirvana the self would definitely be annihilated.*
> *In the moments prior to nirvana,*
> *It would be produced and disintegrate. Since the agent would not exist, their results would not exist.*

That accumulated by another would be consumed by someone else. [6.128]

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that it follows that when the nirvana, which is that to be attained, is attained, there is no attainer, and that when there is the attainer there is no object to be attained. It is like saying that when there is an eater there is no food, and when there is food there is no eater. This is way in which the Prasangika Madhyamikas debate with the lower schools.

Friday morning, 11 May 2001

A vehicle is an exalted knower that is the bearer of the load of either of the two welfares.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> He who does not understand suchness is unable to abandon the afflictions without residue. The thusness that exists with all things, without exception, having a nature of production, was also already indicated as indistinguishable. Even different seeing does not have divisions there; hence this suchness is just not transformed. Because there are no divisions and transformations, therefore the subjective exalted wisdom of thusness is also one nature.
>
> Like this: if the nature of exalted wisdom were multiple, suchness would not be realized because of not realizing the nature exactly as it abides. Because, like that, the subjective exalted wisdom of thusness is undistinguishable due to suchness being unique, therefore, three vehicles do not exist since there is only a single vehicle. This is because of the statement appearing [in the *Sutra of the White Lotus of the Holy Dharma*]:
>
> > Kashyapa, when all phenomena are realized as just equal, it is nirvana. That, moreover, is just one, not two, nor three.
>
> 'Great' in the statement "Great Vehicle" means the buddha bhagavans because they possess the exalted wisdom that is free of obscurations due to abandoning ignorance without residue. Their vehicle is the Great Vehicle because of "*prisha uddhara*" and so forth, the letter '*ta*' [in the Sanskrit *mahata yana*] changing into just '*a*' (i.e., the Sanskrit *mahata yana* becomes mahayana).
>
> Alternatively, since it is a vehicle and it is also great, it is the Great Vehicle because those possessing a buddha's inconceivable exalted wisdom have entered it; or because of being the subject of the limitless classifications of things; or because of abandoning unknowing without exception. Hence, it is the Great Vehicle since it is a vehicle and it is also great.
>
> If it is asked: If nirvana is only one, why are the vehicles of the hearers and the solitary realizers also indicated to pass completely beyond sorrow?
>
> To explain this doctrine as being intentional:
>
> *Because there exist these degenerations producing faults in migrators, therefore,*
> *The world will not enter the deep, the profound, sphere of the buddha.*
> *Because you, Tathagata, possess wisdom together with the method of*
> *Compassion, and because you volunteered "I will liberate sentient beings,"* [12.37]
>
> Five degenerations (or dregs) are indicated due to bringing about an unserviceability of bodies and minds: the degenerations of sentient beings, the eon, afflictions, views, and life span. Because they obstruct even the desire for the unsurpassed exalted wisdom of the Tathagata, being the cause of the very powerful operation of the afflictions, because of destroying superior higher interests, therefore, since a buddha's exalted wisdom is profound, the world will not enter what is difficult to fathom. Yet, the Bhagavan does not cultivate forgetfulness concerning those to be liberated due to merely this – migrators not being vessels. Because the Bhagavan possesses wisdom together with

> the method of compassion and because the Bhagavan previously made prayers "I will liberate sentient beings," therefore, he does not rely on indolence to completely liberate them and seeks the method of their complete liberation because it is, without doubt, necessary to accomplish his promise by way of other aspects.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Since there are these degenerations producing faults in sentient beings,*
> *Therefore the world cannot understand the Buddha's profound sphere of action.* [12.37ab]

There is reason why he did not initially make those to be tamed enter the great vehicle; for some worldly folk [or tamable beings] would not understand the profound sphere of action of the Buddha, because sentient beings have the producers of faults, the five degenerations [of sentient beings, the eon, delusions, views, and lifetime].

Since there is the flourishing of the five degenerations or five dregs, the Buddha knows that sentient beings are not ready to enter the mahayana and therefore first teaches them the hearer and solitary realizer vehicles. The five degenerations, literally the five dregs, are so-called in that they are likened to the dregs of, for example, tea leaves which settle to the bottom of the cup and then come up when stirred. The five degenerations are:
(i) the degeneration of sentient beings, the stature of sentient beings is gradually has been gradually decreasing since the beginning of the eon;
(ii) the degeneration of the eon, the fortunate eon has vanished and presently there is the eon of fighting, sickness, and so forth;
(iii) the degeneration of afflictions, this being in relation to lay people whose afflictions are increasing due to which they have more desire and more dissatisfaction due to which they fight over belongings, power, and so forth;
(iv) the degeneration of views, this is in relation to the ordained who hold to their own views and then fight and argue with other systems; and
(v) the degeneration of lifespan, the average lifespan at the time of the Buddha was 100 years but gradually this is diminishing. In fact, it is said that at the end of every cycle of 100 years the lifespan diminishes by one year. Nowadays, very few people live to 100 years. Although it may appear that presently people are living longer due to modern comforts and technological developments, there are in fact many more dangerous diseases, such as cancer and AIDs, as well as harm caused by chemicals in food and so forth.

Presently the five degenerations or dregs are as if they have burst out of their container. However, it is said that at such a time even a little Dharma practice becomes very powerful. In this way, someone who does hundreds of years of Dharma practice in the fortunate eon and someone who does one year of Dharma practice in this degenerate eon create equal merit. This is due to the great amount of unfavorable conditions for Dharma practice that have to be overcome by the Dharma practitioners of this eon.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Because there are these many conditions hindering migrators from entering the Great Vehicle and it is, without doubt, necessary to place the worldly in nirvana:
>
> > *Therefore, like the wise man that formed, as an interlude, an attractive city*
> > *To relieve the fatigue of a group of beings who set out for a jeweled island,*
> > *You made learners apply the mind to the mode of pacification and taught*
> > *This vehicle separately to those whose minds were trained in detachment.* [12.38]

> This example should be ascertained in the [*Sutra of] the Exalted White Lotus of the Holy Dharma*. The summarized meaning is this: just as the leader actually manifested a city for relaxation until they reached the jeweled island, likewise, the Bhagavan, from the point of view of method, also taught two vehicles, the vehicles of the hearers and the solitary realizers, ahead of the Great Vehicle, being a method to attain the [Great Vehicle] and being the support of the happiness of pacification.
>
> There, to those attaining abandonment of the afflictions of samsara, afterwards, only the Great Vehicle is finely indicated. Having fully completed the collections, it is also doubtlessly necessary for them, like the buddhas, to attain omniscient exalted wisdom, This doctrine of a single vehicle is also to be ascertained in the *Compendium of Sutras* and so forth.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson*,* says:

> *Because you, Sugata, have great wisdom together with compassionate method,*
> *And because you made the promise, "I shall liberate sentient beings",* [12.37cd]
>
> *Therefore, like the wise man who, to ease soon the weariness of his band*
> *Of travelers to the Land of Jewels, created meanwhile a pleasant city,*
> *You put the minds of disciples on these vehicles, the quick way of peace,*
> *And also teach to those quite free, those with trained minds, separately.* [12.38]

There are reasons why he taught the vehicles of the hearers and solitary realizers, so that those of the disciple, or hearer, and solitary realizer families should apply their minds to the way of quickly calming suffering, and afterwards taught the great vehicle separately to those with trained minds, quite free of defilements: because the Sugata has wisdom [skilled in the means] of taming those to be tamed, together with the method of compassion; and because, having promised [when he was a bodhisattva], "I shall liberate all sentient beings," he has to make them reach the goal. For example, he is like the skillful leader who, to remove quickly the weariness of a company of people traveling to the Land of Jewels, temporarily created or manifested a pleasant city.[247]

Although there is only one final vehicle*,* the buddhas teach three in accordance with the dispositions of sentient beings. This is likened to the ship captain who emanated a city in order that a group of merchants could rest on their way to a jewel island. While we are not trying to reach a jewel island*,* we are trying to reach enlightenment.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 455) says:

> Thus, having explained the presentation of the three bodies, it is explained that there is an intention in presenting one vehicle as three vehicles:
>
> *Because, here, other than understanding suchness, there is no other earnest dispeller of all stains;*
> *The suchness of phenomena also does not depend on the divisions of transformations; and*
> *The intelligence that is the object-possessor of suchness is also not different –*
> *You presented an unequaled and inseparable vehicle to migrating beings.* [12.36]
>
> Why is that? It is *because*, *here,*
>
> - *other than understanding* the *suchness* of phenomena *there is no earnest*, that is, principal, *dispeller of all* the *stains* of the two obstructions,
> - *the suchness of phenomena also does not depend on the divisions of* dissimilar *transformations*,

[247] *Saddharmapundarikasutra* VII.

- whereby, also *the intelligence that is the object-possessor of suchness* – that is, exalted wisdom – *is not of different* or dissimilar types comprehending objects,

you, the Subduer, *presented* one *vehicle*, *which is not equal* to any other vehicle and is *inseparable, to* the *migrating beings* who are to be subdued because [the *White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra*] says:

> Kashyapa, when all phenomena are realized to be just equal, that is nirvana. That, moreover, is one, it is not two, nor three

Arya [Nagarjuna] also taught in accordance with the *Supplement* stating:

> Because the sphere of phenomena is inseparable,
> You presented that lacking the divisions of vehicles
> As three vehicles,
> In order for sentient beings to enter.

These [passages indicate] that all the afflictions cannot be extinguished without realizing suchness. However

- the explanation that, since there is no great difference in the suchness of phenomena, there are different ways to progress to nirvana and different causal vehicles that realize and do not realize suchness, and
- the explanation that there are some results or vehicles that do not progress to other vehicles after attaining the mere nirvana that is the extinction of the afflictions

were taught in order to lead trainees for the time being. When this presentation is well realized, the intention of the explanations regarding the lesser vehicle as lacking the realization of the selflessness of phenomena will be realized.

QUESTION: There is only one nirvana which, having been attained, does not require progression to other paths. So why are the vehicles of the hearers and solitary realizers also presented as passing beyond sorrow?

RESPONSE: It is explained that presenting in this way has an intention:

> *Because there exist the degenerations producing faults in migrating beings,*
> *The world does not engage in the deep and profound sphere of activity of a buddha.*
> *Because you, Sugata, simultaneously possess wisdom and the method of compassion, and*
> *Because you promised "I will liberate all sentient beings,"* [12.37]
>
> *Like the wise one who formed a pleasant city in the meantime to dispel the fatigue*
> *Of a group of beings who had set out for an island of jewels,*
> *You made the learners apply their minds to the means of pacification, and*
> *Taught this vehicle separately to those with trained minds, completely devoid.*[12.38]

Because there exist the five *degenerations* of (i) sentient beings, (ii) the eon, (iii) afflictions, (iv) views, and (v) lifespan that, making body and mind unserviceable, become the cause *producing* the strongest *faults* – that is, afflictions – *in migrating beings*, they destroy the especially strong aspiration and, thereby, obstruct interest in the exalted wisdom of a buddha. *Because of that, the world* – those to be subdued – *do not engage in the sphere of activity of a buddha*, difficult to fathom due to being *profound*. *Because you, Sugata*, *simultaneously possess* the *wisdom* that is skilled in the methods for subduing those to be subdued and the *method that is the compassion* which does not have forgetfulness regarding their welfare, and *because you*, when previously a bodhisattva, *promised "I will liberate* all *sentient beings,*" it is necessary to definitely accomplish that by way of other kinds of methods. Because there are many hindrances to migrating beings engaging in the great vehicle and because it is also necessary to definitely place migrating beings in nirvana, as is taught in the *White Lotus [of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra]*, *like the wise* captain who, when *setting out for an island of jewels* in the middle of the ocean, *formed*, or emanated, *a pleasant city to dispel in the meantime the fatigue of the group of beings* who had been traveling for a long time until they reached the island of jewels, *you*, Bhagavan,

- on the side of the great vehicle, taught that which is a method for attaining the great *vehicle*, the two vehicles of the hearers and solitary realizers, to the *learners*, the hearers, and the solitary realizers who are illustrated by [the word "learners"] in order *to apply their minds to* the happiness that is a *means of pacification*, and,

- then taught just the great vehicle *separately*, that is, subsequently, to *those with trained minds completely devoid* of the afflictions of cyclic existence.

These [statements] also [indicate] that, like the buddhas, having completed the collections, one must doubtlessly attain buddhahood. That one vehicle is established is be understood from that taught in the *Compendium of Sutras* and so forth:

> Because they are taught in many sutras as exhausted in one vehicle.

The teaching on three final vehicles is a teaching possessing an intention, whereas the teaching on one final vehicle is definitive. The Buddha taught three final vehicles for the followers of the lesser vehicle who are unable to abandon both obstructions, the afflictive obstructions and the knowledge obstructions. Because they are unable to abandon the knowledge obstructions, the Buddha taught them three final vehicles. This is the only reason for the Buddha to have taught three final vehicles, he did not do so in terms of whether or not the followers of the lesser vehicle have the realization of the selflessness of phenomena. However, such people are unable to apply their intelligence realizing the selflessness of phenomena as an antidote to the knowledge obstructions, rather it becomes an antidote only to the afflictive obstructions. Earlier in the *Supplement* it was said that although hearers and solitary realizers do cultivate the realization of the selflessness of phenomena they do not do so in a complete way. What is a complete way? It means that one's wisdom is able to function as an antidote to both obstructions. The followers of the lesser vehicle do not meditate in a complete manner because they are unable to realize the selflessness of phenomena by means of infinite types of reasonings.

Thus, the purpose in teaching three final vehicles was in order for some trainees to take a rest on the way to enlightenment, however, in the end they too are led to buddhahood. Haribhadra's *Clear Meaning Commentary* on the *Ornament for Clear Realizations* also says that the teaching on three vehicles is an interpretable meaning teaching and not an definitive meaning teaching. Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport* also quotes the *White Lotus Sutra* which discusses seven points: why three final vehicles were taught, the purpose in teaching them, and so forth. Nagarjuna also says:

> Because the sphere of phenomena is inseparable,
> You presented that lacking the divisions of vehicles
> As three vehicles,
> In order for sentient beings to enter.

The sphere of phenomena, that is, emptiness, is without divisions. Thus, the emptiness of a pot and the emptiness of a pillar are one; this emptiness is the mere negation of true existence. The Buddha taught three final vehicles in order for sentient beings with particular dispositions to enter their respective vehicles. Without realizing emptiness, it is not possible to extinguish all the afflictions. Whatever vehicle one enters, one must realize emptiness. The conception of a self of phenomena is an afflictive obstruction, it has to be abandoned in order to become a foe destroyer. Whether one enters the hearer or solitary realizer vehicle, in order to attain the state of a foe destroyer the afflictive obstructions must be abandoned. Thus, the Buddha taught three vehicles in order to gradually lead such people to the great vehicle.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Student: What is the definition of contaminated karma and what is the definition of uncontaminated karma?

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Although there is a discussion of "uncontaminated karma," it is not sure that it is actually uncontaminated. A contaminated action is an action accumulated with the motivation of afflictions. An uncontaminated action is an action that is not motivated by afflictions but is motivated by a subtle level of the latency of ignorance or by a subtle knowledge obstruction. The only uncontaminated in the continuum of a sentient being is single-pointed non-conceptual meditative

equipoise on emptiness. Hence, everything else in the continuum of sentient beings is contaminated. The exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise on the path of preparation is contaminated because it is conceptual. The word "contaminated" has many interpretations.

Student: Does a bodhisattva superior create contaminated karma? If not, then when he generates aversion how is this karma classified?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Bodhisattvas on the first and second grounds have anger but there anger is not like ours. On the third ground there is no manifest anger. The first mind generation of the *Supplement* says that a bodhisattva superior of the first ground does create contaminated karma:

His devotion to giving even his own flesh
Is reason for inferring the unimaginable. [1.9cd]

When someone cuts his flesh, a first ground bodhisattva does not become angry but gladly gives his flesh away. It is not clear whether a first ground bodhisattva generates anger or not, but he does create contaminated karma. However, this is not the projecting karma included in the twelve links of dependent-arising nor is it accomplishing karma.
Student: So what is this contaminated karma?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: A contaminated action is an action accumulated with the motivation of afflictions! For example, a bodhisattva superior generates attachment and out of this gives birth to a child.
Student: Therefore, an uncontaminated path can create contaminated karma because a bodhisattva on the first ground onward is always on an uncontaminated path?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: If it is a path it is not pervaded by being uncontaminated. If it is an uncontaminated existing in sentient beings it must be an exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise.

Student: What are the definitions of "path of action" and "action" according to Prasangika?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: According to Prasangika, action is form. Form is of two types: revelatory form and non-revelatory form. Non-revelatory form cannot be seen with the eyes. In the Prasangika Madhyamika system the discussion of actions being form is similar to the presentation in Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*. There are three types of form:

1. form that can be indicated and is obstructive, for example, a table,
2. form that cannot be indicated and is obstructive, and
3. form that cannot be indicated and is not obstructive, for example, non-revelatory form, such as the form that is a vow and the form that is a non-vow.

There are also forms that are a phenomena sphere and forms that are a form sphere. A form that is a form sphere is, for example, the appearance of form that appears to only an eye consciousness. A form that is a phenomenon sphere is the appearance of form that appears only to a mental consciousness.

An action is an action of body and speech, that is, action that is expressed through body and speech. A path of action is the motivation from which the seven actions of body and speech arise. The three non-virtues of mind are called "paths of action" because they are paths producing the seven non-virtues of body and speech. It is the same for virtue, thus, the three virtues of mind are "paths of actions" in that they are paths producing the seven virtues of body and speech. The seven non-virtues and the seven virtues of body and speech are actions.

Student: According to Prasangika, are the ten non-virtues both actions and paths of action?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: I said before that the seven of body and speech are both actions and paths of actions, whereas the three of mind are only paths of actions.

Student: Does a buddha create any type of karma?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: A buddha does not create karma. However, this subject is debated asking, for example, "Does a buddha not have intention?" The creation of karma is only possible on the grounds of sentient beings, not on the buddha ground. But it can be debated: "Do buddhas not have vows? Do they not have intention? Are these not karma? Are the enlightened activities of a buddha not actions?" However, the creation of karma is only applicable to us sentient beings.

Student: In the presentation of the buddha bodies, the explanation of the body of similar cause refers to the emanation body. What is the 'similar cause' in this context?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The emanation body is similar to the complete enjoyment body. Because the complete enjoyment body emanates the emanation body, the emanation body is a body that is similar to the cause, the completion of the collections of merit and exalted wisdom. Or it can be said that the emanation body emanated by the complete enjoyment body is similar to its cause, the complete enjoyment body. The emanation body is similar to the complete enjoyment body in terms of displaying the deeds of a buddha, although it appears distinctly to different trainees.

Student: If a buddha can see the future, does this mean that our entire path to enlightenment is certain or fixed?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: No, it is not fixed. The buddhas know that Emily will be born in such-and-such a place at such-and-such a time and will become a buddha. The buddhas know that Emily will go to such-and-such a Dharma center and teach such-and-such people the Dharma. Although these future events do not exist know, they do exist.

Student: What is the difference between the aspects of the subjective mode of apprehension of (i) the vajra-like exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of the uninterrupted path, the actual antidote, and (ii) the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise of the uninterrupted path having emptiness as its object of the mode of apprehension?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: These two are the same in being meditative equipoise on emptiness. The uninterrupted path of the mahayana path of seeing of the first ground is a meditative equipoise on emptiness; its object of the mode of apprehension is emptiness. It is not called "vajra-like" because it is not able to destroy the knowledge obstructions. Only the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum of a sentient being which is able to destroy the knowledge obstructions is called "vajra." Thus, the vajra-like meditative stabilization is only that at the end of the continuum of a sentient being.

Student: Chandrakirti, as a basis for distinguishing between interpretable meaning and definitive meaning teachings according to the Prasangika Madhyamikas, presents both the *Teachings of Akshayamati Sutra* and *King of Meditative Stabilization Sutra*, whereas Lama Tsongkhapa presents only the *Teachings of Akshayamati Sutra* in his *Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive*. Is there a reason for this?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is only because the *Teachings of Akshayamati Sutra* is the main reference for this. Emptiness is the definitive meaning.

END

Monday afternoon, 14 May 2001

The second chapter of Jedzun Chogyi Gyeltshen's *Ocean of Sport* sets out a discussion of one final vehicle and three final vehicles. However, in conclusion there is only one final vehicle because all sentient beings enter the mahayana and attain the enlightenment of the buddha ground. So why did the Buddha teach three final vehicles? He taught them in order to guide those beings who have obstacles and whose minds do not have an expansive enough attitude to enter the mahayana right from the beginning. Why are there these obstacles? Think about it. However, the main obstacle is self-cherishing. The mahayana is a mind thinking about others, whereas some people's minds are not compatible with this attitude. With respect to this, there are stories in the teachings on the Stages of the Path about events that took place in the past. For example, there is a story about an old woman who owned a cow. She wanted to mate it with an ox in order for it to give birth to a calf and then produce milk. However, while taking her cow to the ox, she met some monks who asked her where she was taking the cow and, becoming embarrassed, turned back. On another occasion, she asked young monk for advice about what to do in order to have her cow produce milk and he told her to recite the refuge prayer:

> To the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Supreme Community
> I go for refuge until enlightenment.
> Through the merit from generosity and the other perfections,
> May I achieve the state of a buddha for the sake of all sentient beings.

However, the woman felt that she could not possibly think to attain enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings so the monk gave her another prayer to recite:

> I go for refuge to the Three Jewels
> So that my cow, Ayadevi, becomes pregnant,
> Gives birth to a calf, and
> Produces much milk and butter.

The woman liked this prayer and recited it day and night and eventually the cow became pregnant, gave birth to a calf, and produced much milk from which the woman was able to make much butter. She then offered butter and milk to the monastery of the young monk but they did not need it. However, because the cow continued to produce milk without end, the woman began to think about what had happened. She came to understand that only the words "I go for refuge to the Three Jewels" of the prayer she had been taught were meaningful. In short, there are many obstacles to entering the mahayana.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 457) says:

3B2E Explanation of the duration of manifest enlightenment and remaining

1 Explanation from the point of view of the time of manifest enlightenment
2 Explanation from the point of view of the time of remaining

3B2E-1 Explanation from the point of view of the time of manifest enlightenment

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Now, to explain in terms of the time of the Bhagavan manifesting enlightenment and the time of abiding:

As many as are the particles of smallest atoms found in the entirety
Of directions and buddha lands, for that many eons too,
The Tathagata has reached noble most supreme enlightenment.
Nonetheless, you do not declare this secret of yours. [12.39]

The buddha bhagavans do indeed exhibit rebirth and passing beyond sorrow by way of the emanation body, yet the measure of how long ago was the time of the manifest complete enlightenment – that which is the cause giving rise to the emanation body – is to be expressed. The eons of manifest complete enlightenment of the Bhagavan are as many as the amount of particles of smallest atoms existing in the amount of world systems that are lands of the exalted wisdom of the Tathagata.

Because this is difficult to be highly appreciated by those who have not previously accumulated roots of virtue, it is not to be declared; it is explained to some – to those highly appreciating that – in order to accumulate inestimable merit.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3B2E-1 Explanation of the time of actual enlightenment

As many as the tiniest atoms of atoms of all the places
In the buddha realms of the directions are the eons
When sugatas have reached the highest, holy enlightenment. [12.39abc]

The number of demonstrations of the buddhas' way to the supreme point of enlightenment is inconceivable, for as many as the tiniest atoms of atoms that exist in the places of all the buddha lands of the ten directions are the eons in which sugatas have gone to the highest, holy enlightenment.

Nevertheless, you do not relate these secrets of yours. [12.39d]

However, to some of those to be tamed he did not relate these secrets of his, because for those who have not accumulated roots of merit previously, it is hard to have conviction.

A supreme emanation body displays the twelve deeds ranging from descending from the Joyful Land through passing beyond sorrow. The number of times it demonstrates the attainment of enlightenment is inconceivable. A buddha displays the aspect of attaining enlightenment in this world system and simultaneously displays it in a billion other world systems. Because of this, it is to be understood that the time since the attainment of enlightenment is countless. However, when some people are told about this, because it is difficult for them to believe it, they think that it is a trick. On the other hand, those have accumulated sufficient roots of virtue in the past do believe it.

Even though a buddha has descended to the world, we still need the karma to see him and to receive teachings from him. In other words, we need fortune, that is, the accumulation of roots of virtue, in order for this to happen. Who sees a supreme emanation body? It is an ordinary being with pure karma. "Pure karma" refers to virtuous karma. Those with impure or negative karma are unable to see a buddha because it obscures their mind.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 457) says:

As many as are the particles that are subtle particles existing in
The places that are all the buddha lands of the directions,
For that many eons has the Sugata also gone to most holy supreme enlightenment,
Nonetheless, this secret of yours is not to be divulged. [12.39]

As many as are the number of *particles that are the subtle particles existing in the places that are all the buddha lands of the* ten *directions*, *for that many eons have* you, *the Sugata*, *also gone to most holy supreme enlightenment*. It is so, *nonetheless*, because it is difficult for those who have not accumulated roots of virtue in the past to believe it, *this secret of yours is not to be divulged*, yet it is explained here in order for those who strongly believe in it to accumulate inestimable merit.

The explanation by Jayananda's *Explanatory Commentary* "Moreover, it is expressed so since the truth bodies of all the buddhas are one, otherwise other buddhas would not arise" is not correct because the autocommentary teaches [the truth body] from the point of view of the arisal of the emanation body. Also the explanation "The cause for the arisal of the emanation body is intended to be the truth body" is also not feasible

- because if the measurement of having gone to the truth body is asserted to be merely that, the fault of there being no occasion of buddhahood for other persons would also be accrued here, and
- because, if the truth bodies of all the buddhas were one, it would be completely contradictory in that, when the past buddhas became buddhas, the truth bodies of those who did not become buddhas in the past and the truth bodies of those who are yet to become buddhas would have already been attained in the past.

Hence, the measure of having gone to the essence of enlightenment is indicated, but not the measure of the length of time since having become a buddha. Therefore, the amount that the emanation body displays the way of once again becoming a buddha in the essence of enlightenment after having become a buddha is indicated. Thus, Nagtsho's translation [of the root verse] is the best:

As many as the subtle particles existing
In all the lands, the places of the buddhas, of the ten directions,
For that long also your, the supreme sugata's, enlightenment will arise.

Instead of understanding it in this way, if it is explained as in the *Explanatory Commentary*, it becomes an object taught in the root text (v. 12.39d) without explaining [the word] "secret."

There are faults in asserting the truth bodies of all buddhas to be one. Lama Tsongkhapa says: "The explanation by Jayananda's *Explanatory Commentary* 'Moreover, it is expressed so since the truth bodies of all the buddhas are one, otherwise other buddhas would not arise' is not correct because the autocommentary teaches [the truth body] from the point of view of the arisal of the emanation body."

In short, the attainments of enlightenment are numberless. It is said, for example, that there is one human body, whereas there are in fact many. Each person has a different body, yet if it is asked "Are they all human bodies?", the answer is that they are. The instants of human bodies in all this world is about 6 billion. Each human has a body, some being attractive, some ugly, some tall, some short, and so forth. Are they all human bodies? They are. Similarly, the attainments of enlightenment can be posited as numberless. When the six billion human beings attain enlightenment there will be six billion enlightenments. In conclusion, there are numberless enlightenments.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 458) says:

3B2E-2 Explanation from the point of view of the time of remaining

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

Having thus expressed somewhat the time of manifest complete enlightenment, after that it is explained in terms of the time of abiding:

As long as all the worlds have not progressed to total supreme peace
And space has not been totally annihilated, for that long the Conqueror,
Produced from the Wisdom Mother with the nurse of mercy,
Will enact the tradition. Hence, how could you possess total peace? [12.40]

> The Bhagavan, having been born from the mother – the wisdom gone beyond – was entrusted to the nurse of compassion. Hence, the future life span of the Bhagavan should be known to exist as long as all worldly ones are not transformed into buddhahood and as long as space is not overcome.

A buddha remains or abides as long as there is space.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3B2E-2 The time of remaining
>
> *As long as the whole world has not gone completely to highest peace,*
> *And space has not been destroyed, so long will you Victorious One*
> *Born of the mother wisdom, with the nurse of loving compassion,*
> *Act in this way, so how do You have highest tranquillity?* [12.40]

How does he have a one-sided tranquillity? He does not, since as long as all the world has not gone completely to the highest peace, and space has not been destroyed, the Victorious One, born of the mother, [the transcendent action of] wisdom, through the nurse of compassion, acts in this way, remaining until samsara is empty.

A buddha, out of nurse-like compassion, remains until cyclic existence is emptied. A buddha abides in cyclic existence for the sake of all sentient beings until they all attain buddhahood. How is enlightenment attained? Enlightenment is attained when the two collections are complete. Chandrakirti says: "The Bhagavan, having been born from the mother – the wisdom gone beyond – was entrusted to the nurse of compassion." A buddha, having been born, is entrusted to the nurse of compassion. In other words, the perfection of wisdom gives birth to a buddha who is then cared for by the nurse of compassion and remains as long as space is not emptied, that is, until there are no more sentient beings because they have all attained the buddha ground.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If it is asked: What is the compassion of all the buddhas such that in order to accomplish the welfare of all sentient beings it nurtures them for endless periods?
>
> In order to show that the Bhagavan, subsequently perceiving the world as the basis of undergoing various sufferings, does not possibly completely pass beyond sorrow because the Compassionate One turns away from the mind of passing beyond sorrow, it is explained:
>
> *What your mercy is like for the family of beings, who have consumed*
> *Poisoned mundane food out of the fault of bewilderment, is unlike*
> *A mother's suffering for a son who is pained from eating poison.*
> *Thus, the Protectors have not reached total supreme peace.* [12.41]
>
> The term "mundane food" expresses the five attributes of desire. Due to strongly grasping to them, they also become poisonous when consumed because of being the cause of extensive suffering. Also, strong grasping to them as true in reality is produced through the fault of bewilderment.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *To your love for your family, the people who, through the fault of delusion,*
> *Have eaten the poisoned food of the world, a mother's suffering for*
> *Her son, in pain from eating poison, is not similar.*

Therefore, protectors, you have not gone completely to highest peace. [12.41]

He, the Protector, does not go completely to a one-sided highest peace because the suffering mind arising in a mother when her son has eaten poison and is in pain is nothing like the loving compassion which he has for his family, the beings who, through the fault of delusion, [grasping at true existence,] eat the poisoned food of the [five] worldly enjoyments.

If an only son ingests poison, his mother will experience much pain and worry. This is an analogy for the love of the buddhas for the sentient beings who have eaten the poisoned food of the five desirable objects. Why are the five desirable objects illustrated here by poisoned food? It is because, just as eating poisoned food produces pain, likewise, when sentient beings have attachment and adherence to the five desirable objects they experience suffering similar to that of eating poisoned food. In our own experience we can see that most of our sufferings arise from attachment to the five desirable objects. How does this strong adherence to them arise? It arises due to the fault of ignorance or confusion. Chandrakirti says: "Also, strong grasping to them as true in reality is produced through the fault of bewilderment." Hence, strong attachment to the five desirable objects, due to which we circle in cyclic existence, is caused by confusion.

What is the compassion of a buddha like? It is like the mercy of a mother for her only son who has eaten poisoned food. Due to his compassion for sentient beings, a buddha does not pass beyond sorrow.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> There, just as mercy is born in the Bhagavan towards samsaric beings eating poisonous food, torment is not likewise generated in a mother towards someone other than her beloved only son. Therefore, how could one with compassion possess the idea to completely pass beyond sorrow? Because compassion overcomes the mind of passing beyond sorrow, in order to demonstrate that the Bhagavan, subsequently seeing the world as being the basis of undergoing the variety of sufferings, does not possess a passing completely beyond sorrow, it is explained:
>
> *Because the unwise with minds that grasp to things and non-things obtain sufferings*
> *At the birth time and destruction, produced from leaving and meeting the unpleasant and pleasant,*
> *And wicked migrations; therefore, since the world became an object of mercy, your mind,*
> *Compassionate Bhagavan, turned from peace. Hence, you have no passing beyond sorrow.* [12.42]
>
> There, because – the unskillful with awarenesses that strongly grasp to things, having confidence in actions (e.g. karma) and effects, view rebirth as gods and humans as existent and, hence, definitely obtain the sufferings of birth and death and also experience the suffering of separating from pleasant objects and the suffering of meeting with unpleasant objects; [while the unskillful] having awareness that strongly grasps to things as non-existent, who are endowed with wrong view, also obtain fallen migrations such as hell and so forth and the suffering mentioned above – therefore, the compassion of the Bhagavan Buddha, having observed suffering, turns his mind away from passing beyond sorrow and abides.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Because those whose minds, by ignorance, grasp at things and at the nonexistence of things*
> *Find sufferings at times of birth and death and produced by losing and meeting the pleasant and unpleasant*
> *And migration to lower realms; therefore, the whole world becoming the object of love,*

Compassion, O lords, turns your mind aside from peace, and you do not have nirvana. [12.42]

He does not have the nirvana of one-sided peace, because since those whose minds, by lack of knowledge [of absolute reality], grasp at things as truly existent, or the phenomena [of cause and effect] as non-existent, receive sufferings on the occasions of birth and death, and arising from separation from pleasant [objects] and meeting the unpleasant, and migration to the lower realms, therefore, since the whole world has become the object of his great loving compassion, the Lord's mind is turned aside from [seeking one-sided] peace by great compassion.

A buddha turns away from attaining nirvana in order to help sentient beings who are experiencing many types of sufferings. Sentient beings, due to being unskilled, strongly adhere to things as truly existent, whereby, they take many rebirths and in each one experience the sufferings of birth and death. The suffering of death is the greatest of sufferings. In addition, sentient beings experience the suffering of separating from pleasant objects and the suffering of meeting unpleasant objects. For example, meeting a pleasant person makes us happy, whereas meeting an unpleasant person makes us unhappy.

Chandrakirti says: "[the unskillful] having an awareness that strongly grasps to things as non-existent, who are endowed with wrong view, also obtain fallen migrations such as hell and so forth and the suffering mentioned above." Due to the wrong view conceiving things to be non-existent, sentient beings create negative actions and are reborn in the lower migrations, the hells and so forth. This is also taught in the teachings on the Stages of the Path.

Chandrakirti says: "therefore, the compassion of the Bhagavan Buddha, having observed suffering, turns his mind away from passing beyond sorrow and abides." Because a buddha does not tolerate the suffering of sentient beings he does not pass beyond sorrow but remains in order to help them. How long does a buddha abide? He abides until space is emptied of sentient beings. It can be asked: "If a buddha abides that long why did Shakyamuni Buddha only live eighty years?"

Student: The Buddha showed passing beyond sorrow to teach impermanence but because he has a vajra body he does not actually die.

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: Have you seen his vajra body?! The Buddha showed the aspect of passing beyond sorrow in order to guide sentient beings who have a strong conception of permanence.

In short, be mindful of the fact that the five desirable objects are like poisoned food, therefore, just as when we eat poisoned food we experience much pain and even death, so too will be experience much suffering if we continue to use the five desirable objects. Thus, we should avoid generating strong attachment and adherence to them.

Tuesday morning, 15 May 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 458) says:

> *As long as all the worlds have not progressed to supreme total peace and*
> *As long as space has not been thoroughly destroyed,*
> *For that long you conquerors, who are born from the mother wisdom, due to the nurse of compassion*
> *Act in this way. Therefore, how could you possess total peace?* [12.40]

The duration of the future lifespan of a *conqueror* is *as long as all the worlds* – those to be subdued – *have not progressed to supreme total peace*, that is, as long as they have not become buddhas, *and as long as* uncompounded *space has not been thoroughly destroyed*, *for that long* the buddhas *born from the mother* that is the perfection of *wisdom* and entrusted to *the nurse of* great *compassion act in this way* explained before. Therefore, *how could* you who are like that *possess* the *peace* that is biased*?*

The buddhas abide as long as space has not been emptied of migrating beings. The buddha bhagavans are born from the mother-like perfection of wisdom and are cared for by the nurse-like compassion. In short, due to the buddhas themselves having compassion they do not pass beyond sorrow.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 458-9) says:

> QUESTION: What is the compassion of the buddhas like that cares for sentient beings for endless periods in order to accomplish the welfare of all sentient beings?
> RESPONSE:
>
> *Your mercy for worldly beings – the family of those very beings who have eaten poisoned food*
> *Due to the fault of confusion – is not like the suffering of a mother*
> *For her son who is pained from having eaten poison;*
> *Thus, the protectors do not go to supreme total peace.* [12.41]
>
> *By* the force of *the fault of* the *confusion* conceiving true existence, *worldly beings* eat with strong adherence to *food*, that is, the five desirable objects, thereby becoming the cause for extensive suffering. Therefore, the *mercy you* develop for *the family* – what is mine – *of those very beings who have eaten what is poisoned is not like* the mind of *suffering* developed by *a mother for her* only *son who is pained from having eaten poison*. *Thus, the protectors*, the buddhas, *do not go to the supreme total peace* that is biased.

Sentient beings have strong adherence to the five desirable objects due to which they generate attachment and so forth. The five desirable objects are likened to poisoned food, in that when they are made use of sentient beings experience suffering. Seeing this, the buddhas generate great compassion for sentient beings. A mother, ignoring her own pain, suffers when her only son experiences the pain of having ingested poisoned food. Due to thinking about her child's suffering, she does not think about her own suffering. Similarly, the buddhas, seeing the suffering of migrating beings, do not enter into the peace that is one-sided or biased.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 459) says:

> *Because the unskilled have awarenesses that adhere to things and non-things,*
> *Suffering is produced from the occasions of birth and disintegration, separating from the pleasant, and meeting with the unpleasant, and*
> *The migrations of the wicked are attained. Therefore, since the world thoroughly becomes an object of great compassion,*
> *Your minds, bhagavans, out of compassion turn away from peace, whereby you do not possess nirvana.* [12.42]
>
> *Because* of that, since those who are *not skilled* in the meaning of suchness – *having awarenesses that* strongly *adhere to things* as truly existent – view rebirth as a god and human as existing due to belief in actions and results, they are definitely afflicted with the suffering of the *occasions of birth and disintegration* – that is, death – and experience *the suffering that is produced through separating from pleasant* objects *and meeting with unpleasant* objects. Those having an awareness that adheres to *the things* that are causes and results *as non-existent*, possessing wrong view, *attain the migrations of the wicked* – that is, the bad migrations of the hells and so forth – as well as the suffering that was explained earlier. *Therefore*, *since* the beings of *the world thoroughly become objects of* great *compassion*, *your minds, bhagavans, out of* great *compassion turn away from* exertions for a biased *peace*, *whereby you* abide in the world *without possessing the nirvana* that is a biased peace.

Those who unskilled in suchness, strongly adhering to things, that is, actions and results, create actions that bring about rebirth as a god or human being. However, although born in the happy migrations they still experience the various sufferings of birth, death, separating from pleasant objects,

meeting with unpleasant objects, and so forth. There are eight types of sufferings mentioned in the teachings on the Stages of the Path, one of which is the suffering of separation from pleasant objects, such as our friends, and another of which is the suffering of encountering the unpleasant.

In addition, those who view actions and results as non-existent commit negative actions and are reborn in the lower migrations where they also experience the suffering of birth, death, separating from the pleasant, encountering the unpleasant, and so forth. For example, we can see that dogs experience happiness when their master is present and suffer when separated from him.

CONCLUSION

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 460) says:

> 3C The way in which the treatise was composed

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *Bhikshu Chandrakirti, having drawn this tradition*
> *From the* Treatise of the Middle Way,
> *Expressed it consistent with scripture and*
> *In accordance with oral instructions.* [13.1]
>
> *That "just as this dharma does not exist*
> *In other than this [*Treatise*], likewise,*
> *Also the tradition found here does not exist*
> *Elsewhere," should be ascertained by the wise.* [13.2]

That, "just as, except for the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, this dharma called 'emptiness' is not unmistakenly expressed in other treatises, likewise, also the tradition which was related here by us along with responses to objections, arisen from this tradition [of the *Treatise*], like the dharma of emptiness, does not exist in other treatises," please should be ascertained by the wise.

Chandrakirti was a bhikshu, a fully ordained monk. The *Treatise on the Middle Way* is Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom*. Chandrakirti composed his *Supplement* based on the *Treatise on the Middle Way* and in accordance with the Buddha's scriptures and the oral instructions. The Buddha's scriptures are the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, whereas the oral instructions are those of Nagarjuna.

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> 3C The way in which the treatise was composed
>
> *Bhiks□u Chandrakirti compiled this text*
> *From the* Treatise on the Middle Way,
> *Relating it in accordance with*
> *Instructions and with oral teachings.* [13.1]

This text, *Madhyamakavatara*, does not have the fault of being written according to Bhiks□u Shri Chandrakirti's own pleasure; for it is gathered from the *Treatise on the Middle Way*, *Mulamadhyamakakarika*, and related in accordance with [sutra] instructions of definitive meaning and with Nagarjuna's oral teachings.

> *Just as this Dharma is not found*
> *Except here, likewise also*
> *The method appearing here is not*
> *Found elsewhere, the wise should know.* [13.2]

It should be understood that those striving for liberation should enter this method, for the learned must know that, just as this unerringly taught Dharma of voidness does not exist except in this text on Madhyamaka, so too the method appearing here does not exist in other texts.

Since the subject matter of Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* does not exist in other texts, it is suitable to engage in hearing it and thinking about it.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, that which is stated by some saying "That very tradition that is propounded by the Sautrantikas as ultimate is accepted as conventional by the Madhyamikas," should be understood as being stated by only those obviously unaware of suchness, which is the meaning of the *Treatise on the Middle Way*. Further, those who imagine "that propounded as ultimate by the Vaibhashikas is conventional for the Madhyamikas" are also only totally unaware of thusness, the meaning of the *Treatise*, because of the unsuitability of such supramundane phenomena and mundane phenomena being similar. The wise should ascertain that "This tradition is uncommon."

Some scholars say that what is asserted to be ultimate truth by the Sautrantikas is asserted to be conventional truth by the Madhyamikas, however, such people do not understand the meaning of the *Treatise on the Middle Way*. How do the Sautrantikas posit ultimate truth? They say that an ultimate truth is that which is ultimately able to perform a function. However, the Madhyamikas do on accept that there is anything that is ultimately able to perform a function, in fact according to them such a thing is not an object of a valid cognizer.

Other scholars say that what is presented to be ultimate truth by the Vaibhashikas is asserted to be conventional truth by the Madhyamikas, but this too is incorrect. The Vaibhashikas define an ultimate truth is: a phenomenon that is such that, if it is broken or mentally separated into parts, the mind apprehending that object does not cease. This is not asserted by the Madhyamikas to be conventional truth. Therefore, that which is indicated by the Sautrantikas and Vaibhashikas to be ultimate truth is not asserted to be a nominal or conventional truth by the Madhyamikas. For them, since these so-called "ultimate truths" are not objects of a valid cognizer, they do not even exist conventionally. Thus, the scholars who make such statements do not understand the meaning of the *Treatise on the Middle Way*.

Chandrakirti says: "The wise should ascertain that 'This tradition is uncommon.'" There are eight uncommon features of the Prasangika Madhyamika system which are uncommon to specific tenet systems.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> Therefore, since those who become frightened by ascertaining the mere words, not knowing the heart intention of the Acharya and without having already ascertained the meaning of suchness, totally abandon this supramundane dharma; therefore, saying "This *Supplement into the Treatise on the Middle Way* was composed in order to unmistakenly show the suchness that is the meaning of the *Treatise*," it is explained:
>
> *Out of fear due to the color of the very vast ocean of Nagarjuna's intellect,*
> *Beings discard to a great distance what are excellent traditions.*
> *Hence, the water that opens the kamuda [flower] of his*
> *Unblossomed verses now completely fulfill the hopes of Chandrakirti.* [13.3]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *Frightened by the color of the vast ocean of Nagarjuna's mind,*
> *People have avoided his right method by a great distance. Now,*
> *The water from the opening of the kumuda – the unfolding*
> *Of his karikas – fulfills completely Chandrakirti's hopes.* [13.3]

It should be understood that there is an excellent reason for composing this treatise; for, although people propounding true existence, [the Chittamatrins and so on,] being frightened by the color of the very vast ocean of Acharya Nagarjuna's mind, [black in its scarcely fathomable depths,] have avoided Nagarjuna's right method by a great distance, yet the water from the opening of the kumuda lotus which is the unfolding of the *Mulamadhyamakakarika* now fulfills the hopes in the mind of Chandrakirti, [the moon which opens this lotus].

Some people who are unable to understand the meaning of the *Treatise on the Middle Way* become frightened even by ascertaining the mere words. Chandrakirti composed the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* in order "to unmistakenly show the suchness that is the meaning of the *Treatise*." Thus, there is a purpose to Chandrakirti composing his treatise, the *Supplement*: it is to bring those who are far from the meaning of Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* closer to it. For example, an unopened flower bud can be likened to the mind of those of the lower schools. In order to blossom it needs to be watered; this is likened to Chandrakirti composing the *Supplement* in order to open the minds of the followers of the lower schools.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> If asked: Did not the Elders Vasubandhu, Dignaga, Dharmapala, and so forth, those authors of treatises who have already come, frightened by merely hearing the letters, fully reject this unmistakenly indicated meaning of dependent arising?
>
> It is said like that!

Vasubandhu was initially a Sautrantika but later became a Chittamatrin. Dignaga and Dharmapala were Chittamatrins. These three scholars were unable to bear the words of Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* that say that there is not the slightest atom of inherent existence. Instead they assert that phenomena exist inherently and truly, and, therefore, reject Nagarjuna's teachings. In fact, Vasubandhu is know to have once said, "Nagarjuna is a manifestation of a mara and my brother is his follower. The mahayana is like a space-flower." Vasubandhu's older brother was Asanga, a follower of Nagarjuna in that he too asserted the mahayana. According to the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas the mahayana is not the words of the Buddha, that is, it was not taught by the Buddha. Thus, for these two lower schools it is not feasible to accept Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*.

It is recounted that once Vasubandhu went to visit his brother Asanga, in whose room there were the five treatises that composed by Asanga himself, and picking one up began to read it. Vasubandhu's mind was captivated by what was written in these texts and he became a Chittamatrin, that is, he came to accept the mahayana. Vasubandhu, having initially been a hinayanist who deprecated the mahayana, composed the *Treasury of Knowledge* in order to purify this negative karma. Because the *Treasury of Knowledge* was composed for the purpose of purifying the negative karma of abandoning the Dharma, it is said that studying this text purifies this heavy karma.

Dignaga had four main disciples, one of whom was expert in the perfection of wisdom, another in Vinaya, another in Abhidharma, and another in the Treatise of Valid Cognition.

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

If asked: How is this to be realized?

It is explained:

> *This profound terrifying thusness, already explained, will be definitely realized by beings*
> *Out of prior familiarity. Others will not comprehend it though they listen extensively.*
> *Therefore, having seen those systems contrived by their minds, like pudgalavadin texts,*
> *Avoid the mind enjoying texts accepted by other traditions apart from this!* [13.4]

It should be understood that "just as the Forders, those who did not previously deposit imprints of strong interest in emptiness in their mental continua, [temporarily] abandoned the afflictions of the three realms – the desire, form, and formless – and saw they were able to join other tenets, yet were unable to be strongly interested in the ultimate intricately demonstrated by the Lord of Sages, likewise, they also already possess much listening to such types, yet do not utilize comprehending emptiness due to lacking the seeds of great interest in emptiness."

Thus, even in these very days, some who have deposited imprints of strong interest in emptiness in other lifetimes appear to realize the depths of emptiness out of only the strength of the cause. Even from the scriptural traditions of the Forders, those who decrease seeing it as true are seen to judge the depths of emptiness out of only the strength of the cause. Therefore, apart from the scriptural tradition of the Madhyamika, even having studied those systems concerning the texts of others contrived by their minds, like that done in the scriptural traditions of those who elucidate a self, avoid a joyous intellect. One should not realize surprise about other systems contrived by their minds; one should realize surprise only about great interest in viewing one's own emptiness!

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought*, as translated by Martin Willson, says:

> *This fearsome, profound reality which we have explained, will be truly understood*
> *By some from previous habit; others will not understand it though they listen much.*
> *Therefore, one should see that the latter's method is arbitrary, and reject the mind enjoying*
> *Treatises accepted by other schools apart from this, such as Pudgalavadin texts.* [13.4]

It should be understood that since methods teaching ultimate truth [apart from Madhyamika methods] are not the thought of the buddhas, one should see that they are written arbitrarily, and reject the attitude which delights in treatises accepted by other schools, other than this Madhyamika school, such as treatises propounding self-existence of the personality. For this fearsome, profound, absolute reality explained above will be understood truly by a person from habitual impressions of [very great] devotion to voidness in previous [lifetimes], but others will not understand this profound meaning even if they listen extensively.

Someone who lacks the latencies of emptiness from previous lifetimes, even if skilled in other texts, does not listen to this text and does not approach the realization of emptiness. Those who are skilled in the non-Buddhist schools, the Forders, do not believe in emptiness due to not having deposited these latencies in other lives. However, they do become free from the attachment of the three realms – the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm – by means of abandoning the objects of abandonment of the mundane path of meditation. They, therefore, separate from the attachment of the desire realm and attain an actual absorption of the form realm. They then separate from the attachment of the form realm and attain the actual absorptions of infinite space through nothingness. In this way they separate from attachment, that is, the coarse afflictions, up to the level of Nothingness. However, they do not believe in the Buddha's teachings on emptiness due to not having deposited the latencies of listening to teachings on emptiness in their past lives.

Tuesday afternoon, 15 May 2001

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 460) says:

> *This system, compiled by the monk Chandrakirti*
> *from the* Treatise on the Middle Way,
> *Is expressed in accordance with the scriptures and*
> *In accordance with the instructions.* [13.1]
>
> *Just as this Dharma does not exist in others,*
> *Likewise, also the system that occurs here*
> *Should be ascertained by the wise*
> *Stating "It does not exist in others."* [13.2]

The system of this unmistaken commentary on the intention of the protector Nagarjuna, *having been compiled by the monk* Glorious Chandrakirti *from* [Nagarjuna's] *Treatise on the Middle Way – Fundamental Wisdom* – and so forth, is *expressed in accordance with the scriptures*, the sutras of definitive meaning, *and in accordance with the instructions* of Arya Nagarjuna. *Just as this Dharma* called "emptiness" *is not* unmistakenly expressed *in other treatises* apart from the scriptural system of the Middle Way, *likewise*, we ask that *also the system that occurs here* – that described by us here together with objections and responses – *be ascertained by the wise stating* "Such a Dharma of emptiness *does not exist in other treatises*." This is why the autocommentary says that those Madhyamikas who state "Whatever the Sautrantikas and Vaibhashikas say is ultimate is asserted by the Madhyamikas to be conventional," say this due to not understanding the suchness of the *Treatise on the Middle Way* because it is unsuitable for a supramundane Dharma to be similar to a mundane Dharma. Hence, since they posit all assertions of what is nominally presented as lacking establishment by way of its own character, they are a system that asserts tenets, such as that of the two proponents of objects who present on the basis of establishment by way of its own character, not only do not exist as the ultimate of their own system but do not exist even nominally. Thus, it is admonished "Understand that our own system is not only uncommon to the Chittamatrins, but it is uncommon to the system of the other Madhyamikas who comment on the intention of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva!" With respect to this, since Acharya [Chandrakirti] accepts Acharya Buddhapalita's commentary as valid, he does not imply any criticism of him, whereas, the two – the system of the conquerors' son Shantideva and the system of this acharya – appear to be very similar.

In dependence on the presentation of the two truths on the basis of there not existing establishment by way of its own character even nominally, there are many uncommon explanations that do not accept the tenets of the Svatantrikas, a basis-of-all, and so forth, however, they are not discussed here since they are extensively explained in the *Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and Definitive* and so forth.

Although there are non-Buddhists who abandon the afflictions of the desire realm through those of Nothingness, they cannot understand the subject matter of the *Treatise on the Middle Way* due to not having the latencies of emptiness. Even the scholars of the lower Buddhist schools become frightened upon seeing the words setting out emptiness of the Prasangikas. The Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Svatantrika Madhyamikas are unable to realize the uncommon system of the Prasangika Madhyamika. For example, the elders, such as Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and Dharmapala, although skilled in philosophy are not able to realize the uncommon system of the Prasangika Madhyamika, this system being considered uncommon in that it has assertions that are uncommon to or not shared with the lower schools. The wise should understand that this is the case.

Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and others composed texts according to the Chittamatra system, these being unlike Prasangika Madhyamika system. Chandrakirti says that he is unable to understand their minds, meaning he does not know what their level of realization is. One text says: "Those like me can judge their own mind, but they cannot judge the mind of others. If they do, they will degeneration their own realizations." Gyeltshap Je's commentary on Dharmakirti's *Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition* says that we should be careful not to criticize others because we do not

know who is a holy being and therefore risk falling into a pit of fire. It is recounted, for example, that when Shantideva lived in Nalanda Monastery in India he was known as the "One with three realizations," these three being eating, sleeping, and defecating. At that time in the monastery there was a tradition that every fifteen days a monk would give teachings in a nearby nunnery. When Shantideva's turn came to teach, the nuns, in order to make fun of him, constructed an extremely high throne but without any steps up to it. The monks from Nalanda also came to hear the teachings. However, when Shantideva arrived he pressed the high throne down to a normal level with his hand and sat down. He then asked the nuns "What Dharma should I teach today?" They asked him to teach something new that had never been taught before. Shantideva then began his teaching which became the text *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*. When he came to the ninth chapter of this text, which is dedicated to the perfection of wisdom, he flew up into the air through an opening in the roof with his legs in the vajra position and continued on to the Glorious Mountain in the south. However, the foe destroyers in the audience who had the clairvoyance of divine ear were able to hear the remaining teachings. Thus, although Shantideva appeared to be very simple he had in fact great realizations, demonstrated by his ability to fly. Some of the monks later went to the Glorious Mountain and asked him what was the text the *Compendium of Learning* that he had referred to in his teachings on *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*. He told them that this text, written on rolled leaves, could be found hidden in the rafters of his room in Nalanda.

In short, we should not disparage other people as we do not know who is wise and who is a fool.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page (461-3) says:

> OPINION: The supramundane is others' systems, which have passed beyond the nominalities of the world, and the mundane is our own system.
> RESPONSE: Since this contradicts the statement in the autocommentary "[They] thoroughly abandon the supramundane phenomenon," it must be the opposite, that is, the meanings of "mundane" and "supramundane" are the systems that do not realize and do realize suchness just as it is.
>
> Because this way of explaining the intention of the Arya is uncommon, those who do not understand the intention of the Arya and who, without ascertaining the suchness of the scriptures, are frightened by the mere letters that present emptiness, abandon this supramundane Dharma. Therefore, that "The *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* was composed in order to unmistakenly present the suchness that is the meaning of the *Treatise on the Middle Way*" is explained:
>
> *Out of fear due to the color of the extremely vast ocean of Nagarjuna's intellect,*
> *Beings abandon to a far distance that which is the excellent system,*
> *But this water that opens the kumuda flower of his unfolding verses,*
> *Now completely fulfills the hopes of Chandrakirti.* [13.3]
>
> *Out of fear due to the* dark gray *color of the extremely vast ocean* difficult to fathom *of* Arya *Nagarjuna's intellect* realizing the profound, *the beings* who are proponents of Chittamatra and so forth indeed *abandon to a far distance that which is the excellent system* of Nagarjuna, yet *the water that opens the kumuda flower of the unfolding verses* of the Middle Way text acts to open the kumuda, *now fulfilling the hopes* in *Chandrakirti's* mind.
> QUESTION: If it is like that, did the authors of treatises who already came, the elders Vasubandhu, Dignaga, Dharmapala, and so forth, frightened also by hearing the mere letters, thoroughly abandon this unmistaken teaching on the meaning of dependent and related arising?
> RESPONSE: That is what is said. In regard to saying that, the texts of Vasubandhu and Dignaga that are free from argument could indeed be interpreted as the system of Cognition Only, but it is difficult for those like us to thoroughly realize just what the assertions of these acharyas are.
> QUESTION: Moreover, who realizes that profound meaning?
> RESPONSE:
>
> *The terrifying profound suchness that was already explained is definitely realized*
> *By beings through previous familiarity.* [13.4ab]

The terrifying profound meaning of *suchness that was already explained* before seems to be *definitely realized by those beings who previously familiarized* with the latencies of strongly aspiring for emptiness in other lives.

Here, Nagtsho's translation as follows appears to be better than Patshab's translation:

> Those possessing the inferior scriptural system of the Forders viewing true existence are seen to realize emptiness by the force of the cause.

Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:

> *Although they listen extensively, it is not comprehended by others.*
> *Therefore, having seen the systems that are contrived by their own minds, just as you would the scriptural systems that express a self,*
> *Give up the mind that likes those other than this – the texts that assert others' systems.* [13.4bcd]

Just as other schools, those who have not previously deposited the latencies of strongly aspiring for emptiness in their mental continuum, as is explained in *Abhidharma*, abandon, for the time being, the manifest afflictions of the three realms excluding those of the Peak of Existence, and are seen to be able to closely connect to other tenets, yet are unable to strongly aspire for emptiness, the ultimate of the teachings taught by the Buddha, similarly, *although* these acharyas possess *extensive listening* to many scriptures, the profound meaning *is not comprehended by* them, that is, by *others*. *Therefore*, since *the system* of teaching the ultimate of those other than the Madhyamaka system does not become the intention of the Buddha, *having seen*, or viewed, *those that are contrived by their own minds*, *give up – just as you would the scriptural systems that express*, or clarify, *a self* of persons – *the mind that likes texts asserting the systems of other* acharyas, those that are *other than this* Madhyamaka system; that is, do not be amazed by other systems that are contrived by their own minds, but be amazed by just the strong aspiration for our own view of emptiness.

Lama Tsongkhapa says that one should give up enjoying texts that are other than those of the Madhyamika system. One should "be amazed by just the strong aspiration for our own view of emptiness."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 463) says:

3D Dedicating the virtue of having composed the treatise

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> *By whatever merit I have attained through relating Acharya Nagarjuna's good tradition,*
> *Pervading the ends of the directions and white as autumn's moving star in the sky*
> *Of my mind – blue due to afflictions – or jewel-like in the hood of the snake of my mind,*
> *May the entire world realize thusness and quickly progress to the ground of the Sugata*. [13.5]

Gedun Drup's *Mirror of the Clarification of the Thought,* as translated by Martin Willson, says:

3D Dedicating the merits of composition

> *By whatever merits I have received from recounting Acharya Nagarjuna's right method,*
> *Which fill the quarters, like white stars in autumn in the sky of my mind made blue*
> *By defilements or like a jewel in the head of the serpent of my mind,*
> *May all the world perceive reality, and quickly go through to the stage of sugatahood.* [13.5]

By whatever merits I have received from recounting Acharya Nagarjuna's right method, which fill the limits of the directions and are white like the zodiacal constellations in autumn amidst the sky of my mind made blue [or black] by defilements or like a jewel in the head of the serpent of [the author's] mind, may the whole world directly realize absolute reality, and quickly win through to the stage of sugatahood, [called "Universal Light"].

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 463) says:

> *Due to the merit, pervading the limits of the directions, I have attained from describing the excellent system of Acharya Nagarjuna –*
> *White as the moving autumn stars in the sky of my mind, blue from the afflictions,*
> *Or like a jewel in the snake hood of my mind,*
> *May all the worlds without exception realize suchness and then quickly progress to the sugata ground.* [13.5]

By the force of the extensive accumulation of *merit*, *pervading the limits of the directions* that *I have attained*, which arose *from describing*, or explaining, *the excellent system* of the Middle Way of the great *acharya*, Arya *Nagarjuna*, by thoroughly clarifying the collection of scriptures and reasonings – *as* completely *white as the moving autumn stars* in the midst of *the sky of my mind* made dark *blue by the* collection of *afflictions* or *like a jewel in the snake hood of my*, the author's, *mind*, *may all the worlds* of sentient beings *without exception realize* the profound *suchness* just as it is, *then quickly progress to the ground of a sugata*, called "Universal Light." Nagtsho's translation says:

> Whatever merit has been attained through resounding the beautiful system of Nagarjuna in all directions... [13.5a]

Glorious Chandrakirti dedicates the merit he has accumulated from composing the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'* to the attainment of the buddha ground, Universal Light, by all sentient beings. Chandrakirti sets out an analogy as poetic license. He says that most sentient beings' minds are obscured or blackened by the afflictions, but that among the afflictions there are some white or positive minds, just as in the blue sky there are white stars. In this way, Chandrakirti dedicates the white stars of his merit found among the dark blue sky of the afflictions. Chandrakirti also likens his merits to a jewel in the hood of the snake of his, the author's, mind. It is said that the eight types of great nagas have ornaments of jewels on the snake hood that covers their heads. Thus, Chandrakirti likens the black or negative minds to a snake hood in which there are at times positive thoughts, these being likened to the jewels in the snake hood. In this way, Chandrakirti dedicates his merit that all the worlds of sentient beings without exception realize the profound suchness just as it is and then quickly progress to the sugata ground called "Universal Light."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 463-4) says:

4 Meaning of the conclusion

- A The acharya who composed it
- B The translators and pandits who translated it

4A The acharya who composed it

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> That completes the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way,"'* elucidating the manner of the profound and the extensive, composed by Acharya Chandrakirti who looked up to the supreme vehicle, possessed undeprivable wisdom and compassion, and who, by extracting milk from the picture of a milking cow, overcame grasping to true [existence].

The *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* clarifies the manner of the profound and extensive. The profound manner or mode is emptiness. The *Supplement* explains that even though all the phenomena ranging from form through the exalted knower of all aspects are not established by way of their own character or do not exist inherently, agents and actions are still feasible. The extensive manner refers to the

explanation of the three qualities of this context and the eleven grounds, the causal grounds and the resultant ground. The three qualities of ordinary beings are set out in the *Supplement* (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) saying:

> *The mind of compassion, non-dual understanding,*
> *And the altruistic mind of enlightenment*
> *Are the causes of children of conquerors.* [1.1]

Thus, the three qualities are compassion, the understanding of non-duality, and the mind of enlightenment. Compassion is of three types: compassion observing mere sentient beings, compassion observing phenomena, and compassion observing the non-observable. Chandrakirti praises the first type of compassion (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) saying:

> *Homage to that compassion for migrators who are*
> *Powerless like a bucket traveling in a well*
> *Through initially adhering to a self, an 'I',*
> *And then generating attachment for things, 'This is mine.'* [1.3]

There is then a discussion about how migrating beings wander in cyclic existence like a bucket in a well. It is said that first, sentient beings adhere to the existence of a self thinking "I," and then generate the view of the transitory collection of mine. Due to this conception of mine, beings create karma. This is taught also in Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* (Hopkins, *Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation*) saying:

> As long as the aggregates are conceived
> So long thereby does the conception of I exist.
> Further, when the conception of I exists,
> There is action, and from it there also is birth.
>
> When these three pathways mutually causing each other
> Without a beginning, middle, or an end,
> This wheel of cyclic existence
> Turns like the wheel of a firebrand.

Like a swiftly turning firebrand, the three paths of cyclic existence have no beginning, middle, or end. The three paths are

1. the thoroughly afflicted path of afflictions,
2. the thoroughly afflicted path of actions, and
3. the thoroughly afflicted path of rebirth.

Due to these three paths one continues to circle in cyclic existence like the circling of a firebrand. Seeing this, one generates compassion.

The three paths can be related to the twelve links of dependent-arising. The thoroughly afflicted paths of afflictions are the first, eight, and ninth links (ignorance, craving, and grasping); the thoroughly afflicted paths of actions are the second and the tenth links (karmic formations and existence); and the thoroughly afflicted paths of rebirth are the remaining seven links which are suffering (consciousness, name and form, the six entrances, contact, feeling, birth, aging and death).

Chandrakirti (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) praises the third type of compassion, the compassion observing the non-observable, saying:

[Homage to that compassion for] migrators
Seen as evanescent and empty of inherent
Existence like a moon in rippling water. [1.4ab]

How would one praise the second type of compassion? By changing the words of this verse as follows:

[Homage to that compassion for] migrators
Seen as empty of permanence,
Like a moon in rippling water.

Seeing sentient beings in these ways it becomes easy to generate compassion for them. Chandrakirti (Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*) says:

Mercy alone is seen as the seed
Of a conqueror's rich harvest,
As water for development, and as
Ripening in a state of long enjoyment,
Therefore at the start I praise compassion. [1.2]

Since compassion is so important it is praised by Chandrakirti at the very beginning of his text.

In short, the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way'* was composed by Acharya Chandrakirti. There is a story related to the reference here about extracting milk from the picture of a cow. When Chandrakirti was living in Nalanda Monastery the monks kept cows in order to provide the monastery with milk. When it was Chandrakirti's turn to milk the cows, although he let the cows roam completely free without taking care of them, he was able to provide the monastery with milk each morning. The monks wondered how this was possible and went to see how Chandrakirti managed this. Looking into his room, they saw that he extracted milk from a picture of a cow drawn on the wall of his room. This is the reason that here the text says: "who, by extracting milk from the picture of a milking cow, overcame grasping to true [existence]."

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 464) says:

> This completes the *'Supplement to the "Middle Way,"'* clarifying the manner of the profound and extensive, composed by Acharya Chandrakirti, who practiced the supreme, vehicle, possessed unassailable wisdom and compassion, and who, by extracting milk from a drawing of a cow, overcame the adherence to true existence.

This completes the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way,"' clarifying the manner of the profound and extensive in Nagarjuna's system, *composed by* the great *acharya*, glorious *Chandrakirti*, holder of knowledge and renowned to have attained the illusion-like meditative stabilization *who* thoroughly *practiced the supreme*, highest *vehicle*, *possessed* amazing *wisdom and compassion unassailable* by the discordant class, *and who, by extracting milk from a drawing of a cow, overcame* sentient beings' *adherence to true existence*.

Chandrakirti extracted milk from the drawing of a cow in order for sentient beings to overcome their adherence to true existence.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 464) says:

4B The translators and pandits who translated it

Chandrakirti's autocommentary says:

> The sources were written mostly in accordance with sutra,
> And thereafter, when two versions were possible, it was
> Translated to agree with the term's meaning in the root text and commentary.
> Act honestly! It is to be analyzed.

Translated at the Ratnagupta Vihara in the Kashmiri city of Anupatna, during the reign of the Kashmiri king, the Glorious Aryadeva, by the Indian Abbot Tilaka Kalasha and the Tibetan translator Venerable Patsab Nyima Drag, in accordance with the Kashmiri text. Later, at the Rasa [i.e., Lhasa] Ramoche, that very Tibetan translator encountered the eastern Aparanta text and properly correcting [the first version], settled it.

The size of this text is one-sixth of a *bampo* short of twelve *bampos*, having three thousand five hundred and fifty stanzas.

Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination* (Tibetan text page 464) says:

> Translated at the Ratnagupta Vihara, in center of the city of Anupama in Kashmir, during the life of the Kashmiri king, glorious Aryadeva, by the Indian abbot Tilaka and the Tibetan translator Venerable Patshab Nyimadrag, in accordance with the Kashmiri text. Later, at the Ramoche in Rasa (i.e., Lhasa), the Indian abbot Kanakavarma and that very translator compared it to the eastern Aparanta text and correcting it well, settled it.

Translated [from Sanskrit into Tibetan] *at the Ratnagupta Vihara, in center of the city of Anupama in Kashmir, during the life of the Kashmiri king, glorious Aryadeva, by the Indian abbot Tilaka* Kalasha (Drop Vase) *and the Tibetan translator* Patshab Nyimadrag*, in accordance with the Kashmiri text. Later, at the Ramoche in Rasa (i.e., Lhasa), the Indian abbot Kanakavarma* (Golden Armor) *and that very translator compared it to the eastern Aparanta text and correcting it well, settled it* by means of studying it.

The compilation of the common points in terms of the author's colophon and the translator's colophon is from the point of view of revising it through combining the two, the separate translation of the root verses and the root verses in the commentary.

Lama Tsongkhapa's colophon

> The supreme essence of all the teachings of the Conqueror,
> The profound middle way free from extremes, the path of dependent-arising,
> Having abandoned the two extremes, just as prophesied in regard to the Teacher,
> Supreme Arya Nagarjuna precisely composed his commentary.
>
> Although many systems of the wise commenting on the intention
> Of Aryadeva, the holy system far from that,
> Glorious Buddhapalita composed a complete commentary
> On the systems of Chandrakirti and Shantideva.
>
> With respect to the assertions of the three lords of tenets,
> Having synthesized them into one, they are well explained
> With conclusive analysis of the essential points and precise words,
> Whereby, the supreme Prasangika system is established to be stainless.

Even those aspiring to this system in this northern land,
Not following the extremely subtle ways of reasoning and
Having inferior fortune regarding the profound meaning,
Disparage the supreme system that they do not realize.

To eliminate the stains to seeing much and
To clarify the profound path for the few of good fortune,
I too strove in all lives
In order not to be separated the supreme path.

By the virtue that arose from this hardship here,
May all migrating being fully realize the profound essential points and
Exerting themselves constantly to accomplish it night and day,
Always please the conquerors and their sons.

As a result of the persistent urging of the virtuous spiritual friend Lhulaka Chupa Legpa Pel, who offered a mandala of forty silver coins, and the persistent urging of many virtuous spiritual friends who strongly aspired to this Dharma and whose mental capacity for the meanings and realizations is not low, saying "Make an extensive conclusive analysis of the general meaning of [the middle way] that has complete explanations of the difficult points of the autocommentary and that clarifies the words and meanings," the glorious Tsongkhapa Losang Dragpa, a yogi of the great middle way and a monk from the east who had done much listening, composed this [text] called *Illumination of the Thought*, *An Extensive Explanation of [Chandrakirti's]* '*Supplement to the "Middle Way"'* at Ganden Monastery, the place of total victory.

SARVAMANGALAM

English translator's colophon of the *Explanation of the 'Supplement to the "Middle Way"'*:

English colophon Translated into English and edited at Istituto Lama Tzong Khapa, near Pisa, Italy, by Gelong Thubten Tsultrim (George Churinoff), 1994. This working draft is based on a first draft of the translation by the translator with the kind assistance of Tibetan Abbot, Geshe Jampa Gyatso and the translator Acharya Thubten Jampa (partial), following the Peking and Derge editions of the Tibetan text. The first draft was completed January 23, 1991. Seventy copies of this working draft were offered on the occasion of the teaching of this text by His Holiness the Dalai Lama at Sera Monastery, South India, October 31, 1994.

Reprinted January 2000 for the exclusive use of the Masters Program.

English translator's colophon of the *Illumination of the Thought:*

This preliminary translation of part of Lama Tsongkhapa's *Illumination of the Thought*, the commentary on verses 6.8 onward of the *Supplement to the 'Middle Way,'* was done by Joan Nicell (Getsulma Tenzin Choden), and checked and corrected by the Tibetan interpreter and translator Thubten Sherab Sherpa, for use by the Masters Program students on the occasion of the oral commentary by the most precious virtuous spiritual friend Geshe Jampa Gyatso at Istituto Lama Tzong Khapa, Pomaia (Pisa), Italy, during the period May 2000 to May 2001. This translation was then corrected on the basis of Geshe Jampa Gyatso's oral commentary and appears in the weekly transcripts of these teachings, however, it still requires further checking and editing and should in no way be considered final.

Whatever merit has been created is dedicated to the long and healthy life of Geshe Jampa Gyatso,
the ongoing success of the FPMT Masters Program, and
the flourishing of all the Dharma activities of the precious spiritual guides,
Lama Zopa Rinpoche and Lama Osel Rinpoche.

THE END

Extra questions related to the *Middle Way*:

Student: Does stanza 12.39 of the *Supplement* indicate the time from the Buddha's enlightenment until now, or does it indicate how long the Buddha will remain from now (Tibetan text of *Illumination*, page 458)?

> *As many as are the particles that are subtle particles existing in*
> *The places that are all the buddha lands of the directions,*
> *For that many eons has the Sugata also gone to most holy supreme enlightenment,*
> *Nonetheless, this secret of yours is not to be divulged.* [12.39]

Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The amount of supreme emanation bodies is indicated, not the measure of how long a buddha remains after his enlightenment. A buddha attains enlightenment in Not Low (Akanishta) and displays emanation bodies to sentient beings who display the attainment of enlightenment in different places. The time of enlightenment is not just once in Not Low but enlightenment is attained many times in the form of emanation bodies who enact the twelve deeds of a buddha.

Student: Does the supreme emanation body of Shakyamuni Buddha exist at the present time in this world? If someone were to see a buddha with all the signs and exemplifications in the present time in this world, would that necessarily be a supreme emanation body?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: A supreme emanation body with all the signs and exemplifications does not presently exist in this particular world. This is because the period in which Shakyamuni Buddha showed the various deeds has come to an end and he is now enacting the attainment of enlightenment in other worlds. His Holiness the Dalai Lama says that when someone attains the great level of the mahayana path of preparation that person sees buddha statues as actual buddhas in the aspect of supreme emanation bodies and can converse with them. In one text it says: "In front of one with very strong belief, Shakyamuni Buddha appears." We can think of the story of Asanga who did not see Maitreya even though he had been in the cave with him all the time.

Student: In the presentation of the third bodhisattva ground, Lama Tsongkhapa says that a third ground bodhisattva attains the four pure concentrations, four pure formless absorptions, the four pure immeasurables, and the five pure clairvoyances. However, it seems that the bodhisattva attains the concentrations, formless absorptions, immeasurables, and clairvoyances prior to the third ground. Therefore, what is the distinction between these 'pure' attainments and the mere attainments? And does a bodhisattva attain these "pure" attainments on the third ground or before? How do these attainments become "pure"?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: I would have to refresh my memory by looking at *Illumination* again in order to answer the question. But, in general, on the third ground a bodhisattva attains, from among the three higher trainings, the surpassing higher training of the mind. In the commentary it does not say "higher training in meditative stabilization" but instead says "higher training of the mind." The higher training of wisdom is attained on the fourth, fifth, and sixth grounds. On the fourth ground the bodhisattva attains a wisdom skilled in the coarse and subtle thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment, on the fifth ground he attains a wisdom skilled in the coarse and subtle four noble truths, and on the sixth ground he attains a wisdom skilled in coarse and subtle dependent-arising, that is, the forward and reverse orders.

An actual absorption of a first concentration can be either pure or uncontaminated. An uncontaminated actual absorption of a first concentration is one that is suitable to transform into a superior's uncontaminated path. A pure actual absorption of a first concentration is of four types: that concordant with degeneration, that concordant with abiding, that concordant with enhancement, and that concordant with definite differentiation. A pure actual absorption of the first concentration

concordant with degeneration is an actual absorption of the first concentration that will degenerate due to the arisal of afflictions or an actual absorption of the first concentration in which an affliction will arise in the next moment. A pure actual absorption of the first concentration concordant with abiding is one that is presently an actual absorption of the first concentration and in the next moment will remain that. A pure actual absorption of the first concentration concordant with enhancement is an actual absorption of the first concentration which in the second moment will become an actual absorption of the second concentration. A pure actual absorption of the first concentration concordant with definite differentiation is an actual absorption of the first concentration that in the second moment will become the entity of an uncontaminated path.

Student: It is said that the eighth ground bodhisattva will attain the ten controls. Does this mean that he attains them on the eighth ground, or that he merely attains a similitude of them on the eighth ground?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: He only attains a similitude of them on the eighth ground in that the actual controls are only attained on the buddha ground.

Student: According to the Prasangika school what is the pervasion between the perfect end and the uncommon absorption of cessation?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: The perfect end is emptiness, whereas an uncommon absorption of cessation is an exalted knower. However, the actualization of the perfect end means to absorb in meditative equipoise on emptiness in a manner of not arising again. In short, the absorption of cessation is not an emptiness, whereas the perfect end is an emptiness.

Student: What is the difference between anger and hatred according to Buddhism?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In general, they are the same. In the Treasury of Knowledge the six subtle increasors that are root afflictions include anger, which is considered to be the equivalent of hatred.

Student: In the transcript of Geshe-la's *Ornament* teachings (week 14, p. 35, 31 May 2001), it says: "In the perspective of an exalted knower of all aspects seeing modes – that is, a seer of modes – conventional truths do not exist, that is, it does not see varieties." Is the object of this isolate – "in the perspective of an exalted knower of all aspects seeing modes" – an omniscient consciousness? If not, it seems that the mind conceiving this isolate would be a wrong consciousness. Would Geshe-la please comment on this? In short, is the seer of modes not an omniscient consciousness?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: It is
Student: It is not an omniscient consciousness because in its perspective varieties do not exist.
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: In the perspective of that seer of modes varieties do not exist, therefore, they cannot appear to it. Even in the perspective of a seer of modes in the continuum of a superior in meditative equipoise if varieties were to exist they would be an object of negation. That varieties do not exist in the perspective of a seer of modes does not mean that the seer of modes does not realize varieties. Therefore, a seer of modes of a buddha does see varieties. The omniscient consciousness seeing modes sees varieties, but in the perspective of a seer of modes seeing modes the omniscient mind seeing modes does not see varieties.
Student: What is the purpose of this presentation?
Geshe Jampa Gyatso: To make you confused!

END